Operation Market Garden | What went wrong?
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- Опубликовано: 16 авг 2022
- In the Summer of 1944, the western Allies had a big problem. Having broken out from Normandy, Allied Supreme Commander General Eisenhower wanted to advance on Germany on a broad front. But logistical issues meant that the Allies couldn't supply multiple army Groups with the fuel, food and ammunition they needed simultaneously. However, one British general thought that he had the solution.
Field Marshal Montgomery believed that the Allies should employ one bold stroke to shorten the war. His plan, Operation Market Garden, would put the Allies across the Rhine on Germany's frontier in a few days and possibly end the war by Christmas 1944.
The battle would become one of the most controversial episodes of the Second World War, featuring daring assaults, strategic blunders and heroic defences. A battle which would come so close to success, before falling at the final hurdle. In this episode of IWM Stories, curator Sean Rehling examines Operation Market Garden.
Tactics of the Normandy Campaign: www.iwm.org.uk/history/tactic...
The story of Operation Market Garden in photos: www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-st...
See inside Field Marshall Montgomery caravans: www.iwm.org.uk/history/montys...
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i live in arnhem, so im well aware of what went down here. after the war the US army enigeers built a new permanent bridge at the exact posistion of the old one, wich is called the John Frost bridge, every year theres a huge memorial ceremony, followed by a re-enactment of the mass parachutist drop at the Ginkelse Heide. back in the day there would be a boat load of actual market garden veterans, but he number is declining each year, wich is absolutely heartbreaking.
I had the privilege of attending the 1986 and 87 memorial. There were still many of the Vets attending back then. I even met a couple of them that attended the same British Legion club I did 10 years before. The way the citizens treated these men and the children placing flowers on the graves at the service in Oosterbeek CWGS Cemetery was heart-warming
🙏🙏🙏🌹🌹🌹🌹
Shame.. Hi from 🇳🇿.., I have known this story from childhood, our was ww2 RNZAF.., what an absolute example stupendous poor management… nearly saved by the absolute courage and guts of the worker/ the “do er” in the situation…
The selflessness, I remember reading how the men of 30 corp.., having fought to Nijmegen… were in absolute awe of the commanders of men of the 82nd and their painfully slow crossing of the Waal.. in open boats.. under heavy fire.., many wrote of the 82nd as hero’s
@@tigertiger1699 Did you know that 30 Corps tanks were already across the river and watched this crossing in amazement?
From R G Poulussen's book "Lost at Nijmegen"
@@patrickkelly6691
Sorry but I have read it so manual times so many years ago.. I can’t remember..
I remember the reported comments from the British commanders.. at the length of knife carried by the 82nd airborne commanders…, as in 1- they were no gentlemanly lot (like British).., they wore a blade on their thighs.. it ran near the full length of their thighs… & to.. it was clear they were there to take Europe from the Nazi at all costs…
Brad pits character in inglorious bastards reminds me of the description of these airborne commanders ..
and for them to have left that impression on men as tough as what 30 corp had been through to get to Nijmegen…🤯🌹
I'll never forget reading A Bridge Too Far by Cornelius Ryan. My father was a glider pilot. He flew 5 invasion missions. He was one of only 50 Americans who flew copilot with the Brits into Sicily, he flew the Pathfinders into Normandy, first wave into Southern France where they got in to a hell of a dust up in Le Muy..and 2 flights in Market-Garden, he fought at the Waal crossing. About 3/4s of the way through the book, I'm going "wait a minute, this doesn't look good, when do we win?" and the Dad goes "Oh, you didn't know?, nah, that one didn't work out too well..."
That's quite a service record! Which unit was he with?
My father was a "flying bus driver". He was shot down dropping pathfinders of the 82nd in Normandy. He had an inner ear disorder in mid-Sept and missed being shot down again...this time his replacement pilot was killed. He was shot down a 2nd time over Bastogne dropping supplies to the 101st.
"Didn't work out too well"
That's putting it mildly.
Cornelius Ryan took part in a whitewashing and character assassinations in order to deflect the blame. Still, he knew the audience would be in the US and where the dollars were going to be made. It wouldn't do to allow the truth stand between himself and a best seller eh!?
Thank you for sharing, very much appreciated. Total respect and God Bless 🙏 🇺🇸
as a Polish I can't stand the way Montgomery treated Sosabowski as the scape goat for the failure of this operation where in fact this plan was ill fated from the start. It was so disgraceful for the people who lost their lives in there
I don't understand what happened there. Montgomery intially wrote to Sosabowski a letter of praise for his unit's actions and asked him for 10 nominations for decorations. Sometime later he changed his tune. I can only wonder if it was for Sosabowski's insubordination to Horrocks, but that doesn't seem a sufficient reason to me. In any case, the Polish Brigade had nothing to do with the operation's failure, it was another allied unit at Nijmegen that was responsible, but I'm afraid politics prevented that truth from being aired until the last 10 years, with the publication of a number of books going back to primary sources again.
@@davemac1197 both Browning and Horrocks clashed with Sosabowski. It was on the strength of those complaints that Montgomery changed his tune. As you say, it doesn't seem to have been sufficient reason and the Poles were definitely NOT the reason it failed.
While I think this gets most of the facts right, it is guilty of downplaying the part of Gavin's decision to prioritise the Heights over his primary objectives, as ordered by Brereton, which was to take the bridges with "thunderclap surprise".
Contrary to what the IWM has stated, the air intelligence was not ignored. If it was, then Operation Comet would have gone ahead. That Comet was cancelled and Market done instead, but with significantly more resources allocated illustrates quite clearly that the intelligence was absolutely taken into consideration.
Neither 9th SS Panzer nor 10th SS Panzer had anything of note to fight with, and were not deemed sufficient reason to cancel the operation. In fact, the tanks that turned the battle were not even in The Netherlands until the 21st Sept, although two Tiger 1s did arrive at about 20:00 on the 19th Sept. Had Gavin taken his primary objective, then XXX Corps would have been in Arnhem before those reinforcements turned up.
Some blame Browning for the decision, but in Gavin's own book "On to Berlin", he states quite clearly that it was his plan that was presented to Browning and on the strength of that plan, was "ordered" to put the Heights first. He stated that the taking of the major bridge presented him with a problem if it left his LZ exposed.
as a Dutch I can't stand the way Montgomery treated Sosabowski as scape goat either. Nor the enormous time it took to honour Sosabowski and the Polish para's who fought in the Netherlands while their own country was being occupied for a second time in the war. Fortunately they were finally honoured by Queen Beatrix on behalf of the Dutch government and people in 2005 when they received the highest military honour.
@@martijnb5887 - I agree, but I don't think Montgomery was the source. He initially praised Sosabowski and his Brigade, but then changed his tune. I have yet to discover why that was. The only marks against the Poles I can see are Sosabowski's insubordination to Horrocks during the Valburg conference, but he backed down and accepted Horrocks' authority, and the German complaints about the Poles not respecting the Red Cross and firing on their medics. The Germans complained the British always allowed them to collect their wounded, but the Poles did not. Both incidents are understandable, given the Poles' history with the Germans, and if I was a British officer at the Valburg conference I would forget Sosabowski's outburst, it's of little consequence. I don't understand why Montgomery changed his attitude. There has to be a story behind that somewhere.
I'm English and writing this from Cracow in Poland this evening. The reason we entered WWII was to defend Poland. If we had got to Berlin in 1944 - as we could and should have done - we might have been able to save Poland from 44 wasted years under Communism. Over-rated generals like Montgomery - and poor decision making by Churchill - are responsible for us letting the Poles down. If Churchill hadn't gone on his insane Greek adventure in 1941 (echoes of the Dardanelles in WWI), we would have cleared the Axis out of North Africa in 1941 and not 1943. The invasion of Italy was a strategic error - should have been France in 1943.
by 1944 the Germans had become exceptionally good at defensive responses. The troops in Holland were shattered and regrouping from the France disaster. The moment they realized what was happening, every German in Holland, from the Heer and Waffen-SS troops to Luftwaffe auxiliary personal, the railway workers and members of the RAD labor services were organized into mixed Kampfgruppes and deployed to counter the attack with great success. This sort of flexibility can counter just about everything a top down chain of command can throw together.
Yeah, a while back I read a review of the German reaction to M/G; one of the personal tales was how a regular German landser was trying to get to his unit and was shanghaied into an SS unit. An SS officer handwrote his new SS rank in his 'soldbuch', he was given those famous SS Cammies and a pair of "Runes", and Voila= Instant SS soldier.
I always remembered that story because of the constant 'squealing' from the wereabos about there not being 'Poles in the SS' (or the other one: ALL SS were top quality volunteers!) in reaction to the famous 'crossroads' episode in Band of Brothers.
Apparently any darned warm body would be used.
@@nickmitsialis Yeah the Waffen- SS had far looser restrictions on recruitment than the Heer after getting decimated in the winter of 1941-42. They learned a lot of lessons during that winter and emerged a far more effective fighting force.
I cycle across the John Frost bridge here in Arnhem twice a day, and often think about what happened all those years ago…
Very respectful of you to still think about it. Cheers from England ✌️
It's not the original bridge but the end supports were used to build the new bridge.
Thank you for keeping those young mens sacrifice on your memory. Truly noble.
You know a battle isn't going right when you even have a Major General, running around shooting at Germans.
He must've been the very model of a modern Major General.
"I understood that reference" -Captain America
I was lucky enough to jump at the 30th anniversary of the Bruneval Raid, the first battle honour of the Parachute Regiment. John Frost commanded there as well and we were honoured to have him give us a talk through/walk through of that raid, a truly living legend.
Thank you for sharing, just total respect 🙏🇬🇧
@@rickyb5499 Thank you, I hasten to say I never saw combat though.
Market Garden needed too many elements to go right to be successful. Too complex and not enough transports/troops. The Germans put up more of a defense than expected, which should have been expected.
Advancing up one road didnt seem like the greatest idea either
So true, yet another Montgomery failure. I am a retired FDNY Captain, 1980-2003. My series Fatal Flaws traces 9/11 back to WWI. Fatal Flaws Book 1 1914-1945 traces the mistakes of those days and how it affected the future. I found Monty was the best ally Germany had. Everything he did after Africa failed, prolonging the war.
The Germans were usually brilliant in defence... as well as attack ! Able to mount superb counter attacks in the worst possible conditions and situations.
And the notion today that the war would be over by Christmas, like have the British ever been right when they say that?
@@lastguy8613 There wasn't one main road of advance, there were two.
And despite attempts by the Germans to cut the road, they did not manage to delay the British advance or attack it in any meaningful way, which arrived at Nijmegen on schedule.
I live in Arnhem (and drive on the bridge everyday) and this operation is still a very important thing in the history of Arnhem. The name of the bridge is the John Frost bridge now, and in the north there is a memorial (airborne plein).
I listened to an interview of an American Colonel who was on the ground in Operation Market Garden . His answer was the poms where dropped 8 miles away from their objective, as a result cost the lives of 10, 000 men.The Colonel was if l remember correctly was 96 years old . To stand up and give a talk for about an hour and have audience enthralled, fantastic.
Don't suppose you remember his name?
@@davemac1197 Give me a day l will find his name. Cheers Laurie
@@lauriemattila5936 - not if it's too much trouble, but it would be interesting if you can. Cheers, Laurie!
@@lauriemattila5936 The total number of dead suffered by the Allies in Operation Market Garden was around 2,000, of which the number killed in the airborne force which attacked Arnhem was 1,485, with another 6,414 being taken prisoner.
@@davemac1197 Colonel Edward Shames, There are several speeches and interviews with him on American Veterans Center.
Fascinating, thank you for uploading this. Greetings from ‘The Island’, I cross the John Frost Bridge in Arnhem every day as I go to work. These images pass through my mind regularly as I make my way across the Rhine.
"No plan survives initial contact with the enemy." The more complicated a plan, the more a single point of failure can doom the operation, the more rigid or lacking of options there are in the plan, the more the plan is likely to fail.
To me the worst part of the plan was deciding to move the 50,000 men and their vehicles mainly up a single track. The tip of that spear is going to become mighty dull mighty soon. Yes, they were able to fan out in certain areas but then they still needed to concentrate as they crossed the numerous waterways. Any delays, such as the need to rebuild a bridge, the need to defend against stronger than expected counter attacks, the delay in taking a major crossing, combined with the sheer size of XXX Corps just adds to the likelihood of failure.
The worst part of Operation Market Garden was that Montgomery's idiotic plan was approved. His plan delayed the Allied advance by at least two months
And yet it was working until they got to Nijmegen.
@@davemac1197 Map Nijmegen day one i.pinimg.com/originals/6a/5c/de/6a5cde8f149179bb749b61c2b92bb3e3.jpg
the issue of the single road is absolutely over-played. Only on "the island" was it really an issue, and had the bridge at Nijmegen been taken by 82nd AB when they first dropped, then XXX Corps would have been across the island on the 19th Sept before the German reinforcements arrived on the 21st Sept!
@@sean640307 Have you been driving along that road? I drove to Arnhem on my way to Calais and then followed the same road south that XXX corps would have used going north. It was of course a modern road now but still only two lanes one northward and one southward. Having 50.000 men in trucks and transportvehilces and armor on that road, that surely looked different then, must have been a chokepoint.
My great uncle was a glider pilot and died at Arnhem on the 18th of September 1944.
He was one of the 6 glider pilots who flew into France late on the 5th June to take Pegasus Bridge before D DAY.
May he rest in peace. My cousin was in the 401st Glider regiment. He died in Holland on September 30.
Respect.
I went out with a girl in the '60's, her father was a glider pilot at Arnhem and he was still serving in the AAC at Middle Wallop at that time. A grand older man whom I should have picked the brains of and paid more attention to rather than having a one track mind about his daughter. Especiall as I joined the army that year! Shame on me.
It was"A Bridge Too Far", I love that movie. Gene Hackman playing the Polish Paratroop General, Great cast.
My wife's dad was in this battle in the 82nd. He managed to survive the war unscathed.
One of the bitterly sad consequences of this failure was the summary execution of the many Dutch civilians who were suspected of assisting the allied effort during Market Garden. No POW camps for them. Also, the Germans exacted further retribution by demolishing much unscathed housing after the Arnhem battle....as a warning to the population. As a Brit who lived in Holland, I can tell you that the Dutch respect and appreciation of allied sacrifice, allied graves etc is overwhelming and incredibly moving. The German occupation of Holland (and other European countries) during WW2 has left deep psychological scars throughout mainland Europe that will (and should) linger for hundreds of years.
One element not mentioned here is that Market Garden delayed the capture of the approaches of Antwerp. When Monty came round to capturing them, he found that during the delay, the Germans had heavily fortified them, meaning Antwerp was useless for many more months.
One of Montgomery's few serious blunders was not taking the Antwerp approaches when they were undefended, before M-G. Forgetting to take a port is not easily dismissed.
The need to employ a large, idle, gliry-hungry force, not landing on the bridges directly, and a lack of serious close air support were big factors in the failure (I'm not saying many others have not already).
@@lllordllloyd One of many!!
Exactly!
@@phillipnagle9651 Not really that many.
Caen???
I’m from the Netherlands and my family remember Market Garden. We still remember the sacrifice that those soldiers made.
The British and Polish soldiers who took and, for a time, held that bridge fought like absolute legends. Too bad they were dropped too far away, in separate groups and their radios were not up to par for the mission.
To have your country occupied hy far left terrorists...
@@derekweiland1857 my grandad was one of them. A lot of his colleagues are buried in Driel. Za naszą i waszą wolność
Thank you 🙏 👍
What did they sacrifice for? Look around you.
"Sir! the allies are advancing along highway 69!"
"Nice"
"My county can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success..."
Prince Bernhard of The Netherlands
He was clearly not aware the operation was compromised by the American 82nd Airborne at Nijmegen and that had nothing to do with Montgomery.
@@davemac1197 In military strategy, a choke point (or chokepoint), or sometimes bottleneck, is a geographical feature on land such as a valley, defile or bridge, or maritime passage through a critical waterway such as a strait, which an armed force is forced to pass through in order to reach its objective, sometimes on a substantially narrowed front and therefore greatly decreasing its combat effectiveness by making it harder to bring superior numbers to bear. A choke point can allow a numerically inferior defending force to use the terrain as a force multiplier to thwart or ambush a much larger opponent, as the attacker cannot advance any further without first securing passage through the choke point.
The Nazi Party member, and SS man Prince Bernhard of The Netherlands was shown door by both British, and US intelligence organizations due his supect loyalties.
Only his royal connections kept him out prison in the 1970s, due to the Lockheed scandal that engulfed the Dutch Royal family.
HQ blaming Montgomery
*Alan Brooke's own words with Adml Ramsay chiming in*
*"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."*
Monty later admitting it
*The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 In his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr without Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Who would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"*
There were no German forces in the Reichswald that Gavin was shelling and the Groesbeek heights secured and taken with little force and did not need the whole of the 82nd to do so . The landing zone for the second wave between Groesbeek and Reichswald had been quickleynsecured and HQ established .The delay in sending elements led by Warren under Lindquist on day 1 , allowed 10 Panzer at Arnhem to speed south to Nijmegen and occupy the town on the south bank of the Waal . Time lost at the Son had been made up by 30 Corps after intercepting radio messages that the bridge was lost and fotwarded Bailey equipment which was in place overnight . The 101st under Maxwell-Taylor had done an excellent job of achieving and maintaining their objectives throughout . On reaching Nijmegen on schedule , 30 Corps was now facing 10 Panzer that was not there before . The delay that resulted was insufferable.
The force eventually sent against the Groesbeek Heights on day 4 was an ad hoc KG made up of a hospital unit and injured infantry that were easily beaten back with very few casualties taken by the 82nd .
The orders for Lindquist to take the Bridge were clear on the 15th September and reinforced on the 17th . The report from Gavin stating Browning had agreed to prioritise the Heights was not produced by Gavin and was dated 5th October after the event and must be considered unreliable. In any case Gavin has subsequently blamed Lindquist for the failure . Regardless of what had ensued Gavin was in command and had failed to correctly allocate troops to achieve the directive.
The IWM has a responsibility to ensure history is correctly presented regardless of sensibilities.
It was the British AO so where did the intel on the Reichswald come from ?
Browning with his HQ brought in by 38 of first AB's gliders was in command of all airborne.
"He (Browning) became anxious on the same day as he watched the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment and the Grenadier Guards making their attempt to capture Nijmegen Bridge, and when it fell he said to Horrocks of the American crossing, "I have never seen a more gallant action."
Pegasus Archive Browning
I agree with what you say except for the 82nd having more resources than they needed. That was how it worked out on the Groesbeek heights on the first day, but they didn't know that going in because the intelligence picture was not complete. The Dutch resistance had not positively located or identified the 10.SS-Panzer-Division, so there was a possibility the division (reduced to a regimental battlegroup in Normandy) could be in Nijmegen. The only firm intelligence was Ultra, placing the II.SS-Panzerkorps (with the 9.'Hohenstaufen' and presumably the 10.'Frundsberg' divisions) in the eastern Netherlands, but even the existence of Ultra was not made known to commanders at Corps and Division level, or below the rank of (four-star) General (so Montgomery and Dempsey knew it existed, but Brereton of 1st Allied Airborne Army did not).
Gavin was given a vague 'santitised' estimate that "a regiment of SS" may be located in the excellent Dutch army barrack facilities in Nijmegen, and possibly drawing new tanks from a depot thought to be in the Kleve area just behind the Reichswald (it was actually near Münster deeper into Germany), so the Reichswald may be a tank laager. This certainly influenced Gavin's divisonal plan. Having decided his best regiment, the 504th PIR, would be assigned the capture of the Maas highway bridge at Grave to secure his division's supply line to XXX Corps, he seemed to decide his next priority was to defend the division from a potential armoured attack from the Reichswald, so the very experienced and aggressive 505th Regiment was assigned to the Reichswald sector, and to secure a secondary Maas bridge - the rail bridge at Mook. This left the 508th PIR, on only its second combat operation and with a commander that had not performed well in Normandy, to secure the Groesbeek ridge (potentially defended by an SS regiment), and if at all possible to send a battalion directly to the highway bridge over the Waal.
Gavin made no coup de main plan for the Nijmegen highway bridge, as at Arnhem with Urquhart's Reconnaissance Squadron, but Colonel Reuben Tucker of the 504th had the experience and grit to demand a special drop zone for one company to drop near the southern end of the Grave bridge so it could be taken from both ends, and he got it. Gavin instead only ensured Colonel Lindquist was given what he thought was a clear instruction to send a battalion to the bridge in the final divisional briefing before the operation, and one source says he even stood with Lindquist over a map to show him the exact route he wanted the 1st Battalion to take to the bridge. When this did not happen and Lindquist had sent only a small recon force, Gavin was as "mad" as the 508th liaison officer (the unfortunate messenger) had ever seen him, and they went immediately to the 508th CP to get Lindquist moving. By this time it was too late. Most of the patrol had got lost in the city and the 10.SS-Panzer-Division (which had been in the Achterhoek region northeast of Arnhem) won the race to reinforce the bridge and the city centre.
Unfortunately for historians, this story does not seem to have come out until 2012 and 82nd Airborne historian Phil Nordykes' combat history of the 508th PIR in WW2 - Put Us Down In Hell, and American historian John C McManus' September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, who both rely on junior officers coming forward to speak out now that all the senior figures in this drama have passed away. All Gavin said to Cornelius Ryan in his interview in 1967 was that Ridgeway (82nd CO in Normandy) did not trust Lindquist and would not promote him - presumably meaning when Ridgway was given command of the US XVIII Airborne Corps in August, and in fact Ridgway had a problem in that he could not promote any other Colonel in the Division over him because Lindquist had seniority in the grade. Gavin said no more and Ryan did no further digging, because the whole Nijmegen blunder did not appear in his book and unknown to the many other historians who relied on Ryan's primary research. Gavin may also have had the same problem with promotions, because after he inherited the division from Ridgway he failed to replace himself as Assistant Division Commander, so he was running himself ragged doing both jobs during Market Garden.
As far as I know, Gavin has never thrown Lindquist under the bus and he seems to have taken responsibility for the failure on his own shoulders by conflating the relative priorities of bridge and ridge, with support from Browning in their post-war correspondence. Gavin also wrote in a report for the US Army suggesting a change in doctrine that senior commanders making mistakes be given a second chance to learn from their mistakes instead of the current policy of immediate removal. Many may have thought he was referring to himself, but I think he may have been referring to Lindquist as well and had already been applying his own doctrine, since Lindquist remained in post for the remainder of the war. Having caused unnecessary casualties in the battle for Hill 95 (Sainte Catherine) near La Hay in Normandy on 4 July, and then failed to move on a key objective at Nijmegen in September, Lindquist seemed to perform without further incident duing the battle of the bulge.
Great video with great image material. I live in Arnhem so I love seeing the old images
The main issue as far as I’m concerned is the dismissal of intelligence reports of Panzers in the immediate area,particularly with a concise description of the makeup of forces and the order of battle from Dutch sources, including the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the vicinity….thus laying the groundwork for failure even before a single paratrooper left the ground or a single British tank rolled forward…
@54blewis The actual strength of the II SS Panzer Corps was in reality less than that of a single understrength motorized division.
At the start of the battle the 9th SS Panzer Division had no tanks, just a few assault guns and a number of armoured half tracks, it also only had about 6,000 men, of whom only 3,000 were combat troops.
10th SS Panzer wasn't much better with just 8 Panthers, 16 Panzer VI's and 4 Stug III's.
That is approximately it for armour around Arnhem, of course, thanks to the closeness of Germany, armoured reinforcements were rushed to the area.
Knowing this the Allies took 83 anti tank guns into the Operation.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- true, I was merely mentioning the beginning of a whole series of lapses,plus paras v panzer (even a depleted Kampf Gruppe as oppose to a full strength division)is not a desirable situation…
Dismissal of intelligence is a myth, apart from Browning's correct dismissal of the aerial photo showing obsolete tanks near Arnhem and that photo came to light in 2015 from a Dutch archive and did show obsolete Mark III and older Mark IV models, ruling out a 1944 panzer division. That story rested entirely on Cornelius Ryan's interview of Browning's Corps Intelligence Officer after Browning had passed away and the photo could not be located. We now know the identity of the unit and those tanks were laagered opposite the 506th PIR's drop zone near Son on D-Day of the operation and shot up by escorting USAAF fighters. Montgomery cancelled the original Operation Comet because the II.SS-Panzerkorps moved into the Netherlands and upgraded it to Market Garden by adding the two US divisions, so he didn't ignore any intelligence.
The Dutch resistance did not have an order of battle, the II.SS-Panzerkorps was only identified from 'Ultra' decryptions known only to exist to Allied headquarters at Army and Army Group level, the Dutch only reported vehicle insignia with an 'H' bisected by a vertical sword on a shield (9.SS-Panzer-Division 'Hohenstaufen') and identified Ruurlo as a division headquarters, but not which division. Gavin was told there may be a regiment of SS in Nijmegen and tank storage in the Reichswald forest, because the location of the 10.SS-Panzer-Division 'Frundsberg' had not been identified.
The operation was only fatally compromised on the ground by the 508th PIR's failure to secure the undefended Nijmegen highway bridge on the first afternoon, contrary to Gavin's instructions, and that was not in Cornelius Ryan's book and would never be contemplated in an American financed Hollywood film. Nor did you see any British anti-tank guns in the film, when in fact the 1st Airborne Division and Polish Brigade combined had exactly the same number (84) as Model had operational tanks in his entire Army Group B front from Aachen to the North Sea in September 1944. 83 anti-tank guns were taken by air to Arnhem, and for context Model was facing Montgomery's 21st Army Group with 2,400 tanks, plus whatever US 1st Army had at Aachen.
The main issue as far as I'm concerned is that Americans believe their own propaganda is gospel and it's getting very old.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- - just to get the numbers right, Tony...
SS-Panzer-Regiment 9 at Arnhem had just 3 Panthers and 2 Flakpanzer IV 'Möbelwagen' off the books and hidden under trees on the Heijenoordseweg in western Arnhem since Friday 15 September, after moving them out of the barracks to avoid bombing, and an 'alarm kompanie' of 100 Panther crewmen acting as infantry in the Saksen-Weimar barracks in northern Arnhem, having lost their tanks in Normandy. All Mark IVs previously laagered on the Rozendaal Golf Links near the barracks had been handed over to the 'Frundsberg' Division.
SS-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 9 at Apeldoorn had 2 surviving Jagdpanzer IV/L48 tank destroyers having only become operational in time for the retreat from Normandy and lost the other 19 vehicles covering the division's withdrawal.
I./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 (Panther abteilung) were still training at Grafenwöhr in Germany and would not be ready until operation 'Nordwind' in January 1945.
II./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 at Kranenburg monastery in Vorden had 16 Panzer IV (most transferred from the 'Hohenstaufen') concentrated in 5.Kompanie, and 4 StuG IIIG assault guns concentrated in 7.Kompanie. The StuGs were ferried across the Pannerden canal to Nijmegen on 18 September, but the Mark IV tanks were too heavy for the raft and had to be held back until the Arnhem bridge was cleared on 21 September.
When Model sent 20 new Panthers to Arnhem direct from the factory during the battle in a batch of 8 and another of 12, they were crewed by the 100 men from the 9.SS-Panzer-Regiment alarm kompanie and transferred to the 10.SS-Panzer-Regiment as the 8.Kompanie, but they were deployed to Elst after the Arnhem bridge was retaken and operated under the army Kampfgruppe Knaust.
@@davemac1197 👍
A very succinct description of the timeline of the operation. I understand the events much better now. Thank you.
This is not a very accurate depiction of the events though.
My dad's tank was the first one over one of the bridges. As a recovery tank, it had no turret so it was lighter and was sent over to test the weight
I'm guessing it was either the weakened bridge at Honinghutje after the Germans tried to demolish it, or the temporary wooden crossing alongside the inadequate drawbridge at Veghel?
@@davemac1197 he didnt remember
@@michaelwear2252 - bless him! A lot of people are unaware that the Airborne operation involved about 24 target bridges, not counting the Westervoort bridges at Arnhem that couldn't be occupied, and minor bridges that were ancilliary crossings, such as the ones either side of the Son bridge that were demolished before the operation. The rail bridge at Ravenstein was also demolished by the Germans when they saw an American patrol on the riverbank, and it wasn't even a target for the operation. Thanks for the reply.
Love your work 👍
My father flew paratroopers into Operation Market Garden. He talked very little about his experiences during the war, but he did speak about watching paratroopers cut down in the air or tangling in their chutes. He was shot down behind enemy lines close to Grave and was picked up by the Dutch Underground, spending eight days hiding by day and moving at night. He remembers hiding in a ditch and watching German troops march by. He said he could have touched their boots. At one point a little brass band greeted them at a barn where they were hiding. The local people thought they had been liberated. He finally made it back to friendly territory, at the very end finding himself and his driver running through a tank battle, and was reunited with his crew. Amazingly none had died. My father could never speak highly enough of the Dutch people who saved so many at such risk to themselves. He never knew the names of the people who sheltered him or the Underground operators who guided him, but he always told me that I owed my life to the Dutch people because without them, I never would have been born.
Sounds like one of many similar stories researched by Dutch author Hans den Brok in his volumes of books called Market Flights. If you know which unit he was in I might be able to find if he's mentioned and identify the specific volume.
*"Blumentritt disagreed with the Allies′ strategy in the west, discussing the precarious nature of the German position with its meager one armoured division against the twelve of the Allies, and he stated that had Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group been unleashed earlier for a concentrated armoured assault (as he had wished) rather than fighting on a broad front, "Such a breakthrough ... would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944."*
I told you before I'll dig it up Horrocks wanted to make a run early in september before the Gerries dug in and covered the avenues of approach.Monty prevented this - like he did in the Desert
@@bigwoody4704 nope. Horrocks wanted to push north at that point. You've said this yourself, so he could clear the Scheldt. Eisenhower was urging for a push on all fronts over the Rhine, so Monty was simply following orders.
Try sourcing something other than your backside JOHN BURNS how many alias accounts do you have? It's right here thicko no you dismissed facts previously presented because of your obnoxious revision you keep pursueing . Montgomery himself faffed this up on September 4th.Then of course he doesn't show up until after hostilities are over.And bernard never left enough men or materiel instead sending 10,400 men into Arnhem of which 2,100 came out.
*Horrocks: The General Who Led From the Front,by Philip Warner,p.111 - "There was only a single low grade division ahead of Horrocks on Sept 4. it was spread over a 50 mile front along the Albert Canal. Horrocks believed that this could have been brushed aside and XXX Corps could have gone on to cross the Rhine"*
*The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley,p.213-14* On 29 August Horrocks XXX Corp set out on a drive that some conclude might have altered the course of the war. They advanced 250 miles through northern France and into Belgium unopposed and captured the strategic port of Antwerp virtually with out a fight.
*Horrocks admitted as much "we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. We might have even have succeeded in bouncing across the Rhine - if we had taken the chance and and carried straight on" There were no significant German forces between Horrocks and the Rhine.But instead of ordering Horrocks forward on September 4 Montgomery halted him.*
*R.W.Thompson who was an Intelligence Officer in the British Army during WWII,also lays the blame for the army's failure with the Field Marshall "At the crucial hour leadership was lacking,the decision that only Field Marshall Montgomery could have exercised for which the hour demanded on seizing options and opportunities"*
Stephen McCartney
Indeed, and Eisenhower was the ground forces boss from September 1st. Any big push forward had to be cleared by Eisenhower first, but Eisenhower remained 600 km behind the front in his cosy HQ near Cherbourg and communications were terrible. Eisenhower should have moved forward to a more suitable HQ. He didn't, yet he wanted to direct ground strategy. He never had his finger on the pulse. Even when he did move his HQ it was still the other side of Paris, and nowhere near where the armies he was now commanding were.
Bad show from Eisenhower. Very bad.
Stephen McCartney.
"Eisenhower was in a useless place for a land force commander who had to keep his finger on the pulse of his armies and give quick decisions in rapidly changing situations. There were no telephone lines, not even radio telephone between his HQ and Bradley and myself. In the early days of September he was in fact completely out of touch with the land battle".
From Montgomery, Memoirs page 271
This past August 12th I experienced an abbreviated land tour of the operation. I was duly impressed with the size of the 82nd’s LZ in the Groesbeek Heights used for both paratroopers and gliders. For those interested, Market Garden provides a fertile field for additional study. Currently reading an after action report on Jedbough Teams that liaised with Dutch resistance during Market Garden. A lot of moving pieces!
I'm jealous! That area is a lot more built up around Groesbeek than it was in 1944, but it still must have given a good impression of the terrain. I only recently learned that the entire block of woodland to the southwest of Groesbeek was a Luftwaffe ammunition dump called 'Feld-Luftmunitionslager 15/VI Mook', and the Mooksebaan between Groesbeek and the Restaurant 't Zwaantje ran through the middle of it, closed off at both ends with security checkpoints. It was an MG position guarding the perimeter of this installation that nearly killed General Gavin on his way to his Division CP location on the Rijlaan.
Dave
Now you got me interested! I am going to check with my guide to see what he knows about the ammo dump. I did not realize how close Germany and the Siegfried line were till my guide pointed it the green hills in the distance (SSE).
Prior to Amsterdam, I was on a Rhine River boat and saw the remnants of the Ludendorff Bridge. I mentioned this to my son, an Army Combat Engineer,and the bridging of the Rhine. He stated that people have no idea of the planning required to bridge a river like the Rhine
@@patrickmorrissey8754 - See what your guide thinks of this:
I kept hearing about the ammo dump in first-hand accounts but couldn't pin down the location until I got some volumes from Hans den Brok's series on Market Flights - the IX Troop Carrier Command units that transported the Airborne in Operation Market. I was keen to figure out how the American glider pilots operated, so his books on their first hand accounts of their experiences was invaluable. The unexpected bonus was photos of the front or back gate to the Munitionslager opposite the 't Zwaantje restaurant, so that explained they closed the public road (Mooksebaan) running through the dump. Also, a 1945 edition of the military AMS GSGS map for Groesbeek shows the rail spur line from Groesbeek that loops around the south side of town and goes into the Munitionslager from the east, but doesn't indicate the perimeter fence or the extent of the facility, but it's most of that block of woodland as I found on a German document with a map online.
The glider pilots also referred to a work camp they used for accommodation, previously a Dutch labour camp (search 'N.A.D. Kamp de Mookerheide') before the war, and after the occupation the German R.A.D. (Reich Arbeits Dienst - State Labour Service) took over the camp for their own purposes. A RAD unit there was digging trenches and anti-tank defences along the Maas-Waalkanaal at the time of Market Garden, and because it was feared it might be a military barracks it was a target for 2nd Battalion 505th PIR before going into Divisional reserve. Hans said in his book the location was unknown, but I was able to help him out with it - it's gone now, replaced with private homes, but visible on RAF aerial photos. The location is next to the railway and bounded by the streets Oude Bovensteweg, Heumensebaan, Lindenlaan, and Stationstraat.
The Westwall technically ran through the Reichswald and terminated in the Nütterden village area with a few bunkers. There were bunkers in the Grunewald area on the south side of the Reichswald, and this was the battalion HQ for the Füsilier-Ersatz-Bataillon 39, part of the River Maas defence line. The road through the forest to Frasselt was the line of the Westwall, but I think in this section it was only a trench system and dugouts constructed out of logs. 505th PIR patrols that explored the western end of the Reichswald reported it 'empty' and unsuitable for tanks, which relieved Gavin of one his major concerns on the first day.
Another local HQ was for Landesschützen-Ausbildungs-Bataillon I./6, consisting of WW1 rear echelon troops deemed unsuitable for combat when they were young men, based in the Haus Kreuzfuhrt near Kranenbourg, and this unit had three of its five companies detached to defend the Maas-Waalkanaal bridges.
Patrick Morrissey
Have you read "Abundance of Valor" by Will Irwin? It's about the Jedburgh teams that led the way into the Netherlands and during Market-Garden. Embarrassingly, I had studied Market-Garden for decades, and had never noticed anything about the Jedburgh teams until I found this book.
@@dongilleo9743
Don! I found an after-action report about the four Jedbough teams deployed for Market-Garden on the internet after coming back to Albuquerque. I will check-out the book you mentioned. Than you for the info!
Patrick Morrissey
It failed because 1) It was commanded by Montgomery who just wasn’t up to this type of operation. 2) Lack of sufficient transport aircraft 3) Gen Gavin delayed taking the Waal Bridge at Nijmegen. 4) Poor choice of landing zones at Arnhem. 5) Inadequate radios. But it was marked by incredibly heroic action by all the forces involved. The British paratroopers at Arnhem in particular fought like lions and held on despite strong German attacks.
Number 3) was the only problem actually fatal to the operation, but it was the 508th Regiment Commander, not Gavin, that delayed. When Gavin found out they were diggin-in on the Groesbeek ridge, he was as angry as the 508th's Liaison Officer had ever seen him. This was NOT Gavin's divisional plan being carried out at all. The limitation on transport aircraft was taken into account by the planners (what else could they do?), choice of landing zones were dictated by Flak and terrain (what alternatives did they have?), terrain effects on radio communications were not known about (they affected the Germans as well), and Montgomery's plan was brilliant and audacious, but he only made the mistake of thinking his allies were just as capable as his own troops. He gave the Americans too much credit. Why the Americans would blame Montgomery is an emotional response and not a rational one based on the facts.
@@davemac1197 What could they do about not having enough transport aircraft and not having a landing zone close enough to the bridge at Arnhem especially given the German forces available near Arnhem? Well they could not attempt the operation for one thing. The fact that they went ahead given those limitations is the fault of the planners. And the fault of the Commander who insisted it go forward.
Eisenhower wrote a note taking all the blame for the failure of D Day had it gone wrong and he relied on his British and Canadian and French Allies. It’s the nature of command.
But Montgomery was well known for being cautious and methodical and insisting on large material advantages before launching operations. He failed to take Caen according to the Overlord time table, whose fault was that? He failed to close the Falaise (sp) gap during the end stage of the battle of the bulge, whose fault was that?
Montgomery was a great general, but he was not capable of making rapid advances, it wasn’t in his nature.
He also wisely realized that the British people were down to their manpower limits and that he could not afford to lose men by being too aggressive but then he planned a too aggressive attack and didn’t account for the change in intelligence when they learned of the German forces that had been moved into the Arnhem area.
All commanders have their strengths and weaknesses, British, American, German and Soviet alike. Montgomery was not good in a rapid advance he was his best in a methodical set piece battle and Market Garden was as much a race as any battle of WW2.
@@Whitpusmc - obviously you enjoy having a joke! The operation almost succeeded (according even to the Germans) and would have done so if the Nijmegen bridges had been secured on the first afternoon. The fact they weren't cannot be placed at Montgomery's door.
@@davemac1197 He was both the planner and in overall command and insisted on a plan where a series of subsidiary operations all had to succeed or it failed with no “plan b.” The Germans could have blown the Arnhem bridge at any time and that fact alone meant that it didn’t have a significant chance of success. Furthermore as other posters have pointed out Gen Gavin did secure the Waal bridge when 30 Corps got to them and even then they had to turn around and recapture part of the road behind them. Securing the bridge before 30 corps got there would not have done anything. Monty was the overall commander and insisted on an overly complex operation and didn’t change it when new intelligence on German forces made the chance of success significantly less. He’s to blame, no joke especially given the casualties taken.
@@Whitpusmc - Gavin's Divisonal plan for Nijmegen did not 'fail'. It simply wasn't carried out. This was the fault of the Regimental commander, who had also exhibited very questionable decision-making in Normandy. Reading Phil Nordyke's combat history of the 508th - Put Us Down In Hell (2012) is very illuminating in this respect. Gavin inherited a Division from Matthew Ridgway with a problem Parachute Regiment and two excellent combat veteren units (three, if you include the Glider Infantry).
Gavin entrusted the 508th with securing the Groesbeek ridge and then proceeding into Nijmegen to grab the bridges. The reason for the initial ridge objective is clear if you study a map. The German strength in Nijmegen was unknown and it was feared the 10.SS-Panzer-Division (reduced to a regimental battlegroup) might be in the city - its whereabouts were unknown at the time. If the ridge was occupied, it would be a significant defensive position blocking access to the city and its bridges. In the event, the city was evacuated of its rear echelon units and the available combat units were all deployed defending the Maas-Waalkanaal bridges west of the city.
The 508th's commander, having secured the ridge without any opposition, then started digging-in, against orders, while sending only recon patrols into the city. The patrol from the 1st Battalion, consisted of the S-2 (Intelligence) Section, the 3rd Platoon from 'C' Company, an LMG Section from HQ Company, and equipped with 'C' Company's SCR-300 radio (on the battalion net). The patrol got separated in the city due to the Dutch citizens coming out onto the streets and celebrating their 'liberation' (source: Chapter 10, Put Us Down In Hell, Phil Nordyke, 2012).
Only three lead Scouts from the S-2 Section got to the highway bridge. They surprised 6/7 Germans, taking them prisoner and capturing a "small artillery weapon". They waited for reinforcements that never arrived, until at dusk they decided to release their prisoners and withdraw. As they did so, they could hear "heavy equipment" arriving at the other end of the bridge (source: 'Nijmegen Bridge', Chapter 6, The 508th Connection, Zig Boroughs, 2013).
Montgomery wrote after the war that he made a mistake in thinking the Canadian 1st Army would be able to clear the approaches to Antwerp on their own (it was in their sector), while he was going for the Ruhr with British 2nd Army. He made a similar mistake in Market Garden when he obviously thought the American units he was loaned for the operation were at least as capable as his own troops. In this case he was too polite to write that about his allies (probably another mistake), but it's very clear he was wrong to trust them. The result was the failure of the entire operation and the virtual destruction of 1st Airborne Division. The Parachute Infantry Regiment at Nijmegen had an easier job to do than the Parachute Brigade at Arnhem. They landed 30 minutes earlier, had 3 Km less to march to their main objective, and had less opposition than even Frost's battalion at Arnhem (he had MGs and armoured cars on his route). Frost held his bridge for four days, as Browning had promised, against a reduced SS-Panzer-Division and reinforcements from Germany. The 508th got three men to their bridge, and then had to withdraw.
Blaming Montgomery is an emotional response, not a rational one based on the facts.
We shall honour and remember them all. The bravery and heroism of all that took part in this ill-fated mission will always stand as a testament and example to all that follow them.
Amen.
Pity the paras threw all honour away less than 30 years later by murdering 22 innocent civilians in the UK.
As related content, I recommend Jeremy Clarkson's programme about his father in law winning a VC during this operation.
Montgomery failed to uphold take Caen on D-Day or shortly thereafter.
He Finally took Antwerp but not the estuary.
And Failed with Market Garden.
Not taking the estuary of Antwerp was a failure of epic proportions. He shouldn't have been allowed to command anymore after that blunder. Instead he was given another chance with disastrous consequences. Not only did Market Garden fail, but it led to reprisals against the Dutch and this in turn made the situation for the Dutch in the following winter worse as well.
B A, let's just overlook his successes in Africa then and the fact that he was Commander in Chief of all allied land forces on D Day and for many weeks after and devised the plan for the ground forces. What an idiot he clearly was.
Market Garden was not Monty's plan. It was his idea, he did not do the planning. At Caen, there was more German armour per square mile than there was at Kursk.
@@CIMAmotor and the weather was garbage. Its amazing that the Americans get cut some slack in south where they faced minimal opposition because of the poor weather but Montgomery gets chastised for not being able to steamroll the largest concentration of armor assembled on the western front in a day.
@@bushyfromoz8834 Yeah, and the reason that the Americans faced minimal opposition is that Monty's attack sucked in German reserves
My great uncle took part in Operation Market Garden..... Tommy Scullion from Ballymena Northern Ireland. He had a part in a film about it playing himself. Oddly in the film he gets captured but in reality as far as I'm aware he fought his way back to his own lines
Sounds like he might have been in Theirs is the Glory released in 1946
@@neilholmes8200 that's the one
I saw the ‘Theirs is the glory’ fairly recently, I believe his character actually died? Himself and Peter Holt were very memorable in that film
"Mass glider landings can be a hazardous business to say the least. As men unloaded equipment from their gliders and began to move off the landing zone, they had to keep a wary eye behind them for gliders that were still landing. The prospect of such accidents appeared to be the only cause for concern, because although the standard procedure for disembarking from a glider calls for a rapid and defensive exit, there was such a lack of enemy activity that men calmly left their craft and went about their business as if they were on a training exercise in England."
Pegasus Archive Arnhem 5. The First Lift (Sunday 17th September)
9th SS was close to decimated! 10th SS was, intentionally, dismantling their armour to prevent them from being handed over to other units! Neither unit was combat ready when MG began. 10th SS was ferrying over dismantled Sturmgeschütze, which had to be both repaired and then ferried back again.
What greatly hampered the advance was the vast, VAST amount of artillery and their near limitless supply of ammunition. This artillery was also perfectly placed in relation to the corridor and able to pound beyond Nijmegen to the south and well north of the Rhine. This cut the corridor several times.
While the weather did play a role, finding the complete plans in a crashed Horsa glider provided the German troops around Arnhem and Oosterbeek with all the data they needed to engage the further coming droppings.
A very good book on the German immediate response as well as the prior preparations by Field Marshall Walter Model is Een Andere Kijk op de Slag om Arnhem: De Snelle Duitse Reactie - Peter Berends from 2002. This is only available in Dutch though.
Other way round - 9.SS handed over heavy equipment and some units to 10.SS, but had held some vehicles back by removing tracks and guns.
The SS panzer division was still in the area and had not completely dismantled their armour, which contributed to the demise of the British paratroopers at Arnhem bridge. Yes, they were dismantling, but they were still an in tact division that had tanks at the moment when the operation began, and was responsible for the coup de grace at Arnhem. The dutch resistance tried warning Montgomery about this iirc
@Herbert Ackermans: I have never heard of this before. Only of the "surprise" presence of panzers. Where did all of the artillery come from? Very little German equipment made it out of Normandy, so it must have come from units which had not been deployed in Normandy.
@@str2010 - Absolutely not an intact division by any stretch of the imagination. The remnants of SS-Panzer-Regiment 9 under an SS-Lieutenant based at the Saksen-Weimarkazerne (barracks) in northern Arnhem had exactly three Mark V 'Panther' tanks and two Flakpanzer IV 'Möbelwagen' on 17 September. 100 Panther crewmen were grouped into an 'alarm' company acting as infantry, and the Werkstatt (workshop Company) formed another. All other tanks (Mark IV) had been handed over to II./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 at Vorden, bringing their total to 16 concentrated in the 5.Kompanie.
The remaining five 9.SS tanks had been moved out of the barracks (presumably having their tracks and guns refitted in the workshops after removing them to record them as 'non-operational' to avoid handover) on Friday 15 September, to be hidden under trees on Heijenoordseweg (according to Dutch residents in a house at the end of Callunastraat who were asked for milk by the panzer crews).
During the battle, two of the three Panthers of Kampfgruppe Harder were dealt with by a PIAT and a Gammon bomb dropped from an upstairs window by Major Peter Waddy (Commander 'B' Company, 3rd Para Battalion) in the western outskirts of Arnhem on 18 September. The Flakpanzers were in action on the Dreyenscheweg against 4th Parachute Brigade, their 3.7cm Flak guns proving to be devastating against infantry. The remaining Panther was in action throughout the seige of the Oosterbeek perimeter, but wary of anti-tank weapons the Germans avoided getting too close and used their tanks as SP guns to shell houses from a distance.
Also during the battle, the 10.SS received deliveries of 8 and then 12 brand new Panthers direct from the factory, and they were crewed by the 100 Panther crewmen transferred from the SS-Panzer-Regiment 9 alarm company. Some of the Panthers were lost in the area of Elst after the Arnhem bridge was retaken. They were still in the overall desert yellow factory paint finish, having no time for camouflage colours or tactical numbers to be applied.
The Dutch resistance reports were taken seriously, but could not be confirmed. A plan for the 82nd Airborne to be dropped at Arnhem and the 1st Airborne at Nijmegen was switched, because the British Airborne had far more anti-tank guns, including 17-pounders, while the American Airborne units had more field artillery. The Dutch had identified SS units between Arnhem-Apeldoorn-Zutphen as belonging to the 'H' (9.SS Hohenstaufen) Division, but there was no information on the location of the 10.SS at all. There was concern they may have been in Nijmegen and drawing new tanks from a depot thought to be in the Kleve area (SHAEF Intel Summary #26 dated 16 September 1944), which led to a silly rumour the Reichswald forest could be hiding up to 1000 tanks!
It's quite wrong to suggest Montgomery knew two Panzer-Divisions were at Arnhem. It wasn't even true, both in terms of strength or location, and the intelligence picture was more complex in both reality and perception at the time.
@@dpeasehead - you're right about the equipment not coming from Normandy. The 10.SS-Panzer-Division became 'over establishment' in artillery as the commander of their 4./Flak-Abteilung battery discovered 40 brand new 10.5cm leFH 18/40 guns on a freight train at Arras station in northern France during the retreat. The escorting troops had abandoned the train in the panic. Since 10.SS had lost most of their artillery and the prime movers (heavy half-tracks), arrangements were made to find enough trucks from the logistics trains in the Division to move them. They absorbed the guns by having six guns instead of the establishment four in each leFH battery, although they somehow ended up with two '10.Batterie' listed on strength.
Montgomery staff didn’t believe the intelligence reports it was getting from the Dutch underground and the reconnaissance photos showing a few tanks were dismissed. In the end British and Polish paratroopers ended up going against an elite Armor division.
It wasn't that they didn't believe them, they just couldn't get confirmation. The Dutch resistance were normally very reliable and usually had good information, but the Germans had some counter-intelligence successes in penetrating Dutch resistance cells. The information could not be relied on without confirmation, but there is evidence the planning of the operation took into account the available information. At one stage the 82nd Airborne were planned to drop on Arnhem and the 1st Airborne at Nijmegen, but this was reversed after the only suggestion of panzer units remained in the Arnhem area and British Airborne Divisions had more anti-tank guns in their establishments. These included the heavy 17-pounder guns capable of taking on Tiger tanks, now air transportable for the first time, much to the surprise of the Germans.
The tanks that were photographed in the Arnhem area were rightly dismissed, as a study conducted in 2015 by the RAF after the original photo came to light has proved. The tanks were obsolete models that did not belong to a 1944 Panzer-Division, and the only unit in Holland with such tanks were a training unit near the 101st Airborne's drop zones on the day the operation started, and were a minimal threat dealt with by the escorting fighter aircraft. The way Browning was portrayed in A Bridge Too Far greatly upset his widow, and also Dirk Bogarde who played him had misgivings, as he served during the war as an RAF Intelligence officer on Dempsey's 2nd Army staff.
Most of the German opposition at Arnhem were from a vast array of training and replacement units mobilised from all over Holland and Germany. The 'elite' SS-Panzer-Divisions had been virtually destroyed by British units in Normandy and were in Holland to refit, although the 9.SS was actually in the process of leaving for Germany to refit.
"didn’t believe the intelligence reports" or chose not to believe them ?
Chose not to present information to Montgomery because they knew he would demote or sack them ?
My cousin was killed in Holland in Operation Market Garden. He was just 24 years old. Rest in peace, Noah.
Most airborne assaults in WW2 failed badly. This last big one here was the worst. “Coins in the pocket that had to be spent” as Rick Atkinson said.
Watching this from my living room with a view over the Nijmegen bridge. Always nice to see such a good summary of what happened.
Almost every bridge over the rhine or waal rivers at Nijmegen and Arnhem is named in honour of the brave hero's of this operation
Imagine being a German solider. Fresh off the 3 year Russian front
for a vacation, and these guys decide to drop in, and ruin it for you.
Don't know which German soldiers you're talking about, but 9 and 10.SS-Panzer-Divisions were raised in France in 1943 and trained for counter-airborne operations in preparation for the expected Allied invasion of the continent, but were sent to Ukraine to rescue the 1.Panzerarmee at Tarnopol in April 1944 and therefore missed the D-Day landings for which they were trained to fight in June. They were brought back to Normandy by late June and further reduced by British units in the fighting around Caen and Hill 112. After helping to keep the Falaise gap open as long as possible they conducted a withdrawal to Arnhem to refit in early September. They were in Ukraine on the Eastern Front for barely three months, not years.
Making an advance of 9 bridges was a massive success
Ok I finished watching n Listening too the Prior Video 📷📸, it was Impressive, informative, and Enjoyable as well as Complete.
Thank You for Sharing it with me and the Many Others out There?
In retrospect there were many Aspects about the Offensive, I wasn't aware of Apparently. Please Forgive any out of Line BS, or improper Comment's by Me. Thank You again.
my grandfather was I co 3rd battalion 504th pir 82nd airborne. He served with them from North Africa and participated in Sicily Salerno and Anzio prior to market garden. He made that assault in the first wave on the 20th of September across the waal. He helped organize and lead the survivors of the assault to clear the dike on the German side of the bridge. He was severely wounded trying to take out a mg-42 in a barn with a rifle grenade. Suffice to say his war was finally over., and he'd just turned 20 on September 16th of 44. Different breed.
"Lieutenant-General Browning specified to their commander, Brigadier-General Gavin, who gave his approval, that the 82nd Airborne's priorities were, first, the large area of high ground known as the Groesbeek Heights, second, the bridge over the River Maas at Grave, then three bridges over the Maas-Waal Canal, and finally Nijmegen Bridge."
Pegasus Archive Arnhem 30. Reasons for the Failure
Tik History does an interesting video covering this. From what I remember some of these sources were written years after the battle and contradict what Gavin said at the time where he states it was his decision to de-prioritise the Nijmegen bridge.
@@CB-fz3li Tik did about a dozen vids on MG including one on Beevors book because he didn't like it because it did not lay all of the blame on the US.
@@nickdanger3802 I don't get that impression from Tik. I know one of the sources he referenced was Poulussen who is Dutch so not likely to have an axe to grind either way. Personally I think with the heavy hitters like Beevor and Hastings, although they should be respected they aren't infallible and there can be a sense of a chumocracy at play. I think it is healthy that they be challenged where the evidence supports it.
@Stephen Jackson Bridges were captured in the order they would be needed by XXX Corps which was supposed to be in the area on day two.
@@CB-fz3li Tik did a vid on supply vs demand economy in WWII so he could bitch about the NHS.
The Dutch told the British the plan was a bad idea due to the terrain.
I was expecting a revisionist version of history; pleasantly suprised that this was not the case. Any commander today that would deploy troops into a conflict with defective communications (non-working radios) and deliberately hide the intelligence reports of heavy armour would and should face time behind bars. It was mainly through the tenacity of the individual soldier that the operation was partially successful; despite the incompetence of those of higher office.
You were lucky if Army radios in the 1940s worked at all, especially after jumping out of a plane and four days in the field.
@@spoddie The fact is; they were known to be defective and inoperable prior to take-off (how's that for incompetence - check with the Imperial Museum if you don't believe me).
You are so correct. Monty refused to allow the Intel about the SS Panzer Units to affect "His Grandiose Plan.) He was actually the best ally Germany had. Every one of his operations after Africa failed. I am a retired FDNY Captain, 1980-2003. My series Fatal Flaws traces 9/11 back to WWI. Fatal Flaws Book 1 1914-1945 goes in depth to examine all of the failures from that war as it related to world events. Especially Monty's.
@@richardmeo2503 Another brainwashed yank... Monty was a very good commander. Why dont you write about the bloody incompetence at hurtgen forest or pattons failures in the lorraine campaign. In Normandy while Monty fought the majority of german armour, Bradley couldnt overcome a few understrength german divisions. Had General Gavin captured Nijmegan bridge and had brereton not altered the plans for dropping paratroopers Market Garden wouldnt have ended so badly. Both American generals who evade criticism. Monty was the best the western allies had.
@Stephen Jackson Not true. They were discovered because overflights took photos of their tanks trying to stay under cover. Monty and company were warned of the tanks, but they never cancelled the plan nor did they warn their Paras.
A background factor was that there was infighting over control of the airborne corp and this had to have a detrimental effect on communication/coordination.
Band of brothers brought me here...
Respect to all our brave heroes..
Always astonished by the short view about Market Garden.
Of course the 3 days long planned airborne deployment was the major flaw.
But what about "most secret" plans, not to be brought, in ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, on the battle ground, featuring all the operation plans fell in germans hands ?
What about Browning landing with his staff in the Nijmegen area with more than 18 gliders on the FIRST day, that could have been more useful elsewhere (Arnhem area?) and he, be as useful in a rear area or England ?
What about Browning subscribing to Gavin's concern about the "10000 german tanks lurking in the Reichwald" SSW Groosbeeh heights thus delaying the advance on the capital targets that were Nimjegen rail and road bridges ?
On a further note, what about appointing an infantry officer to lead an airborne division ? He lacked almost all support a regular british ID could expect at this time in WWII.
And why the Polish Ind Bde was assigned LZ an DZ that were not suitable for 1st AIR, since taking a bridge from two sides should seem more efficient than on only one ?
I know a youtuber that tried to face some of these questions In very lengnth.. He has currently heavy real life matters to deal with. Then not available to enquire, I gess..
You IWM, should have many more and deeper to provide than a quickie such as this.
My regards, anyway.
True the headquarters element of British First Airborne did base themselves in Nijmegen.
Yeah, it seems the IWM doesn't really wish to point names (hint: Gavin and Browning). At least not blaming the Polish, that is a positive move...
This. Had Gavin taken Nijmegen on schedule the plan may have worked complex though it was.
Even if Nijmegen bridge had been captured and held on day one, a difficult and not sure thing, Market-Garden would have still come to a dead stop at Arnhem. The tiny bridgehead at the Arnhem bridge wasn't sufficient for 30th Corps to cross, turn right, and sweep into Germany to end the war by Christmas. The leading elements of 30th Corps would have been bunched up at Arnhem just in time for the German counterattack to cut the corridor further south for a day and a half.
Then there's the problem of supplies. British supply lines stretch all the way back to Normandy. The 1st Canadian Army and a bunch of British divisions are spread out halfway back to Normandy; some of them deliberately halted so their transportation assets could be used to try to keep other divisions supplied. Without the docks at Antwerp to fully supply the Allied armies, they weren't going to cross the Rhine in strength until Spring of 1945.
@@dongilleo9743 Fair point and it would be hard to hold the airfield to the north which was one of the objectives as well. Arnhem could have turned into another Caen. But even if there was time to evacuate civilians south imagine the traffic jam.
Let’s not forget that hindsight is a wonderful thing. With a few different factors in the allies favour it would be heralded as the best manoeuvre ever.
No as they would be on the wrong side of the IJssel. Still not being able to go into the Rurh. It's the river the forget to mention every time...
@@Goulmy86 Agreed. But that small factor:) wouldn’t have stopped the hype.
Agreed and I hate armchair generals, BUT Market Garden could have succeeded using the available resources and what was known /at the time/.
@@Goulmy86 The Rhur was maybe the eventual destination. However the original plans were to secure the airstrip at Driel and swing north first.
This would cut off a large section of German troops and open Antwerp up to supplies.
Michel Goulmy
The Ijssel was irrelevant. Easily Bailey Bridged.
The plan for Market Garden was also for much of Arnhem to be taken not just the bridge. If this was achieved, the Ijssel wouldn't have presented many problems. The Germans possibly would have even pulled back with XXX Corps in Arnhem in great force and allied ground attack aircraft prevalent during consolidation.
Of course, the Americans would have had to get past Aachen and then Cologne for a pincer attack into the Ruhr, and that would have been a bigger problem. They couldn't get much further than Aachen all through the rest of 1944.
One of the commanders of German forces there was Kurt Student - former commander of German airborne forces,so the trap for allied airborne assault was well-prepared.
There was no trap set for Allied airborne forces on any large scale, the airborne operation was a complete surprise, the Germans were only expecting British 2nd Army to continue their advance from their Neerpelt bridgehead on the Meuse-Escaut canal at any time, but they were not expecting the airborne landings.
The reason General Kurt Student was sent to the Netherlands was because Hermann Göring had completely surprised Hitler's staff during a discussion on how to close the huge gap that had opened up in their lines in Belgium by offering tens of thousands of redundant Luftwaffe ground personnel who were no longer needed because of the parlous state of his air force. These personnel were therefore transferred to the Fallschirmtruppe and used to rebuild the Fallschirmjäger regiments decimated by the fighting in Normandy. Student was in Berlin and available, so he was assigned to command the new 1.Fallschirm-Armee, based at 's-Hertogenbosch in the Netherlands, where there was a collection centre for surviving Fallschirmjäger troops from Normandy forming a cadre for rebuilding the Fallschirmtruppe. Student was also given command of the army's LXXXVIII Korps, which were part of the occupation forces based in the Netherlands and contained a couple of static divisions redeployed from the Dutch coast.
The only officer who predicted an airborne assault specifically in the Arnhem area was Luftwaffe Generalmajor Walter Grabmann, commander of the 3.Jagd-Division at Deelen airbase north of Arnhem. He tried to warn Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model at a dinner hosted by Model at his new headquarters in Oosterbeek that the fields to the west of Oosterbeek around Wolfheze made ideal landing zones and his headquarters might be vulnerable. Model dismissed these concerns as he felt secure so far from the front lines and behind several river barriers, he thought it was unlikely the Allies would try such a deep penetration with an airborne operation.
The one officer present at the dinner who took Grabmann's warning seriously was SS-Sturmbannführer Sepp Krafft, commander of the SS-Panzergrenadier-Ausbildungs-und-Erstaz-Bataillon 16, who decided to remove his two training companies of Hitler Youth, who were finishing their training as replacements for 12.SS-Panzer-Division 'Hitlerjugend', from their barracks in Arnhem and have them camped in the woods just north of Oosterbeek on the Johannahoeve estate. Krafft himself occupied the nearby Villa Waldfriede.
The next day the airborne attack began with the preliminary bombing of the barracks in Arnhem and other towns, followed by glider and parachute landings at Wolfheze. Krafft had his 2.Kompanie on an exercise in the woods near the Hotel Wolfheze at the time, and they were immediately ordered to attack the landing zones with an aggressive reconnaissance, while he brought up his 4.Kompanie and ordered his 7.(Stamm) reception and 8.(Genesenden) convalescent companies in Arnhem and Velp respectively to form a 9.(Marsch) march company to reinforce them. This battalion was the only unit placed in exactly the right location at the right time to cause the most immediate impediment to the airborne deployment at Arnhem, and neither the II.SS-Panzerkorps in the Veluwe and Achterhoek regions or Student's 1.Fallschirm-Armee in the province of Noord-Brabant were anticipating an airborne operation at all.
RAF on Market Garden "In their view the right course was to use all available transport aircraft to maintain supplies to Patton's army, which was the furthest forward, so that he could continue his offensive. It was impossible to do both once the Supreme Commander ruled in favour --192-- of airborne operations."
Hyperwar Royal Air Force 1939-1945 Vol III
Patton wasn't going to the most important targets, like Berlin or the Ruhr. His target was the Saar industrial area - important, but doesn't end the war.
The option to not proceed with Market Garden would simply mean another bloody frontal assault into strong German positions causing heavy casualties, exactly what occurred at Metz, Huertgen & Overloon.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- - the battles at Overloon and Woensdrecht on the flanks of Market Garden after Market Garden, show how difficult it was to make advances across the Dutch terrain without the benefit of Airborne forces taking the bridges for you.
If you can get hold of them, I highly recommend Jack Didden's and Maarten Swart's books Herbststurm ('Autumn Gale', 2013) on Woensdrecht, and Kampfgruppe Walter And Panzerbrigade 107 (2016) on Overloon, as two cases in point.
@@davemac1197
WWII / Nazi Germany Occupation Map / 1938-1945
ruclips.net/video/-ASR3rypn98/видео.html
@@davemac1197 I don't understand why people say supplies should have gone South, i mean has anyone actually seen the terrain? Mountains, forests, doesn't sound ideal for tanks to advance on compared to the vast Northern German Plain.
There is a reason why the Japanese failed in all their overly complex scenarios. Some people never learn.
My thoughts, ignoring what is /now/ known, what was known at the time?
1. D-Day had already had to be postponed for a day /due to the weather/. Also in 1940 Hitler had called off Sealion /because of the weather/. Not accounting for it in a /three day //airborne// operation in the autumn was a catastrophic error.
2. The whole operation was flawed in concept. Instead of an incremental bite and hold strategy, the operation took one huge bite and failed to hold it.
3. Why was XXX Corp sent second? They should have been sent /first/ and when they passed a certain point /then/ launch the airborne to take the first bridge. Then XXX Corps race across, get to a second point, launch second wave of airborne, take and hold second bridge. Repeat for last wave. The airborne troops would have had to hold for much less time.
4. Poor use of 2 TAF. Ground suppression e.g. Typhoons should have been used to suppress resistance on the landing grounds.
None of this was especially Monty's fault as the detailed planing was done by others - although as Caen had taken much longer to take than planned he should have anticipated problems at Nijmegen. However the overall strategy was IMHO flawed.
The operation failed because one Regiment did not follow its operational orders to seize its bridge objectives at Nijmegen on the first day. Taking your points in turn:
1. The critical phase of the operation was the first two days, the time it was estimated for the tanks to reach Arnhem, and the weather was forecast to be guaranteed clear the first two days and unpredicatble after that.
2. You have to seize all the bridges you need on the first day and hold them against counter-attacks. If you try to operate incrementally, the enemy will reinforce the unoccupied bridges as soon as you telegraph your intended route.
3. Because the 2nd TAF air support had to be deconflicted from the Airborne transports and escorts. That is why Operation Garden commenced at 1430 hrs, after the Operation Market airlift timed at 1300 hrs was complete. Sebastian Ritchie's book Arnhem: Myth And Reality: Airborne Warfare, Air Power and the Failure of Operation Market Garden (2011, updated 2019), is the best work on the air plan and the reasons why it had to be done the way it was carried out.
4. There was little to no resistance on the landing grounds on the first day and Flak suppression during the airlifts were the responsibility of the escorts and not 2nd TAF, which had to be grounded for deconfliction reasons when the airlifts were scheduled. Flak suppression was effective and transport losses were minimised.
Montgomery was let down at Nijmegen by one of the units loaned to him for the operation. He is often accused of "hubris", but it's not hubris to overestimate your ally.
@@davemac1197
1. How often are weather forecasts wrong? Very often.
2. So you send all the airborne forces on the same day. By your own logic you don't send them over three days. You assume there would be enough time for the enemy to prepare defences between increments. That would depend on the speed XXX Corps moved.
@@julianmhall
1. The forecast was correct because they got two clear days and then it started to deteriorate, delaying the 3rd Lift by two days.
2. There's an argument for going with what you can airlift in one go, so at Arnhem they would have had six battalions with which to strike at Arnhem instead of holding three back to defend the landing zones. The idea behind feeding more Airborne troops in by air was to reinforce the attacking force, hopefully faster than the defenders can reinforce by land. In the first two days the Airborne operation was doing that successfully, but the initiative went over to the Germans after the airlifts fell behind schedule because of the weather. All the more important that you secure all your bridges on the frist day and get the tanks to Arnhem in two days. That's why I think the crucial error, totally unforced, was at Nijmegen on the first day. All the stuff about weather, intel, the single road, are all excuses to cover the thing that can be controlled but wasn't.
*Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.108*
Never the less Montgomery's plan required 100% mission success something unkown in large scale Airborne operations. Failure to capture a single objective would jeopardize the entire XXX Corp offensive
*Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p131 Montgomery altered his assesments from his obvious desire that the offensive should proceed as planned. He persuaded himself that any threat from the Germans was off set by the large number of Airborne troops. *Despite warnings from the head of intelligence and Bedell-Smith suggested that the operation be revised or halted Monty dismissed the objections out of hand*
*Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.138 Brereton was not in a position to exploit strategic intelligence,and he would also have known that Montgomery alone had access to ULTRA and had never the less decided that Market Garden should proceed* First Allied Airborne depended very heavily on Mongomery's 21st Army Group for their supply of intelligence. *1st Parachute Brigade summary by Capt. W.A. Taylor that appeared on September 13th which pointed out that "the whole Market area was being feverishly prepared for defense" - a statement entirely in accord with Dempsey's diary notes of September 9th & 10th*
*Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.160 By September 1944 Air Force Planners were unable to see a happy outcome. More over it was documented that because Arnhem lay so far in land they did not expect to attain outright tactical surprise. The previous Comet Operation air warning stated "Surprise is extremely unlikely and the enemy will undoubtedly have knowledge of the approach of Troop Carrier formations by radar alert or visual reconnaissance."*
The American 82nd never attempted to take the Bridge. And there was no major counterattack from the forest. As for the attack across the river the crews of the canvas boats were British and although the Americans had to cross the river once the boat crews crossed it 14 or more times and suffered 50%+ casualties.
Just to clarify some details, the first attempt to take the Nijmegen bridge was too late, due to a command failure in the 508th PIR on the first afternoon, 17 September. Subsequent attempts on the 19 September by the 505th with support from Guards Armoured Division also failed due to strong opposition by 10.SS-Panzer-Division. The final attacks in co-ordination with the river assualt by the 504th were successful, but the boats were crewed by engineers from C Company of the US 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion, which normally supported the 504th Regimental Combat Team. The first wave carrying H and I Companies 504th suffered 50% casualties, losing half of the 26 boats. Royal Engineers provided rafts for the Jeeps and anti-tank guns in the 504th RCT. Counter-attacks from the Reichswald forest did take place, conducted by myriad infantry units of poor quality from Division 406 of Wehrkreis VI and later II.Fallschirm-korps.
Monty chicken out and Carrington stopped but in Britain that gets you a Fileld Marshall and a LORD
I can handle watch this, I have read so much about it…, the courage and grit bubbles me to tears.., to see again the vid of the paratroopers being snipped in their cutes….🤯👍🌹
Monty didnt lead the 30corp himself
Left it to horrocks!
He actually made no tactical desicions during the operation itself
I'm not a fan of Montgomery's plan here but this is a silly comment. Montgomery was an Army Group commander. He didn't lead Corps. He was way above that.
Modern warfare does put commanders in rear echelon positions not like the old days
When even kings rode into battle!
Saul has slain thousands
David tens of thousands!
@@angloaust1575 The Romans smashed army after army of brave warrior kings because by in large their commanders would sit up on commanding terrain, properly see the battlefield, and be able to react to the battle as it unfolded. Save the heroics for the rank and file. Commanders need to lead.
A good document movie 💪
I'm of the opinion that even had Market Garden succeeded, it would have failed.
The critical problem the Allies faced, at the time, was supply, and their most important objective should have been clearing the Scheldt Estuary so they could put the Antwerp docks into service. A bridge across the Rhine would have made little difference, so long as supplies were still being trucked from Normandy and Provence.
Market Garden was supposed to thrust all they up to the Zuider Zee, securing Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and totally isolating the German forces on the Scheldt. Which is why Eisenhower "insisted on it". His words
Even if Market Garden suceeded and Arnhem was taken, no advance could have been made towards the Ruhr without the US 1st Army to the south moving beyond Aachen. Then both armies would move towards the Ruhr together in a pincer movement.
The US 1st Army did not fail to get beyond Aachen and did not fail in the Hurtgen Forest due to supplies, but rather poor strategy and stubborn German resistance. Antwerp being opened wouldn't have changed that. Bradley and Hodges would still have made the same mistakes.
John Cornhole err,I mean Lyndon. the wretch Bernard not only didn't prioritze the Port but chickened out completely. Probably with you getting the Full Monty
I was in 307th Combat Engineer BN in the 1980's. To this Day, we still remember the Waal River crossing. 40 Beers , Engineers! AATW
Actor Dirk Bogarde plays General Browning, who discounts the reports of photo interpreters that detected German tanks in the area. During the War Bogarde actually was a photo interpreter.
Everyone has different views, and having studied it for years I still think it was very close to success, and if the plan had gone accordingly at Nijmegen, it might indeed have succeeded. I don't have the depth of knowledge of many though. But here goes.........firstly it all depends whether you assess the time they took against the 'hoped for' 48 hour (2 day) limit to reach Arnhem, or the outer time limit of 96 hours and 4 days.
There were contributing factors, such as complexity, too many objectives for Paratroopers, distance of drops from objectives, drops carried out over different days rather than the single day intended, communication difficulties between air and ground, supply drop issues, weather, and critically speed and quality of German response, but still, it nearly succeeded. They knew of the presence of 10th SS Panzer Division, though there is debate whether they knew about 9th as well, totalling around 6,000 men near Arnhem, a depleted but still very capable force, but felt they could be overcome. So intelligence wasn't ignored, it was just under-estimated. Indeed, perhaps the biggest criticism is that they under-estimated the organisation and remaining strength of the German Army overall following their rout at Normandy, and under-estimated the effect of strong direct supply links between Germany and Arnhem, especially by rail. They also had excellent Commanders like Model, Student, Hemel, and Bittrich who knew the area like the back of their hand.
But we cannot ignore the fundamental fact that Brereton reiterated that all Paratroopers must go for the bridges with 'thunderclap speed', so quite why the Waal bridge at Nijmegen was demoted to 4th priority by a combination of Boy Browning and US 82nd Commander Gavin (ultimately Gavin states this was his decision) remains a mystery, especially as Dutch intelligence told arriving US troops that there were no German tanks in the nearby Reichswold Heights or adjacent forest, which was instead given top priority. But holding landing zones and the Heights was given top priority by Gavin, and Browning was perfectly happy to authorise this battle order. In simple terms, too little priority was given by Gavin or Browning to take the Waal road bridge, though there is further internal 82nd debate whether Gavin's own Colonel's misinterpreted his own orders. The US Army official enquiry admonished Lindquist in this respect.
As shock-troops, the lightly-armed British, US, and Polish Paratroopers all performed superbly, that is without question, as they were dropped at three different strategic locations along the route. The British only took the northern end of Arnhem Bridge however, with others bogged down on the outskirts at Oosterbeek, and the Poles were belatedly dropped into a 'hornets nest' but at least they helped relieve the encircled Brits there. 101st US did well to attain most objectives with relatively little initial opposition but later coming under constant attack, but as highlighted, 82nd delayed attacking the main Waal bridge, allowing 10th SS Panzer Division based near Arnhem to make the short journey and bed in strongly at the bridge later the same day, and also create strong defences on the elevated ground just south of the bridge, facing the adjacent town centre itself. They also bedded in within the town. This delay was critical as a window of opportunity was missed.
30 Corps (2nd British Army), containing 50,000 men, are often criticised, but Route 69 (Hells Highway) was a single-track 64-mile long, often elevated and exposed road that was well-defended at various points by anti-tank traps and 88-mil guns. 9 tanks were knocked out soon after they set off. 30 Corps - the Guards Brigade tanks and 50th Northumbrian Division took Valkenswaard by the evening on their first day, but they had only gained 6 miles. British 8th and 12th Divisions moved slowly forward on either flank. 30 Corps were further slowed by counter-attacks along the route and had to build a bailey bridge at Son on the evening of Day 2, before arriving at Nijmegen on schedule at mid-day on the 19th, only to find Nijmegen and its bridge firmly in the hands of the Germans. 30 Corps and 82nd US Division then spent more than 2 full days fighting in Nijmegen and for the bridge, eventually taking it at 7.30pm-8pm on 20th.
This attack on the Waal bridge chiefly involved the King's Company of the 1st Grenadier Guards (30 Corps), who with 82nd US gradually cleared Nijmegen. The Grenadier's eventually charged the elevated defences at the southern end of the Waal bridge at the heavily-defended 'Valkhof' during heroic hand-to-hand fighting in ditches and defences, whilst the remaining Grenadier Guards and 82nd US Division took the adjacent Hunnerspark. These heroic efforts are little recognised, but these attacks where the Grenadier's lost nearly 100 dead enabled the bridge to be taken, when a few British Guards Brigade tanks rolled across the defended bridge, whilst 504th US Brigade heroically traversed the river under heavy fire, losing 48 men, taking the rail bridge and then meeting up at the northern end of the road bridge and around nearby Lent. A dozen tanks eventually got across despite the ongoing threat that it would be detonated, and formed a defensive semi-circle against counter-attack. Lets be clear, they were at this point only late because of having to take Nijmegen and its Waal bridge over 2 days.
It is alleged that they could have gone on at this point, at 8pm on 20th, but in darkness they stopped to consolidate, with 30 Corps infantry still fighting in Nijmegen and also being pulled back to help 101st US division from counter-attack near Veghel where 107th SS Panzer Division broke the supply line for two full days. The Coldstream Guards were also helping 82nd US Division from an attack that now came from the Reichswold Heights, which was beaten off. On 21 September, the following morning, Guards Brigade set off but tanks were quickly taken out as they traversed along the exposed, raised road, so 43rd infantry (of 30 Corps) were brought forward and over the next few days they and Guards Brigade tanks were involved in heavy fighting between Nijmegen and Arnhem around Elst and what was called 'The Island'. After taking Elst, 30 Corps artillery were able to fire shells at the Germans at Oosterbeek. The brave Poles were dropped in and frantically tried to relieve the encircled British Airborne Paras at Oosterbeek, but separated by the river. The efforts of the British Paras at Arnhem are legendary, but once the bridge there fell totally into German hands late on the 20th, German troops and armaments from nearby Germany poured across the bridge into the region between Arnhem and Nijmegen, and the Allies withdrew over a few days to Nijmegen where both sides eventually settled, drawing a line for a period.
So 30 Corps were involved in fighting backwards and forwards along the whole length of the 64 mile route, as Germans counter-attacked. Could they had moved more quickly at times? Possibly but who knows? Strategically, it was inevitably very difficult to organise and co-ordinate 50,000 troops, tanks and artillery to different, appropriate points of the narrow, littered highway as counter-attacks occurred. If Nijmegen Bridge had been taken when there were only a handful of guards there, on the day of arrival on 17th, and then kept, 30 Corps would have potentially been able to roll on to Arnhem rather than getting bogged down completing a job that was not meant to be their objective.
The one other question that is open to debate is whether they could have gone on to Arnhem after taking Nijmegen Bridge on the evening of the 20th September, just 7-8 miles away. Model later confirmed that there were few defences between Nijmegen and Arnhem that evening, but the British did not know this and were fearing counter-attack. They only had a small contingent of tanks, and 30 Corps infantry were still on the other side of the river fighting in Nijmegen and further back south that night, and they state they were exhausted after 4 days of fighting. But Horracks had seemingly implied that they would do just that to 504th US troops prior to the attack. The situation was so fluid and the following day the German defences along the route were strong, and became stronger still over coming days. For me, this is the only criticism of 30 Corps that is arguable, and even then I think it is only said with the benefit of hindsight, and used as a deflection for 82nds failure to prioritise the Waal bridge. Those leading British tanks had bravely taken the bridge under the fear that it was about to be blown. In my opinion 30 Corps were on a hiding to nothing, and General Horracks always believes they performed very well against strong German defences, in difficult terrain. But yes, after taking the Waal bridge, they may have been overly cautious, but concurrently perhaps for good reason.
The Germans were apparently very close to defeat at Arnhem, but strong supplies were being brought in, so whilst Operation MG, following closely after Normandy, seemed like a gamble worth taking at the time, it failed by a whisker. That marks the difference between post-battle assessment describing its creators as overly-ambitious and unrealistic egoists, to tactically brilliant and innovative leaders.
But perhaps the Allies had severely underestimated the remaining strength of the Germans overall at this point, a justified criticism but of course easy to say after the event. It seemed a risk worth taking at the time, with leaders and planners determined to strike whilst the iron was hot and bring an end to the wretched war.
No plan survives first contact with the enemy... (1871, Helmuth von Moltke)
@@rrl4245 ............but some plans are better than others - so that adage is neither an explanation nor an excuse.
I would say; strategically excellent, operationally doubtful, tactically excellent. And that should have been obvious in the planning stages and steps should have been taken to offset the doubts (disadvantages in Wellington's decision making matrix).
@@graemesydney38 Well, that plan was doomed from the start - an overly-ambitious dream... But I was responding to a previous comment: "if the plan had gone accordingly, it might indeed have succeeded."
@@graemesydney38 I'm sorry sir, but as an X-Army officer, infantry, airborne, had I proposed such a plan at Fort Benning, (The Infantry Officer School) I fear I would have been laughed out of Georgia... Far too many critical path items, (single points of failure), coupled with weak intelligence on enemy dispositions. And on a personal note, as an Airborne officer, I can only feel disgust for the wasteful destruction of the 1st Paras.
"That's not the worst of it. See this part here, it's the WIDE part."
*Historynet Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them.*
Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe.
Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. *Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative" Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed - and Monty botched it.*
You had an Incompetent General, Monty, who put his prestige and stupidity before the troops.
I suppose it was a bit silly to expect an American unit to be able to seize an undefended bridge in Nijmegen on the first afternoon. I mean, what was Monty thinking...?
Incompetent? But Montgomery was the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 by some way. He took more ground through more countries while facing more quality German opposition than any other Western Allied ground commander in WW2. Nobody did more to help win the ground war in the west than Bernard Montgomery. This is fact not opinion.
But Monty didn't plan it. Monty cancelled Operation Comet, when intel showed stronger defences building in the area. So how did he put his prestige before the troops?
Hogwash! Montgommery was not even formally in command of the operation. Not that he wasn't inclined to take credit of it if it succeeded, but in a fit of unexpected decency and loyalty he took the flak when it didn't. Monty being Monty was as insufferable and pedantic as he was known for and thus made it very easy to make him a scapegoat.
The crucial problem with the whole operation was that Gen. Gavin failed to execute his PRIMARY objective. All else, despite everything worked out fine and XXX Corps was in time, on time, at the proper place and ready, but then were used for having to fight through Nijmegen and help taking the bridges. After that is it was too late. All due to Gen. Gavin failing to do as he was ordered and take the Nijmegen bridge(s) on day 1.
Go to the Netherlands. Look at the geography. Then visit the the cemeteries so beautifully kept by the Dutch. Like me, you'll figure it out.
Enjoyed your video so I gave it a Thumbs Up
A good plan takes into account contingencies to factor issues that could scuttle plans such as this. I imagine there was a lot of wishful thinking as well as overestimation of the para capabilities given the actual conditions on ground. Intelligence is often crucial, but perhaps too much trust was put into allied intelligence.
Well that's good because Market Garden had contingencies. There was also a rail bridge at Nijmegen (totally ignored by Hollywood), on which the Germans had already conveniently overlaid the rail bed with a wooden deck for wheeled vehicles, and the backup plan for both bridges being held in strength by the enemy was for a river assault to be conducted by 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division with either one or two Brigades up. Two Brigades each had one battalion fully motorised with DUKW amphibious trucks, and if suitable ramps were not available the assault battalions would use the folding canvas assault boats that were also to be used by the rest of the Brigade(s) in the following waves. My source for this is the Special Bridging Force - Engineers Under XXX Corps During Market Garden by John Sliz (2021).
Gavin only insisted his own Division make the assault crossing with the 504th PIR to make amends for the 508th's failure to seize the highway bridge on the first afternoon, when the regiment knew from resistance leader Geert van Hees that the city was evacuated by German rear echelon units and the bridge guarded by just an NCO and seventeen men. The capabilities of the troopers in the 508th was more than good enough to seize this bridge, but the commander was another matter. Despite being given specific instruction by Gavin in the division briefing, even pointing out on a map the route he wanted 1st Battalion to take, the regiment did not make a move for the bridge until after Gavin found out they were dug-in on the Groesbeek ridge, by which time it was too late to get them moving before SS-Panzer troops arrived.
The major and most obvious reason the plan failed was the Allied decision to ignore vital intelligence. Admittedly the Dutch resistance had been infiltrated by the Germans which made any reports from them deemed unreliable but they did have aerial recon that showed tanks and troop build up. Gavin's decision not to prioritise Nijmegen bridge was a huge mistake as that was, after all, what the plan was all about, the bridges. Take them first, hold them, then worry about everything else. It also didn't help that the man in control of the Germans forces defending the front line with 30 corp was General Karl Student, the father of modern parachute tactics. He immediately saw what the Allies intended and used what forces he had to stop them, he knew just where to hurt them thanks to his experience and of course the captured plans from a crashed glider.
With hindsight its easy to suggest ways the plan may have worked. For example use all the planes available to drop the 101st and 82nd on day one so they had full strength to take every bridge and hold it if 30 Corp had issues. The Germans would come south to try and retake Nijmegan and then on day two or 3 drop the entire British and Polish forces on Arnhem and capture the bridge putting the Germans in a vice between Arnhem and Nijmegan.
Even without hindsight, regarding the 82nd Airborne; in a plan to capture bridges, not bothering to even attack the bridge could be seen as a flaw!
@@dannymalone7101 Browning was in command at Nijmegen.
@@nickdanger3802 Not correct. Browning used over thirty invaluable gliders to fly his corps staff into the 82nd Div area with the first lift. These were actually the only people Browning commanded (they holed up in woods in the Groesbeek area under the command of Thomas Firbank, the author). In the Market garden plan the Divisions would retain independent command until reached by the ground forces. They would then come under the control of XXX Corps. It's likely that Browning just wanted to be in the combat area before the4 war ended.
@@dannymalone7101 So there was no reason for Browning to be there with 38 of 1st AB's gliders.
@@nickdanger3802 No reason at all. Even Thomas Firbank, who commanded this motley collection of signallers and clerks, could see no reason for their presence at Groesbeek. He covers it loosely in his book 'I bought a star'
Montgomery's ego killed so many soldiers. He came up with a plan with no room for anything to go wrong, ignoring the factors that made it impractical. Because, you imagine, he was so busy picturing the accolades and parades people would give him for his brilliant plan, he didn't want to hear that it wouldn't work. That it worked as well as it did was due to almost superhuman effort by the poor soldiers throw into this stupid plan.
All high ranking officers have an ego. Patton and MacArthur were another two and both lost men unnecessarily.
Monty came up with a broad outline, which Ike approved of, but he didn’t plan it.
Far fewer troops were killed in Market Garden than other allied battles at the same time such as the Lorraine, Hurtgen Forest, Operation Queen etc. And those all failed too.
Actually, just about everything went wrong. And they still nearly succeeded.
It *was* a terrible plan and it was poorly executed.
That said, Montgomery was without doubt an excellent general, certainly the best army group commander the western allies had. His 'ego' was no different from other high-achieving people. Please don't forget he fought courageously as a rifle platoon leader in WW1 and was so severely wounded he was left for dead. He saw a lot of useless slaughter in WW1 and developed a superb professionalism (*very* rare in the British army in those days) to ensure it never happened again. Quite frankly, while Montgomery spent the interwar years preparing himself and the units he commanded for war, an awful lot of his colleagues played polo and drank G&Ts. The low level of professionalism in the WW2 British officer corps was scandalous. Montgomery had zero patience for that, which is one of the reasons he was disliked. He also didn't come from the aristocracy like most of the officer corps, so that's another social strike against him. Add to it an abrasive personality (he really could be a dick) and that's why he was unpopular with a lot of fellow officers. But the troops generally loved him because they knew he gave a shit about them.
The only way I can understand his thinking with regard to MARGET GARDEN is that he, along with much of the highest-level leadership on the allied side, thought the war was nearly won; that they were facing a situation much like Nov 1918 in which 'one more push' would cause German collapse. To be fair, they'd just inflicted a truly massive defeat on the Germans in France and had plenty of reasons to believe this. So.....if you assume little to no opposition, then MARKET GARDEN starts to make some sense. As soon as you consider the possibility of more-than-token german defense, then of course the plan looks abysmal. Add in the terrible execution, the very poor state of discipline in 1st ABN Div etc and you get a mess.
Browning remained convinced that Market Garden was a sound plan which had been thwarted by bad luck. The incessant reference to the operation as a "failure" was a continual annoyance to him as the parts played by the two American airborne divisions had been a great success, and it angered him that they were never, in his lifetime, given due credit. In private correspondence he wrote "People don't seem to have been told that it [Arnhem] was only rather less than a third of the Airborne effort and the whole thing was 80% successful. The two US Airborne Divisions which I have the honour to command have done marvellously and if it hadn't been for the atrocious weather and sheer bad luck the whole thing would have been 100% successful which in war would have been phenomenal." He also said "I only wish that the exploits of the two American divisions and everyone else during those hectic days when we were holding the corridor open, fighting the battle against the Germans in the Reichswald and struggling to force a corridor to the 1st Division, might be more fully appreciated." Browning received no British recognition for the part that he played in the Battle, but he was, ironically considering his relations with both countries, honoured by the United States who awarded him the Legion of Merit, and by the Poles who gave him the Order of Polonia Restituta.
Pegasus Archive Browning
"..as the parts played by the two American Airborne divisions had been a great success..."
Oh really? Let's look at this coldly and with the facts. Were the key objectives of both divisions taken and controlled? No. Son bridge, blown. Nijmegen - Grav road, left open. Nijmegen, left to the enemy, and crucially, Nijmegen bridge left for someone else to do.
Nick, mate, Pegasus archive has some good resources, but poor analysis.
@@stephenmccartneyst3ph3nm85 He (Browning) became anxious on the same day as he watched the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment and the Grenadier Guards making their attempt to capture Nijmegen Bridge, and when it fell he said to Horrocks of the American crossing, "I have never seen a more gallant action."
Pegasus Archive Browning
"A Single Road Too Narrow". "Garden" was ill advised, poorly planned and timidly executed in the face of stiffer initial resistance than was assumed possible. The ground attack came as no surprise to the Germans and they had once again gained a breather to form ad hoc defense units. Once the operational plans were found in a downed Allied glider the entire timetable was exposed and the plan was doomed.
The ground advance was working and was still on schedule when it reached Nijmegen in less than 48 hours, where it was found the Germans still possessed the two key bridges over the Waal. That was not part of the plan, so you can't blame the plan or the ground advance for that failure.
Furthermore, the crashed glider belonged to the 101st Airborne Division's liaison officer to Browning's Airborne Corps HQ at Groesbeek. The documents he carried included the resupply schedule for his division, rather than the whole operational plan suggested by a Hollywood film. Only 1.Fallschirm-armee commander General Kurt Student, whose headquarters at Vught was near the glider crash site, understood the significance of the schedule after it had been translated, while GFM Model did not attach any significance to it. Student arranged through his own Luftwaffe chain of command (the Fallschirmtruppe were part of the Luftwaffe and only tactically under army command) to have fighter aircraft over the drop zones when the airlifts were due to arrive, but this worked against the Germans when the airlifts were all delayed by weather in England and the Luftwaffe planes were on the ground being refuelled when the transports arrived.
The operation was compromised at Nijmegen. All the other excuses are misdirection that can be easily debunked with a bit of research.
@@davemac1197 "That was not part of the plan" And only 740 men getting to one end of the last intact bridge near Arnhem at 2000 hours was part of the plan?
"my task was to take the three bridges ... on that first afternoon"
Lt. Col. J.D. Frost about Operation Market Garden
ruclips.net/video/mdvpA94XSv0/видео.html
The plan wasn't merely complex, it was complex and each element was necessary to be successful for the next element to have any chance.
In reality not a single airborne group took all of their objectives, but there wasn't really a good contingency if they failed to do so. Namingen may have been the worst failure (or the luckiest success, by all rights to bridge should have been blown), but the whole plan was susceptible to delays from each failure.
So yeah, it really was a bridge too far.
Namigen, what the heck for name is that? u mean Nijmegen, learn to spell and read for crying out loud
@@commandbrawler9348the grammar Nazis are always watching ;p
@@johnschmidt1262 its a bit important that you know history and learn to spell place names correctly. u didnt even correct your scentence lmfao. and yes they are watching! this time i couldnt stand seeing a city name in the country where i live being spelled wrong, the correct spelling of the name can even be seen in the video many times !
If you look at the history of airborne operations in WW2(American, British, German, and Russian), most of them were flawed, failures, or even near disasters. To plan such an ambitious and complicated operation like Market-Garden, thinking and even depending on everything going absolutely right, was not being realistic.
The planning for Market-Garden also ignored or deliberately violated the hard earned lessons of previous airborne operations.
By spreading the airborne landings out over THREE days, the element of surprise was lost by day two. The airborne divisions were being asked to take and hold their objectives at reduced strength; in the case of the British 1st Airborne with barely a third of it's strength.
Previous operations had shown the importance of landing airborne units on or immediately close to their objective. Landing miles from their main objectives, threw away the the element of surprise. Within a half hour of the landings, any competent German General with a map could see what Market-Garden was about, and take the initiative to oppose it.
Lastly was the need of regular ground forces to quickly link up with airborne units. By necessity, airborne units are lightly armed and have less firepower. Even the overly optimistic expectation of 30th Corps to reach Arnhem in two days was pushing it.
@@dongilleo9743 I read your above conclusion in the book "War as I knew it": by General George Patton. About airborne troops must be close to their objectives and must be relieved by Allied ground troops fast.
My father had to fly in awful conditions to see if the Bridge was still there . The 1 time he talked about it was the only time he talked about operations & the 1 time I saw him really angry, & that anger seemed to be pointed at 1 man only. The great film “A Big too far” was the trigger for him losing his temper.
That's a real shame, because half of the film is fiction and too many people believe it to be more accurate.
@@davemac1197 The film was just a catalyst. I hate writing about it because as you said the film was half fiction. I only saw him angry like that twice in my life. Something happened that made him feel that the fighter pilots were just expendable. Flying in to find the bridge was extremely hairy, because the weather was so bad , from what I can see on his squadrons missions 4 Mustang III’s went in. that day & they found the bridge still there. The flight was not the reason he was so angry, My mother knew but I was never told.
Like many pilots he absolutely loved flying in such an amazing aircraft & pushing his own limits( his description of flying around Scotland for instance ) but hated some of the operational side. By the way the film showed a couple of aircraft. The whole RAF 2nd Tactical Air Force was close by. The weather was very bad that part is true.
I always thought that they should have done one bridge at a time.
Capture one bridge and advance up the orad.
Then land on the next one and so on
Then the Germans would have done likewise. Thrown all their reinforcements around the next bridge instead of having to disperse them everywhere at once.
Stretching supply line requirements too far from the beginning as the original plan, doomed Market Garden to failure. Eisenhower should never have agreed to the plan.
I think that is exaggerated. But the picture could have been very different if the RAF and the USAF had cleared the IX and X SS panzer divisions the day before the attack and if the paras were dropped close the the Arnhem bridge.
The idea of crossing the Waal with a Bailey bridge does not show any appreciation of the huge width of this river. But the ferry at Driel could have been very useful had the British not ignored it.
The air generals insisting on dispersed drops over a number of days killed Market Garden.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Indeed, you could argue that Market-Garden was set to fail back in 1942-43, when the Americans and British were setting their production and training priorities. If all three airborne divisions and the Polish brigade had been able to land at full strength at one time on the first day of Market-Garden, the course of the operation would almost certainty have been successful. To have the required number of transport planes, gliders, glider tugs, pilots and crews in September 1944 would have required that they be put in the production and procurement system in the 1942-43 time period.
In 1942-43, American and British procurement people had to plan for what they might need come 1944. Do they build fighters, fighter-bombers, and bombers, which they know will be useful, or do they devote precious and scarce resources to build transport planes and gliders, and train crews to go with them, that might be useful in some unforeseen future large airborne operations? They did the logical thing at the time and built warplanes, not transport planes.
Not having the required number of transports for Market-Garden meant the operation either had to be scaled back to use the available air assets, or that the airborne units had to go in piecemeal over several days. Going in piecemeal meant the divisions were understrength on the crucial first day when it was most important to seize their assigned objectives. After that, the most important element of surprise was lost, and they found themselves increasingly set up on by German reinforcements.
It is strange that both the Americans and British devoted so much to building airborne forces, without devoting the effort, expense, and resources to build the necessary air assets to deploy them; at least not all at once. There was never the expectation that more than one or two divisions would be used at a time. Even by the time of Operation Varsity in March 1945, the Americans and British still only had the air assets to deploy two airborne divisions at once. Originally, an additional American airborne division was planned to participate, but the lesson of the importance of landing airborne units at full strength on day one had been brutally relearned from Market -Garden.
Market-Garden was similar to Japanese naval battle plans. Complex and requiring the enemy to act as expected. Disregarding that an enemy may not do as the plan expected them too. The enemy always had a say in how the battle proceeds
The Imperial Japanese Navy was trained by the British, so there's the connection.
@@davemac1197 …. One reason the US Army is said in WW2 to have done well is chaos. As in war is chaos. And the US Army was practiced in chaos. On a daily basis. The US Navy had it’s own traditions separate from the Royal Navy. Before the end of the first year of the Pacific War lessons had been learned and underperforming senior naval officers replaced. As Admiral Yamamoto warned after Pearl Harbor Japan was headed into a war it couldn’t win. However his IJN took a grim toll on the US Fleet that first year
@@Idahoguy10157 - that's a really interesting point. For many years since reading Cornelius Ryan in 1977, I thought all the problems that Market Garden suffered were the reason it failed. It's only in the last 10 years that a number of books have emerged going back to the source material and taking a fresh look at it to arrive at a different conclusion. It's now clear to me that Market Garden failed because of one regimental commander in 82nd Airborne failed to follow the plan at Nijmegen, and that officer was also criticised in his unit's first operation in Normandy and got a lot of men killed.
It's clear that the divisional commander should have taken action to remove that officer from command of the regiment, either during or after Normandy. In fact Matthew Ridgway had an easy way out of the problem, because he was promoted to command the XVIII Airborne Corps in August, and the officer in command of the 508th Parachute Infantry began his Airborne career as a very talented S-1 (Admin officer) to the Airborne forces, so Ridgway could have taken that officer with him to XVIII Airborne Corps as his S-1, and a proven combat officer take over the 508th Regiment. The division was taken over by James Gavin, the Assistant Divisional Commander, and the first mistake he made was not to replace himself, so in Market Garden he was running himself ragged doing both jobs!
@@Idahoguy10157 - to answer your original post, the enemy actually took advantage of an Allied mistake - the failure to secure the Nijmegen bridges on the first afternoon. The Germans correctly identified Nijmegen as their 'schwerpunkt' (point of main effort), and that's where they defeated Market Garden.
@@davemac1197 …. Obviously you’re more well read than I am.
I’ve opined that sending armor and mechanized infantry up one raised exposed two lane road was one fatal flaw.
IMHO Monty should instead have prioritized securing the Schelt estuary to get the port of Antwerp online.
I realize the entire Airborne Army was waiting for a mission. But as Market-Garden showed there was already a lack of C-47’s and gliders to use them all expeditiously in a drop.
Compare that to simply trucking the 101st Division to reinforce Bastogne in December. Where they were invaluable to holding off the Germans
we need sometimes at the bigger picture - we can not blame an after thought - the only shame many soldiers lost their life -
This is bcoz of excellent generalship of Walter Model and complicated Allied planning.
1st airborne division never ran out of 6pdr and 17 pdr ammunition in the final cauldron north of the north rhine-which is why the perimeter wasnt overun
From Dunkirk, at the beginning of World War II, to Normandy, almost at the end, the Allied Armies did not put a single soldier in Germany. No a single one. The participation of the Allied Forces in Europe was limited to Aerial Bombing. These actions received a lot of publicity to make us believe that the Aerial Bombings were winning the war. But, there is a very long list of Bombing cities by “Mistake”. The bombing of Nijmegen in the Netherlands (February 1944), it occurred when US bombers returning from a failed mission, as occurred in most cases, were looking for "Optional" targets. Nearly 1,000 Dutch civilians were killed by the bombing. It is proven fact that Aerial Bombardment does NOT win wars, unless it is Atomic. Aerial Bomb't can destroy cities but does NOT destroy armies. If there is any doubt, then Nazi Germany would have defeated England, after nearly a year of bombing, or the US would have won in Korea, Vietnam or Afghanistan. Propaganda has always led us to believe that we, "The Yankees", beat Hitler. But, I have news for you: The US did not win the war against Germany. The Russians won it. The Allied Army of the US, UK, Canada, Belgium and France (and Poland, and other countries), was able to reach Normandy, thanks to the Soviets destroying the Nazis in Stalingrad, Leningrad, in Kurks and in Kiev, in 1943. It took them 289 days but the Russians won and without the help of nobody… OF NOBODY! Normandy was until June 1944, and Mr. “Hollywood” Patton did NOT manage to set foot on Germany until February 1945, when the Red Army was going over Berlin. In Fact, General Patton was able to cross the border into Germany only when the Russians were 150 kilometers from the Oder River (LOL). The Allies were defeated at Arnhem (Market Garden Sep. 25-1944), and at The Battle of the Bulge (Jan. 25-1945). "Operation Varsity" took place near the end of the War (March 1945), and only 85,000 German soldiers fought against almost 700,000 Allied Forces who could NOT cross the Rhine River due to the heroic resistance of an "Army" of 18-year-olds and 50-year-old Reserve Infantry. So, here General Patton was paralyzed without fuel, while the Red Army was preparing for its last offensive into Berlin. Look here: The average age of the German Army that fought in Normandy was between 18 and 24 years old. And these soldiers faced each other in a ratio of 27 to 1, without Tanks, without Artillery, no Navy nor Air Force. To make matters worse, knowing that four Parachute Divisions were inland behind their backs. This was the reason the Allies won in Normandy. Never the less, It took the Allies 8 months to advance only 500 kilometers from Normandy to Arnhem, and from there, start the Withdrawal back to the border of France/Belgium (What?), facing a virtually defeated German Army cuz USSR. It's a Verifiable Fact that is written in all the History Books, that the German High Command surrendered to the Russian Generals six days BEFORE the first US soldier set foot in Berlin. Well… The US has been defeated in Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Lebanon, Somalia and now, in Afghanistan. However, the powerful US Army defeated the tiny island of Grenada (1983), as it faced a fearsome army of 287 Police Officers, since Grenada does NOT have an army. In fact, they were half this number, since the Policemen on the afternoon shift had not yet come to work. What seems incredible is the fact that the US was defeated by Vietnam. What? Did the US lose the war against Nam? OMG! Against a poor country, underdeveloped, malnourished, without Navy, without Air Force, NO Marines, Green Berets, SEALs, Rangers, Delta Force, USMC, Rambos or Chuck Norris. Defeated by a country of peasants without strategic plans, no B-59 Bombers, PT-Boats, Northrop F-5 "Freedom Fighter", nor Atomic Submarines. Without Aircraft Carriers, NO Continental Missiles, nor Tanks, Choppters, AR-15, Gatlin Machines’, Flamethrowers, Napalm, Agent Orange. NADA! And to top it off, defeated by an army of teenagers who had no shoes: WITHOUT SHOES!!! Army that fought with bamboo sticks!!! Charlie Kicked Our Asses and even invaded our Embassy. Jeezzz!!! Here is the Duty, Courage and Chanting of Heroism of the US Army. This is the True Story of our Country. This is the History that is already written in the US Books. And the History that was written in Afghanistan is made with the same ink.
Salvador Vizcarra
Throughout the entire 1939-45 war the Axis didn't put a single soldier into England.
See how that works?
The irony is that the man who considered it a success was none other than Gen Student, commander of the German Paras.
It wasn't a success for the Germans, they lost 4 bridges and lost a ton of ground, and key position, sure they prevented it from being a total disaster by not losing Arkhem but they were fighting with heavy armor and tanks against a few surrounded and under equipped paratroopers divisions there, obviously would be an embarrassment to lose that fight.
Occam's Razor....This concept sums up Market Garden's failure. Okay, just one, then: Attacking on an absurdly narrow front....the width of a road....the British were mad.
The British were making it work just fine, thanks. The tanks reached Nijmegen on schedule, in just 45 hours with only another 11 miles to go to Arnhem, only to find the Americans had failed to secure any bridges over the Waal on the first afternoon, when they were virtually undefended and the Germans had evacuated the city. This was an unforced error, and a failure to follow the specific instructions of their own divisional commander at the briefing in England. Ref: Chapters 9 (divisional briefing) and 10 (Nijmegen), Put Us Down In Hell, Phil Nordyke (2012).
They forgot the Battle of The Green Hell of The Huertgen . Took place same time as Operation Market Garden , and, also , grim results for USAs 2st , and 9th Armies. And the Vosges Mtn. Struggle of the USAs 7th Army about same time.
Patton's 3rd Army in the Lorraine was the worst of the lot. 55,000 casualties and objective not achieved.
Lyndon Latrine - Patton like the Russians finished the Reich as bernard hid from away from Market Garden and was a castaway on our coattails - you're welcome
If Market Garden had been a success, the Allied Forces had probably reached the Ruhr Area in October 1944. The Ruhr Area - a heavily industrialised region in Western Germany - was an important part of the German war industry. The loss of this large industry complex might have shortened the war by several months. Possibly the Western Allied Forces would have been the first to reach Berlin. Looking at the benefits, It was worth it IMO.
a successful Market Garden would also have cut off 15th Army Group, and opened up access to the port of Rotterdam, and potentially Amsterdam, too, making Antwerp a bonus port once available. The intention of Eisenhower for Market Garden was to push to the Ziederzee region, in addition to being at the gateway to the Rhur.
Could the Allies been able to capture some Polish territory as to not make it fall into Soviet hands or would it have been too late by then?
@@VeteranAlpha No, the territories was already cut up between the Allies. The Soviet Union received Eastern Europe, including Poland. Some parts of Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia were liberated by the Americans, but they had those territories given back to the Soviets.
@@sean640307 You mean Zuiderzee region, the Marker Lake and IJssel Lake today.
Capturing Berlin would have a costly affair, it costs the Soviet Army 80.000 men. And Eastern Germany was already promised to Stalin, so no need to take Berlin.
Never underestimate your enemy.
Montgomery OVERESTIMATED his allies at Nijmegen - they failed to secure an undefended bridge in a city evacuated by the Germans on the first afternoon of the operation.
The Germans did it all the time. Battle of Britain, Barbarossa, Ardennes etc.
I always wondered if Monty proposed this daring plan after suffering the sting of rumors he'd gone too slowly around Caen and was trying to prove something to the Americans.
nope he already was wanting to do something along these lines even before D day so way before Caen, also as a side not things went slow around Caen because that's what the Germans defended, only a singe panzer brigade of the 16 available where not dedicated to the Caen part of the line.
Most of his daring plans got undone by Bradley (he was worse than Patton in his own way). They had a major falling out over Linnet (cancelled Airborne op). Comet was going to be all British, but then had to be upgraded to Market by using the Linnet air plan with both US divisions. Can't help but feel we could have ended the German war sooner if the Americans were not still fighting the war of independence.
@@davemac1197 Churchill saw it differently.
“Now at this very moment I knew that the United States was in the war, up to the neck and in to the death. So we had won after all! How long the war would last or in what fashion it would end no man could tell, nor did I at this moment care ... We should not be wiped out. Our history would not come to an end ... Hitler's fate was sealed. Mussolini's fate was sealed. As for the Japanese, they would be ground to a powder. All the rest was merely the proper application of overwhelming force.”
The glider soldiers were so brave, some rite to the bridge,LEST WE FORGET.
Great presentation! I still wonder what happened to the overwhelming allied air support that had helped clinch the German defeat and route from Normandy. Holland should have been a shooting gallery for the masses of fighter bombers and twin engine medium bombers that the allies had available to them.
From Dunkirk, at the beginning of World War II, to Normandy, almost at the end, the Allied Armies did not put a single soldier in Germany. No a single one. The participation of the Allied Forces in Europe was limited to Aerial Bombing. These actions received a lot of publicity to make us believe that the Aerial Bombings were winning the war. But, there is a very long list of Bombing cities by “Mistake”. The bombing of Nijmegen in the Netherlands (February 1944), it occurred when US bombers returning from a failed mission, as occurred in most cases, were looking for "Optional" targets. Nearly 1,000 Dutch civilians were killed by the bombing. It is proven fact that Aerial Bombardment does NOT win wars, unless it is Atomic. Aerial Bomb't can destroy cities but does NOT destroy armies. If there is any doubt, then Nazi Germany would have defeated England, after nearly a year of bombing, or the US would have won in Korea, Vietnam or Afghanistan. Propaganda has always led us to believe that we, "The Yankees", beat Hitler. But, I have news for you: The US did not win the war against Germany. The Russians won it. The Allied Army of the US, UK, Canada, Belgium and France (and Poland, and other countries), was able to reach Normandy, thanks to the Soviets destroying the Nazis in Stalingrad, Leningrad, in Kurks and in Kiev, in 1943. It took them 289 days but the Russians won and without the help of nobody… OF NOBODY! Normandy was until June 1944, and Mr. “Hollywood” Patton did NOT manage to set foot on Germany until February 1945, when the Red Army was going over Berlin. In Fact, General Patton was able to cross the border into Germany only when the Russians were 150 kilometers from the Oder River (LOL). The Allies were defeated at Arnhem (Market Garden Sep. 25-1944), and at The Battle of the Bulge (Jan. 25-1945). "Operation Varsity" took place near the end of the War (March 1945), and only 85,000 German soldiers fought against almost 700,000 Allied Forces who could NOT cross the Rhine River due to the heroic resistance of an "Army" of 18-year-olds and 50-year-old Reserve Infantry. So, here General Patton was paralyzed without fuel, while the Red Army was preparing for its last offensive into Berlin. Look here: The average age of the German Army that fought in Normandy was between 18 and 24 years old. And these soldiers faced each other in a ratio of 27 to 1, without Tanks, without Artillery, no Navy nor Air Force. To make matters worse, knowing that four Parachute Divisions were inland behind their backs. This was the reason the Allies won in Normandy. Never the less, It took the Allies 8 months to advance only 500 kilometers from Normandy to Arnhem, and from there, start the Withdrawal back to the border of France/Belgium (What?), facing a virtually defeated German Army cuz USSR. It's a Verifiable Fact that is written in all the History Books, that the German High Command surrendered to the Russian Generals six days BEFORE the first US soldier set foot in Berlin. Well… The US has been defeated in Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Lebanon, Somalia and now, in Afghanistan. However, the powerful US Army defeated the tiny island of Grenada (1983), as it faced a fearsome army of 287 Police Officers, since Grenada does NOT have an army. In fact, they were half this number, since the Policemen on the afternoon shift had not yet come to work. What seems incredible is the fact that the US was defeated by Vietnam. What? Did the US lose the war against Nam? OMG! Against a poor country, underdeveloped, malnourished, without Navy, without Air Force, NO Marines, Green Berets, SEALs, Rangers, Delta Force, USMC, Rambos or Chuck Norris. Defeated by a country of peasants without strategic plans, no B-59 Bombers, PT-Boats, Northrop F-5 "Freedom Fighter", nor Atomic Submarines. Without Aircraft Carriers, NO Continental Missiles, nor Tanks, Choppters, AR-15, Gatlin Machines’, Flamethrowers, Napalm, Agent Orange. NADA! And to top it off, defeated by an army of teenagers who had no shoes: WITHOUT SHOES!!! Army that fought with bamboo sticks!!! Charlie Kicked Our Asses and even invaded our Embassy. Jeezzz!!! Here is the Duty, Courage and Chanting of Heroism of the US Army. This is the True Story of our Country. This is the History that is already written in the US Books. And the History that was written in Afghanistan is made with the same ink.
@@salvadorvizcarra769 Korea is an interesting case. The UN air forces ran out of what they considered to be "viable targets" within the first few months (neither of the Koreas was heavily industrialized and the road network on that hilly and mountainous peninsula was a joke as the heavily mechanized UN ground forces soon found out) but they continued to bomb with impunity every day of every month of every year until the war ended and still only achieved a stalemate. The allied air forces never paralyzed the opposing communist armies as they had those of Germany in 1944-1945.
Poor weather is one answer. Another is that the Allied advance across France had outrun the air support infrastructure, to a degree. Ground/Air liaison was also very patchy during Market Garden, with a lot of equipment failures.
Blame Brereton for that. He didn't want allied ground attack air support interfering with the FAAA flight routes.
@@salvadorvizcarra769 you are forgetting Dieppe, St Nazaire etc..1942
The Parachute Regiment museum at Arnhem is wonderful as a resource for this. And it tells more of the story, as the Germans afterwards took out their frustrations on the Dutch citizens. But in all of this, Monty's ego shines through. The plan would have been brilliant had it worked, but it was extremely complex and complicated. Everything would have to work perfectly, and of course it didn't. But Monty was so fixated on the plan that he willfully ignored the intelligence of the presence of 2 SS Panzer divisions in Arnhem, which previously was thought to be defended by weak homeguard units that would put up light resistance. He was told, but that didn't fit his plan, so he ignored it, and 7,500 paratroopers were lost. Not to mention all the other units that took casualties during the operation.
It was Monty's idea (which he had presented to Ike) not his plan. The plan was made by USAAF officers.
@@CIMAmotor The driving force behind the creation of Market Garden was Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, who disagreed with the 'broad front' strategy favoured by Eisenhower, in which all Allied armies in North-West Europe advanced simultaneously. The whole operation would not have taken place if it was n´t for Montgomery insisting on having it his way.
@@trident6547 and Eisenhower agreed with Montgomery. then allocated officers in the USAAF to plan it.
I was 8 years in Germany when I first saw this, my family was stationed there in the Army, we saw a few movies that year but out of all them as I came out the theater I can see the sobering faces from the soldiers
in that base theater. After serving in the corps, jump qualified, task force Ripper in the Gulf War, I later on
saw this movie as part of my history class in college on military tactics. In the beginning of the movie as the
highers were getting debrief, I said to myself, "They are f.cked!" Fast forward to today, Ukraine, a professional
comedian fighting the Russians, history repeats itself. We will never learn.
The greatest flaw appears to have been the reliance on only one road for the ground forces to advance on. Any issues on the one road, then problems escalate as actually happened.
Sounds like a nice argument, exept that the British Army had been using main supply routes on 'single roads' to supply its divisions since the breakout from Normandy and continued them into Germany all the way to Bremen. The 'Club Route' used by Guards Armoured Division did not start and end for Market Garden. The flanking VIII and XII Corps were using designated 'Spade' and 'Diamond' routes respectively, and there were alternative crossings for XXX Corps on the 'Heart Route' in case a bridge was blown. There was also a 'Triangle Route' between Eindhoven and Uden opened up during one of the instances when 'Club Route' was cut by the Germans, but of course you never hear about these things unless you do a lot of reading on the subject. The appearance of reliance on just one road is just that - appearance.
As I understand the situation, a large part of the failure can be laid at the feet of Gen. Gavin. He had one objective and one only: capture of the bridge(s) at Nijmegen. Now I do understand the need to protect your flanks but Gavin seem to have made protecting his flanks a priority which delayed capturing the bridge. By the time the flanks were deemed sufficiently fortified, the Germans had fortified positions at both bridges with a defensive perimeter around it in the town. From that moment on the paratroopers had very little chance of capturing any of the Nijmegen bridges before being reinforced by armoured units that were being held up between Son and Veghel.
That's essentially correct, but just a couple of points.
Of Gavin's three Parachute Regiments, the 504th were assigned to the Maas bridge at Grave and taking the Maas-Waalkanaal bridges from the west, the 505th to assist in taking the canal bridges from the east, clear the town of Groesbeek, take a rail bridge over the Maas at Mook, and patrol the Reichswald forest. The 508th were assigned to first secure the Groesbeek ridge (a possible German defensive position), and once that was secure, to move on the bridges in Nijmegen as soon as possible. The problem was the 508th was the least aggressive unit in the Division, because of its poor leadership. At 1800 hrs on the first day, Gavin learned the 504th had secured his supply line - his top priority, the 505th reported the Reichswald empty and unsuitable for tanks, and the 508th were reported digging-in on the Groesbeek ridge against absolutely no opposition. Gavin was furious and ordered the 508th's Liaison Officer into a Jeep to "get them moving!" It was too late.
The XXX Corps ground forces were still on schedule when they made contact with the 504th at Grave, about 45 hours into the operation, only to find the Nijmegen bridges were still in German hands and heavily reinforced with SS-Panzer troops. There was no delay between Son and Grave, they did that journey in 2.5 hours for the armoured cars and 4 hours for the tanks. In fact there wasn't even really a hold up at Son because the Bailey bridge was constructed overnight when it was doctrine not to operate tanks. They would have to stop overnight in the 101st Airborne's area anyway. The delay that put the operation 36 hours behind the notional schedule happened at Nijmegen, when two combined operations, the first unsuccessful, had to be mounted to finally capture the Waal bridges.
He had four objectives capture the bridges at Nimegan, Waal, Graves and secure the high ground against possible counter attack. Three of them were achieved on schedule. The problem was he needed to take all four for the operation to be considered successful. That was really the underlying problem of operation Market Garden, there were too many things that could go wrong that simply couldn't be worked around.
@@johnschmidt1262 The bridges were the key though, what is the point of holding the heights if you haven't secured the bridges. Gavin has a well deserved good reputation but the delay at Nijmegen was potentially crucial.
@@johnschmidt1262 yet he was to prioritise the bridges and he didn't. He has to take a fair share of the blame like the planners should for ignoring key intelligence.
@@Challis1989 I saw the Tik video also. It's fine to believe Gavin made a mistake, I was simply pointing out it is factually wrong to say that he only had one objective. It's also worth pointing out that none of the airborne groups actually achieved all of their objectives successfully. But most of the fault has to lie with the plan itself, they really didn't ask what would happen if any group fails, a possibility you should always consider. The whole plan was set up in a way such that any one element failing causes the failure of everything further down the line.
The main reason was that expecting troops to capture and hold against counter-attacks multiple bridges at multiple locations was expecting too much. Also, the corridor was very narrow and open to German counterattack. Montgomery was the person who developed the plan. Montgomery was very good at planning an initial attach such as El Alamein and Overlord. He was not as strong in making plans in the middle of an attack to deal with the unexpected. Probably the biggest reason it failed, is that the German Army was still willing to fight.
The Germans were, sadly, the best soldiers in WW2 which is why they were able to hold on so long before being beaten.
But... Market-Garden was worth a go. Had it not been for Nijmegen, it might have been successful - see TIK’s Battlestorm presentation, his points have a lot going for them and the detail is excellent.
@@mikereger1186 TIK's video is good for details of events but his conclusions that it was not Monty's fault are just stupid. The success was dependant on every single detail going as imagened by Montgomery. Any delay on the way and the operation fails. That is sole fault of Montgomery and his planning and not anyone else in the field.
@@mikereger1186 while that would increase market garden's chances we don't know how exactly it would turn out otherwise. One end of Arnhem bridge was held by the Germans for a long time, and they could just blow it if XXX corps arrived. And the Germans did counterattack at several areas along the highway, which did delay the corps' advance and threaten to cut the corps off.
Il Maresciallo Montgomery , ottimo comandante non brillava però certo in azzardo . ha sempre privilegiato la tattica con una certa sicurezza . dubito che un operazione così rischiosa venisse solo dalla sua mente , a meno che non avesse in mano rapporti di intelligence completamente errati.
Overlord? Monty didn't plan Overlord. Lieutenant-General Frederick E. Morgan and a substantial staff planned Overlord.
There were various things that fouled up. If the radio batteries had been charged the paras would have had air support, both close air support, resupply and reinforcements.
There was also a ferry across the Rhine that was big enough to take tanks and operated for several days while 30 corps drove past.
There was also another road parallel with the main road north that was not defended.
What parallel road and which ferry are you referring to?
@@davemac1197 There was a book I read quite a few years ago that went through all the bad luck Market Garden had. The ferry was eventually shelled by the Germans, but not before it could have carried many tanks across the Rhine. There were actually many other pieces of bad luck and mistakes that doomed the operation, but I can’t remember all of them.
@@SvenTviking - there was a ferry from Heveadorp to Driel on the Rijn that was known about (I have a Defence Overprint map that notes the ferry can hold 8 Jeeps) that could have been useful, unfortunately the Phase 2 positions of the 1st Battalion The Border Regiment were not quite far enough west to cover the ferry in the original plan and by the time it was realised it could be useful it was a bit late to push the perimeter out. I believe that particular ferry was sabotaged by the Dutch ferryman, because he didn't want the Germans to have use of it and no one from the Airborne came to make use of it until it was too late.
Another ferry at Huissen was also sabotaged by the ferryman after the Germans used it to get an SS battalion (Euling) to Nijmegen, so other forces following had to take a wide detour to the ferry at Pannerden to get across.
The parallel road, I wonder if you were thinking of the new highway between Nijmegen and Arnhem? It was still under construction in 1944 and was not suitable for traffic. That was in the intelligence briefing for 1st Parachute Brigade, if memory serves. That road is now the A325.
Planned in a week, supplied for a day, expected to last hours, was a doomed in a minute
For anyone interested, an interesting examination of Market-Garden is "The Last German Victory" by Aaron Bates. The training and tactical doctrine of the German Army, it's emphasis on individual officers and even soldiers exercising personal initiative on every level, gave it a distinct advantage. The British Army , by virtue of it's training, tactical doctrine, and the war fighting techniques it had grown accustomed by this point in the war, was ill suited and unprepared to succeed in an operation of the scope and type of Market-Garden.
I agree with you, thanks to the identical training to all different German troops, SS-men could fight with the Grüne Polizei-men (Green Police) seamlessly. And all other German troops of the Heer (Army) and Luftwaffe.
Great post Don and the truth,of course Monty with the spine of a gummy bear never appeared.Unlike an actual Field Marshall Walter Model directing in person
Actually Garden, the ground part, mostly suceeded. Market, the air part, mostly failed.
In Market Garden, the British Army advanced the fastest against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period.
It wasnt the British Army that failed Market Garden. It was the air forces. The First Allied Airborne Army, USAAF and RAF all made major tactical errors which doomed the operating.
None of the three airborne divisions suceeded in their objectives.
The British Army, without any airborne input, went on to further push the Germans back in Operation Aintree in October, taking Overloon and Venray etc.
Ah another of Monty's apologists pokes his head out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan. Actually it was Monty who admitted it - and like you he LIES, MONGTOMERY lied to IKE stating the Air Marshalls Ageed when in fact they were not even consulted.They had the the hard part of the planning.1,600 flights over 300 miles with less and less daylight. There is a lot of logistics involved, try removing your head from Monty's backside and read *Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality* The pinhead Monty just pointed toward Arnhem and told the tanks to go that way. He was nothing more than a shady sargeant doing a poor private's job and did not have the decency to show up and command
I think it’s unfair to say the British Airborne performed poorly against SS panzer divisions. I think it should be respected that they held the north end of the Bridge till they ran out of Ammunition. I think it comes down to poor planning from the higher ups and them underestimating German strength in the area
Montgomery's objective was to reach eventually even further into the Netherlands; even to the IJsselmeer lake which separates the West part of the Netherlands to the North and East, and in that way cut off the German troops and encircle those in the key provinces of North and South Holland. Isolated they would have been easily forced to surrender. He probably counted on a shock effect too, disorganised defense. Instead he found refitted troops, SS army pantzer groups with veterans that previously fought in Normandy and had a score to settle. I also think he wanted to stop V1 and V2 rockets that were mostly fired from the Netherlands. Although it was an opportunistic, ultimately brazen plan, but I would not call it a complete failure. Even if they did not liberate the Netherlands, they did cut through the German front, in fact the allies made enormous and fast progress to the north and west wards. They fought extremely hard and it was a huge blow to the Germans. It also cost a lot of civilian lives and many cities and towns were left in total ruin. For the Dutch, the price was very high; while expected to be liberated, and you face this destruction instead, let's say it left some bitter and mixed emotions about Montgomery's ambitions. But this is war, you can hardly blame a single general, the tip of the spear always takes the brunt of the impact, but the spear itself lodged deep. The Germans north of the Rhine never managed to cross or wage a significant counter offensive. When the last winter of war turned very harsh in the lowlands, a horrific famine followed, especially hit hard were the big cities, like Amsterdam and Rotterdam, as already scarcely available food was taken mostly by the Germans, thousands of people died. This was the hangover for the Dutch after the high expectations of september 1944.
I agree with every word except the SS-Panzer units (9.SS and 10.SS-Panzer-Divisons of II.SS-Panzerkorps) were not yet "refitted". Your English is obviously very good, but it would be correct to say they were in the area to "refit", but this process had not yet started.
In reality Monty's plan had No Chance of success because of his constant failures. (He was the best ally Germany Had!) Ike had ordered him to clear the Estuary to enable him to get his supplies from Antwerp. Monty refused. He was supposed to form the northern pincer at Falaise to surround the Germans in Normandy with Patton. Monty again failed and over 50,000 escaped. Many of those units were re-equipped and waiting in Belgium and Holland!
@@richardmeo2503 - and yet Market Garden came very close to succeeding - I understand now why an American unit at Nijmegen deliberately had to screw up to ensure Montgomery maintained his perfect record of failure. Thanks for straightening me out, Dick.
By the way, Montgomery wrote after the war that he also made a mistake in thinking the Canadian 1st Army would be able to clear the Scheldt Estuary on their own - it was in their sector after all. Since Montgomery was commander of 21st Army Group, 1st Canadian Army was part of his command. He didn't refuse to do anything. He overestimated the capability of an ally. Seems to be a habit of his, doesn't it?
And at Falaise, Patton's Third Army was under Montgomery's command. Land Forces command did not transfer to Eisenhower until 1st September. So which arm of the pincer was at fault? Dempsey's British 2nd Army, or Patton's US 3rd Army? I would put that one down to the Germans, unless hipocrisy is another hobby of yours?
@@davemac1197 No, MG did not come close to succeeding. It was a ridiculous plan and IKE was wrong in allowng it. Patton was NOT under Monty's command at Falaise, He was under Bradley. And both were under IKE who had taken over in July. Had Monty made it to Caan on DDay as was planned and he boasted he would, Falaise would never have happened. But since Monty took 28 days to reach Caan, just 12 miles from the beaches, and within range of Navy guns, the Americans had to plod through the Bocage getting decimated. The Allies planned on 12 fighter strips, all in Monty's sector. Since he never advanced, they were never built, increasing US losses in the Bocage. You should read my book. It has over 200 footnotes, and the series was written over 12 years. As far as "Monty writing after the war," it was done to cover his failures, which prolonged the war costing hundreds of thousands of casualties, military and civilian, and assisted Stalin in controlling most of Europe. If you can't face my work, read It Never Snows in September, Death of a Nazi Army and The Battle for Mortain. Those works highlight his failures, and what should have been done.
@@richardmeo2503 - and Bradley's 12th Army Group was under Montgomery's command during Falaise - he was Land Forces Commander until Eisenhower took over on 1st September, not 1st July!
'On August 13, 1944, concerned that American troops would clash with Canadian forces advancing from the north-west, Bradley overrode Patton's orders for a further push north towards Falaise, while ordering XV Corps to "concentrate for operations in another direction".[1] Any American troops in the vicinity of Argentan were ordered to withdraw.[2] This order halted the southern pincer movement of General Haislip's XV Corps.[3] Though Patton protested the order, he obeyed it, leaving an exit-a "trap with a gap"-for the remaining German forces.'
[1] Essame, Herbert, Patton: As Military Commander, (1998) p.168
[2] Essame, p.168: Bradley was supported in his decision by Eisenhower.
[3] Essame, p.182
Looks to me like Bradley stopped Patton closing the gap in case he caused Canadian casualties!
Around Caen, British and Canadian Armies had both SS-Panzerkorps and army panzer units in their sector, because the Germans knew how important Caen was. I don't think they received a copy of Montgomery's planned phase lines! After Paris, Allied armies were ahead of schedule, and the Guards Armoured Division's advance to Brussels on 3rd September was a record daily divisional advance that bettered than anything Patton ever achieved.
I'm sure your work is very popular for covering US failures, but it sounds like another American friendly fire incident to me.
I'm going to say something to my friends who have commented on this video that will be controversial, but from my studies of WWII I don't believe Operation Market Garden was ever meat to be, or going to be a total success. However, it was far from a total failure. The Allies were able to secure the port at Antwerp for supplies for the winter & open a huge new front against the Germans which eventually led to the Battle of the Bulge & the end of WWII. The allies & Montgomery made the decision & put mostly British forces in harm's way just as they did on D Day by landing in Caen. Operation Market Garden gave the Allies multiple ways to resupply & keep pouring the pressure on the German High Command. It wasn't a popular battle plan because it led to so many casualties, but it was the right & necessary thing to do to win the war. It had to be done.
"Montgomery later admitted that he was wrong to assume the Canadians could open the approaches to Antwerp while his forces tried to reach Germany. But his timing was off. The Canadians began fighting around Antwerp in early October, after Market Garden had ended. So, our original question prompts another: Why did it take to the middle of October for Montgomery to support the embattled Canadians and make Antwerp a priority?"
Legion magazine Should Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery have tried to clear the Scheldt Estuary in September 1944?
@@nickdanger3802 But if you look at the big picture, Antwerp would have never really been secured as the Germans could have launched a successful counter offensive earlier against that port which failed in December when they finally did launch their final assault against the allies. Personally, I believe the reason the Germans didn't was because they were very concerned that the allies could attack from a myriad of fronts thanks to Market Garden. I'm not in love with Monty as a master strategist, but the operation was far from a total failure.
Defend Monty all you want but you alll know Monty's ego propelled this to be one of the Allies largest blunders
The blunder was made by the 508th PIR at Nijmegen for disobeying orders and failing to move on the undefended Waal bridges on Day 1. It's not "ego" to think your allies are just as capable as your own troops. He was let down.
Ha “largest blunders”. This operation led to around 15,000 casualties. American forces lost over 100,000 men in operations during the Lorraine campaign,Hurtgen forest and operation queen. All of which resulted in no gains for the allies and were pointless.
@@commando4481 - one of the casualties in the Hürtgen was a Lieutenant Colonel who was previously the Executive Officer of the 508th PIR in Normandy. As a result of the scattered drop pattern on D-Day, this officer was the most senior in a group from mixed units landing in their area, but according to a witness who was a Major and the 508th's Medical Officer, he refused to take command of the group and deferred to another Major who was a combat officer instead. The Medical Officer was shocked by this dereliction of duty and insisted the Colonel take command, but the man refused. The medical officer had to stay with a number of wounded who could not be moved, so he ended up getting captured by the Germans. Once he was satisfied that his casualties were being taken care of by German medical personnel, he managed to slip away and eventually make it back through the lines to locate the 508th Command Post. He was surprised to see the XO sitting on a chair in the CP with his M1 rifle between his legs and just staring down at the floor. He asked the CO what the XO was doing in the CP, and told him the story. The Colonel relieved the XO of command and sent him up to Division. Ridgway sent him back to England. Apparently, he was later transferred to an Infantry Division which ended up in the Hürtgen.
@Anthony Fauci With a casualty total of under 9,000 men, Market Garden would have been classed by the Soviets and German's as merely a minor skirmish.
Why does Bradley seem to get away with the Battle Of Hurtgen Forest almost scott free ?
It had nearly 4 times the number of casualties as Market Garden (33,000), just to capture some trees.
American blunders in autumn 1944 such as the Lorraine, Hurtgen Forest and the Ardennes lead to over 200,000 casualties.
It may have failed, but neither Hodges or Patton were making barely any progress attacking the West Wall either. At least Monty had the good sense to try something else instead of breaking his army group on the teeth of the Siegfried Line.
And in doing so forgot to cover his rear, take Antwerp, clear the Scheldt and insure a solid port for resupply so desperately needs !
horsepuckey patton broke through german lines and his supplies were taken away and given to that idiot montey
John,
Antwerp is a red herring. It was never crucial for the westwall battles. The allies were well supplied in October and November and still failed. In fact Antwerp was fully open in late November and supplies poured in....... yet Operation Queen still failed and then the retreat in the Ardennes occurred.
Antwerp was crucial for the planned advance across Germany, but not so for the westwall campaign. Supplies came in from Le Havre, Cherbourg, by air and elsewhere.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Hey Lyndon go to the video Germany’s Perspective on the Major Allied Armies of WW2 - Where Did they Rank Them and look for someone in the comments called Philip Nagle
@@lyndoncmp5751 I respectfully disagree. The Germans were in control of the Scheldt estuary right up until the end of the war, dug in, well armed, albeit cut off. The allies could not afford to run the gauntlet of using Antwerp for resupply the British/Canadian sector, which meant supplies had to come hundreds of miles. Montgomery later admitted his mistake that he should have cleared Antwerp and the Scheldt as soon as was able. He got caught up with the Arnhem campaign instead.