One of the things I find interesting about Aquinas’ rejection of Anselm’s argument is that he explicitly did _not_ reject, as many today often do, its soundness. Specifically, Aquinas did not find the argument to be circular. I’ve been running Anselm’s argument around in my head for years, and while I cannot find a _petitio principii_ neither can I definitively assert there isn’t one. Aquinas’ response strongly inclines me to reject the circularity criticism. Note: this does not mean none of the formulations of Anselm’s argument is circular; but that whatever _petitio principii_ those formulations commit is the fault of the formulation, not the argument itself.
Aquinas certainly DID think Anselm's ontological argument was circular/question-begging! "...Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist."~Aquinas
they are using some philosophical/logic terms and concepts that are covered in Aristotle's Organon...it would be tough to follow if you haven't studied the text.
The fullness of God in terms of attributes may not be self-evident to a creature, by definition as a creature. But God is indeed self-evident in the sense of natural theology, for God is existence in and of Himself. Were existence not evident, then God would not be self-evident to us. But, of course that is not the case. It is incoherent to posit existence in and of itself to 'not be'.
The logic behind the ontological argument is nothing other than the Principle of Identity. Rejection of it is rejection of Identity applying to reality. Its the most certain rational thing conceivable and its rejection is that than which none more irrational can be conceived.
Same with transgenderism vs transsexualism. It is not self evident what gender (inner) a person is from his or her inner life. His or her sex is self evident, externally. So I don't have to call people by what they want me to. 🙂
Aquinas did not object to Anselm's argument so much he clarified it. Moses' revelation at Mt. Horeb is our first real introduction to an argument from ontology: "I appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, as God Almighty, but by My name LORD I was not known to them" (Exodus 6). The capitalized form of "LORD" indicates the traditional translation in English of the ineffable Mosaic Hebrew theonym יהוה from the root verb "hayah" meaning "to be." That is, the Patriarchs understood God, like Anselm, as the maximally great being, "The Almighty", but Moses understood God as existence in and of itself or as Aquinas later writes, i.e. ipsum esse subsistens. Both Moses and the Patriarchs were correct, but Moses was more insightful, for Moses' view encompasses the Patriarchs' view.
To be fair, I'm not sure this proves how "intellectually honest" Aquinas was or anyone else for that matter who would reject an argument. Disclaimer, I think highly of Aquinas and think he was about as honest as a person could be but would still have biases toward certain things. I am someone who thinks the ontological argument works and is sound. I think a lot of Christian philosophers reject it on account of the fact that it solves the whole problem too easily or makes this whole philosophy of religion thing too simple. Its simplicity almost ironically undermines the philosophical discipline as a whole (and I say this as a lover of philosophy) by showing maybe it's not that hard to show God exists after all. They have built their livelihood on these arguments being so complex and intricate that this one just seems too good to be true and threatens to, (I think in their mind), undermine their entire endeavor of arguing for God's existence. However, I don't even think that is true, because not all arguments work for everyone so I think they could accept this and still pursue other avenues of argumentation. Was this a bit of phycological speculation on my part? Of course! But to think imperfect people have perfect motives would be naive and I truly think in this case some philosophers reject it because it's not "cool" enough (aka esoteric enough).
I think that's an unwarrantedly strong statement which paints too broad a brush negatively on the philosophical enterprise as a whole without a good reason. I think Anselm's argument actually perhaps may be valid and sound, but it is very, very difficult to conclude that and the premises need to be thought through very carefully. I don't think, for instance, Aquinas's proofs are at all 'esoteric', they are remarkably clear when you get down to them.
@@cabrerascorner hmm, I thought my comment was clear that I was not broadly undermining the philosophical enterprise as a whole as a I gave many qualifications. What I was intending to say is that it isn’t clear to me how we get from “Aquinas rejected a theistic argument”, to, therefore “Aquinas must have done it out of intellectual integrity”. That’s not clear to me at all and I was merely pointing out why many philosophers might want to reject the ontological argument and other biases may prove to be the reason for it. The only option is not intellectual integrity.
Aquinas allowed that it does work, _if_ one accepts the premise that God’s essence/existence is self-evident to all. But Aquinas held that while God’s essence/existence is self-evident _per se,_ and while it may be self-evident to the wise, it is _not_ self-evident to all.
I think traditional ontological arguments are a little weak. Ontological arguments based on modal logic (and not in conceivability) are strong because of the modal way of existence of the word God, and that from S5 flows naturally that if it's possible that God exists, then God exists in all possible worlds (including ours).
*”if it’s possible that God exists, then God exists in all possible worlds”* To be more precise, if it’s possible for a necessarily existent being to exist in any possible world, then it exists in every possible world, including the actual world. My hesitancy with Plantinga’s argument rests here: Plantinga’s modal argument rests on possible worlds mechanics. But this is, at the very least, to take the long way round to the conclusion. The very definition of “necessarily exists” _is_ “exists in every possible world”. To put it another way, there is no possible world that lacks a necessarily existent ground. To say “possible world” is to say “necessarily existent ground”. Which is to say the assertion “a necessary being exists in some possible world” is tautological.
@@nathanaelculver5308 idk, some theists (like Ed Feser, who defends an aristotelic-thomist metaphysical background) rejects the modal understanding of possible worlds. He rejects the plantinga's version of the ontological argument.
@@simonocampo Actually, my analysis is heavily influenced by Feser. I don’t see Feser, at least in the discussion of Plantinga, as rejecting possible world mechanics _per se;_ only that he argues resting an argument for God on possible world grammar is putting the cart before the horse. Feser points out that Aquinas did not reject the possibility of any successful ontological argument, and has briefly outlined a sketch of a possible Thomistic ontological argument.
@@nathanaelculver5308 I really like Feser's work, specially on philosophy of religion. I don't know what to think about his position regarding the modal ontological argument. I think it's a sound argument, but I'm open to reconsider the philosophical background used in that kind of arguments.
@@simonocampo I’m not comfortable saying the MOA is either unsound or invalid. Hence my wording above: I lean toward the argument taking too many steps to arrive at the conclusion. It seems more efficient to argue directly that necessary existence entails existence in “all possible worlds” (i.e., arguing _from_ necessarily existent _to_ “all possible worlds” rather than the converse; this, I believe, is Feser’s criticism), or even to point out that the very concept of a “possible world” necessarily entails a necessary ground. But then that simply reduces the MOA to a cosmological argument.
I'm puzzled from the get go, because the definition of God that's given for the ontological argument makes God out to be something or someone of our own conception. What we think or believe about God is irrelevant when it comes to who He actually is. He's not God because we've conceived Him to be! In Christ, Andrew
He is greater than human beings can think because He transcends our limited intellectual capacities on earth. The ontological argument says we know He exists (not that we make Him exist), because we cannot say that that than which nothing greater can be thought can also be thought to not exist because the property of existing is within the actual definition. But that is the subject of a ton of arguments.
@@OniLeafNin Can you restate the ontological in a different way? I'm honestly still not getting it. And I'm being sincere, not intentionally difficult. Thank you and God bless! In Christ, Andrew
@@Ezekiel336-16 The Ontological argument reduces the non-existence of God to a logical contradiction. The point of the argument is to get the person to admit that God not existing would be akin to the concept of a square-circle. If you start with the idea of God as Anselm defines it, "That than which nothing greater can be thought" It follows from that definition that objective existence would be part of the definition of that which nothing greater can be thought. Because *If that than which nothing greater can be thought does not have objective existence then it would not be that than which nothing greater can be thought.* Therefore in the opinion of Anselm and many, it must be the case, that that which nothing greater can be thought would have objective existence, since logical contradictions are not possible, the opposite must be true. Its debated quite a lot, however.
That's a caricature, I'd humbly submit. For one, God is referred to as "THAT than which...[ ]". It is a verbal formulation that points outward, using our concepts as a springboard. God does not exist because of our concept, we have our concept because God exists. Ultimately, St. Anselm concludes that his formulation entails that God is greater. People often confuse Anselm's argument because they don't see the Proslogion as a unified argument, or they don't get the background metaphysics. Aquinas had a legitimate objection, but it boils down to a perennial standoff in epistemology between Platonist and Aristotelian epistemology--not something we can say is "refuted" or fallacious.
@@Ezekiel336-16 Of course Anselm would agree that God is independent of our conceptions of him. He’s simply asserting that we _do_ have conceptions of God, and specifically comparing two of those: the conception of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived existing only in the intellect, and the conception of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived existing also in reality. He finds that any attempt to conceive that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived as existing in the intellect alone is self-contradictory, leaving by disjunct (either A or B; not A, therefore B) a conception of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived existing in reality as the only rational conception.
St. Augustine once said, “Faith is to believe what you do not see. The reward of faith is to see what you believe.”
In my teaching on Anselm and Aquinas, I will show this conversation! THANK YOU 🙏
Always a class act, Dr. Kreeft, but w/o air...love this man
Do you mean without hair?
Aquinas to this day has a very sharp wit to his writing, somewhat dry but very hard to argue against.
One of the things I find interesting about Aquinas’ rejection of Anselm’s argument is that he explicitly did _not_ reject, as many today often do, its soundness. Specifically, Aquinas did not find the argument to be circular. I’ve been running Anselm’s argument around in my head for years, and while I cannot find a _petitio principii_ neither can I definitively assert there isn’t one.
Aquinas’ response strongly inclines me to reject the circularity criticism.
Note: this does not mean none of the formulations of Anselm’s argument is circular; but that whatever _petitio principii_ those formulations commit is the fault of the formulation, not the argument itself.
Aquinas certainly DID think Anselm's ontological argument was circular/question-begging! "...Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist."~Aquinas
I had a hard time keeping up, and they were even speaking in very general terms. I guess I'm not exactly great at philosophy lol
they are using some philosophical/logic terms and concepts that are covered in Aristotle's Organon...it would be tough to follow if you haven't studied the text.
Watch it again and pause often. I'm not knowledgeable about this but I took my time with it and understood ok. Not fully though
The fullness of God in terms of attributes may not be self-evident to a creature, by definition as a creature. But God is indeed self-evident in the sense of natural theology, for God is existence in and of Himself. Were existence not evident, then God would not be self-evident to us. But, of course that is not the case. It is incoherent to posit existence in and of itself to 'not be'.
Peter Kreeft sounds like Owlman in Crisis of Infinite Earths Justice League movie...
The logic behind the ontological argument is nothing other than the Principle of Identity. Rejection of it is rejection of Identity applying to reality.
Its the most certain rational thing conceivable and its rejection is that than which none more irrational can be conceived.
I find the OA very intriguing, but it hinges on at least rationalism and that things are objectively greater than other things.
Same with transgenderism vs transsexualism. It is not self evident what gender (inner) a person is from his or her inner life. His or her sex is self evident, externally. So I don't have to call people by what they want me to. 🙂
Aquinas did not object to Anselm's argument so much he clarified it.
Moses' revelation at Mt. Horeb is our first real introduction to an argument from ontology: "I appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, as God Almighty, but by My name LORD I was not known to them" (Exodus 6). The capitalized form of "LORD" indicates the traditional translation in English of the ineffable Mosaic Hebrew theonym יהוה from the root verb "hayah" meaning "to be."
That is, the Patriarchs understood God, like Anselm, as the maximally great being, "The Almighty", but Moses understood God as existence in and of itself or as Aquinas later writes, i.e. ipsum esse subsistens.
Both Moses and the Patriarchs were correct, but Moses was more insightful, for Moses' view encompasses the Patriarchs' view.
Anselm was right on this one
To be fair, I'm not sure this proves how "intellectually honest" Aquinas was or anyone else for that matter who would reject an argument. Disclaimer, I think highly of Aquinas and think he was about as honest as a person could be but would still have biases toward certain things. I am someone who thinks the ontological argument works and is sound. I think a lot of Christian philosophers reject it on account of the fact that it solves the whole problem too easily or makes this whole philosophy of religion thing too simple. Its simplicity almost ironically undermines the philosophical discipline as a whole (and I say this as a lover of philosophy) by showing maybe it's not that hard to show God exists after all. They have built their livelihood on these arguments being so complex and intricate that this one just seems too good to be true and threatens to, (I think in their mind), undermine their entire endeavor of arguing for God's existence. However, I don't even think that is true, because not all arguments work for everyone so I think they could accept this and still pursue other avenues of argumentation. Was this a bit of phycological speculation on my part? Of course! But to think imperfect people have perfect motives would be naive and I truly think in this case some philosophers reject it because it's not "cool" enough (aka esoteric enough).
This was very helpful, thank you.
I think that's an unwarrantedly strong statement which paints too broad a brush negatively on the philosophical enterprise as a whole without a good reason. I think Anselm's argument actually perhaps may be valid and sound, but it is very, very difficult to conclude that and the premises need to be thought through very carefully. I don't think, for instance, Aquinas's proofs are at all 'esoteric', they are remarkably clear when you get down to them.
@@cabrerascorner hmm, I thought my comment was clear that I was not broadly undermining the philosophical enterprise as a whole as a I gave many qualifications. What I was intending to say is that it isn’t clear to me how we get from “Aquinas rejected a theistic argument”, to, therefore “Aquinas must have done it out of intellectual integrity”. That’s not clear to me at all and I was merely pointing out why many philosophers might want to reject the ontological argument and other biases may prove to be the reason for it. The only option is not intellectual integrity.
ahhhh, Anselm. This is ultimately not provable nor disprovable. St. Edith Stein has interesting things to say on this one
OW! MY HEAD!
But ultimately the argument does "work". Gotta disagree with Aquinas.
Aquinas allowed that it does work, _if_ one accepts the premise that God’s essence/existence is self-evident to all. But Aquinas held that while God’s essence/existence is self-evident _per se,_ and while it may be self-evident to the wise, it is _not_ self-evident to all.
The whole essence of religion: i don't understand something, therefore God.
Algorithm
I think traditional ontological arguments are a little weak. Ontological arguments based on modal logic (and not in conceivability) are strong because of the modal way of existence of the word God, and that from S5 flows naturally that if it's possible that God exists, then God exists in all possible worlds (including ours).
*”if it’s possible that God exists, then God exists in all possible worlds”*
To be more precise, if it’s possible for a necessarily existent being to exist in any possible world, then it exists in every possible world, including the actual world.
My hesitancy with Plantinga’s argument rests here: Plantinga’s modal argument rests on possible worlds mechanics. But this is, at the very least, to take the long way round to the conclusion. The very definition of “necessarily exists” _is_ “exists in every possible world”. To put it another way, there is no possible world that lacks a necessarily existent ground. To say “possible world” is to say “necessarily existent ground”.
Which is to say the assertion “a necessary being exists in some possible world” is tautological.
@@nathanaelculver5308 idk, some theists (like Ed Feser, who defends an aristotelic-thomist metaphysical background) rejects the modal understanding of possible worlds. He rejects the plantinga's version of the ontological argument.
@@simonocampo Actually, my analysis is heavily influenced by Feser. I don’t see Feser, at least in the discussion of Plantinga, as rejecting possible world mechanics _per se;_ only that he argues resting an argument for God on possible world grammar is putting the cart before the horse.
Feser points out that Aquinas did not reject the possibility of any successful ontological argument, and has briefly outlined a sketch of a possible Thomistic ontological argument.
@@nathanaelculver5308 I really like Feser's work, specially on philosophy of religion. I don't know what to think about his position regarding the modal ontological argument. I think it's a sound argument, but I'm open to reconsider the philosophical background used in that kind of arguments.
@@simonocampo I’m not comfortable saying the MOA is either unsound or invalid. Hence my wording above: I lean toward the argument taking too many steps to arrive at the conclusion. It seems more efficient to argue directly that necessary existence entails existence in “all possible worlds” (i.e., arguing _from_ necessarily existent _to_ “all possible worlds” rather than the converse; this, I believe, is Feser’s criticism), or even to point out that the very concept of a “possible world” necessarily entails a necessary ground. But then that simply reduces the MOA to a cosmological argument.
I'm puzzled from the get go, because the definition of God that's given for the ontological argument makes God out to be something or someone of our own conception. What we think or believe about God is irrelevant when it comes to who He actually is. He's not God because we've conceived Him to be!
In Christ,
Andrew
He is greater than human beings can think because He transcends our limited intellectual capacities on earth. The ontological argument says we know He exists (not that we make Him exist), because we cannot say that that than which nothing greater can be thought can also be thought to not exist because the property of existing is within the actual definition. But that is the subject of a ton of arguments.
@@OniLeafNin Can you restate the ontological in a different way? I'm honestly still not getting it. And I'm being sincere, not intentionally difficult. Thank you and God bless!
In Christ,
Andrew
@@Ezekiel336-16 The Ontological argument reduces the non-existence of God to a logical contradiction.
The point of the argument is to get the person to admit that God not existing would be akin to the concept of a square-circle.
If you start with the idea of God as Anselm defines it, "That than which nothing greater can be thought"
It follows from that definition that objective existence would be part of the definition of that which nothing greater can be thought.
Because *If that than which nothing greater can be thought does not have objective existence then it would not be that than which nothing greater can be thought.*
Therefore in the opinion of Anselm and many, it must be the case, that that which nothing greater can be thought would have objective existence, since logical contradictions are not possible, the opposite must be true.
Its debated quite a lot, however.
That's a caricature, I'd humbly submit. For one, God is referred to as "THAT than which...[ ]". It is a verbal formulation that points outward, using our concepts as a springboard. God does not exist because of our concept, we have our concept because God exists. Ultimately, St. Anselm concludes that his formulation entails that God is greater. People often confuse Anselm's argument because they don't see the Proslogion as a unified argument, or they don't get the background metaphysics. Aquinas had a legitimate objection, but it boils down to a perennial standoff in epistemology between Platonist and Aristotelian epistemology--not something we can say is "refuted" or fallacious.
@@Ezekiel336-16 Of course Anselm would agree that God is independent of our conceptions of him. He’s simply asserting that we _do_ have conceptions of God, and specifically comparing two of those: the conception of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived existing only in the intellect, and the conception of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived existing also in reality. He finds that any attempt to conceive that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived as existing in the intellect alone is self-contradictory, leaving by disjunct (either A or B; not A, therefore B) a conception of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived existing in reality as the only rational conception.
Wow......talking pap !!
🐐
🤯I know you believe you understand what you thought I said but I’m not sure you realise that what you heard is not what I meant 🤯 head explodes !😜