You nailed it, at 2:12 ATC called out AAL 1083 to turn left with a heading and field at 10:00, this was clearly meant for AAL2133. AAL 1083 than does a read back stating right turn instead of the instructed left turn and ATC did not pick that up.
Yup, exactly. He had even asked if 1083 had the field in site before clearing 1083 to turn left. I think if 1083 had spoken up when they received a second clearance for the approach, the controller may have released his mistake. Not putting any blame on them, of course, but speaking up in situations like this can save lives
2:18 ATC said the field was at 10 o’clock, for 1083, it was not. That was an opportunity for 1083 to question whether the radio call was really intended for them.
2:13 ATC gives instructions to 1083 that are intended for 2133 2:18 ATC again gives instructions to 1083 that should be for 2133 2:24 ATC fails to recognize that 1083 has clearly said "Right turn" when he instructed a left turn. Good chance to realize something is off with that readback 2:28-2:40 ATC fails to realize that 1083 has turned right and 2133 hasn't turned At least 4 mistakes in short succession. One of the pilot could have recognized it and helped him out, but ultimately this very poor from TRACON.
Another mistake by AA1083 is they confirmed they had the field in sight when it was at their 5 o'clock and behind them rather than their 10 o'clock and just to the left. Should have been another sign the instruction was not meant for them.
@@FactsMattermore controllers would mean the current ones wouldn’t all be working record setting amounts of mandatory overtime. That would be a good start…..
Another thing the controller got wrong (or ASSUMED) at 3:55 was that 9AR had 2133 "in sight"... Based on the timing of 9AR's "traffic in sight" report 2:06 he had been warned about, and located, 5DA *at his 1 o'clock at 3400* -- _the plane ahead of him in sequence!_ -- but no ATC mention of 2133 at 12:30 o'clock, 5500 ft, and converging vectors! 2133 saw 9AR first, but if 9AR ever saw 2133 it was at the last second, NOT from ATC guidance!
ATC incorrectly said turn left for runway for AA1083, it was meant for AA2133 (left turn) then AA1083 answered right turn for runway, correcting him on making right turn. Mistake was AA call sign by ATC TRACON.
When ATC gives me a wrong instruction (they say "right" instead of "left", or more commonly they say a slightly wrong callsign) I'll often do what AA1083 did and interject the correction in my readback: "Okay, understand RIGHT turn to 110..." This is a bad practice because I'm reading back something I didn't hear. In the future I'm going to take the extra step to explicitly ask for clarification "was that for Callsign123?" or "confirm you want a left turn to 110?"
@@toddwolfe The 100% "by the book" method is asking them to say (it) again, without asking anything specific, the theory being that you might "prompt"/confuse/startle them into confirming something they didn't actually mean, and getting them to do it "from scratch" will make them think it through again. Now, if you really have time for that in practice.....
Wow, that was a bit tight. I had a nearly identical situation at SJC once, where approach vectored me and a B757 on a collision course for parallel runways that set off the 757's TCAS, even after I requested an overhead to left traffic to follow the 757 to avoid that situation. Tower told me to maintain visual separation on turn to short final, and then tried to set me up for a violation because the 757 overtook me and landed just as I did, saying I did not maintain visual separation on final after I and the 757 were both cleared to land on Parallel runways.
@@VictoryAviation I didn't file a grievance but had a conference call with an FAA investigator and the tower chief. Radar and ATC recordings showed that as I was turning base to final the Tower told me to maintain Visual sep. from the 757 that was behind me turning base to final, and as I was looking back in my turn, with a strong right crosswind, I drifted about 150ft left of runway centerline. As I recall, the Tower chief said that Visual separation rules in the pattern at SJC were like 2500ft and radar showed my drift put me at about 2,000 ft from the 757, and that was what the tower chief wanted me violated for. I asked the tower chief what the distance from centerline to centerline of the two runways were and I think she said 2,000ft, so I pointed that clearing two aircraft to land as she did, did not maintain visual sep. I also asked the tower chief what FAR that 2500ft pattern separation rule was, and she said it was not an FAR, but some unpublished SJC approach requirement. I then asked the FAA inspector if pilots are expected to know all unique airport traffic regs, if they are not published, and he said Pilots are required to be aware that each airport may have published and unpublished procedures and requirements and should ask if not advised or familiar with them. The FAA inspector asked why I asked for an overhead crosswind and left down to 25L (or whatever the short GA runway was at SJC) rather than Rather than right downwind to 25R, (the long runway for airline traffic) as instructed, and I explained I anticipated a potential conflict and that having me cross from east to west over the airport 500ft above traffic put me on the GA runway away from airline traffic, and avoided me having to wait and taxi across three active runways. The FAA inspector said that made sense and asked the Tower Chief why she did not allow my request and instead controlled two aircraft make head-on turns to final. She said "We do it all the time, it's SOP". The FAA inspector said that it sounded Like I had a better situational awareness and plan then she did, and suggested, she consider making what I requested SOP. I have found that in the past the FAA impetus was to involve all parties, evaluate and learn from mistakes rather than to punish and encourage adversarial concealment and contention. The FAA inspector was as former Airline ATP and Said "We all make mistakes, and no one here sounds like they are incompetent or reckless, we all learned something and will do better from it. And no further action was taken. However from what I hear from friends who still fly for a living and a friend who still works for FAA, Violations and prosecutions are more the norm now.
@@mikemontgomery2654 Some aspects, were a bit "Crazy" in that I suspect the Tower Chief was trying to shift responsibility and accountability to me and my error that resulted from her sketchy and questionable instructions. Nevertheless, anyone who flies is likely to encounter a collision of Regulations, egos and bureaucracy, especially after near or actual collisions of aircraft, and bureaucratic as well as ego emotional situational awareness, and having some sense as how to mitigate or deal with egos and bureaucracy, is another valuable survival skill in aviation.
@@carsonfranThat was him having the preceding Challenger traffic in sight that the controller pointed out previously but the king air said "no joy" to. Once he saw them he identified it in sight. But the Airbus traffic was never pointed out to the king air.
@@carsonfran Controller's words: "your 1 o'clock at 3400"....that's 5DA! 2133 was more 1230-ish and 5500 at the time! 9AR found the craft he was instructed to, and reported accordingly. 2133 vs. 9AR was never mentioned until 3:55, with a "oh, you must have had him in sight all along, right?" sort of assumption....AFTER the near head-on!
Similar sounding call signs, please use caution. This is an excellent primer why shortening call signs with "eighty-three" or "thirty-three" is a shitty way to run comms. The controller meant "twenty-one thirty-three" but said "ten eighty-three" because brain. Probably didn't even realize he said the wrong one. Then, ignored the responding airplane saying "oh no that's a RIGHT turn" which should be a huge unexpected-response red flag.
@@N1120A They may have gotten a yellow dot, but if AA2133 got a TCAS resolution advisory from the King Air, they would have definitely told ATC (it's a required call, and the AA pilot was anxiously awaiting his approach clearance and knew ATC screwed up). That's the only thing that makes me think this wasn't really THAT close of a call. ATC clearly screwed up, but there was no RA.
All the airport has to do is envoys the universal instruction of “do not pass through the extended centreline of the runway”. This ensures that such head to head encounters don’t happen in the event of radio failure or blocked transmission. It works well at one particular airport I’m familiar with. Contacting the tower with their concern was correct, but initiating the left turn would also be a good idea considering the closure rate and proximity involved.
The US airspace seems the only one in the world under such constant stress. I think that the system works through ability and professionalism of ATC and pilots, but the safety margin is paper thin, and dangerous situations can occur very quickly through the slightest of errors.
I think it's because regional airlines are the only viable form of medium-to-long-distance travel in America. High-speed passenger rail is basically nonexistent, and that's exactly what keeps the skies of Europe, China, and Japan relatively uncongested.
"I have that number for you when you're ready" are words a pilot never wants to hear, but at least in this case he's not the one who's potentially in trouble.
Had this happen at AUS a few weeks ago. Controller realized his mistake and basically begged us to not fly through final. I saw the situation unfolding and already had my game plan in play.
Approach is handled by the TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach Control). Some airports are "up/down" facilities, which means that they aren't busy enough to warrant a full separate TRACON facility, and so the same controllers will move "up and down" from the radar facility and the tower on different shifts to handle both duties.
Is it fair to say the issue was American 2133 hearing an instruction for American 1083 and following it, then saying was never cleared? It seems this started the chain of events? The controller never cleared 2133 for the approach, so it's surprising an approach was made
I’ve had ATC turn us left and another airliner on my left, right. The perfect collision vector. Luckily saw what was happening and took evasive action. Metering is from the computer and vectors are from controllers. Experience and thought process are missing
ATC should never have cleared them both to 4000ft. From what I understand at some other airports on a different continent they would always assign potentially conflicting traffic a different altitude and line-up they have to stick to until cleared the approach/established?
For ILS's they need to separate them by 1000' until they are both established on the localizer. For visual approaches this is not a requirement, but it still seems incredibly reckless. Having traffic on opposing bases at the same altitude is just asking for trouble if someone overshoots because a call is missed or misidentified, as in this case.
@@TheWayOfJamesBand It's this last issue, traffic on opposing bases at same altitude - very high risk. During approach is where planes naturally start converging in location and altitude, so then matching altitude adds risk, and now planes really hold altitudes pretty precisely so you are 50 feet +/- of that so a collision becomes more likely if you end up in same position. There are alerts for all this thankfully that are automated with RA's.
I agree that the visual approach clearance was meant for AAL2133, not AAL1083, based on the field position report of 10 o'clock 10 miles, followed by Turn Left 110, cleared for visual approach RW 8. That aligned perfectly with AAL2133's position, not AAL1083's. It's clear that Approach had a brain-fart, which created the conflict incident. Regardless, that situation should have never been allowed to continue, and a supervisor should have intervened. Additionally, the controller should have recognized the developing conflict when both aircraft were nose-to-nose at less than 5 miles, and taken immediate action to deconflict. Likewise, he should have picked up that AAL1083 "corrected" the turn instruction by saying "right turn, 110" when the controller issued a Left Turn, and also saw that 1083 was starting to turn instead of 2133. In the end, it is *always* the responsibility of the pilot to decide whether or not to continue or abort/reject their current clearance if minimum safe separation is lost. Also, TCAS, if it wasn't inhibited by the proximity to the airport, would have issued an avoidance advisory if a collision was eminent; the pilot is *required* to execute the advisory, which overrides any current/previous ATC instruction. Happily, this worked out in the end. The TRACON controller will probably be required to take temporary leave, followed by remedial training, before being put back into active rotation.
TCAS RA is only inhibited at/below 1000FT AGL in the A320 family. TCAS RA (Resolution Advisory) would have worked out fine in this case. It’s unclear if a Traffic advisory was triggered (unlikely), but an RA would have resolved this conflict should they have gotten dangerously close.
@@flame1973 It's the same for Boeing aircraft (1,100' AGL); specifically, it's tied to the Radio Altimiter, and becomes inhibited at and below ~1,000' above terrain.. KPHX is ~1,135' elevation, so TCAS would still have been active in both aircraft (AAL & the small Medivac plane). I'm pretty sure they both received a traffic advisory, but since the Medivac plane was actively turning onto final, I don't think either received a resolution advisory before AAL called in for an immediate turn. Still, it's pretty scarey when you see another aircraft heading straight for you at the same altitude, closing in at over 200 kn combined....
2133 probably should’ve been a little more proactive. Could’ve done a lot to prevent that by being proactive, asking for the clearance etc, when it became apparent things weren’t progressing as expected.
I think he tried at least once. That point where a transmission got blocked due to multiple planes talking at once, I'm pretty sure the second plane was 2133 trying to alert the controller to the situation.
When it does not make sense while airborne, immediate clarification should be done. Guess the controller should have taken them further out and used the localizers instead, maybe?
This is not the year to be flying! There have been so many incidents, close calls and mechanical issues. I love flying but I think I will wait a couple of years.
are these types of situations increasing? Are steps being made to fix these problems or will unfortunately a major tragedy will need to happen to force change?
The controller was thinking about something else (when he swapped callsigns) instead of concentrating on his job. Absolute attention is required. I know, I’m a retired controller.
Normally we hear the tower handing out a phone number to a humbled and self disappointed pilot. Funny how the tower ask "can I help you?" That was ATC hoping with a last tiny shred.. that the pilot was going to say "no"
Taxi Question: (I’m learning some basics, want to one day get a license), I pulled up the diagram for PHX and after landing American was told Sierra, Charlie, India. I can’t find India indicated on the diagram. I was just curious where they were being directed. Would it be two different diagrams?
India is one of the alleyways between concourses of the terminal. If you look at a satellite image of terminal 4 you will see taxiways that go in and out of these alleys. India is the one furthest west at terminal 4.
There probably was. ATC messed up here, but I am surprised the AA pilot didnt act on TCAS without asking the tower. If you need to do something immediately, do it.
@@worldtravels2763 I believe there is 2 possible things. The TCAS relies on transponder to be activated on both aircraft, and the TCAS is only going to go off if there is a conflict. While they were at the same altitude, I think that both aircraft being in a turn didn't allow the system to make that calculation, assuming the transponder is working on both aircraft. Also, there may have been enough spacing that the computer didn't sound the alarm. I'm just speculating but that's my thoughts on why the TCAS didn't go off.
I was hoping this was from that rude ATC at JFK, but this tower was actually very profesional, the AA pilots said some stuff on air that didn’t need to be said, should have waited till their phone call to make accusations, very immature/unprofessional!
AA1083 didn’t help, but very poor situational awareness by the controlled. The right instead of left turn by AA1083 should have been a clue he messed up. Phoenix is an AA hub, so not like the controller isn’t dealing with multiple AA flights every shift
Yeah I was about to say. This isn't an IFR approach. So fly the plane. You can absolutely ignore ATC to maintain the safety of your aircraft. You likely have more SA than they do.
These aren't recreational pilots happily flying around in their Cessna's at some uncontrolled field in the middle of nowhere. One would expect a bit more professionalism from in this case ATC to make life for everyone easier and safer🙄
Thats why its dumb to do late rw changes. If they do it like everywhere else and everyone knows which rw they are using, the A321 would have probably decided to turn final without clearance knowing their radio got stepped on.
If not for *awake* crews, these blunders would cost lives. Surprised the American flight accepted that left turn. Instead, turn right and get the heck out of that airspace!
It’s really sad, how the human brain works, everyone wether it’s in real life or on RUclips, everyone is picking a side and is blaming the other. Theres many people to blame here and also there’s FATE to blame here as well, ultimately nothing happened and hopefully everyone will learn from the mistake. That’s why doing mistakes is good, so you learn!
Traffic controller is one of the more stressed professions and short careers in the world. Due to that only a special kind of personality should be able to work and deal with it - Observer, Patient, comprehensive, Fluent in several language's and having an agreable voice and clear speech, Adaptable, Focused, Dinamic, Quick Thinker, Organized, Responsible, Ethical and possess a good general culture are for me the Best qualities for the position. IQ is not the right option. Kind regards from Portugal
Traffic Collision Avoidance System Resolution Advisory. TCAS is an automated system in pretty much all large commercial aircraft and most medium sized planes that talks to other airplanes to help them not come together. An RA is the warming it gives with directions to avoid the other airplanes.
@SkylinesSuck Exactly. So with two aeroplanes heading directly toward each other at the same level, then surely a TCAS RA was generated rather than the pilots rather urgent request for a heading to avoid?
@@andrewbirch3033 It's more complicated than that. RA's only say climb or descend, no headings. And they are inhibited below a certain altitude but I'm not sure exactly what. I also think pilots have a bit of discretion in certain situations to, if not ignore, at least delay complying with the RA. Airport setups like that with parallel runways can put planes on final right next to each other very close at the same altitude under specific conditions and rules that are too complicated to explain. I know some completely legal and safe situations set off RAs. If pilots didn't have some wiggle in there, things would be unworkable as currently designed. Just guessing this pilot let it go as long as he did assuming the controller hadn't screwed the pooch. Then he realized he did and that just added to his fear/frustration.
I don't understand why after seemingly decades of smooth ATC operations we are seeing so many close calls. One of these days the luck is going to run out if this continues.
The FAA controllers are severely understaffed. Years ago they identified a shortage of controllers and concluded that they would need more. Today, not only have they not met their staffing needs, they actually have fewer controllers. Plus they brag about how many they hired but they are hired on a temp basis until they can pass to become fully certified and the number of controllers who pass to be certified is a single-digit percentage number. The shortage has gotten so bad that some airports are getting their towers contracted out to a private company and one of the airports I fly to for making night requirements had 1 person who does Clearance, Ground, Tower, and Approach during the evening. In the New York airspace, the FAA estimated about half of flights would be delayed this Summer solely due to controller shortage if airlines would not cooperate and reduce their flights in/out of the NY area. A lot is highlighted on the pilot shortage because of demand, but the controller shortage is huge in keeping the skies safe.
This was simply a matter of similar sounding callsigns doing what they do best which makes things dangerous. And frankly, I’m a controller a long ways away from PHX and I’VE had dead similar callsign issues with American in and out of there before. Their company over there sucks. Not blaming this all on American as the controller should’ve told each aircraft about each others callsign per the 7110.65 but similar sounding callsigns IMO aren’t taken as seriously as they should be.
What are you talking about, AA1083 and AA2133 aren’t remotely similar sounding, if a controller/pilot can’t deal with that they shouldn’t be working anywhere near a plane!
He coulda just done pilot shit and made a decision. Guarantee phx was vfr conditions. Just turn inbound. Use your tcas to see if there’s close traffic for the same runway. Quit the blinders and be a pilot
Wouldn’t it be difficult to see what’s happening on the runway while not even on final yet? Could be there’s a plane to take off before them and things could get more complicated by not following atc...
@@rutgerw. I’m talking about on final. Runway wouldn’t matter. We routinely use our tcas to follow traffic and space ourselves on final. Controllers do a good job but they aren’t god. If you feel you need to turn inbound do it
Both airplanes have each other in sight. Both probably have TCAS. Come on guys ... save the whining about what did or did not happen on the ground. Fly your damn plane.
They did both “fly the damn plane”. But, if you were paying attention you’d have recognized that the medevac had visual on the *prior* plane which had already landed by then, *not* the one they were nearly steered into.
I heard from my pool guy’s sister’s cousin’s hairdresser that the controller is now working the ticket booth at the east economy parking lot. He’s lucky to still be employed near an airport.
When you are looking at the radar return everything seems perfectly logical and safe. As a pilot on AAL2133 they probably couldn't visualize the position of MEDIVAC9AR until they were almost nose to nose, albeit separated by 400 feet vertically and the space between runways horizonally. Could have been quite a shock to them to suddenly see another plane heading right at them. However, they must have also been having an extremely bad day to want to report this because in hidsight there really was no significant danger.
If you don't think this situation was dangerous you should watch @vasaviation coverage of it instead, more accurate radar graphics and his video actually shows the TRACON CA alerts for 9AR and AAL2133. Other than capturing the pilot request for TRACON phone number this video is not a great representation of the event. The situational awareness of both the controller and AAL1083 was extremely poor here. Sky Harbor is my home airport; any AAL pilot that has flown a west-east approach vectored to RWY 8 should have questioned being issued a turn to final vectors at the position AAL1083 was when they received the turn that was intended for 2133. They were not in IMC conditions at the time either so they were literally BSing the controller by giving them a readback. Lots of factors at play including overworked controllers and FAA incompetence to utilize proper hiring, training and scheduling, a likely apathetic pilot not questioning controller instructions on an approach they've probably flown dozens of times now that they're approaching retirement age, city of Tempe & Phoenix not having proper RNAVs established for eastbound approach flows due to residents bitching about noise issues... I could go on, but this is a great example of the swiss cheese model playing out, and I for one am glad there wasn't a shower of aluminum and body parts over my house last week because of it.
ATC made a mistake, obviously has many have noted. But also, as many have noted, the pilot should have been more proactive. This is not a situation where, I didn't make the screw up why should I be the one to fix it? Is the situation where everybody who sees this screw up needs to do their best to fix it. Why? Because people will die that isn't the attitude everyone has. Pilot realize the situation was weird he should have called it out. That said, this is of course a busy time for the pilot of an airliner, but he still realized it before the ATC did so.
He tryed to but the frequency was blocked by atc not paying attention. It is not uncommon for atc to give a late turn to create some more space with the preceding so commercial pilots would try to be as accomodating as possible and not make life for others more difficult. This is 100% on atc!
Pilot can still make the turn to avoid overshooting the extended centreline whilst trying to speak to ATC. Worse case is a discontinued approach if they’re too close to the preceding aircraft.
@@AEMoreira81 AA 1083 was more at fault here than people want to admit. They should have been the ones being proactive and questioning that vector as they were nowhere near the proper turning point to set up for RWY 8 when that call was made. They should have asked the controller to clarify and this situation would have been avoided, but instead, the likely apathetic 1083 pilot knowingly read back something that contained errors as he said "right" instead of the controller-given "left".
American pilots not the brightest lights on the runway. Most are regional guys. They continued to fly inbound without asking are they cleared. Dummies. They lose it when they have any issues with the bird
ANC is really only for emergency situations like engine failure on take off, where a strict priority of tasks has to be accomplished. During normal flight ANC occurs simultaneously and not in that order.
Seriously? Please spare us the sanctimonious neoliberal attempt at self triggering. Plenty of people pointed out the fact the controller completely screwed the pooch. Besides, why are you assuming this person is white? Or even a male for that reason? You have no idea how they identify. Quit misgendering people bigot.
In VFR conditions even under an IFR clearance the pilot is to maintain visual separation. AA bunch getting a bit fussy. "Approach AA 2133 waiting on a turn," don't just sit there waiting to be told. So tedious.
You know it's bad when the pilot wants to be given a number to call.
And he sounded pretty pissed. :O
Glad they kept the arguments to a minimum on frequency to clarify this later on the phone.
That's a first!
@@Great-DocumentariesAnd I'm blocking your channel for that dumb dumb comment about Harrison Ford.
He's a pilot for Karen Airlines
@@1450JackCade oh no, blocking them!? *Gasp*, I bet they are devastated! 🤣
You nailed it, at 2:12 ATC called out AAL 1083 to turn left with a heading and field at 10:00, this was clearly meant for AAL2133. AAL 1083 than does a read back stating right turn instead of the instructed left turn and ATC did not pick that up.
Yup, exactly. He had even asked if 1083 had the field in site before clearing 1083 to turn left.
I think if 1083 had spoken up when they received a second clearance for the approach, the controller may have released his mistake. Not putting any blame on them, of course, but speaking up in situations like this can save lives
2:18 ATC said the field was at 10 o’clock, for 1083, it was not. That was an opportunity for 1083 to question whether the radio call was really intended for them.
I was surprised that 1083 confirmed the airport in sight even though it was basically behind them at 2:11
I'm thinking the controller was already stressed with that left call to the wrong plane. good catch
I agree that the entire set of instructions was for 2133.
Amazing how clear, concise and deliberate a pilot is when they're pissed off.
2133 was actually very deliberate with their call sign before the incident. The pilot on comms sounded hyper aware of his surroundings in general.
And when they arent pissed off they speak like a doctor writes.
This seems like an important skill for the job. “Hey would you mind turning out of the way I think we’re going to cr-“
@@VictoryAviation 2133 sounded like a douche.
2:13 ATC gives instructions to 1083 that are intended for 2133
2:18 ATC again gives instructions to 1083 that should be for 2133
2:24 ATC fails to recognize that 1083 has clearly said "Right turn" when he instructed a left turn. Good chance to realize something is off with that readback
2:28-2:40 ATC fails to realize that 1083 has turned right and 2133 hasn't turned
At least 4 mistakes in short succession. One of the pilot could have recognized it and helped him out, but ultimately this very poor from TRACON.
Another mistake by AA1083 is they confirmed they had the field in sight when it was at their 5 o'clock and behind them rather than their 10 o'clock and just to the left. Should have been another sign the instruction was not meant for them.
Wow. After all the jokes about a pilot asking for a number, here we have it in the flesh. Dangerous!
Hahaha. It was the first time I hear when pilot asks for a number as well 🤣
That is why you need more controllers. There were calls for 1083 or 2133 clearly meant for the other.
@@AEMoreira81 more? You're gonna have to explain how having MORE controllers will make things clearer..
@@FactsMattermore controllers would mean the current ones wouldn’t all be working record setting amounts of mandatory overtime. That would be a good start…..
Another thing the controller got wrong (or ASSUMED) at 3:55 was that 9AR had 2133 "in sight"... Based on the timing of 9AR's "traffic in sight" report 2:06 he had been warned about, and located, 5DA *at his 1 o'clock at 3400* -- _the plane ahead of him in sequence!_ -- but no ATC mention of 2133 at 12:30 o'clock, 5500 ft, and converging vectors! 2133 saw 9AR first, but if 9AR ever saw 2133 it was at the last second, NOT from ATC guidance!
1083 must have been really breaking their neck when they declared field in sight at their 5 o' clock.
ATC incorrectly said turn left for runway for AA1083, it was meant for AA2133 (left turn) then AA1083 answered right turn for runway, correcting him on making right turn. Mistake was AA call sign by ATC TRACON.
When ATC gives me a wrong instruction (they say "right" instead of "left", or more commonly they say a slightly wrong callsign) I'll often do what AA1083 did and interject the correction in my readback: "Okay, understand RIGHT turn to 110..." This is a bad practice because I'm reading back something I didn't hear. In the future I'm going to take the extra step to explicitly ask for clarification "was that for Callsign123?" or "confirm you want a left turn to 110?"
@@toddwolfe The 100% "by the book" method is asking them to say (it) again, without asking anything specific, the theory being that you might "prompt"/confuse/startle them into confirming something they didn't actually mean, and getting them to do it "from scratch" will make them think it through again. Now, if you really have time for that in practice.....
Wow, that was a bit tight. I had a nearly identical situation at SJC once, where approach vectored me and a B757 on a collision course for parallel runways that set off the 757's TCAS, even after I requested an overhead to left traffic to follow the 757 to avoid that situation. Tower told me to maintain visual separation on turn to short final, and then tried to set me up for a violation because the 757 overtook me and landed just as I did, saying I did not maintain visual separation on final after I and the 757 were both cleared to land on Parallel runways.
What was the outcome after I’m sure you filed a grievance?
@@VictoryAviation I didn't file a grievance but had a conference call with an FAA investigator and the tower chief. Radar and ATC recordings showed that as I was turning base to final the Tower told me to maintain Visual sep. from the 757 that was behind me turning base to final, and as I was looking back in my turn, with a strong right crosswind, I drifted about 150ft left of runway centerline.
As I recall, the Tower chief said that Visual separation rules in the pattern at SJC were like 2500ft and radar showed my drift put me at about 2,000 ft from the 757, and that was what the tower chief wanted me violated for. I asked the tower chief what the distance from centerline to centerline of the two runways were and I think she said 2,000ft, so I pointed that clearing two aircraft to land as she did, did not maintain visual sep.
I also asked the tower chief what FAR that 2500ft pattern separation rule was, and she said it was not an FAR, but some unpublished SJC approach requirement. I then asked the FAA inspector if pilots are expected to know all unique airport traffic regs, if they are not published, and he said Pilots are required to be aware that each airport may have published and unpublished procedures and requirements and should ask if not advised or familiar with them.
The FAA inspector asked why I asked for an overhead crosswind and left down to 25L (or whatever the short GA runway was at SJC) rather than Rather than right downwind to 25R, (the long runway for airline traffic) as instructed, and I explained I anticipated a potential conflict and that having me cross from east to west over the airport 500ft above traffic put me on the GA runway away from airline traffic, and avoided me having to wait and taxi across three active runways. The FAA inspector said that made sense and asked the Tower Chief why she did not allow my request and instead controlled two aircraft make head-on turns to final. She said "We do it all the time, it's SOP". The FAA inspector said that it sounded Like I had a better situational awareness and plan then she did, and suggested, she consider making what I requested SOP.
I have found that in the past the FAA impetus was to involve all parties, evaluate and learn from mistakes rather than to punish and encourage adversarial concealment and contention. The FAA inspector was as former Airline ATP and Said "We all make mistakes, and no one here sounds like they are incompetent or reckless, we all learned something and will do better from it. And no further action was taken. However from what I hear from friends who still fly for a living and a friend who still works for FAA, Violations and prosecutions are more the norm now.
That’s pretty crazy. Thank you for sharing that.
@@mikemontgomery2654 Some aspects, were a bit "Crazy" in that I suspect the Tower Chief was trying to shift responsibility and accountability to me and my error that resulted from her sketchy and questionable instructions. Nevertheless, anyone who flies is likely to encounter a collision of Regulations, egos and bureaucracy, especially after near or actual collisions of aircraft, and bureaucratic as well as ego emotional situational awareness, and having some sense as how to mitigate or deal with egos and bureaucracy, is another valuable survival skill in aviation.
@@jackoneil3933 oh, I know it. I work in the industry. I likely see the egos far more often than pilots do. My job is a pilot support role.
The controller also claims the King Air had the Airbus in sight, but no such call was given by the King Air.
The King Air _did_ report that he had the traffic in sight. At 2:30.
@@carsonfranThat was him having the preceding Challenger traffic in sight that the controller pointed out previously but the king air said "no joy" to. Once he saw them he identified it in sight. But the Airbus traffic was never pointed out to the king air.
But he did thank him 🤣🤣🤣 trying to cover his ass.
@@180mph9yeah that was definitely an attempt at CYA. I don’t think it’ll do a damned thing to help justify his performance.
@@carsonfran Controller's words: "your 1 o'clock at 3400"....that's 5DA! 2133 was more 1230-ish and 5500 at the time! 9AR found the craft he was instructed to, and reported accordingly. 2133 vs. 9AR was never mentioned until 3:55, with a "oh, you must have had him in sight all along, right?" sort of assumption....AFTER the near head-on!
Always enjoy your visuals and ATC chatter. Keep up the good work.
Thank you for watching 😊
@@YouCanSeeATC one of the better Avgeek channels for sure
Similar sounding call signs, please use caution. This is an excellent primer why shortening call signs with "eighty-three" or "thirty-three" is a shitty way to run comms. The controller meant "twenty-one thirty-three" but said "ten eighty-three" because brain. Probably didn't even realize he said the wrong one. Then, ignored the responding airplane saying "oh no that's a RIGHT turn" which should be a huge unexpected-response red flag.
If only we had the audio of the phone call. Someone was about to be ripped a new ass.
Damn that was scary. Glad they had visual contact.
TCAS would have beeped at them soon anyway
My guess is TCAS did beep at them
@@N1120A They may have gotten a yellow dot, but if AA2133 got a TCAS resolution advisory from the King Air, they would have definitely told ATC (it's a required call, and the AA pilot was anxiously awaiting his approach clearance and knew ATC screwed up). That's the only thing that makes me think this wasn't really THAT close of a call. ATC clearly screwed up, but there was no RA.
Two words: positive separation
All the airport has to do is envoys the universal instruction of “do not pass through the extended centreline of the runway”. This ensures that such head to head encounters don’t happen in the event of radio failure or blocked transmission. It works well at one particular airport I’m familiar with.
Contacting the tower with their concern was correct, but initiating the left turn would also be a good idea considering the closure rate and proximity involved.
The US airspace seems the only one in the world under such constant stress. I think that the system works through ability and professionalism of ATC and pilots, but the safety margin is paper thin, and dangerous situations can occur very quickly through the slightest of errors.
Their education system is not as good, they're all dealing with language and comprehension deficits that other Western nations don't have.
@@GlennDavey 🤡
I think it's because regional airlines are the only viable form of medium-to-long-distance travel in America. High-speed passenger rail is basically nonexistent, and that's exactly what keeps the skies of Europe, China, and Japan relatively uncongested.
"I have that number for you when you're ready" are words a pilot never wants to hear, but at least in this case he's not the one who's potentially in trouble.
controller mixed up the 2 AAL.
ATC: "We have a number for you."
Pilot: "Uno reverse sir, I have a number for you."
Getting Tracons number reminds me of this line from Space Balls, "Or else, Pizza, is gonna send out, for you"
Me too! Holy cow!
Medevac just there feeling the tension saying oh god this is awkward
Had this happen at AUS a few weeks ago. Controller realized his mistake and basically begged us to not fly through final. I saw the situation unfolding and already had my game plan in play.
Airmanship on display. Seems to be a rare commodity nowadays.
Wow....cool game plan. So impressive.
Each parallel runway should have altitude separation when making the base turns.
As my wife would say when we argue, an apology isn't good enough here. 😂
Hope you give her Eddie’s “stuff” as a thank you, friend. 😂❤
The FAA will be having a good investigation here.
The Approach ATC guy sounds like Alex Gong from VATSIM on Flight Simulator. He is always on Arizona/Alburquerque ATC's.
That was definitely a Tower screw up, approach is handled by psersonell in the tower, not TRACON.
Approach is handled by the TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach Control). Some airports are "up/down" facilities, which means that they aren't busy enough to warrant a full separate TRACON facility, and so the same controllers will move "up and down" from the radar facility and the tower on different shifts to handle both duties.
@PancakeRodeo you're correct, I confused ARTCC & TRACON.
1 wrong number, 2 aircraft suddenly in the wrong place. Eesh.
Controller fucked up
Is it fair to say the issue was American 2133 hearing an instruction for American 1083 and following it, then saying was never cleared? It seems this started the chain of events? The controller never cleared 2133 for the approach, so it's surprising an approach was made
I’ve had ATC turn us left and another airliner on my left, right. The perfect collision vector.
Luckily saw what was happening and took evasive action. Metering is from the computer and vectors are from controllers. Experience and thought process are missing
ATC should never have cleared them both to 4000ft. From what I understand at some other airports on a different continent they would always assign potentially conflicting traffic a different altitude and line-up they have to stick to until cleared the approach/established?
For ILS's they need to separate them by 1000' until they are both established on the localizer. For visual approaches this is not a requirement, but it still seems incredibly reckless. Having traffic on opposing bases at the same altitude is just asking for trouble if someone overshoots because a call is missed or misidentified, as in this case.
@@TheWayOfJamesBand It's this last issue, traffic on opposing bases at same altitude - very high risk. During approach is where planes naturally start converging in location and altitude, so then matching altitude adds risk, and now planes really hold altitudes pretty precisely so you are 50 feet +/- of that so a collision becomes more likely if you end up in same position. There are alerts for all this thankfully that are automated with RA's.
I agree that the visual approach clearance was meant for AAL2133, not AAL1083, based on the field position report of 10 o'clock 10 miles, followed by Turn Left 110, cleared for visual approach RW 8. That aligned perfectly with AAL2133's position, not AAL1083's.
It's clear that Approach had a brain-fart, which created the conflict incident. Regardless, that situation should have never been allowed to continue, and a supervisor should have intervened. Additionally, the controller should have recognized the developing conflict when both aircraft were nose-to-nose at less than 5 miles, and taken immediate action to deconflict. Likewise, he should have picked up that AAL1083 "corrected" the turn instruction by saying "right turn, 110" when the controller issued a Left Turn, and also saw that 1083 was starting to turn instead of 2133.
In the end, it is *always* the responsibility of the pilot to decide whether or not to continue or abort/reject their current clearance if minimum safe separation is lost. Also, TCAS, if it wasn't inhibited by the proximity to the airport, would have issued an avoidance advisory if a collision was eminent; the pilot is *required* to execute the advisory, which overrides any current/previous ATC instruction.
Happily, this worked out in the end. The TRACON controller will probably be required to take temporary leave, followed by remedial training, before being put back into active rotation.
Fantastic analysis and insight. Are you a controller as well, bc I have a question if so.
TCAS RA is only inhibited at/below 1000FT AGL in the A320 family. TCAS RA (Resolution Advisory) would have worked out fine in this case. It’s unclear if a Traffic advisory was triggered (unlikely), but an RA would have resolved this conflict should they have gotten dangerously close.
From the terminology you utilise in your comment, I can infer that you are neither a pilot or controller. Most likely a MS Flight Sim gamer.
@@flame1973 It's the same for Boeing aircraft (1,100' AGL); specifically, it's tied to the Radio Altimiter, and becomes inhibited at and below ~1,000' above terrain.. KPHX is ~1,135' elevation, so TCAS would still have been active in both aircraft (AAL & the small Medivac plane). I'm pretty sure they both received a traffic advisory, but since the Medivac plane was actively turning onto final, I don't think either received a resolution advisory before AAL called in for an immediate turn. Still, it's pretty scarey when you see another aircraft heading straight for you at the same altitude, closing in at over 200 kn combined....
@@VictoryAviation Ask away, Matti, there are controllers viewing these comments.
2133 probably should’ve been a little more proactive. Could’ve done a lot to prevent that by being proactive, asking for the clearance etc, when it became apparent things weren’t progressing as expected.
Exactly! Controller slipup doesn't absolve the pilots from not maintaining command.
I think he tried at least once. That point where a transmission got blocked due to multiple planes talking at once, I'm pretty sure the second plane was 2133 trying to alert the controller to the situation.
When it does not make sense while airborne, immediate clarification should be done. Guess the controller should have taken them further out and used the localizers instead, maybe?
Tower, prepare to copy a phone number....
This is not the year to be flying! There have been so many incidents, close calls and mechanical issues. I love flying but I think I will wait a couple of years.
"Nose to nose"🤷
are these types of situations increasing? Are steps being made to fix these problems or will unfortunately a major tragedy will need to happen to force change?
This is 100% on ATC who screwed up the callsign.
Possible Controller Deviation advise you contact American Airlines.
The controller was thinking about something else (when he swapped callsigns) instead of concentrating on his job. Absolute attention is required. I know, I’m a retired controller.
Did anyone get fired?
these dudes need paid more
Normally we hear the tower handing out a phone number to a humbled and self disappointed pilot. Funny how the tower ask "can I help you?" That was ATC hoping with a last tiny shred.. that the pilot was going to say "no"
Perhaps someone should be listening to the Opposing Bases podcast!
And things are only going to get worse
Taxi Question: (I’m learning some basics, want to one day get a license), I pulled up the diagram for PHX and after landing American was told Sierra, Charlie, India. I can’t find India indicated on the diagram. I was just curious where they were being directed. Would it be two different diagrams?
India is one of the alleyways between concourses of the terminal. If you look at a satellite image of terminal 4 you will see taxiways that go in and out of these alleys. India is the one furthest west at terminal 4.
Thanks! I am trying to “learn from
others” and hopefully avoid being in one of these videos someday. Haha
Thanks! I am trying to “learn from
others” and hopefully avoid being in one of these videos someday. Haha
Thanks! I am trying to “learn from
others” and hopefully avoid being in one of these videos someday. Haha
Thanks! I am trying to “learn from
others” and hopefully avoid being in one of these videos someday. Haha
Surprised there was no TCAS RA in this situation.
There probably was. ATC messed up here, but I am surprised the AA pilot didnt act on TCAS without asking the tower. If you need to do something immediately, do it.
@@worldtravels2763 I believe there is 2 possible things. The TCAS relies on transponder to be activated on both aircraft, and the TCAS is only going to go off if there is a conflict. While they were at the same altitude, I think that both aircraft being in a turn didn't allow the system to make that calculation, assuming the transponder is working on both aircraft. Also, there may have been enough spacing that the computer didn't sound the alarm. I'm just speculating but that's my thoughts on why the TCAS didn't go off.
Approach, possible controller deviation, I'm gonna need you to give me a number here when you have a moment ☎
I was hoping this was from that rude ATC at JFK, but this tower was actually very profesional, the AA pilots said some stuff on air that didn’t need to be said, should have waited till their phone call to make accusations, very immature/unprofessional!
Sometimes when youre sitting on 2 points because your butthole clenched the size of a sesame seed, you say stuff at the person who set it up that way.
Mom: We Have VASaviation at home
VASaviation at home:
This video actually shows the request for the TRACON number.
the arrogance of almost killing people.
if i were american... id have gone missed and made a left for traffic.
Yeah...but you aren't. You're a keyboard warrior playing on a computer. Cool though.
@@billybuttons4298 ok mr nobodyasked
AA1083 didn’t help, but very poor situational awareness by the controlled. The right instead of left turn by AA1083 should have been a clue he messed up. Phoenix is an AA hub, so not like the controller isn’t dealing with multiple AA flights every shift
pretty dumb to fly through final even without a clearance.
Yeah I was about to say. This isn't an IFR approach. So fly the plane. You can absolutely ignore ATC to maintain the safety of your aircraft. You likely have more SA than they do.
These aren't recreational pilots happily flying around in their Cessna's at some uncontrolled field in the middle of nowhere. One would expect a bit more professionalism from in this case ATC to make life for everyone easier and safer🙄
Oh and by the way, they were never cleared the visual approach so they were still IFR and atc’s responsibility😉
@@rutgerw.when in doubt, 91.3 😂
Thats why its dumb to do late rw changes. If they do it like everywhere else and everyone knows which rw they are using, the A321 would have probably decided to turn final without clearance knowing their radio got stepped on.
hmmmmmm...........; two (or even 3x) times human error..................
Another belly up from the slaves in the tower. Time to bring out the whips.
If not for *awake* crews, these blunders would cost lives.
Surprised the American flight accepted that left turn. Instead, turn right and get the heck out of that airspace!
It’s really sad, how the human brain works, everyone wether it’s in real life or on RUclips, everyone is picking a side and is blaming the other. Theres many people to blame here and also there’s FATE to blame here as well, ultimately nothing happened and hopefully everyone will learn from the mistake. That’s why doing mistakes is good, so you learn!
blaming fate; that's a new one. 🙄
@@swiftadventurer you don’t understand aviation and most importantly, you don’t understand life! #lowIQ
Traffic controller is one of the more stressed professions and short careers in the world. Due to that only a special kind of personality should be able to work and deal with it - Observer, Patient, comprehensive, Fluent in several language's and having an agreable voice and clear speech, Adaptable, Focused, Dinamic, Quick Thinker, Organized, Responsible, Ethical and possess a good general culture are for me the Best qualities for the position. IQ is not the right option. Kind regards from Portugal
fluent in several language's what?
Does this pilot sound like the Atlanta call sign pilot from a few years back to anyone else?
TCAS RA?
Traffic Collision Avoidance System Resolution Advisory. TCAS is an automated system in pretty much all large commercial aircraft and most medium sized planes that talks to other airplanes to help them not come together. An RA is the warming it gives with directions to avoid the other airplanes.
@SkylinesSuck Exactly. So with two aeroplanes heading directly toward each other at the same level, then surely a TCAS RA was generated rather than the pilots rather urgent request for a heading to avoid?
@@andrewbirch3033 It's more complicated than that. RA's only say climb or descend, no headings. And they are inhibited below a certain altitude but I'm not sure exactly what. I also think pilots have a bit of discretion in certain situations to, if not ignore, at least delay complying with the RA. Airport setups like that with parallel runways can put planes on final right next to each other very close at the same altitude under specific conditions and rules that are too complicated to explain. I know some completely legal and safe situations set off RAs. If pilots didn't have some wiggle in there, things would be unworkable as currently designed. Just guessing this pilot let it go as long as he did assuming the controller hadn't screwed the pooch. Then he realized he did and that just added to his fear/frustration.
I don't understand why after seemingly decades of smooth ATC operations we are seeing so many close calls. One of these days the luck is going to run out if this continues.
Partly because there is more air traffic and a lot because we have a lot more visibility into ATC operations now than we used to.
The FAA controllers are severely understaffed. Years ago they identified a shortage of controllers and concluded that they would need more. Today, not only have they not met their staffing needs, they actually have fewer controllers. Plus they brag about how many they hired but they are hired on a temp basis until they can pass to become fully certified and the number of controllers who pass to be certified is a single-digit percentage number. The shortage has gotten so bad that some airports are getting their towers contracted out to a private company and one of the airports I fly to for making night requirements had 1 person who does Clearance, Ground, Tower, and Approach during the evening.
In the New York airspace, the FAA estimated about half of flights would be delayed this Summer solely due to controller shortage if airlines would not cooperate and reduce their flights in/out of the NY area. A lot is highlighted on the pilot shortage because of demand, but the controller shortage is huge in keeping the skies safe.
You just didn't have these RUclips channels publishing every little mishap for decades.
Yikes that could've been an air disaster! That couldn't have been any closer!
Of course it could have been closer.
This was simply a matter of similar sounding callsigns doing what they do best which makes things dangerous. And frankly, I’m a controller a long ways away from PHX and I’VE had dead similar callsign issues with American in and out of there before. Their company over there sucks. Not blaming this all on American as the controller should’ve told each aircraft about each others callsign per the 7110.65 but similar sounding callsigns IMO aren’t taken as seriously as they should be.
What are you talking about, AA1083 and AA2133 aren’t remotely similar sounding, if a controller/pilot can’t deal with that they shouldn’t be working anywhere near a plane!
He coulda just done pilot shit and made a decision. Guarantee phx was vfr conditions. Just turn inbound. Use your tcas to see if there’s close traffic for the same runway. Quit the blinders and be a pilot
Wouldn’t it be difficult to see what’s happening on the runway while not even on final yet? Could be there’s a plane to take off before them and things could get more complicated by not following atc...
@@rutgerw. I’m talking about on final. Runway wouldn’t matter. We routinely use our tcas to follow traffic and space ourselves on final. Controllers do a good job but they aren’t god. If you feel you need to turn inbound do it
@@stevel8743- that’s the common sense approach to this situation.
Both airplanes have each other in sight. Both probably have TCAS. Come on guys ... save the whining about what did or did not happen on the ground. Fly your damn plane.
They did both “fly the damn plane”.
But, if you were paying attention you’d have recognized that the medevac had visual on the *prior* plane which had already landed by then, *not* the one they were nearly steered into.
I heard from my pool guy’s sister’s cousin’s hairdresser that the controller is now working the ticket booth at the east economy parking lot.
He’s lucky to still be employed near an airport.
😂
🤣🤣🤣
Controller make mistakes too...
That’s why safeties are supposed to be built into the system instead of this nonsense.
How is there this much chaos for 3 aircraft??
Spatial management !
Read the disclaimer. Uninvolved aircraft are omitted from the video.
@@jeremy-bahadirli Ty, didn't realize that.
Wasn't as bad as they made it out to be.
agreed, AA drama queens again
It was pretty bad
Says you sitting in the comfort of your home and not at the controls of a passenger aircraft on a collision course with another aircraft. 🙄
Wasn't as bad... Drama queen's. Arm chair pilots are back at it lmao
Not bad at all , I mean , they had visual with each other, and a closing speed over 500mph ........ its all just dandy😅
When you are looking at the radar return everything seems perfectly logical and safe. As a pilot on AAL2133 they probably couldn't visualize the position of MEDIVAC9AR until they were almost nose to nose, albeit separated by 400 feet vertically and the space between runways horizonally. Could have been quite a shock to them to suddenly see another plane heading right at them. However, they must have also been having an extremely bad day to want to report this because in hidsight there really was no significant danger.
TCAS will have shown them where the other aircraft was, so they’d have had situational awareness.
If you don't think this situation was dangerous you should watch @vasaviation coverage of it instead, more accurate radar graphics and his video actually shows the TRACON CA alerts for 9AR and AAL2133. Other than capturing the pilot request for TRACON phone number this video is not a great representation of the event. The situational awareness of both the controller and AAL1083 was extremely poor here. Sky Harbor is my home airport; any AAL pilot that has flown a west-east approach vectored to RWY 8 should have questioned being issued a turn to final vectors at the position AAL1083 was when they received the turn that was intended for 2133. They were not in IMC conditions at the time either so they were literally BSing the controller by giving them a readback. Lots of factors at play including overworked controllers and FAA incompetence to utilize proper hiring, training and scheduling, a likely apathetic pilot not questioning controller instructions on an approach they've probably flown dozens of times now that they're approaching retirement age, city of Tempe & Phoenix not having proper RNAVs established for eastbound approach flows due to residents bitching about noise issues... I could go on, but this is a great example of the swiss cheese model playing out, and I for one am glad there wasn't a shower of aluminum and body parts over my house last week because of it.
ATC made a mistake, obviously has many have noted.
But also, as many have noted, the pilot should have been more proactive.
This is not a situation where, I didn't make the screw up why should I be the one to fix it?
Is the situation where everybody who sees this screw up needs to do their best to fix it. Why? Because people will die that isn't the attitude everyone has.
Pilot realize the situation was weird he should have called it out.
That said, this is of course a busy time for the pilot of an airliner, but he still realized it before the ATC did so.
He tryed to but the frequency was blocked by atc not paying attention. It is not uncommon for atc to give a late turn to create some more space with the preceding so commercial pilots would try to be as accomodating as possible and not make life for others more difficult. This is 100% on atc!
AA2133 got stepped on (the radio). AA1083 also read back instructions clearly intended for AA2133.
Pilot can still make the turn to avoid overshooting the extended centreline whilst trying to speak to ATC. Worse case is a discontinued approach if they’re too close to the preceding aircraft.
@@AEMoreira81 AA 1083 was more at fault here than people want to admit. They should have been the ones being proactive and questioning that vector as they were nowhere near the proper turning point to set up for RWY 8 when that call was made. They should have asked the controller to clarify and this situation would have been avoided, but instead, the likely apathetic 1083 pilot knowingly read back something that contained errors as he said "right" instead of the controller-given "left".
American pilots not the brightest lights on the runway. Most are regional guys. They continued to fly inbound without asking are they cleared. Dummies. They lose it when they have any issues with the bird
Life is a bit different from your MSFS experience.
@@burncycle4621 only
If you knew.
There are three jobs - Aviate, Navigate, Communicate. The American pilots neglected all three, then cried about it.
ANC is really only for emergency situations like engine failure on take off, where a strict priority of tasks has to be accomplished. During normal flight ANC occurs simultaneously and not in that order.
Came for the relaxed attitudes toward white male ATC’s error, was not disappointed.
Seriously? Please spare us the sanctimonious neoliberal attempt at self triggering. Plenty of people pointed out the fact the controller completely screwed the pooch. Besides, why are you assuming this person is white? Or even a male for that reason? You have no idea how they identify. Quit misgendering people bigot.
How often does your race baiting succeed?
Can’t wait for A.I. to do these jobs
The Biden administration is developing a program to give homeless ATC jobs. All they have to do is identify as controllers and they're in.
"All flights, descend and maintain -100 feet."
Oh edgelord.
Vaccine. More close encounters than ever.... just sayin
Those guys were just being dramatic. Been there done that a few times.
Meh
In VFR conditions even under an IFR clearance the pilot is to maintain visual separation. AA bunch getting a bit fussy. "Approach AA 2133 waiting on a turn," don't just sit there waiting to be told. So tedious.