I’m on the edge of my seat watching each episode; I wouldn’t have been able to stand the wait for the next one had I found you sooner. The journey of the T-54’s feels like it should be Mission 1 of a North Vietnamese tanker campaign, but maybe that’s just my imagination. :) Thank you for all your effort in making this!
the 22nd division, the one that my grandpa was in. its quite interesting to know what he couldve experienced during his service. this video explained it well, thank you
Yeah, the 22nd was hit very hard by the PAVN in 1972, hopefully the videos on the channel can shed more light on many other people's family in the war. Thanks to him again for his service.
Hmm I have not read that, but there is an account from a radio operator discussing with Colonel Lê Đức Đạt, and he explicitly requested artillery on his own command post as a final order. You can find it by searching Chuẩn Tướng Lê Đức Đạt Bùi Đức Lạc, although it is in Vietnamese so not sure if you can read that.
Tôi thật muốn biết rằng tại sao quân đội bắc việt có thể di cư trong rừng và núi của nam việt,nhưng QLVNCH chủ yếu phụ thuộc những xa lộ. (sorry if there's any grammer error,I am still learning Vietnamese) I really wonder that why PAVN's forces,even armored forces can move in the jungles and mountains in South Vietnam while ARVN just mainly relys on the highways
Oh ha ha I speak English primarily. The PAVN had an entire division dedicated to building and maintaining roads. By the end of the war, the HCM trail was a pretty modern highway. Both armies depended heavily on roads for transportation much later on in the war.
Can you go further on why the US and South Vietnamese did not utilize the defense-in-depth tactic earlier on in 72? For it was clear from WWII that trying to form a wall against a concentrated combined arm assault is an easy way to get overruned.
There's a concept when understanding war called the 'fog of war' - it's the concept that you don't know everything about what your enemy is going to do. Up until 1972, in II Corps, North Vietnam never used tanks, so John Paul Vann and much of the US/South Vietnamese leadership assumed that PAVN forces were simply going to do artillery/infantry assaults like they did for the last ~10 years. It was not so clear that tanks would actually be used in II Corps. But General Wear concluded that they would and, in the 2 parts before, he tried his best to advocate for it. Here were the differences in strategy: 1. John Paul Vann's plan was to concentrate at Tân Cảnh/Đăk Tô II, since this would make sure that South Vietnam lost as little land as possible, and would work well against infantry assaults. 2. General Wear's plan was to create defensive lines - this would work well against combined-arms. But it also guarantees that land is lost, and if they employed this when tanks were not used then lost land, it is bad politically. Redeployment takes time, so by the time Vann changed his mind, there was only 2-3 days left before the attack. The men and resources simply couldn't be moved fast enough. As an example of the defence-in-depth, the Soviets took about 3 months to create their defence before the Battle of Kursk.
I like how effective B-52 Arc Light strike were. But I don't like how expensive it was and the fact the B-52 technology is classified secret means that South Vietnam basically have to rely on the US for fire power. I just don't see how that is viable for South Vietnam
Thank You for these videos. I’m from Can Tho, but was adopted in early 1974 and raised in America. Any chance you know about the fighting and battles near Can Tho and the Me Kong Delta in late 1973? Thanks again!
I don't really know about the battles here too much, but was going to start looking into them after this battle for (hopefully) smaller battle videos. The base sources I was going to start from were for the period: Le Gro, William E. Vietnam From Cease-Fire to Capitulation. Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History, 1981. Vien, Cao Van. The Final Collapse. Washington, D.C.: United States Center of Military History, 1985. These are free if you want to take a look yourself
Not really there were tons of different ground forces and very good programs such as the kit Carson scouts which studies have shown to be over 70% effective
What is are power heavily used sure but when people hang on that they simplify it to the point of dishonesty not saying you are but people do. Air power alone cannot retake a city building by building nor Cannon pin other units in place without ground units air power means nothing
@@johnnie743 i get your point, but what im trying to say is that in vietnam, ground power was more effective than air power, for example when the M48s couldnt even pen the T55s, and how PAVN artillery massively outranged ARVN and the US' and what advantage the US had in close air support was negated by PAVN's extensive anti air usage
@@disservice_vicpavn anti-air capabilities didn't work, especially in an loc, where the commies were constantly bombed to hell, despite the copious amount of anti-air weapons they had At Kotum it was different, mainly because PAVN operated mostly at night
@@disservice_vic no that is not the case the m48 absolutely could penetrate the t-55 and my source for that is steel and blood history of South Vietnamese armor by former colonel Hai Mai Viet also so did air Marshall Cao Ky in an interview with William f Buckley
Its been quite covered in political discourse and the media, I think, so most likely not for a while. If I were, it would be to argue against the idea that it was intentionally used as a chemical weapon. From what I have read, it was a case of a poor procurement and testing process. The effects were far too long term to be a chemical weapon - but its definitely viewed as one by a lot of people now.
I’m on the edge of my seat watching each episode; I wouldn’t have been able to stand the wait for the next one had I found you sooner. The journey of the T-54’s feels like it should be Mission 1 of a North Vietnamese tanker campaign, but maybe that’s just my imagination. :) Thank you for all your effort in making this!
The South Vietnamese army was missing anti-tank weapons plus the M72 Law and medium tanks like the M47, greetings, bait.
the 22nd division, the one that my grandpa was in. its quite interesting to know what he couldve experienced during his service. this video explained it well, thank you
Yeah, the 22nd was hit very hard by the PAVN in 1972, hopefully the videos on the channel can shed more light on many other people's family in the war. Thanks to him again for his service.
I read in a now-deactivated website that Col. Dat tried and failed to get John Paul Vann to order B-52 box strikes around the 22nd. HQ to no avail.
Hmm I have not read that, but there is an account from a radio operator discussing with Colonel Lê Đức Đạt, and he explicitly requested artillery on his own command post as a final order. You can find it by searching Chuẩn Tướng Lê Đức Đạt Bùi Đức Lạc, although it is in Vietnamese so not sure if you can read that.
Tôi thật muốn biết rằng tại sao quân đội bắc việt có thể di cư trong rừng và núi của nam việt,nhưng QLVNCH chủ yếu phụ thuộc những xa lộ. (sorry if there's any grammer error,I am still learning Vietnamese) I really wonder that why PAVN's forces,even armored forces can move in the jungles and mountains in South Vietnam while ARVN just mainly relys on the highways
Oh ha ha I speak English primarily. The PAVN had an entire division dedicated to building and maintaining roads. By the end of the war, the HCM trail was a pretty modern highway. Both armies depended heavily on roads for transportation much later on in the war.
Can you go further on why the US and South Vietnamese did not utilize the defense-in-depth tactic earlier on in 72? For it was clear from WWII that trying to form a wall against a concentrated combined arm assault is an easy way to get overruned.
There's a concept when understanding war called the 'fog of war' - it's the concept that you don't know everything about what your enemy is going to do. Up until 1972, in II Corps, North Vietnam never used tanks, so John Paul Vann and much of the US/South Vietnamese leadership assumed that PAVN forces were simply going to do artillery/infantry assaults like they did for the last ~10 years. It was not so clear that tanks would actually be used in II Corps. But General Wear concluded that they would and, in the 2 parts before, he tried his best to advocate for it.
Here were the differences in strategy:
1. John Paul Vann's plan was to concentrate at Tân Cảnh/Đăk Tô II, since this would make sure that South Vietnam lost as little land as possible, and would work well against infantry assaults.
2. General Wear's plan was to create defensive lines - this would work well against combined-arms. But it also guarantees that land is lost, and if they employed this when tanks were not used then lost land, it is bad politically.
Redeployment takes time, so by the time Vann changed his mind, there was only 2-3 days left before the attack. The men and resources simply couldn't be moved fast enough. As an example of the defence-in-depth, the Soviets took about 3 months to create their defence before the Battle of Kursk.
Thank you
Thanks for watching !
I like how effective B-52 Arc Light strike were. But I don't like how expensive it was and the fact the B-52 technology is classified secret means that South Vietnam basically have to rely on the US for fire power. I just don't see how that is viable for South Vietnam
Thank You for these videos. I’m from Can Tho, but was adopted in early 1974 and raised in America. Any chance you know about the fighting and battles near Can Tho and the Me Kong Delta in late 1973? Thanks again!
I don't really know about the battles here too much, but was going to start looking into them after this battle for (hopefully) smaller battle videos. The base sources I was going to start from were for the period:
Le Gro, William E. Vietnam From Cease-Fire to Capitulation. Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History, 1981.
Vien, Cao Van. The Final Collapse. Washington, D.C.: United States Center of Military History, 1985.
These are free if you want to take a look yourself
The ARVN alway lack firepower when it came to their weapon
Kênh làm về chiến tranh VN mà k có tiếng việt là sao ???
kênh làm cho người nước ngoài, bạn muốn có tiếng việt thì qua theo dấu giày sô xem.
This is what we call "high quality contents"
Theo Dấu Giày Sô hay nhấy cho tiếng Việt. I couldn't possibly dare to compete.
the us focused way too much on air and air doctrines, which were too easily countered… a great shame
Not really there were tons of different ground forces and very good programs such as the kit Carson scouts which studies have shown to be over 70% effective
What is are power heavily used sure but when people hang on that they simplify it to the point of dishonesty not saying you are but people do. Air power alone cannot retake a city building by building nor Cannon pin other units in place without ground units air power means nothing
@@johnnie743 i get your point, but what im trying to say is that in vietnam, ground power was more effective than air power, for example when the M48s couldnt even pen the T55s, and how PAVN artillery massively outranged ARVN and the US' and what advantage the US had in close air support was negated by PAVN's extensive anti air usage
@@disservice_vicpavn anti-air capabilities didn't work, especially in an loc, where the commies were constantly bombed to hell, despite the copious amount of anti-air weapons they had
At Kotum it was different, mainly because PAVN operated mostly at night
@@disservice_vic no that is not the case the m48 absolutely could penetrate the t-55 and my source for that is steel and blood history of South Vietnamese armor by former colonel Hai Mai Viet also so did air Marshall Cao Ky in an interview with William f Buckley
I don't know if I already mentioned this but will "Agent Orange" ever be a topic?
Its been quite covered in political discourse and the media, I think, so most likely not for a while. If I were, it would be to argue against the idea that it was intentionally used as a chemical weapon. From what I have read, it was a case of a poor procurement and testing process. The effects were far too long term to be a chemical weapon - but its definitely viewed as one by a lot of people now.