We recommended early on (like in 2007-2009) that the default be automated landing but were overridden by the customer. We knew this would happen. Glad the pilot safely ejected, he got lucky, or was very quick or both, That is all (a recently retired Ph.D. Principal Software/Aerospace Engineer with the two current frontline F planes' mothership).
Thanks Steve and happy retirement. Most folks who are not intimate with the airplane blame the aircraft they have no clue that the contractor have to comply with the customer's requirements and have no recourse but to wait until a mishap occurs! Navy regs are written in blood so no surprise here.
the phenomenon of thinking the automation system is working when it's not seems like an interface problem. I'm the least qualified person but I think the pilot should know intuitively who is controlling the throttle and control surfaces, whether it's a 737 or an A320 or an F35, the number of incidents and mishaps that have been caused by misuse of misunderstanding of automation seems like it's been a problem for a long time
Yep, they could easily install an optic transmitter on the stern of the ship for the aircraft to sense when it's lined up for landing, then auto engaging PLM.
The Pilot, a Lt. on his first cruise, was graded as a Top 5 Nugget, Top 10 Ball Flyer, so he was doing very well. He kept his wings but is done flying and serving in a different role in the Navy. I also heard on a different channel that the LSO was seriously injured and was flown 500 miles. Navy Times has a write up and another channel has a pretty good review also.
I saw the other channel's review as well - I was curious as to why the mishap pilot was removed permanently from flight status. Is there no way back for the pilot in this situation?
@Corsair37 he apparently suffered a back injury but I don't know if that played a roll in his status or not. It's unfortunate though since he seemed on track to have an excellent flying career.
If you're in manual, semi-automatic landing mode (computer controls throttle only), or full automatic landing mode it should be glaringly obvious in the user interface what mode you're in. Something like key control indicators change to different colors for each automatic mode.
It seems the review board came to this same conclusion. I'm a bit baffled as to why manual mode didn't already have any "idiot lights" or Betty tones associated, since it is considered to be the "degraded performance" option. Better to add it late than never, i suppose? Not having it looks like it cost the LSO his wings, though.
@@jimallen8186something can both be human error and also be preventable by better designed systems The whole point of well designed systems is to minimize the possibility and damage of simple human mistakes.
interesting analysis, I was a Crash ALPO in the 90's and I was surprised the Bos'N had the Crash truck so close to the landing area. When I was in, we would spot it between Cats 1/2 and another one forward of the 6/8 pack depending on the ship.
Excellent report as always, Mover! Although everyone survived, it's sad on many counts. Several lives seriously and permanently impacted in such a short series of moments. It sounds like poor Paddles got the worst of all this. How fragile we humans and our lives actually are !
Trying a maneuver for the first time with no prebrief was a recipe for trouble. LSO was nearly morted and will never fly again due to his injuries. Prayers for the continued recovery of all involved.
@T.J. Kong The Section Lead pilot turned Lead position over to the nugget wingman on the RTB leg of the hop to provide him with some Section Lead training. A normal practice.
Totally agree. Lack of pre-brief was a critical part of this incident. The actual lead should have intervened here IMHO. He could have had the LT do the SH break part with a planned early go around to get a feel for all the elements.
@T.J. Kong It’s routine to allow a qualified nugget to take the lead as part of their training. The mishap was a result of the pilot’s personal decision to attempt a SHB landing.
@T.J. Kong not really possible to be a follower for the procedure he was attempting. Not super well explained by mover, but SHB doesn't just mean breaking slightly faster, it means breaking before crossing the deck edge, further quickening the timeline. Can't do that as the follower as you wouldn't have the proper interval on the proceeding aircraft. Deciding to do it real time is less desirable than planning it ahead of time, but it doesn't look like the investigators considered that a major factor. Bottom line is he forgot to hit that switch.
@@user-fn6pq9tp2g ALL THIS IS CRAP! All the nugget has to do when he was HIGH AND FAST AT THE 45 was tell the Boss he was going around, fly the BRC and not climb. The Boss would have called his downwind or departed him. BASIC. SHIP SOP AND “HEADWORK!” AIR WING TWO- USS RANGER
Yet every other incident-free landing with F-35Cs in the fleet has been done with IDLC and/or DFP. First flight of F-35C was in 2010. They did very aggressive and intensive carrier integration testing with the F-35C, including a hook re-design, further development of carrier landing modes common to the Super Hornet, and the F-35C started racking up a better trap rate than even the Block II Super Bug. They took the improved carrier landing mode DFP from F-35C and are integrating it into the Super Hornet. That's how good it is.
To me one of the interesting parts of the timeline is looking at the time from ramp strike to where the crash/fire response happens. I think it was 14 seconds. Remarkable.
Well, they still have other jets, possibly low on fuel, still in the pattern. They need to clear the only available landing surface potentially within 1000 miles, or they'll have more jets in the drink.
@@BonesCapone yes, and we saw they diverted to the other carrier as the deck couldn’t be cleared… perhaps a weakness of composite aircraft exposed? How quick should they be able to clear the landing area? Their response was fast. Have our newer jets rendered what was appropriate response inadequate? And at what point do we risk FOD iot complete the recovery?
Excellent video, I‘ve been reading accident reports (both civil & military) for decades but you add so much more information to it that it‘s way more interesting/insightful to us non-pilots (well at least RC in my case). Thanks a lot and keep up the good work!
Retired AF here - F-4, F-16, F-18 (Marine exchange, w/ 19 carrier landings). I once hit the break at 500 kts in the F-4. Very difficult getting slowed down... and with such a wide pattern not sure I saved any time getting it on the ground. I don't see any tactical/combat advantage being so fast at the break.
Their argument would be for doing the breaks earlier with quicker arrivals so as to minimize the time the ship needs to “steam into the wind.” While the ship conducts aircraft operations, it is limited in maneuverability and is much more vulnerable. So, there is merit to getting everyone in faster, but I disagree with it as such increases risk of a wave-off or of a bolter either due to poor pattern, which in turn delays the whole recovery period. And then there’s this element with the FOD by the composite aircraft shutting down the deck for so long; doesn’t speak well for combat recoveries. You could also argue that if you make your marshall time on time, you’ve no need to be fast to get to the recovery (he wasn’t actually that fast at 400 (350 is the norm)). But they’d still push for a division to break sooner to not push too far upwind. Yet we seem to be just fine doing such even if we get a little far upwind with -4, nobody actually cares about such. Next division can “spin two” with no negative impact to the recovery.
There is one other item of note. The LSO was injured and needed to be flown to the PI, but the doctor aboard the carrier told the CMV-22B crew that they needed to keep the pilot as close to wave top level during the entire flight. The pilots balked at that and said that they would need to fly at least above 100 ft. So instead of a fast 200+knot flight to the hospital in the CMV-22B, a MH-60 had to do what the CMV-22B could not do, fly at wave top level to the PI.
Thanks for the Dragnet style “just the facts” reading style. I’m glad the pilot survived, I pray the injured fully recovered and I lament the loss of 100 million plus for a looks cool shit hot break. Stay safe out there folks.
this sounds pretty much exactly like asiana airlines flight 214 - the pilot flying didn't realize that the boeing jet he was flying wouldn't automatically maintain airspeed the way an airbus would, and lost too much altitude and hit the sea wall.
This is what concerns me about more automation with cars. Yes the systems are probably very good but not when there is confusion with operator not knowing if a certain mode is activated.
Like when I practice flying a r22 with the govenor off. You can do it in normal situations but when you get saturated your brain implodes and you stop flying...
Mover offers some of the most interesting content presented in a calm, level-headed manner. Everything is very professionally done with knowledgeable, interesting guests of similar demeanor. No histrionics, no finger-pointing, just the facts, Ma'am. Between Mover and Ward Carroll, I'm never without entertaining and informative content.
There"s a lot to be said for old fashioned stick and rudder training. Great explanation. well done. Just sad that the LSO seems to have suffered life changing injuries.
I designed tail hook buffer seal, and fixed the flight control seals. I know it's bad to say but honestly, I'm relieved to hear that neither of these were a factor in this accident.
Be glad you weren't on F-14 or F/A-18 during their first 10 years of operational service. During that time, they had: 73 F-14 losses, 19 fatalities 97 F/A-18 losses, 27 fatalities F-16 had 143 airframe losses with 71 fatalities its first 10 years.
@LRRPFco52 My uncle accounts for 2 of those F-16 airframe losses, he had to eject twice about 6 or 7 years apart. Was aircraft malfunction both times though as he kept his wings and kept flying.
Reminds me of the civilian accident reports that Mentour Pilot does on his channel. It seems like quite a few of them involve the pilot mistakenly thinking that an automated feature was engaged when it wasn’t, or mistakenly thinking an automated feature *wasn’t* engaged when it was engaged.
Lord! I fly a Cessna 182 and I don't understand most of this. The only help I get landing is my wife giving me instructions, like she does when I'm driving. Thanks for the report.
I mostly want to know how much trouble that sailor on the flight deck got into for snapping a photo of the jet on their cellphone floating in the ocean and leaked it seemingly before it even sank all the way to the sea floor. That afternoon I already saw that photo. Those smart phone photos are full of metadata that makes it easy to find out who took them, I bet.
They were dealt with according to the UCMJ and the Captain of the ship took care of it. It could have been a loss of rank plus 2 months 1/2 pay, this is an educated guess from an old Sailor.
@@gregorymaupin6388 Thats all? Remember this could have given chinese the frigging GPS coordinates to the location of the sunken brand new technologically advanced fighter aircraft, if they could get the original file.
Wow. Thank you Mr. C.W. I feel badly for the pilot. I hope his career isn’t over because of his mishap. Apart from this mishap the pilot was noted to be proficient. With pilots at such a premium now hopefully this mistake will not take his wings.
No. My friend was on the Wasp back in 95 (I think) and a Harrier had a brake problem while rolling take off. The pilot ejected and landed on the flight deck while the AC went into the Atlantic. He said they hanged around for some time then moved on. For this incident, they did move on and the AC was recovered some time later by a team hired by the USN. There was big speculation on whether the PRC would try to recover the AC before the US did. I will bet in both incidents the ships were plotting their location.
I would not call it a automation Issue, it's still the pilot at the controls. For instance In trucking (Large fleets in particular) we have huge amounts of automation everything from idle speed to the transmission to radar guided cruise control and automated collision avoidance. But at the end of the day we are the driver at that wheel and the one sitting behind bars for smashing into the school bus when it fails. Moral of the story here is if you trust a computer to do your job you have already failed. Honestly I find it more distracting than anything since you spend your time checking if the computer is doing it right instead of just doing it yourself the right way first. TLDR at the end lol: They fucked up.
Agreed. It was over-reliance on automation that caused this, it was the pilot’s compressing his own timeline when he wasn’t up to handling it yet, his failure to use the automation as intended, and some systemic issues (such as no indicator for non-engagement and leaving engagement entirely to pilot discretion) that made that an easier mistake to make. His expectation that the automation would cause the plane to react a particular way was 4th or 5th down on the list of contributory factors at least. He was already behind the curve at that point, and even if he had realized it a second or two sooner, it probably wouldn’t have made a difference.
The report mentions the AOA and I've seen it defined as "the angle between the oncoming air or relative wind and a reference line on the airplane or wing". If an F/A-18 manual mentions a certain AOA what is the reference line for that ? Is it some line connecting the leading edge and trailing edge of the wing, is it the longitudinal axis of the body, or what ? Would there even be a difference between those ?
@T.J. Kong Very helpful, thanks !! The precise axis might matter if you're trying to demonstrate that the apparent rotation of something in an ATFLIR video is caused by the pod rotating at the same time. :) If the pitch of the pod in the model is off by 2 degrees it messes things up a bit. We have a way of estimating the pitch based on the angle of the cue dot, but it'd be great to have some added confirmation. The model seems to work with a maximum range AoA value at the right altitude listed in the F/A-18 E/F NATOPS. However, the encounter in the video was said to have occurred while returning to base, low on fuel, which suggests we might need a maximum endurance AoA instead ? Is it possible that the ATFLIR pod is mounted at a slight angle relative to the reference axis that the AoA in the manual is using ? If you know, or happen to know a guy who knows a guy who knows, that would be amazing ! This is about trying to figure out the Gimbal UFO video. :) The New York Times and ABC News have reported, via an anonymous government source, that the apparent rotation in that video is an artifact of the camera, and we have a model which confirms that, but some people still doubt it, so we'd like to continue addressing any remaining uncertainties.
Haha. Loved the last comment about the audio mishap. I recorded an hour long motorcycle ride only to realise my Go-Pro has slipped and was pointing directly at the tank the entire time. Doh!
So from now on all F-35C pilots must use the APC/DFP mode to land on carriers, but what if the APC/DFP mode malfunctions and the pilot has to manually recover the plane? Will future F-35C pilots be trained sufficiently in landing onboard carriers without APC/DFP mode?
You are totally a Garand Thumb fan. I like you even more. Or maybe you don’t but like the spoof, either way, love the channel.
Год назад+2
Automation complacency even in fighter jets? Is this good? :) I'm surprised that fighter pilots dont use manual throttle control all the time. What I've heard is that they generally "hate" automatics, and most will fly manually. And also the do a better job at keeping speed compared to the auto-throttle, considering it can't see into the future. Admittedly for a very much older gen aircraft.
I did that once when I just couldn't get to sleep before a mission over Iraq. I reported in, told them I had been unable to sleep and didn't feel safe to fly, and they thanked me for my honesty and found someone else who was willing and able to go. There were no repercussions for me.
If the jet takes control of throttle in the advanced landing mode, why not have the throttle manually at max anyway, then if the automatic system wasn't working at least the default, manual method, would prevail? If it was working, automatic thrust adjustments would override manual max thrust?
Great analysis and very down to earth (no pun intended). Often there is a lot of bulls**t by folks that don't know how it is. There are people that make mistakes and address them as best they can. There are other people who spend their time denying making a mistake. I know who I want to hang around with.
Amazing how it doesn’t matter what you fly, we all can learn from any ones mistake. We all work from check lists for the most part and it’s always a good reminder to not forget a step.
Checklists only work in Ordered Systems. We don’t always work from checklists. In the case of fighters, after the first few flights, only takeoff (or catapult launch) and landing are done by list except for abnormality/emergency. And if these be compounded, sometimes they aren’t even done by the lists. As for not forgetting a step, such is human nature. It is easy to get distracted then pick up at the wrong spot of a list. This is why flows QA’ed by checklist as opposed to “do-list” are great. You can still miss but much less likely as you’ve had two chances to hit the steps. Note the redacted JAGMAN was wrong to see the cause as incomplete landing checklist. There were too many other links in this causal chain to pin it all on this. Some of the links, such as failing to adhere to two LSO “Rules to Live By” weren’t even captured in the report. This, in turn, shows others could have prevented this too as the LSOs could have waived him off earlier for violating these rules, could have anticipated the problem earlier by seeing the rules violated, though much like the pilot, were probably lulled in to false sense of security by how well the automated systems have worked in the past. “Children of the Magenta” should be mandatory viewing for all while the command cultures should also be questioned. As should noting the “automated” system, which isn’t actually automated but really assisted, requires exact opposite inputs to that which would be used in manual and used in any other airplane - automated required pulling up when low energy - that is poor human interface design.
@@jimallen8186 I did try to include a for the most part. Maybe I should have said we all learned using checklists, some are memorized some are not completely. Either way your response was very detailed. Thanks for the correction and education. Always amazing to see how intricate flying can get, especially when you get past a Cessna. 🤙🏻
I have a question, not a pilot, if the flight computer commands engine thrust changes, does the physical stick in the pilot's hand move to reflect those commands in the F-35? Does this happen in Boeings or Airbuses? In fact I'm pretty sure it doesn't in Airbuses, which I've always thought to be a missed opportunity for computer-human interfacing. It's a lot easier to understand what the computer's doing if it moves the controls under your hand.
@@jimmyjs8907 It's not multi billion for one, and the second thing is that he had to have been one of the top ranked students in order to fly an F-35, so I doubt that they would have just removed his flight status so easily.
Good straight-up analysis. Anyone know if: * the physical throttle moves with power demand by the automation ( override force was mentioned and it'd be daft if it didn't ) * they're trained to guard/follow the throttle with the left hand Given his speed into the groove there probably wasn't any demand for thrust most of the way, but I'm curious if there was training to recognise any lack of throttle movement that should have been coupled with his pull on the stick - provided the plane *does* move the throttle. That would seem to be the ultimate autothrottle check system. Maybe it's downplayed as a concept to rdduce saturation?
Something else to which I’m curious in that discussion was that the black box reporting was the modes were never engaged. That is different than the modes never being attempted to engage. Assuming he was really fast, which he was, he likely was holding pressure back on the throttle while holding “speed brakes” out; would such inhibit attempt to engage as it cancels already engaged? I don’t trust his recall of not completing the checklist as memory is fallable and we can change our memory to fit facts. See Dave Snowden’s reference to radiologists with 17% seeing the ape and later recalling not seeing such. I’d also like to point out procedural controls like prohibiting speed brake in close are the weakest form of control outside risk transference (transference really not being a risk control at all).
I LOVE your very last comment at the very end there considering this video's very topic is - _Human Error._ I wonder if that was the reason you did it. Bravo! Well done.
If in this you mean “human error” as in any of us could have done it, then yes, agree with the sentiment. Such seemed to me to be the presenter’s sentiment near the end. If, however, we’re looking at the JAGMAN conclusion of this human’s error, then, no completely disagree. Unfortunately it also seemed to me the presenter bought this conclusion at face value. There were lots of systemic errors here and lots of systemic vulnerabilities that were going to lead to the human errors given adequate time. We can see this as the Recs as they don’t match the Conclusions which don’t match the Findings of Fact. It really is worthwhile to compare this with both The Atlantic’s The Deadly Myth Human Error Causes Car Crashes and with ProPublica’s Disaster in the Pacific.
My own opinion is that the over-reliance on automation encourages complacency, and ignorance. There's no substitute for a pilot understanding the jet 100%, and being able to pilot the thing under all situations.
5th gen aircraft are sick… but I’m kind of relieved I’m learning a 4th gen fresh out of UPT. Notes, warnings, cautions are written in blood and past experiences. In academics alone we’ve had instructors that said they were the ones who added a caution/note. I couldn’t imagine being among the first to encounter/do something that leads to an addition in a checklist
We lost 519 4th Gen fighters with 189 fatalities in their first 10 years of operational service alone. There are still TCTOs out on some that have resulted in recent fatalities because they weren't corrected at the unit level. We have lost 65 F-16s in the past 10 years, with 38 fatalities. Super Hornet is experiencing engine failures that were almost non-existent in the Baby Hornet.
@@LRRPFco52 not surprised to read those numbers. I hate seeing we’ve lost that many pilots, but hopefully the info provided by the SIBs will prevent further mishaps and make us younger pilots more knowledgeable. That’s what i meant when i said I “preferred” getting a 4th gen over a 5th (especially the f-35). More fleshed out checklist with numerous added NWCs from over the years compared to a relatively new aircraft. Thank god for AGCAS and the numerous other additions made to save pilot lives. Wish they were added sooner, would’ve saved a couple hundred pilots the past two decades.
@@Incah2036 We were on the F-16 CTF at Edwards in the 1980s, then F-15 CTF. I don't recall ever seeing the loss/fatality statistics back then, but we did hear about individual crashes sometimes and the wire chaffing problem with the Viper. There was even a movie about it called Afterburn. "Lawn Dart" moniker was thrown around, but a lot of the mishaps were CFIT and GLOC, as well as BFM mid-airs. The early F100-PW-200 had all sorts of problems, as did the PW-100 in the Eagle. USAF got fed up as did Navy with TF30 in the F-14, which kicked off the engine wars. That led to the F100-PW-229 and GE F110, which had major improvements in reliability over the first-gen F100s. One of the most common mishaps I see still with Vipers is runway overshoots. They don't like to be put down.
But don’t let that line stop you from making changes. Some immediate actions as well as warnings and cautions outlive their usefulness as system changes render them moot but because “they were written in blood,” we refuse to take them out of the manual.
We recommended early on (like in 2007-2009) that the default be automated landing but were overridden by the customer. We knew this would happen. Glad the pilot safely ejected, he got lucky, or was very quick or both, That is all (a recently retired Ph.D. Principal Software/Aerospace Engineer with the two current frontline F planes' mothership).
This is the way it is in the Rhino. PLM is default but can revert to rate by depressing the NWS button while on landing config.
Thanks Steve and happy retirement. Most folks who are not intimate with the airplane blame the aircraft they have no clue that the contractor have to comply with the customer's requirements and have no recourse but to wait until a mishap occurs! Navy regs are written in blood so no surprise here.
the phenomenon of thinking the automation system is working when it's not seems like an interface problem. I'm the least qualified person but I think the pilot should know intuitively who is controlling the throttle and control surfaces, whether it's a 737 or an A320 or an F35, the number of incidents and mishaps that have been caused by misuse of misunderstanding of automation seems like it's been a problem for a long time
to be fair theres probably other things that go into the decision, but yeah that came to mind immediately indeed
Yep, they could easily install an optic transmitter on the stern of the ship for the aircraft to sense when it's lined up for landing, then auto engaging PLM.
The Pilot, a Lt. on his first cruise, was graded as a Top 5 Nugget, Top 10 Ball Flyer, so he was doing very well. He kept his wings but is done flying and serving in a different role in the Navy. I also heard on a different channel that the LSO was seriously injured and was flown 500 miles. Navy Times has a write up and another channel has a pretty good review also.
@Gregory Maupin I watched it prior to this one but thanks!
I saw the other channel's review as well - I was curious as to why the mishap pilot was removed permanently from flight status. Is there no way back for the pilot in this situation?
@Corsair37 he apparently suffered a back injury but I don't know if that played a roll in his status or not. It's unfortunate though since he seemed on track to have an excellent flying career.
You watched Mooches video….
@@PennHoo Thank you....that makes sense. Definitely a shame if an injury shortened his career.
Straight to the point! No nonsense review! Love it!
Hillarious take on editing at the end. Well done, brother. Informative and entertaining. Thanks!
Wombat is fantastic! Thanks for bringing him in once in awhile!
If you're in manual, semi-automatic landing mode (computer controls throttle only), or full automatic landing mode it should be glaringly obvious in the user interface what mode you're in. Something like key control indicators change to different colors for each automatic mode.
It seems the review board came to this same conclusion. I'm a bit baffled as to why manual mode didn't already have any "idiot lights" or Betty tones associated, since it is considered to be the "degraded performance" option. Better to add it late than never, i suppose? Not having it looks like it cost the LSO his wings, though.
@@ShuRugal A recommendation which disagrees with the conclusion that the cause of this was the pilot failing to complete a landing checklist.
@@jimallen8186something can both be human error and also be preventable by better designed systems
The whole point of well designed systems is to minimize the possibility and damage of simple human mistakes.
interesting analysis, I was a Crash ALPO in the 90's and I was surprised the Bos'N had the Crash truck so close to the landing area. When I was in, we would spot it between Cats 1/2 and another one forward of the 6/8 pack depending on the ship.
Excellent report as always, Mover! Although everyone survived, it's sad on many counts. Several lives seriously and permanently impacted in such a short series of moments. It sounds like poor Paddles got the worst of all this. How fragile we humans and our lives actually are !
This is great. Professional and well done. Thanks Mover.
Trying a maneuver for the first time with no prebrief was a recipe for trouble. LSO was nearly morted and will never fly again due to his injuries. Prayers for the continued recovery of all involved.
@T.J. Kong
The Section Lead pilot turned Lead position over to the nugget wingman on the RTB leg of the hop to provide him with some Section Lead training. A normal practice.
Totally agree. Lack of pre-brief was a critical part of this incident. The actual lead should have intervened here IMHO. He could have had the LT do the SH break part with a planned early go around to get a feel for all the elements.
@T.J. Kong It’s routine to allow a qualified nugget to take the lead as part of their training. The mishap was a result of the pilot’s personal decision to attempt a SHB landing.
@T.J. Kong not really possible to be a follower for the procedure he was attempting. Not super well explained by mover, but SHB doesn't just mean breaking slightly faster, it means breaking before crossing the deck edge, further quickening the timeline. Can't do that as the follower as you wouldn't have the proper interval on the proceeding aircraft. Deciding to do it real time is less desirable than planning it ahead of time, but it doesn't look like the investigators considered that a major factor. Bottom line is he forgot to hit that switch.
@@user-fn6pq9tp2g
ALL THIS IS CRAP!
All the nugget has to do when he was HIGH AND FAST AT THE 45 was tell the Boss he was going around, fly the BRC and not climb. The Boss would have called his downwind or departed him.
BASIC. SHIP SOP AND “HEADWORK!”
AIR WING TWO- USS RANGER
I take your point about not learning not to blindly trust the automation. I've seen it in non-aviation contexts...
Yet every other incident-free landing with F-35Cs in the fleet has been done with IDLC and/or DFP.
First flight of F-35C was in 2010. They did very aggressive and intensive carrier integration testing with the F-35C, including a hook re-design, further development of carrier landing modes common to the Super Hornet, and the F-35C started racking up a better trap rate than even the Block II Super Bug. They took the improved carrier landing mode DFP from F-35C and are integrating it into the Super Hornet. That's how good it is.
Thanks for breaking this one down Mover. Hopefully the injured have healed, and everyone has their heads on straight.
Would be very interested in hearing about DFP/APC procedures during inclement weather / pitching deck
To me one of the interesting parts of the timeline is looking at the time from ramp strike to where the crash/fire response happens. I think it was 14 seconds. Remarkable.
Well, they still have other jets, possibly low on fuel, still in the pattern. They need to clear the only available landing surface potentially within 1000 miles, or they'll have more jets in the drink.
Deck crew responses were on point for sure.
They were literally standing around waiting for this exact thing to happen. It's like someone trying to steal a car in a police station parking lot.
@@BonesCapone yes, and we saw they diverted to the other carrier as the deck couldn’t be cleared… perhaps a weakness of composite aircraft exposed? How quick should they be able to clear the landing area? Their response was fast. Have our newer jets rendered what was appropriate response inadequate? And at what point do we risk FOD iot complete the recovery?
Glad the pilot and the other injured survived. Good job on the coverage as always Mover. I am sure it is not fun reading those reports.
Reminded me of some film we watched in boot for fire fighting awareness back in '80. On a ship, there's no where to go - gotta' contain that fire.
Ouch ... good to know no one got killed. Much sadness about the extensive and continuing injuries .
Excellent video, I‘ve been reading accident reports (both civil & military) for decades but you add so much more information to it that it‘s way more interesting/insightful to us non-pilots (well at least RC in my case). Thanks a lot and keep up the good work!
Retired AF here - F-4, F-16, F-18 (Marine exchange, w/ 19 carrier landings). I once hit the break at 500 kts in the F-4. Very difficult getting slowed down... and with such a wide pattern not sure I saved any time getting it on the ground. I don't see any tactical/combat advantage being so fast at the break.
Their argument would be for doing the breaks earlier with quicker arrivals so as to minimize the time the ship needs to “steam into the wind.” While the ship conducts aircraft operations, it is limited in maneuverability and is much more vulnerable. So, there is merit to getting everyone in faster, but I disagree with it as such increases risk of a wave-off or of a bolter either due to poor pattern, which in turn delays the whole recovery period. And then there’s this element with the FOD by the composite aircraft shutting down the deck for so long; doesn’t speak well for combat recoveries. You could also argue that if you make your marshall time on time, you’ve no need to be fast to get to the recovery (he wasn’t actually that fast at 400 (350 is the norm)). But they’d still push for a division to break sooner to not push too far upwind. Yet we seem to be just fine doing such even if we get a little far upwind with -4, nobody actually cares about such. Next division can “spin two” with no negative impact to the recovery.
Man, landing a tank like the f-4 on a ship had to be a real experience.
Outstanding coverage and good on you for putting up with another take
Great reporting Mover. And most gracious - “there for the grace of God go I.”
There is one other item of note.
The LSO was injured and needed to be flown to the PI, but the doctor aboard the carrier told the CMV-22B crew that they needed to keep the pilot as close to wave top level during the entire flight. The pilots balked at that and said that they would need to fly at least above 100 ft. So instead of a fast 200+knot flight to the hospital in the CMV-22B, a MH-60 had to do what the CMV-22B could not do, fly at wave top level to the PI.
Why would the height matter?
@@alexg5107 higher the altitude the lower the air pressure, this can cause problems for patients with trauma and concussions, open wounds.
@@pogo1140 Got it, thanks! Surprised the osprey pilots denied doing that.
He forgot to turn the APC on. They left him his wings, but he will never fly again.
Good job CPT C W Lamoine. MOVER..
There report review videos are excellent. Keep'm coming.
Thanks for the Dragnet style “just the facts” reading style. I’m glad the pilot survived, I pray the injured fully recovered and I lament the loss of 100 million plus for a looks cool shit hot break. Stay safe out there folks.
Cant wait for the mishap report on the audio recording snafu. 🙂
Been waiting for this review from THIS channel, not some other click bait channels with cartoony thumbnails.
Great breakdown, thanks.
Love your novels by the way. I read them too quickly, always seem to be waiting for the next one 😀
Love the end of video🤣🤣🤣So frustrating about the audio I’m sure! We appreciate your channel!
this sounds pretty much exactly like asiana airlines flight 214 - the pilot flying didn't realize that the boeing jet he was flying wouldn't automatically maintain airspeed the way an airbus would, and lost too much altitude and hit the sea wall.
Mooch did a video about it the other day. You did a much more detailed explanation. Thanks, Mover.
This is what concerns me about more automation with cars. Yes the systems are probably very good but not when there is confusion with operator not knowing if a certain mode is activated.
Like when I practice flying a r22 with the govenor off. You can do it in normal situations but when you get saturated your brain implodes and you stop flying...
Thanks Mover, glad he got out and lived to see another day. Props to Martin-Baker.
Mover offers some of the most interesting content presented in a calm, level-headed manner. Everything is very professionally done with knowledgeable, interesting guests of similar demeanor.
No histrionics, no finger-pointing, just the facts, Ma'am. Between Mover and Ward Carroll, I'm never without entertaining and informative content.
I'm sure mp is happy he get to do take 2.
Excellent job going through the report Mover, thank you.
Nice presentation. Thank you.
Great vid mover!! Keep 'em coming!
Thanks for explaining this so even non pilots can understand.
Accidents happen. Equipment can be replaced.
Thankfully the men are all still with us.
I liked the end comment, keeping in mind trusting the automation and all.
Thank you. I appreciate these videos.
Kudos for re-recording the whole thing Mover
There"s a lot to be said for old fashioned stick and rudder training. Great explanation. well done. Just sad that the LSO seems to have suffered life changing injuries.
Excellent job thank you
Thank you C.W. you gave me a lot more info on what all it takes to land aircraft either on land or ship, how you guys do it wow Polly!
Loved the GarandThumb reference! 😇
The question is what is his deductible?
Good summation. TY
I designed tail hook buffer seal, and fixed the flight control seals. I know it's bad to say but honestly, I'm relieved to hear that neither of these were a factor in this accident.
Be glad you weren't on F-14 or F/A-18 during their first 10 years of operational service. During that time, they had:
73 F-14 losses, 19 fatalities
97 F/A-18 losses, 27 fatalities
F-16 had 143 airframe losses with 71 fatalities its first 10 years.
@@LRRPFco52 gravity is a bitch
@LRRPFco52 My uncle accounts for 2 of those F-16 airframe losses, he had to eject twice about 6 or 7 years apart. Was aircraft malfunction both times though as he kept his wings and kept flying.
@@jcast25 Do you know the dates or what units he was with? We can look up each incident and usually see what the circumstances were.
Reminds me of the civilian accident reports that Mentour Pilot does on his channel. It seems like quite a few of them involve the pilot mistakenly thinking that an automated feature was engaged when it wasn’t, or mistakenly thinking an automated feature *wasn’t* engaged when it was engaged.
yeah but in the second case automation is easy to override if it was engaged and you thought it wasnt
See Children of the Magenta
Excellent synopsis Mover.
Nice, with the Garand Thumb sign-off.
good stuff.....cheers from Florida, Paul
If one wants to read the AIB report in its' entirety, it is on the USNI web page.
Which is linked in the description. 👍
Thanks!
Lord! I fly a Cessna 182 and I don't understand most of this. The only help I get landing is my wife giving me instructions, like she does when I'm driving. Thanks for the report.
Thanks for doing these.
I mostly want to know how much trouble that sailor on the flight deck got into for snapping a photo of the jet on their cellphone floating in the ocean and leaked it seemingly before it even sank all the way to the sea floor. That afternoon I already saw that photo. Those smart phone photos are full of metadata that makes it easy to find out who took them, I bet.
They were dealt with according to the UCMJ and the Captain of the ship took care of it. It could have been a loss of rank plus 2 months 1/2 pay, this is an educated guess from an old Sailor.
@@gregorymaupin6388 Thats all? Remember this could have given chinese the frigging GPS coordinates to the location of the sunken brand new technologically advanced fighter aircraft, if they could get the original file.
@@thevictoryoverhimself7298 It's not like the USN carrier group wasn't literally right on top of it. You think they just sailed off? Damn.
Your right
@@gregorymaupin6388 "USMJ"(sic)
UCMJ
Thankyou for getting it done right in take 2 xD But, thats actually another point why i dont really trust automation in anything
That was excellent. Thanks.
Wow. Thank you Mr. C.W. I feel badly for the pilot. I hope his career isn’t over because of his mishap. Apart from this mishap the pilot was noted to be proficient. With pilots at such a premium now hopefully this mistake will not take his wings.
So, good pilot/bad day?
Thanks.
Don’t they use pre-landing checklists?
If there's a crash into the ocean does the whole strike group stop until the plane is recovered?
No. My friend was on the Wasp back in 95 (I think) and a Harrier had a brake problem while rolling take off. The pilot ejected and landed on the flight deck while the AC went into the Atlantic. He said they hanged around for some time then moved on. For this incident, they did move on and the AC was recovered some time later by a team hired by the USN. There was big speculation on whether the PRC would try to recover the AC before the US did. I will bet in both incidents the ships were plotting their location.
@@MotoroidARFC I’d be surprised if they didn’t deploy a submarine to keep station and make sure no one came poking.
I would not call it a automation Issue, it's still the pilot at the controls. For instance In trucking (Large fleets in particular) we have huge amounts of automation everything from idle speed to the transmission to radar guided cruise control and automated collision avoidance. But at the end of the day we are the driver at that wheel and the one sitting behind bars for smashing into the school bus when it fails. Moral of the story here is if you trust a computer to do your job you have already failed. Honestly I find it more distracting than anything since you spend your time checking if the computer is doing it right instead of just doing it yourself the right way first. TLDR at the end lol: They fucked up.
Agreed. It was over-reliance on automation that caused this, it was the pilot’s compressing his own timeline when he wasn’t up to handling it yet, his failure to use the automation as intended, and some systemic issues (such as no indicator for non-engagement and leaving engagement entirely to pilot discretion) that made that an easier mistake to make. His expectation that the automation would cause the plane to react a particular way was 4th or 5th down on the list of contributory factors at least. He was already behind the curve at that point, and even if he had realized it a second or two sooner, it probably wouldn’t have made a difference.
The report mentions the AOA and I've seen it defined as "the angle between the oncoming air or relative wind and a reference line on the airplane or wing". If an F/A-18 manual mentions a certain AOA what is the reference line for that ? Is it some line connecting the leading edge and trailing edge of the wing, is it the longitudinal axis of the body, or what ? Would there even be a difference between those ?
@T.J. Kong Very helpful, thanks !! The precise axis might matter if you're trying to demonstrate that the apparent rotation of something in an ATFLIR video is caused by the pod rotating at the same time. :) If the pitch of the pod in the model is off by 2 degrees it messes things up a bit. We have a way of estimating the pitch based on the angle of the cue dot, but it'd be great to have some added confirmation. The model seems to work with a maximum range AoA value at the right altitude listed in the F/A-18 E/F NATOPS. However, the encounter in the video was said to have occurred while returning to base, low on fuel, which suggests we might need a maximum endurance AoA instead ? Is it possible that the ATFLIR pod is mounted at a slight angle relative to the reference axis that the AoA in the manual is using ? If you know, or happen to know a guy who knows a guy who knows, that would be amazing ! This is about trying to figure out the Gimbal UFO video. :) The New York Times and ABC News have reported, via an anonymous government source, that the apparent rotation in that video is an artifact of the camera, and we have a model which confirms that, but some people still doubt it, so we'd like to continue addressing any remaining uncertainties.
Love the Garand Thumb reference at the end lol.
Haha. Loved the last comment about the audio mishap. I recorded an hour long motorcycle ride only to realise my Go-Pro has slipped and was pointing directly at the tank the entire time. Doh!
My 20+ language father gone down 10 years ago. He was into some magic stuff, too.
Love you guys all
Hello, Mr. Alien.
So from now on all F-35C pilots must use the APC/DFP mode to land on carriers, but what if the APC/DFP mode malfunctions and the pilot has to manually recover the plane? Will future F-35C pilots be trained sufficiently in landing onboard carriers without APC/DFP mode?
Nah - it will never break
You are totally a Garand Thumb fan. I like you even more. Or maybe you don’t but like the spoof, either way, love the channel.
Automation complacency even in fighter jets? Is this good? :)
I'm surprised that fighter pilots dont use manual throttle control all the time. What I've heard is that they generally "hate" automatics, and most will fly manually. And also the do a better job at keeping speed compared to the auto-throttle, considering it can't see into the future. Admittedly for a very much older gen aircraft.
He goes full Garand Thumb at the end! Love it!! 🤣
Are there a lot of times where a pilot might say he is too tired or didn't sleep well enough to fly?
If a pilot doesn't sleep or is too tired, they can and should remove themselves from the schedule.
I did that once when I just couldn't get to sleep before a mission over Iraq. I reported in, told them I had been unable to sleep and didn't feel safe to fly, and they thanked me for my honesty and found someone else who was willing and able to go. There were no repercussions for me.
If the jet takes control of throttle in the advanced landing mode, why not have the throttle manually at max anyway, then if the automatic system wasn't working at least the default, manual method, would prevail? If it was working, automatic thrust adjustments would override manual max thrust?
32:39 Someone else watches Garand Thumb I see!
Great breakdown, Mover. Some good key takeaways for anyone operating machines.
My last squadron when I retired in 2010... I was an Argo when we flew F-18E's
Oh my goodness. There could be a Blue light kind of like the DLC notification on the S-3 back in the day to let the LSO know it is in auto mode.
Love the detail of the breakdown, 👌🏼
Seems like with more automation the error chain monster becomes more insidious. 🤔
Children of the Magenta
The late shot at Wombat was a nice touch.
yea it seemed like you had already read it all once but still good to hear a recap with insight
Great analysis and very down to earth (no pun intended). Often there is a lot of bulls**t by folks that don't know how it is. There are people that make mistakes and address them as best they can. There are other people who spend their time denying making a mistake. I know who I want to hang around with.
Id like to see a video on the F35 vertical crash in Ft Worth findings.
‘Can’t take your own wave off” so if the pilot felt like he/she were behind the aircraft they couldn’t “go around”?
Yes, He should have been resolving to doing a go around instead of trying to save the approach and get it aboard.
@@gtdcoder my question is- does “can’t take your own wave off” mean you aren’t allowed go around on your own accord?
Amazing how it doesn’t matter what you fly, we all can learn from any ones mistake. We all work from check lists for the most part and it’s always a good reminder to not forget a step.
Checklists only work in Ordered Systems. We don’t always work from checklists. In the case of fighters, after the first few flights, only takeoff (or catapult launch) and landing are done by list except for abnormality/emergency. And if these be compounded, sometimes they aren’t even done by the lists. As for not forgetting a step, such is human nature. It is easy to get distracted then pick up at the wrong spot of a list. This is why flows QA’ed by checklist as opposed to “do-list” are great. You can still miss but much less likely as you’ve had two chances to hit the steps. Note the redacted JAGMAN was wrong to see the cause as incomplete landing checklist. There were too many other links in this causal chain to pin it all on this. Some of the links, such as failing to adhere to two LSO “Rules to Live By” weren’t even captured in the report. This, in turn, shows others could have prevented this too as the LSOs could have waived him off earlier for violating these rules, could have anticipated the problem earlier by seeing the rules violated, though much like the pilot, were probably lulled in to false sense of security by how well the automated systems have worked in the past. “Children of the Magenta” should be mandatory viewing for all while the command cultures should also be questioned. As should noting the “automated” system, which isn’t actually automated but really assisted, requires exact opposite inputs to that which would be used in manual and used in any other airplane - automated required pulling up when low energy - that is poor human interface design.
@@jimallen8186 I did try to include a for the most part. Maybe I should have said we all learned using checklists, some are memorized some are not completely. Either way your response was very detailed. Thanks for the correction and education. Always amazing to see how intricate flying can get, especially when you get past a Cessna. 🤙🏻
Great video. What happened to the pilot in terms of penalty?
Keeps his wings but he'll never fly again in the Navy.
I have a question, not a pilot, if the flight computer commands engine thrust changes, does the physical stick in the pilot's hand move to reflect those commands in the F-35? Does this happen in Boeings or Airbuses? In fact I'm pretty sure it doesn't in Airbuses, which I've always thought to be a missed opportunity for computer-human interfacing. It's a lot easier to understand what the computer's doing if it moves the controls under your hand.
It's been reported the mishap pilot was allowed to keep his wings but his flight status has been permanently revoked.
Due to injury from the ejection I presume?
@@justalpha9138 I believe the reason for losing flight status was the loss of a multi billion dollar aircraft.
@@jimmyjs8907 It's not multi billion for one, and the second thing is that he had to have been one of the top ranked students in order to fly an F-35, so I doubt that they would have just removed his flight status so easily.
He got scapegoated.
Good straight-up analysis. Anyone know if:
* the physical throttle moves with power demand by the automation ( override force was mentioned and it'd be daft if it didn't )
* they're trained to guard/follow the throttle with the left hand
Given his speed into the groove there probably wasn't any demand for thrust most of the way, but I'm curious if there was training to recognise any lack of throttle movement that should have been coupled with his pull on the stick - provided the plane *does* move the throttle. That would seem to be the ultimate autothrottle check system. Maybe it's downplayed as a concept to rdduce saturation?
Something else to which I’m curious in that discussion was that the black box reporting was the modes were never engaged. That is different than the modes never being attempted to engage. Assuming he was really fast, which he was, he likely was holding pressure back on the throttle while holding “speed brakes” out; would such inhibit attempt to engage as it cancels already engaged? I don’t trust his recall of not completing the checklist as memory is fallable and we can change our memory to fit facts. See Dave Snowden’s reference to radiologists with 17% seeing the ape and later recalling not seeing such. I’d also like to point out procedural controls like prohibiting speed brake in close are the weakest form of control outside risk transference (transference really not being a risk control at all).
Hallelujah. 👍❤️
Amazing
The post-credits scene was worth waiting for, and explains a lot. Ca-knot.
I LOVE your very last comment at the very end there considering this video's very topic is - _Human Error._ I wonder if that was the reason you did it.
Bravo! Well done.
If in this you mean “human error” as in any of us could have done it, then yes, agree with the sentiment. Such seemed to me to be the presenter’s sentiment near the end. If, however, we’re looking at the JAGMAN conclusion of this human’s error, then, no completely disagree. Unfortunately it also seemed to me the presenter bought this conclusion at face value. There were lots of systemic errors here and lots of systemic vulnerabilities that were going to lead to the human errors given adequate time. We can see this as the Recs as they don’t match the Conclusions which don’t match the Findings of Fact. It really is worthwhile to compare this with both The Atlantic’s The Deadly Myth Human Error Causes Car Crashes and with ProPublica’s Disaster in the Pacific.
Nice Garand Thumb reference!
My own opinion is that the over-reliance on automation encourages complacency, and ignorance. There's no substitute for a pilot understanding the jet 100%, and being able to pilot the thing under all situations.
how does this "automated" system work in rough waters like down around the horn at night ?
5th gen aircraft are sick… but I’m kind of relieved I’m learning a 4th gen fresh out of UPT. Notes, warnings, cautions are written in blood and past experiences. In academics alone we’ve had instructors that said they were the ones who added a caution/note. I couldn’t imagine being among the first to encounter/do something that leads to an addition in a checklist
We lost 519 4th Gen fighters with 189 fatalities in their first 10 years of operational service alone.
There are still TCTOs out on some that have resulted in recent fatalities because they weren't corrected at the unit level.
We have lost 65 F-16s in the past 10 years, with 38 fatalities.
Super Hornet is experiencing engine failures that were almost non-existent in the Baby Hornet.
@@LRRPFco52 not surprised to read those numbers. I hate seeing we’ve lost that many pilots, but hopefully the info provided by the SIBs will prevent further mishaps and make us younger pilots more knowledgeable.
That’s what i meant when i said I “preferred” getting a 4th gen over a 5th (especially the f-35). More fleshed out checklist with numerous added NWCs from over the years compared to a relatively new aircraft.
Thank god for AGCAS and the numerous other additions made to save pilot lives. Wish they were added sooner, would’ve saved a couple hundred pilots the past two decades.
@@Incah2036 We were on the F-16 CTF at Edwards in the 1980s, then F-15 CTF. I don't recall ever seeing the loss/fatality statistics back then, but we did hear about individual crashes sometimes and the wire chaffing problem with the Viper. There was even a movie about it called Afterburn.
"Lawn Dart" moniker was thrown around, but a lot of the mishaps were CFIT and GLOC, as well as BFM mid-airs. The early F100-PW-200 had all sorts of problems, as did the PW-100 in the Eagle. USAF got fed up as did Navy with TF30 in the F-14, which kicked off the engine wars. That led to the F100-PW-229 and GE F110, which had major improvements in reliability over the first-gen F100s.
One of the most common mishaps I see still with Vipers is runway overshoots. They don't like to be put down.
If I do join the Air Force I'd love to fly the F-35. It's quickly become my favorite jet. I love everything about it, including how it looks.
But don’t let that line stop you from making changes. Some immediate actions as well as warnings and cautions outlive their usefulness as system changes render them moot but because “they were written in blood,” we refuse to take them out of the manual.