Locke's argument was not at all that 'we don't know who's right, therefore we should tolerate them'. This might have been the case for specific Protestant denominations, but Locke did not argue for tolerating Catholics or atheists, and by extension non-Christians. A more adequate comparison of Locke to Islamic theology would be something along the lines of whether different Islamic denominations/sects should be tolerated alongside one another.
Actually, epistemological scepticism _is_ a big part of Locke's argument. Have a look at this article, www.jstor.org/stable/27745104 + a lot of others. Also, Locke believed in tolerating individual Catholics, just not the Catholic Church itself as a hegemonic entity.
@@hasanspikerandtwomullas I reiterate my point upon reading the article you sent: that specific argument pertained only to other Protestants, not Catholics or non-Christians. Regarding Catholics, the term 'hegemonic entity' is very vague that in no way explains the nature of the Church's power in any state, much less seventeenth-century England. The issue he had with Catholics was that their allegiance is/was first and foremost to the Holy See, thereby making them less loyal to the English/British state than Protestants who supported the king on both political and religious grounds. Locke, like pretty much all other Protestants of his time, simply did not trust Catholics for this reason, and considering the Christian underpinnings of monarchical authority at the time, this also goes a long way in explaining why he did not wish to see toleration extended to non-Christians. It's a question of political loyalty. Another point in your talk which is very vague is to characterise 'medieval Christianity' as Platonic. Ignoring the fact that the medieval period lasted over a 1000 years and that there were many different currents within Christianity (not to mention, from 1054 onwards, three major denominations, but I will assume you mean the West), there is the issue that while Platonism did inform Christianity and its development, Western Christianity never committed to Platonism. Yes, there is a concept of this world and the divine, but in Catholicism these are very intertwined. The Cathars were platonists, and they believed the mortal realm was entirely unholy and only the divine was holy. This was condemned as a heresy and was ferociously stamped out, because it would deny God's creation in this world's holiness. It is important not to ignore the increasing importance of Aristotelianism on the Church in the last 3-4 centuries of the medieval period and the advent of Thomistic philosophy, which was very against Platonism generally speaking.
@@frederiknielsen5496 Locke definitely defended the rights of individual Catholics to freedom of belief, but had a problem with what he perceived as the Catholic Church's intolerance, as it were, i.e. that it would not itself allow freedom of religion to Protestants. It was Don Cupitt who characterized medieval Christianity as 'Platonic' in the talk above, not the speaker. Nonetheless, Cupitt meant Platonic in a very broad sense, not in any way vitiated by anything you have said. You should look at the work on the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius and the Proclean Liber De Causis on Aquinas to see the Platonic aspects in Aquinas. In the broad sense that Cupitt intended, medieval Christianity was certainly highly Platonic, in the sense that it believed that the world of creation was subordinate to and a mere reflection of Divine Reality, specifically the Divine Ideas, and moreover subject to an angelic hierarchy akin to that described by Pseudo-Dionysius and that also informed the social stratification of Medieval Christianity. It is also relevant that the major theological figure Catholics and especially Lutheran Protestants share in common is Augustine, whose philosophy is fundamentally Plotinian. Note also this is an _excerpt_ from a talk, an excerpt focusing on the viability of analytic philosophy. It is hardly the place for a nuanced appraisal of the nature of Medieval Christianity.
This is a mistaken (but unfortunately widespread) way of framing the question. As real scholars of the history of philosophy explain (such as Robert Pasnau in his book Metaphysical Themes, 83-88), none of the scholars associated with nominalism (even Ockham) ever held anything like the doctrine that universals are 'just names'. On the other hand, another widespread characterization of nominalism, that it is the doctrine teaching that all reality is particular, is also a doctrine held by 'realists' like Avicenna and Aquinas. In fact, nominalism is a term that doesn't really apply clearly to any philosophical 'school' in the history of philosophy. The question of nominalism with respect to the ulama is framed as the question of whether things have 'essences' or not. This is falsely framed as an issue of 'nominalism'. However, although it has little to do with the nominalism/realist debate (anachronistically grafted on to the quite different context of the history of Islamic thought) it DOES HAPPEN TO BE TRUE that the objective knowability of the world (and thus the viability of natural theology) absolutely _does_ depend upon the existence of essences. It is just that the existence of essences has little to do with an arcane debate about the relationship between universals and particulars (i.e. the realism/nominalism debate). This confusion of nominalism for a rejection of essences is simply the result of our philosophical illiteracy in a sub-philosophical culture and period (i.e. our own age). The status of 'universals' is really almost completely irrelevant - the real question is whether the intelligibility (objective knowability) of the world rests upon a prior, spiritual exemplary reality, or not (prior, that is, to the sensible particular world). As Lloyd Gerson has shown, the world of exemplary, spiritual reality (in broad Platonism as well as Plato himself) is not the world of 'universals'. The universal qua universal is purely mental, although it acquires its intelligibility from that prior world (just as the sensible world does as well). The mashsha'i answer to this question (including Avicenna and most late Kalam) is no, intelligibility is purely immanent. The Platonic, Ghazalian, Suhrawardian and Akbarian answer, is that yes, the intelligibility of the world presupposes such a prior exemplary reality. Indeed, the immanentist approach is not really philosophically viable in the final analysis, as it contains a dawr (as you will see if you read _Things As They Are_ ). And is this a question of Ash'ari and Maturidi !!??? No, those are schools of creed, not philosophical schools. Most later 'Ash'aris, while agreeing with his creedal formulations against the Mu'tazila, disagree with Imam al-Ash'ari on almost every philosophical point (look in Sharh al-Mawaqif for innumerable examples). But yes, creed presupposes minimally the intelligibility of the world and thus the existence of essences (i.e. that the entities that constitute the world are objectively distinct in themselves such that they can be distinguished and ordered). Again, this is nothing to do with the pseudo-question of realism and nominalism.I suggest reading the reference above by Pasnau for more clarification on this. I regret that I can't commit to replying on RUclips comments because of time constraints, but I hope this short tahqiq has been of help.
Jazak Allah for such a detailed reply. I know this isn’t the platform for these types of discussions. If you could provide just a few further references in Arabic or English to help me better my understanding, I would be grateful.
Islam is not the system of deep philosophical thinking. Analytic philosophy is absolutely incompatible with Islam. Islam is full of concepts like for example: "If your heart desires to do a certain act, and your master's order is against it, you should carry out that order. If something seems good to you, but if your master says it is bad, you must accept it as bad. And if something else seems bad but your master says it is good, then you must accept it as good. If you think a certain action will be harmful, but your master says it must be done, then done it must indeed be, even though it may entail you in loss of life or property. Similarly, if you expect to benefit from a certain action, but your master forbids it, you must refrain from it even though it might have brought all the worldly treasures. Indeed, the noblest among you in the sight of God is the most God fearing of you".- al-Hujurat 49:13
Locke's argument was not at all that 'we don't know who's right, therefore we should tolerate them'. This might have been the case for specific Protestant denominations, but Locke did not argue for tolerating Catholics or atheists, and by extension non-Christians. A more adequate comparison of Locke to Islamic theology would be something along the lines of whether different Islamic denominations/sects should be tolerated alongside one another.
Actually, epistemological scepticism _is_ a big part of Locke's argument. Have a look at this article, www.jstor.org/stable/27745104 + a lot of others. Also, Locke believed in tolerating individual Catholics, just not the Catholic Church itself as a hegemonic entity.
@@hasanspikerandtwomullas I reiterate my point upon reading the article you sent: that specific argument pertained only to other Protestants, not Catholics or non-Christians. Regarding Catholics, the term 'hegemonic entity' is very vague that in no way explains the nature of the Church's power in any state, much less seventeenth-century England. The issue he had with Catholics was that their allegiance is/was first and foremost to the Holy See, thereby making them less loyal to the English/British state than Protestants who supported the king on both political and religious grounds. Locke, like pretty much all other Protestants of his time, simply did not trust Catholics for this reason, and considering the Christian underpinnings of monarchical authority at the time, this also goes a long way in explaining why he did not wish to see toleration extended to non-Christians. It's a question of political loyalty.
Another point in your talk which is very vague is to characterise 'medieval Christianity' as Platonic. Ignoring the fact that the medieval period lasted over a 1000 years and that there were many different currents within Christianity (not to mention, from 1054 onwards, three major denominations, but I will assume you mean the West), there is the issue that while Platonism did inform Christianity and its development, Western Christianity never committed to Platonism. Yes, there is a concept of this world and the divine, but in Catholicism these are very intertwined. The Cathars were platonists, and they believed the mortal realm was entirely unholy and only the divine was holy. This was condemned as a heresy and was ferociously stamped out, because it would deny God's creation in this world's holiness. It is important not to ignore the increasing importance of Aristotelianism on the Church in the last 3-4 centuries of the medieval period and the advent of Thomistic philosophy, which was very against Platonism generally speaking.
@@frederiknielsen5496 Locke definitely defended the rights of individual Catholics to freedom of belief, but had a problem with what he perceived as the Catholic Church's intolerance, as it were, i.e. that it would not itself allow freedom of religion to Protestants. It was Don Cupitt who characterized medieval Christianity as 'Platonic' in the talk above, not the speaker. Nonetheless, Cupitt meant Platonic in a very broad sense, not in any way vitiated by anything you have said. You should look at the work on the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius and the Proclean Liber De Causis on Aquinas to see the Platonic aspects in Aquinas. In the broad sense that Cupitt intended, medieval Christianity was certainly highly Platonic, in the sense that it believed that the world of creation was subordinate to and a mere reflection of Divine Reality, specifically the Divine Ideas, and moreover subject to an angelic hierarchy akin to that described by Pseudo-Dionysius and that also informed the social stratification of Medieval Christianity. It is also relevant that the major theological figure Catholics and especially Lutheran Protestants share in common is Augustine, whose philosophy is fundamentally Plotinian. Note also this is an _excerpt_ from a talk, an excerpt focusing on the viability of analytic philosophy. It is hardly the place for a nuanced appraisal of the nature of Medieval Christianity.
What is the position of the Ahlus Sunnah (Asharis and Maturidis) on the existence of universals? Did the ulama affirm realism or nominalism?
This is a mistaken (but unfortunately widespread) way of framing the question. As real scholars of the history of philosophy explain (such as Robert Pasnau in his book Metaphysical Themes, 83-88), none of the scholars associated with nominalism (even Ockham) ever held anything like the doctrine that universals are 'just names'. On the other hand, another widespread characterization of nominalism, that it is the doctrine teaching that all reality is particular, is also a doctrine held by 'realists' like Avicenna and Aquinas. In fact, nominalism is a term that doesn't really apply clearly to any philosophical 'school' in the history of philosophy. The question of nominalism with respect to the ulama is framed as the question of whether things have 'essences' or not. This is falsely framed as an issue of 'nominalism'. However, although it has little to do with the nominalism/realist debate (anachronistically grafted on to the quite different context of the history of Islamic thought) it DOES HAPPEN TO BE TRUE that the objective knowability of the world (and thus the viability of natural theology) absolutely _does_ depend upon the existence of essences. It is just that the existence of essences has little to do with an arcane debate about the relationship between universals and particulars (i.e. the realism/nominalism debate). This confusion of nominalism for a rejection of essences is simply the result of our philosophical illiteracy in a sub-philosophical culture and period (i.e. our own age). The status of 'universals' is really almost completely irrelevant - the real question is whether the intelligibility (objective knowability) of the world rests upon a prior, spiritual exemplary reality, or not (prior, that is, to the sensible particular world). As Lloyd Gerson has shown, the world of exemplary, spiritual reality (in broad Platonism as well as Plato himself) is not the world of 'universals'. The universal qua universal is purely mental, although it acquires its intelligibility from that prior world (just as the sensible world does as well). The mashsha'i answer to this question (including Avicenna and most late Kalam) is no, intelligibility is purely immanent. The Platonic, Ghazalian, Suhrawardian and Akbarian answer, is that yes, the intelligibility of the world presupposes such a prior exemplary reality. Indeed, the immanentist approach is not really philosophically viable in the final analysis, as it contains a dawr (as you will see if you read _Things As They Are_ ). And is this a question of Ash'ari and Maturidi !!??? No, those are schools of creed, not philosophical schools. Most later 'Ash'aris, while agreeing with his creedal formulations against the Mu'tazila, disagree with Imam al-Ash'ari on almost every philosophical point (look in Sharh al-Mawaqif for innumerable examples). But yes, creed presupposes minimally the intelligibility of the world and thus the existence of essences (i.e. that the entities that constitute the world are objectively distinct in themselves such that they can be distinguished and ordered). Again, this is nothing to do with the pseudo-question of realism and nominalism.I suggest reading the reference above by Pasnau for more clarification on this. I regret that I can't commit to replying on RUclips comments because of time constraints, but I hope this short tahqiq has been of help.
Jazak Allah for such a detailed reply. I know this isn’t the platform for these types of discussions. If you could provide just a few further references in Arabic or English to help me better my understanding, I would be grateful.
Tashneeful masaami fi sharh Jamil jawaami. تشنيف المسامع في شرح جمح الجوامع للزركشي
Islam is not the system of deep philosophical thinking. Analytic philosophy is absolutely incompatible with Islam.
Islam is full of concepts like for example:
"If your heart desires to do a certain act, and your master's order is against it, you should carry out that order. If something seems good to you, but if your master says it is bad, you must accept it as bad. And if something else seems bad but your master says it is good, then you must accept it as good. If you think a certain action will be harmful, but your master says it must be done, then done it must indeed be, even though it may entail you in loss of life or property. Similarly, if you expect to benefit from a certain action, but your master forbids it, you must refrain from it even though it might have brought all the worldly treasures.
Indeed, the noblest among you in the sight of God is the most God fearing of you".- al-Hujurat 49:13