The physical or material is a pure abstraction. The most parsimonious explanation is that consciousness, which is most immediately obvious to us, is fundamental.
This has become my current metaphysical leaning - so great video on it! I think it's also important to note that the term 'physical' is a little amorphous. We only know of the 'physical' - say the trajectory of a bullet being fired as captured by Newtonian physics - through our experience of it. And thus, all is ultimately traced back to the mind. It is a theoretical abstraction to say that that object exists in some mind independent state governed by subject to some form of existential inertia. And thus we have no real basis to think the 'physical' exists as we often assume it to. I also think there is an interesting parallel between reductive physicalism and idealism. Both pose that the brain and the mind are the same thing, and that there is a single substance that permeates reality. I sometimes wonder if the differences between them is more of a language problem. But I don't know.
Awesome, thanks! I couldn't agree more with what you said about the physical. I often make the same point that whenever we're trying to give a description of what's normally called 'physical' it's really just a description of experience. There are some similarities with reductive physicalism and idealism, such as how they're both a form of reductionism, but where they differ is in what their reduction base is. To the physicalist the reduction base is the brain, while the idealist holds the reduction base is the mind, each has its own consequences. I argue physicalism faces a problem here, particularly the hard problem, while idealism has no such issue.
@@MonisticIdealism hey there! I agree entirely wrt. the hard problem. I find it impassable so it very quickly eliminated physicalism as an option for me.
@Aidan *"And thus we have no real basis to think the physical exists as we often assume it to."* The physical has to exist, because only the physical has causal powers on its own. Primary causality entails an exemplification tie or compresence relation, since properties, that which imbue an entity with causal powers, don't hang about loosely in reality, but are tied to concrete particulars. To have a compresence entails a collocation or substratum. Both of which are of physical phenomena. An immaterial substratum is incoherent and immaterial phenomena are aspatial. Causality entails spatiality, since a causal happening must take place somewhere. Only physical phenomena are spatial on their own. Causality entails a before and after. A temporal change and endurantism if you will. Only physical phenomena are temporal on their own. This is why only physical phenomena have causal powers on their own. *"We only know of the physical through our experience of it. And thus, all is ultimately traced back to the mind."* This is what I call the telescope fallacy. The means through which you know something, doesn't exist outside the means. A person looks in a telescope and sees a galaxy through the telescope, then erronoesly assumes the galaxy doesn't have an independent existence outside the telescope. This is akin to a child who thinks a toy no longer exists if he is not playing with it and it is not in his immediate direct awareness. The galaxy has to exist outside the telescope because the means of awareness does not have control over the object of awareness, and still exists for others when that individual awareness is gone.
@@MonisticIdealism *"I often make the same point that whenever we're trying to give a description of what's normally called 'physical' it's really just a description of experience"* You are being so irrational and fallacious. You pick up a cell phone and dial a number on the key pad. You are experiencing this feeling of pressing the numbers and experiencing the solidity of the cell phone in your hand. But you fallaciously question beg that this is all there is to that cell phone is your experience of it. You are, without argument, assuming that the solidity of the cell phone and the mass and shape is all in your mind and not independent, extra-mental characteristics of the cell phone.👎
@@Dhorpatan hey there. Apologies I am on my phone. But I would just want to ask what is your definition of physical? And why should one accept that only the physical can have causal powers? Consider a dream. That is sheer mentality, with the perception of the external world, with apparent causality and a spatial temporal nature. Would that not be a defeater to your claim?
Great video. That sound animation and the music kicking in at 5:22 made me laugh 😂. I also think a model like this could escape the metaphysical (and political/social) dichotomy between metaphysical individualism vs holism. It can also be summed up as reductionism/atomism (individuals are like islands in the sea by themselves) against existence monism (only the whole exists). A model like this can possible lead to a greater synthesis (Hegelian dialectical logic) between the individual and the community. I also tend to see the difference between the modern idealists Bernardo Kastrup and Donald Hoffman as a modern day Schopenhauer vs Leibniz metaphysical idealist battle - only the cosmic conscious whole exists (idealistic existence monism) vs infinite conscious agents (monadic pluralistic idealism). I’m also sceptical of Plato being classed as an idealist. We do tend to sometimes refer to his system as “Platonic Idealism” but I think its better to classify him as a defender of metaphysical dualism since he makes a sharp dividing line distinction between the realm of Becoming and the realm of Being (and mathematical forms and ideas were described as non-physical, non-mental, objectively existing abstract entities). Plato’s dualism is an integral part of his whole metaphysics since he was trying to overcome the problems with Heraclitus and Parmenides. I also don’t believe Baruch Spinoza was an idealist too. I believe the best way to describe his position within metaphysics and philosophy of mind is to describe it as a type of dual-aspect monism combined with pantheism/panentheism (Oppositum also believes this).
Lol thanks I'm glad you liked it. I agree, I think this metaphysical framework offers a third option that places importance on both the whole of society as well as the parts of society. I think that's a great example to use. What we see with Bernardo and Hoffman is a continuation of the classic debate about monism vs pluralism but in the modern day. I think it's fair to classify Plato as an idealist, though I would call him a dualistic idealist. He's identified as an idealist in the SEP's entry on idealism with reasons provided. However you're right that the issue of Spinoza is a bit more controversial. Perhaps I should have added another asterisk for him. Some argue he is an idealist, such as J. Clark Murray, but there are other interpretations of Spinoza.
@Ellis Farrow That is hilariously messed up you've been rewarded with 30 thousand subscribers ripping off other people's content and putting it on your channel. Not to mention you are almost certainly committing copyright infringement.🤦♀️👎 My goodness that is some unjust mess from the humans that subscribed to you. You have 6 times more subscribers than me and Monistic idealism combined, and we do the work to make our own original content.😒
@@MonisticIdealism Spinoza was not an idealist nor a phyicalist, he was simply a substance monist. He believed mind and extension were properties of the substance, not seperate substances in themselves. How he accounts for the relationship between these properties is something entirely different.
@@CMVMic Dr. Michael Della Rocca argues Spinoza is an idealist. He's a distinguished professor of philosophy at Yale who edited _The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza,_ and he notes Spinozas conception of PSR and the mind-dependent nature of diversity commits Spinoza to idealism. This is said in the book: _Spinoza and German Idealism_ published on Cambridge University Press.
@@MonisticIdealism I know who he is. I have watched many lectures from him. I respectfully disagree with him. There are many published papers that disagree with that.
Great video. I've come to think that there is no subject without an object either but instead of a duality of physical and mental I posit a third non-dual possibility. A superclass of subject-object duality. The idealist explanation seems to reverse the hard-problem because then we have to ask how does the subject form objects. If there is one self that needs to be objectified in some way to become manifest it would rely on the a subclass of selves to provide the optics. What if God wanting his wrath to be known created vessels unto dishonor? That is to say the All had to create subjects so that the All could exist. These subjects are still a subclass of the all but are necessary as well. The other thing is that to these subjects the All undergoes some objectification just as those subjects do among each other. A self seen from another self is an object of subjective experience.
This is an objection I once had. However, the thing is, idealists don't just assert there is no subject without an object, but also that there is no object without a subject. Now, both of those assertions sound reasonable, but they can't both be true, right? If thing A is conditional on thing B, and thing B is conditional on thing A, how could either exist, it would be self-causation, right? Only if A and B are different, I counter. As many idealists thought history, probably most famously F. H. Bradly have pointed out, subject and object are essentially abstracted distinctions, ontologically posterior to experience. Experience is what mind is, subject and object are just abstract ways of talking about it. As some like Bernardo Kastrup have put it, "TWE [(That-which-experiences)] and experience are of the same essential nature. More specifically, experience is a pattern of excitation of TWE". (The Idea of the World, Bernardo Kastrup, 2019). He then uses the example of waves in water, which I think is a good analogy. Water must have some shape, but not any particular one. So, I think the question here is "What is it like to be God/the One/the Absolute/whatever you want to call it. (We'll go with God, since this sounds pretty familiar "God is entirely thought, entirely mind, entirely feeling, entirely source of all good things" -St. Irenaeus of Lyons). The answer? Only God knows. If I tell someone who doesn't know what green is that something is green, that tells him nothing. Even if we were to say that God is perfect, unlimited, all-knowing, etc., the only way to know what that really means is to be God. So we can't really know what the default state is, because that's God's mind before he made any limited minds, rules, etc. The best I can say is that there's probably just perfect happiness, perfect all-encompassing knowledge of mathematics, logic, etc. in one timeless instant)
There's a video called "This is Jonathan Schaffer" from a channel called feallsanachd and I edited that a bit. I lowered the audio when the other guy was speaking in that clip, then I recorded my lines with an audio filter that made it sound like I was on the phone.
great video 👍 what about the idea that there are third person properties (shape, color, mass) and first person properties (sensation, memory, intentionality)? Would you say that ultimately all objects require an appeal to first person properties to describe them? Because if we can wholly describe a rock in terms of third person properties then that seems to undermind idealism.
I'm glad you liked it 👍 The idea you're referring to is known as property dualism and I have a video refuting that idea called "The Failures of Property Dualism": ruclips.net/video/FM-BB1WIEfA/видео.html
@@MonisticIdealism Usually, holism is a metaphysical framework which holds that the world is a single, indivisible whole, not reducible to the sum of its parts. This is in contrast to atomism which is a metaphysical framework which holds that the world is not an indivisible whole, but rather, is made up of and reducible to its parts - that the world is an aggregate of parts.
@@jimmyfaulkner1855 I definitely reject atomism. I'm tempted to say that I'm a holist, but I want to emphasize that I believe both the whole and the parts exist, I just believe the whole to be prior to the parts.
How can you be a monist and say whole and parts.. Doesnot "and" mean duality.. Parts are only nominal or relative/dependent things not real in the sense that parts don't exists by themselves.. Take this example Sun rays are not parts existing on its own or a fruit can't exist independent of the tree.. So parts are only nominal true..
What you imply by whole and parts is called attributive monism..and that I have refuted.. Fragmentation, separation, dissociations etc are just words used to point to something which in itself is Holistic.. So dont hold on to words(pointers) like these.. There is only whole not parts..
I'm not really I sure I understand how idealism work Do you deny the actual existence of physical properties such as mass, spin and charge and everything is just tastes and sounds and other perceptions?
I do not eliminate physical properties, I reduce physical properties. So what you call physical properties exist, it's just that these properties are actually mental properties. Think of the properties you see in your dream as an example. The objects and properties you normally call physical are present in dreams, it's just that these objects and properties are purely mental and are nothing over and above experience. I have a Playlist called "Understanding Idealism" on my channel that goes into more detail on how to grasp the basics of the idea.
@@MonisticIdealism i have a few points: - I fail to see how mass or charge can be an experience, they're totally outside our experience - does taste, smell and other mental properties have a real existence outside our own experiences, or they're just a representation in our minds to help us understand a more fundamental reality that is wholly other as Donald Hoffman says? I can't see how those mental properties can exist for exemple at the beginning of the universe, where there is neither human nor animal minds to experience them, nor at the subatomic level where they don't even exist
@@anarcho845 I don't see how they're "outside of experience" when they are described with experience. Science is about the investigation of the empirical world. If these are not empirical then these concepts are not scientific. I think they have a real existence. I believe there is a single subject that is fundamental and experiences everything.
@@MonisticIdealism i think I'm confusing experience with perception The fundamental subject of consciousness is experiencing the world in a manner different than our right? It's not visual or auditive?
@@anarcho845 I think this quote from Mary Whiton Calkins will help clarify my own view on this since I am a personal idealist like her: "Here it is of capital importance to remember that the term ‘self,' as applied to the Absolute, must mean, qualitatively, precisely what it means in its application to human selves. To call the absolute reality self is meaningless, unless there is then attributed to the absolute self a consciousness which is like that of finite selves. From finite selves the absolute self must, it is true, differ; but it differs by virtue of its absoluteness, not by virtue of its selfhood. One may be guided, therefore, in the study of the nature of the absolute self by the following principle: to attribute to the absolute self all experiences and characters of the finite self which are essential to selfhood, but not to attribute to it any qualities which are inconsistent with absoluteness." - Mary Whiton Calkins, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 422
@Hager Wow! So I think I understand what you are saying, but it's so irrational. Looks like you are saying nothing exists outside of consciousness, and therefore everything is consciousness because whatever is known, can only be known through consciousness. But that is irrational since at best that only gets you an epistemic claim, not an ontic one. And also how does that allow you to say everything is immaterial? When whatever might exist outside of consciousness could be matter, you simply don't know one way or the other, so you have to be agnostic on that. Also, how do you get around the fact that your senses verify physical properties like solidity or felt volume or 3 dimensionality?
@@Dhorpatan "Wow! So I think I understand what you are saying, but it's so irrational. Looks like you are saying nothing exists outside of consciousness, and therefore everything is consciousness because whatever is known, can only be known through consciousness. But that is irrational since at best that only gets you an epistemic claim, not an ontic one. And also how does that allow you to say everything is immaterial? When whatever might exist outside of consciousness could be matter, you simply don't know one way or the other, so you have to be agnostic on that." The material and immaterial would be grounded in consciousness. "Also, how do you get around the fact that your senses verify physical properties like solidity or felt volume or 3 dimensionality?" No one has to get around those facts; since they are direct observations from experience. 'Conflating Abstraction with Empirical Observation: The False Mind-Matter Dichotomy' No one should conflate the empirical observation of solidity, felt volume, or 3 dimensionality with the abstraction of matter
@@danielhager6805 But let me ask you this: Do you really want to be on the same side as a person like Monistic Idealism that is irrational enough to think dreams are real and contain conscious persons?😳
I do have some difficulties with going as far as positing the mental to be the foundation of reality It's a little bit some sort of neo-geocentrism, conscious beings represent just an infinitly small constituant of reality, i just have some difficulties with saying that the experiences of those small beings will make is change all our understanding if the world It seem consciousness represent just a small portion of the universe
@@Dhorpatan For some reason, I got no notification for this video and only noticed it after randomly visiting the channel. Happy new year to you as well! ✨
personalism and love are higher in my hierarchy of mind than some concepts of parsimony and even my idea of parsimony might not be compatible with others if they can't manage to regard one and many as the same whole that are co-equal and co-eternal. the infinite mind is one and many and the only thing that is and thus the only foundation of itself. it is a whole and not a fragment though humans seem to be fragments due to their ignorance. the many make the one and the one make the many but we are okay because we are infinite and eternal and thus have infinitely better versions of ourselves to make sure we never get caught in a permanent chaos. I cast out from myself all crude christian baggage as unnecessary and something evil trying to keep me away from God and I accept that what Jesus spoke was just as true for me as he. without love people get an insane idea about reality, that it has no bias, that it just produces everything irrationally and that evil and goodness are equal to it. it is a reverting back into naturalism and physicalism due to only an abstract knowledge of reality.
Nobody said simplicity is more important than love or personalism. Simplicity is merely a theoretical virtue. As a orthodox Christian that affirms the trinity what you're saying about the one being many actually resonates with me. I can still meaningfully say the one is prior to the many though since this oneness has to do with substance and orthodox Christianity affirms God is one in terms if substance but is plural in terms if personhood.
@@MonisticIdealism who even tried to make a distinction of God and the Godhead? magically when I say that personality/mind = substance, I have shown that Godhead and God are the same.
@@SpiritualPsychotherapyServices it is but to delete others minds, loves or freedom is to make them cease to exist which is why love has to be both a multiplicity and unity. I guess I was being a fool thinking that simplicity is not a great thing :D
What gives people the right to think that they can impose on reality what it's actual nature is in the name of parsimony. I get the need for parsimony when it comes to epistemology that we shouldn't make too many postulates that we can't account for because it becomes more and more likely that we are wrong as the postulates increase but when it comes to ontological issues no one has the right to say it must be this way or that way. reality is what it is. it's not for us to determine what the ontological state is (which is exactly what this principle of ontological parsimony does) for that is already a determined reality whether known or not. you can say this is how ontological reality is and put on the table whatever insight you might have but please please don't tell us what it must be, again what makes anyone think they can settle by opinion what is already settled in fact.
What do you think about epistemological idealism? Also, epistemological idealism can lead to epistemological solipsism which would then collapse into epistemological theism.
The point about parsimony has to do with quantifying fundamental reality rather than qualifying fundamental reality (stating what it's actual nature is). Holding that only one entity is fundamental instead of many is on its face more parsimonious since that view assumes less fundamental entities. When it comes to identifying the nature of ultimate reality I merely went over the main options that are available and how idealism is more virtuous than the other options. Priority monism holds only one entity is fundamental, but dualism holds 2 entities are fundamental (mental and physical substances) so that won't fit. Materialists can hold only one entity is fundamental, like Jonathan Schaffer, but this faces the hard problem of consciousness which is fatal. To avoid fatal problems and cohere with priority monism then idealism is the best option of the main ones available.
@@MonisticIdealism in as far as ontological categories go I'm with you on that, that we have no grounds to say that there is more than the mental category. But priority monisim in idealism seems to lead to some sort of cosmic consciousness, this idea that individual minds are essentially one unified mind that is somehow interacting with its self. Now you may argue that as you say it's simpler but I think it matters More what is true. Do you believe in God as defined by classical theism more precisely the God of the judeo-christian tradition?
@@janenjoki7822 Yes, priority monism with idealism does lead to cosmic consciousness of sorts. Truth and simplicity are not in competition, the point of simplicity is that it's a part of our methodology in arriving at the truth. I do believe in God but I'm not 100% if I'm a classical theist. I agree with a lot of what classical theists say but one things that's for sure is I am a Christian theist.
@@danielhager6805 I think epistemological idealism is reasonable to hold to than believe something else that you can't account for like embracing physical realism. Ideally I think we are all epistemological solipsists in as far as we can only access our own subjective experience. But I don't get what you mean by epistemological theism
And exactly what is the argument against metaphysical coherentism? Also, explanations need not termintate or be grounded, they can also be circular. Clearly, people aren't familiar with Munchhausen's Trilemma enough to understand that. Rasumussen is wrong. Existence doesnt require an explanation, it can be brute, also, being cannot come from nonbeing so @3:41 you cannot bring yourself into existence, you were never brought into existence, what you are made of always existed. When one assumes linear causation, that is when the problem arises.
Metaphysical coherentism is viciously circular. It doesn't make sense to say x caused itself, x would need to exist in the first place in order to cause anything. As you said yourself: "you cannot bring yourself into existence...being cannot come from non-being". I'm well aware of the trilemma you bring up. It goes way back to the ancient Greek days and is sometimes referred to as Agrippa's Trilemma. I accept a form of epistemic and metaphysical foundationalism, as most people seem to. Most people aren't satisfied with brute explanations and seems open the door to more inquiries than it closes. Such as why that's brute and why other aren't and so on. Why is existence the way it is? Why does it exist? It seems lazy to just say it's brute and doesn't really answer the question.
@@MonisticIdealism It is not necessarily vicious. X always exists. I assume we both hold to substance monism. Therefore, your argument is levelled at becoming, not being. Seeing there cannot be anything external to reality, motion is either internally absolute (Heraclitus) or a mind dependent illusion (Parmenides). Nothing comes into existence, Existence is eternal i.e. nonchanging/time independent. There is no real change (gain/loss of properties/states). The thought that there must be a priority ordering which terminates at the fundamental level is often expressed with the notion of well-foundedness. An option, which undermines this priority ordering and suggests that dependence chains can form loops, is called metaphysical coherentism. All "arbitrary" nodes within the chain are mutually interdependent. The chain itself is ontologically independent. There is no justification for why there must be a hierachy. RE: Vicious Circularity (Russell Paradox) There is no escaping a logical circle without question begging. The problem of the criterion highlights this much. Otherwise, one could charge the reliability of perception as utlizing vicious circularity. However, it should also be noted, not all logical circles are malignant, some can be benign. If you want to properly address the topic of metaphysical explanation, you must first define what you mean by metaphysical explanation. See entry plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysical-explanation/#MoniVsPlurAbouMetaExpl RE: Trilemma An acceptance of metaphysical foundationalism is ultimately arbritrary. It is presupposed i.e. question begging. Your argument against brute explanations is basically an argument against metaphysical foundationalism itself. To say it is lazy, it just an appeal to emotion/ridicule. So what if it seems lazy? Why does existence demand a metaphysical explanation? Clearly, non-existence is a logically incoherent notion.
@@CMVMic If X always exists then that's indistinguishable from foundationalism. From there it looks like your point can't get off the ground without pressupposing a form of foundationalism. I'm not seeing a reason to believe motion is necessary for change. I'm also not seeing a reason to believe there needs to be question begging in order to avoid a vicious circle. What I mean by metaphysical explanation is basically what Schaffer means by it in the lecture I referenced in the video. Metaphysical explanation is divided in 3 parts: the metaphysical principles, the metaphysical ultimate, and the metaphysical derivatives. We explain the derivatives in terms of what's ultimate and how they relate with these fundamental principles. I don't think there's anything arbitrary about a foundational belief like the law of non-contradiction. To infer it is of course to beg the question, but to deny it is also nonsensical. By starting with that as an axiom there's no question begging and given it's undeniable it seems anything but arbitrary. You left out how brute facts open more inquiry than they close, they don't explain anything and they're purely arbitrary. Why hold that X is brute but Y and Z aren't? Unlike you, the foundationalist can appeal to something like the principle of sufficient reason, so there is an explanation in the necessity of what's fundamental rather than it just being some arbitrary brute fact.
@@MonisticIdealism RE: Spinoza Sure, Spinoza was an existence and priority monist, however, regarding fundamentality and the nature of existence, he claimed it was neither material (realist) nor mental (idealist) but neutral. He explicitly stated that mind and extension were only two amongst an infinite number of modes of being, he never claimed mind is being. RE: If X always exists then that's indistinguishable from foundationalism. You are conflating becoming with being. Existence is brute, it requires no explanation. However, the proposal of Metaphysical Coherentism has to do with becoming, not being. It has to do with ontological dependence relations, where metaphysical foundationalism is the view that there is atleast one fundamental (concrete) entity upon which all non-fundamental entities ultimately ontologically depend. If only X, i.e. there is only one substance, then there aren’t any non-fundamental entities. A causal chain need not be metaphysically foundational simply because if all the nodes within the chain are ontologically interdependent, then the chain itself is ontologically independent. This is basically Priority Monism, where the whole is more fundamental than the parts. However, it should be noted that this also presupposes ontological priority. There is no justification for why there need be a hierarchy of basicness for reality. Existence monism: ∃x(Cx&∀y(Cy→x=y)) OR Existence monism (cosmic): ∃!xCx&Cu∃!xCx&Cu This says that there is exactly one concretum, namely the cosmos. Metaphysical/Ontological foundationalism: ∀x(Fx∨∃y(Fy&Pyx))∀x(Fx∨∃y(Fy&Pyx)) In words, ontological foundationalism holds that every entity is either basic or posterior to something basic. In content, what ontological foundationalism excludes is the prospect of something being neither itself foundational nor founded on something else that is foundational. This exclusion is unjustifiable eg. The Whole = The Parts. Clearly, there is no ontological priority here. RE: Presupposing foundationalism (Indirect Skepticism). This is called Argument via Indirect Proofs (one can assume another’s position for the sake of argument). Metaphysical coherentism hasn’t been proved impossible/implausible. I have not argued that metaphysical coherentism is true. "I'm not seeing a reason to believe motion is necessary for change." It is necessary for change within one existing substance. Temporal/Spatial change requires the gain/loss of a property. There can be no gain/loss without motion. For eg. Change in thought incorporates temporal change. How can a substance change without motion? Adopting Cambridge Change, it can also defined as inconsistent relations within/between different states, but if all states simultaneously exist, there is no real change. The natural view of change is that real, metaphysical change in a thing would be change in the monadic or internal or intrinsic properties of the thing. This topic would require a deeper investigation into the nature of time, space, motion and change. We can do this if you want. “I'm also not seeing a reason to believe there needs to be question begging in order to avoid a vicious circle.” To presuppose is to beg the question (petitio principii). By arguing in a circle or incorporating infinitism, the questions are answered, it just may not be satisfactory. Are you familiar with the problem of the criterion? Have you even considered its metaphysical applications? To know whether things are as they seem to be, we must have a procedure for distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. But to know whether our procedure is a good procedure, we have to know whether it really succeeds in distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. And we cannot know whether it does really succeed unless we already know which appearances are true and which ones are false. And so we are caught in a circle. Chisholm owns up to the validity of this charge, writing, “What few philosophers have had the courage to recognize is this: we can deal with the problem [of the criterion] only by begging the question.” “What I mean by metaphysical explanation is basically what Schaffer means by it in the lecture I referenced in the video.” As far as I can see, Schaffer did not define metaphysical explanation in that video, which is what I am asking you to do. Please refer to the link I posted in my previous comment. On a constructual ontology, Schaffers’ conception of metaphysical inquiry into what the world is like, consists of three parts i.e. fundamentality, principles and its derivatives. This inquiry has to do with going beyond asking why is there something rather than nothing, it has to do with explaining what the world is like, not why reality itself exists. “We explain the derivatives in terms of what's ultimate and how they relate with these fundamental principles.” Granted. However, you assume that the derivates are not themselves as fundamental as the whole. “I don't think there's anything arbitrary about a foundational belief like the law of non-contradiction.” Ofcourse it is. It is assumed true without justification. Do you even know what foundationalism is? “To infer it is of course to beg the question, but to deny it is also nonsensical.” Appeal to ridicule and common sense. Utility does not entail truth. “By starting with that as an axiom there's no question begging and given it's undeniable it seems anything but arbitrary.” Ofcourse it can be denied. It’s called Dialetheism. “You left out how brute facts open more inquiry than they close, they don't explain anything and they're purely arbitrary. Why hold that X is brute but Y and Z aren't?” If it is a brute fact, by definition, it requires no further investigation/inquiry. If there is only X (one substance), there is no Y and Z. Asking why not, is like asking ‘why doesn’t nothing exist?’. “Unlike you, the foundationalist can appeal to something like the principle of sufficient reason, so there is an explanation in the necessity of what's fundamental rather than it just being some arbitrary brute fact.” Lol Unlike me? You presuppose my position good sir. I am merely an interlocutor. It is definitely an arbitrary brute fact. Is there an explanation for why the PSR is true? Just because you claim something is necessary or fundamental does nothing to change that it is axiomatic. The principles of logic are themselves brute. You cannot explain them without using logic, in other words, arguing in a circle or begging the question. How else would you explain why there is something rather than nothing?
@@CMVMic When it comes to Spinoza I already provided a quote in another comment to you by Professor Rocca giving the argument that Spinoza is an idealist. Since that comment is in a separate thread focused on that specific issue, I suggest we continue the Spinoza discussion on that thread to avoid redundancy. You haven't shown that pointing out that X always exists is indistinguishable from foundationalism is a conflation of being with becoming. If X is something that exists and has always existed and did not derive from somewhere else, then that's not really a difference from what the foundationalist is saying. I'm also not seeing any reason from you as to think that existence is brute. Being brute and believing that something is brute are 2 different things. If something is brute then there is no explanation for it, but if you're going to believe that something is brute you still have a burden of proof if you wish to claim that belief is true. I'm not seeing any reason from you to believe that existence is brute, or that anything is brute for that matter. _Prima facie,_ beings such as you and I appear to be derivative and distinct from each other. It doesn't seem like we've always existed or that we're all identical. Hence there is _prima facie_ justification that there is a hierarchy for reality. The question that's entertained by metaphysicians for the most part is whether the whole or the parts are fundamental, not whether the whole = the parts. I already went over how metaphysical coherentism impossible/implausible on its face. You even admitted yourself that being does not come from non-being and something cannot cause itself to exist. This is largely why metaphysical coherentism is the least explored option between the three. Infinitism is explored more than coherentism, but not by much. Foundationalism is the one that's taken the most seriously and written about the most about and for good reason as noted by the _prima facie_ justification I brought up. I'm not seeing a reason to believe that motion would be necessary for a substance monist who is an idealist. If one is losing a belief or thought or feeling I'm not seeing how "motion" applies here. Presupposing something is not begging the question. Question begging is a type of circular reasoning in which the premises that are meant to support an argument already assume that the conclusion is true. Just having a presupposition, such as an axiom, is not reasoning in a circle, it's just having a starting point that you reason from, not reason towards. Schaffer did define metaphysical explanation in the full lecture, you must have missed it. Plus I already explained it for you. To give a metaphysical explanation is to explain the derivatives in terms of what's fundamental and how they tie together with metaphysical principles. Schaffer gives an example of metaphysical explanation by noting how we explain biology in terms of chemistry and we explain chemistry in terms of physics. By definition a derivative is not fundamental. If something is fundamental then it's not derivative. You're just saying of course it's arbitrary without any justification. I already pointed out that though the law of non-contradiction cannot be proven without going in a circle, it cannot sensibly be denied so it hardly seems arbitrary hence why it's identified as an axiom by logicians. To be clear, what I mean by sensible or sensical is that it's coherent. It's not coherent to deny the law of non-contradiction, to deny it would be to presuppose its truth which would then entail it's falsehood, and on its face this doesn't make any coherent sense at all. Do you know what an axiom is? Dialetheism is widely rejected, my previous paragraph includes a common reason as to why. I understand what is meant by brute, but you're not recognizing the distinction between X being brute and believing that X is brute. _Why_ should we believe that X is brute or that anything is brute? Unless you're talking about existence monism, then there's still Y and Z since there's still a plurality of other entities, so why believe some entities are brute and some aren't? I don't see how I'm presupposing your position when you stated, and I quote directly: "Existence is brute". This is your position. If you're trying to be like the youtuber Carneades where he only holds positions for the sake of argument then so be it, but if that's the case then you can't really be going around saying that "existence is brute" as if that really is the case when you don't even believe it. Alexander Pruss and Joshua Rasmussen go into the justification for PSR in their book _Necessary Existence_ if you're interested. They would appeal to necessity if I'm not mistaken and they have sophisticated arguments answering objections and further explications.
When discussing philosophy, I always like to have background music that sounds like it comes out of an Miami discoteque in the 80s.
Great summarization of priority monism and the advantages of idealism over materialism!
Thank you!
Thank you, I think you’re one of the few that “get it” as to how important as rare these topics are to find on RUclips
The physical or material is a pure abstraction. The most parsimonious explanation is that consciousness, which is most immediately obvious to us, is fundamental.
10:54 Occam's Blazer commands us not to multiply our wardrobe without necessity.
This is both funny and wise. Well played.
Great video! Love the work you're doing to advance the truth of Idealism!
Thank you! I'll continue my work and post some new videos soon.
This has become my current metaphysical leaning - so great video on it!
I think it's also important to note that the term 'physical' is a little amorphous. We only know of the 'physical' - say the trajectory of a bullet being fired as captured by Newtonian physics - through our experience of it. And thus, all is ultimately traced back to the mind. It is a theoretical abstraction to say that that object exists in some mind independent state governed by subject to some form of existential inertia. And thus we have no real basis to think the 'physical' exists as we often assume it to.
I also think there is an interesting parallel between reductive physicalism and idealism. Both pose that the brain and the mind are the same thing, and that there is a single substance that permeates reality. I sometimes wonder if the differences between them is more of a language problem. But I don't know.
Awesome, thanks! I couldn't agree more with what you said about the physical. I often make the same point that whenever we're trying to give a description of what's normally called 'physical' it's really just a description of experience. There are some similarities with reductive physicalism and idealism, such as how they're both a form of reductionism, but where they differ is in what their reduction base is. To the physicalist the reduction base is the brain, while the idealist holds the reduction base is the mind, each has its own consequences. I argue physicalism faces a problem here, particularly the hard problem, while idealism has no such issue.
@@MonisticIdealism hey there! I agree entirely wrt. the hard problem. I find it impassable so it very quickly eliminated physicalism as an option for me.
@Aidan
*"And thus we have no real basis to think the physical exists as we often assume it to."*
The physical has to exist, because only the physical has causal powers on its own. Primary causality entails an exemplification tie or compresence relation, since properties, that which imbue an entity with causal powers, don't hang about loosely in reality, but are tied to concrete particulars. To have a compresence entails a collocation or substratum. Both of which are of physical phenomena. An immaterial substratum is incoherent and immaterial phenomena are aspatial.
Causality entails spatiality, since a causal happening must take place somewhere. Only physical phenomena are spatial on their own. Causality entails a before and after. A temporal change and endurantism if you will. Only physical phenomena are temporal on their own. This is why only physical phenomena have causal powers on their own.
*"We only know of the physical through our experience of it. And thus, all is ultimately traced back to the mind."*
This is what I call the telescope fallacy. The means through which you know something, doesn't exist outside the means. A person looks in a telescope and sees a galaxy through the telescope, then erronoesly assumes the galaxy doesn't have an independent existence outside the telescope. This is akin to a child who thinks a toy no longer exists if he is not playing with it and it is not in his immediate direct awareness. The galaxy has to exist outside the telescope because the means of awareness does not have control over the object of awareness, and still exists for others when that individual awareness is gone.
@@MonisticIdealism
*"I often make the same point that whenever we're trying to give a description of what's normally called 'physical' it's really just a description of experience"*
You are being so irrational and fallacious. You pick up a cell phone and dial a number on the key pad. You are experiencing this feeling of pressing the numbers and experiencing the solidity of the cell phone in your hand. But you fallaciously question beg that this is all there is to that cell phone is your experience of it. You are, without argument, assuming that the solidity of the cell phone and the mass and shape is all in your mind and not independent, extra-mental characteristics of the cell phone.👎
@@Dhorpatan hey there. Apologies I am on my phone. But I would just want to ask what is your definition of physical? And why should one accept that only the physical can have causal powers? Consider a dream. That is sheer mentality, with the perception of the external world, with apparent causality and a spatial temporal nature. Would that not be a defeater to your claim?
Great video. That sound animation and the music kicking in at 5:22 made me laugh 😂. I also think a model like this could escape the metaphysical (and political/social) dichotomy between metaphysical individualism vs holism. It can also be summed up as reductionism/atomism (individuals are like islands in the sea by themselves) against existence monism (only the whole exists). A model like this can possible lead to a greater synthesis (Hegelian dialectical logic) between the individual and the community.
I also tend to see the difference between the modern idealists Bernardo Kastrup and Donald Hoffman as a modern day Schopenhauer vs Leibniz metaphysical idealist battle - only the cosmic conscious whole exists (idealistic existence monism) vs infinite conscious agents (monadic pluralistic idealism).
I’m also sceptical of Plato being classed as an idealist. We do tend to sometimes refer to his system as “Platonic Idealism” but I think its better to classify him as a defender of metaphysical dualism since he makes a sharp dividing line distinction between the realm of Becoming and the realm of Being (and mathematical forms and ideas were described as non-physical, non-mental, objectively existing abstract entities). Plato’s dualism is an integral part of his whole metaphysics since he was trying to overcome the problems with Heraclitus and Parmenides. I also don’t believe Baruch Spinoza was an idealist too. I believe the best way to describe his position within metaphysics and philosophy of mind is to describe it as a type of dual-aspect monism combined with pantheism/panentheism (Oppositum also believes this).
Lol thanks I'm glad you liked it. I agree, I think this metaphysical framework offers a third option that places importance on both the whole of society as well as the parts of society.
I think that's a great example to use. What we see with Bernardo and Hoffman is a continuation of the classic debate about monism vs pluralism but in the modern day.
I think it's fair to classify Plato as an idealist, though I would call him a dualistic idealist. He's identified as an idealist in the SEP's entry on idealism with reasons provided. However you're right that the issue of Spinoza is a bit more controversial. Perhaps I should have added another asterisk for him. Some argue he is an idealist, such as J. Clark Murray, but there are other interpretations of Spinoza.
@Ellis Farrow
That is hilariously messed up you've been rewarded with 30 thousand subscribers ripping off other people's content and putting it on your channel. Not to mention you are almost certainly committing copyright infringement.🤦♀️👎
My goodness that is some unjust mess from the humans that subscribed to you. You have 6 times more subscribers than me and Monistic idealism combined, and we do the work to make our own original content.😒
@@MonisticIdealism Spinoza was not an idealist nor a phyicalist, he was simply a substance monist. He believed mind and extension were properties of the substance, not seperate substances in themselves. How he accounts for the relationship between these properties is something entirely different.
@@CMVMic Dr. Michael Della Rocca argues Spinoza is an idealist. He's a distinguished professor of philosophy at Yale who edited _The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza,_ and he notes Spinozas conception of PSR and the mind-dependent nature of diversity commits Spinoza to idealism. This is said in the book: _Spinoza and German Idealism_ published on Cambridge University Press.
@@MonisticIdealism I know who he is. I have watched many lectures from him. I respectfully disagree with him. There are many published papers that disagree with that.
Fantastic job as usual
Thank you, your encouragement is much appreciated.
Great video. I've come to think that there is no subject without an object either but instead of a duality of physical and mental I posit a third non-dual possibility. A superclass of subject-object duality. The idealist explanation seems to reverse the hard-problem because then we have to ask how does the subject form objects. If there is one self that needs to be objectified in some way to become manifest it would rely on the a subclass of selves to provide the optics. What if God wanting his wrath to be known created vessels unto dishonor? That is to say the All had to create subjects so that the All could exist. These subjects are still a subclass of the all but are necessary as well. The other thing is that to these subjects the All undergoes some objectification just as those subjects do among each other. A self seen from another self is an object of subjective experience.
This is an objection I once had. However, the thing is, idealists don't just assert there is no subject without an object, but also that there is no object without a subject. Now, both of those assertions sound reasonable, but they can't both be true, right? If thing A is conditional on thing B, and thing B is conditional on thing A, how could either exist, it would be self-causation, right? Only if A and B are different, I counter. As many idealists thought history, probably most famously F. H. Bradly have pointed out, subject and object are essentially abstracted distinctions, ontologically posterior to experience. Experience is what mind is, subject and object are just abstract ways of talking about it. As some like Bernardo Kastrup have put it, "TWE [(That-which-experiences)] and experience are of the same essential nature. More specifically, experience is a pattern of excitation of TWE". (The Idea of the World, Bernardo Kastrup, 2019). He then uses the example of waves in water, which I think is a good analogy. Water must have some shape, but not any particular one. So, I think the question here is "What is it like to be God/the One/the Absolute/whatever you want to call it. (We'll go with God, since this sounds pretty familiar "God is entirely thought, entirely mind, entirely feeling, entirely source of all good things" -St. Irenaeus of Lyons). The answer? Only God knows. If I tell someone who doesn't know what green is that something is green, that tells him nothing. Even if we were to say that God is perfect, unlimited, all-knowing, etc., the only way to know what that really means is to be God. So we can't really know what the default state is, because that's God's mind before he made any limited minds, rules, etc. The best I can say is that there's probably just perfect happiness, perfect all-encompassing knowledge of mathematics, logic, etc. in one timeless instant)
grateful for this video, but the music is very distracting and disturbing in the beginning.
I'm grateful for your honest feedback and I'm glad you're still grateful for the video.
How did you make that Schaffer call thing?
There's a video called "This is Jonathan Schaffer" from a channel called feallsanachd and I edited that a bit. I lowered the audio when the other guy was speaking in that clip, then I recorded my lines with an audio filter that made it sound like I was on the phone.
great video 👍
what about the idea that there are third person properties (shape, color, mass) and first person properties (sensation, memory, intentionality)?
Would you say that ultimately all objects require an appeal to first person properties to describe them? Because if we can wholly describe a rock in terms of third person properties then that seems to undermind idealism.
I'm glad you liked it 👍
The idea you're referring to is known as property dualism and I have a video refuting that idea called "The Failures of Property Dualism": ruclips.net/video/FM-BB1WIEfA/видео.html
Does priority monism imply a belief in metaphysical holism?
It depends on what you mean by metaphysical holism. How would you define it?
@@MonisticIdealism Usually, holism is a metaphysical framework which holds that the world is a single, indivisible whole, not reducible to the sum of its parts. This is in contrast to atomism which is a metaphysical framework which holds that the world is not an indivisible whole, but rather, is made up of and reducible to its parts - that the world is an aggregate of parts.
@@jimmyfaulkner1855 I definitely reject atomism. I'm tempted to say that I'm a holist, but I want to emphasize that I believe both the whole and the parts exist, I just believe the whole to be prior to the parts.
How can you be a monist and say whole and parts.. Doesnot "and" mean duality..
Parts are only nominal or relative/dependent things not real in the sense that parts don't exists by themselves..
Take this example
Sun rays are not parts existing on its own or a fruit can't exist independent of the tree.. So parts are only nominal true..
What you imply by whole and parts is called attributive monism..and that I have refuted..
Fragmentation, separation, dissociations etc are just words used to point to something which in itself is Holistic.. So dont hold on to words(pointers) like these..
There is only whole not parts..
11:47 bookmark
I'm not really I sure I understand how idealism work
Do you deny the actual existence of physical properties such as mass, spin and charge and everything is just tastes and sounds and other perceptions?
I do not eliminate physical properties, I reduce physical properties. So what you call physical properties exist, it's just that these properties are actually mental properties. Think of the properties you see in your dream as an example. The objects and properties you normally call physical are present in dreams, it's just that these objects and properties are purely mental and are nothing over and above experience. I have a Playlist called "Understanding Idealism" on my channel that goes into more detail on how to grasp the basics of the idea.
@@MonisticIdealism i have a few points:
- I fail to see how mass or charge can be an experience, they're totally outside our experience
- does taste, smell and other mental properties have a real existence outside our own experiences, or they're just a representation in our minds to help us understand a more fundamental reality that is wholly other as Donald Hoffman says?
I can't see how those mental properties can exist for exemple at the beginning of the universe, where there is neither human nor animal minds to experience them, nor at the subatomic level where they don't even exist
@@anarcho845 I don't see how they're "outside of experience" when they are described with experience. Science is about the investigation of the empirical world. If these are not empirical then these concepts are not scientific. I think they have a real existence. I believe there is a single subject that is fundamental and experiences everything.
@@MonisticIdealism i think I'm confusing experience with perception
The fundamental subject of consciousness is experiencing the world in a manner different than our right? It's not visual or auditive?
@@anarcho845 I think this quote from Mary Whiton Calkins will help clarify my own view on this since I am a personal idealist like her:
"Here it is of capital importance to remember that the term ‘self,' as applied to the Absolute, must mean, qualitatively, precisely what it means in its application to human selves. To call the absolute reality self is meaningless, unless there is then attributed to the absolute self a consciousness which is like that of finite selves. From finite selves the absolute self must, it is true, differ; but it differs by virtue of its absoluteness, not by virtue of its selfhood. One may be guided, therefore, in the study of the nature of the absolute self by the following principle: to attribute to the absolute self all experiences and characters of the finite self which are essential to selfhood, but not to attribute to it any qualities which are inconsistent with absoluteness."
- Mary Whiton Calkins, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 422
5:25 😎🏍️✨🎶💿
This was a great video, and is it ok if I email you an article?
Thank you. Sure you can email me.
@Hager
Wow! So I think I understand what you are saying, but it's so irrational. Looks like you are saying nothing exists outside of consciousness, and therefore everything is consciousness because whatever is known, can only be known through consciousness. But that is irrational since at best that only gets you an epistemic claim, not an ontic one. And also how does that allow you to say everything is immaterial? When whatever might exist outside of consciousness could be matter, you simply don't know one way or the other, so you have to be agnostic on that.
Also, how do you get around the fact that your senses verify physical properties like solidity or felt volume or 3 dimensionality?
@@Dhorpatan "Wow! So I think I understand what you are saying, but it's so irrational. Looks like you are saying nothing exists outside of consciousness, and therefore everything is consciousness because whatever is known, can only be known through consciousness. But that is irrational since at best that only gets you an epistemic claim, not an ontic one. And also how does that allow you to say everything is immaterial? When whatever might exist outside of consciousness could be matter, you simply don't know one way or the other, so you have to be agnostic on that."
The material and immaterial would be grounded in consciousness.
"Also, how do you get around the fact that your senses verify physical properties like solidity or felt volume or 3 dimensionality?"
No one has to get around those facts; since they are direct observations from experience.
'Conflating Abstraction
with Empirical Observation: The False Mind-Matter Dichotomy'
No one should conflate the empirical observation of solidity, felt volume, or 3 dimensionality with the abstraction of matter
@@danielhager6805
Wow, you're supposedly unsure, but it looks like you're a die-hard Idealist to me.
@@danielhager6805
But let me ask you this: Do you really want to be on the same side as a person like Monistic Idealism that is irrational enough to think dreams are real and contain conscious persons?😳
I do have some difficulties with going as far as positing the mental to be the foundation of reality
It's a little bit some sort of neo-geocentrism, conscious beings represent just an infinitly small constituant of reality, i just have some difficulties with saying that the experiences of those small beings will make is change all our understanding if the world
It seem consciousness represent just a small portion of the universe
I cant believe no sight thus far of Jacob Power or video gamer AnduinX BYM!😅
Am I late to the party?
@@anduinxbym6633
Yep. Why did it take so long for you to post on the video?
Also, happy New Years!✌
@@Dhorpatan For some reason, I got no notification for this video and only noticed it after randomly visiting the channel. Happy new year to you as well! ✨
It can indeed be the case that it is turtles all of the way down.
personalism and love are higher in my hierarchy of mind than some concepts of parsimony and even my idea of parsimony might not be compatible with others if they can't manage to regard one and many as the same whole that are co-equal and co-eternal. the infinite mind is one and many and the only thing that is and thus the only foundation of itself. it is a whole and not a fragment though humans seem to be fragments due to their ignorance. the many make the one and the one make the many but we are okay because we are infinite and eternal and thus have infinitely better versions of ourselves to make sure we never get caught in a permanent chaos. I cast out from myself all crude christian baggage as unnecessary and something evil trying to keep me away from God and I accept that what Jesus spoke was just as true for me as he. without love people get an insane idea about reality, that it has no bias, that it just produces everything irrationally and that evil and goodness are equal to it. it is a reverting back into naturalism and physicalism due to only an abstract knowledge of reality.
Nobody said simplicity is more important than love or personalism. Simplicity is merely a theoretical virtue. As a orthodox Christian that affirms the trinity what you're saying about the one being many actually resonates with me. I can still meaningfully say the one is prior to the many though since this oneness has to do with substance and orthodox Christianity affirms God is one in terms if substance but is plural in terms if personhood.
Why can LOVE not be parsimonious?
@@MonisticIdealism who even tried to make a distinction of God and the Godhead? magically when I say that personality/mind = substance, I have shown that Godhead and God are the same.
@@noxot13 That's a good question: who even tried to make a distinction of God and the Godhead? I know I didn't.
@@SpiritualPsychotherapyServices it is but to delete others minds, loves or freedom is to make them cease to exist which is why love has to be both a multiplicity and unity. I guess I was being a fool thinking that simplicity is not a great thing :D
What gives people the right to think that they can impose on reality what it's actual nature is in the name of parsimony. I get the need for parsimony when it comes to epistemology that we shouldn't make too many postulates that we can't account for because it becomes more and more likely that we are wrong as the postulates increase but when it comes to ontological issues no one has the right to say it must be this way or that way. reality is what it is. it's not for us to determine what the ontological state is (which is exactly what this principle of ontological parsimony does) for that is already a determined reality whether known or not. you can say this is how ontological reality is and put on the table whatever insight you might have but please please don't tell us what it must be, again what makes anyone think they can settle by opinion what is already settled in fact.
What do you think about epistemological idealism? Also, epistemological idealism can lead to epistemological solipsism which would then collapse into epistemological theism.
The point about parsimony has to do with quantifying fundamental reality rather than qualifying fundamental reality (stating what it's actual nature is). Holding that only one entity is fundamental instead of many is on its face more parsimonious since that view assumes less fundamental entities. When it comes to identifying the nature of ultimate reality I merely went over the main options that are available and how idealism is more virtuous than the other options. Priority monism holds only one entity is fundamental, but dualism holds 2 entities are fundamental (mental and physical substances) so that won't fit. Materialists can hold only one entity is fundamental, like Jonathan Schaffer, but this faces the hard problem of consciousness which is fatal. To avoid fatal problems and cohere with priority monism then idealism is the best option of the main ones available.
@@MonisticIdealism in as far as ontological categories go I'm with you on that, that we have no grounds to say that there is more than the mental category. But priority monisim in idealism seems to lead to some sort of cosmic consciousness, this idea that individual minds are essentially one unified mind that is somehow interacting with its self. Now you may argue that as you say it's simpler but I think it matters More what is true. Do you believe in God as defined by classical theism more precisely the God of the judeo-christian tradition?
@@janenjoki7822 Yes, priority monism with idealism does lead to cosmic consciousness of sorts. Truth and simplicity are not in competition, the point of simplicity is that it's a part of our methodology in arriving at the truth. I do believe in God but I'm not 100% if I'm a classical theist. I agree with a lot of what classical theists say but one things that's for sure is I am a Christian theist.
@@danielhager6805 I think epistemological idealism is reasonable to hold to than believe something else that you can't account for like embracing physical realism. Ideally I think we are all epistemological solipsists in as far as we can only access our own subjective experience. But I don't get what you mean by epistemological theism
And exactly what is the argument against metaphysical coherentism? Also, explanations need not termintate or be grounded, they can also be circular. Clearly, people aren't familiar with Munchhausen's Trilemma enough to understand that. Rasumussen is wrong. Existence doesnt require an explanation, it can be brute, also, being cannot come from nonbeing so @3:41 you cannot bring yourself into existence, you were never brought into existence, what you are made of always existed. When one assumes linear causation, that is when the problem arises.
Metaphysical coherentism is viciously circular. It doesn't make sense to say x caused itself, x would need to exist in the first place in order to cause anything. As you said yourself: "you cannot bring yourself into existence...being cannot come from non-being". I'm well aware of the trilemma you bring up. It goes way back to the ancient Greek days and is sometimes referred to as Agrippa's Trilemma. I accept a form of epistemic and metaphysical foundationalism, as most people seem to. Most people aren't satisfied with brute explanations and seems open the door to more inquiries than it closes. Such as why that's brute and why other aren't and so on. Why is existence the way it is? Why does it exist? It seems lazy to just say it's brute and doesn't really answer the question.
@@MonisticIdealism It is not necessarily vicious. X always exists. I assume we both hold to substance monism. Therefore, your argument is levelled at becoming, not being. Seeing there cannot be anything external to reality, motion is either internally absolute (Heraclitus) or a mind dependent illusion (Parmenides). Nothing comes into existence, Existence is eternal i.e. nonchanging/time independent. There is no real change (gain/loss of properties/states).
The thought that there must be a priority ordering which terminates at the fundamental level is often expressed with the notion of well-foundedness. An option, which undermines this priority ordering and suggests that dependence chains can form loops, is called metaphysical coherentism. All "arbitrary" nodes within the chain are mutually interdependent. The chain itself is ontologically independent. There is no justification for why there must be a hierachy.
RE: Vicious Circularity (Russell Paradox)
There is no escaping a logical circle without question begging. The problem of the criterion highlights this much. Otherwise, one could charge the reliability of perception as utlizing vicious circularity. However, it should also be noted, not all logical circles are malignant, some can be benign. If you want to properly address the topic of metaphysical explanation, you must first define what you mean by metaphysical explanation. See entry plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysical-explanation/#MoniVsPlurAbouMetaExpl
RE: Trilemma
An acceptance of metaphysical foundationalism is ultimately arbritrary. It is presupposed i.e. question begging. Your argument against brute explanations is basically an argument against metaphysical foundationalism itself. To say it is lazy, it just an appeal to emotion/ridicule. So what if it seems lazy? Why does existence demand a metaphysical explanation? Clearly, non-existence is a logically incoherent notion.
@@CMVMic If X always exists then that's indistinguishable from foundationalism. From there it looks like your point can't get off the ground without pressupposing a form of foundationalism. I'm not seeing a reason to believe motion is necessary for change. I'm also not seeing a reason to believe there needs to be question begging in order to avoid a vicious circle. What I mean by metaphysical explanation is basically what Schaffer means by it in the lecture I referenced in the video. Metaphysical explanation is divided in 3 parts: the metaphysical principles, the metaphysical ultimate, and the metaphysical derivatives. We explain the derivatives in terms of what's ultimate and how they relate with these fundamental principles. I don't think there's anything arbitrary about a foundational belief like the law of non-contradiction. To infer it is of course to beg the question, but to deny it is also nonsensical. By starting with that as an axiom there's no question begging and given it's undeniable it seems anything but arbitrary. You left out how brute facts open more inquiry than they close, they don't explain anything and they're purely arbitrary. Why hold that X is brute but Y and Z aren't? Unlike you, the foundationalist can appeal to something like the principle of sufficient reason, so there is an explanation in the necessity of what's fundamental rather than it just being some arbitrary brute fact.
@@MonisticIdealism RE: Spinoza
Sure, Spinoza was an existence and priority monist, however, regarding fundamentality and the nature of existence, he claimed it was neither material (realist) nor mental (idealist) but neutral. He explicitly stated that mind and extension were only two amongst an infinite number of modes of being, he never claimed mind is being.
RE: If X always exists then that's indistinguishable from foundationalism.
You are conflating becoming with being. Existence is brute, it requires no explanation. However, the proposal of Metaphysical Coherentism has to do with becoming, not being. It has to do with ontological dependence relations, where metaphysical foundationalism is the view that there is atleast one fundamental (concrete) entity upon which all non-fundamental entities ultimately ontologically depend. If only X, i.e. there is only one substance, then there aren’t any non-fundamental entities. A causal chain need not be metaphysically foundational simply because if all the nodes within the chain are ontologically interdependent, then the chain itself is ontologically independent. This is basically Priority Monism, where the whole is more fundamental than the parts. However, it should be noted that this also presupposes ontological priority. There is no justification for why there need be a hierarchy of basicness for reality.
Existence monism: ∃x(Cx&∀y(Cy→x=y))
OR
Existence monism (cosmic): ∃!xCx&Cu∃!xCx&Cu
This says that there is exactly one concretum, namely the cosmos.
Metaphysical/Ontological foundationalism: ∀x(Fx∨∃y(Fy&Pyx))∀x(Fx∨∃y(Fy&Pyx))
In words, ontological foundationalism holds that every entity is either basic or posterior to something basic. In content, what ontological foundationalism excludes is the prospect of something being neither itself foundational nor founded on something else that is foundational. This exclusion is unjustifiable eg. The Whole = The Parts. Clearly, there is no ontological priority here.
RE: Presupposing foundationalism (Indirect Skepticism).
This is called Argument via Indirect Proofs (one can assume another’s position for the sake of argument). Metaphysical coherentism hasn’t been proved impossible/implausible. I have not argued that metaphysical coherentism is true.
"I'm not seeing a reason to believe motion is necessary for change."
It is necessary for change within one existing substance. Temporal/Spatial change requires the gain/loss of a property. There can be no gain/loss without motion. For eg. Change in thought incorporates temporal change. How can a substance change without motion? Adopting Cambridge Change, it can also defined as inconsistent relations within/between different states, but if all states simultaneously exist, there is no real change. The natural view of change is that real, metaphysical change in a thing would be change in the monadic or internal or intrinsic properties of the thing. This topic would require a deeper investigation into the nature of time, space, motion and change. We can do this if you want.
“I'm also not seeing a reason to believe there needs to be question begging in order to avoid a vicious circle.”
To presuppose is to beg the question (petitio principii). By arguing in a circle or incorporating infinitism, the questions are answered, it just may not be satisfactory. Are you familiar with the problem of the criterion? Have you even considered its metaphysical applications? To know whether things are as they seem to be, we must have a procedure for distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. But to know whether our procedure is a good procedure, we have to know whether it really succeeds in distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. And we cannot know whether it does really succeed unless we already know which appearances are true and which ones are false. And so we are caught in a circle. Chisholm owns up to the validity of this charge, writing, “What few philosophers have had the courage to recognize is this: we can deal with the problem [of the criterion] only by begging the question.”
“What I mean by metaphysical explanation is basically what Schaffer means by it in the lecture I referenced in the video.”
As far as I can see, Schaffer did not define metaphysical explanation in that video, which is what I am asking you to do. Please refer to the link I posted in my previous comment. On a constructual ontology, Schaffers’ conception of metaphysical inquiry into what the world is like, consists of three parts i.e. fundamentality, principles and its derivatives. This inquiry has to do with going beyond asking why is there something rather than nothing, it has to do with explaining what the world is like, not why reality itself exists.
“We explain the derivatives in terms of what's ultimate and how they relate with these fundamental principles.”
Granted. However, you assume that the derivates are not themselves as fundamental as the whole.
“I don't think there's anything arbitrary about a foundational belief like the law of non-contradiction.”
Ofcourse it is. It is assumed true without justification. Do you even know what foundationalism is?
“To infer it is of course to beg the question, but to deny it is also nonsensical.”
Appeal to ridicule and common sense. Utility does not entail truth.
“By starting with that as an axiom there's no question begging and given it's undeniable it seems anything but arbitrary.”
Ofcourse it can be denied. It’s called Dialetheism.
“You left out how brute facts open more inquiry than they close, they don't explain anything and they're purely arbitrary. Why hold that X is brute but Y and Z aren't?”
If it is a brute fact, by definition, it requires no further investigation/inquiry. If there is only X (one substance), there is no Y and Z. Asking why not, is like asking ‘why doesn’t nothing exist?’.
“Unlike you, the foundationalist can appeal to something like the principle of sufficient reason, so there is an explanation in the necessity of what's fundamental rather than it just being some arbitrary brute fact.”
Lol Unlike me? You presuppose my position good sir. I am merely an interlocutor. It is definitely an arbitrary brute fact. Is there an explanation for why the PSR is true? Just because you claim something is necessary or fundamental does nothing to change that it is axiomatic. The principles of logic are themselves brute. You cannot explain them without using logic, in other words, arguing in a circle or begging the question. How else would you explain why there is something rather than nothing?
@@CMVMic When it comes to Spinoza I already provided a quote in another comment to you by Professor Rocca giving the argument that Spinoza is an idealist. Since that comment is in a separate thread focused on that specific issue, I suggest we continue the Spinoza discussion on that thread to avoid redundancy.
You haven't shown that pointing out that X always exists is indistinguishable from foundationalism is a conflation of being with becoming. If X is something that exists and has always existed and did not derive from somewhere else, then that's not really a difference from what the foundationalist is saying. I'm also not seeing any reason from you as to think that existence is brute. Being brute and believing that something is brute are 2 different things. If something is brute then there is no explanation for it, but if you're going to believe that something is brute you still have a burden of proof if you wish to claim that belief is true. I'm not seeing any reason from you to believe that existence is brute, or that anything is brute for that matter. _Prima facie,_ beings such as you and I appear to be derivative and distinct from each other. It doesn't seem like we've always existed or that we're all identical. Hence there is _prima facie_ justification that there is a hierarchy for reality. The question that's entertained by metaphysicians for the most part is whether the whole or the parts are fundamental, not whether the whole = the parts.
I already went over how metaphysical coherentism impossible/implausible on its face. You even admitted yourself that being does not come from non-being and something cannot cause itself to exist. This is largely why metaphysical coherentism is the least explored option between the three. Infinitism is explored more than coherentism, but not by much. Foundationalism is the one that's taken the most seriously and written about the most about and for good reason as noted by the _prima facie_ justification I brought up.
I'm not seeing a reason to believe that motion would be necessary for a substance monist who is an idealist. If one is losing a belief or thought or feeling I'm not seeing how "motion" applies here.
Presupposing something is not begging the question. Question begging is a type of circular reasoning in which the premises that are meant to support an argument already assume that the conclusion is true. Just having a presupposition, such as an axiom, is not reasoning in a circle, it's just having a starting point that you reason from, not reason towards.
Schaffer did define metaphysical explanation in the full lecture, you must have missed it. Plus I already explained it for you. To give a metaphysical explanation is to explain the derivatives in terms of what's fundamental and how they tie together with metaphysical principles. Schaffer gives an example of metaphysical explanation by noting how we explain biology in terms of chemistry and we explain chemistry in terms of physics.
By definition a derivative is not fundamental. If something is fundamental then it's not derivative.
You're just saying of course it's arbitrary without any justification. I already pointed out that though the law of non-contradiction cannot be proven without going in a circle, it cannot sensibly be denied so it hardly seems arbitrary hence why it's identified as an axiom by logicians. To be clear, what I mean by sensible or sensical is that it's coherent. It's not coherent to deny the law of non-contradiction, to deny it would be to presuppose its truth which would then entail it's falsehood, and on its face this doesn't make any coherent sense at all. Do you know what an axiom is?
Dialetheism is widely rejected, my previous paragraph includes a common reason as to why.
I understand what is meant by brute, but you're not recognizing the distinction between X being brute and believing that X is brute. _Why_ should we believe that X is brute or that anything is brute? Unless you're talking about existence monism, then there's still Y and Z since there's still a plurality of other entities, so why believe some entities are brute and some aren't?
I don't see how I'm presupposing your position when you stated, and I quote directly: "Existence is brute". This is your position. If you're trying to be like the youtuber Carneades where he only holds positions for the sake of argument then so be it, but if that's the case then you can't really be going around saying that "existence is brute" as if that really is the case when you don't even believe it.
Alexander Pruss and Joshua Rasmussen go into the justification for PSR in their book _Necessary Existence_ if you're interested. They would appeal to necessity if I'm not mistaken and they have sophisticated arguments answering objections and further explications.
Interesting but the music was super distracting and in my opinion unnecessary
Dude I love synthwave, it was perfect imo