If I remember correctly you did a video on this channel sometime back that referred to 1943 as the year of "defense without strategy" for the Wehrmacht. It increasingly sounds as though 1942 could be termed the year of "offense without strategy".
Hmmm, more like "From sequential offense with 'okish' assumptions to parallel offense with overly optimistic assumptions". Directive 41 was, "ok, we have limits, let's deal with those" and then Directive 45 is like "fuck this, all in". and yes, it was Wehrmacht 1943 - Defense without Strategy (btw. not my title, it was used by one of the authors): ruclips.net/video/KPyICOCmwSk/видео.html
@Slarty Bartfast Eh. Germans kinda did have a big plan but the problem was that the plan was based on pipe dreams and so when they didn't come true then they were totally stunned and had to work it out as they went on. And Japanese started the war with a plan that depended on everything going their way and US just ignoring that it got suckerpunched and just doing nothing.
@@k3D4rsi554maq America wanted war? We had enough of our own problems. One of which was a Great Depression. Wars cost money, which we didnt have. Besides, Americas most influential industrialists and capitalists, the Rockafellers, Fords and Kennedys were known Nazi sympathizers. America hates Europe and its pointless bloody wars.
Sub artic climate, Like the upper peninsula of Michigan. Late May thru early September the mosquitoes are terrible. In Michigan, ya get biting black flies in clouds. By October the snow starts, and does not end till the end of April. Trying to fight a war, in that. Glad it was not me.....
@@knutdergroe9757 true, and just a few hundred km to the south in Ohio we have relatively few mosquitos in comparison. For me this just proves that studying the eastern front is an enormous undertaking because the length of the front lends itself to so *many* varying non-combat factors as one studies various pieces of the front.
@@Chironex_Fleckeri Check out __We Will Not Go to Tuapse__ for a depiction of the southernmost front: no big bugs, but no roads either. The author spends most of the campaign 'lost' (yeah, right) in vast grasslands dotted by a few nameless hamlets. ...That is, if you can stand bloviating right-wing narcissists. Belgian "Rexist" volunteer for the Walloon SS. It goes to show you not all the Waffën SS units were well-trained and equipped, though, too ... bring plenty of salt.
Another fantastic piece of research on a lesser known part of the war. The eastern front 1942 focus is always on Case Blue in the south, so this is brilliant. Thank you.
And military archeologists still finding some separate remainders of German Erd-Holz-Bunkers. In the summer-time swamps, that's why the remainders are stilll here. Old friend of mine has got his death after 50 years due to Sprengmine 35 that was dried in summer time...
Vladimir I am sorry to hear that. My neighbour died from a leftover landmine as well. Sadly, some wars are still claiming casualties, decades after they ended.
The Soviet attack was the part of their relief attempt called Sinyavino Offensive. The thing is both sides didn't know that the enemy was preparing for the offensive, so there was a lot of confusion since the Soviet offensive started literally 4 days before the planned German offensive (Operation Nordlicht). Although it would have been a lot better for the Germans if the 11th Army was present during Fall Blau, they still inflicted heavy losses to the Soviets in the Leningrad area.
@@spqr1945 Not true, the Soviet forces were too small for encircling maneuvers and were attacking on a very narrow front, they were just meant to break through the siege. Doubtful it would be successful even without 11th Army reinforcements.
@@Grondorn at that time 2nd shock army was one the best soviet armies, so I think it had decent chances for success. But we will never know it for sure, because it didn't happen. 2nd shock army was encircled and destroyed, only handful of its soldiers survived.
@@spqr1945 I think that was the second time the 2nd shock army was destroyed. I sincerely doubt in its success because 4 months later Soviets mounted a new offensive called Operation Iskra and very soon after Operation Polyarnaya Zvezda when the Soviets actually tried to encircle the German forces, which included a large, more mechanized force with more artillery support and of course Germans didn't have the 11th Army anymore. This time they managed to open a small corridor to Leningrad, but every effort to inflict serious casualties to the Army Group North failed.
Kind of sounds like the second battle of Kharkov in May 42. Where both sides were preparing for offensives. The Soviets ran headlong into the forces building for Case Blau and were decimated. Which indirectly lead to 11th army being shipped north because the opening phases of Case Blau was mopping up the remnants of the 2nd battle of Kharkov.
I liked the thoroughness of the logistical summations. Wasn't until I started watching your videos I realized the hell a german staff officer must have had to make sure the units had the right ammo. So this was the planned offensive that just stopped another offensive...
They minimized the problem early on by making sure that the front line "offensive" divisions had orthodox weaponry, and gave the French, Polish, Russian, Czech, etc. weapons to rear echelon and police units. As the war dragged on though, they needed every weapon they could get for the fronts.
Ooh that's St. Isaac in the background with the bronze statue of Peter the Great in its protective case. Yes I just posted about the background of this video
makes you wonder if the Germans saw the rage inducing Rasputitsa while the '42 Leningrad plan was still mulled and simply went "nope. screw this" as well
"Rasputitsa is Russian for the mud season when roads become difficult to traverse. The Rasputitsa is a psychotic, insane, drop to your knees and cry sufferfest." www.rasputitsagravel.com
Forget "General Winter", hunh? Sounds like the US-American Civil War, if one reads detailed histories. Except for a few hours of heavy fighting, the generals wrote about rivers and railroads; their subordinates, about corduroy-ing dirt roads. "A road made of logs laid down crosswise." From __The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 5th Edition.__ ...If they tried to march a whole army down a single road, the logs would wear through. Then they were _really_ screwed, because it made the road both unusable _and_ temporary irrepairable.
@@davidtuttle7556 Slovaks and producing heavy weapons? And where exactly? Synthetic petrol for sure, but I'm not really certain about many weapons made in WW2 Slovak State. And don't forget that one of those, who assassinated that major nazi leader was a Slovak as well. Ok, the Czechs weren't quite happy about producing weapons for the Reich, but they had the means to do so and they certainly did, although forced to. Please don't put the blame on Slovaks, who even though somewhat willingly cooperated, didn't contributed that much to the war effort.
This is incredible that I’ve never heard any of this. I honestly don’t think that this operation would succeed because of the urban combat and the lack of soldiers by the Germans. Thanks for the video!
So the attack didn't happen because the German troops that were meant to do it found themselves counterattacked from the side by Soviet troops, and a force that was meant to make an urban assault found itself having to fight a pitched battle? I guess that could be seen as a very successful case of a spoiling attack.
Another excellent coverage on an aspect of German operations in 1942! :) The German overall strategic situation in 1942 seemed to go on something like -- 'I'll be damned if I don't. I'll be damned if I do.' That is, they had several strategic objectives to achieve -- advance to the Don-Volga Front and the Caucasus, while holidng the Rzhev Salient and strangle Leningrad. But they did not have the strength to prevail, let alone win a decisive victory over even one of these objectives. So, within the context of trying to do too much with too little, it is understandable to see the Germans no longer able to define Schwerpunkt like they used to.
Their failure comes from not focusing on one as originally planned, while not necessarily a given victory, it would be more likely to succeed if maybe they do Leningrad only, and just Japan the city (I forget the Chinese name but in 1944 a siege lasted 43 days or so and brought in 5 whole divisions to crush the 18,000 men holding the city), they would be able to do more, and free more forces and inflict a resounding morale defeat, a perfect PR point as well for the home and geopolitics and then do other things, like the whole southern offensive Or vice versa
they also had something like 40 divisions in France, 20 of which they should have thrown into Russia instead of being overtly cautious, waiting for an underequipped Allied invasion.
What about Leningrad 41 lost operation ? Capturing Leningrad instead of Typhoon would have changed the war in a rather large way. Namely a supply line for AGN, freeing numerous divisions, freeing the Finnish army and cutting off the Murmansk railway. Depending how far subsequent operations go, the Axis would be in a better position to attack Moscow in 42, or if not, just in a better position to face Soviet offenses.
It's crazy, a mountain division was sent to Leningrad when they would have been better used in the Caucasus, there weren't any mountains or even any big hills near Leningrad, though at least there was lots of snow in winter.
An extra division, let alone an extra army (the 11th) commanded by one of the wars brightest officers would have made an incredible difference during the battle of Stalingrad. I have no doubt that had Hitler retained the original units earmarked for Blau, even with the infamous order to split Army Group South, the Germans would have more than likely taken Stalingrad well before winter.
Why not attack in 1943, rather than Kursk? In comparison, taking Leningrad would be a smaller operation and could reduce the length of the front lines. Releaving pressure in the center or south, plus it would hurt the Soviets
The Oranienbaum bridgehead was always a concern as well as Kronstadt. It appears that whilst the Germans did plan to not only encircle and starve out Leningrad, but the wider operational objective was to swing around Lake Ladoga via Volkhov and link up with the Finns and the AOK. The number of constant incoming offensives sapped any offensive strength the Germans had, and could they have done better? Having an admittedly smallish army group concentrated and stuck besieging such an iconic Soviet city was more trouble than it was worth. Could the Germans have mustered enough offensive power to bypass the city and head North completely isolating the entire area? After all, Archengelsk was the final objective, but it seems that by not harnessing the required men and materiel until early 1943 seriously cost them.
If it hadn't been for Mansteins troops Leningrad would have had an overland connection with the rest of USSR in September 1942 instead of January 1943. That is part of the story too.
@@looinrims Historically Manstein's divisions stabilized the front so that the Soviets could not break through to Leningrad. This left Manstein's divisions so depleted that they couldn't attack Leningrad as planned later in 1942. So, yes. Without Manstein's divisions the Soviet would probably break trough to Leningrad in September 1942. The distance the Soviets had to cover was small, and the room for manoeuvre for the Germans was small.
Capturing Leningrad would have eased the logistical problems of supplying Army Group North, which could then be supplied from the sea, and cut the north-south railway to Moscow. It would also have pulled Finland into the war properly and made Sweden more favourable to the German side
not enough men for the job. Finland had to demobilize a major portion of her troops in winter 1941, not enough siege artillery and given the low size of manpower and need to get men back to the economy meant that casualties that would have been taken in the attack would have been too much for Finland. And hitler did not ask Finland to attack Leningrad in 1942 when he visited Finland
what I remember, without remembering the source, is the following: Mannerheim had ordered a limited offensive to support the Germans around Leningrad. UK declared war and threatened action (only time two democracies have been at war). The finnish troops moved up, but protested once they found out they were on Russian soil. So, the troops couldn't be moved into an offensive, and any action would have meant retaliation. Also, if it didn't succeed, the finns would have shared the wrath of the Bear.
Thanks all the book I am currently reading "Finland at War, The Continuation and Lapland Wars 1941-1945" has the letters between Marshall Mannerheim and Prime Minister Churchill. These two men did not want to go to war with each other. Is too bad that Finland could not find another other Ally.
The commander of Finnish army had served in military of Russian Empire, he realized that if Finns touch Leningrad Soviet Union/Russia will never forget it. Finns were careful to not cross a line against Soviet Union where conquest of entire Finland would of been only possible outcome should Germany loose. Of course that is answer that Finns couldn't give to Germans, so our leaders gave reasons that wouldn't of been problem. Also that direction was fortified before world war and was part of the Stalin line.
>Did the Finns ever explain why they did not help take Leningrad? They tried but were stopped at KaUR, later they also tried to cut off food supply line over Ladoga but failed, and after Stalingrad the Finns were more thinking about how to exit the war because their main card occured to have been beaten.
Leningrad is the most underrated objective for 1942 Getting the city would have meant that the finish and the german would have had enough troops to cut murmansk. These shipments were there largely the reason the soviet Civil economy didn't collapse
Not really, they were little compared with the Soviet whole civil economy, so not really. But losing Leningrad and Mursmansk would have been a problem for the Soviets.
Murmansk was not the only supply road for Lend-lease. Soviets also received Allied help through Persia and Vladivostok. The loss of Murmansk road would be compensated by sending more through those roads
@@auguststorm2037 Vladivostok wasn't realy an option There was only one rail line an the distance was way to long. This would have been the greatest bottleneck of all time. Persia was an option but it's also a huge deture plus I don't realy think there was any huge harbour that could have handled the supplies needed to make an impact
Why didn't they at least just take Oranienbaum? Surely that would have been the sort of limited objective that was within their means (provided the Kriegsmarine helped surely it could have been surrounded)
well, I think you have ask Hitler about that. Maybe the arguments are covered somewhere, but I can't remember running across why the South and not the North. I think it was the oil, so getting first resources for Germany and then cutting off the Soviet Union from Lend-Lease.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized hi lol The Germans must have known about the amount to material coming from Murmansk- To me if Leningrad is taken the rail way/Murmansk is useless- for 6-12 months? or how long would it take to build? a railway around to the east? IS there another way to supply Moscow from Murmansk if Leningrad falls? If Murmansk is useless then the entire character of the northern front changes. I hope you do more research/ videos on this. Thanks for your note- and the great videos you make.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized hi A u.s.army war college? video states 80% of the material/supplies used in the Russian dec 41 offensive were British. They also said without those supplies that offensive would not have happened. Where would the Germans be if that offensive did not happen? Does Archangel use the same railway to Moscow? IF the Murmansk/ Moscow railway does not work -Would there be no northern convoys- no u boats- no surface navy- no Luftwaffe in that theater?? IF Leningrad falls in sept 41 would that make Moscow an easier fight?
@@samstewart4807 Eh. Losing Leningrad would have only meant that shipments would be diverted to Arkhangelsk and so not much would change. Also the Murmansk railway does go towards Arkhangelsk too, so trains could have been rerouted too. As for the British supplies. The tanks that the British supplied were used for second line units so they didn't take much part in the fighting and so weren't as important as people make them. And if the Soviet counter offensive had not happened then AGC would be in little better shape but still not able to operate properly in 1942. And no. Taking Leningrad wouldn't make Battle of Moscow any easier as Germans could only support one front for such an attack so if the Germans attack Leningrad they cannot attack Moscow. And an attack to Leningrad would cause actually MORE casualties than the Battle of Moscow as the Germans would need to push towards Leningrad and then fight in the city itself and Germans always took horrible losses when they fought in cities. Also you can bet that the Soviets will attempt an offensive to relieve pressure from Leningrad and possibly to form a corridor there so the Germans would have to fight two major battles at the same time!
Why did the Germans never attempt to reduce the Oranienbaum pocket? Its elimination could of freed up forces. Maybe its indicative of the limits of German manpower/resources in Heeresgruppe nord. I guess the main point of my thought is how can you think about a Leningrad operation if you seem to be unable to eliminate the Oranienbaum pocket?
The Germans missed their opportunity to starve/seize Leningrad when they failed to close up to the mouth of the Volkhov River where it empties into Lake Lagoda in the early winter/frost of 41. Had they done so it would have given them a superb defensive position while preventing any resupply/evacuation of the city over the ice of the lake. Forcing the Russians to the east of the Volkhov Delta would have added over 100 miles ONE WAY to any attempt at crossing the ice. Which would have exposed the convoys to daylight interdiction. A much weakened Leningrad would then have been far easier to take were the Germans to wait until the last of the blizzard season and then assaulted across the still frozen Neva onto the Leningrad Isthmus itself; probably late March 42.
Germans didn't have the manpower for that and considering that the Germans transferred everyone they could to AGC for the Battle of Moscow the AGN definitely didn't have the manpower needed to attack Leningrad directly and another black hole of manpower would have destroyed the Germans far faster than they historically fell.
@@Pikkabuu Actually BEFORE Typhoon and AFTER they'd closed up on Leningrad the Germans launched a pointless attack South of Novgorod across the Volkhov aimed at severing all of Karelia. It involved elements of 6 divisions; 4 inf, 1 Mot., 1 Pnzr. They punched forward over 50 miles into.... NOTHING. All they found was swamp, forest and more swamp. After 3 weeks they called it off. So the manpower was there... What was lacking was the foresight to envision an ice road across Lagoda. AND the ONLY place it could work from was the river/lake port on the West bank of the Volkhov. Past the river mouth/delta the lake shoreline actually runs South then East for close to 40 miles before turning North again. Additionally they have to go far enough North to escape the unstable ice over the Volkhov inflow. The Germans at the time of their "Strategic Bog Campaign" were less than 30 miles from the river mouth. They satisfied themselves with cutting the rail-line instead of going ahead and clearing the bank. Failing to eliminate that bridgehead would result in numerous Red Army offensives that would have been precluded had they been defending the river line. I'm sorry I can't offhand cite the source; But I recall Von Leeb after the fact saying that failure to close on the Volkhov when they had the opportunity was a theater/strategic mistake...
@@MrArtbv You cannot expect that the Germans could figure out all the possibilities, especially when the German meteorologists reported that the winter would be mild and as Typhoon hit the fan there were more pressing matters to attend to. So having such an oversight and missing something important like that in a war where Germans missed tons of possibilities really isn't surprising.
@@Pikkabuu I always try to keep in mind; "Hindsight is 20/20 AND.. Armchair generals NEVER lose the war". During and after "Blau", Stalingrad etc. Et al.. Leningrad was the LEAST of the Wehrmacht's worries. Plus the industries there weren't really much of a factor after they ran thru raw stocks on hand. In the end the only question is would the casualties incurred in an assault been worth the freeing up the 5-7 Inf divisions involved in the screening/siege?? And of course the city would have required a significant garrison even after capture. I lean toward assault... but meh.. I can see it both ways. Of course Napoleon would disagree; "When you set out to take Vienna.. TAKE VIENNA". Then again, he went into Russia w 600,000 and came out with what 20-25,000 tops??? LOL
@@MrArtbv With the way that the Germans took heavy losses every time they fought in a city I highly doubt that the amount of men freed from besieging Leningrad would counter the horrible losses suffered during taking the city. After all the Germans suffered already horrible casualties in Stalingrad before the encirclement and the Germans outnumbered the Soviets! In Leningrad the Soviets had more men and the city was far larger so casualties taken in the operation would have pretty much been the final nail on the German coffin.
What everyone also overlooks is the role played by poor Generalship. When Timoshenko - not that great a commander - took over from Voroshilov - a catastrophic commander - Soviet performance improved markedly and the Finns found themselves outfought in short order and Soviet losses relative to Finnish losses diminished appreciably. Plus the Finns, like the Germans, did not seem that interested in taking prisoners but more on tormenting the trapped and freezing Soviets.
The center was also were most German troop reinforcements went to in 1942 (not the south or the north). Some reinforcements in the south was diverted/cancelled because of the heavy bleeding in the center. Now I learn that the attack in the north was pre-empted and annulled by Soviet attack in the north, which I didn't know before. I thought it never happened because Stalingrad failed - now I see that isn't the complete story.
It is fortunate Hitler never saw the advantages of taking Leningrad. The Germans could have done it cheaply in 41 and with more difficulty in 42. That would have made the Baltic secure, given the Germans a forward supply base and most importantly freed resources for operations in the Centre and South. But moving the 11th Army North on the eve of Operation Blau was a mistake as Manstein believed. It should have attacked across the Taman peninsula. It's heavy artillery, which could be detached, would have been very useful at Stalingrad in a counter battery role against Red Army artillery on the East bank of the Volga. AFAIK the attack on Leningrad was serious but thwarted by Red Army offensives.
No they couldn't. The Germans did actually try attacking Leningrad in summer but were repulsed and as troops were transferred to Army Group Center in autumn AGN lost the manpower that it needed to even try taking Leningrad. So how could the Germans take Leningrad in 1941 when they failed at it already and how could they take it in 1942 when they hardly had the manpower to hold the siege?! Also the plan was to destroy Leningrad. It wouldn't be left to stand so it couldn't act as a supply base either.
@@Pikkabuu Good points but the Germans never seriously attempted to take Leningrad. They probed the outskirts and then stopped once they realised they couldn't just take it off the march. It is in fact almost indefensible from the position the Wehrmacht reached in 41 if a determined effort is made. But the Germans decided to besiege instead and use the resources for operation Typhoon against Moscow, far too late in the campaigning season, and then in the South in 42. This was a huge mistake, caused partly because Hitler never understood logistics. Leningrad was not only a major port, it was the second most important railway hub in Russia after Moscow. Railways mattered much more than roads in Russia at that time. If you take Leningrad not only do you get a major forward port and the railway hub to distribute supplies but Leningrad is easy to defend from the West because of the topography so once taken you can safely redeploy resources, just hold the region with infantry divisions. There is a natural defence line just to the East of Leningrad, the Volkov river line. It's capture effectively ends the war in the North. There is nothing much beyond it until Archangel although the Russians did fear Moscow being outflanked from the North if Leningrad fell.
@@alexandershorse9021 Except that Leningrad wasn't such a great prize as Moscow or the Caucasus oilfields were and so naturally the Germans didn't put much thought on Leningrad! Besides again the thing was that the Germans would demolish it and so it couldn't act as a port or a crossroads! And had Germans attacked Leningrad instead of Moscow it could have been just Stalingrad a year earlier in a much more massive scale! And taking losses like that wouldn't be good for the Germans. And again the Germans didn't have the manpower to take it over to begin with!
@@alexandershorse9021 actually Hitler understood logistics far better than his COS, Halder did. Thats why Hitler had wanted to go south from the very beginning. Hitler always knew that war with the Soviets was going to be long. Thats why Hitler wanted the Ukraine and Caucasus in German hands. The idea that if you take Moscow, youve taken Russia is a myth. The British burned Washington, we didnt quit. Napolean took Moscow and the Russians keot fighting and eventually ruined him. The French captured Hanoi but eventually got smashed at Dien Bien Phu. Leningrad would only have mattered if the Germans were then prepared to move on to Murmansk and Arkangel. The key to Russian logistics and economics have always been its river systems, particularly the Volga and the Don. Take Moscow and you've still got another 500 miles to go.
@@davidtuttle7556 Hitler expected the war in the East to be short - he said knock in the door and the whole rotten system would collapse. Yes the river systems in Russia are very important too as transport arteries and defensive lines. Most of them run North/South. The key cities you must take to dominate the rivers and control the railways in Russia are Moscow and Leningrad. If you take them the major river systems work for you rather than against you because you can move down the rivers. They are outflanked. Similarly the Russian railway system was based on the French hub and spoke model. There are two major hubs - Moscow and Leningrad. The Bolsheviks won the civil war because they controlled these hubs.
Beyond imagine the City held out for so long. But also a waist of energy on German side, and a prequel to Stalingrad. In Logistics , and not being able to fight Russia in Winter Time ! Logistics was the main Achilles heel since the 1941 invasion.
No, it wasn't by a long shot. Manstein's 11th Army was initially in the order of battle for Fall Blau, they were to secretly attack from Crimea through the Kuban to strike deep into Soviet rear and to secure a foothold at the Caucasus. If they weren't redeployed a total collapse and encirclement of the Soviet Southern and Southwestern front which was barely prevented during Fall Blau would likely occur and Soviets would be in serious trouble. (Or at the very least they would be there to help to prevent the encirclement at Stalingrad). Few are aware of how bad the '42 was for the Soviets.
i wonder about a "Three-stage invasion plan" for Barbarossa: 1) take Leningrad as priority in '41, cutting off Murmansk supply line. 2) take Stalingrad/Caucasus in '42, securing oil access 3) finally finish off Moscow in '43. (4) Allies defeat Germany in 45/46 and take over...no cold war with USSR. Barbarossa is the biggest "what if" operation in modern history.
![Israël/Palestine : fuir sous les bombes ? Alain Gresh et Rony Brauman [EN DIRECT]](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/24feUlWPyIc/mqdefault.jpg)
If I remember correctly you did a video on this channel sometime back that referred to 1943 as the year of "defense without strategy" for the Wehrmacht. It increasingly sounds as though 1942 could be termed the year of "offense without strategy".
Hmmm, more like "From sequential offense with 'okish' assumptions to parallel offense with overly optimistic assumptions".
Directive 41 was, "ok, we have limits, let's deal with those" and then Directive 45 is like "fuck this, all in".
and yes, it was Wehrmacht 1943 - Defense without Strategy (btw. not my title, it was used by one of the authors): ruclips.net/video/KPyICOCmwSk/видео.html
The British and Americans wanted war with Germany. It wasn't a war that Hitler could avoid.
@@k3D4rsi554maq Well he could of started by maybe not invading Poland maybe???
@Slarty Bartfast
Eh. Germans kinda did have a big plan but the problem was that the plan was based on pipe dreams and so when they didn't come true then they were totally stunned and had to work it out as they went on.
And Japanese started the war with a plan that depended on everything going their way and US just ignoring that it got suckerpunched and just doing nothing.
@@k3D4rsi554maq America wanted war? We had enough of our own problems. One of which was a Great Depression. Wars cost money, which we didnt have. Besides, Americas most influential industrialists and capitalists, the Rockafellers, Fords and Kennedys were known Nazi sympathizers. America hates Europe and its pointless bloody wars.
I met a fellow that served in a special bridge building unit. He said that the Mosquitos around Leningrad were the size of birds.
Sub artic climate,
Like the upper peninsula of Michigan.
Late May thru early September the mosquitoes are terrible.
In Michigan, ya get biting black flies in clouds. By October the snow starts, and does not end till the end of April.
Trying to fight a war, in that.
Glad it was not me.....
@@knutdergroe9757 true, and just a few hundred km to the south in Ohio we have relatively few mosquitos in comparison. For me this just proves that studying the eastern front is an enormous undertaking because the length of the front lends itself to so *many* varying non-combat factors as one studies various pieces of the front.
@@Chironex_Fleckeri Check out __We Will Not Go to Tuapse__ for a depiction of the southernmost front: no big bugs, but no roads either. The author spends most of the campaign 'lost' (yeah, right) in vast grasslands dotted by a few nameless hamlets.
...That is, if you can stand bloviating right-wing narcissists. Belgian "Rexist" volunteer for the Walloon SS. It goes to show you not all the Waffën SS units were well-trained and equipped, though, too ... bring plenty of salt.
@@johnd2058 you have a lot of angsty resentment
You sound like a little loser
The mosquitoes would fuck the birds
Another fantastic piece of research on a lesser known part of the war. The eastern front 1942 focus is always on Case Blue in the south, so this is brilliant. Thank you.
Another example of "everyone knows that," but when you really dig into it, it's not the case. Thanks!!!
And military archeologists still finding some separate remainders of German Erd-Holz-Bunkers. In the summer-time swamps, that's why the remainders are stilll here. Old friend of mine has got his death after 50 years due to Sprengmine 35 that was dried in summer time...
Vladimir I am sorry to hear that. My neighbour died from a leftover landmine as well. Sadly, some wars are still claiming casualties, decades after they ended.
The Soviet attack was the part of their relief attempt called Sinyavino Offensive. The thing is both sides didn't know that the enemy was preparing for the offensive, so there was a lot of confusion since the Soviet offensive started literally 4 days before the planned German offensive (Operation Nordlicht).
Although it would have been a lot better for the Germans if the 11th Army was present during Fall Blau, they still inflicted heavy losses to the Soviets in the Leningrad area.
Well whithout these reinforcements Red Army had really good chances to break through Leningrad and encircle German troops near Sinyavino
@@spqr1945 Not true, the Soviet forces were too small for encircling maneuvers and were attacking on a very narrow front, they were just meant to break through the siege. Doubtful it would be successful even without 11th Army reinforcements.
@@Grondorn at that time 2nd shock army was one the best soviet armies, so I think it had decent chances for success. But we will never know it for sure, because it didn't happen. 2nd shock army was encircled and destroyed, only handful of its soldiers survived.
@@spqr1945 I think that was the second time the 2nd shock army was destroyed.
I sincerely doubt in its success because 4 months later Soviets mounted a new offensive called Operation Iskra and very soon after Operation Polyarnaya Zvezda when the Soviets actually tried to encircle the German forces, which included a large, more mechanized force with more artillery support and of course Germans didn't have the 11th Army anymore. This time they managed to open a small corridor to Leningrad, but every effort to inflict serious casualties to the Army Group North failed.
Kind of sounds like the second battle of Kharkov in May 42. Where both sides were preparing for offensives. The Soviets ran headlong into the forces building for Case Blau and were decimated. Which indirectly lead to 11th army being shipped north because the opening phases of Case Blau was mopping up the remnants of the 2nd battle of Kharkov.
Thanks for this. A very underrated topic.
I liked the thoroughness of the logistical summations. Wasn't until I started watching your videos I realized the hell a german staff officer must have had to make sure the units had the right ammo. So this was the planned offensive that just stopped another offensive...
They minimized the problem early on by making sure that the front line "offensive" divisions had orthodox weaponry, and gave the French, Polish, Russian, Czech, etc. weapons to rear echelon and police units. As the war dragged on though, they needed every weapon they could get for the fronts.
@@princeofcupspoc9073 yeah but here he talks about artillery and heavy artillery and such, not many rear or police units use those...
This is interesting. Gives an entirely new perspective on operation Blue as well with the logistics and time frame. Nice job!
Ooh that's St. Isaac in the background with the bronze statue of Peter the Great in its protective case. Yes I just posted about the background of this video
short 23000.8 men? I wonder who was the 0.8?
One was severe wounded
Cut off one leg
Wasnt it 23.8 thousand? So 23,800?
makes you wonder if the Germans saw the rage inducing Rasputitsa while the '42 Leningrad plan was still mulled and simply went "nope. screw this" as well
"Rasputitsa is Russian for the mud season when roads become difficult to traverse. The Rasputitsa is a psychotic, insane, drop to your knees and cry sufferfest." www.rasputitsagravel.com
Forget "General Winter", hunh? Sounds like the US-American Civil War, if one reads detailed histories. Except for a few hours of heavy fighting, the generals wrote about rivers and railroads; their subordinates, about corduroy-ing dirt roads.
"A road made of logs laid down crosswise."
From __The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 5th Edition.__
...If they tried to march a whole army down a single road, the logs would wear through. Then they were _really_ screwed, because it made the road both unusable _and_ temporary irrepairable.
France, happy provider of heavy weapons for the Wehrmacht. (Honourable mention to the Czech.)
I laughed
That was the Slovaks. The Czechs at least killed a major Nazi leader. But they then paid dearly for it.
@@davidtuttle7556 Were there diverging Slovak and Czech identities during that time period?
@@fuzzydunlop7928 Yes. Very much so.
@@davidtuttle7556 Slovaks and producing heavy weapons? And where exactly? Synthetic petrol for sure, but I'm not really certain about many weapons made in WW2 Slovak State. And don't forget that one of those, who assassinated that major nazi leader was a Slovak as well. Ok, the Czechs weren't quite happy about producing weapons for the Reich, but they had the means to do so and they certainly did, although forced to. Please don't put the blame on Slovaks, who even though somewhat willingly cooperated, didn't contributed that much to the war effort.
This is incredible that I’ve never heard any of this. I honestly don’t think that this operation would succeed because of the urban combat and the lack of soldiers by the Germans. Thanks for the video!
So the attack didn't happen because the German troops that were meant to do it found themselves counterattacked from the side by Soviet troops, and a force that was meant to make an urban assault found itself having to fight a pitched battle?
I guess that could be seen as a very successful case of a spoiling attack.
Time for another amazing video
Another excellent coverage on an aspect of German operations in 1942! :) The German overall strategic situation in 1942 seemed to go on something like -- 'I'll be damned if I don't. I'll be damned if I do.' That is, they had several strategic objectives to achieve -- advance to the Don-Volga Front and the Caucasus, while holidng the Rzhev Salient and strangle Leningrad. But they did not have the strength to prevail, let alone win a decisive victory over even one of these objectives. So, within the context of trying to do too much with too little, it is understandable to see the Germans no longer able to define Schwerpunkt like they used to.
Their failure comes from not focusing on one as originally planned, while not necessarily a given victory, it would be more likely to succeed if maybe they do Leningrad only, and just Japan the city (I forget the Chinese name but in 1944 a siege lasted 43 days or so and brought in 5 whole divisions to crush the 18,000 men holding the city), they would be able to do more, and free more forces and inflict a resounding morale defeat, a perfect PR point as well for the home and geopolitics and then do other things, like the whole southern offensive
Or vice versa
they also had something like 40 divisions in France, 20 of which they should have thrown into Russia instead of being overtly cautious, waiting for an underequipped Allied invasion.
What about Leningrad 41 lost operation ?
Capturing Leningrad instead of Typhoon would have changed the war in a rather large way. Namely a supply line for AGN, freeing numerous divisions, freeing the Finnish army and cutting off the Murmansk railway. Depending how far subsequent operations go, the Axis would be in a better position to attack Moscow in 42, or if not, just in a better position to face Soviet offenses.
As well as preventing the chaos caused by being overstretched due to Typhoon.
It's crazy, a mountain division was sent to Leningrad when they would have been better used in the Caucasus, there weren't any mountains or even any big hills near Leningrad, though at least there was lots of snow in winter.
First combat use of the tiger tanks was at Leningrad and the soviets managed to capture one of them, if I remember correctly...
It burned down, fell over, and then sank into the swamp.
but Soviets captured that Tiger.
An extra division, let alone an extra army (the 11th) commanded by one of the wars brightest officers would have made an incredible difference during the battle of Stalingrad.
I have no doubt that had Hitler retained the original units earmarked for Blau, even with the infamous order to split Army Group South, the Germans would have more than likely taken Stalingrad well before winter.
Why not attack in 1943, rather than Kursk?
In comparison, taking Leningrad would be a smaller operation and could reduce the length of the front lines.
Releaving pressure in the center or south, plus it would hurt the Soviets
The Oranienbaum bridgehead was always a concern as well as Kronstadt. It appears that whilst the Germans did plan to not only encircle and starve out Leningrad, but the wider operational objective was to swing around Lake Ladoga via Volkhov and link up with the Finns and the AOK.
The number of constant incoming offensives sapped any offensive strength the Germans had, and could they have done better? Having an admittedly smallish army group concentrated and stuck besieging such an iconic Soviet city was more trouble than it was worth.
Could the Germans have mustered enough offensive power to bypass the city and head North completely isolating the entire area? After all, Archengelsk was the final objective, but it seems that by not harnessing the required men and materiel until early 1943 seriously cost them.
If it hadn't been for Mansteins troops Leningrad would have had an overland connection with the rest of USSR in September 1942 instead of January 1943. That is part of the story too.
That assumes the Soviets would always make the breakthrough
@@looinrims Historically Manstein's divisions stabilized the front so that the Soviets could not break through to Leningrad. This left Manstein's divisions so depleted that they couldn't attack Leningrad as planned later in 1942.
So, yes. Without Manstein's divisions the Soviet would probably break trough to Leningrad in September 1942. The distance the Soviets had to cover was small, and the room for manoeuvre for the Germans was small.
Capturing Leningrad would have eased the logistical problems of supplying Army Group North, which could then be supplied from the sea, and cut the north-south railway to Moscow. It would also have pulled Finland into the war properly and made Sweden more favourable to the German side
Did the Finns ever explain why they did not help take Leningrad?
not enough men for the job. Finland had to demobilize a major portion of her troops in winter 1941, not enough siege artillery and given the low size of manpower and need to get men back to the economy meant that casualties that would have been taken in the attack would have been too much for Finland. And hitler did not ask Finland to attack Leningrad in 1942 when he visited Finland
what I remember, without remembering the source, is the following: Mannerheim had ordered a limited offensive to support the Germans around Leningrad. UK declared war and threatened action (only time two democracies have been at war). The finnish troops moved up, but protested once they found out they were on Russian soil. So, the troops couldn't be moved into an offensive, and any action would have meant retaliation. Also, if it didn't succeed, the finns would have shared the wrath of the Bear.
Thanks all the book I am currently reading "Finland at War, The Continuation and Lapland Wars 1941-1945" has the letters between Marshall Mannerheim and Prime Minister Churchill. These two men did not want to go to war with each other. Is too bad that Finland could not find another other Ally.
The commander of Finnish army had served in military of Russian Empire, he realized that if Finns touch Leningrad Soviet Union/Russia will never forget it. Finns were careful to not cross a line against Soviet Union where conquest of entire Finland would of been only possible outcome should Germany loose. Of course that is answer that Finns couldn't give to Germans, so our leaders gave reasons that wouldn't of been problem. Also that direction was fortified before world war and was part of the Stalin line.
>Did the Finns ever explain why they did not help take Leningrad?
They tried but were stopped at KaUR, later they also tried to cut off food supply line over Ladoga but failed, and after Stalingrad the Finns were more thinking about how to exit the war because their main card occured to have been beaten.
Leningrad is the most underrated objective for 1942
Getting the city would have meant that the finish and the german would have had enough troops to cut murmansk.
These shipments were there largely the reason the soviet Civil economy didn't collapse
Not really, they were little compared with the Soviet whole civil economy, so not really. But losing Leningrad and Mursmansk would have been a problem for the Soviets.
@@podemosurss8316 by capturing murmansk I mean that the Germans stop the northern soviet resupply corridor.
@@flolow6804 Yes, I know, but again, that wasn't the only problem for the Soviets.
Murmansk was not the only supply road for Lend-lease. Soviets also received Allied help through Persia and Vladivostok. The loss of Murmansk road would be compensated by sending more through those roads
@@auguststorm2037 Vladivostok wasn't realy an option
There was only one rail line an the distance was way to long. This would have been the greatest bottleneck of all time.
Persia was an option but it's also a huge deture plus I don't realy think there was any huge harbour that could have handled the supplies needed to make an impact
Why didn't they at least just take Oranienbaum? Surely that would have been the sort of limited objective that was within their means (provided the Kriegsmarine helped surely it could have been surrounded)
So glad are looking at Leningrad. Why did the Germans not think taking Leningrad/ closing Murmansk was most important?
well, I think you have ask Hitler about that. Maybe the arguments are covered somewhere, but I can't remember running across why the South and not the North. I think it was the oil, so getting first resources for Germany and then cutting off the Soviet Union from Lend-Lease.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized hi lol The Germans must have known about the amount to material coming from Murmansk- To me if Leningrad is taken the rail way/Murmansk is useless- for 6-12 months? or how long would it take to build? a railway around to the east? IS there another way to supply Moscow from Murmansk if Leningrad falls? If Murmansk is useless then the entire character of the northern front changes. I hope you do more research/ videos on this. Thanks for your note- and the great videos you make.
one author actually stated that the German likely over-estimated what was coming in via Murmansk.
The other port: Archangelsk.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized hi A u.s.army war college? video states 80% of the material/supplies used in the Russian dec 41 offensive were British. They also said without those supplies that offensive would not have happened. Where would the Germans be if that offensive did not happen? Does Archangel use the same railway to Moscow? IF the Murmansk/ Moscow railway does not work -Would there be no northern convoys- no u boats- no surface navy- no Luftwaffe in that theater?? IF Leningrad falls in sept 41 would that make Moscow an easier fight?
@@samstewart4807
Eh. Losing Leningrad would have only meant that shipments would be diverted to Arkhangelsk and so not much would change. Also the Murmansk railway does go towards Arkhangelsk too, so trains could have been rerouted too.
As for the British supplies. The tanks that the British supplied were used for second line units so they didn't take much part in the fighting and so weren't as important as people make them.
And if the Soviet counter offensive had not happened then AGC would be in little better shape but still not able to operate properly in 1942.
And no. Taking Leningrad wouldn't make Battle of Moscow any easier as Germans could only support one front for such an attack so if the Germans attack Leningrad they cannot attack Moscow. And an attack to Leningrad would cause actually MORE casualties than the Battle of Moscow as the Germans would need to push towards Leningrad and then fight in the city itself and Germans always took horrible losses when they fought in cities. Also you can bet that the Soviets will attempt an offensive to relieve pressure from Leningrad and possibly to form a corridor there so the Germans would have to fight two major battles at the same time!
Why did the Germans never attempt to reduce the Oranienbaum pocket? Its elimination could of freed up forces. Maybe its indicative of the limits of German manpower/resources in Heeresgruppe nord. I guess the main point of my thought is how can you think about a Leningrad operation if you seem to be unable to eliminate the Oranienbaum pocket?
Too strongly defended and the Germans lack of manpower.
The Germans missed their opportunity to starve/seize Leningrad when they failed to close up to the mouth of the Volkhov River where it empties into Lake Lagoda in the early winter/frost of 41. Had they done so it would have given them a superb defensive position while preventing any resupply/evacuation of the city over the ice of the lake. Forcing the Russians to the east of the Volkhov Delta would have added over 100 miles ONE WAY to any attempt at crossing the ice. Which would have exposed the convoys to daylight interdiction. A much weakened Leningrad would then have been far easier to take were the Germans to wait until the last of the blizzard season and then assaulted across the still frozen Neva onto the Leningrad Isthmus itself; probably late March 42.
Germans didn't have the manpower for that and considering that the Germans transferred everyone they could to AGC for the Battle of Moscow the AGN definitely didn't have the manpower needed to attack Leningrad directly and another black hole of manpower would have destroyed the Germans far faster than they historically fell.
@@Pikkabuu Actually BEFORE Typhoon and AFTER they'd closed up on Leningrad the Germans launched a pointless attack South of Novgorod across the Volkhov aimed at severing all of Karelia. It involved elements of 6 divisions; 4 inf, 1 Mot., 1 Pnzr. They punched forward over 50 miles into.... NOTHING. All they found was swamp, forest and more swamp. After 3 weeks they called it off. So the manpower was there... What was lacking was the foresight to envision an ice road across Lagoda. AND the ONLY place it could work from was the river/lake port on the West bank of the Volkhov. Past the river mouth/delta the lake shoreline actually runs South then East for close to 40 miles before turning North again. Additionally they have to go far enough North to escape the unstable ice over the Volkhov inflow. The Germans at the time of their "Strategic Bog Campaign" were less than 30 miles from the river mouth. They satisfied themselves with cutting the rail-line instead of going ahead and clearing the bank. Failing to eliminate that bridgehead would result in numerous Red Army offensives that would have been precluded had they been defending the river line. I'm sorry I can't offhand cite the source; But I recall Von Leeb after the fact saying that failure to close on the Volkhov when they had the opportunity was a theater/strategic mistake...
@@MrArtbv
You cannot expect that the Germans could figure out all the possibilities, especially when the German meteorologists reported that the winter would be mild and as Typhoon hit the fan there were more pressing matters to attend to. So having such an oversight and missing something important like that in a war where Germans missed tons of possibilities really isn't surprising.
@@Pikkabuu I always try to keep in mind; "Hindsight is 20/20 AND.. Armchair generals NEVER lose the war". During and after "Blau", Stalingrad etc. Et al.. Leningrad was the LEAST of the Wehrmacht's worries. Plus the industries there weren't really much of a factor after they ran thru raw stocks on hand. In the end the only question is would the casualties incurred in an assault been worth the freeing up the 5-7 Inf divisions involved in the screening/siege?? And of course the city would have required a significant garrison even after capture. I lean toward assault... but meh.. I can see it both ways. Of course Napoleon would disagree; "When you set out to take Vienna.. TAKE VIENNA". Then again, he went into Russia w 600,000 and came out with what 20-25,000 tops??? LOL
@@MrArtbv
With the way that the Germans took heavy losses every time they fought in a city I highly doubt that the amount of men freed from besieging Leningrad would counter the horrible losses suffered during taking the city. After all the Germans suffered already horrible casualties in Stalingrad before the encirclement and the Germans outnumbered the Soviets! In Leningrad the Soviets had more men and the city was far larger so casualties taken in the operation would have pretty much been the final nail on the German coffin.
What everyone also overlooks is the role played by poor Generalship. When Timoshenko - not that great a commander - took over from Voroshilov - a catastrophic commander - Soviet performance improved markedly and the Finns found themselves outfought in short order and Soviet losses relative to Finnish losses diminished appreciably. Plus the Finns, like the Germans, did not seem that interested in taking prisoners but more on tormenting the trapped and freezing Soviets.
Respect for defenders of Leningrad. One of strategic Russian victories. R.I.P. fallen soldiers et civilians.
The center was also were most German troop reinforcements went to in 1942 (not the south or the north). Some reinforcements in the south was diverted/cancelled because of the heavy bleeding in the center. Now I learn that the attack in the north was pre-empted and annulled by Soviet attack in the north, which I didn't know before. I thought it never happened because Stalingrad failed - now I see that isn't the complete story.
It is fortunate Hitler never saw the advantages of taking Leningrad. The Germans could have done it cheaply in 41 and with more difficulty in 42. That would have made the Baltic secure, given the Germans a forward supply base and most importantly freed resources for operations in the Centre and South. But moving the 11th Army North on the eve of Operation Blau was a mistake as Manstein believed. It should have attacked across the Taman peninsula. It's heavy artillery, which could be detached, would have been very useful at Stalingrad in a counter battery role against Red Army artillery on the East bank of the Volga. AFAIK the attack on Leningrad was serious but thwarted by Red Army offensives.
No they couldn't. The Germans did actually try attacking Leningrad in summer but were repulsed and as troops were transferred to Army Group Center in autumn AGN lost the manpower that it needed to even try taking Leningrad. So how could the Germans take Leningrad in 1941 when they failed at it already and how could they take it in 1942 when they hardly had the manpower to hold the siege?!
Also the plan was to destroy Leningrad. It wouldn't be left to stand so it couldn't act as a supply base either.
@@Pikkabuu Good points but the Germans never seriously attempted to take Leningrad. They probed the outskirts and then stopped once they realised they couldn't just take it off the march. It is in fact almost indefensible from the position the Wehrmacht reached in 41 if a determined effort is made. But the Germans decided to besiege instead and use the resources for operation Typhoon against Moscow, far too late in the campaigning season, and then in the South in 42. This was a huge mistake, caused partly because Hitler never understood logistics. Leningrad was not only a major port, it was the second most important railway hub in Russia after Moscow. Railways mattered much more than roads in Russia at that time. If you take Leningrad not only do you get a major forward port and the railway hub to distribute supplies but Leningrad is easy to defend from the West because of the topography so once taken you can safely redeploy resources, just hold the region with infantry divisions. There is a natural defence line just to the East of Leningrad, the Volkov river line. It's capture effectively ends the war in the North. There is nothing much beyond it until Archangel although the Russians did fear Moscow being outflanked from the North if Leningrad fell.
@@alexandershorse9021
Except that Leningrad wasn't such a great prize as Moscow or the Caucasus oilfields were and so naturally the Germans didn't put much thought on Leningrad! Besides again the thing was that the Germans would demolish it and so it couldn't act as a port or a crossroads!
And had Germans attacked Leningrad instead of Moscow it could have been just Stalingrad a year earlier in a much more massive scale! And taking losses like that wouldn't be good for the Germans.
And again the Germans didn't have the manpower to take it over to begin with!
@@alexandershorse9021 actually Hitler understood logistics far better than his COS, Halder did. Thats why Hitler had wanted to go south from the very beginning. Hitler always knew that war with the Soviets was going to be long. Thats why Hitler wanted the Ukraine and Caucasus in German hands. The idea that if you take Moscow, youve taken Russia is a myth. The British burned Washington, we didnt quit. Napolean took Moscow and the Russians keot fighting and eventually ruined him. The French captured Hanoi but eventually got smashed at Dien Bien Phu. Leningrad would only have mattered if the Germans were then prepared to move on to Murmansk and Arkangel. The key to Russian logistics and economics have always been its river systems, particularly the Volga and the Don. Take Moscow and you've still got another 500 miles to go.
@@davidtuttle7556 Hitler expected the war in the East to be short - he said knock in the door and the whole rotten system would collapse. Yes the river systems in Russia are very important too as transport arteries and defensive lines. Most of them run North/South. The key cities you must take to dominate the rivers and control the railways in Russia are Moscow and Leningrad. If you take them the major river systems work for you rather than against you because you can move down the rivers. They are outflanked. Similarly the Russian railway system was based on the French hub and spoke model. There are two major hubs - Moscow and Leningrad. The Bolsheviks won the civil war because they controlled these hubs.
Summary please!
Beyond imagine the City held out for so long.
But also a waist of energy on German side, and a prequel to Stalingrad.
In Logistics , and not being able to fight Russia in Winter Time !
Logistics was the main Achilles heel since the 1941 invasion.
The war was lost by that point anyway.
No, it wasn't by a long shot. Manstein's 11th Army was initially in the order of battle for Fall Blau, they were to secretly attack from Crimea through the Kuban to strike deep into Soviet rear and to secure a foothold at the Caucasus. If they weren't redeployed a total collapse and encirclement of the Soviet Southern and Southwestern front which was barely prevented during Fall Blau would likely occur and Soviets would be in serious trouble. (Or at the very least they would be there to help to prevent the encirclement at Stalingrad).
Few are aware of how bad the '42 was for the Soviets.
No
i wonder about a "Three-stage invasion plan" for Barbarossa:
1) take Leningrad as priority in '41, cutting off Murmansk supply line.
2) take Stalingrad/Caucasus in '42, securing oil access
3) finally finish off Moscow in '43.
(4) Allies defeat Germany in 45/46 and take over...no cold war with USSR.
Barbarossa is the biggest "what if" operation in modern history.
@@terraflow__bryanburdo4547 If the USSR falls i don't think the allies would be able to defeat Germany, at least until the late forties.
me think this russian campaign as a whole was a lost operation