Diogo Ferrer | Truth and method: Hegel's reading of Spinoza

Truth and method: Hegel's reading of Spinoza
Hegel undoubtedly belongs to the philosophical movement that emerged in the wake of Kant, a movement characterized by Jacobi's well-known expression of constructing a “Spinozism of freedom.” An unmistakable indication of this affiliation is found in Hegel’s statement, in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, where he asserts that in systematic philosophy, “everything hangs on grasping and expressing the true not just as substance but just as much as subject.” (GA 3, 18) After briefly contextualizing Hegel’s reception of Spinoza within the framework of post-Kantian philosophy, this presentation will elucidate the primary methodological and logical transformations that Hegel introduced as a result of his critique of Spinoza. The fundamental change pertains to the logical interpretation of negation, which led to a new dialectical and synthetic conception of logic. Hegel thus completely departed from Spinoza's geometric and analytical approach. Subsequently, we address the implications of this logical change for epistemology, ontology, and metaphysics, particularly with regard to the status of the subject in cognition, the relationship between thought and its reference to reality, and the replacement of metaphysics by logic as the core philosophical discipline. The study of Spinoza’s influence on Hegel, as present in Hegel’s Lessons in the History of Philosophy and the Science of Logic, with particular emphasis on the contrast between the principles of conatus and Aufhebung, will highlight the systematic and historico-philosophical significance of the aforementioned shift in the concept of negation. Building upon this examination, we argue that Hegel’s new conception of negation offers a more satisfactory resolution than Spinoza to the problems raised by dualities such as mind and body, freedom and necessity, and subject and object. Hegel's reception of Spinoza led thus to a revised form of monism that encompassed two pivotal philosophical innovations: a new comprehension of the relationship between concepts and reality and the capacity to incorporate opposition and conflict into both logic and metaphysics.
Diogo Ferrer is professor of Philosophy at Coimbra University, Portugal. His main research subject is German Idealism and its resonances in the 20th and 21st Century, with special regard to topics in Metaphysics, Philosophy of Art, and Philosophy of Nature.
The international philosophical conference Between Substance & Subject. The Presence of Spinoza in Hegel (26-28 October 2023, AGRFT, Ljubljana) was organized by the University of Padua and the University of Ljubljana - Faculty of Arts & Academy of Theatre, Radio, Film and Television. The conference was carried out as part of the project Hegel's Political Metaphysics (J6-2590), which is financed by the Slovenian Research Agency and will continue within the framework of the Hegel Congress 2024.
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Summary
Ferrer analyses how a seemingly minor change in Spinoza’s geometric method could lead to a profound transformation of his ethical system. Spinoza's Ethics, structured geometrically, is shown to be vulnerable to such shifts, which can fundamentally alter its philosophical outcomes. This idea is explored through Hegel’s critical engagement with Spinoza’s work.
Hegel reinterprets Spinoza's system by focusing on the notion of substance, which he views differently than Spinoza. Hegel retains the Romantic idea of substance as infinitely and radically productive but critiques Spinoza for the perceived immobility of his concept of substance. For Hegel, this immobility arises from what he sees as Spinoza’s overly intellectual and external method.
Furthermore, Hegel challenges Spinoza's proposition that finite things are destroyed only by external causes. Hegel argues instead that destruction arises from an internal cause, rooted in the essence of the thing itself. This internal dynamic is essential to Hegel's broader philosophical system, which emphasizes negativity and self-transcendence.
Hegel's method is integrative, emphasizing the unity of form and matter, which he believes Spinoza’s approach is lacking. He critiques Spinoza for failing to integrate the cognitive and epistemological dimensions into his system, a gap Hegel aims to bridge through his own philosophy, particularly in his Phenomenology of Spirit.
Hegel's critique extends to Spinoza’s understanding of truth and substance. While Spinoza distinguishes between subjective and objective knowledge, Hegel finds Spinoza's method insufficient, arguing that it cannot fully encompass the complexities of reality. In contrast, Hegel’s approach seeks to integrate freedom, complexity, and negativity into a comprehensive system, moving beyond the static nature of Spinoza’s ethics.
The paper presentation illustrates how Hegel’s transformation of Spinoza’s system is not merely a critique but a reworking that incorporates and transcends Spinoza’s ideas, resulting in a more dynamic and integrative philosophical framework.