*The World Teacher - Jagadguru Svāmī Vegānanda* 1. I have personally experienced the inner witness of the Holy Spirit. 2. God is the best explanation of the origin of the universe. 3 God is the best explanation of the fine tuning of the universe. 4 God is the best explanation of the existent of contingent things 5 God is the best explanation of the existence of objective moral facts 6 The facts surrounding the life and death of Jesus are best explained by the proposition “God raised Jesus from the dead”
This is an absolute breath of fresh air. Personally I think ontological arguments are just silly, but watching these two guys discuss it with such obvious good-natured humility is kind of shocking in today's battle debate climate. I recently learned of the tragic loss of Dr. Arbour and his wife, and I have to say that it saddened me very deeply. The world needs Christians like them. Rest in peace.
@@alistairmaleficent8776 well honestly i am the kind that doesn't understand a single thing they say so i am not very bright, but i am curious about your reasoning
@@LeafSouls The gist of it is this: the arguments assert that if god is possible in any possible world, then he must exist. This is downright silliness, and Oppy himself says that almost no one takes it seriously. Just take a moment and ponder the implications of these arguments, now that you have a brief summary. I'm betting you can come up with as many absurdities as I can, and I've read the actual papers describing these arguments.
I found this very interesting but I was hoping for a debate. I was disappointed that Ben really didn’t make a clear cut case for why he things that argument works with ready answers to Grahams objections. I for one count myself amongst those theists who are unimpressed with the argument.
Do Dr Oppy and Arbour get paid for this? This was so good, people would normally need to pay good money to sit in a class to hear this. I'm a Christian, and am unmoved by arguments, but like to know them, and this was great. I'd like to have heard more explanation by Dr Oppy on the reverse Ontological Argument because it just doesn't work for me (but clearly he could expand on it at length). I need to do more exploring, but I'm certain I'll find rebuttals pertaining to negative properties vs positive properties, and they do not seem to be the same. It seems of course that the reverse OA would argue "If it is possible that God (MGB) does not exist, then God does not exist", which is obviously the inverse of the OA proper, which argues "If it is possible that God (MGB) exists, then God exists". I'm just not sure how that works in its negation. The basis of the positive OA argument is dependent upon the notion that if an MGB exists, then the MGB must necessarily exist. That is if MGB exists in any possible world, because of the fact that the MGB must be necessary in order to meet the criteria of "MGB" (obviously only necessary beings can be MG), then the MGB exists in every possible world. Why would the inverse be true? If there is is a possibility that MGB does not exist (does not exist in at least one possible world), why should be extrapolated to include all possible worlds and include the "necessarily impossible" inference? It seems to me that the reverse Ontological Argument must still demonstrate that God is literally impossible, which it does not. In short, God not existing in one possible world, does not imply that God exists in no possible world (aka God is impossible). However, if God exists in on world, by the definition of MGB, God must exist in all. It seems that if an MGB exists in any possible world, it would only prove that the claim "An MGB does not exist in a possible world" is false. Anyhow, I could be full of crap, so would like for anyone to give me an explanation.
Like you said, it's part of the definition of a necessary being that if it exists in at least one possible world it exists in all possible worlds. Remembering that in modal logic, "it is possible that x exists" is the same as "x exists in at least one possible world". If it does not exist in at least one world then it is false that it exists in all worlds. If it does not exists in all worlds it does not exist in any world, because if it did then it would exist in all worlds. (if A then B), means the same as (if not B then not A). The reverse OA, like the OA, works with a god that is necessary. God may not exist in all worlds but could still exist in this world, that would just be a contingent god.
@@lukeanthony9904 Correct me if I'm wrong, but when dealing with necessary modal logic, contrary to contingent (finite vs all possible worlds), the positive and negative proofs for necessary existence seem to become synonymous. In other words, both the OA and ROA, demonstrate that God is logically either strictly impossible or necessary. It doesn't seem to me that the ROA is an answer at all to the OA, but merely another way of restating it and serves as much of a proof for the OA as the OA does. The OA proper seems to demonstrate the "strictly necessary" part of the equation and the ROA seems to demonstrate the "strictly impossible" part, but both notions can be inferred by either argument. It seems if the ROA is correct, then stating "It is logically possible that God does not exist" is synonymous with stating "It is logically impossible that God exists" (God exists in no possible world). This turns out to be the exact same thing as stating "If God exists in any possible world, then God exists in all". It's either one or the other. Thus, the original OA still stands, that if it is even possible that God exists, then God exists. Either way, it still leaves open the possibility of a contingent God as you stated, but that wouldn't qualify as "God" in Plantinga's argument, so that'd open a whole different can of worms. What do you think of my reasoning, am I missing something? It's fascinating. It seems a lot harder for me to get my head around than the other "God arguments". I wish I could hear Oppy's reasoning on the ROA.
True Believer The issue that it doesn’t seem particularly hard to imagine a world in which God does not exist. For example, you could ask “is it possible that there was not a full, morally sufficient reason for [insert horrible natural disaster]. The argument from evil can equally be framed as superficially logically coherent. Even if you think God does have morally sufficient reasons for evil, don’t you think it’s possible that no such explanation exists in any possible world? I’m not saying that therefore we should be atheists, but it does tell me that more justification than “apparent or the presupposition of possibility” is required.
Most people reject the argument because they think it appeals to "grammatical or logical technicalities" rather than intuition. But when I was a teenager the argument occurred to me intuitively. It was only later that I discovered all the logical formulations.
Are you suggesting intuition is a warrant for belief? That's how we get flat earthers and a whole host of other nonsense. Flat earthers disbelieve the movement of our planet because they intuit they should feel the motion for instance. Intuition is not a pathway to knowledge, it was a primitive survival trait controlled by no inference rules so is irrational.
Ganesh' s stepbrother 7193 He meant Logical formulations led to the justification of his intuition, which most atheists deny because of their intuition. You pretty much described everything clear and well but misplaced Atheist with Flat-earther.
I think there is an important distinction to make regarding what makes something "brute." What makes a fact "brute" is that it has no explanation _simpliciter_ . Dr. Oppy seems to be saying that something is brute when an explanation cannot be _given_ , which isn't the case. It doesn't follow that something doesn't have an explanation from the fact that a person can't give one. The paranormal seems like a clear case here. Obviously I may not be able to explain a paranormal experience I have, but that doesn't mean there is no explanation principally.
Yeah, can not be given because there isnt one. I think (at least from other talks) that Oppy is clear that brute fact is a fact that has no explanation. Can you point out when did he use it incorrectly?
There's a great book by an LDS author that shows that there's perfect harmony between the prophetic statements concerning the garden of Eden being in Missouri and the Old Testament account concerning the garden of Eden. It's called Canaan, Babylon, and Egypt A Comparative Theological Analysis on Creation sold by Eborn Books.
It seems to me that the epistemic warrant needed for a positive ontological modal claim like "it is possible X" is far less than a negative claim like "it is possible not X". When we make these claims, we situate ourselves as if the claim is true. Well, the data required for us to establish that the claim is true for the positive existential modal claim is 1 instantiation of that claim among the infinite possible universes. The data required for us to establish the claim is true for a negative existential modal claim is EVERY possible world. That is to say, one would need to examine all possible worlds to confirm the negative existential claim. In fact, if there are an infinite number of possible worlds, then it is in principle impossible to establish the premise "It is possible not X" unless X entails some logical incoherence that causes the premise to be rejected for reasons other than the strength of the modal claim.
I think you're missing the symmetry here. If this X is true in one possible world only, you'd have to examine the supposed infinite array of worlds to confirm that.
I agree with Matt that Russell is missing the symmetry, but Matt also misses the symmetry. To say "it is possible X", all you need is one instance of X, which means "at least one instance", not "one instance only," as Matt wrongly says. Russell wrongly says that "it is possible X" is weaker than "it is possible not X". This is incorrect because logically they are equal in strength; they only require a single veridical instance. The same applies to the MOA, because those two equal propositions both lead to propositions that are much stronger and still equal to each other. "it is possible that an MGB exists" leads to "an MGB exists" "it is possible that an MGB does not exist" leads to "an MGB does not exist" This is why the MOA, though pretty cool, is not convincing to me, because the reverse argument draws a tie against it. To me, the MOA defines itself into having a 50% chance of being true. Plus, I think relying on other theistic arguments to support "it is possible that an MGB exists" is good, at least in principle. The contingency argument seems to me to come closest to helping this.
"Possibly exists" means its counter state is "it's not known if it it exists" "Possibly doesn't exist" means its counter is "it's possible it exists", which just affirms the first position, no? So really only "possibly exists" is plausible, correct?
@@davidcallari541 I see what you're saying, but things are different when you consider necessary beings. "Possibly exists" means "exists in at least one possible world". If a necessary being exists in at least one possible world, then it exists in all of them. "Possibly doesn't exist" means "doesn't exist in at least one possible world". If a necessary being does not exist in at least one possible world, then it exists in none of them. As you can see, those two claims are not identical, and clearly lead to opposite conclusions.
37 minutes in, and I'm reminded of how much I wish I could say to Swinburne: The statement "God does not exist" is not a contradiction on its own; but the statement "God could have existed but happens not to" is, because all such "could haves" are grounded in conditions that weren't met and God's existence has no conditions. Any state of affairs would be sufficient for Him to exist, and so the contradiction is in saying "the state of affairs for X to exist is totally sufficient (meets all the conditions) and yet X doesn't exist". I think that is clearly self-contradictory.
Hi! Can you please explain what you find wrong with my view, which may or may not be related to Swinburnes? I believe God exists in every possible world in which there is an actual world, and therefore God exists in all possible worlds by extension. But possible worlds do not exist unless it is contingently true that the actual world exists. This means that God necessarily exists in all possible worlds, but the space of possible worlds is not prior to the actual world. Contingent truths are only contingent ways THIS world could have been. So even though God is extensive with all possible worlds, God’s existence is still contingent. This is grounded in the view that “possibility” is grounded in ways the actual world could have been, and not in terms of a logically prior “free floating space”of possibilities. That would make “possible worlds” logically prior to God, even if God is coextensive with the contents of all possible worlds. My view explains transworld identity in a way that grounds it in causality and temporality. I suppose this could be an objection to S5?
@@paulkelly1162 I think there are a few issues at play here. My first red flag was when you said "possible worlds in which there is an actual world". The actual world is not "in" any other possible worlds; it's just one among them. In general, I find that, while talk of "possible worlds" is quite handy at times, it is mostly rather slippery and dangerous. A "possible world" just refers to how things could have been. If things had been some other way (instead of how they are), then *that* would be the actual world. But, in any case, try re-phrasing it without any reference to the worlds at all (especially without any reference to them "existing", which is very problematic, since that would imply they are actual things, which is precisely what they're not! _pace David Lewis..._). When I try to re-phrase your position without reference to "worlds", I'm having trouble seeing what it means. Surely you're not saying that, if everything weren't just as it happens to actually be, down to the last detail, then the other ways things *could have been* would be impossible...? That seems straightforwardly false. So, maybe clarify what you mean, without reference to worlds, so I can understand better. Also, I don't see how any of this would make God contingent. If God exists, then the actual "world" (everything that actually is) owes its existence to God. God causally explains why this state of affairs exists rather than some other one. And He cannot Himself be contingent on something He causes.
I often find myself wondering, if God didn't exist how could we even still be having these conversations like this? Its amazing how much depth this subject has. That is saying something within itself.
You realize that often and more reasonably that argument goes the other way right? If god existed why after all these years are we still debating god’s existence or non existence, it should be clear using any epistemological method.
Does Ben REALLY now know the difference between epistemic and metaphysical possibility? Graham very kindly points it out to him at 1:22:45 (after Ben’s long argument that the cumulative effect of other arguments makes the Ontological argument more attractive.) This is a little odd. Anybody else notice?
Also, Graham says the evidence for and against God is a wash. Then why isn’t he an agnostic? What scientific evidence can he offer to support his atheism seeing he cut himself off with that statement?
He means that both naturalism and theism can explain stuff eqaully well, so the data doesn't really constitute evidence either way. At this point, Oppy uses Ockham's Razor to rule out theism in favor of naturalism in virtue of naturalism being theoretically simpler or more parsimonious.
@@Nexus-jg7ev thanks ,yeah but is it simpler explanation that owe our existence ,ultimately, to non-existence, as Dawkins opined, the universe “evolved out of literally nothing” ? I think not. That does not qualify as an explanation at all let alone a simple one.
@@todddweiner8070 That's a really bad explanation because something cannot come from absolute nothing indeed, and nobody advances this idea - neither theists, nor atheists. Even if theists accept that the universe was created from nothing, they do not say that something in general came from absolute nothing, because God is not nothing. God is something. All we seek now is an explanation for why there is something rather than nothing. I do no not know whether the universe exhausts natural reality or whether natural reality extends beyond our observable universe but let's grant that the universe exhausts natural reality for the sake of argument. For the atheist naturalist, then, the universe alone exhausts reality. The theist reality includes the universe and God. When both the theist and the atheist have to explain why there is something rather than nothing, it's not the case that both only have to explain why the universe exists. Because theists' ontology includes God, they also have to explain why God exists. It turns out that all the explanations that theists can give for why there is something rather than nothing with respect to God and the universe, can also be given by atheists with respect to the universe alone. If God involves an infinite regress, the universe might involve an infinite regress. If God has always existed, the universe might have also always existed. Both can be said to have a special kind of existence - God has always existed timelessly while the universe has always existed because it has existed for as long as time has existed - it had existed at all points in time. Time is part of the universe. If God exists of necessity, the universe can exist of necessity. If God's existence is a brute fact, the existence of the universe can be a brute fact. Atheists can explain the existence of the universe without having to appeal to a creator. They can simply use the same arguments that explain why God exists. The universe could've either: 1) Have always existed 2) Have involved an infinite regress 3) Have been necessary 4) Have been a brute fact It doesn't matter which explanation is actually true. What matters is that, since we can use these explanations for the universe itself, there is no need to go further and postulate a creator god and then explain the existence of the god with the exact same explanations that we can just apply to the universe itself. This means that postulating a creator god doesn't give the theist any advantage over the atheist when it comes to explaining existence. Thus, theism is simply redundant.
@Nexus-jg7ev We can not use those arguments for the universe: (1) The universe couldn't have always been. The expansion of the universe precludes that. (2) An infinite regress is bad for the atheist explanation. It's also more intuitive to ground reality on a conscious being as the efficient cause of what we see in the universe itself since a non-conscious universe wouldn't have any intentionality to explain why anything more than the bare universe itself exists. E.g., why do we have life and non-life rather than just one or the other? (3) The universe can't be necessary because it's made of matter which undergoes change that must be explained outside of itself. (4) The bruteness of the universe as a ground for reality is neither intuitive nor self-evident given its causal effeteness.
i think the 1st premise that Arbour is defending is accurately represented in "maybe god exists" but in "maybe there's a possible world where god exists", and that makes a big difference.
@Oners82 you're right, what i wanted to say was that the claim "is possible that God exists" is very different from "maybe is possible that God exists", that was the point that Oppy made i guess. So, if you say that possibly God exists then you're saying that it is possible that he exists, and that means he exists at least in one possible world, and through M5 the conclusion would just follow. But there's a huge difference between "maybe is possible that God exists", and "possibly God exists." or "it is possible that God exists".
Couldn't understand half of what they were saying, even then they agreed on much at times it was hard to tell who was on what side. Maybe a disclaimer for that next time "only watch if philosophy student"
@@TheWorldTeacher Don't try to impose your universalist pantheism on this. I understand enoguh that Ben is an orthodox Christian and Graham is a kind of atheist, and the simple form of this is: if God exists in one possible universe He exists in all.
@@TheWorldTeacher Ohh getting angry so fast haa haa, hit a sore spot for you? Sorry but your compilation of stories gather by a roving warband in the ancient middle east and India are not convincing to me and shouldn't be to anyone. It is laughable you have five totally different creation stories, and people can be anything from atheist to pantheist. No wonder you had to adopt universalism it is the only way to even try make sense of all this nonsense. Also explains why missionary work is banned and illegal in the literal shithole that is India. If we're talking about being slaves too, yes I am a slave to the king of the universe, God who loves and calls us His children and friends while you are a slave to this contradictory foolishness. Hows that for having insufficient facts?
@@TheWorldTeacher Yep no response of any value typical of you eastern types all lost in your heads, rather than using any kind of sense, thinking everyone is somehow right. You call me arrogant, and presumptuous, take a look in the mirror first. Also if you want to talk about grammar and spelling you're the one using all caps, emojis, and improper sentence structure.
@@TheWorldTeacher whatever I'm blocking you, you are a waste of time, go climb up and meditate on a mountain the rest of your life, leave rational people alone, as you have nothing but empty sayings and insults, and can't seem to engage with anything I'm putting down, again not surprising for one like you.
1:19 What I call "the cumulative case for dubious arguments, argument" I don't find a collection of unconvincing arguments any better than any single argument from that group. If a gave you 10 unconvincing arguments for any proposition why would the tally have any more justification for belief in that premise? Seems a psychological appeal to intuition.
if you have two argument that you are 75% sure about.... you are only 56% sure that they are both correct. that is how it works with arguments, unless you demonstrate a link between both
Neither the video nor the comments actually address Anselm's Ontological argument or Godel's Ontological argument which uses a modal logic. I will state Anselm's argument and Godel's argument using a modal logic. For a modal logic we need to add the connectives "necessary that" and "possibly that" in addition to the connectives in a predicate logic.
Let □ represent "necessary that" and ◇ represent "possibly that". Using a predicate logic we can easily prove the "substitution rule" which states: p V q q --> r -------- theterfore, p V r. Using a truth table(which can be used in a predicate logic) you can show that (~p --> q) V (p V q) is a tautology. I.E; the two statements are equivalent. Call this tautology A: (~p --> q) (p V q). Proof: (1) p V q Given (2) q --> r Given (3) ~p --> q A (1) (4) ~p --> r Chain Rule (3) and (2) (5) p V r A (4) QED. Becker's Postulates: (1) □p --> □□p (2) ◇p --> □◇p Axiom 1: ◇p Axiom 2: p --> □p modal modus ponens: □(p --> q) --> (□p --> □q) modal modus tollens: (p --> q) --> (□~q --> □~p) (*) ~□p --> □~p (**) ◇p --> ~□~p necessitation postulate: □p Law of excluded middle: □p V □~p Anselm's proof using a modal logic: To prove : □g (1) g --> □g Axiom 2 (2) ◇~g --> □◇~g Becker's postulate 2 (3) □g V □~g Law of excluded middle (4) □g V □◇~g Substitution rule (2,3) (5) ~□g --> ~g law of contrapositive (1) (6) ◇~g --> ~g by * (5) (7) □(◇~g --> ~g) necessitation postulate (6) (8) □◇~g --> □~g modal modus ponens (7) (9) □g V □~g substitution (4,8) (10) ◇g --> ~□~g by ** (11) ◇g Axiom 1 (12) ~□~g modus ponens (10,11) (13) □g Law of detachment (9,12) The argument is clearly a valid argument, whether it's a sound valid argument I leave to others to debate on the Axioms above. Godel's Ontological Argument is worth looking in to. An attempt at Godel's ontological proof. Pos(F) states property F is positive Axiom 1 : Pos(F) --> □Pos(F) Axiom 2: Pos(F) --> ~Pos(~F) It's clear that Axiom 2 states if F is a positive property, then it's negation is not positive. Axiom 3: Pos(F) --> [(F --> H) --> Pos(H)] Axiom 3 just states that positive properties imply other positive properties. def: A property F is said to be consist if ◇(∃x)Fx is true and if property F is inconsistent then F --> ~F. Theorem 1: Pos(F) --> ◇(∃x)Fx Proof: Let Pos(F) be true and suppose F is inconsistent, then F --> ~F and by Axiom 3 Pos(F) --> [(F --> ~F) --> Pos(~F)] --> Pos(~F) is true --> ~Pos(~F) is false which contradicts Axiom 2. Therefore, the assumption is false and the assertion Pos(F) --> ◇(∃x)Fx is true. Here we define what it means to be Godlike. Let Gx stand for x is Godlike. def 1: Gx = df(F)[□Fx Pos(F)] is a tautology. I.E; The two statements are equivalent. This states that every essential property of a godlike individual x is a positive property and every positive property of x is an essential property. Note: This definition does not imply that a godlike individual has all positive properties. It states that a godlike individual has those positive properties which are essential properties. F ess x reads "F is an essence of x." Next we define what it means for a property F to be a essence of an individual x. def 2: F ess x = df(H)[□Hx (F --> H)] is a tautology. Next we define what it means for an individual x to exist necessarily. Let NE(x) read "x necessarily exists". def 3: NE(x) = df(F)[F ess x --> □(∃y)Fy]. Axiom 4: Pos(G). Axiom 5: Pos(NE). Corollary 1 : ◇(∃x)Gx Proof: By Axiom 4 Pos(G) and by Theorem 1 Pos(G) --> ◇(∃x)Gx QED. Theorem 2: Gx --> G Ess x. Proof: Assume Gx is true and let □Hx. To show: □y(Gy --> Hy) By (def 1 and Axiom 1) □Hx --> Pos(H) --> □Pos(H). Referring to the Note above by def 1 we have: □[Pos(H) --> (y)(Gy --> Hy)] and by modul modus ponens □Pos(H) --> □(y)(Gy --> Hy). Now let Gx be true and G --> H. Show □H. By (Axiom 4) Pos(G) and by (Axiom 3) and (def 1) we have : Pos(G) --> [G --> H) --> Pos(H)] --> □H. Therefore Gx --> G Ess x. Prove: □(∃x)Gx. Prior to proving the above statement we need two theorems in modal logic. Theorem A* : □(p --> q) --> [◇p --> ◇q]. Theorem A** : ◇□p --> □p. Proof of □(∃x)Gx. If Gx where true, then by (def 1) □Pos(G) and by (Axiom 4) Pos(NE) --> NE(x) is true and by (Theorem 2) G ess x is true --> [(∃x)Gx --> □(∃x)Gx]. By necessitation axiom above □[(∃y)Fy --> □(∃y)Fy] and Theorem A* --> ◇(∃x)Gx --> ◇□(∃x)Gx and by Corollary 1 ◇(∃x)Gx which by A** --> □(∃x)Gx. QED Using an ordinary MacBook computer, Godel's proof was shown to be correct, at least on a mathematical level, using a higher modal logic. I find it amazing that Godel's argument can be proven automatically in a few seconds or even less on a standard notebook. The equations all add up. If there are other things that use similar logic it may be possible to develop computer systems to check each single step of a proof to make certain they are correct.
@@Dan_1348 but that does not entail a 'cumulative case'. If you have a 100 poor arguments, that are all unlikely.. it may be likely at least one of them is true. it should never raise your confidence in the whole thruth. if it is 75% likely jesus was born of a virgin + 75%likely her raised from the dead.. if may be likely 'at least one is correct' .. but you need both to make the believe reasonable. unless you demonstrate a link between both. for example: if you have demonstated a god exists, who can do this. without that link, you cannot increase the whole likelyhood.
I don't get conceivability implies possibility. It's conceivable to me that 3143 * 4087 equals 12845443 but when I then do the calculation it just isn't the case. Feels like the possibility of something just isn't reliant on our imagination or lack of imagination at all.
You get the notion of conceivability wrong , at least as term was used in the modern period, starting with Descartes and employed in the relevant way in the various fromulations of the ontological argument. 'Conceive' here doesn't just mean entertain an idea whatsoever , but it means rather to posit a distinct and clear idea. You can 'imagine' only in a more general sense, for ex., an euclidean triangle having the sums of its internal angles different from 180°, or that 3143 * 4087 equals 12845443, but you can't conceive it in the narrower techincal sense that philosophers use it for ground possibilities. You can't conceive any other solution of the sum 2+2 different from 4, even though you can mistakenly entartain the idea that sum make 6 or 4 : consistency is the necessary condition for conception.
@@dekab6133 But then, can anyone can conceive of God in Gods full glory? Seems like most theist say that we cannot know the mind of God and that we can only speak analogicaly about him.
@@Oskar1000 This was indeed a central concern about the argument, and something similar was present in the early Gaunilo's objection. However, typically the defender of the ontological proof argues that while we can''t understand or imagine the nature of God, we can conceive it by the means of pure intellection, giving us the possiblity to have an adeguate idea of it without fully understand it (they are ready to grant indeed that such idea can only be conceived beyond our possibility to comprehend it). This is also the broader problem of how can we speak meaningly about God, a problem central in kataphatic and apophatic theology. Btw, this kind of defence is ,of course ,controversial: most famously, Kant argues that we can't have nothing more than a nominal definition of an ens realissimum, and our mere undestanding of the meaning of the expression of 'uncondititioned existence' doesn't give us any knowledge about it, precluding the demonstration of the real possibility of such thing, being beyond the power of our reason.
So, when Ben talks about the “ideal agnostic”, I don’t think of that necessarily as a fence-sitting position. I see that more so as someone who doesn’t believe it’s even possible to know one way or the other whether any God/gods exist(s). I consider myself an agnostic atheist for this very reason. I don’t believe any God/gods exist(s), but if I’m being intellectually honest with myself, I can’t say that I KNOW that no God/gods exist(s).
If an atheist agrees that it is possible that God exists but equally agrees it is possible God doesn't exit in any possible world, shouldn't the positive claim take hold and should be accepted, Because to claim both, seems absurd and existence is maximally better than non existence? Or am i missing something?
The point is that it is not possible to hold those two propositions. The OA shows that if it is possible that God exists, then God must exist. The atheist must not merely affirm that it is possible for God to exist and happens to not exist in the actual world, they must affirm that it is impossible for God to exist at all. Similarly, the ROA shows that the theist must affirm that it is impossible for God to not exist, not that it is possible that God doesn't exist and happens to exist in the actual world.
Ascribing possibility to something can work in reverse: why would this thing not be possible? Well, things are impossible either because they make no sense (entail a contradiction, misuse a term, etc) or because the obtaining of their sufficient conditions make no sense. The rational default is that anything is possible until some reason is given (like the above reasons) why it can't be. Likewise for the possibility of His non-existence, in the absence of it making no sense or its conditions making no sense. Now, enter the definitional parts of an Ontological Argument, which inform us that God has no required conditions (any state of affairs is sufficient, He is either impossible in the sense of being meaningless or He exists in every possible state of affairs (every possible world)... the other way to be impossible isn't available because He has no required conditions which could fail to obtain or fail to make sense). I think that sort of information is very useful to the agnostic indeed. They might never have thought that, in the absence of meaninglessness, God (like anything else) exists wherever His conditions are met; but He has no required conditions! So He exists come what may, unless you can show the very idea of Him is meaningless.
It seems to me that you can run the same argument for any entity whose "existence has no conditions" (e.g. an omniscient, omnipotent, necessarily existing, perfectly evil being), and that this puts God in bad company. You should try formulating your argument as a valid argument of modal logic where (as you're probably aware) similar notions have been more rigorously worked out.
@@thepresident2974 "Evil" is like ignorance or powerlessness. So this counter-example does not work (just as it does not work against the more traditional Ontological Arguments you mentioned).
@@Mentat1231 "Evil" may be *like* ignorance or powerlessness (although I find this notion dubious), but it doesn't follow from this that if a being is evil it is thereby not omniscient or not omnipotent. In any case, my argument doesn't rest on any particular counterexample. Unless you want to assert that the only non-meaningless entity whose "existence has no conditions" is God - in which case, you have a bit more arguing to do.
@@Mentat1231 Although I've just pointed out that my argument doesn't rest on any particular counterexample, here's another one: an omniscient, omnipotent, necessarily existing, perfectly good being who just happens not to be God. This is a being whose existence also has no conditions, so unless you can show that the very idea of an omniscient, omnipotent, necessarily existing, perfectly good being who isn't God is meaningless, by your lights this being also exists come what may.
@@thepresident2974 To your second point: Saying there is an omnipotent, omniscient, necessary, and perfectly good being that just happens to not be God is like saying there is a molecule with only two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom that just happens to not be a water molecule. To the first point, about an evil being: The reason that omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness, etc. are even related to the "having no conditions" is because some finite amount of power, knowledge, goodness, etc., would be an arbitrary limit requiring some sort of explanation (why that much and not more or less?). To be evil is to be a moral being that falls short to some degree from perfect goodness. It is like lacking knowledge or lacking power. Such arbitrary limits would need explanation. To be completely without a moral dimension at all would contradict its being omniscient. So, your proposal doesn't work either way.
I really liked Oppy’s point that the argument could equally go the opposite way- a reverse ontological argument. It seems to me that if one thinks that there is a possible world of nothingness, then one should disbelieve that there are any necessary beings. So the premise “If God exists, then God necessarily exists” is false. Instead of rejecting the existence of God, one could take out the idea of necessary existence from the definition of God. Otherwise, it would feel cheap to deny the existence of God by the requirement for logical necessity. So I think that the ontological argument should “play zero role” in determining one’s belief (contrary to Arbour’s statement) if they have come to believe that no necessary beings exist. Seemed like Arbour’s “cumulative case” for theism at 1:18:18 does little/nothing for the ontological argument because from what I understand, those a posteriori arguments do not argue for a *logically* necessary being (except the argument from numbers, haven’t heard that one), but rather mostly with causality/inductive inference. Oppy replies that those arguments are a posteriori are just about the evidence in the actual world, not for a possible world (maybe =/= possibly) Arbour and Oppy should have further discussed whether necessary existence really does add any greatness to God
If a world of nothingness is possible how would that disprove the premise that "If God exists, then God necessarily exists", both can be simultaneously be true
@@ryanmayfield6231 I agree that "A world of nothingness is possible" and "God exists" are contradictory but "if God exists he necessarily exists" and "A world of nothingness is possible" are completely compatible.
There actually is a world of completely total and entire nothingness. That’s why it doesn’t even exist, because it is the least good possible world, so good that lacks every possible perfection (including existence). I suppose one can have any number of issues with the ontological argument, but I think this one doesn’t work
@@lukelombardi1059 The old "an *existent* being is greater than a non-existent being" argument is an absurdity, nothing more than an attempt to define God into existence. By that logic I could simply grant existence as a property of anything and have exactly as much justification for them. Ylem is by definition the *existent* necessary origin of all things, including any and all existent gods. Now we're in conflict because we both have equal claim to mutually exclusive entities, both of which exist *by definition.* If it works for God it works for Ylem, right? And that's why it's absurd to treat existence as a property, or to attempt to append it to the definition of an entity. Whether or not a thing exists is independent of the definition you give that thing. Defining "nothing" as lacking existence fails at the gate. Especially when you simultaneously claim that it does and doesn't exist... that's utterly incoherent. These word games are should not be convincing to anyone.
@@TheMonk72 what you call Ylem is then quite simply by definition the same as God, the same reality referred to by different words. You can say it’s an attempt to define God into existence- I could say the same of you, that you are attempting to define God into non-existence, which doesn’t get us anywhere in reference to the actual cogency of the argument. The very point of the argument, however, is that the application of it simply does not allow for a broad an unwieldy use to prove the existence of any Thor or Zeus you like. For example, that greater than which nothing can be conceived, must exist, for that which is conceived of existing in thought is greater than that which is not conceived of existing in thought, must be the source of all that is not itself, being the source of all perfections, is one, not having its being divided into separate units which could otherwise be combined to make it greater, for nothing greater than it can be conceived, and so forth. In a similar way you could proceed to derive the various traditional divine attributes. It doesn’t refute the argument to simply say that you could use the argument to prove the existence of other gods, which in reality end up being other names for the very same thing to which I am referring
It seems to me that the purpose of the Ontological Arguments is to raise the price tag on atheism; and I think it does that successfully. The reverse Ontological Argument likewise raises the bar for theism, but not in a way that any theist minds. It's a cost they are quite willing, and even happy to pay; whereas the reasonable atheist should think really hard about whether they want to pay the price of the Ontological Argument.
Only if you conflate "metaphysical/logical possibility" with conceivability. As an atheist I feel no extra force saying that I don't know if God could possibly (as in metaphysical or logical possibility) exist. I would feel the force if was forced to say that he couldn't conceivably exist but that's not the proposition. Even then I can't conceive of the entirety of God so I could at most conceive of something vaguely God like. Even theists say that they can't describe God and that he is beyond explanation and so on, so how am I suppose to draw a conclusion that he could possibly exists.
@@Oskar1000 Not "conceivability", but meaningfulness. Metaphysical or logical impossibility means the existence of the thing is, in some sense, meaningless (either because of straightforward contradiction, or because of a conceptual incoherence, when fully analyzed... [Edit addition] this is true even in "powers" approaches to alethic modality, which I strongly endorse, and any other non-Lewisean view). Do you not think the price tag for calling God impossible is higher than for simply saying He happens not to exist?
@@Mentat1231 I haven't seen any full analysis of God and I don't think humans could comprehend all the entailments even if it was done. So to say that it is logically possible that it would exists seems premature. Even then, metaphysical seems even harder to clear up. On the other hand, it feels like I can describe a universe which has no contradictions and also has no God quite easily. It's just a single point, existing eternally and never changing. What's the contradiction there? It's basically one proposition and one supersimple ontological entity. Seems logical to me.
@@Oskar1000 If God is defined in terms of the great-making properties or goods, which we know to be coherent from our experience (things like power, knowledge, moral goodness, and freedom) + being a causal agent (which is, again, fundamental in our conceptual scheme and as familiar to us as anything is), then granting mere possibility seems quite easy. On the other hand, to claim that God is impossible seems like it would bear the burden of *showing* the incoherent entailment. That's what I mean by a much "higher price tag". As for the reverse ontological argument, as I said in my original post, the theist is ok with the price tag of having to say that God could not have failed to exist. We often have separate arguments for that position anyway (for example, when you talk about the Universe existing eternally and unchangingly as a "single point", you have the problem that it actually *did* change about 14 billion years ago, which points to its being contingent and requiring an explanation that could not have failed to be). Moreover, the very concept of God fits quite comfortably with necessary existence (He doesn't have any of the limitations or requirements that point to contingency). I should add that it's not as though atheists haven't historically tried to show incoherent entailments in the concept of God, such that He actually would be impossible. It's just that these have all failed; which is itself evidence of His possibility.
@@Mentat1231 So my point universe has nothing to do with the actual universe. I just postulated a possible universe. So in that universe it just wouldn't explode. Sorry for the confusion. To me there is definitely a worry that we are throwing a bunch of coherent things into a big concept and that there is something contradictory that arises at some point. I am not claiming the truth of the reverse ontological argument, just that they way equally heavy for me. So someone has a burden to show possibility or impossibility but surely I do not have a burden to solve this problem. It feels like being presented with Google's entire codebase and being asked if there is a bug somewhere. And then all of these properties of God may also be analogical so I am not even analysing the correct thing really.
The existence of God can be demonstrated. But the human mind is capable of coming up with, and getting itself to believe, all sorts of bizarre things. So it is hardly surprising that some people have also denied the existence of God.
1:22:00 - The ontological argument plays no role for me either way. Maybe I just don't get it. I imagine a possible world made entirely of green jello. The laws of physics are different so it just stays jello. I imagine God could maybe exist in that world. OK, so what? How does that mean a god must also exist in a real world?
It's an attempt to smuggle in God via the concept of necessity. If a necessary being exists then it exists in a single world then by definition it exists in all possible worlds, including the actual world. Oppy headed this off right near the start by pointing out that there's an unsatisfied conditional there: *if* a necessary being exists. The argument can't be used to establish the existence of God, only make hypothetical statements about God's properties in the case that it does exist. It certainly doesn't settle the question of God's existence.
Mike Westbrook I describe what you're saying as pragmaticly possible, in order to be pragmaticly possible all of the objects particulars must have a verified parallel or precedent.
Arbour says a lot, but he never actually demonstrates the soundness of the premise. His entire spiel about "greatest possible" is nothing more than defining God into existence. It's simply another undemonstrated claim, nothing more. Oppy didn't state it explicitly but there exists a possible world in which the greatest possible being is contingent, therefore it is necessarily true that there is no God. Or to put it more simply, ontological arguments prove absolutely nothing.
the OA can't really build on all the other arguments (Kalam, moral, ..). None of the other arguments argue for a 'maximally great being that exists in all possible worlds'. When they lead someone to say 'maybe god exists'.. they say 'there is a possible world where the universe is greated by a god; but i maybe that isn't case.'
They do argue that there does exist a necessary being which is God. So they do argue that a necessary being like God exists. So therefore there are reason to think the maximally great being possibly exist
@Oners82 They try to establish that God (which is necessary) exists in at least some possible world, because, from that it follows God exists in all possible worlds, including the actual (since the actual is possible and from S5 + necessity).
@Oners82 lol, no. Necessity is not that which is trying to be established, possible existence is that to be established. Graham Oppy agrees God is necessary, he just doesn't think he is possible. Please go read some actual academic writing on this before making these huge errors.
@Oners82 Yes, they try to establish that a necessary being actually exists, and they do that by establishing that a necessary being possibly exists. Just saying that something is necessary is not smuggling it in. This isn't an issue for anyone who understands the argument. Have you read what Plantinga himself says about the argument?
I gave up after an hour and a quarter of discussing what a theist/atheist and agnostic is. A complete waste of time and somewhat nonsensical as agreed by the participants when contradicting themselves over their various starting points.
@@thorobreu I have a leprechaun at the bottom of my garden and he is a maximally great leprechaun so it is possible that he exists now I imagine some possible book that says the leprechaun exists and is maximally great which includes being necessary. If all possible books must agree what is necessary then every possible book contains the claim that the leprechaun exists and since the actual book is also a possible book It says so to.
@@truthgiver8286 I'm not sure what all these books are about, but I think you're just trying to run the modal ontological argument for this leprechaun. And if that's true, then I agree you can. You can establish that if it's possible that a maximally great leprechaun exists, then he does actually exist.
@@TheWorldTeacher I didn't say I didn't understand it, I said it was twaddle. And you may need above-average intelligence or you may not - the same could be said for almost any academic field. But what you definitely need is a background in the subject, and that's just learning the language and the rules of the game.
you guys really need to stop using technical philoso-speak no one will understand anything you're saying. listen to how alex malpas does it instead of showing off.
Most of the technicalities here are irrelevant to their discussion. But, since both Arbour and Oppy are professional philosophers, they need to see whether they are on the same page regarding some technical issues like other systems of modal logic, accessibility relation and stuff like that. This is somehow due to the nature of the topic because you cannot rigorously discuss ontological argument without saying something about the system of logic underlying it and this discussion was definitely rigorous.
RIP Ben Arbour.
gay
@@justinsankar1164 lol. Are you what? 12?
@@Alkis05 i didnt know he died sorry. I thought he meant he lost in the debate
@@justinsankar1164 now if that were true that would be gay
Watching this again 2 years later... Still one of the best dissections of the Ontological Argument I've seen. Oppy is truly a "necessary being." 😂🤣
Great discussion and respectful with no recourse to ridicule or bar room insults.
That is always Oppy's modus operandi.Sadly Arbour had his moments check out his debate with Tjump to see his snarky side,
Really great discussion! Really wish Graham was on the theist’s side, he is brilliant and quite likable
Of course!
*The World Teacher - Jagadguru Svāmī Vegānanda*
1. I have personally experienced the inner witness of the Holy Spirit.
2. God is the best explanation of the origin of the universe.
3 God is the best explanation of the fine tuning of the universe.
4 God is the best explanation of the existent of contingent things
5 God is the best explanation of the existence of objective moral facts
6 The facts surrounding the life and death of Jesus are best explained by the proposition “God raised Jesus from the dead”
*The World Teacher - Jagadguru Svāmī Vegānanda* Those don’t really respond to the reasons I gave though haha
Travis Ritt he always just copies and pastes that thing.
*The World Teacher - Jagadguru Svāmī Vegānanda* i mean i have seen that block of text like 10 times (plus like 4 others) so...
This is an absolute breath of fresh air. Personally I think ontological arguments are just silly, but watching these two guys discuss it with such obvious good-natured humility is kind of shocking in today's battle debate climate. I recently learned of the tragic loss of Dr. Arbour and his wife, and I have to say that it saddened me very deeply. The world needs Christians like them. Rest in peace.
whats silly about it
@@LeafSouls If you're not aware of the silliness of ontological arguments for god, it's a safe bet you just don't understand them
@@alistairmaleficent8776 well honestly i am the kind that doesn't understand a single thing they say so i am not very bright, but i am curious about your reasoning
@@LeafSouls The gist of it is this: the arguments assert that if god is possible in any possible world, then he must exist.
This is downright silliness, and Oppy himself says that almost no one takes it seriously.
Just take a moment and ponder the implications of these arguments, now that you have a brief summary. I'm betting you can come up with as many absurdities as I can, and I've read the actual papers describing these arguments.
@@alistairmaleficent8776 i can see where ur coming from, its not the best argument, but there is SOME merit to it i think
5:22 Ben Arbour starts to define the terms
7:38 Oppy's turn to define
I found this very interesting but I was hoping for a debate. I was disappointed that Ben really didn’t make a clear cut case for why he things that argument works with ready answers to Grahams objections. I for one count myself amongst those theists who are unimpressed with the argument.
@@TheNaturalTheologian what is your blog about?
Do Dr Oppy and Arbour get paid for this? This was so good, people would normally need to pay good money to sit in a class to hear this.
I'm a Christian, and am unmoved by arguments, but like to know them, and this was great.
I'd like to have heard more explanation by Dr Oppy on the reverse Ontological Argument because it just doesn't work for me (but clearly he could expand on it at length). I need to do more exploring, but I'm certain I'll find rebuttals pertaining to negative properties vs positive properties, and they do not seem to be the same.
It seems of course that the reverse OA would argue "If it is possible that God (MGB) does not exist, then God does not exist", which is obviously the inverse of the OA proper, which argues "If it is possible that God (MGB) exists, then God exists".
I'm just not sure how that works in its negation. The basis of the positive OA argument is dependent upon the notion that if an MGB exists, then the MGB must necessarily exist. That is if MGB exists in any possible world, because of the fact that the MGB must be necessary in order to meet the criteria of "MGB" (obviously only necessary beings can be MG), then the MGB exists in every possible world.
Why would the inverse be true? If there is is a possibility that MGB does not exist (does not exist in at least one possible world), why should be extrapolated to include all possible worlds and include the "necessarily impossible" inference?
It seems to me that the reverse Ontological Argument must still demonstrate that God is literally impossible, which it does not.
In short, God not existing in one possible world, does not imply that God exists in no possible world (aka God is impossible). However, if God exists in on world, by the definition of MGB, God must exist in all.
It seems that if an MGB exists in any possible world, it would only prove that the claim "An MGB does not exist in a possible world" is false.
Anyhow, I could be full of crap, so would like for anyone to give me an explanation.
Like you said, it's part of the definition of a necessary being that if it exists in at least one possible world it exists in all possible worlds. Remembering that in modal logic, "it is possible that x exists" is the same as "x exists in at least one possible world". If it does not exist in at least one world then it is false that it exists in all worlds. If it does not exists in all worlds it does not exist in any world, because if it did then it would exist in all worlds. (if A then B), means the same as (if not B then not A).
The reverse OA, like the OA, works with a god that is necessary. God may not exist in all worlds but could still exist in this world, that would just be a contingent god.
@@lukeanthony9904
Correct me if I'm wrong, but when dealing with necessary modal logic, contrary to contingent (finite vs all possible worlds), the positive and negative proofs for necessary existence seem to become synonymous.
In other words, both the OA and ROA, demonstrate that God is logically either strictly impossible or necessary. It doesn't seem to me that the ROA is an answer at all to the OA, but merely another way of restating it and serves as much of a proof for the OA as the OA does.
The OA proper seems to demonstrate the "strictly necessary" part of the equation and the ROA seems to demonstrate the "strictly impossible" part, but both notions can be inferred by either argument.
It seems if the ROA is correct, then stating "It is logically possible that God does not exist" is synonymous with stating "It is logically impossible that God exists" (God exists in no possible world). This turns out to be the exact same thing as stating "If God exists in any possible world, then God exists in all". It's either one or the other. Thus, the original OA still stands, that if it is even possible that God exists, then God exists.
Either way, it still leaves open the possibility of a contingent God as you stated, but that wouldn't qualify as "God" in Plantinga's argument, so that'd open a whole different can of worms.
What do you think of my reasoning, am I missing something? It's fascinating. It seems a lot harder for me to get my head around than the other "God arguments". I wish I could hear Oppy's reasoning on the ROA.
True Believer The issue that it doesn’t seem particularly hard to imagine a world in which God does not exist. For example, you could ask “is it possible that there was not a full, morally sufficient reason for [insert horrible natural disaster]. The argument from evil can equally be framed as superficially logically coherent. Even if you think God does have morally sufficient reasons for evil, don’t you think it’s possible that no such explanation exists in any possible world?
I’m not saying that therefore we should be atheists, but it does tell me that more justification than “apparent or the presupposition of possibility” is required.
@@TheWorldTeacher please give me an objection to the grimm reaper
Interesting discussion. Very technical, but I think I could follow the main ideas.
Ok I was an atheist but Christian Bale is so clearly the best Batman so I'm convinced.
Most people reject the argument because they think it appeals to "grammatical or logical technicalities" rather than intuition. But when I was a teenager the argument occurred to me intuitively. It was only later that I discovered all the logical formulations.
Are you suggesting intuition is a warrant for belief?
That's how we get flat earthers and a whole host of other nonsense.
Flat earthers disbelieve the movement of our planet because they intuit they should feel the motion for instance.
Intuition is not a pathway to knowledge, it was a primitive survival trait controlled by no inference rules so is irrational.
Ganesh' s stepbrother 7193 He meant Logical formulations led to the justification of his intuition, which most atheists deny because of their intuition. You pretty much described everything clear and well but misplaced Atheist with Flat-earther.
@@ApozVideozexcept that’s not true. Theists come to their beliefs through intuition, or cultural initiation.
@@princegobi5992what about those who come to theism because of direct, personal experience of the divine?
I think there is an important distinction to make regarding what makes something "brute." What makes a fact "brute" is that it has no explanation _simpliciter_ . Dr. Oppy seems to be saying that something is brute when an explanation cannot be _given_ , which isn't the case. It doesn't follow that something doesn't have an explanation from the fact that a person can't give one. The paranormal seems like a clear case here. Obviously I may not be able to explain a paranormal experience I have, but that doesn't mean there is no explanation principally.
Yeah, can not be given because there isnt one. I think (at least from other talks) that Oppy is clear that brute fact is a fact that has no explanation. Can you point out when did he use it incorrectly?
Awesome discussion!
There's a great book by an LDS author that shows that there's perfect harmony between the prophetic statements concerning the garden of Eden being in Missouri and the Old Testament account concerning the garden of Eden. It's called Canaan, Babylon, and Egypt A Comparative Theological Analysis on Creation sold by Eborn Books.
It seems to me that the epistemic warrant needed for a positive ontological modal claim like "it is possible X" is far less than a negative claim like "it is possible not X". When we make these claims, we situate ourselves as if the claim is true. Well, the data required for us to establish that the claim is true for the positive existential modal claim is 1 instantiation of that claim among the infinite possible universes. The data required for us to establish the claim is true for a negative existential modal claim is EVERY possible world. That is to say, one would need to examine all possible worlds to confirm the negative existential claim. In fact, if there are an infinite number of possible worlds, then it is in principle impossible to establish the premise "It is possible not X" unless X entails some logical incoherence that causes the premise to be rejected for reasons other than the strength of the modal claim.
I think you're missing the symmetry here. If this X is true in one possible world only, you'd have to examine the supposed infinite array of worlds to confirm that.
I agree with Matt that Russell is missing the symmetry, but Matt also misses the symmetry. To say "it is possible X", all you need is one instance of X, which means "at least one instance", not "one instance only," as Matt wrongly says.
Russell wrongly says that "it is possible X" is weaker than "it is possible not X". This is incorrect because logically they are equal in strength; they only require a single veridical instance.
The same applies to the MOA, because those two equal propositions both lead to propositions that are much stronger and still equal to each other.
"it is possible that an MGB exists" leads to "an MGB exists"
"it is possible that an MGB does not exist" leads to "an MGB does not exist"
This is why the MOA, though pretty cool, is not convincing to me, because the reverse argument draws a tie against it. To me, the MOA defines itself into having a 50% chance of being true. Plus, I think relying on other theistic arguments to support "it is possible that an MGB exists" is good, at least in principle. The contingency argument seems to me to come closest to helping this.
"Possibly exists" means its counter state is "it's not known if it it exists"
"Possibly doesn't exist" means its counter is "it's possible it exists", which just affirms the first position, no? So really only "possibly exists" is plausible, correct?
@@davidcallari541 I see what you're saying, but things are different when you consider necessary beings.
"Possibly exists" means "exists in at least one possible world". If a necessary being exists in at least one possible world, then it exists in all of them.
"Possibly doesn't exist" means "doesn't exist in at least one possible world". If a necessary being does not exist in at least one possible world, then it exists in none of them.
As you can see, those two claims are not identical, and clearly lead to opposite conclusions.
37 minutes in, and I'm reminded of how much I wish I could say to Swinburne: The statement "God does not exist" is not a contradiction on its own; but the statement "God could have existed but happens not to" is, because all such "could haves" are grounded in conditions that weren't met and God's existence has no conditions. Any state of affairs would be sufficient for Him to exist, and so the contradiction is in saying "the state of affairs for X to exist is totally sufficient (meets all the conditions) and yet X doesn't exist". I think that is clearly self-contradictory.
Hi! Can you please explain what you find wrong with my view, which may or may not be related to Swinburnes? I believe God exists in every possible world in which there is an actual world, and therefore God exists in all possible worlds by extension. But possible worlds do not exist unless it is contingently true that the actual world exists. This means that God necessarily exists in all possible worlds, but the space of possible worlds is not prior to the actual world. Contingent truths are only contingent ways THIS world could have been.
So even though God is extensive with all possible worlds, God’s existence is still contingent. This is grounded in the view that “possibility” is grounded in ways the actual world could have been, and not in terms of a logically prior “free floating space”of possibilities. That would make “possible worlds” logically prior to God, even if God is coextensive with the contents of all possible worlds. My view explains transworld identity in a way that grounds it in causality and temporality. I suppose this could be an objection to S5?
@@paulkelly1162
I think there are a few issues at play here. My first red flag was when you said "possible worlds in which there is an actual world". The actual world is not "in" any other possible worlds; it's just one among them. In general, I find that, while talk of "possible worlds" is quite handy at times, it is mostly rather slippery and dangerous. A "possible world" just refers to how things could have been. If things had been some other way (instead of how they are), then *that* would be the actual world. But, in any case, try re-phrasing it without any reference to the worlds at all (especially without any reference to them "existing", which is very problematic, since that would imply they are actual things, which is precisely what they're not! _pace David Lewis..._).
When I try to re-phrase your position without reference to "worlds", I'm having trouble seeing what it means. Surely you're not saying that, if everything weren't just as it happens to actually be, down to the last detail, then the other ways things *could have been* would be impossible...? That seems straightforwardly false. So, maybe clarify what you mean, without reference to worlds, so I can understand better.
Also, I don't see how any of this would make God contingent. If God exists, then the actual "world" (everything that actually is) owes its existence to God. God causally explains why this state of affairs exists rather than some other one. And He cannot Himself be contingent on something He causes.
the sheer contrast with this and the caliber of debate to be had on discord.
I often find myself wondering, if God didn't exist how could we even still be having these conversations like this? Its amazing how much depth this subject has. That is saying something within itself.
You realize that often and more reasonably that argument goes the other way right? If god existed why after all these years are we still debating god’s existence or non existence, it should be clear using any epistemological method.
Does Ben REALLY now know the difference between epistemic and metaphysical possibility? Graham very kindly points it out to him at 1:22:45 (after Ben’s long argument that the cumulative effect of other arguments makes the Ontological argument more attractive.)
This is a little odd. Anybody else notice?
Also, Graham says the evidence for and against God is a wash. Then why isn’t he an agnostic? What scientific evidence can he offer to support his atheism seeing he cut himself off with that statement?
He means that both naturalism and theism can explain stuff eqaully well, so the data doesn't really constitute evidence either way. At this point, Oppy uses Ockham's Razor to rule out theism in favor of naturalism in virtue of naturalism being theoretically simpler or more parsimonious.
@@Nexus-jg7ev thanks ,yeah but is it simpler explanation that owe our existence ,ultimately, to non-existence, as Dawkins opined, the universe “evolved out of literally nothing” ? I think not. That does not qualify as an explanation at all let alone a simple one.
@@todddweiner8070 That's a really bad explanation because something cannot come from absolute nothing indeed, and nobody advances this idea - neither theists, nor atheists. Even if theists accept that the universe was created from nothing, they do not say that something in general came from absolute nothing, because God is not nothing. God is something. All we seek now is an explanation for why there is something rather than nothing. I do no not know whether the universe exhausts natural reality or whether natural reality extends beyond our observable universe but let's grant that the universe exhausts natural reality for the sake of argument. For the atheist naturalist, then, the universe alone exhausts reality. The theist reality includes the universe and God. When both the theist and the atheist have to explain why there is something rather than nothing, it's not the case that both only have to explain why the universe exists. Because theists' ontology includes God, they also have to explain why God exists. It turns out that all the explanations that theists can give for why there is something rather than nothing with respect to God and the universe, can also be given by atheists with respect to the universe alone.
If God involves an infinite regress, the universe might involve an infinite regress.
If God has always existed, the universe might have also always existed. Both can be said to have a special kind of existence - God has always existed timelessly while the universe has always existed because it has existed for as long as time has existed - it had existed at all points in time. Time is part of the universe.
If God exists of necessity, the universe can exist of necessity.
If God's existence is a brute fact, the existence of the universe can be a brute fact.
Atheists can explain the existence of the universe without having to appeal to a creator. They can simply use the same arguments that explain why God exists. The universe could've either:
1) Have always existed
2) Have involved an infinite regress
3) Have been necessary
4) Have been a brute fact
It doesn't matter which explanation is actually true. What matters is that, since we can use these explanations for the universe itself, there is no need to go further and postulate a creator god and then explain the existence of the god with the exact same explanations that we can just apply to the universe itself. This means that postulating a creator god doesn't give the theist any advantage over the atheist when it comes to explaining existence. Thus, theism is simply redundant.
@@Nexus-jg7ev Thanks for responding and keeping it a “clean fight.” I will reply soon in detail when I’m free. Good day.
@Nexus-jg7ev We can not use those arguments for the universe:
(1) The universe couldn't have always been. The expansion of the universe precludes that.
(2) An infinite regress is bad for the atheist explanation. It's also more intuitive to ground reality on a conscious being as the efficient cause of what we see in the universe itself since a non-conscious universe wouldn't have any intentionality to explain why anything more than the bare universe itself exists. E.g., why do we have life and non-life rather than just one or the other?
(3) The universe can't be necessary because it's made of matter which undergoes change that must be explained outside of itself.
(4) The bruteness of the universe as a ground for reality is neither intuitive nor self-evident given its causal effeteness.
20 minutes on the definition of atheism...geez!
i think the 1st premise that Arbour is defending is accurately represented in "maybe god exists" but in "maybe there's a possible world where god exists", and that makes a big difference.
@Oners82 you're right, what i wanted to say was that the claim "is possible that God exists" is very different from "maybe is possible that God exists", that was the point that Oppy made i guess. So, if you say that possibly God exists then you're saying that it is possible that he exists, and that means he exists at least in one possible world, and through M5 the conclusion would just follow. But there's a huge difference between "maybe is possible that God exists", and "possibly God exists." or "it is possible that God exists".
@Oners82 Yes, idk why i said M5 lol. But yeah, that was the point.
@Oners82 [] P vs []P
What’s the name of the book on the ontological argument that Ben mentioned in this debate?
Couldn't understand half of what they were saying, even then they agreed on much at times it was hard to tell who was on what side. Maybe a disclaimer for that next time "only watch if philosophy student"
@@TheWorldTeacher Don't try to impose your universalist pantheism on this. I understand enoguh that Ben is an orthodox Christian and Graham is a kind of atheist, and the simple form of this is: if God exists in one possible universe He exists in all.
@@TheWorldTeacher Ohh getting angry so fast haa haa, hit a sore spot for you? Sorry but your compilation of stories gather by a roving warband in the ancient middle east and India are not convincing to me and shouldn't be to anyone. It is laughable you have five totally different creation stories, and people can be anything from atheist to pantheist. No wonder you had to adopt universalism it is the only way to even try make sense of all this nonsense. Also explains why missionary work is banned and illegal in the literal shithole that is India. If we're talking about being slaves too, yes I am a slave to the king of the universe, God who loves and calls us His children and friends while you are a slave to this contradictory foolishness. Hows that for having insufficient facts?
@@TheWorldTeacher Yep no response of any value typical of you eastern types all lost in your heads, rather than using any kind of sense, thinking everyone is somehow right. You call me arrogant, and presumptuous, take a look in the mirror first. Also if you want to talk about grammar and spelling you're the one using all caps, emojis, and improper sentence structure.
@@TheWorldTeacher whatever I'm blocking you, you are a waste of time, go climb up and meditate on a mountain the rest of your life, leave rational people alone, as you have nothing but empty sayings and insults, and can't seem to engage with anything I'm putting down, again not surprising for one like you.
1:19
What I call "the cumulative case for dubious arguments, argument"
I don't find a collection of unconvincing arguments any better than any single argument from that group.
If a gave you 10 unconvincing arguments for any proposition why would the tally have any more justification for belief in that premise?
Seems a psychological appeal to intuition.
if you have two argument that you are 75% sure about.... you are only 56% sure that they are both correct. that is how it works with arguments, unless you demonstrate a link between both
Neither the video nor the comments actually address Anselm's Ontological argument or Godel's Ontological argument which uses a modal logic.
I will state Anselm's argument and Godel's argument using a modal logic.
For a modal logic we need to add the connectives "necessary that" and "possibly that" in addition to the connectives in a predicate logic.
Let □ represent "necessary that" and ◇ represent "possibly that".
Using a predicate logic we can easily prove the "substitution rule" which states:
p V q
q --> r
--------
theterfore, p V r.
Using a truth table(which can be used in a predicate logic) you can show that (~p --> q) V
(p V q) is a tautology. I.E; the two statements are equivalent.
Call this tautology A: (~p --> q) (p V q).
Proof:
(1) p V q Given
(2) q --> r Given
(3) ~p --> q A (1)
(4) ~p --> r Chain Rule (3) and (2)
(5) p V r A (4)
QED.
Becker's Postulates:
(1) □p --> □□p
(2) ◇p --> □◇p
Axiom 1: ◇p
Axiom 2: p --> □p
modal modus ponens:
□(p --> q) --> (□p --> □q)
modal modus tollens:
(p --> q) --> (□~q --> □~p)
(*) ~□p --> □~p
(**) ◇p --> ~□~p
necessitation postulate: □p
Law of excluded middle:
□p V □~p
Anselm's proof using a modal logic:
To prove : □g
(1) g --> □g Axiom 2
(2) ◇~g --> □◇~g Becker's postulate 2
(3) □g V □~g Law of excluded middle
(4) □g V □◇~g Substitution rule (2,3)
(5) ~□g --> ~g law of contrapositive (1)
(6) ◇~g --> ~g by * (5)
(7) □(◇~g --> ~g) necessitation postulate (6)
(8) □◇~g --> □~g modal modus ponens (7)
(9) □g V □~g substitution (4,8)
(10) ◇g --> ~□~g by **
(11) ◇g Axiom 1
(12) ~□~g modus ponens (10,11)
(13) □g Law of detachment (9,12)
The argument is clearly a valid argument, whether it's a sound valid argument I leave to others to debate on the Axioms above.
Godel's Ontological Argument is worth looking in to.
An attempt at Godel's ontological proof.
Pos(F) states property F is positive
Axiom 1 : Pos(F) --> □Pos(F)
Axiom 2: Pos(F) --> ~Pos(~F)
It's clear that Axiom 2 states if F is a positive property, then it's negation is not positive.
Axiom 3: Pos(F) --> [(F --> H) --> Pos(H)]
Axiom 3 just states that positive properties imply other positive properties.
def: A property F is said to be consist if ◇(∃x)Fx is true and if property F is inconsistent then F --> ~F.
Theorem 1: Pos(F) --> ◇(∃x)Fx
Proof:
Let Pos(F) be true and suppose F is inconsistent, then F --> ~F and by
Axiom 3 Pos(F) --> [(F --> ~F) --> Pos(~F)] --> Pos(~F) is true --> ~Pos(~F) is false
which contradicts Axiom 2. Therefore, the assumption is false and the assertion
Pos(F) --> ◇(∃x)Fx is true.
Here we define what it means to be Godlike.
Let Gx stand for x is Godlike.
def 1:
Gx = df(F)[□Fx Pos(F)] is a tautology. I.E; The two statements are equivalent.
This states that every essential property of a godlike individual x is a positive property and every positive property of x is an essential property.
Note: This definition does not imply that a godlike individual has all positive properties.
It states that a godlike individual has those positive properties which are essential properties.
F ess x reads "F is an essence of x."
Next we define what it means for a property F to be a essence of an individual x.
def 2:
F ess x = df(H)[□Hx (F --> H)] is a tautology.
Next we define what it means for an individual x to exist necessarily.
Let NE(x) read "x necessarily exists".
def 3: NE(x) = df(F)[F ess x --> □(∃y)Fy].
Axiom 4: Pos(G).
Axiom 5: Pos(NE).
Corollary 1 : ◇(∃x)Gx
Proof:
By Axiom 4 Pos(G) and by Theorem 1 Pos(G) --> ◇(∃x)Gx
QED.
Theorem 2: Gx --> G Ess x.
Proof:
Assume Gx is true and let □Hx.
To show: □y(Gy --> Hy)
By (def 1 and Axiom 1) □Hx --> Pos(H) --> □Pos(H).
Referring to the Note above by def 1 we have: □[Pos(H) --> (y)(Gy --> Hy)]
and by modul modus ponens □Pos(H) --> □(y)(Gy --> Hy).
Now let Gx be true and G --> H.
Show □H.
By (Axiom 4) Pos(G) and by (Axiom 3) and (def 1) we have :
Pos(G) --> [G --> H) --> Pos(H)] --> □H.
Therefore Gx --> G Ess x.
Prove: □(∃x)Gx.
Prior to proving the above statement we need two theorems in modal logic.
Theorem A* : □(p --> q) --> [◇p --> ◇q].
Theorem A** : ◇□p --> □p.
Proof of □(∃x)Gx.
If Gx where true, then by (def 1) □Pos(G) and by (Axiom 4) Pos(NE) --> NE(x) is true and
by (Theorem 2) G ess x is true --> [(∃x)Gx --> □(∃x)Gx].
By necessitation axiom above □[(∃y)Fy --> □(∃y)Fy] and Theorem A* -->
◇(∃x)Gx --> ◇□(∃x)Gx and by Corollary 1 ◇(∃x)Gx which by A** --> □(∃x)Gx.
QED
Using an ordinary MacBook computer, Godel's proof was shown to be correct, at least on a mathematical level, using a higher modal logic.
I find it amazing that Godel's argument can be proven automatically in a few seconds or even less on a standard notebook.
The equations all add up.
If there are other things that use similar logic it may be possible to develop computer systems to check each single step of a proof to make certain they are correct.
@@Dan_1348 but that does not entail a 'cumulative case'. If you have a 100 poor arguments, that are all unlikely.. it may be likely at least one of them is true.
it should never raise your confidence in the whole thruth.
if it is 75% likely jesus was born of a virgin + 75%likely her raised from the dead.. if may be likely 'at least one is correct' .. but you need both to make the believe reasonable. unless you demonstrate a link between both. for example: if you have demonstated a god exists, who can do this.
without that link, you cannot increase the whole likelyhood.
I don't get conceivability implies possibility. It's conceivable to me that 3143 * 4087 equals 12845443 but when I then do the calculation it just isn't the case. Feels like the possibility of something just isn't reliant on our imagination or lack of imagination at all.
You get the notion of conceivability wrong , at least as term was used in the modern period, starting with Descartes and employed in the relevant way in the various fromulations of the ontological argument. 'Conceive' here doesn't just mean entertain an idea whatsoever , but it means rather to posit a distinct and clear idea. You can 'imagine' only in a more general sense, for ex., an euclidean triangle having the sums of its internal angles different from 180°, or that 3143 * 4087 equals 12845443, but you can't conceive it in the narrower techincal sense that philosophers use it for ground possibilities. You can't conceive any other solution of the sum 2+2 different from 4, even though you can mistakenly entartain the idea that sum make 6 or 4 : consistency is the necessary condition for conception.
@@dekab6133 But then, can anyone can conceive of God in Gods full glory? Seems like most theist say that we cannot know the mind of God and that we can only speak analogicaly about him.
@@Oskar1000 This was indeed a central concern about the argument, and something similar was present in the early Gaunilo's objection. However, typically the defender of the ontological proof argues that while we can''t understand or imagine the nature of God, we can conceive it by the means of pure intellection, giving us the possiblity to have an adeguate idea of it without fully understand it (they are ready to grant indeed that such idea can only be conceived beyond our possibility to comprehend it). This is also the broader problem of how can we speak meaningly about God, a problem central in kataphatic and apophatic theology.
Btw, this kind of defence is ,of course ,controversial: most famously, Kant argues that we can't have nothing more than a nominal definition of an ens realissimum, and our mere undestanding of the meaning of the expression of 'uncondititioned existence' doesn't give us any knowledge about it, precluding the demonstration of the real possibility of such thing, being beyond the power of our reason.
@@dekab6133 Thanks for the explication. I think I agree with you. Have a wonderful Sunday
What is the positive OA argument?
So, when Ben talks about the “ideal agnostic”, I don’t think of that necessarily as a fence-sitting position. I see that more so as someone who doesn’t believe it’s even possible to know one way or the other whether any God/gods exist(s). I consider myself an agnostic atheist for this very reason. I don’t believe any God/gods exist(s), but if I’m being intellectually honest with myself, I can’t say that I KNOW that no God/gods exist(s).
Alot of this hinges on the definition (and understanding of the definition) of God.
Do you know the definition of God?
If an atheist agrees that it is possible that God exists but equally agrees it is possible God doesn't exit in any possible world, shouldn't the positive claim take hold and should be accepted, Because to claim both, seems absurd and existence is maximally better than non existence? Or am i missing something?
The point is that it is not possible to hold those two propositions.
The OA shows that if it is possible that God exists, then God must exist. The atheist must not merely affirm that it is possible for God to exist and happens to not exist in the actual world, they must affirm that it is impossible for God to exist at all.
Similarly, the ROA shows that the theist must affirm that it is impossible for God to not exist, not that it is possible that God doesn't exist and happens to exist in the actual world.
Ascribing possibility to something can work in reverse: why would this thing not be possible? Well, things are impossible either because they make no sense (entail a contradiction, misuse a term, etc) or because the obtaining of their sufficient conditions make no sense. The rational default is that anything is possible until some reason is given (like the above reasons) why it can't be. Likewise for the possibility of His non-existence, in the absence of it making no sense or its conditions making no sense.
Now, enter the definitional parts of an Ontological Argument, which inform us that God has no required conditions (any state of affairs is sufficient, He is either impossible in the sense of being meaningless or He exists in every possible state of affairs (every possible world)... the other way to be impossible isn't available because He has no required conditions which could fail to obtain or fail to make sense). I think that sort of information is very useful to the agnostic indeed. They might never have thought that, in the absence of meaninglessness, God (like anything else) exists wherever His conditions are met; but He has no required conditions! So He exists come what may, unless you can show the very idea of Him is meaningless.
It seems to me that you can run the same argument for any entity whose "existence has no conditions" (e.g. an omniscient, omnipotent, necessarily existing, perfectly evil being), and that this puts God in bad company. You should try formulating your argument as a valid argument of modal logic where (as you're probably aware) similar notions have been more rigorously worked out.
@@thepresident2974
"Evil" is like ignorance or powerlessness. So this counter-example does not work (just as it does not work against the more traditional Ontological Arguments you mentioned).
@@Mentat1231 "Evil" may be *like* ignorance or powerlessness (although I find this notion dubious), but it doesn't follow from this that if a being is evil it is thereby not omniscient or not omnipotent. In any case, my argument doesn't rest on any particular counterexample. Unless you want to assert that the only non-meaningless entity whose "existence has no conditions" is God - in which case, you have a bit more arguing to do.
@@Mentat1231 Although I've just pointed out that my argument doesn't rest on any particular counterexample, here's another one: an omniscient, omnipotent, necessarily existing, perfectly good being who just happens not to be God. This is a being whose existence also has no conditions, so unless you can show that the very idea of an omniscient, omnipotent, necessarily existing, perfectly good being who isn't God is meaningless, by your lights this being also exists come what may.
@@thepresident2974
To your second point:
Saying there is an omnipotent, omniscient, necessary, and perfectly good being that just happens to not be God is like saying there is a molecule with only two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom that just happens to not be a water molecule.
To the first point, about an evil being: The reason that omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness, etc. are even related to the "having no conditions" is because some finite amount of power, knowledge, goodness, etc., would be an arbitrary limit requiring some sort of explanation (why that much and not more or less?). To be evil is to be a moral being that falls short to some degree from perfect goodness. It is like lacking knowledge or lacking power. Such arbitrary limits would need explanation. To be completely without a moral dimension at all would contradict its being omniscient. So, your proposal doesn't work either way.
I really liked Oppy’s point that the argument could equally go the opposite way- a reverse ontological argument.
It seems to me that if one thinks that there is a possible world of nothingness, then one should disbelieve that there are any necessary beings. So the premise “If God exists, then God necessarily exists” is false. Instead of rejecting the existence of God, one could take out the idea of necessary existence from the definition of God. Otherwise, it would feel cheap to deny the existence of God by the requirement for logical necessity.
So I think that the ontological argument should “play zero role” in determining one’s belief (contrary to Arbour’s statement) if they have come to believe that no necessary beings exist.
Seemed like Arbour’s “cumulative case” for theism at 1:18:18 does little/nothing for the ontological argument because from what I understand, those a posteriori arguments do not argue for a *logically* necessary being (except the argument from numbers, haven’t heard that one), but rather mostly with causality/inductive inference. Oppy replies that those arguments are a posteriori are just about the evidence in the actual world, not for a possible world (maybe =/= possibly)
Arbour and Oppy should have further discussed whether necessary existence really does add any greatness to God
If a world of nothingness is possible how would that disprove the premise that "If God exists, then God necessarily exists", both can be simultaneously be true
@@ryanmayfield6231 I agree that "A world of nothingness is possible" and "God exists" are contradictory but "if God exists he necessarily exists" and "A world of nothingness is possible" are completely compatible.
There actually is a world of completely total and entire nothingness. That’s why it doesn’t even exist, because it is the least good possible world, so good that lacks every possible perfection (including existence). I suppose one can have any number of issues with the ontological argument, but I think this one doesn’t work
@@lukelombardi1059 The old "an *existent* being is greater than a non-existent being" argument is an absurdity, nothing more than an attempt to define God into existence. By that logic I could simply grant existence as a property of anything and have exactly as much justification for them. Ylem is by definition the *existent* necessary origin of all things, including any and all existent gods. Now we're in conflict because we both have equal claim to mutually exclusive entities, both of which exist *by definition.* If it works for God it works for Ylem, right?
And that's why it's absurd to treat existence as a property, or to attempt to append it to the definition of an entity. Whether or not a thing exists is independent of the definition you give that thing. Defining "nothing" as lacking existence fails at the gate. Especially when you simultaneously claim that it does and doesn't exist... that's utterly incoherent.
These word games are should not be convincing to anyone.
@@TheMonk72 what you call Ylem is then quite simply by definition the same as God, the same reality referred to by different words. You can say it’s an attempt to define God into existence- I could say the same of you, that you are attempting to define God into non-existence, which doesn’t get us anywhere in reference to the actual cogency of the argument. The very point of the argument, however, is that the application of it simply does not allow for a broad an unwieldy use to prove the existence of any Thor or Zeus you like. For example, that greater than which nothing can be conceived, must exist, for that which is conceived of existing in thought is greater than that which is not conceived of existing in thought, must be the source of all that is not itself, being the source of all perfections, is one, not having its being divided into separate units which could otherwise be combined to make it greater, for nothing greater than it can be conceived, and so forth. In a similar way you could proceed to derive the various traditional divine attributes. It doesn’t refute the argument to simply say that you could use the argument to prove the existence of other gods, which in reality end up being other names for the very same thing to which I am referring
It seems to me that the purpose of the Ontological Arguments is to raise the price tag on atheism; and I think it does that successfully. The reverse Ontological Argument likewise raises the bar for theism, but not in a way that any theist minds. It's a cost they are quite willing, and even happy to pay; whereas the reasonable atheist should think really hard about whether they want to pay the price of the Ontological Argument.
Only if you conflate "metaphysical/logical possibility" with conceivability.
As an atheist I feel no extra force saying that I don't know if God could possibly (as in metaphysical or logical possibility) exist.
I would feel the force if was forced to say that he couldn't conceivably exist but that's not the proposition. Even then I can't conceive of the entirety of God so I could at most conceive of something vaguely God like.
Even theists say that they can't describe God and that he is beyond explanation and so on, so how am I suppose to draw a conclusion that he could possibly exists.
@@Oskar1000
Not "conceivability", but meaningfulness. Metaphysical or logical impossibility means the existence of the thing is, in some sense, meaningless (either because of straightforward contradiction, or because of a conceptual incoherence, when fully analyzed... [Edit addition] this is true even in "powers" approaches to alethic modality, which I strongly endorse, and any other non-Lewisean view). Do you not think the price tag for calling God impossible is higher than for simply saying He happens not to exist?
@@Mentat1231 I haven't seen any full analysis of God and I don't think humans could comprehend all the entailments even if it was done. So to say that it is logically possible that it would exists seems premature. Even then, metaphysical seems even harder to clear up.
On the other hand, it feels like I can describe a universe which has no contradictions and also has no God quite easily. It's just a single point, existing eternally and never changing. What's the contradiction there? It's basically one proposition and one supersimple ontological entity. Seems logical to me.
@@Oskar1000
If God is defined in terms of the great-making properties or goods, which we know to be coherent from our experience (things like power, knowledge, moral goodness, and freedom) + being a causal agent (which is, again, fundamental in our conceptual scheme and as familiar to us as anything is), then granting mere possibility seems quite easy. On the other hand, to claim that God is impossible seems like it would bear the burden of *showing* the incoherent entailment. That's what I mean by a much "higher price tag".
As for the reverse ontological argument, as I said in my original post, the theist is ok with the price tag of having to say that God could not have failed to exist. We often have separate arguments for that position anyway (for example, when you talk about the Universe existing eternally and unchangingly as a "single point", you have the problem that it actually *did* change about 14 billion years ago, which points to its being contingent and requiring an explanation that could not have failed to be). Moreover, the very concept of God fits quite comfortably with necessary existence (He doesn't have any of the limitations or requirements that point to contingency).
I should add that it's not as though atheists haven't historically tried to show incoherent entailments in the concept of God, such that He actually would be impossible. It's just that these have all failed; which is itself evidence of His possibility.
@@Mentat1231 So my point universe has nothing to do with the actual universe. I just postulated a possible universe. So in that universe it just wouldn't explode. Sorry for the confusion.
To me there is definitely a worry that we are throwing a bunch of coherent things into a big concept and that there is something contradictory that arises at some point. I am not claiming the truth of the reverse ontological argument, just that they way equally heavy for me. So someone has a burden to show possibility or impossibility but surely I do not have a burden to solve this problem. It feels like being presented with Google's entire codebase and being asked if there is a bug somewhere.
And then all of these properties of God may also be analogical so I am not even analysing the correct thing really.
Is brute dependent upon will power?
The existence of God can be demonstrated. But the human mind is capable of coming up with, and getting itself to believe, all sorts of bizarre things. So it is hardly surprising that some people have also denied the existence of God.
I hope you see the irony in your comment one day.
1:22:00 - The ontological argument plays no role for me either way. Maybe I just don't get it.
I imagine a possible world made entirely of green jello. The laws of physics are different so it just stays jello. I imagine God could maybe exist in that world. OK, so what? How does that mean a god must also exist in a real world?
It's an attempt to smuggle in God via the concept of necessity. If a necessary being exists then it exists in a single world then by definition it exists in all possible worlds, including the actual world. Oppy headed this off right near the start by pointing out that there's an unsatisfied conditional there: *if* a necessary being exists. The argument can't be used to establish the existence of God, only make hypothetical statements about God's properties in the case that it does exist. It certainly doesn't settle the question of God's existence.
In order to say something is possible don't you have to know that it's possible? Same goes for impossible.
Anything is possible in a different world ,even a unicorn .the only thing thats not possible is a squared circle or logics impossibilities
@@ahaan-thakker9142 Why do you think anything besides logical contradictions is possible?
Mike Westbrook I describe what you're saying as pragmaticly possible, in order to be pragmaticly possible all of the objects particulars must have a verified parallel or precedent.
@@howlong1248 Is there a difference between possible and pragmatically possible?
Arbour says a lot, but he never actually demonstrates the soundness of the premise. His entire spiel about "greatest possible" is nothing more than defining God into existence. It's simply another undemonstrated claim, nothing more.
Oppy didn't state it explicitly but there exists a possible world in which the greatest possible being is contingent, therefore it is necessarily true that there is no God.
Or to put it more simply, ontological arguments prove absolutely nothing.
the OA can't really build on all the other arguments (Kalam, moral, ..). None of the other arguments argue for a 'maximally great being that exists in all possible worlds'.
When they lead someone to say 'maybe god exists'.. they say 'there is a possible world where the universe is greated by a god; but i maybe that isn't case.'
They do argue that there does exist a necessary being which is God. So they do argue that a necessary being like God exists. So therefore there are reason to think the maximally great being possibly exist
@Oners82 They try to establish that God (which is necessary) exists in at least some possible world, because, from that it follows God exists in all possible worlds, including the actual (since the actual is possible and from S5 + necessity).
@Oners82 I never said you should, I was just explaining how you were wrong.
@Oners82 lol, no. Necessity is not that which is trying to be established, possible existence is that to be established. Graham Oppy agrees God is necessary, he just doesn't think he is possible. Please go read some actual academic writing on this before making these huge errors.
@Oners82 Yes, they try to establish that a necessary being actually exists, and they do that by establishing that a necessary being possibly exists. Just saying that something is necessary is not smuggling it in. This isn't an issue for anyone who understands the argument. Have you read what Plantinga himself says about the argument?
I gave up after an hour and a quarter of discussing what a theist/atheist and agnostic is. A complete waste of time and somewhat nonsensical as agreed by the participants when contradicting themselves over their various starting points.
They spoke quite briefly about that roughly half the way through. No idea what you're complaining about.
Yes and using this argument you can insert anything you want and prove it exists. You are getting more and more desperate.
I ask you to stop making it about God, and make it about the Protestant heretics who worship the sun god and call him "Jesus"
I think you may be confusing it with Anselm's ontological argument. The modal ontological argument can't be used that way
@@thorobreu I have a leprechaun at the bottom of my garden and he is a maximally great leprechaun so it is possible that he exists now I imagine some possible book that says the leprechaun exists and is maximally great which includes being necessary. If all possible books must agree what is necessary then every possible book contains the claim that the leprechaun exists and since the actual book is also a possible book It says so to.
@@truthgiver8286What a nerd!🤦♂️😅 Crawl back to your mommy's basement, American pagaп🤣
@@truthgiver8286 I'm not sure what all these books are about, but I think you're just trying to run the modal ontological argument for this leprechaun. And if that's true, then I agree you can. You can establish that if it's possible that a maximally great leprechaun exists, then he does actually exist.
Ben is so not to the point. Please let's not get to the point.
47 minutes in and Ben still wants a few minutes to clarify things before we get to the disagreement
Thirty-eight minutes in; never heard so much twaddle. Will continue. Not optimistic.
@@TheWorldTeacher I didn't say I didn't understand it, I said it was twaddle. And you may need above-average intelligence or you may not - the same could be said for almost any academic field. But what you definitely need is a background in the subject, and that's just learning the language and the rules of the game.
As an atheist and former Christian, I can’t see why these arguments are persuasive. They simply insert god. “Hey look at this table....god”
What is absolute nothingness and why do you think it is possible?
you guys really need to stop using technical philoso-speak no one will understand anything you're saying. listen to how alex malpas does it instead of showing off.
Most of the technicalities here are irrelevant to their discussion. But, since both Arbour and Oppy are professional philosophers, they need to see whether they are on the same page regarding some technical issues like other systems of modal logic, accessibility relation and stuff like that. This is somehow due to the nature of the topic because you cannot rigorously discuss ontological argument without saying something about the system of logic underlying it and this discussion was definitely rigorous.