My Dad was on the USS Utah when it was sunk at PH, and was assigned to the USS Ralph Talbot and was at Savo Island. Not only was he lucky to survive but he went through the entire war without a scratch.
Thank you for stimulating my interest in the events of the Pacific Theater! I have long been interested in and researched the European Theater because my grandfather served there as a staff officer under General Harmon of the Second Arnored Division. I also knew his brother served in the Pacific and on a cruiser sunk by enemy action. By watching your videos of the event, Drachinifel's, and speaking to my parents generation; I figured out that my Great Uncle served as the Marine detachment commander on the USS Northampton. I only met my great uncle twice, but during one of our family reunions I spoke with him for a couple of hours about his service during the war and the time he spent in the water wwaiting for rescue. My interest in the Pacific War, caused me to mention some of what I learned here to two of my adult children. They also developed interest in these events. I both gave them a brief summary and a link back to your channel so they can pursue their own investigation. Thank you again for making this information accessible to people who are interested in these subjects but don't normally do historical research. Also, for awakening this interest in our future generations.
I like and comment every time to keep your excellent content going. I tried to explain to my twenty something neighbors why being a Captain in USN was an achievement that had few equivalents in life. Only a few hundred people at anytime. With responsibility and pressure that is not seen in any other profession. They laughed. I hope we aren't doomed. Thank you Captain Toti.
I'd also recommend The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal as well. It's the closest to a shot by shot account of the action in and around Iron Bottom Sound as is possible to discern.
@@MegaBloggs1 How much more critical did you think they should have been? I thought it was right on point. However, what other episodes did you feel "punches" were pulled. I'd like to go back and see if I missed anything, thanks. tm
I want to thank you men for this highly informative programming. I am a 3rd generation veteran 2nd gen Navy Veteran. My father was a Gun Captain on the Big E from 1940 to 1943. Received 4 combat purple hearts 3 on the Enterprise. He lost his brother on the Lexington and remained in the Navy almost 30 years . Retired a CO on the Uss Yuma ATF 93 when he retired. I learned of this magnificent Navy of ours at the feet of my father and his former shipmates. I knew the Navy was my calling a very young man. Very proud of the greatest generation to defend this nation. Thank You again.
Lovely to hear Bill discussing the night vision acuity tests carried out by Japan. This makes sense - a great deal of it. Who among us ever read of the 'highly-trained specialist Japanese lookouts, specially trained for night duties' and thought, at least at some point, "hey, this sounds weird"? Well, this is why it always sounded weird. Trained to have better night vision? Nah. *Selected* for it. *Then* trained as lookouts. Much more like it. The truth is always far more believable. Thanks Bill.
@@fakecubed I've known for a while that I have exceptionally poor night vision. When I worked with some high voltage electronics, a diagnostic we'd do sometimes was to either bias or float a test device at high voltage while keeping the room dark (and looking into the dark box holding the device) and looking for corona discharge. Everyone I ever compared with was better at seeing those discharges than me.
@@fakecubedas a simple grunt my night vision became "legendary" in my unit. At the time I didn't understand why, before night ops, Gunny would tell me to go sleep past dark and be ready for an all nighter. Lol, like my cats I just assumed everyone could see in the dark.
@@jonhenson5450Its simple, its basically how large your pupil can dialate on low light. Older people like me can have maybe 5,5mm pupil. Exceptional very young people can have 8mm pupil. The latter gets well over twice as much light into his eye to process.....
I’m glad my father didn’t arrive for another few weeks on the USS Washington (BB-56) I might not be here now had it been this kind of engagement in October. It’s amazing that the US command staff was so screwed up these were 05 and above! Not reserves and 90 day ensigns!
Montemayor is (slowly) going through pretty much the whole Pacific Theater with his animated maps and analysis. I expect this channel will finish the war long before he does, but his animations are really good for understanding the realtime tactical situation in these big battles, and I like his pauses to go over the decision-making of various commanders, weighing the pros and cons of different hypothetical actions. For example, in this battle, he talks about the decision by Mikawa not to attack the transports, concluding that the Japanese doctrine leaned in favor of letting the army deal with the Marines on Guadalcanal as they were insisting they could. And he talks about Mikawa essentially making the same calculated risk decision to preserve his surface ships in light of dealing disproportionate damage to the Allies, with what he thought he knew of the position of American carriers. Another feature of a lot of his videos is the fog of war, explaining how incomplete scouting information or mistaken reports can cause decisions that make no sense looking back with all the information we have now. Many of these battles, I know all the facts, but I don't necessarily know what subset of those facts the commanders knew at the time, and I can learn a lot from that.
1:06:13 Quincy's last salvo hit Chokai's bridge, nearly killing VDAM Mikawa and his staff. Mikawa lost his navigational maps from that salvo. Another reason Mikawa decided to call it a night, he didnt feel comfortable leading the Japanese Task Force without his navigation maps and the chance of a collision with one of his ships similar to what happened with Mogami and Mikuma during the Battle of Midway.
He not only had lost his charts, but his cruisers were out of formation and he believed that it would be at least an hour before he had them organized into battle order again.
@@leoamery I am not so sure that Scott would have been beaten. It is not likely that he would have 'won', but I think he would have inflicted sever damage to the Japanese task force. This would probably have been similar to Evans on the Johnston at the Battle of Leyte Gulf (Oct 1944) when he, all on his own and not from any direction or orders from his superiors, jumped into the 'frying pan' and attacked the invading force. While his ship was eventually sunk, and he no doubt went down with it, his actions spurred on all the others, and essentially we 'won' that battle. I think that Scott would have probably achieved something similar to Evans. Also, after all the so called learning from this battle, why did they put Callahan in charge instead of Scott in the next greatest defeat of the US Navy in Nov 1942??? I know it was due to a few days of seniority, but war and battles are not won on seniority! After all, Nimitz got to his position, and it was NOT due to seniority. I think the Navy often continued to make this very same mistake throughout the war.
@@leoamery slight correction: the USN’s destroyer launched torpedoes were the Mark 15. The Mark 14 was for submarines. That being said, both had many of the same problems and performed equally poorly early in the war.
I was fortunate to exchange some emails with Mackenzie Gregory who at the time was a Lt. bridge officer aboard the Canberra. Said the ship was so low in the water the following day he was able to step off it and directly onto the deck of the destroyer USS Blue. It took a lot of shells and crap Mk 14s to finish the Canberra when the decision to sink her was passed down. Mac went on to command Australia's first carrier.
I knew there were errors made, but you guys have shown that it was almost a comedy of errors, top to bottom, leading to a horrific night for so many good men.
I’m so glad you mentioned Jutland! Jutland had a night action where the Germans eluded their British pursuers. As a result, the British really developed their night fighting doctrine in the inter-war years. This training bore fruit at Cape Matapan against the Italians where they, and theirs no subtle way to say this, obliterated a cruiser formation. The “what-if” is what if the US took the same lessons and put that in their Naval Problems exercises….what if indeed…
@@kemarisiteThe British 15”/42 was a helluva rifle. It was an old gun by the time WWII rolled around but the Brits had tons of them & decades of experience using them.
I had missed this episode up to now. Another excellent episode even if, like your excellent Pellieu episode, it totally broke my heart to watch. I think your analysis is very, very good! Seth's brilliant historical perspective, augmented as always by Bill's usual brilliance in doctrinal and procedural analysis REALLY gets to the crux of the many errors of the USN and RAN. False assumptions, Allied over-confidence, lack of technical knowledge of RADAR and the underpinning excellence of IJN preparedness and weaponry for night surface actions all led to this tragic defeat. BZ guys!
My exwifes granfather was on Vinccense when it got hit and went down. He told me his story. His name is James Phillips. Lucky for him he made it to live a long life.
For a great animation video of this battle, (& also a 2 part Midway animation!) check out Montemayor 's channel: Here's is the Savo Island animination video; ruclips.net/video/lICRQPIduFc/видео.html
Just a note to say thanks for all the work you both are putting into these episodes... and also kudos for ignoring myths and revisionist history and relating what actually happened to the degree possible. I can tell that you're both very passionate in your pursuit of the facts, and telling the stories of the individual heroes is important to you.
I first heard the details about this catastrophe on Drachinifel's channel. But I have to say you do a splendid job of pounding on lessons learned. Your hypothetical about Mikawa completing his mission by taking out the transport ships really makes me understand why you say that Guadalcanal is the turning point of the war in the PTO. King and Nimitz would have been out, and the only remaining (US) defense for Australia in 1942 would have been... MacArthur !!! 🙄 Thank you for your videos, they are most informative and instructive ! Cheers from Belgium 🙂
Having been an airline pilot and a CRM facilitator , study after study of disasters it’s always a failure to recognize and stop a long chain of events that lead to a disaster
Excellent episode, many tough lessons. This is learning war the hard way. A stunning indictment of the U.S.Navy's leadership, which left its ships sadly unprepared for what they would face.
Excellent breakdown of this total failure of command. I studied this battle in boot camp. It was used to reinforce the importance of alert watch standers.
From my reading of the naval battles around Guadalcanal, Savo Island seems like a real radar obstacle. Just about every night engagement has Savo island interfering with radar image location and recognition.
@@gregorylumpkin2128 Better that US forces stay close to the area of concern. IJN forces could have easily looped around the island chain north or south.
Savo Island wasn’t a RADAR issue, islands don’t move, ship do. Trust in RADAR was the issue. If they had used RADAR to hit the Japanese ships they would have sunk because the long lance was far more dangerous on board. And SG radar was good to 100000yd or 15NM. And rain should not have significantly interfered at that band. And they should have been using the SC radar that was good to at least 30miles. Those picket ships either weren’t watching or didn’t believe the radar indications or both. I’m going for both. I think they saw them but didn’t believe they were enemy until they were by them. Someone should have been balled out for that but the officers were protected.
S-38’s report should have been taken seriously, you should figure in a war zone things will not get reported right. At least you should prepare for the worst.
Excellent presentation folks. Really interesting. One thing that got me, i had always thought of the US navy as a learning organisation. The after action reports leading to steady incremental and continuous improvements. But this was not so true after Savo island. Do you know why this happened? Were the Navy overwhelmed by the amount they needed to change, were they learning the wrong lessons, or were lessons being learned but we just don't see the results yet?
It was a steep curve…. If it hadn’t been for prewar preparations and industry strength the war in the pacific would have been much longer and bloodier for all involved.. (my opinion.)
The surface and carrier engagements of Guadalcanal covered about four months and involved constant influx and outflux of ships and men.And no Internet to speed communication either! It took about half of 1943 to fully analyze all the after action reports and decide on procedures to implement changes mandated by hard won experience.
Your description on how important the US transports and cargo ships were was spot on! When people discuss the Guadalcanal Campaign they always talk about the number of carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyers lost on both sides. I never hear anyone compare the losses of the US transports and cargo ships vs the Japanese Marus. The US transports and cargo ships that “abandoned” the Marines went back to Guadalcanal time and time again. To my knowledge only one, the George F. Elliott was lost during the campaign. The Japanese Marus took heavy losses.
One thing that bears mentioning, on his way out Mikawa lost a heavy cruiser as the S44 torpedoed the IJN Kako and her torpedoes actually worked and sank her. That may have reinforced the withdrawal idea in Mikawa's mind post battle.
Your final comment about the turning point of the campaign in the PTO is spot on. In my opinion, the combination of the Solomons Campaign and the New Guinea Campaign was the death knell for the air arm of the IJN, as it never regained the potency that was present at the outset of the war. And the valiant fighting by the Australian troops on New Guinea inn those early dark days was another reason the tide turned, no matter how much Mac Arthur tried to downplay it. And Savo Island was the first, but not the last, instance of American naval flag officers dropping the ball in the Solomons. Norman Scott was the only one who showed some real ability in close combat at night in The Slot and unfortunately he died at the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, most likely from friendly fire from San Francisco. Callaghan, Ainsworth, Wright and other were found vert much wanting. It wasn't until Tip Merrill that the USN had a real fighting admiral who also knew how to use his destroyers properly. And having destroyer squadron leaders like Arleigh Burke and Roland Smoot, who knew the proper tactics that needed to be used was a big plus.
What astounds me about the battle of Savo Island is how the Northern Group could possibly have been surprised. They must have heard all the gunfire and explosions nearby, and what, other than an enemy engagement, could possibly explain that at that time?
Drachinifel said they were worried about a friendly fire mishap breaking out. Which only goes to further show the arrogance of "nah, the japs won't attack at night"
I am new to your 'podcasts' (I thought a podcast was only audio), but I enjoyed this one immensely! I a a very long time WW II buff, how 20-30 books, 20-30 documentary videos (CDs) and watch everything I cab on WW II ()and recent on WW I also). Your level of detail and explanation as to why we got our asses kicked so thoroughly is amazing. I never heard about all the mistakes at the admiral, captain, and other levels that were involved that led to this utter disaster. So, thank you so much. Also, to add a bit more detail, 1,768 soldiers were killed (mainly Marines), but 4,911 navy personnel were lost, and 420 aircrew, over the entire 6 months. To a very large part, the Battle of Guadalcanal was mainly a Navy one, just as you pointed out that without the support of the US Navy, the marines would have died on the island, just like what did happen to the Japanese on Guadalcanal (20,000 lost). And this WAS the turning point in the Pacific, and not Midway. This showed that with real persistence (obviously not displayed in the battle you described so well here), even after hefty loses, we can and will become victorious. One more note - this was not the only time, and not just one of two times, that the Japanese failed to persevere through and take advantage of their fruits of labor during the War. It happened over and over, and not just at Leyte Gulf. This was one of the major reasons that the Japanese lost the war, apart from the huge industrial disparity, along with our ability to think on the fly, at the moment, to be innovative, etc.
Sadly, Shawn, we don't have the technical ability to do that. Perhaps a partnership with Drachinfel, but we are having difficulty keeping up with our production schedule as it is. Too many battles, not enough time.
Even just a rough drawing on a connected tablet will do the job and save 1,000 words. Expect you would already have all the equipment and technical skills you need.
My late Uncle, Dale Merrill, served on both the cruisers Astoria and Vincennes from 1934-1939 , later Honorably Discharged in 1939 from the Vincennes. He spoke Spanish well enough to be interpreter at the dinner given to the Peruvian Navy Admiral and entourage. I still have the menu. In the spring of 1942, he tried to enlist again to " get back on the Vincennes", as he stated. Navy would not accept him, as he was working in the shipyards of Portland, Oregon , and he was in " critical " defense industry. That refusal likely saved his life, however, someone in his place likely perished. He also stayed in a letter and article published in the Gresham Oregon Outlook that they were practicing " Fleet Problems" ; Dale told me those fleet problems were exercises in fighting the Imperial Japanese Navy, this in the mid 1930s.
Seth and Bill, I thi k this is the best video Ive seen yet by you guys. Thanks so much. The thing that concerns me is that this might not be taught today. Is it? Please say it is! I know our carriers have been caught flat footed by Russian aircraft numerous times. once while I was aboard the Carl Vinson, a curl flew along side us at eye level taking pictures and waving. They knew they had us. We launched alert 5 fighters about 15 minutes later due to one hydralic leak and a catapult going down. I worry so much for our Navy now as we face a increasing threat of war with China.
From Bill: I wish I could tell you it is. Touched on at Annapolis, but not revisited in later professional training. And not sure they are teaching the right lessons from the battle.
Just found your channel. 3 minutes in. Can't wait to hear your take. Love WWII. When I was 8 (1982) my grandpa told me about when his carrier, the Saratoga, was hit by 5x 500lb bombs and 3x Kamikazes in 3 minutes off Iwo Jima. Most amazing story I've heard in my life. His name was Leo Slesinski. So I hope this holds up, coming from a WWII buff for 42 years. Obviously this isn't Iwo Jima, but he was at Eastern Solomons.
He did. Captain Bode should then have positioned his ship in the lead but apparently he decided to do it in the morning and went back to sleep. Crutchley didn't receive any censure from the RN who aren't slow to court martial their Captains for losing ships. I think The Canberra is treated a bit harshly here. It did increase speed and turned to port to position itself between the attacking force and the transports. This meant its guns had to train to starboard and were about to be fired( the turrets were not unmanned!!) when it got hit by two dozen 8" shells which killed the captain and the bridge crew instantly. All power was also lost making it the one ship which physically couldn't warn anyone about what was happening. I think the Japanese performed a superb night action but I also think they 'lucked out' in hitting the Canberra first, like being on the receiving end at Matapan.
There is so much great content here that I needed to listen twice. By the way, I love it when Bill is your straight man. While it is hard to believe that people could misinterpret so much of what was happening around them, I recently read about the sinking of the Royal Oak in Craig Symonds' WW2 at Sea. People misinterpreted explosions occurring around the Royal Oak as something wrong with the ship. It happens.
The characterization of the British dragging their feet on Overlord is in this case misapplied. They believed the Allies (particularly the Americans) weren't ready for it. Torch and the invasion of Sicily and Italy proved that to be true. Many lessons learned there.
As a young man who had incredible night vision i can attest that this is a real factor. My ability to spot deer and elk in the dark far surpassed anyone i was ever with. My Dad would just shake his head in disbelief. Im 54 now and although not nearly as accute my night vision still amazes my gf while driving. Still have no problem being stuck out in the dark hiking or biking and STILL listening to others saying "how can you see anything!!" I remember being very young at camp and thinking these kids must all need glasses or something when we were playing games at night.
This maybe the best content ever created on this event...damn fine job men. Im really enjoying your work...Mac bashing aside lol Keep it up...there is so much more to talk about!
Your comments early on about the missed opportunities to correctly identify and prepare for the Japanese attack reminds me of all the missed opportunities to alert the American forces at Pearl Harbor. Many senior American Naval officers in the Pacific in Aug 1942 seem to not have embraced the fact that we were in shooting war and that it was more important to take immediate action (like going to GQ) than to play it "safe" by no action so you wouldn't get in trouble with your CO for making a mistake.
Interesting that the Australian Coastwatchers were able to give warning of incoming Japanese air raids, but not approaching attacks by the IJN. They must have approached out of sight of land. Fascinating presentation. TFP
I first found this channel from episode 121. In 121, Jon gives a convincing argument that Turner was responsible for the surface forces at Savo and Fletcher’s decision to take his carriers for refueling was reasonable. In this episode you argue the opposite (that Fletcher should have stayed). Comparing the two episodes, it seems like Fletcher could not have prevented Savo even if he had stayed. His pilots were were not trained to operate at night. They could have scouted during the day, but so could the cruiser float planes, which they should have since there was a conformed sighting in the slot from earlier in the day (the planes also might not have been so explosive/full of fuel). And of course, Turner made the call to pull away Crutchley, who could have helped provide key leadership (and another cruiser) during the fight. There were a lot of blunders, but the largest ones seem to be Turner’s. Thank you for you interesting videos!
Can't resist a second comment about Mikawa's failure to destroy the U.S. transports and the effect on the course of the war if he had. There's little question that the U.S. Navy would have had to pullback, and the Marines on Guadacanal might have been overrun or forced to surrender. But, as bad as that would have been, this would have amounted to no more than a serious setback, a smaller loss in human terms than the loss of the Philippines. My guess is that the U.S. would have effectively recovered from such a defeat within 4-6 months, and the war would have followed pretty much the same course, because a defeat at Guadacanal would not have altered the fundamentals of the war. America's advantages in production, technology, and manpower would have ultimately decided the outcome.
Watched this one after the fact, but really appreciated the insights from Captain Toti in light of his experience as a former naval officer. He spared no sentiment for the failure of the officers who were in command aboard those unfortunate cruisers that night. I tend to agree.
Great presentation! I am working my way through all the podcasts in order. I was wondering if there was a board of inquiry regarding the US commanders' actions at Savo Island. If so, will you be covering it in later episodes?
Stolen from Wikipedia: A formal United States Navy board of inquiry, known as the Hepburn Investigation, prepared a report of the battle. The board interviewed most of the major Allied officers involved over several months, beginning in December 1942. The report recommended official censure for Captain Howard D. Bode of the Chicago for failing to broadcast a warning to the fleet of encroaching enemy ships. The report stopped short of recommending formal action against other Allied officers, including Admirals Fletcher, Turner, McCain, and Crutchley, and Captain Riefkohl. The careers of Turner, Crutchley, and McCain do not appear to have been affected by the defeat or the mistakes they made in contributing to it. Riefkohl never commanded ships again. Bode, upon learning that the report was going to be especially critical of his actions, shot himself in his quarters at Balboa, Panama Canal Zone, on 19 April 1943 and died the next day.
British Admiral Crutchley's performance here was strange. His previous battle experience before Coral Sea was on HMS Warspite in Narvik. Drachinifel chanel has a good 1.5 hour presentation on the three battles of Narvik. Crutchley was in the last of the three (third battle to me, second to British as the first was Germany against Norway only). He volunteered for many operations in his career.
Based on a lot of my reading of interwar RN training and doctrine, it seems Crutchley’s mistake was in assuming that USN captains would operate the same way as a group of RN cruiser captains would, in which the one who was most senior would actively take command on his own initiative. Waiting for explicit orders had been the bane of Fisher and his cadre’s existence prior to WWI, which showed its serious shortcomings during WWI, in which numerous engagements had RN vessel commanders acting much like the USN’s of 1942. The aggression and initiative showed by organisations such as the Dover patrol and Harwich Force was recognised and encouraged fleet-wide in the interwar period. In all likelihood, Crutchley assumed the USN would act the same way.
That's likely right and he didn't receive any censure from the RN who aren't slow to court martial their Captains for losing ships. I think The Canberra is treated a bit harshly here. It did increase speed and turned to port to position itself between the attacking force and the transports. This meant its guns had to train to starboard and were about to be fired( the turrets were not unmanned!!) when it got hit by two dozen 8" shells which killed the captain and the bridge crew instantly. All power was also lost making it the one ship which physically couldn't warn anyone about what was happening. I think the Japanese performed a superb night action but I also think they 'lucked out' in hitting the Canberra first, like being on the receiving end at Matapan.@@oriontaylor
Crutchley was completely exonerated by the Hepburn Inquiry. His decisions in terms of the destroyer screen were correct (albeit their performance was abysmal), the splitting of the forces was logical. His calling away to the conference was extremely unfortunate as HMAS Australia (a war hardened crew with significant experience) could well have turned the battle. Ghormley, McCain and Fletcher have to bare the most blame for Savo.
When you where talking about why didn't Japan send in all 4 battleships to Iron Bottom Sound, and I have to think about what Yamamoto had to say to the Emperor after Midway, when he lost 4 carriers. Somehow going back a few months later to say "I lost 4 battleships too" would not be a acceptable thing to do, so they needed to hold back something!
The seas in that area were very confined, with a lot of shallow areas. It would be comparatively easy for a big ship to get in a lot of trouble. (Besides, both sides thought that using BBs for shore bombardment was a poor use of resources.) The Japanese changed their minds when they realized how important it was to knock out Henderson Field, and the US changed their tune when they found themselves without any cruisers that could be spared from guarding the CVs.
About the USS Chicago's actions, the book NEPTUNE'S INFERNO, chapter 6 A Captain in the Fog, says: "Bode continued west toward what he thought would be the arena of the principal fight. Afterward, the track charts of the battle would show with cruel clarity that this is not at all what Bode was accomplishing. The record would even suggest, to the uncharitable eyes of inquiring superiors, that the star skipper of the cruiser Chicago was in the grip of an emotion quite distinct from courage."
His ship, at the very least could've saved the Northern Force and perhaps even turned the battle. The Chicago was a fully functional heavy cruiser, the damage it took was very minor as can be seen by the speed of his withdrawal. There was nothing wrong with his radar either. I wonder what the rest of the bridge officers on the Chicago were thinking as they saw all the gunfire in the distance. Captains like Bode get found out very quickly in wartime but sometimes the cost is extremely high.
Wow this was really a sad episode to watch. Losing so many men and lack of command--really upsetting. Curious if there were any courts martial for skippers that survived the attack. The skipper of the destroyer I hope was decorated for his courage. He should be made an honorary member of Taffy 3. Thanks guys appreciate you covering this but sure was a very sad episode.
Which codebreaking unit was responsible for the Guadalcanal area and decoding Mikawas response on August 7? Was it station Hypo (ie Rochefort) at Pearl or station Cast in Australia which was just getting back on its feet after being kicked out of the Philippines? Was there actually a division of responsibility at the time or whoever picked up the message first?
34:23 Small correction. Japanese had many seaplane tenders which could hit 30 knots max, and go all the way down the slot at battle speed of 26 knots (Chitose, Chiyoda and Nisshin). One only slightly slower similar vessel (Mizuho) was lost already when Solomons campaign began. Those Japanese seaplane tenders could very easily be mixed to cruisers or vice versa. Japanese built these around 11.000 tons ships to be ready for rapid conversion to light aircraft carriers. Zuiho and Shoho are two more, they werent aircraft carriers originally but submarine tenders (submarine tender which goes 29 knots 😅). Ryuho is oldest of the same ilk.
Furutaka, Kako, Aoba and Kinugasa were OLD cruisers from mid 20s with just six main battery guns and slower rate of fire per gun than all newer classes of IJN heavy cruisers. The C team indeed, but crews not bit worse than newest ships. Only flagship Chokai was full size, somewhat newer cruiser with 10 main battery guns. Mikawa had to do with bottom of barrel as before Solomons campaign lit up, area was backwater. Would had been fun to see whole Mogami class following Chokai and what happens (same thing, only 2 to 3 times faster).
Great video as usual. I am wondering why the “fallout” of these horrible decisions was not addressed. Perhaps there was none? It would be interesting to know who was called out and what happened to them.
I know Captain Bode shot himself before he faced his court martial. RUclipsr's Montemayor and Drachinifel also cover this debacle. Between those two sources and this podcast, pretty much everything gets covered.
I believe the conference was about what to do with the Transport unloading operation after Fletcher had already pulled the carriers out that day because of the Air attacks from Rabaul though the aircrews were being decimated by AA. Nevertheless Fletcher thought his carriers were vulnerable and had pulled them out of range that day. There was a dearth of dock equipment and unloading was going slow so the conference was about how much time would it take and planning a schedule around that with no carrier support. What the battle further expedites is the transports leaving early the next day though not completely unloaded. think Java Sea was the worst defeat because it left Australia vulnerable and a temporary absence of allied power at a time that left the Japanese with a free hand for the time being.. It had a similar number of casualties. An Australian commander can't be as much a handicap a Dutch Commander with a language barrier and different goals. Survivors were more often than at Guadalcanal Sound taken prisoner and put to slave labor on the Thailand railway project. I think it's just that this and Tassaferonga were embarrassing examples of incompetence at the command level that factors in this case with the assessment as worst defeat. If we were going by that factor I guess that puts Savo Island over the top. The deadliest battle in US Navy's history, btw, is Okinawa. . BTW, Saburo Sakai used to practice identifying stars in the daytime to exercise his eyes to spot fighter aircraft at distances. Try that. The code gleaning was new info to me.. MacArthur's command sending a message to Turner via Pearl Harbor then back to Guadalcanal the morning after the battle seems as tragic..My defense of Mikawa is in the comments in your video about commanders of Guadalcanal.
17:22 9 metres long, nearly 30 feet long. The beast weighed 2.8 tons, over 6000 pounds. And still most Japanese destroyers and cruisers had rapid reloads for them. Tubes could be reloaded in around 5 minutes, while ship makes 180 turn and is coming back to you, tubes are ready for second salvo.
Would love to see a breakdown of Tassafaronga, which was another beatdown of the US Navy except for the fact that strategically the Guadalcanal campaign had been all but won by then.
So, I'm just starting my 6th decade of this life. I've observed that a history of successes and power tends to breed complacency, sloth and an unhealthy conservatism in human cultural groups, whether military, corporations, sports fans, economic groups, whatever. There's lots of "we're number one!"-type chest-beating and a heartset feeling of what I term "confidence without competence" pervades the hearts and minds of the the people in that cultural group. A resistance to change and innovation creeps in and pervades the hearts, minds and habits of the people so afflicted. . For large groups of such people to be willing to be shaken out of their stagnation, usually the group must greatly suffer an actual large disaster. Great magnitudes of pain of various kinds and losses of various kinds are typically required to shake peoples' arrogance, their "confident incorrectness" and change them to be willing to change, to learn, to make the investments and clear out the dead wood and actually do the work that makes them better in reality. . Related: It's usually about 3 times easier to learn from disasters than from comparable successes. If you succeed, do you and the people throughout your cultural group know why? Maybe you all were theeling (thinking and feeling) you were highly competent when in reality you as individuals and as a group were mediocre and just lucky. On the other hand, once the failure investigation is done, the necessary elements of success that were absent usually become apparent. This is why the study of human and other failures that result in failure, catastrophes, and disasters is so rewarding to attentive students. . I've seen this pattern in ship disasters (Titanic and Thresher are marvelous case studies), aviation disasters, business near-death disasters, military disasters as in the case of the Battle of Savo Island, etc. It seems to be endemic to humanity.
re: the type 93- it also had lower speed settings that enabled longer ranges (up to 40K) ... also the Picric acid based Shimose explosive was between 7 and 20% more powerful than an equivalent amount of TNT ( it was also unstable enough to sometimes explode when subjected to severe shock- kind of a double edged sword) ...so essentially, the type 93 warhead was roughly equivalent to 2.5 times the explosive power of the Mark 15 mod 0 the Americans were using at the time.
With regards to my research the former Captain (Bode) of the capsized Oklahoma, December 7, who was ashore during the attack was entirely incompetent. The arrogant Bode ran from engagement and failed to attack the enemy and at least failed to communicate "his" situation. He was sacked to a back water command to the Panama Canal. Soon after and after inquiries he placed a 45 in his mouth and ended his life. He never admitted culpability. Very sad. I believe, fortunately for the US, Makawa didn't press the attack on the beach head(s). Gormley was not up to command and Turner acted the bafoon.
Excellent. Subscribed. I am disappointed however that you didn’t elaborate as to whether or not any USN personnel were subjected to disciplinary action resulting from…well, let’s just call it “conspicuous incompetence.”
My next door neighbor was on Guadalcanal. He suffered what We now call PTSD and foot rot and other physical issues all His life. He never talked about what happened in the Pacific campaign. 😮
The Type 93 "Long Lance" was almost 30 feet long. It was almost twice the weight of a modern Mark 48, for comparison. The related Type 95 submarine torpedo was a 21" version and quite a bit smaller.
48:34 You failed to mention that captain of USS Chicago, which with all propability seeing enemy coming at full force in middle of night, instead fighting, fled like chicken seeing fox. And without his XO or other officers objecting. 5 Japanese heavy cruisers were killing RAN Canberra at rock throw away from Chicago, with gunfire. Captain Bode shot himself before investigation on his actions on that night was finished. The ship itself got karma reaching them 6 months later when Japanese sank her, under different captain. USS Chicago case in Savo is clear cowardice. There is some possibily that some other ships too avoided fighting as they were way too close Japanese not to see them.
Years ago, I read the war diary of a damage-control officer of the USS Chicago. A bleak view of the unpreparedness of the Pacific fleet at every level to defeat a determined foe.
Modern priority of fires for Marine artillery which is counter mech., not counter battery, illustrates the Marine ethos towards a team effort. The example of the navy leaving Marines in the lurch on Guadalcanal bespeaks a lesser concept. This is why Marines view the navy departing Guadalcanal as an abandonment.
We have Radar and they don't! Well, there is radar, and there is radar. When we think of search radar, we think of a PPI scope sweeping around showing us everything out there. Unfortunately, before 1st Guadalcanal, no deployed US combatants had PPI, the radars were all manually (hand cranked) trained with an "A Scope" (oscilloscope - range only display). If you happen to be looking in the right direction, pretty good range accuracy. But sector searching, or tracking multiple targets, not very usefull at all. At 1st Guadalcanal, two cruisers and two destroyers had SG, with powered sweeps and 360 degree display, but the Admirals there had never seen one, and had no idea what they could do. At Guadalcanal II, both BBs had it, and Ching Lee won because he was the guy who brought the technology from the Brits, he knew exactly what it could do, and used it well.
Lee was an exceptional officer who knew how to use what he had at his disposal. Captain Bode apparently thought radar worked like a searchlight and could be detected by the enemy and so he only allowed it to be used for one sweep, once an hour. I got that snippet from either Montemayor or Drachinifel's account of Savo Island.
You want another Season 🌊? How bout an in depth analysis of each major battle covered, especially the controversial ones. This episode is graphic & great! I finally comprehend the tracks of this battle. What a bummer; sounds like Keystone Cops - but the Marines gut reaction & sentence, in retrospect, is myopic & needs to be appealed. WOW, I can hear the impacts…
In reference to the Long Lance torpedoes, if, the USN had followed through and developed and introduced the MK.17 navol equipped torpedo in 1939, the exploder issue not withstanding, would this have changed any of the dismal performance of destroyer torpedo attacks? If I’m not mistaken, the MK.17 had an 18000 yard range at 46kts and the navol fuel made it wake less.
This seems a case of a peacetime command structure fundamentally not yet "at war"? The entire command seems to not yet have a wartime awareness. Kind of similar to the US submarine skippers in the opening months of the war.
It seems to be some sort of rule of human nature or axiom that, generally, mankind only learns important lessons, and/or is motivated to change, by suffering fatalities and catastrophic disastrous events. Or more specifically, will take substantive steps to alter in-place systems short of life threatening disasters taking place. Even when clear indicators of negative events could be forthcoming should in-place systems be allowed to continue unchanged. It is indeed a very bewildering human characteristic. I think any belligerent in war that overcomes this human tendency is the side that usually emerges victorious….
Gents, you need to read the book by Bruce Loxton, The Shame of Savo, which is an Australian account of the battle and the loss of HMAS Canberra. The criticism of Crutchley is somewhat unjustified. For context, the man is one of very, very few sailors to have ever received the Victoria Cross - the highest honour for the British and Commonwealth nations for courage in battle (the equivalent of the US' Medal of Honour). Crutchley was CALLED/ORDERED to the conference by Turner. You did not mention that the overall commander of the Guadalcanal Campaign, Ghourmley was not even present (he was back in Noumea). Crutchley, like Turner, based on available reports did not expect the IJN force to arrive that evening and had passed overall command to Riefkohl and Bode (USS Chicago) of the southern cruiser force for the duration of the conference/meeting. Hepburn's Inquiry completely exonerated any failings by Crutchley. The absence of HMAS Australia from the Southern force (due to the 'conference) cannot be underestimated. Firstly, lack of experience in surface actions by the USN contingent is significant in the overall outcome. HMAS Australia was a battle hardened crew, having seen action in the Atlantic and Med prior to Savo. Under Crutchley she would have given a good account of herself and I believe may have turned the overall outcome. You don't mention the destroyer screen of the Southern force, namely USS Bagley's performance. HMAS Canberra's loss was largely brought about by it being torpedoed by USS Bagley (Bagley's Captain had a mental breakdown during the battle and was replaced by his Executive Officer). It is the view of many of the Canberra crew, Crutchley and Turner that Canberra was torpedoed by a US destroyer which rendered her unable to return fire. Loxton goes into considerable detail as to why the gunfire sustained by Canberra would not have rendered her with completely no power, only a torpedo strike to her machinery spaces could have done this. Canberra was hit by a torpedo on her STARBOARD side amidships and started listing 7 degrees to the starboard. She immediately lost all power, including the ability to train and fire her main batteries. Canberra's performance, albeit brief, was noteworthy. She was quickly to stations, commenced her turn to starboard to commence firing and to avoid the torpedos already in the water. She was preparing to fire when she loses all power throughout the ship. Canberra was scuttled the following morning (unnecessarily) as she was listing to STARBOARD, despite being hit by the IJN salvos on her port side. Loxton again goes into considerable detail that Canberra could have been saved, if not the order for her to be underway by 6:30am (when in actual fact the fleet did not leave the sound until 3:00pm). Contrary to your claims, the 'underwater surveillance' by Ballard and Allen of HMAS Canberra are inconclusive as she is sitting in mud/sand/silt which is above her waterline. There is however, buckling of her deck on the starboard side amidships, consistent with a torpedo hit. When she was scuttled, a torpedo strike was recorded on the starboard side adjacent to her bridge, NOT amidships. It is important to note, that the only ships who had previously been involved in surface action prior to Savo were the RAN vessels; the Australia, Canberra, and Hobart who had all seen active service since '39 in the Atlantic, Med, Indian and Pacific oceans.
The other factor .... Japanese mistake, not destroying their heavy equipment when the Marines arrived. This equipment was used to construct Henderson Field. ...No SeaBees equipment was offloaded and at this point the airfield was not usable. No usable airfield changes the ability of the Japanese to land men and supplies. Excellent program.
I enjoyed this episode (as I always do); but I think you were unduly harsh on Fletcher and his decision to withdraw: at the least, some more engagement with John Lundstrum's analysis would have made it more even-handed.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar Thank you kindly for the reply! And you are correct to note that in other episodes, Lundstrum's work is brought in for discussion (which I appreciated). You're absolutely entitled to have a tougher opinion on Fletcher's action on Aug. 8. (Lord knows, many still do!) I only commented because I thought... it could have been improved by a more immediate acknowledgement of the pro-Fletcher case at that point in the discussion, while still coming back to a more critical stance: "Look, Lundstrum makes worthwhile points about Nimitz's standing orders, Ghormley's failure to exercise proper command, Turner's poor communication and the critical fuel situation, but I don't think these developments fully absolve Fletcher of responsibility for what was foreseeable as a terribly costly decision." Or something like that. But I should emphasize that this is a nitpick. You're doing outstanding work with this channel. Carry on!
Slightly ironic that you state the US torpedoes "did not work" given you are discussing Savo Island where USS Bagley (probably) got a torpedo hit on HMAS Canberra.
You said the Navy did not abandon the Marines on Guadalcanal, and I agree, but the transports did pull back to the point that the delivery of supplies in the way of food and ammo was delayed to the point that the Marines suffered major shortages. I have video of my dad who was in coast guard attached to the 1st marine division, who operated a landing craft during Guadalcanal campaign talking about how the had unloaded the Marines, but not the food, or ammo, and that when they pulled back, the marines nearly starved. You referred to Jutland Battle of WWII. I'm sure it was just a misstatement as Jutland took place in 1916 WW1
Unlike the "Purple" Japanese code which literally went through a decoding machine and then had to be interpreted to English, it sometimes took days to decipher the message you're working on. The radiomen didn't have a clue to write urgent for decipher - Japanese Battle Plan. There was no real time JN25x message deciphering. This is totally different than routing siting reports which was atrocious.
My Dad was on the USS Utah when it was sunk at PH, and was assigned to the USS Ralph Talbot and was at Savo Island. Not only was he lucky to survive but he went through the entire war without a scratch.
Incredible! I visit Utah every time I return to Pearl.
And of course Ralph Talbot had a role to play in the recovery of the survivors of USS Indianapolis.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar Thanks, my Dad was on the bridge shooting sharks while the RT was picking up survivors. Very harrowing stuff.
@@drtroosevelt shooting on the bridge? Normally the captain frowns upon that
@@chadrowe8452 Dad was the QM and the Captain authorized it. Guess you had to be there to understand
Thank you for stimulating my interest in the events of the Pacific Theater!
I have long been interested in and researched the European Theater because my grandfather served there as a staff officer under General Harmon of the Second Arnored Division.
I also knew his brother served in the Pacific and on a cruiser sunk by enemy action. By watching your videos of the event, Drachinifel's, and speaking to my parents generation; I figured out that my Great Uncle served as the Marine detachment commander on the USS Northampton.
I only met my great uncle twice, but during one of our family reunions I spoke with him for a couple of hours about his service during the war and the time he spent in the water wwaiting for rescue.
My interest in the Pacific War, caused me to mention some of what I learned here to two of my adult children. They also developed interest in these events. I both gave them a brief summary and a link back to your channel so they can pursue their own investigation.
Thank you again for making this information accessible to people who are interested in these subjects but don't normally do historical research. Also, for awakening this interest in our future generations.
I like and comment every time to keep your excellent content going.
I tried to explain to my twenty something neighbors why being a Captain in USN was an achievement that had few equivalents in life.
Only a few hundred people at anytime. With responsibility and pressure that is not seen in any other profession.
They laughed.
I hope we aren't doomed.
Thank you Captain Toti.
All anyone can do is encourage people to take an interest and read/view.
The late James Hornficher would've been a great guest for this episode. Love his book Neptune's Inferno.
Indeed he would've been
I'd also recommend The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal as well. It's the closest to a shot by shot account of the action in and around Iron Bottom Sound as is possible to discern.
yes its a great book and he didnt pull punches unlike some of these episodes
@@MegaBloggs1 we’ve pulled punches? Do explain…
@@MegaBloggs1 How much more critical did you think they should have been? I thought it was right on point. However, what other episodes did you feel "punches" were pulled. I'd like to go back and see if I missed anything, thanks. tm
I want to thank you men for this highly informative programming. I am a 3rd generation veteran 2nd gen Navy Veteran. My father was a Gun Captain on the Big E from 1940 to 1943. Received 4 combat purple hearts 3 on the Enterprise. He lost his brother on the Lexington and remained in the Navy almost 30 years . Retired a CO on the Uss Yuma ATF 93 when he retired. I learned of this magnificent Navy of ours at the feet of my father and his former shipmates. I knew the Navy was my calling a very young man. Very proud of the greatest generation to defend this nation. Thank You again.
Lovely to hear Bill discussing the night vision acuity tests carried out by Japan. This makes sense - a great deal of it.
Who among us ever read of the 'highly-trained specialist Japanese lookouts, specially trained for night duties' and thought, at least at some point, "hey, this sounds weird"?
Well, this is why it always sounded weird. Trained to have better night vision? Nah. *Selected* for it. *Then* trained as lookouts. Much more like it.
The truth is always far more believable.
Thanks Bill.
I learned recently that I have exceptionally good night vision. I had no idea most people can't see as well as I can in the dark.
@@fakecubed I've known for a while that I have exceptionally poor night vision. When I worked with some high voltage electronics, a diagnostic we'd do sometimes was to either bias or float a test device at high voltage while keeping the room dark (and looking into the dark box holding the device) and looking for corona discharge. Everyone I ever compared with was better at seeing those discharges than me.
@@fakecubedas a simple grunt my night vision became "legendary" in my unit. At the time I didn't understand why, before night ops, Gunny would tell me to go sleep past dark and be ready for an all nighter. Lol, like my cats I just assumed everyone could see in the dark.
@@jonhenson5450Its simple, its basically how large your pupil can dialate on low light. Older people like me can have maybe 5,5mm pupil. Exceptional very young people can have 8mm pupil. The latter gets well over twice as much light into his eye to process.....
@@kimmoj2570 thanks, explains a lot.
Hands down, this was the best, most detailed presentation of the Savo Island battle amongst all the youtube depictions out there.
Great work.
Many thanks. We certainly try.
Hrrmm ... Drachinifel did a good job, but from a different perspective.
I’m glad my father didn’t arrive for another few weeks on the USS Washington (BB-56) I might not be here now had it been this kind of engagement in October. It’s amazing that the US command staff was so screwed up these were 05 and above! Not reserves and 90 day ensigns!
Montemayor is (slowly) going through pretty much the whole Pacific Theater with his animated maps and analysis. I expect this channel will finish the war long before he does, but his animations are really good for understanding the realtime tactical situation in these big battles, and I like his pauses to go over the decision-making of various commanders, weighing the pros and cons of different hypothetical actions. For example, in this battle, he talks about the decision by Mikawa not to attack the transports, concluding that the Japanese doctrine leaned in favor of letting the army deal with the Marines on Guadalcanal as they were insisting they could. And he talks about Mikawa essentially making the same calculated risk decision to preserve his surface ships in light of dealing disproportionate damage to the Allies, with what he thought he knew of the position of American carriers.
Another feature of a lot of his videos is the fog of war, explaining how incomplete scouting information or mistaken reports can cause decisions that make no sense looking back with all the information we have now. Many of these battles, I know all the facts, but I don't necessarily know what subset of those facts the commanders knew at the time, and I can learn a lot from that.
@@Zephyrmec If any American BB had plot armor it might have been Washington.
1:06:13 Quincy's last salvo hit Chokai's bridge, nearly killing VDAM Mikawa and his staff. Mikawa lost his navigational maps from that salvo. Another reason Mikawa decided to call it a night, he didnt feel comfortable leading the Japanese Task Force without his navigation maps and the chance of a collision with one of his ships similar to what happened with Mogami and Mikuma during the Battle of Midway.
Great insight!
He not only had lost his charts, but his cruisers were out of formation and he believed that it would be at least an hour before he had them organized into battle order again.
@@threecedarshomestead1330 Yea,these things are rarely simple yes/no things.
@@leoamery I am not so sure that Scott would have been beaten. It is not likely that he would have 'won', but I think he would have inflicted sever damage to the Japanese task force. This would probably have been similar to Evans on the Johnston at the Battle of Leyte Gulf (Oct 1944) when he, all on his own and not from any direction or orders from his superiors, jumped into the 'frying pan' and attacked the invading force. While his ship was eventually sunk, and he no doubt went down with it, his actions spurred on all the others, and essentially we 'won' that battle. I think that Scott would have probably achieved something similar to Evans.
Also, after all the so called learning from this battle, why did they put Callahan in charge instead of Scott in the next greatest defeat of the US Navy in Nov 1942??? I know it was due to a few days of seniority, but war and battles are not won on seniority! After all, Nimitz got to his position, and it was NOT due to seniority. I think the Navy often continued to make this very same mistake throughout the war.
@@leoamery slight correction: the USN’s destroyer launched torpedoes were the Mark 15. The Mark 14 was for submarines. That being said, both had many of the same problems and performed equally poorly early in the war.
I was fortunate to exchange some emails with Mackenzie Gregory who at the time was a Lt. bridge officer aboard the Canberra. Said the ship was so low in the water the following day he was able to step off it and directly onto the deck of the destroyer USS Blue. It took a lot of shells and crap Mk 14s to finish the Canberra when the decision to sink her was passed down. Mac went on to command Australia's first carrier.
Fantastic episode! We (the USA) we're extremely fortunate to come out of this without even heavier losses.
I knew there were errors made, but you guys have shown that it was almost a comedy of errors, top to bottom, leading to a horrific night for so many good men.
I’m so glad you mentioned Jutland! Jutland had a night action where the Germans eluded their British pursuers. As a result, the British really developed their night fighting doctrine in the inter-war years. This training bore fruit at Cape Matapan against the Italians where they, and theirs no subtle way to say this, obliterated a cruiser formation. The “what-if” is what if the US took the same lessons and put that in their Naval Problems exercises….what if indeed…
The hilarious part of Matapan was that the carrier HMS Formidable was part of the opening salvo on the Italian cruisers.
Hard to phrase battleships at 3,500 yards doing anything other than "obliterate" heavy cruisers.
@@kemarisiteThe British 15”/42 was a helluva rifle. It was an old gun by the time WWII rolled around but the Brits had tons of them & decades of experience using them.
I had missed this episode up to now. Another excellent episode even if, like your excellent Pellieu episode, it totally broke my heart to watch. I think your analysis is very, very good!
Seth's brilliant historical perspective, augmented as always by Bill's usual brilliance in doctrinal and procedural analysis REALLY gets to the crux of the many errors of the USN and RAN. False assumptions, Allied over-confidence, lack of technical knowledge of RADAR and the underpinning excellence of IJN preparedness and weaponry for night surface actions all led to this tragic defeat. BZ guys!
My exwifes granfather was on Vinccense when it got hit and went down. He told me his story. His name is James Phillips. Lucky for him he made it to live a long life.
One of your best efforts to date. I just wish you had maps for clarity. Keep up the good work.
We’ve considered maps, but neither of us are graphic artists and I simply don’t have the time to work on specific maps. Wish I did.
For a great animation video of this battle, (& also a 2 part Midway animation!) check out Montemayor 's channel: Here's is the Savo Island animination video;
ruclips.net/video/lICRQPIduFc/видео.html
Just a note to say thanks for all the work you both are putting into these episodes... and also kudos for ignoring myths and revisionist history and relating what actually happened to the degree possible. I can tell that you're both very passionate in your pursuit of the facts, and telling the stories of the individual heroes is important to you.
I first heard the details about this catastrophe on Drachinifel's channel. But I have to say you do a splendid job of pounding on lessons learned. Your hypothetical about Mikawa completing his mission by taking out the transport ships really makes me understand why you say that Guadalcanal is the turning point of the war in the PTO. King and Nimitz would have been out, and the only remaining (US) defense for Australia in 1942 would have been... MacArthur !!! 🙄
Thank you for your videos, they are most informative and instructive !
Cheers from Belgium 🙂
Thank You for a great job.
Thanks for watching!
Compelling, informative, outstanding presentation.
Having been an airline pilot and a CRM facilitator , study after study of disasters it’s always a failure to recognize and stop a long chain of events that lead to a disaster
Excellent episode, many tough lessons. This is learning war the hard way. A stunning indictment of the U.S.Navy's leadership, which left its ships sadly unprepared for what they would face.
Excellent breakdown of this total failure of command. I studied this battle in boot camp. It was used to reinforce the importance of alert watch standers.
Thanks! It is an extensive History lessons .
From my reading of the naval battles around Guadalcanal, Savo Island seems like a real radar obstacle. Just about every night engagement has Savo island interfering with radar image location and recognition.
It definitely interfered with almost every surface battle that was fought. Like a pothole in a street.
It would seem as if trying to interdict the incoming IJN forces to the west of Savo Island might have been a better idea?
@@gregorylumpkin2128 Better that US forces stay close to the area of concern. IJN forces could have easily looped around the island chain north or south.
Savo Island wasn’t a RADAR issue, islands don’t move, ship do. Trust in RADAR was the issue. If they had used RADAR to hit the Japanese ships they would have sunk because the long lance was far more dangerous on board. And SG radar was good to 100000yd or 15NM. And rain should not have significantly interfered at that band. And they should have been using the SC radar that was good to at least 30miles. Those picket ships either weren’t watching or didn’t believe the radar indications or both. I’m going for both. I think they saw them but didn’t believe they were enemy until they were by them. Someone should have been balled out for that but the officers were protected.
S-38’s report should have been taken seriously, you should figure in a war zone things will not get reported right. At least you should prepare for the worst.
Excellent presentation folks. Really interesting.
One thing that got me, i had always thought of the US navy as a learning organisation. The after action reports leading to steady incremental and continuous improvements. But this was not so true after Savo island. Do you know why this happened? Were the Navy overwhelmed by the amount they needed to change, were they learning the wrong lessons, or were lessons being learned but we just don't see the results yet?
It was a steep curve…. If it hadn’t been for prewar preparations and industry strength the war in the pacific would have been much longer and bloodier for all involved.. (my opinion.)
I would definitely tend to agree with you.
The surface and carrier engagements of Guadalcanal covered about four months and involved constant influx and outflux of ships and men.And no Internet to speed communication either! It took about half of 1943 to fully analyze all the after action reports and decide on procedures to implement changes mandated by hard won experience.
Keep in mind that in the 30's little real training took place other than the annual fleet exercises.
Your description on how important the US transports and cargo ships were was spot on! When people discuss the Guadalcanal Campaign they always talk about the number of carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyers lost on both sides. I never hear anyone compare the losses of the US transports and cargo ships vs the Japanese Marus. The US transports and cargo ships that “abandoned” the Marines went back to Guadalcanal time and time again. To my knowledge only one, the George F. Elliott was lost during the campaign. The Japanese Marus took heavy losses.
Thanks!
We can't ever allow to be forgotten what happened at Savo Island. It's an uncomfortable story that needs to be told again and again.
Very true
For sure..... unbelievable dumb and arrogant decisions at high costs of you g lifes....!!!!
Another outstanding presentation!
One thing that bears mentioning, on his way out Mikawa lost a heavy cruiser as the S44 torpedoed the IJN Kako and her torpedoes actually worked and sank her. That may have reinforced the withdrawal idea in Mikawa's mind post battle.
Yes, but that happened hours after he had disengaged.
Yes, the good old fashioned Mk 10 torpedoes. I don't know if the S boats could carry the Mk 14.
Great discussion, I learned a lot, thank you!
Your final comment about the turning point of the campaign in the PTO is spot on. In my opinion, the combination of the Solomons Campaign and the New Guinea Campaign was the death knell for the air arm of the IJN, as it never regained the potency that was present at the outset of the war. And the valiant fighting by the Australian troops on New Guinea inn those early dark days was another reason the tide turned, no matter how much Mac Arthur tried to downplay it. And Savo Island was the first, but not the last, instance of American naval flag officers dropping the ball in the Solomons. Norman Scott was the only one who showed some real ability in close combat at night in The Slot and unfortunately he died at the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, most likely from friendly fire from San Francisco. Callaghan, Ainsworth, Wright and other were found vert much wanting. It wasn't until Tip Merrill that the USN had a real fighting admiral who also knew how to use his destroyers properly. And having destroyer squadron leaders like Arleigh Burke and Roland Smoot, who knew the proper tactics that needed to be used was a big plus.
Thanks!
Thank you!
What astounds me about the battle of Savo Island is how the Northern Group could possibly have been surprised. They must have heard all the gunfire and explosions nearby, and what, other than an enemy engagement, could possibly explain that at that time?
A few thought southern group was performing shore bombardment.
Drachinifel said they were worried about a friendly fire mishap breaking out.
Which only goes to further show the arrogance of "nah, the japs won't attack at night"
I am new to your 'podcasts' (I thought a podcast was only audio), but I enjoyed this one immensely! I a a very long time WW II buff, how 20-30 books, 20-30 documentary videos (CDs) and watch everything I cab on WW II ()and recent on WW I also). Your level of detail and explanation as to why we got our asses kicked so thoroughly is amazing. I never heard about all the mistakes at the admiral, captain, and other levels that were involved that led to this utter disaster. So, thank you so much.
Also, to add a bit more detail, 1,768 soldiers were killed (mainly Marines), but 4,911 navy personnel were lost, and 420 aircrew, over the entire 6 months. To a very large part, the Battle of Guadalcanal was mainly a Navy one, just as you pointed out that without the support of the US Navy, the marines would have died on the island, just like what did happen to the Japanese on Guadalcanal (20,000 lost). And this WAS the turning point in the Pacific, and not Midway. This showed that with real persistence (obviously not displayed in the battle you described so well here), even after hefty loses, we can and will become victorious.
One more note - this was not the only time, and not just one of two times, that the Japanese failed to persevere through and take advantage of their fruits of labor during the War. It happened over and over, and not just at Leyte Gulf. This was one of the major reasons that the Japanese lost the war, apart from the huge industrial disparity, along with our ability to think on the fly, at the moment, to be innovative, etc.
Another great episode and discussion of implications if SAVO had gone bad for the USN
Loved the in-depth coverage. My only suggestion would be maybe add an rough animated account of the battle to give greater context.
Sadly, Shawn, we don't have the technical ability to do that. Perhaps a partnership with Drachinfel, but we are having difficulty keeping up with our production schedule as it is. Too many battles, not enough time.
Both Drachinfel and Montemayor's channels have excellent graphic depictions that supplement these accounts
Even just a rough drawing on a connected tablet will do the job and save 1,000 words. Expect you would already have all the equipment and technical skills you need.
@@warrenklein7817 well we don’t. You should volunteer. I will await your application…
This has been my favorite episode so far. So much I've learned.
Ignominious is such a big word it’s hard to get it out all at once. Cheers Bill from a USN Radio Man’s son. Love, love, love you guys!
I like ignomious!
My late Uncle, Dale Merrill, served on both the cruisers Astoria and Vincennes from 1934-1939 , later Honorably Discharged in 1939 from the Vincennes. He spoke Spanish well enough to be interpreter at the dinner given to the Peruvian Navy Admiral and entourage. I still have the menu. In the spring of 1942, he tried to enlist again to " get back on the Vincennes", as he stated. Navy would not accept him, as he was working in the shipyards of Portland, Oregon , and he was in " critical " defense industry. That refusal likely saved his life, however, someone in his place likely perished. He also stayed in a letter and article published in the Gresham Oregon Outlook that they were practicing " Fleet Problems" ; Dale told me those fleet problems were exercises in fighting the Imperial Japanese Navy, this in the mid 1930s.
Back in 1938, Fleet Problem XIX featured a dawn surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor. The person behind the idea was Earnest J. King.
Seth and Bill, I thi k this is the best video Ive seen yet by you guys. Thanks so much. The thing that concerns me is that this might not be taught today. Is it? Please say it is! I know our carriers have been caught flat footed by Russian aircraft numerous times. once while I was aboard the Carl Vinson, a curl flew along side us at eye level taking pictures and waving. They knew they had us. We launched alert 5 fighters about 15 minutes later due to one hydralic leak and a catapult going down. I worry so much for our Navy now as we face a increasing threat of war with China.
From Bill: I wish I could tell you it is. Touched on at Annapolis, but not revisited in later professional training. And not sure they are teaching the right lessons from the battle.
Just found your channel. 3 minutes in. Can't wait to hear your take. Love WWII. When I was 8 (1982) my grandpa told me about when his carrier, the Saratoga, was hit by 5x 500lb bombs and 3x Kamikazes in 3 minutes off Iwo Jima. Most amazing story I've heard in my life. His name was Leo Slesinski. So I hope this holds up, coming from a WWII buff for 42 years. Obviously this isn't Iwo Jima, but he was at Eastern Solomons.
Excellent, a great follow-up to reading Neptune's Inferno.
I have heard that Admiral Crutchley did notify the senior Cruiser Captain in the southern group, Captain Bode that he was leaving.
He did. Captain Bode should then have positioned his ship in the lead but apparently he decided to do it in the morning and went back to sleep. Crutchley didn't receive any censure from the RN who aren't slow to court martial their Captains for losing ships. I think The Canberra is treated a bit harshly here. It did increase speed and turned to port to position itself between the attacking force and the transports. This meant its guns had to train to starboard and were about to be fired( the turrets were not unmanned!!) when it got hit by two dozen 8" shells which killed the captain and the bridge crew instantly. All power was also lost making it the one ship which physically couldn't warn anyone about what was happening. I think the Japanese performed a superb night action but I also think they 'lucked out' in hitting the Canberra first, like being on the receiving end at Matapan.
@@jacksprat9172 It is also believed she took a few torpedoes to her port side. What a time for American torpedoes to work.
Another excellent, informative presentation
There is so much great content here that I needed to listen twice. By the way, I love it when Bill is your straight man.
While it is hard to believe that people could misinterpret so much of what was happening around them, I recently read about the sinking of the Royal Oak in Craig Symonds' WW2 at Sea. People misinterpreted explosions occurring around the Royal Oak as something wrong with the ship. It happens.
The characterization of the British dragging their feet on Overlord is in this case misapplied. They believed the Allies (particularly the Americans) weren't ready for it. Torch and the invasion of Sicily and Italy proved that to be true. Many lessons learned there.
As a young man who had incredible night vision i can attest that this is a real factor. My ability to spot deer and elk in the dark far surpassed anyone i was ever with. My Dad would just shake his head in disbelief. Im 54 now and although not nearly as accute my night vision still amazes my gf while driving. Still have no problem being stuck out in the dark hiking or biking and STILL listening to others saying "how can you see anything!!" I remember being very young at camp and thinking these kids must all need glasses or something when we were playing games at night.
Jon Parshall and others have stated a complete opposite opinion of Fletcher leaving and "abandoning" the marines compared to your interpretation.
This maybe the best content ever created on this event...damn fine job men. Im really enjoying your work...Mac bashing aside lol
Keep it up...there is so much more to talk about!
Your comments early on about the missed opportunities to correctly identify and prepare for the Japanese attack reminds me of all the missed opportunities to alert the American forces at Pearl Harbor.
Many senior American Naval officers in the Pacific in Aug 1942 seem to not have embraced the fact that we were in shooting war and that it was more important to take immediate action (like going to GQ) than to play it "safe" by no action so you wouldn't get in trouble with your CO for making a mistake.
Interesting that the Australian Coastwatchers were able to give warning of incoming Japanese air raids, but not approaching attacks by the IJN. They must have approached out of sight of land. Fascinating presentation. TFP
I first found this channel from episode 121. In 121, Jon gives a convincing argument that Turner was responsible for the surface forces at Savo and Fletcher’s decision to take his carriers for refueling was reasonable. In this episode you argue the opposite (that Fletcher should have stayed).
Comparing the two episodes, it seems like Fletcher could not have prevented Savo even if he had stayed. His pilots were were not trained to operate at night. They could have scouted during the day, but so could the cruiser float planes, which they should have since there was a conformed sighting in the slot from earlier in the day (the planes also might not have been so explosive/full of fuel). And of course, Turner made the call to pull away Crutchley, who could have helped provide key leadership (and another cruiser) during the fight.
There were a lot of blunders, but the largest ones seem to be Turner’s. Thank you for you interesting videos!
Can't resist a second comment about Mikawa's failure to destroy the U.S. transports and the effect on the course of the war if he had. There's little question that the U.S. Navy would have had to pullback, and the Marines on Guadacanal might have been overrun or forced to surrender. But, as bad as that would have been, this would have amounted to no more than a serious setback, a smaller loss in human terms than the loss of the Philippines. My guess is that the U.S. would have effectively recovered from such a defeat within 4-6 months, and the war would have followed pretty much the same course, because a defeat at Guadacanal would not have altered the fundamentals of the war. America's advantages in production, technology, and manpower would have ultimately decided the outcome.
Watched this one after the fact, but really appreciated the insights from Captain Toti in light of his experience as a former naval officer. He spared no sentiment for the failure of the officers who were in command aboard those unfortunate cruisers that night. I tend to agree.
Bill responds-- while I have sympathy, I also understand what comes with the responsibility of command.
Great presentation! I am working my way through all the podcasts in order. I was wondering if there was a board of inquiry regarding the US commanders' actions at Savo Island. If so, will you be covering it in later episodes?
Stolen from Wikipedia:
A formal United States Navy board of inquiry, known as the Hepburn Investigation, prepared a report of the battle. The board interviewed most of the major Allied officers involved over several months, beginning in December 1942. The report recommended official censure for Captain Howard D. Bode of the Chicago for failing to broadcast a warning to the fleet of encroaching enemy ships. The report stopped short of recommending formal action against other Allied officers, including Admirals Fletcher, Turner, McCain, and Crutchley, and Captain Riefkohl. The careers of Turner, Crutchley, and McCain do not appear to have been affected by the defeat or the mistakes they made in contributing to it. Riefkohl never commanded ships again.
Bode, upon learning that the report was going to be especially critical of his actions, shot himself in his quarters at Balboa, Panama Canal Zone, on 19 April 1943 and died the next day.
British Admiral Crutchley's performance here was strange. His previous battle experience before Coral Sea was on HMS Warspite in Narvik. Drachinifel chanel has a good 1.5 hour presentation on the three battles of Narvik. Crutchley was in the last of the three (third battle to me, second to British as the first was Germany against Norway only). He volunteered for many operations in his career.
Based on a lot of my reading of interwar RN training and doctrine, it seems Crutchley’s mistake was in assuming that USN captains would operate the same way as a group of RN cruiser captains would, in which the one who was most senior would actively take command on his own initiative. Waiting for explicit orders had been the bane of Fisher and his cadre’s existence prior to WWI, which showed its serious shortcomings during WWI, in which numerous engagements had RN vessel commanders acting much like the USN’s of 1942. The aggression and initiative showed by organisations such as the Dover patrol and Harwich Force was recognised and encouraged fleet-wide in the interwar period. In all likelihood, Crutchley assumed the USN would act the same way.
That's likely right and he didn't receive any censure from the RN who aren't slow to court martial their Captains for losing ships. I think The Canberra is treated a bit harshly here. It did increase speed and turned to port to position itself between the attacking force and the transports. This meant its guns had to train to starboard and were about to be fired( the turrets were not unmanned!!) when it got hit by two dozen 8" shells which killed the captain and the bridge crew instantly. All power was also lost making it the one ship which physically couldn't warn anyone about what was happening. I think the Japanese performed a superb night action but I also think they 'lucked out' in hitting the Canberra first, like being on the receiving end at Matapan.@@oriontaylor
Crutchley was completely exonerated by the Hepburn Inquiry. His decisions in terms of the destroyer screen were correct (albeit their performance was abysmal), the splitting of the forces was logical. His calling away to the conference was extremely unfortunate as HMAS Australia (a war hardened crew with significant experience) could well have turned the battle.
Ghormley, McCain and Fletcher have to bare the most blame for Savo.
Great program!
When you where talking about why didn't Japan send in all 4 battleships to Iron Bottom Sound, and I have to think about what Yamamoto had to say to the Emperor after Midway, when he lost 4 carriers. Somehow going back a few months later to say "I lost 4 battleships too" would not be a acceptable thing to do, so they needed to hold back something!
The seas in that area were very confined, with a lot of shallow areas. It would be comparatively easy for a big ship to get in a lot of trouble. (Besides, both sides thought that using BBs for shore bombardment was a poor use of resources.) The Japanese changed their minds when they realized how important it was to knock out Henderson Field, and the US changed their tune when they found themselves without any cruisers that could be spared from guarding the CVs.
The Japanese didn't have unlimited stocks of fuel in the area. Battleships running at top speed up and down the slot would have used a LOT of oil.
Great series
About the USS Chicago's actions, the book NEPTUNE'S INFERNO, chapter 6 A Captain in the Fog, says: "Bode continued west toward what he thought would be the arena of the principal fight. Afterward, the track charts of the battle would show with cruel clarity that this is not at all what Bode was accomplishing. The record would even suggest, to the uncharitable eyes of inquiring superiors, that the star skipper of the cruiser Chicago was in the grip of an emotion quite distinct from courage."
His ship, at the very least could've saved the Northern Force and perhaps even turned the battle. The Chicago was a fully functional heavy cruiser, the damage it took was very minor as can be seen by the speed of his withdrawal. There was nothing wrong with his radar either. I wonder what the rest of the bridge officers on the Chicago were thinking as they saw all the gunfire in the distance. Captains like Bode get found out very quickly in wartime but sometimes the cost is extremely high.
The non-performance of Bagley and Chicago in the loss of Canberra are significant.
Wow this was really a sad episode to watch. Losing so many men and lack of command--really upsetting. Curious if there were any courts martial for skippers that survived the attack. The skipper of the destroyer I hope was decorated for his courage. He should be made an honorary member of Taffy 3. Thanks guys appreciate you covering this but sure was a very sad episode.
Which codebreaking unit was responsible for the Guadalcanal area and decoding Mikawas response on August 7? Was it station Hypo (ie Rochefort) at Pearl or station Cast in Australia which was just getting back on its feet after being kicked out of the Philippines? Was there actually a division of responsibility at the time or whoever picked up the message first?
34:23 Small correction. Japanese had many seaplane tenders which could hit 30 knots max, and go all the way down the slot at battle speed of 26 knots (Chitose, Chiyoda and Nisshin). One only slightly slower similar vessel (Mizuho) was lost already when Solomons campaign began. Those Japanese seaplane tenders could very easily be mixed to cruisers or vice versa. Japanese built these around 11.000 tons ships to be ready for rapid conversion to light aircraft carriers. Zuiho and Shoho are two more, they werent aircraft carriers originally but submarine tenders (submarine tender which goes 29 knots 😅). Ryuho is oldest of the same ilk.
Thank-You
Furutaka, Kako, Aoba and Kinugasa were OLD cruisers from mid 20s with just six main battery guns and slower rate of fire per gun than all newer classes of IJN heavy cruisers. The C team indeed, but crews not bit worse than newest ships. Only flagship Chokai was full size, somewhat newer cruiser with 10 main battery guns. Mikawa had to do with bottom of barrel as before Solomons campaign lit up, area was backwater. Would had been fun to see whole Mogami class following Chokai and what happens (same thing, only 2 to 3 times faster).
Great video as usual. I am wondering why the “fallout” of these horrible decisions was not addressed. Perhaps there was none? It would be interesting to know who was called out and what happened to them.
I know Captain Bode shot himself before he faced his court martial. RUclipsr's Montemayor and Drachinifel also cover this debacle. Between those two sources and this podcast, pretty much everything gets covered.
All these years later one can see how upset the retired USN Captain is about this battle
Seems pretty mad about the jacked up torpedoes too. I'd recommended searching for drachinifel's video about US torpedoes.
I believe the conference was about what to do with the Transport unloading operation after Fletcher had already pulled the carriers out that day because of the Air attacks from Rabaul though the aircrews were being decimated by AA. Nevertheless Fletcher thought his carriers were vulnerable and had pulled them out of range that day. There was a dearth of dock equipment and unloading was going slow so the conference was about how much time would it take and planning a schedule around that with no carrier support. What the battle further expedites is the transports leaving early the next day though not completely unloaded.
think Java Sea was the worst defeat because it left Australia vulnerable and a temporary absence of allied power at a time that left the Japanese with a free hand for the time being.. It had a similar number of casualties. An Australian commander can't be as much a handicap a Dutch Commander with a language barrier and different goals. Survivors were more often than at Guadalcanal Sound taken prisoner and put to slave labor on the Thailand railway project. I think it's just that this and Tassaferonga were embarrassing examples of incompetence at the command level that factors in this case with the assessment as worst defeat. If we were going by that factor I guess that puts Savo Island over the top. The deadliest battle in US Navy's history, btw, is Okinawa.
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BTW, Saburo Sakai used to practice identifying stars in the daytime to exercise his eyes to spot fighter aircraft at distances. Try that.
The code gleaning was new info to me.. MacArthur's command sending a message to Turner via Pearl Harbor then back to Guadalcanal the morning after the battle seems as tragic..My defense of Mikawa is in the comments in your video about commanders of Guadalcanal.
17:22 9 metres long, nearly 30 feet long. The beast weighed 2.8 tons, over 6000 pounds. And still most Japanese destroyers and cruisers had rapid reloads for them. Tubes could be reloaded in around 5 minutes, while ship makes 180 turn and is coming back to you, tubes are ready for second salvo.
Would love to see a breakdown of Tassafaronga, which was another beatdown of the US Navy except for the fact that strategically the Guadalcanal campaign had been all but won by then.
It's coming
So, I'm just starting my 6th decade of this life. I've observed that a history of successes and power tends to breed complacency, sloth and an unhealthy conservatism in human cultural groups, whether military, corporations, sports fans, economic groups, whatever. There's lots of "we're number one!"-type chest-beating and a heartset feeling of what I term "confidence without competence" pervades the hearts and minds of the the people in that cultural group. A resistance to change and innovation creeps in and pervades the hearts, minds and habits of the people so afflicted.
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For large groups of such people to be willing to be shaken out of their stagnation, usually the group must greatly suffer an actual large disaster. Great magnitudes of pain of various kinds and losses of various kinds are typically required to shake peoples' arrogance, their "confident incorrectness" and change them to be willing to change, to learn, to make the investments and clear out the dead wood and actually do the work that makes them better in reality.
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Related: It's usually about 3 times easier to learn from disasters than from comparable successes. If you succeed, do you and the people throughout your cultural group know why? Maybe you all were theeling (thinking and feeling) you were highly competent when in reality you as individuals and as a group were mediocre and just lucky. On the other hand, once the failure investigation is done, the necessary elements of success that were absent usually become apparent. This is why the study of human and other failures that result in failure, catastrophes, and disasters is so rewarding to attentive students.
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I've seen this pattern in ship disasters (Titanic and Thresher are marvelous case studies), aviation disasters, business near-death disasters, military disasters as in the case of the Battle of Savo Island, etc. It seems to be endemic to humanity.
re: the type 93- it also had lower speed settings that enabled longer ranges (up to 40K) ... also the Picric acid based Shimose explosive was between 7 and 20% more powerful than an equivalent amount of TNT ( it was also unstable enough to sometimes explode when subjected to severe shock- kind of a double edged sword) ...so essentially, the type 93 warhead was roughly equivalent to 2.5 times the explosive power of the Mark 15 mod 0 the Americans were using at the time.
With regards to my research the former Captain (Bode) of the capsized Oklahoma, December 7, who was ashore during the attack was entirely incompetent. The arrogant Bode ran from engagement and failed to attack the enemy and at least failed to communicate "his" situation. He was sacked to a back water command to the Panama Canal. Soon after and after inquiries he placed a 45 in his mouth and ended his life. He never admitted culpability. Very sad. I believe, fortunately for the US, Makawa didn't press the attack on the beach head(s). Gormley was not up to command and Turner acted the bafoon.
thank you . what happened to those captains
Excellent. Subscribed. I am disappointed however that you didn’t elaborate as to whether or not any USN personnel were subjected to disciplinary action resulting from…well, let’s just call it “conspicuous incompetence.”
My next door neighbor was on Guadalcanal. He suffered what We now call PTSD and foot rot and other physical issues all His life.
He never talked about what happened in the Pacific campaign.
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When ugly danger raised its head brave sir Robin ran away. There was never an easy way out.
What happened to HMAS Australia of the southern group, no mention of her, what happened?
That was great, but please do incorporate a few basic maps if possible. Thanks
Thank you.
The Type 93 "Long Lance" was almost 30 feet long. It was almost twice the weight of a modern Mark 48, for comparison.
The related Type 95 submarine torpedo was a 21" version and quite a bit smaller.
48:34 You failed to mention that captain of USS Chicago, which with all propability seeing enemy coming at full force in middle of night, instead fighting, fled like chicken seeing fox. And without his XO or other officers objecting. 5 Japanese heavy cruisers were killing RAN Canberra at rock throw away from Chicago, with gunfire. Captain Bode shot himself before investigation on his actions on that night was finished. The ship itself got karma reaching them 6 months later when Japanese sank her, under different captain. USS Chicago case in Savo is clear cowardice. There is some possibily that some other ships too avoided fighting as they were way too close Japanese not to see them.
Years ago, I read the war diary of a damage-control officer of the USS Chicago. A bleak view of the unpreparedness of the Pacific fleet at every level to defeat a determined foe.
Modern priority of fires for Marine artillery which is counter mech., not counter battery, illustrates the Marine ethos towards a team effort. The example of the navy leaving Marines in the lurch on Guadalcanal bespeaks a lesser concept. This is why Marines view the navy departing Guadalcanal as an abandonment.
We have Radar and they don't! Well, there is radar, and there is radar.
When we think of search radar, we think of a PPI scope sweeping around showing us everything out there. Unfortunately, before 1st Guadalcanal, no deployed US combatants had PPI, the radars were all manually (hand cranked) trained with an "A Scope" (oscilloscope - range only display). If you happen to be looking in the right direction, pretty good range accuracy. But sector searching, or tracking multiple targets, not very usefull at all. At 1st Guadalcanal, two cruisers and two destroyers had SG, with powered sweeps and 360 degree display, but the Admirals there had never seen one, and had no idea what they could do.
At Guadalcanal II, both BBs had it, and Ching Lee won because he was the guy who brought the technology from the Brits, he knew exactly what it could do, and used it well.
Lee was an exceptional officer who knew how to use what he had at his disposal. Captain Bode apparently thought radar worked like a searchlight and could be detected by the enemy and so he only allowed it to be used for one sweep, once an hour. I got that snippet from either Montemayor or Drachinifel's account of Savo Island.
You want another Season 🌊? How bout an in depth analysis of each major battle covered, especially the controversial ones. This episode is graphic & great! I finally comprehend the tracks of this battle. What a bummer; sounds like Keystone Cops - but the Marines gut reaction & sentence, in retrospect, is myopic & needs to be appealed. WOW, I can hear the impacts…
In reference to the Long Lance torpedoes, if, the USN had followed through and developed and introduced the MK.17 navol equipped torpedo in 1939, the exploder issue not withstanding, would this have changed any of the dismal performance of destroyer torpedo attacks? If I’m not mistaken, the MK.17 had an 18000 yard range at 46kts and the navol fuel made it wake less.
This seems a case of a peacetime command structure fundamentally not yet "at war"? The entire command seems to not yet have a wartime awareness. Kind of similar to the US submarine skippers in the opening months of the war.
It seems to be some sort of rule of human nature or axiom that, generally, mankind only learns important lessons, and/or is motivated to change, by suffering fatalities and catastrophic disastrous events. Or more specifically, will take substantive steps to alter in-place systems short of life threatening disasters taking place. Even when clear indicators of negative events could be forthcoming should in-place systems be allowed to continue unchanged.
It is indeed a very bewildering human characteristic.
I think any belligerent in war that overcomes this human tendency is the side that usually emerges victorious….
Gents, you need to read the book by Bruce Loxton, The Shame of Savo, which is an Australian account of the battle and the loss of HMAS Canberra.
The criticism of Crutchley is somewhat unjustified. For context, the man is one of very, very few sailors to have ever received the Victoria Cross - the highest honour for the British and Commonwealth nations for courage in battle (the equivalent of the US' Medal of Honour).
Crutchley was CALLED/ORDERED to the conference by Turner. You did not mention that the overall commander of the Guadalcanal Campaign, Ghourmley was not even present (he was back in Noumea). Crutchley, like Turner, based on available reports did not expect the IJN force to arrive that evening and had passed overall command to Riefkohl and Bode (USS Chicago) of the southern cruiser force for the duration of the conference/meeting. Hepburn's Inquiry completely exonerated any failings by Crutchley.
The absence of HMAS Australia from the Southern force (due to the 'conference) cannot be underestimated. Firstly, lack of experience in surface actions by the USN contingent is significant in the overall outcome. HMAS Australia was a battle hardened crew, having seen action in the Atlantic and Med prior to Savo. Under Crutchley she would have given a good account of herself and I believe may have turned the overall outcome.
You don't mention the destroyer screen of the Southern force, namely USS Bagley's performance. HMAS Canberra's loss was largely brought about by it being torpedoed by USS Bagley (Bagley's Captain had a mental breakdown during the battle and was replaced by his Executive Officer). It is the view of many of the Canberra crew, Crutchley and Turner that Canberra was torpedoed by a US destroyer which rendered her unable to return fire. Loxton goes into considerable detail as to why the gunfire sustained by Canberra would not have rendered her with completely no power, only a torpedo strike to her machinery spaces could have done this. Canberra was hit by a torpedo on her STARBOARD side amidships and started listing 7 degrees to the starboard. She immediately lost all power, including the ability to train and fire her main batteries. Canberra's performance, albeit brief, was noteworthy. She was quickly to stations, commenced her turn to starboard to commence firing and to avoid the torpedos already in the water. She was preparing to fire when she loses all power throughout the ship.
Canberra was scuttled the following morning (unnecessarily) as she was listing to STARBOARD, despite being hit by the IJN salvos on her port side. Loxton again goes into considerable detail that Canberra could have been saved, if not the order for her to be underway by 6:30am (when in actual fact the fleet did not leave the sound until 3:00pm).
Contrary to your claims, the 'underwater surveillance' by Ballard and Allen of HMAS Canberra are inconclusive as she is sitting in mud/sand/silt which is above her waterline. There is however, buckling of her deck on the starboard side amidships, consistent with a torpedo hit. When she was scuttled, a torpedo strike was recorded on the starboard side adjacent to her bridge, NOT amidships.
It is important to note, that the only ships who had previously been involved in surface action prior to Savo were the RAN vessels; the Australia, Canberra, and Hobart who had all seen active service since '39 in the Atlantic, Med, Indian and Pacific oceans.
You guys forgot about Norman Scott's force and the Australia.
The other factor .... Japanese mistake, not destroying their heavy equipment when the Marines arrived. This equipment was used to construct Henderson Field. ...No SeaBees equipment was offloaded and at this point the airfield was not usable. No usable airfield changes the ability of the Japanese to land men and supplies. Excellent program.
I enjoyed this episode (as I always do); but I think you were unduly harsh on Fletcher and his decision to withdraw: at the least, some more engagement with John Lundstrum's analysis would have made it more even-handed.
We tried to keep it balanced. We understand what Fletcher thought his mission was. We talk about this in several episodes.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar Thank you kindly for the reply! And you are correct to note that in other episodes, Lundstrum's work is brought in for discussion (which I appreciated). You're absolutely entitled to have a tougher opinion on Fletcher's action on Aug. 8. (Lord knows, many still do!) I only commented because I thought... it could have been improved by a more immediate acknowledgement of the pro-Fletcher case at that point in the discussion, while still coming back to a more critical stance: "Look, Lundstrum makes worthwhile points about Nimitz's standing orders, Ghormley's failure to exercise proper command, Turner's poor communication and the critical fuel situation, but I don't think these developments fully absolve Fletcher of responsibility for what was foreseeable as a terribly costly decision." Or something like that.
But I should emphasize that this is a nitpick. You're doing outstanding work with this channel. Carry on!
Slightly ironic that you state the US torpedoes "did not work" given you are discussing Savo Island where USS Bagley (probably) got a torpedo hit on HMAS Canberra.
Are the torpedoes US dropped from planes the same as the ones we shot from boats/subs?
You said the Navy did not abandon the Marines on Guadalcanal, and I agree, but the transports did pull back to the point that the delivery of supplies in the way of food and ammo was delayed to the point that the Marines suffered major shortages.
I have video of my dad who was in coast guard attached to the 1st marine division, who operated a landing craft during Guadalcanal campaign talking about how the had unloaded the Marines, but not the food, or ammo, and that when they pulled back, the marines nearly starved.
You referred to Jutland Battle of WWII. I'm sure it was just a misstatement as Jutland took place in 1916 WW1
Is it that it takes a certain kind of person to skipper a destroyer or does the job turn them reckless? In a good way of course.
Unlike the "Purple" Japanese code which literally went through a decoding machine and then had to be interpreted to English, it sometimes took days to decipher the message you're working on. The radiomen didn't have a clue to write urgent for decipher - Japanese Battle Plan. There was no real time JN25x message deciphering. This is totally different than routing siting reports which was atrocious.
So effectively, Mikawa saved King and Nimitz's careers - don't think he had that in mind.