Видео

White Sarah Wilson Shirley Lopez Jason

Martinez Nancy Thomas Paul Clark Amy

Young John Lewis John Lewis Amy

Harris Deborah Anderson Nancy Thompson Charles

Conversation is war

That rambling question at 25:20 😂🤣🤣

It's always interesting when they start talking about "social theories"... The girl team.

You talk about feminist theory but women idolise insects that behead and eat their co-social sexual partner. And the feminine ideal in the animal world is the horse, which is to be idolised because of its strength... Where as men idolise horses for freedom of movement and projection of power. In whatever terms you want to talk about the "oppressive patriarchy" just remember it's the Womin not having enough babies. Cos they career driven whatever the heg they think that means (memorising where all the nice berries are no doubt)

Thompson Frank Gonzalez Helen Jackson Paul

Thomas Anthony Lopez Donna Allen David

Williams Edward Perez Michelle Anderson Karen

Williams Melissa Martinez Jeffrey Gonzalez Sandra

The Hegel and Spinoza similarity and difference. Insightful.

Are any of these papers published somewhere? Where can we access them? Thanks.

Lewis Kimberly Hernandez Michael Jones Deborah

Summary Ferrer analyses how a seemingly minor change in Spinoza’s geometric method could lead to a profound transformation of his ethical system. Spinoza's Ethics, structured geometrically, is shown to be vulnerable to such shifts, which can fundamentally alter its philosophical outcomes. This idea is explored through Hegel’s critical engagement with Spinoza’s work. Hegel reinterprets Spinoza's system by focusing on the notion of substance, which he views differently than Spinoza. Hegel retains the Romantic idea of substance as infinitely and radically productive but critiques Spinoza for the perceived immobility of his concept of substance. For Hegel, this immobility arises from what he sees as Spinoza’s overly intellectual and external method. Furthermore, Hegel challenges Spinoza's proposition that finite things are destroyed only by external causes. Hegel argues instead that destruction arises from an internal cause, rooted in the essence of the thing itself. This internal dynamic is essential to Hegel's broader philosophical system, which emphasizes negativity and self-transcendence. Hegel's method is integrative, emphasizing the unity of form and matter, which he believes Spinoza’s approach is lacking. He critiques Spinoza for failing to integrate the cognitive and epistemological dimensions into his system, a gap Hegel aims to bridge through his own philosophy, particularly in his Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel's critique extends to Spinoza’s understanding of truth and substance. While Spinoza distinguishes between subjective and objective knowledge, Hegel finds Spinoza's method insufficient, arguing that it cannot fully encompass the complexities of reality. In contrast, Hegel’s approach seeks to integrate freedom, complexity, and negativity into a comprehensive system, moving beyond the static nature of Spinoza’s ethics. The paper presentation illustrates how Hegel’s transformation of Spinoza’s system is not merely a critique but a reworking that incorporates and transcends Spinoza’s ideas, resulting in a more dynamic and integrative philosophical framework.

Summary Professor Holgate delves into Hegel’s critique of Spinoza, highlighting Hegel’s interpretation of Spinoza’s concepts of substance and the absolute. Hegel, while acknowledging the depth of Spinoza’s thought, engages critically with what he perceives as fundamental shortcomings in Spinoza’s philosophy. Hegel begins by praising Spinoza for his rigorous focus on the one, absolute substance, and for renouncing the determinacy of particular aspects in favor of a more unified, philosophical approach. This renunciation, Hegel argues, marks the beginning of all true philosophy. However, he quickly moves into criticism, noting that Spinoza’s concept of substance, though profound, remains rigid and unmoved. According to Hegel, Spinoza fails to develop substance into a self-knowing Spirit or to differentiate it into various attributes and modes. Instead, Spinoza presupposes these attributes, like thought and extension, without logically deriving them from substance. This results in a system where everything is thrown back into the one absolute substance, but nothing emerges from it, leaving the substance static and undifferentiated. Hegel further critiques Spinoza for basing his philosophy on definitions and axioms that are merely presupposed rather than systematically derived. For Hegel, this approach leads to a form of dogmatism, as it assumes the truth of these definitions without proper justification. He contrasts this with his own demand for a presuppositionless philosophy, which begins with sheer indeterminate being and derives its concepts systematically. Another critical point Hegel raises is Spinoza’s failure to fully grasp the concept of negation. While Spinoza understands that determination is negation, he does not, according to Hegel, appreciate the dialectical nature of negation-that it must be self-negating and thus, through this process, become affirmative. This lack of dialectical movement in Spinoza’s substance leads Hegel to conclude that Spinoza’s system ultimately lacks the dynamic, self-developing character that Hegel sees as essential to a true speculative philosophy. Hegel’s critique culminates in his view that Spinoza’s substance remains fundamentally different from Hegel’s concept of the absolute. For Spinoza, substance is the ultimate cause to which all modes point back, but for Hegel, the absolute comes to be itself through its modes, reaching its true nature only at the end of its process of self-realization. Thus, while Hegel recognizes certain merits in Spinoza’s philosophy, he ultimately finds it lacking in the dialectical development that he believes is necessary for a complete understanding of substance and the absolute.

A great lecture. Hegel is extremely important, and the neglect of him is unacceptable.

I tried to ask at the conference but wasn't given the word, that it's a bit ironic that Phenomenology of Spirit itself begins with a serious, yet implicit, references to Spinoza, so I don't see how someone dedicating himself to Spinozist philosophy could be accused of antisemitism.

This looks like the same talk from the year ago, while the other post looks new. What's going on?

Thanks for the upload. Great conference.