The largest surrender in British history | Singapore, 1942
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- Опубликовано: 22 май 2024
- On the 15th of February 1942, Lt General Arthur Percival signed the largest surrender in British history at Singapore. The city was supposed to be a fortress, but his force of 85,000 men had been defeated by just 35,000 Japanese troops.
Little over 2 months earlier Japanese forces had invaded northern Malaya. Thanks to their advanced tactics and training, the Japanese advanced with incredible speed pushing the unprepared British back to Singapore in a so-called 'bicycle blitzkrieg'. When they crossed the Johore straights and captured the Bukit Timah heights above Singapore itself, Percival was forced to surrender.
So how did the Japanese defeat a numerically superior force? Why wasn’t Singapore an impregnable fortress? And could the British have held out?
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00:00 Introduction
00:55 Fortress Singapore?
01:23 Japanese plan
02:31 British plan
04:45 The Malayan campaign
07:00 Defending Singapore
08:47 The Battle of Singapore
11:24 Impact on the war
Was Percival to blame? Was he hamstrung by underinvestment in Singapore? Or were the Japanese too strong either way? Let us know what you think!
Eighty years on, and Britain is still trying try to whitewash its failure and disgrace. It was a shame then; it's a shame now. My grandfather said as much - and, no, he wasn't at Singapore.
He was from Hong Kong. He was lucky to get to Australia in 1937, when the Japanese invaded Shanghai, where he worked. But he was torn to see his Hong Kong given up.
If there's one thing to be gained from Singapore, it was that it was a wakeup call to the fact that Britain considered all its colonies - who had fought on its behalf for in so many conflicts - merely expendable. Yet it didn't stop his whinging at Curtin for bringing home our troops to what Britain was going to fail to do (despite its promises): defend Australia. Britain felt entitled to our soldiers, and felt entitled to our country sacrificing ourselves for Britain.
We'd taken hits for Churchill's ego before in the last war. We weren't going to do it again, not when our homes were on the line.
The fact that Percival in 1942 could (2 years after the Wehrmacht successfully traversed the Ardennes into France) dismiss the possibility of a landward invasion by the Japanese amounts to one of the worst acts of hubris in military history.
Great Britain was fighting a desperate battle for survival trying to defend her island home against the Gernan onslaught. France which was deemed to have a superior Army crumbled in a few weeks , democracies which respect the antiwar sentiments of their public were slow to mobilise for all out war , where as, Germany and Japan were effectively under the control of their military leadership. In addition European domination of Asian countries which were not industrialised, for centuries, led them to believe that Asians were no match for Europeans in modern warfare. The defeat of the Russian navy by the Japanese almost forty years before pear harbour should have opened the eyes of military strategists, but deep rooted prejudice is hard to overcome .
The defence force in Singapore outnumbered the Japanese 3 to 1. They lost within weeks. They were foreigners defending a foreign land, and their lackluster effort in defending the country proved to Britain’s colonies that defence must be taken into their own hands. Percival was to blame, but not as an individual but as a foreigner who was left to protect a people who weren’t his own
@@willd4491 This is what happens when you factor in racial prejudice in military strategic planning. Nothing illustrates that more painfully than the demise of Force Z going on a sortie with no aircraft carrier support fully aware Pearl Harbor just happened. Only the captain of the HMS Prince Of Wales (in his last correspondence with his son) knew they weren't going to make it back.
My late Grandad surrendered there, his ship changed course from North Africa to Cape Town, then India and finally Singapore. He landed during a air raid and had surrendered within a week. He survived 3 years on the Burma Railway and passed away in 2001.
Wow. Dang.
Was he in the 18th Division ? If so it would have been better if he was diverted to Australia. To form the basis of counter attacking force.
Your Grandad did very well to make it to 2001. My father was also captured in Singapore and also on the Burma railway. He died back in 1964. I don't remember him very well. One thing he said that puzzled me at the time. "Always remember, I was a just a private soldier, not an officer". Like many, he was an expat professional who was conscripted into the army just months before the invasion.
@@johugra1 KOp
My sincere respects on your grandfather's service. I'm very glad he made it through and lived to a ripe old age.
My uncle, a corporal in 2nd battalion the Cambridgeshire regiment died on the 15th February 1941.
A large number of our soldiers carried on fighting after the surrender only to run out of ammunition.
My uncles company defended the Adam Road area with rifles and grenades,a couple of Brens. .. no artillery. A few mortars maybe.
Until they were overrun. Totally left to fend for themselves. No equipment. Not enough of what they had and the generals underestimated what the Japanese soldiers could endure. My uncle was shot after surrendering. His body was never found. His name is on the kranji memorial in Singapore. He was 21. God rest his soul.
RIP
He rests among the sons of Singapore. We will not forget him
God rest his soul. I lived by Adam Road for many years.. I know the battleground well
We appreciate his sacrifice
what's his name?
I attended Singapore American School (SAS) in 1973-75, and lived in Bukit Timah. We had a Singaporean gentleman speak to our history class one day. He said that by the time the Japanese reached Singapore, most of their bicycles had worn out the rubber inner tubes and there were no spares. So they cycled along on just the metal rims. He said that when they came down the paved roads of Singapore it sounded like heavy tanks in the distance, which led to much confusion and panic in the ranks. He was captured and survived, but had nothing good to say about the way the Japanese treated the civilians and the captured troops.
Those Japanese always had a tricks
My father became a prisoner of war with the fall of Singapore. He was taken to Japan as forced labour and was there when the war ended. He lived until aged 89 and maintained close contact with other ex-POWs working for years to get proper veterans benefit for them and their widows.
good thing he was still alive after the war, whereas many didnt make it
Your father was lucky. My grand father was starved and work to death in a coal mine in Borneo.
I visited Kanchanaburri cemetery back in 2006. I was shocked by the variety of ages of the Aussie soldiers, from 19 to 39. Meaning many may have been eligible for World War 1. I was also able to visit Hellfire Pass. Not ashamed to say it brought tears to the eyes. I had read much about the men who struggled day and night to did this chasem.
He died like a dog 👍
My uncle (Alec Shaw, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders) was also taken prisoner at Singapore. He survived captivity and later rejoined the colours, retiring from the army in 1960. No finer man ever walked this Earth.
Oddly enough, Percival knew that the Japanese would land at Kota Bharu-had the British had their forces there, the could have stopped the Japanese cold. Instead, he retreated and did nothing to stop the japanese advance.
There were defenders at Kota Bharu. The Japanese landed in multiple locations along the East coast. Most Japanese forces came ashore north of Kota Bharu in what was Thai territory where the British led forces were not permitted. The British did consider occupying the South East of Thailand to prevent just such a move by the Japanese (Operation Matador). But the Op never proceeded because London would not provide sufficient men or equipment to make it feasible as they were focussed on North Africa instead.
@@speakenglishwithmatt5175 Close, although the defenders were starved of equipment, it was viewed politically unacceptable to invade Thailand to prevent Japanese landings.
No good general looses a defensive battle with superior numbers.
The formation commander at KB had orders - a letter that is still on file - to abandon Kelantan once the airfield was lost. Once the RAF/RAAF threw in the towel, the Indian brigade conducted a successful fighting withdrawal down to the railhead at Kuala Krai and got away.
The RAF has to take some responsibility for building an airfield so close to a vulnerable coastline, and for concentrating on the local attack rather than the main landings in Thailand - which was the point of the 'spoiling' attack at KB
@@benjamindover2601 “No-Good” general lose a defensive battle with superior numbers.😉
Interesting that when the time came to defend Singapore itself, Percival adopted the same strategy that failed miserably to defend the Malay Peninsula. And the whole idea of still pushing in reinforcements when it should have been clear that they would be better used elsewhere was borderline criminal. I wonder just how many of them surrendered before they ever had a chance to fire a shot in their own defense.
The order for more troops would have been Churchill, it was a commander that was needed.
@@tonyclough9844 Agreed. My only complaint is that if you weren't going to replace Percival, sending more troops was just a case of flushing resources down the toilet.
@@hellhound47bravo3 yes you see how these w_____ work there way into gov like they have here.
Only we dont have a Churchill to get us out.
@@hellhound47bravo3 yes a lot of the reinforcements got off the boat and surrendered.
What a wonderful arm-chair-expert-with-hindsight you are hellhound. Please use your brilliance to explain how to defeat the current insurgency in the Sahel, Boko Haram etc.
It's a rule in every battle: Never EVER underestimate your enemy.
Percival Over estimated the strength of the Japanese.
@@anthonyeaton5153 overestimation is a bigger idiocy than underestimation.
Liddell Hart wrote: “ the ground forces were widely dispersed to guard airfields that contained no airforces … built to cover a naval base that contained no fleet.” Percival should have adjusted his strategy.
Percival was not the man for the job.
Percival was an administrator when they needed a military leader.
The fault starts at the very top with his flawed appointment.
@@purrfekt Yes I think he was promoted above his ability.
Liddell Hart write much much more about the fall of Singapore. It is fascinating and indepth. Churchill was to blame, period.
He should have been court marshalled
This sounds like a bit of an apologia for Percival. Not every city or front had Maginot Line quality fortifications, so talk of underinvesting in Singapore seems to merit more analysis. Some questions to ask:
- When did the British begin the build up in Singapore (I assume things got accelerated in July of 1941 when the full oil embargo and freezing of assets commenced)
- What were the quality of the troops and more important, the officers?
- What training, war games, other preparations were carried out, to get familiar with the theater of operations?
- What kind of intelligence did the British have on the Japanese prior to and during the invasion, notably on Japanese formations advancing rapidly down the peninsula?
- Why no better showing of a flexible defense on their own ground, on the peninsula?
- Were British forces road bound, and if so, why?
Probably there are more questions to ask. At this point, I am inclined to say Percival should be assigned a good bit of blame for the disaster - he was the general commanding officer since at least May 1941, and it was his job to responsibility to prepare his forces and to conduct a strong defense of the colony.
Otherwise, Singapore is at a pretty strategic location. Not sure I buy in to the point about the defense being more political and a point of prestige. Afterwards, the Japanese could support their efforts in Burma more effectively, while the Imperial Japanese Navy went on a bit of a tear in the Indian Ocean.
This channel has a massive British bias. Great channel, but it is biased. Historiography, WW2 in real time, and Kings and Generals all have a better less biased analysis of the British failure and collapse in SE Asia.
- The quality of the Indian Troops was as low as it could be. They were generally half-trained or less units that were pressed into service in Malaya;. The units in question were the leftovers after the Indian Army had been picked over several times to both form new units and to support units in the field in the middle east. The lower ranked officers (often up to Captain) were mostly immediate commissions with really no training or experience at all. The higher ranked officers in the unit were often peacetime captains pushed up into command of Battalions. I can't speak to the quality of the Australians. The Malaya brigades were just local defense troops.
- The Indian Units had often been trained either for service in Afghanistan border regions or in more aird parts of India. The plan for most of the units deployed to Malay was originally them being sent to the middle east.
- The British had minimal intelligence on the Japanese. Part of this was by intent. Regional intelligence collection was avoided out of concern it would push Thailand more fully into a Japanese alliance.
- Why no more flexible defense? Lack of transport and mobility. But the biggest problem was the inability of British forces to hold a line. The Japanese would slip through their lines, get behind them and then they would retreat. This was a major problem in the far east well beyond Malaya. It was eventually tactically corrected by creating "box" formations months after the Malaya campaign and not retreating due to the Japanese getting through the line. They set up for all-around defense and forced the Japanese to take out the unit rather than the unit retreating to the next line. The ability of the Japanese to get behind the British in the jungle and to get through any defensive line was part of what went wrong in Malaya.
- They were not "road bound" in terms of fighting or their deployments.
As far as Burma goes, the invasion of Burma by the Japanese was launched and well underway during the Malaya campaign. The forces in Burma for defense were far worse than those available in Malaya. Burma was written off early and even the forces that were intended to be sent there (such as an Australian division) were not sent. The tactical problem in Burma was generally similar to Malaya. The Japanese would get through or behind the British/Indian lines and then the British would fall back.
If the Japanese had been able to land a military force in India in 1942, the entire British administration might have collapsed in the same way it did in Malaya. To fight in Greece, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Ethiopia and Egypt, the British had stripped everything to be bone. And that was on top of a decade of neglect in terms of military spending in India and the far east.
A better commander in Malaya would have figured out what the Japanese were doing and figured out a way to counter it as other commanders eventually did later. But the command in Malaya was addicted to the idea that form line, defend line and retreat if the enemy breaks through the line.
One other thing though. Singapore as a fortress without Malaya in 1942 was defendable in my opinion. The whole idea of "fortress singapore" that Brtish still believed in was an extremely dated idea. If the Japanese reached the edges of the city, it was doomed to fall.
It would have helped if the British fought back. Australians were 17% of the force but 70% of the casualties.
After the surrender the Japanese confirmed that the failure of the British to support the Australians and starving them of ammunition allowed their breakthrough.
The General is always at fault. Doubly so if the general decides to, "take what he can get", rather than resign forecasting woe should more investment in his or her command not be made. LTG Percival is a perfect example of why officers who enjoy their perks of office more than their duty should be avoided at all costs. He might have been the right general for peace, but he certainly was not the right general for war.
gave 2 much to sg importance to churcjill... sg only a trading post in the far east...no value to britian's war in europe...percial was a carrer soldier..unlike macarthur..."crazy whites standing in the noon sun..n drinking in raffles bar..."..sg was a mangrove swamp trading post this is all.
But he really should have done a better job. Not the problem but was a part of it. Philippines held out for almost 5 months.
@@ifuknjk Singapore was vitally important to British interests in the far East. It was a major naval base and had shipyards. The closest ones after that were in Ceylon and South Africa.
Percival was an inept and also extraordinarily brutal leader of the Brits in the Irish war of independence, torturing republicans to death, dragging them behind lorries, burning houses, and behaving like the Japanese in WW2. He helped lose the war in Ireland too.
@@peterflynn9123 Anyone comparing 'British' soldiers (many of whom were just as Irish as the IRA terrorists) to the Japanese in WW2 lacks intelligence, knowledge, education, and reason. Percival, and the other generals were angels compared to their foe. Far from being brutal, they were never allowed to actually fight the IRA on any sort of level playing field. Despite that they crushed the IRA and brought them to the negotiating table. The British 'war' aim was to implement a form of Home Rule, which they essentially did. The IRA wanted a 32 county republic. Still waiting on that. There are letters in the late 1920s from Percival to Montgomery on the subject where Percival remarks that the subsequent Free State soldiers actually did what Percival and co had not been allowed to do, and deal with scum as scum.
regardless of his fault in the fall of Singapore, no good general brands his troops as cowards and certainly wouldn't brand allied soldiers as inferior due to nothing more than colonial thinking. the willingness of the British to later blame the Australians (who made up only 13% of the forces but would suffer 73% of the casualties) for the fall of Singapore encapsulates how little regard the British had for their colonies despite their loyalty.
They were referred to as Daffodils, the best Australian troops were in North Africa.
The performance of all British and Commonwealth troops in the Malayan and Singapore campaigns was poor.
Maybe get the chip off your shoulder and read some books.
Malaya was defended by 3 Indian and 1 Australian division with a solitary British division arriving once Malaya had already fell
There were British reports of all discipline breaking down with the Australian Forces, including looting and drunkenness. Also the fact that the Australian General hopped on a small boat and fled leaving his troops behind didn't help the impression the Australians left on the British. Either way a disaster all round.
@@elliskaranikolaou2550 quite right. There were many reports from civilians, including Singaporean Chinese of Australians streaming back to town, saying the war was lost and getting drunk on looted booze. Unfortunately, some British troops joined in and this contributed to the poor defence. But the treachery of General Gordon Bennett was the worst. He was the Australian General you mention, in charge of all the Australians. He fled the battlefield, leaving his men and was seen half naked in a commandeered boat leaving Singapore.
He returned to Australia eventually as he thought some senior position was opening up and didn't want tu to be a POW. He was never given active command again. Every decent person is prepared to give credit where it's deserved but over the years, far from British persons being unable to accept home truths, the Aussies can never accept fault for their share of any military failures.
@@matpk : Learn Chinese so you have a chance of surviving the Work and Re Education Camps where the Chinese will intern you for being disrespectful.
As Tom Barry said of him, "I always knew he was a coward." Percival's only talent was torturing Irish prisoners in the Twenties.
The guy was a sadist. Pity Tom Barry never got him although a his reputation in tatters must have been hell for him. Which is good enough for me.
Not just prisoners, he liked to murder innocent civilians too John.
Percival was a weak, incompetent leader. Tbh., he was a good example of why the british empire was decaying, even then. His lack of leadership condemned his troops to years of incarceration by the Japanese.
Actually, about 30,000 troops of the British Indian Army would end up in the Indian National Army. Granted a good number may have been coerced, and that conditions in the INA may not have been that wonderful.
Percival was only part of the problem. Churchill was the biggest problem for ignoring the frequent requests to reinforce Malaya and for not putting a better man in command. Percival was far from exemplary but he was up against a hugely superior force of experienced soldiers with the best training, equipment and motivation that Japan could muster.
@@speakenglishwithmatt5175 So 35,000 Japanese army was "hugely superior" to the 85,000 British troops? You might want to check your math
@@teoengchin There were more factors than just numbers of soldiers though. The Japanese had total air superiority with 500 state of the art Hayabusa and Zero fighter's, the British had less than 100 obsolete Brewster Buffalo and Hurricane mk 1's to match them, the Japanese had 120 tanks the British: none. Also of the 85,000 British troops only 20%were actual combat troops the rest were rear echelon. And nearly all were green. That's a situation which any commander would struggle in.
@@Apollo890 The British only held a paper majority in every other respect they were deficient. The Japanese had over 200 tanks the British did not have a single tank in Malaya.The situation was even worse in the Air & at sea. Don't be fooled by simple head counts the situation was far more complicated than that.
A great uncle of mine who I think of quite often died at Singapore. He'd fought through WWI and won a military medal during the Somme and was killed when his troop ship was sunk. We still have his tankard on the mantlepiece and remember him and the other family members who didn't come home, or who only partly did. Lest we forget
For a very comprehensive dissection of the failures of Percival, which exacerbated the mentioned material problems, read Norman Dixon's analysis in "On the Psychology of Military Incompetence", written in the early 70ies. It is quite devastating.
Do you know where to obtain a copy?
Sounds fascinating
Percival was a great officer and leader IF you needed an officer to murder innocent civilians and torture prisoners of war to death. I bet the brits were sorry in 1942 that Commandant General Tom Barry of the Irish Republican Army hadn't managed to kill the barsteward in 1921 in Cork for his war crimes and inhumanities.
Thank you for making this
Thank you, IWM, for producing this video. Congratulations for covering some major explanations that I believe made it easy for the general public to understand. Most of your verbal comments were also accurate. I must also thank the many online commentators for their posts that made interesting read, especially the personal experiences of their ancestors who were directly involved in the defence and fall of Malaya (including Singapore). Though these did not answer IWM's macro questions, they nevertheless added a refreshing micro-perspective of those who had fought on the ground. May future generations always remember their (of defenders') sacrifices with gratitude.
Admittedly, within this online space, it's impossible to cover all factors that led to the fall of Singapore, for this topic has multi-faceted and multi-layered dimensions. They ranged from political, economic, military, institutional to political and military key decision makers and their men on the ground, both on the Allied and Axis sides.
On one hand, short, pithy comments risk coming across as one-sided (unbalanced), opinionated, impressionistic or shallow. On the other hand, attempting a comprehensive and balanced summary, though courageous, still may not do full justice to this topic.
For the more serious students of history, if one does not have access to all the primary evidences, the next best recourse is to refer to the professionals who have gained access to them. Over the decades, there are many books written on this topic. For a more holistic, balanced, nuanced and comprehensive view on the subject, I would recommend that they read, among many other excellent works, especially:
(a) The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1940-1942 by Professor Brian P. Farrell, NUS History, first published in 2006 by Tempus Publishing Limited; and
(b) Churchill and the Lion City: Shaping Modern Singapore by Professor Brian P. Farrell (Editor); and
(c) Colonel Masanobu Tsuji: The Mastermind behind Japan's Greatest Victory; Britain's Worst Defeat: The Capture of Singapore 1942.
Since the release of Britain's cabinet papers to UK National Archives in the 1990s, there have been more revelations about Churchill's role in depriving Malaya of adequate defence, both in terms of quantity and quality of resources. These revelations were followed by scathing criticisms of Churchill. I am thus surprised that the question is still framed as "Is Percival to blame?" today, instead of "Is Churchill to blame?", since the release of the official documents over 20 years ago. In the annals of history, Percival more than Churchill continues to be associated with Singapore's fall in 1942.
A more empathetic view towards Churchill is that any colonial master would naturally prioritise the protection of his homeland and home waters first, over some far-flung corners of the British empire. As the first law of human nature, survival and self-preservation comes first. If Britain were to surrender to Nazi Germany, the British empire would collapse instantly, and Axis partner Japan would simply walk into Malaya, as it did in Vichy French Indochina. But if only parts of the empire were to fall, no matter how "impregnable", strategic or humiliating, HQ Britain could still live to fight another day, leveraging on the industrial might and growing military prowess of the USA and USSR to help defeat the immediate threat; Nazi Germany first, and then Japan, the Pacific enemy. In response to the emotive undertones of some comments, especially those from the Far East, this is the reality of realpolitik that dominions of any colonial master have to confront. Otherwise, as post-WWII events bear out, fight for political independence from the colonial master.
Sadly Percival was no De Valette, the Grand Master of the Knights of Malta who held out against enormous odds against the Turks in 1565. A man of De Valette's determination and character may well have created a very alternative history of "the siege of Singapore". Singapore would probably still have fallen eventually, but its resistance would have been a source of pride and inspiration.
Awesome point!
the Seige of Malta 1565 would make a great story in a video.
The guy was a scumbag auxiliary during the Irish war of independence known for torture.
well... perhaps but De Valette didn't have to deal with airplanes....
he was also no Kemal Ataturk who prevented the British naval force from crossing the straits in 1915. In case we want to stop portraying non-westerners like the Japanese and Turks as the villains.
@@davidlewis5312 You are correct but I am looking more at the character of the man, and how an inspirational leader can bring out exceptional qualities in every fighting man. I take the point that Ataturk is another example of such leadership.
Great insightful episode
As a Singaporean born many, many years after the war, I’ve always grown up hearing and learning about the British and Japanese in Singapore. So it’s always interesting to hear different perspectives from the different parties involved in the history. War really does affect everyone, regardless of the victors or losers
I hope Imperial War Museum could also do an episode on Malaya (eg: The Battle of Slim River) and an episode on British landing in North Borneo. These are also important episodes in the history of British Empire during the WWII.
There is such and episode. Watch the episodes of KIngs and Generals covering the war in the pacific. You won't regret it.
@Tan Chee Yong
Did the P(risoners) O(f) M (ajesty) make more stuff ups there as like Percival did on Sngspore ??
Yes, I think the IWM should as the defence of Malaya was really the defence of Singapore, as the Singapore episode does say. Singapore was adequately defended by its coastal guns and the only real way to take it was by coming down the peninsula. This was recognised by both the British and the Japanese and so the campaign was all about the battle of Malaya. Not only Slim River but the Kota Bahru landings and other battles.
Agree. I see a lot of discussion on the loss of Northern Malaya, but it was really at Slim River where things began to fall apart for the British.
@@ogukuo72 wrt slim river -have a look at the initial japanese assault on the prepared british positions-it happened at night in pouring rain with tank support-even though the anglo indians had 25 pounders and 2pounder anti tank guns, the japanese succeeded in a frontal assault
As a Singaporean thank you for making this informational video!
A few comments from an armchair general. Percival’s defence in depth strategy could only work if there was a mobile defensive reserve to counter attack. Otherwise the more mobile Japanese attackers would always be able to gain local numerical superiority. So it appears the wrong strategy to start with. It appeared at no point did Percival consider counter attacking and thus ceded the initiative for the entire battle to the Japanese. He then incorrectly anticipated where the main thrust of the Japanese invasion of the island would take place and took too long to recognise it as the main thrust. Again he also had no organised reserves for a counter attack, despite having numerical superiority. Finally he fell for the Japanese bluff at the surrender negotiations. This was a complete failure of intelligence but also seemed to stem from a lack of proper reconnaissance to gain a true estimate of enemy strength over the entire campaign.
This type of defense only makes sense if one has good means of transport and can send relief forces quickly.
It seems that he was too passive and had no plan on how to use his troops successfully.
Nope. Percival's attitude toward the Japanese itself, regarding them as inferior, shown that he already underestimated the enemy. With that kind of mindset, he already lost the war.
In contrast, General Kuribayashi during the defense of Iwo Jima worried about US capability. He had different mindset than his peers. The result was bloody carnage for the US Marines.
I don't know why Wavell did not sack Percival & take command himself.
Exactly this. Was he under equipped on a theater that was far from the priority for the Allies? For sure, did he also took bad tactical decisions that ultimately lead to defeat? Yes, and that part is very much on his own .
My Grandads cousin was taken as a PoW at Singapore. He was part of 18th (5th Bn. The loyal Regt. [North Lancs.]) Regt. Reconnaissance Corps, RAC, captured in Singapore 15th of February 1942. He was sent to work on the death railway and was killed on the 8th of December 1944 when the Americans bombed the train that he and 15 other POWs were being transported on. He’s buried in Kanchanaburi war cemetery in Thailand, not too far from the infamous bridge on the river Kwai
I’ve been to the Australian museum and the Commonwealth War Grave, both of which are excellent, plus a walk up to Hellfire Pass which is very moving.
However I have to tell you that there is no ‘Bridge on the River Kwai’. It was the name of a French book and an excellent film. But although there is a River Kwai the Burma Railway didn’t cross it.
After the film was released tourists started to arrive looking for the site of the bridge. The Thais, being very innovative, renamed the section of the river at Kanchanaburi to ‘Kwai’ and point the tourists to the metal railway bridge which was - coincidentally - bombed by the Allies. In fact there are two preserved (and empty) British 1000 lb bombs on the Eastern side of the bridge, near the station.
@@bob_the_bomb4508 I genuinely did not know that, thank you.
@@synthrich1 no worries :)
A total of 556 personnel from the 2/15th were captured; they would spend three-and-a-half years in Japanese captivity, during which 294 men died. After the war ended in August 1945, the surviving members of the regiment were repatriated to Australia and the regiment was disbanded
Percival was sent to Singapore because he was viewed as a menace in the European theatre. After all, they thought even he couldn't lose Singapore. The Indian and Malayan forces were poorly trained and poorly lead. Their officers were afraid of the jungle so stayed on the roads and rubber plantations next to them. While the Australians used the jungle as did the Japanese. But poor logistics meant they had fighting withdrawal. Percival refused to take advice from his staff and when the Australians wanted to be reinforced as they could see the build up of the Japanese opposite their position. Even after the landing, they wanted to fight on but were ordered to surrender.
He should have been court marshalled! Yes, circumstances were against him but he could have fought on this forcing the Japanese to withdraw to the mainland. Thus giving time for help to be sent from Australia.
No way could the BCEF in Malaya be supported in time from even as 'close' as from Australia. You may as well say McArthur should have held out until further deployment from San Francisco.
@@uingaeoc3905 Two different things. I'm not saying saving Malaya but Singapore. The Philippines is like Malaya couldn't save it.
Indian & Malayan afraid of jungle...okay
@@jirachi-wishmaker9242 Not the Troops but their English officers!! Indian and Maylaain soldiers weren't trusted to get beyond NCO's. Racism and snobbery were rife in the British armed forces! So, no disrespect for the poor troops but contempt for the leaders!
@N Fels Yes, the officers weren't the highest quality! That is what was saying can you comprehend English? If you don't know what you are talking about it is best not to say anything as it just shows your ignorance! Galah!
Thank you very good videos
It should be remembered that the 8th Australian division consisted of 2 infantry brigades only, instead of the normal established of 3 brigades. The 3 battalions of the other brigade were sent to separate locations in what is now Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. They were quickly overwhelmed by the Japanese when the time came. I have always wondered if the third brigade would have made any difference in the defense of Malaya.
Of course it would not.
It's a interesting question. If there had been an Australian brigade at Kota Bharu to defend the two RAAF Squadrons there, reinforce the Dogras (who put up an extraordinary fight) and cut off the Japanese flanking manouvre through the swamps, then perhaps at least the landing at KB might have failed. But it still would have been the only failed one of four landings. And if they were kept organic with 8Div, the early stuffing around and abandonment of prepared positions, and the later constant collapse of units on the Division's flanks, would still have meant the loss of Malaya, albeit perhaps with a few more Japanese casualties. The problems ran far, far deeper than anything one brigade could fix.
They were NOT quckly overwhelm ed at all , you should read ab out their engagment of the Japanese at Gemas and the retreat of the Australians that took place two weeks after that, resulting in a charge with just spades and axes against japanese machine gun emplacements....there is still a memorial to them on that spot. read about it.
The Australians ran away casting away their arms and went on the rampage.
Singapore
A classified wartime report by Wavell released in 1992 blamed the Australians for the loss of Singapore.[28] According to John Coates, the report "lacked substance", for though there had undoubtedly been a lack of discipline in the final stages of the campaign-particularly among the poorly trained British, Indian and Australian reinforcements that were hurriedly dispatched as the crisis worsened-the 8th Australian Division had fought well and had gained the respect of the Japanese. At Gemas, Bakri and Jemaluang, "they achieved the few outstanding tactical successes" of the campaign in Malaya and although the Australians made up 13 per cent of the British Empire's ground forces, they suffered 73 per cent of its battle deaths. Coates argues that the real reason for the fall of Singapore was the failure of the Singapore strategy, to which Australian policy-makers had contributed in their acquiescence and the lack of military resources allocated to the fighting in Malaya.
LTG Arthur E. Percival remained partially responsible for the fall of Singapore. He had command responsibility as the General Officer Commanding (GOC) over Malaya. He failed to make optimal use of limited time and resources to train and prepare his troops for a spirited and coordinated defence of Malaya. He dispersed his forces too widely. He could not stop the blame-shifting and bickering among his senior allied commanders that became corrosive for morale. Neither did he improve fixed defences in northern Singapore. He fell for the Japanese feint and misjudged that the Japanese would attack from the northeast. Even after the Japanese had landed in the northwest, Percival refused to accept that this was the main invasion and held back valuable reinforcements until it was too late. He also failed to make a last stand to fight to the last man in Singapore as instructed by PM Churchill.
However, the seeds of Singapore’s fall were sown years before Percival’s arrival. They involved larger strategic, political, economic and military factors beyond his control. Pax Britannica was on the wane after Britain was weakened by WWI. Wearied by WWI and wary of another world war, British public opinion in the inter-war years did not want to provide the resources to shoulder the empire defence burdens of their governments. Neither did their elected governments summon the political courage to challenge their nation to reconsider. So they failed to develop their colonies’ economies to fund the buildup of credible military defences at strategic locations of their empire. Instead, Sir Winston Churchill, then Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1924, believed that a war with Japan was inconceivable and thus made deep budget cuts to the Royal Navy. So they maintained the illusion of being able to defend their overstretched empire via propaganda (deception in the name of keeping up public morale). Successive British governments vacillated over building the Singapore naval base until Japan turned expansionist. By WWII, the British empire was not equipped sufficiently to deal the European, Atlantic and Pacific theatres of war simultaneously. So Churchill's wartime cabinet prioritised limited resources to defending the British homeland and home waters, and with it the British Crown and King, the Mediterranean, freeing Britain's Atlantic lifeline to the USA from the stranglehold of German U-boats, liberating North Africa and continental Europe from Nazi Germany and protecting India first over Malaya. These higher priorities dictated the central direction of British imperial defence. In so doing, limited resources were not allocated sufficiently to Malaya, thus compromising its defence plans "Operation Matador" and "The Singapore Strategy", and the men on the ground tasked to implement these plans.
The British military establishment should bear some responsibility too. The London War Office largely ignored Percival’s 1937 report calling for the construction of more fortifications north of Singapore. It did not approve budget to ensure adequate training and equipment for the Malayan defenders. Besides underestimating its enemy (hubris), overestimating the jungle’s ability to deter the enemy (complacency) and believing its own propaganda (self-deception), the British military doctrine and system of set-piece battles, static defence, pre-occupation with procedures, making the situation fit the plan, had no answer to the Japanese military’s quick and fluid tempo of advance and outflanking tactics by day and night. Worse, the British High command sent a staff officer (in Percival), who was not an experienced field commander who could inspire his troops during crisis. Troops sent to Percival were inexperienced in fighting in tropical jungles. They had no tanks for support. Percival's army did not receive adequate inter-service cooperation from the RAF and navy. In fact, there was rivalry between the RAF and the army. Deploying Hawker Hurricanes and obsolete Brewster Buffaloes, the RAF lost a few air battles to Japanese Zeros and Oscars and subsequently withdrew prematurely to the Dutch East Indies. Two battleships were sent as token support without air cover. During the Malayan campaign, there was also mutual blaming among British and Australian senior commanders, miscommunication and poor coordination down the allied ranks. BBC History magazine sums it up as "negligence and incompetence at ALL levels of (British allied) command". The deepest problem was British complacency.
Ultimately, Japan should bear the most responsibility for Singapore’s fall; for without its invasion, how could Singapore fall? It took advantage of the Allied preoccupation with fighting Nazi Germany to launch the Pacific war. It employed spies who helped its military planned effective attacks. Its infantry, especially the 5th and 18th divisions of LTG Tomoyuki Yamashita's 25th Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) were some of the best in the entire Japanese army. They were well equipped. They secretly underwent prior inter-service training in tropical-like conditions in Taiwan, Hainan island and southern Indochina, and were issued guidelines on how to fight to win in Malaya. They were led by an aggressive and confident field commander in Yamashita who inspired confidence. Morale and fighting spirit were high among his troops. They enjoyed better air and naval support. Yamashita adapted the German blitzkrieg to suit the tropical terrain of Malaya. His strategy of a driving charge; employing speed, surprise, tactical mobility and improvising on the move, did not give his enemies time to re-group. 25th IJA's logistical problems, that had been created by the speed of its advance, were eased by captured ammunition, fuel, vehicles, food and other stockpiles of "Churchill supplies" left behind by the hastily retreating RAF and British army down the Malayan peninsula. These factors led to Malaya’s fall in 70 days, turning a defeat into a disaster.
Even if the 25th IJA ran out of artillery ammunition, or the British Army could exploit its foreknowledge (via ULTRA intercepts) that 25th IJA was numerically inferior in troops and put up a well-coordinated defence, the fall of Malaya (including Singapore) could at best be delayed. This was because the Malayan defenders could not withstand the might and bushido spirit of the Japanese empire indefinitely. Surrounded by sea on three sides, Malaya simply lacked strategic depth in defence. Tokyo, which saw Singapore as a prized catch, could still draw on Japan's combined fleet of arms; its IJN (navy) with 10 aircraft carriers (Kido Butai), battleships and amphibious landing ships, to support the invasion. To pummel the city into submission, Yamashita could call on further air and naval power from the Southern Expeditionary Force on its way to invading the Dutch East Indies. In a siege, naval blockade and/or war of attrition, Singapore would still be a lost cause to Churchill in early 1942.
Weighing all the above factors, Percival should still be held responsible for Singapore’s fall, on account of factors within his control. But he should not be held solely or mainly responsible because of the more significant geo-strategic, geo-political, economic and military factors before his time and beyond his control. Unfortunately, much of the mutual blaming and deflection of it among the British and Commonwealth politicians and generals, was driven by the politics of self-preservation (the first law of human nature). That it was convenient to find a scapegoat in one man (Percival) or blame its Commonwealth dominions was ultimately self-serving of the British establishment. Deflecting the spotlight on the men on the ground and finger-pointing among nationalities, merely hide the systemic causes of the disaster in the shadows. The most consequential of these were the weaknesses of the British military system - from inflexibility in thinking, planning to failure in adapting quickly enough to the changing realities of rapid and fluid mobile warfare, and the misjudgments of the men who ran the system.
So passing the buck must stop with any leadership. In this case, it must stop with the British colonial masters, with Churchill as its PM. Churchill knew he was presiding over a sunset empire. By his actions more than his excuses, he de-facto made Singapore expendable in his global strategic priorities. During the closing stages of the battle, his thinking was to lose Singapore reluctantly and temporarily, but come back to fight and retake Malaya another day after Burma, to restore whatever was left of British imperial pride and prestige. But it was not to be. The Pacific war ended with US atomic bombings.
Protected by the British Official Secrets Act that suppresses official documents from public access until 50 years after WWII, Churchill went to his grave in 1965, with a grateful public of his era who remembered him more for his pivotal role in bringing WWII victory to Europe, than for his role in the "worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history". Churchill never fulfilled his promise to launch a full public inquiry into the fall of Singapore, because the consequent political fallout could accelerate the breakup of the British empire and undermine his legacy. Whereas Percival, who joined him a year later, departed with the ignominy of not being able to salvage his honour and reputation, condemning his family name to be always associated with the fall of Singapore. May history judge these and other characters fairly.
This is my tentative conclusion, unless new archival evidence emerges in the future that proves otherwise.
On this 80th anniversary of the fall of Singapore, let us remember the thousands of British, allied and native men and women who gave their lives in defence of Malaya’s and Singapore’s freedom from tyranny.
The price of freedom is eternal vigilance.
Lest we forget.
Arthur Percival was the commander for the ground forces of the Malaya Command only. He had no operational control of the RAF or Royal Navy in Malaya. He was in fact subordinate to Sir Archibald Wavell in the Far East theatre. After the RAF and Royal Navy abandoned Singapore, and the departure of General Wavell on 10 February 1942 from Singapore to Java, Percival became the highest ranking general officer commanding what was left of the allied forces in Malaya.
Lychan, I entirely agree with this analysis. I do think he bears significant responsibility but qualified by all the reasons you state.
I always feel he should have accepted the Australian left was folding and the weight of Yamashita's attack was falling on them. If as you say a tested field commander saw this he would have pulled out all the stops for the 18th Division to swing to the centre and north and fought the division as much as possible. The result might not have been much different, save for more casualties but it could have averted a defeat and so was worth the risk.
Then, as we now know the Japanese might have retreated due to lack of ammunition, giving time for further reinforcements.
@@beowulf1312 Thank you for your views. Unlike the Soviet Union, Malaya simply lacked strategic depth in defence. Stalin could afford to trade land, space and manpower for time, to mobilise more resources beyond the Ural mountains and Siberia; massing men and war materiel to beat back the Nazi German invasion. In contrast, Malaya is surrounded on all three sides by sea. Even if Yamashita ran out of ammunition or had the British realised that the 25th IJA was outnumbered, Tokyo could still mobilise the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) to block reinforcements to Malaya and to conduct more amphibious landings on the many beaches along Malaya's sea coasts. At the height of its power, IJN had 10 aircraft carriers to support such an invasion. In a war of attrition, Malaya would still be a lost cause to Churchill.
Based on how the Japanese conquerors exacted revenge on Lt Adnan bin Saidi after the Battle of Pasir Panjang Ridge, bayoneted and shot the doctors, nurses and patients at Alexandra Hospital and massacred the Chinese civilian men during Operation Sook Ching, they would likely exact an even greater toll on the civilian population and military personnel if the latter had resisted the invasion longer. So with the benefit of hindsight, LTG Arthur E. Percival made the ignominious but merciful decision to surrender Singapore once water supplies were cut off. If not, more of us in Malaysia and Singapore, as well as descendants of British and Commonwealth soldiers who became prisoners, would not be alive today. This positive point about Percival is under-appreciated in public forums and discourse.
@@tvgerbil1984 Yes, Percival had his constraints as you've highlighted. But one should not forget the big picture; who was the colonial master over Commonwealth or allied troops? Who designed the structure of the allied command defending Malaya, such that Percival had no operational control over the RAF and RN? Who sent a staff officer but inexperienced field commander whose personality could not inspire his troops during crisis? Was it not the British High Command that led all the way up to Churchill? The buck stops with the British colonial masters.
All Allied and Axis Generals, from George S. Patton, Zhukov, Bernard Montgomery and Erwin Rommel, reported to superiors in their chain of command. Most if not all, had their challenges with their superiors. Even Yamashita reported to Field Marshal Count Terauchi and faced politics and resistance within the ranks of his 25th IJA that stemmed from rivalry and jealousy from Japanese PM Hideki Tojo. Yet, unlike Percival, each of the highlighted generals made an appreciable difference to the outcome of their battles. If western allies apply the Yamashita standard (equally without double standards) to Percival as to Yamashita himself, it can be argued that Percival must still be held accountable for his role as GOC of Malaya. He had command responsibility, especially for factors within his control. For one, he failed to exert effective leadership control over his senior allied subordinate commanders to stop the mutual blame shifting and bickering. Unfortunately, this mutual finger pointing persisted for decades after WWII. As recent as 1993, with then Australian PM Paul Keating retorting a British wartime report that blamed the fall of Singapore on Australian soldiers.
In my first post, I have attempted to give a bigger, balanced picture and more holistic view of factors responsible for Singapore's fall. Admittedly, not all aspects of the battle and fall of Singapore can be covered here. Unlike @beowulf1312, the likes of @TV Gerbil can adopt a one-sided stance, focus exclusively on areas of disagreements with my post or nit-pick into the details of which personalities were involved during the battle of Malaya (including Singapore), or even potentially provoke endless rounds of debates on the apportionment of the blame.
To generate more light (and hopefully less heat), WWII history enthusiasts can refer to Professor Brian P. Farrell's 452-page book entitled, "The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1940-1942" by Tempus Publishing Limited in 2006. In it, Farrell draws extensively on primary documents in Britain, Japan, Australia and Singapore to give a more complete picture of how and why Singapore fell. For obvious reasons, too many details in that book cannot and should not be reflected here.
@@lychan2366 Some would argue Archibald Wavell had undermined Percival but without sacking him. Nevertheless, Wavell's report to the British War Cabinet in May 1942 on the failings and circumstances of the fall of Singapore is still worth reading. Don't dismiss it just because some latter day Australian politician disliked it. The report was written by a very experienced soldier who had a good overview of the military facts.
British love of 'procedures' played a huge part. Percival was simply unprepared and applied no strategy with what he had. Insufficient ground training and procedural limitations on equipment like antiaircraft guns being relocated to protect the ithsmus connecting Singapore to the mainland.
The blatant truth is that the British did not regard the defence of Malaya seriously.
Percival was a war criminal during the Irish War of Independance, murdered civilians and pow's but was never brought to justice by Britain. Just like every other brit murderer really.
0:01 and 2:39 did the speaker for the IWM actually just pronounce it 'lieu'-tenant and not 'leff' tenant?
Horrendous how high the level of 'Americanisation' of our language is.
Quiet correct!
as opposed to the amazing french that the word derives from?
@@williamm2003 doesn't mean we should pronounce it like they do.
interesting viewpoints about the Generals on the comments here. nonetheless, hats off to IWM for the background work on this vid. you guys even got the pronunciations of local neighbourhoods correct!! 👏👏
The battle was lost in large part due to the way Percival deployed his troops on the peninsula. They were scatter and easily destroyed piecemeal.
As a Singaporean, I am extremely grateful to the z island into a regional urban hub. Unlike other colonies, I celebrate the fact that we once were part of the Great British Empire. However, this video speaks to why I also believe in our independence and need for self-sufficiency. I take to heart the regrets of my older relatives who lived through the war and tell me " I wish we had the chance to fight to the last men and keep our island strong and free".
Best wishes to you in Singapore. A country I respect and admire. 👍🇬🇧
But you love under a dictatorship... How can you say you are free?
@@tubarao1143 Why do you call Singapore a dictatorship?
@@foursix32 errrr because it is literally one?
The indigenous population of Singapore was white men, Sidney Raffels looking for an eastern province ended up on the Island.
The Dutch had all the best Islands, all there was on the Island was snakes mosquitoes spiders.
The men with him said your crazy this place will never make anything, he said I will make it into something.
Very interesting Video
The Japanese conquest of SE Asia in several months is one of the most impressive military campaigns in history.
Apart from taking France, Belgium and the Netherlands in six weeks.
Britain had most of its strength in Europe and Africa so I don’t think it’s impressive as it looks at first glance
Actually, the most easiest campaign for the Axis. British and Dutch were too busy with affairs at mainland Europe. And what they had in their Pacific colonies were just colonial troops.. these troops meant to repel against local insurgencies.. but grossly lacked the ability of a conventional army to defend from foreign invasion. Look at the Japanese, as soon as they faced the real armed forces: US Marines & US successfully established the winning ground at Battle of Midway, the path to their defeat came very quickly.
Only because Europe was at war since 1939. Ask the Russians at Nomohan.
@@timcahill4676 This is easily the biggest cope. The facts are the British still held numerical superiority in holdings in Asia...Couple that with the fact that the Japanese sometimes had inferior equipment (Such as them using bicycles instead of transport vehicles the British had)....Your point is quite mute.
The British empire was impressive until you realize it took centuries to reach its height and you guys were mostly conquering backwards people who were fighting you with sticks and stones versus your modern guns.
The Japanese on the other hand had reached its territorial peak in as little as 6 months whilst facing technologically on-par enemies, whom also had much more manpower than Japan did. To make matters even worse against Japan, the Japanese were doing all this while under a MASSIVE resource deficit particularly in oil AND still achieving victories in China.
To any rational historian the Japanese empire is 100% more impressive than anything Britain did. Actually many soldiers in WW2 fighting for Britain believed the same. Over 100,000 British colonial soldiers had defected and fought for the Japanese against Britain instead......Approximately zero Japanese soldiers defected to the British side. lol
Common defense design error for a port -- fortify the harbor greatly but under fortify the land side.
The huge guns on Sentosa island could turn 360° but didn't have any high explosive shells. So they were basicaly useless.
It is said to never underestimate (or "undermisedtimate") your opponent.
The troops who fought were Malays, Indians and Australian, as well as British. The larger proportion of the infantry came from India and Australia.
The fighting was done predominately by Australians. They were 14% of the troops and 74% of the casualties.
@@terryfox9229Hundreds of Australians deserted en masse at Singapore and went on the rampage long before the Japanese arrived. The British and Indian troops stood fast. It is all recorded in the book
Singapore, the pregnable Fortress with the sub title of,
A study in deception discord and desertion.
The Australian forces were a disgrace.
Nobody from Australia ever talks about this.
Many Aussies who finally returned from Singapore would have had a guilty conscience for the rest of their life.
Percival's reluctance to reinforce the northern part of Singapore Island for fear of creating a defeatist, defensive attitude was a poor choice.
Given the lack of British armour and airpower Japan's rapid advance down the Malayan Peninsular is understandable, but even with the lack of northern defences on the island, the speed and relative ease of the Japanese crossing of the Johore Strait and final advance on Singapore has always shocked me.
Not wanting to frighten the population by building defences... that must have been a great consolation to them when after the defeat they were marched off to death camps.
"Defense are bad for morale". It was his fault. Fortress Singapore (and Johor) did not have fixed defences facing the north, because Percival refused to permit their construction.
Not quite true. He asked for defenses all over the island before the war but he was denied
Defeat in detail is a well known military strategy. Percival, being a general should have prepared for that possibility.
The mapping of the coastal artillery guns at 7:48 is largely incorrect. Hopefully this can be accurately remapped for your viewers😀
Percival divided his forces to defend his airfields without having modern planes to put on them.
And refused requests by his officers to build defences on the mainland .
Yes, Percival was to blame. Every step of this battle was lost due to incompetence at the top and a cowardly approach to defence.
Battle of Singapore shows that Japan was a formidable opponent when they were evenly matched with their enemy. They simply did not have the industrial output to match the United States.
My father, in the Royal Artillery commanding a 25 pdr Field Gun, was redirected from his way to North Africa, to Singapore, and was taken prisoner there. He was put on the Burma railway. He had a few things in his favour: he was super fit being a cup winning cyclist, he had generations of carpentry skills which the Japanese valued for construction of the bridges, and he had the savoir to avoid the worst malaria. He knew Ronald Searle, who hid his drawings of the murderous events in bamboo sections under the hut floors.
He was moved to Japan late in the war, and put down mines to construct pit props. In both locations he saved other men’s lives by teaching them how to put a Japanese wood plane together, which was the test for carpentry skills. He saw the immediate aftermath of the Nagasaki bomb. The lowest moment for him was after the surrender, standing on a beach with his friend who was the only other survivor from the beginning that he knew, watching an American drop of supplies. A parachute didn’t open and when the drum hit the beach, the lid sprang off and decapitated his friend, standing next to him.
Even after travelling round the world on his way home, including a train across the USA, he was like a skeleton on return, many boils, and slept for weeks. He was told he would never be able to have children, but soon began his three. He was still driving at age 88, and lived to 91, passing away in 2012.
If my sister’s detailed, appalling short hand record of his memories ever get typed up, I think it will be quite worthwhile.
Churchill wrote that it no more occurred to him that Singapore had no landward defences than that a battleship could be launched without a bottom. But he added, he should have enquired. It was Percival's clear duty to improve those defences, and he had the means and time to do it. Civilian labour could have been conscripted. Underwater obstacles and deep bunkers could have been prepared. Water cisterns could have been built for rain run-off. Shells for the harbour guns could have been refilled and re-fused with high-explosive. (It's a myth that the guns could not be trained to fire on the strait. The problem was, they only had SAP shells for naval targets.) Barbed wire and cement was in plentiful supply. Food had been stockpiled, at least, and there was time and transport to send civilians south.
Given a competent and energetic general, Singapore should have been able to hold out for at least six or eight months, and would have cost the Japanese far more, meaning that they would have to bring in resources from other theatres. But Percival was not that general. He actually forbade his engineers to construct better defences, giving as a reason that he did not want to depress civilian morale. That was idiotic, or worse.
Norman Dixon's "The Psychology of Military Incompetence" contains a section on Percival's behaviour that seeks to explain it from psychological factors, but for me it is sufficient that he behaved in that way. It was, in my opinion, unconscionable that he was not court-martialed at the end of the war for his failure to do his duty, and was allowed to retire on full pension and write his highly self-exculpatory memoirs.
wat if ..... sg fall.malaya fall etc.. even god could not stop japan's invasion in the pacific..
Churchill was the First Sea Lord starting in September of 1939 until he became PM in late May 1940 and would have been thoroughly familiar with the defenses of Singapore. His remark was disingenuous.
@@sethdekooters7567 singapore was NOT important to the british empire n churchill... only a trading post.....
@@ifuknjk Wrong. The loss of Singapore led to the invasion and occupation of Burma, another English colony, and ultimately Bengal. Their Pacific fleet lost its most important base. It's loss was the catalyzing event for the independence movements across the British Empire.
@@sethdekooters7567 broken up of british empire was the signs of the times...like 2022 west broken up n asia whole again..biggest elephant is WW 3.. imminent or not n failure of climate change n mankind survival...or dino is dead
My Great Uncles name turned up on a POW list for the railway of death in Thailand (which felt weird anyway as I am half Thai). I can only assume he was a part of this surrender. Unfortunately I never met him as he had a falling out with my grandfather. I salute him all the same.
Percival was a leader in Bandon in the South of Ireland during the war of Independence. His actions were little different to those of the Japanese in WW2. He lost in Ireland too, so history shows him as serially inept as well as a war criminal .
He was actually an excellent staff officer. Agree on his role in Ireland where he committed what can be called war crimes
@@ropaul8006 excellent staff officer in peace times and even that's a maybe.
I read about his actions in Ireland, and you're right, he was senselessly brutal, and absolutely incompetent as commander, not the right man for such a delicate position.
Yep !! Percival was an "excellent" Staff Officer but not in the field, ...he was "excellent" in London Private Members’ Clubs
@@bermudezhg obviously. His staff work was actually top notch. It's why he went up through the ranks. He's the type of man you'd want to run your office. It's easy to judge with hindsight but with Japanese air & naval superiority not to mention hundreds of tanks I doubt any British officer could have held out. The best solution would probably have been to evacuate the troops but that might not have been possible with Japanese Air and naval superiority
I'd expect if the British had any inkling of how POWs and Singaporeans would be treated by the Japanese, there would not have been any thought of surrender.
There certainly wasn't any such thoughts later in the war. For example Imphal and Kohima.
Living in Penang as I do (island in the Andaman Sea near Thai border) memories here are of course waning but they remember waking up one morning to find that every westerner had been evacuated by boat to Singapore leaving the local population to the tender mercies of the Japanese who arrived a day or so later. The mass torture and execution pits can still be seen today. The Japanese used to use the cricket pitch on the Esplanade for ceremonial executions with the severed heads of their victims impaled on spikes for all to see. All the Indian young men were sent to work on the Burma railway, thousands died. The Japanese would conduct periodic roundups of villages in the south of the island massing all the people into one place then machine gunning and bayonetting them. Their bodies were piled into mass burial pits. So much else too. So yes it was a massive loss of prestige and power in the Far East. Churchill wanted the troops to display as much fighting elan as the Russians were doing at that point to the far superior German soldiers as well as what the Americans were doing in their desperate defense of the Philippines. That they didn't is forever a scar.
What this documentary does not say is that many POWs were also sent to various places in the new Japanese possessions to build airfields. For what happened to them, google 'Sandakan POW camp'. The only reason anything is known of the fate of these POWs is that 6 escaped.
Sickening cowardice displayed by Percival. What else was not mentioned is that the Japanese killed at least 50,000 Chinese in Singapore in the early days, not because they considered them racially inferior (a popular bell to ring these days), rather the Chinese were fighting like crazy in China against the Japanese with much of their financial and other support coming from the Chinese diaspora much of which was in Malaya and Singapore. These were reprisals.
As for the Japanese being superior jungle fighters, perhaps the IWM should describe quite where those jungles before the Malayan invasion were where they had gained their supposed expertise.
All the documentary are of such high quality. I expect you to have more viewers... The RUclips algorithm is not doing Their job.
I went to Singapore in 2017 for the 75th anniversary of The Fall. A very moving commemoration at the Commonwealth memorial in Kranji.
The Chinese were viewed by the Japanese as supplying arms and/or money for arms to their fellow Chinese to fight the Japanese in the mainland country.
so So which country and region do the Chinese in Singapore like most now, is the origin of their ancestors PRC, Malaysia or Taiwan？
@@Jeffrey21058 like all the other hypocrites, its all about where the money is
@@ruleoftwo6174 yes,just as Interests
@@Jeffrey21058 well, firstly Singapore. We are our own successful nation now. And as for second place, that varies from person to person, though most of us do feel slightly more attached to Malaysia, since a lot of us have family or business there. In the end, it varies, but overall we try to be impartial and more rational
No. Most of the Chinese that complied and agreed not to conduct illegal guerilla warfare against the Japanese, in support of Mainland China, were spared. Those who refused in accordance to international law, were simply captured
Very nice to learn my country's history through a non-local presentation
Very interesting in terms of the strategic defense. Due to the terrain of Malaysia at the time, I think a winning strategy on land would require very very large amount of defensive forts, and multiple layers of artillery and AA guns as well as high quality wide roads crisscrossing the island and large quick response motorized armies would be needed at central points rather than spread out along the coasts, but the area was just far too undeveloped on every factor for this to happen. The local population I think was also an issue, people were overall struggling to survive on a daily basis let alone to rise up to defend their own land which might not have been a priority for many reasons, the treatment by the British, the lack of self identity due to being under foreign rule, lack of education and world perception at the time. This is very different today of course, just the aspect of self identity today would be an incredible force and lead to determination to defend a homeland, this just wasn't the case under British rule, at least not anywhere near the extent it is today.
The defence of Malaya was frankly a comedy of errors. Defence of Malaya was premised upon 3 things. Preventing the Japanese from landing at Singgora and Patani by preemptively invading Siam to take those ports, blocking a landing at Kota Bahru in the sea, and finally stopping any advance by the Japanese at Jitra.
Poor communication and coordination, hesitation, indecision or just plain bad decisions on the part of senior commanders led to the rapid collapse of Malaya and chaos amongst the retreating troops. Histograph Extra has an extremely good day by day of the Malayan campaign
ruclips.net/video/PdJ6RtPVm5o/видео.html&pp=ygUQQmF0dGxlIG9mIE1hbGF5YQ%3D%3D
Britain: Singapore is an impregnable fortress!!
Also Britain: *Does nothing to actually turn the island into an impregnable fortress*
*Singapore falls*
Also Also Britain: *Surprised Pikachu Face*
Years ago, I read a book about the surrender of Singapore. Because the news of the oncoming Japanese forces down the Malayan peninsula was censored, one man kept track of which branches of a certain bank were advertised in newspapers as having been closed. Of course, they were closed because they'd been captured by the Japanese.
And people complain about the kind of force required in August 1945 to stop this madness. It actually required a second one for the "penny to drop".
Something not too often talked about was how much of recent British weapon production was going to the USSR as lend lease, this made a serious shortfall for new weapons going to British troops. Just imagine 100 Valentine or Matilda tanks in Malaya and 100 or so new model Spitfires available in Dec 41.
It should be remembered that at the time of their deployment the Indian and Australian forces role was of deterrence rather than defence because Japan had yet to enter the war
Churchill made a decision in 1941 to focus military force on the middle east and run the risk of war with Japan with forces in Asia that amounted to a giant bluff. There was no navy, no aircraft, no anti-aircraft defense and the vast majority of the forces deployed to Malaya were third rate. The Indian forces in particular were either half-trained or were the remainder left behind in India when the units were stripped of good men for service in other units.
They ran a giant bluff. The Japanese called their bluff. And they lost.
There was some Ack Ack - not enough, but not zero.
My uncle was shipped out there in Nov 1941. He was a radar gun layer (radar operator) and joined 11 Battery of 3 Heavy Anti Aircraft Regiment, which was already out there.
the biggest problem in singapore was that when the british government decided to make their main war effort in the middle east against italy, the strategic plan was changed. the original priority for troops and supplies was great britain, singapore, supply convoys, and the middle east. this was suddenly altered to put the middle east first and singapore last. because of this, there were not enough planes(and those there were bad), trained troops, and especially naval forces to make an effective defense.
Quite right Ken, this longstanding Imperial Defence policy of Singapore having priority over every other area after Britain itself, is usually overlooked. It was Churchill's fixation on the Middle East, where he interfered constantly, pressing premature attacks on his commanders who he treated atrociously, that was the real reason why Singapore/Malaya was starved of the quality resources that were available but sent to other theatres. Britain could easily have held the Italians in a purely defensive position in Libya or east of Alamein however Churchill couldn't bear this idea and poured all available resources into that theatre.
There is another aspect rarely touched upon too: the huge number of troops tied up in Britain, long after the threat of Sea Lion was over. This meant that until the invasion of Italy in 1943, the British Army was largely inactive, most of the campaigns being fought by mainly Empire troops. (The Canadians were the big exception and was one of the reasons why they were earmarked for Dieppe.)
The other major issue was that the Australian 8th Division was newly formed and untested in battle. It faced the Imperial Japanese Guards Division, amongst other veterans of the Sino-Japanese War. It acquitted itself well overall, but the compounding problems affecting the campaign also impacted on its performance, notably poor strategic command.
@@montecarlo1651 excellant points.
The Japanese General looked alot more intimidating than The British one too
im a malaysian n singapore's war history is basically part of malaysia's history but I haven't really knew it in detail. but what i hate the most is the fact that british army would destroy every facility n amenities when they knew they had no hope to defend malaya n singapore just so that the japanese couldn't use them, n the one suffered from it the most were the civillians bcs either way they would be oppressed very hard anyway, only japanese army were more brutal. I'm just lucky that now we are now living in a democratic n independent state as compared to our ancestors who had never tasted what it was like living in a country that is independent as we were always being occupied for more than 500 years aka 6 lifetimes, which is crazy. anyway thanks for the video!
wonder how Percival got his promotions up to LT.GEN in the British Military
Believe it or not he was a hero in the First world war. He led an attack from the front at the Somme and despite being wounded four times he stayed with his men until the attack was completed. He also served bravely in the Russian Civil war. He was no military genius that's for sure but neither was he a coward.
what is the music in background anyone know please
im doing a research project on this right now, cheers for uploading lmao.
strange that it was not mentioned that one of the British's greatest colonial strength also served the Japanese well, ROADS. British colonial surveyors built an excellent road network in Malaya that served them well during colonial rule, and their retreat, negating any effects the Malayan jungle might have. these same roads enabled the Japanese to advance on bicycle towards Singapore.
The higher ups are not there to give you want you want, but to only provide barely sufficient resources (emphasis on "sufficient"). The Generals job is to make their case, work the channels and develop the strategies and tactics to suit the situation. It seems that Percival neither stood up for himself or had any clue how to face an enemy. Blaming his superiors does not seem to be a valid defence on his part.
The utterly magnificent defence of Imphal by Slim shows what a great General can accomplish against a superior Japanese force.
6:43 Chief strategist Masanobu TSUJI (辻政信, 1902-61?) was a lieutenant colonel during the Malaya campaign. He was thereafter promoted to the rank of colonel and was indeed a colonel at the end of the war against the Allies.
PLEASE PLEASE PLEASE, don't put film clips in without first checking audio levels. This one was terribly loud at one point. I had it a little loud to cover nearby traffic and now my ears are ringing.
I remember learning this in history class and I always found it so funny that the brits lost to bicycles, I'm from Malaysia 😂
The Japanese also had 200 tanks, the British had none. The British also had a traitor in their ranks by the name of Capt Patrick Heenan who gave the Japanese the daily recognition codes for the British air base at Alor Setar enabling them to destroy most of the British aircraft while still on the ground and in turn allowed the Japanese to gain air superiority.
The Japanese didn't win with bicycles alone.
The British wanted the Indians and Singaporeans to sacrifice themselves first. But The Japanese attack from the back and exposed the white British command, so the surrendered immediately. Lucky the Japanese attacked from the exposed back otherwise many Indians and Singaporeans would hv died for the incompetent British command.
@@justonecornetto80 yeah yeah blah blab but they lost anyway
I thought so too! But well things already happened a long time ago so.
@@monke6475 if hearing the reality offends you don't bother coming here to learn
A small error in your mapping of the British Empire at that time. You mark Sarawak on Borneo as being part of the empire which at that time it wasn't but ruled by Raja Brooke. Whereas Sabah is not marked in blue and was then British North Borneo.
Just wanna ask in 1:28 part, who owned sabah? And if we adhere to this map, can we revive the philippine claim?
It was under the British North Borneo Chartered Company, a protectorate of the British Empire.
I always find it fascinating that in all these fall of Singapore videos no one ever mentions the insubordinations and defiance of LTC Duncan Maxwell of the Australian Army which played a critical role in why Singapore was lost.
In the morning of 9 February, after the Japanese landed and broke through the lines of the adjacent 22nd Brigade, Maxwell sought to withdraw a portion of his forces, but Bennett denied him permission. Later in the day, with the Japanese now landing in his sector, Maxwell ordered them to withdraw from the causeway anyway, having already replaced his two battalion commanders, Galleghan and Boyes, with more compliant officers. This was despite the Japanese advance being hindered more than expected because of the robust defence mounted to this point. After the brigade's withdrawal the next day, it was temporarily attached to the 11th Indian Division by orders of the GOC Malaya, Lieutenant General Arthur Percival.
However, soon Maxwell, on receiving orders from his now divisional commander to attack towards his abandoned sector, claimed that he had received differing orders from Percival. To divisional staff, he stated the orders came from Bennett. He was to move the brigade to recapture Bukit Panjang. Percival and Bennett both later denied any knowledge of these orders. In any event, the move failed and Maxwell's brigade began to break down into companies and platoons and retreated back into Singapore.
Made a prisoner of war after the fall of Singapore, Maxwell was held by the Japanese in a camp on Taiwan. Here he conceded to another prisoner, Brigadier Arthur Blackburn who had been captured on Java, that he deliberately directed his men to retreat from the causeway to let the Japanese land unopposed as he considered his position to be hopeless. He was conscious of the lives of his men and did not wish to see them wasted defending British Malaya.
Should have have been drawn and quartered
Another factor 5 million people in Malaya at the time was against the British. British realize this and thought Japan would allied with 5 million Malayan people, that's why British surrendered.
@@iamgreat1234 Yes, because the general populace at the time don't like the Japanese, but they certainly don't like the British more. So the Japanese took advantage of this and spread propaganda that Asia are for Asians but in reality the Japanese meant Asia for the Japanese.
So once the local population population realised the Japanese are like the British but far, far worst, it was already too late.
Edit: I am a Malaysian. This was what was taught in our history books at least.
Not a word here in regard to General Gordon Bennett of the Australian forces who simply disappeared unlike Percival who stayed in charge to the end. The Australians lost all morale and actual leadership because of this. Bennett was cashiered on arrival in Australia - if he had been an Axis or Soviet general he would have been shot.
Obviously, something they wanted to keep quiet!
Why would you particularly mention this? More relevant was how he was want abrasive with the British and his general lack of diplomacy, plus a tendency to act without orders. His service record back to WW1 gives no hint of cowardice as you imply. Behind the scenes he was probably instrumental in council to Prime minister Curtin deciding to stand up to Churchill to insist that the 6th and 7th divisions be brought home.
Facts are that Bennett made his plans to escape on Feb 15 when Percival made the decision that he would surrender . Obviously Bennett’s job as a fighting commander were over. His argument was that it was his duty to escape. Further he regarded himself of value to educate the rest of the Australian Army on tactics to defeat the Japanese in future battles. At this time he was not issued orders, so he could have stayed as a hollow tribute to morale. Instead he again acted without asking for orders. This decision tends to summarized as a coward. Had he stayed he would, like other senior ranks, be removed from representing his soldiers anyway, as Japanese control was about not having former leaders available for soldiers to defer to.
The critical consideration here is that he never got along with Percival, and postwar Percival had to answer for his own military leadership. He subsequently wrote to Blamey , who also shared the same dislike for Bennett. This is where suggestions of cowardice gained traction and became arguable.
In contrast less than a month later Douglas MacArthur did the same thing. Officially he was ordered to Australia. Argument has been that this order was issued retrospectively, to prevent morale issues and Wainwright later did more than his duty to keep dirt hidden.
Amazing how popularity could out maneuver military proficiency.
@@BC-op7rj I notice you do not contradict my two points - Bennett was cashiered and his 'escape' led to a collapse in morale of the Australian forces. I mention it because once the Public Record allowed the circumstances of the Bennett 'escape' to be exposed it destroyed the myth that the Australian forces in Singapore had been 'betrayed' by the British a constant these of my early years post-War and a replay of Gallipoli myth. The majority of the BC&E casualties at Gallipoli were British and the majority of the BC&E force which went into captivity at Singapore were British.
@@BC-op7rj interesting retort
@@uingaeoc3905 Prior you incited that Bennet was a coward and now you dodge that. Curtin actually gave a speech praising Bennett's escape. For those who did not escape there are mixed views. Most troops were in view that at least some escaped (as was a soldiers duty). Most criticism was civilian and of course Blamey and Percival elevating themselves post war by putting Bennett down. But that was 1945/6, not 1942/3.
At one point in 1943 Australia believed the Japanese were planning to invade Western Australia. Many forces were transferred from the Eastern seaboard, to go under Bennett's command . After that Bennett was merely left to whither in a backwater command for the remainder of the war because Blamey was in charge and had is own issues.
Australians betrayed by the British is a separate subject. IMO you are pulling strings on two separate bags and not catch either answer. Singapore was promised to be the keystone in defending Australia when the 2nd AIF went to the Middle East and Churchill broke promises.
You probably need to better make your point concerning loss of morale. Men of the 6th, 7th and 9th Divisions were all trying to transfer in December-March to get a crack at the Japanese. Assume you mean just the 8th Div , not the entire AIF and AMF? Loss of morale after capture is incorrect. Yes no one wants to be a prisoner , but when the 8th went into captivity members made concerted efforts around camp hygiene and food. Men worked as pairs to survive. Meanwhile British, Indians and Dutch prisoners were more inclined to have moments of squabbles among the ranks. Their survival was mainly as individuals who made little effort to maintain hygiene for example.
This is an example of how morale did not crumble in the Australian ranks. There was a predisposition among Australians then being better acclimatised to harsh independent living. Alternatively the British were mostly city folk and the Indians lacked medical staff and education to stay ahead of diseases as best they could.
In short your assessment is just wrong. Australian morale did not crumble. and Bennett was not cashiered in 1942-43..
And I still have no idea what your destination is regards ANZAC legend being broken. That might be your agenda, ....whatever. The men here were on average born four years after Gallipoli. As for the numbers, no, India supplied the most prisoners, not Britain. Numbers were 38,496 United Kingdom, 18,490 Australian of whom 1,789 were killed and 1,306 wounded, 67,340 Indian and 14,382 local volunteer troops
A British narrator talking about a British officer, but he uses the American "lootenant" pronunciation. Very odd. At least he says "Force Zed" rather than "Force Zee".
0:07 that guy throwing his flag was like "it's over man,it's game over"
While the next guy to him "relax dude....what worst can happen?"
" Freedom which the British empire stands."
That's one of the funniest joke I ever heard.. 😂
The Fall of Singapore was a combination of underestimating a formidable foe, poorly trained and poorly lead troops. In addition to limited anti-tank capabilities.
But we must also keep in mind that by the time the Japanese landed, the British were hard pressed on several fronts already in Europe. They had to fight both the Germans and the Italians in the Mediterranean, North Africa, the North Atlantic, the Home Islands and from June 1941, in the Arctic. And now Britain had to deal with a 3rd adversary, the Japanese.
And to make matters worse, in November 1940, the German raider Atlantis, captured the British steamer Automedon, which carried detailed notes on the capabilities of Singapore and it's defensive capabilities, and it clearly showed how poorly prepared the British truly were. So when the Japanese invaded they already had very insight into the weaknesses of the British defense.
Also the fall of France had a significant impact on the campaign in Malaya.
Churchill redirected tanks and aircraft to Russia rather than Singapore, but i feel Percival wouldn't have known what to do with them if he had them, and who sent force Z to its doom, there is a white church in Singapore and part of it is dedicated to the men of force Z. Even now it feels like a national disgrace, to the last man that is a terrible order, but it also occurred north of Dunkirk too .
I hope IWM can do one on the Malayan Emergency 1948-60
Germany invades France through Belgium: *Sabaton Ghost Division starts playing*
Japan invades Malaya: *Ghost Division: Kazoo cover starts playing*
*One seems to omit the very real fact that perhaps ... Percival was indeed just "a blundering idiot"*
Though LTG Percival was denied many resources, proper and equipping of his forces (3 times that of the Japanese), he made many military and strategic errors in his judgment on deploying his troops properly as well as being arrogant and obnoxious in underestimating the Japanese commander, their creativity and tactics. I also question his intelligence and the decisiveness of his decisions. Obviously, he was a poor poker player.
Lt. Gen. Percival. LTG is an American army abbreviation.
@@alastairbarkley6572 You must be British as they love to correct folks.
As a Singaporean, this hits home.
The fall of Singapore made us Singaporeans realize that no one will protect us other than ourselves... The British totally underestimated the japanese forces...
Worse than that Churchill knew the dangerous situation and lied to Roosevelt. Love Singapore. Lived there for four years.
看你头像好像也是个中华胶（不是骂你，因为我也是一个香港蓝丝）
Singapore was never a fortress.
At the end of the Great War two of the Allie’s The US and Britain decided that there next war would be with a third ally Japan who was in an expansionist phase.
The US move it’s Pacific Fleet to the new base at Pearl Harbor and UK knowing that only a sea invasion could enable the Japanese to capture the oil and rubber it needed decided to send its entire fleet to the Far East to secure the poses ions there.
A major. Sea battle would occur and no repair facility existed so UK built a Class One Navy Yard in Singapore.
It was to defend this repair yard that the 5 by 15 inch guns and smaller guns where installed to defeat a ship Bourne invasion. AP and Semi AP where the ammunition provided, no HE for use against land troops.
In mid 1930s the GOC MALAYA reported to London the civilian administration had constructed a road down the western side of Malaya enabling a land invasion.
Col Percival was promoted to Brigadier General Staff and sent out to plan defenses.
He recommended 40 batttaalions of infantry 2 tank regts and 359 of the new monoplanes fighters and bombers, the UK gov sent none.
Percival commanded a devision of the BEFF in France and was sent out out as commander land forces not C in C.
Singapore needed water from Malaya and that determined the end of the battle.
John
Singaporean here, It would be fair to consider it a fortress if one only considered as assault from the seaward side. The coastline south of the nation is rocks and elevated, with just several possible landing points along the south east beaches. Anyone landing there would be slaughtered without remorse.
This claim that is is a fortress, is of course, rendered moot once you consider the location of the dense rainforests, and the backdoor it represents to any attacking force.
The Japanese were clearly to strong at that stage, the best trained jungle fighters in the world. It wasn't the bicycle frontal attack that made the difference, it was IJN barges leap frogging down the coast of Malaya attacking well defended positions from the rear cutting supply lines, then again invading Singapore through the rear, in what was considered impenetrable mangrove swamp, nobody could stop them, that was of course, until they called the Aussies gutless, then it was on for young and old, setting the stage for Japans first land battle defeat at Milne bay, at the hands of the Australians, including my uncle Tommy and uncle Gilbert.
The Japanese weren’t actually good jungle fighters
As an American I have a different perspective on this. Just as McArthur in the Phillippine's underestimated the Japanese the British also did too. Both were at the very end of the supply line of their country so got only what wasn't needed elsewhere before Dec. 7th 1941 and very little afterward. In both cases the decisions to hold out were more political them military as any good general who could see the "whole picture" would realize that both bases were going to be lost. It was only a matter of time as to how long they could hold out. Unfortunately the longer they held out the more soldiers would die. They were the ones that paid the price, not the generals.
Churchill wasn’t exactly honest to Roosevelt about the strength (or lack of strength).
After visiting the battlebox in fort canning. I can safely say that Percival was just not equipped to handle the japanese. Even though the british stationed in S.E.A had twice the number of troops that the japanese brought to invade, the british were not equipped to handle the speed of which the japanese moved leading to the british's downfall in asia
Percical wasn't equipped to handle a chook raffle.
@@kenchristie9214 The biggest problem he faced was a lack of Japanese POW's and local civilians to torture and murder; he was very skilled in war crimes in the Tan War in Ireland - he could have given the Sandhurst lectures on mistreatment, torture and murder to future british officers like the Parachute Regiment.
Dont judge a book by its cover they say; Percival is an exception
It is unfair, I think, to blame the last man (Percival) for the loss of Singapore even though his contribution to it, in the end, may have been significant. It has been pointed out that in the many years, centuries even, prior to 1941, that Singapore may well perhaps have been considered a fortress protected from the north by jungle impenetrable by large force and so thus likely to face attack from the sea.. but just as the Japanese had commenced their planning for the invasion of SE Asia in 1905, the British had at least that much time to improve the defenses of Singapore..
By 1941, Singapore was no longer protected by a jungle from the north as significant road systems had been constructed to aid the development of the Malayan tin and rubber industries.. yet no defenses had been constructed to match these changed circumstances.. nor was the island provided with the tools of a modern army, such as tanks and an airfore.. it is my understanding that, in Percival's time, many requests had been made for modern fighter aircraft, such requests being denied with the resultant 158, mostly obsolete, aircraft to defend Singapore.
So the lack of preparedness in Singapore lays generally at the feet of the British govt. Of course, by the time it was time to take the situation seriously, Britain was in a fight for its own life in Europe.
Laziness resulting from the draining of morale and treasure from WW1 could be a cause for blame; certainly, white supremacy did not give the IJA credit for its abilities, which had been being honed in China since 1931.
Sending PoW and Repulse to scare the Japanese was idiocy, knowing full well the lack of aircover,..
Certainly many things could have been done in the 7 months preceding the IJA attack.. for instance, improving communications as they were dependant on the public telephone system to contact advanced troops, often needing to wait for a line!
There has also been blame laid at the feet of the Australians, supposedly for cowardice.. mostly apportioned by English troops who did not face the full force of the invasion of the island.. at best, the defences facing the Japanese were last minute constructions.. Australia's best and battle-hardened troops had been facing the Germans in North Africa.. replacements were untrained, and many had never even fired weapons before.. their small, untrained force was placed in defensive positions on northwest Singapore, where many small rivers were used by the invading forces to quickly get in behind the defensive positions..
It seems some commentators perhaps need to deepen and broaden their knowledge..
English troops?
The majority of the British forces in Singapore were Indian and Commonwealth, British troops were in the minority, there were no specifically 'English' troops.
@John Brereton unless those troops with English accents who have been interviewed in historical documentaries claiming to have been defending Singapore were lying .. there were English troops in Singapore at the fall.. supposedly defending the northern shore east of the Causeway.. where Percival expected the Japanese main attack to take place..
@@markgorhk
The point I am making is that, there hasn't been an English army since 1707. Therefore, these troops were British troops and contained soldiers from all across the British isles and its Empire.
@John Brereton the point I am making is that the "British" troops with English accents are well known to have blamed the "British" troops with accents other than accents heard in England, of cowardice in the fall of Singapore.. and in fact, that accusation was made in the comments to this video as well..
Tiny Finnland was able to fend off mighty Russia for quite some time with no tanks, no air force, no artillery and an untrained and inferior infantry.
I can see why the British didn't take Japanese on bicycles seriously - it seems like a ridiculous idea even now, but was obviously extremely effective.
I have a request, can you tell us the story of Leftenen Adnan bin Saidi, the person who last stands defending Bukit Candu, Singapore against the Japanese in the Pasir Panjang war battle. thanks!
i agree, i remember the movie about Adnan, he deserved a medal of honour for distinguish service
Interesting that Churchill’s strategy of fighting to the last man was the best one. A counterattack would have worked. His strategy of using the navy to capture Instanbul was also the right one if the admirals had kept to the plan.
Are you referring to Gallipoli in WW1? Because that was such a disaster that it was partially responsible for Australia and New Zealand becoming independent. Using the navy to capture Istanbul (which was Constantinople then) completely overlooked that the straits were surrounded by land that the Ottomans had heavily fortified and that it would take a massive effort by the army to get the navy anywhere, and ultimately failed because the land battle couldn't be won so the navy couldn't be used the way he wanted at all. It was a massive strategic failure.
Agree with Steve but even more they expected the enemy, battle-hardened troops to come from the jungle. Arrogance in leadership will cost you every time. Singapore was never a fortress to begin with
The 23 tanks in Malaya were Mark VIs armed with machine guns.