Fun fact: While Theodore Roosevelt had been heavily inspired by Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Mahan himself had found the inspiration for his naval treatise from Theodore Roosevelt's The Naval War of 1812.
It's interesting how similar Mahan's Sea Power is to Sun-Tzu's Art of War in terms of its goals. Both works were originally intended to address immediate and specific situations; Mahan wanted to promote the reform of his own military service branch, while Sun-Tzu was essentially writing a job application. And yet, both works have found applications well beyond the situations they were written for, albeit complete with the potential for misapplication that's probably inherent to such popularity.
Machiavelli’s the Prince (a book full of strategic thinking) as well was a job application towards the Medici family who ruled Florence Italy at the time.
@@Sea_ss Maybe (it's very debatable if he wanted a job with the Medici's, who had been enemies. The dedication may have just been to keep himself from getting tortured by the Medicis, more), but Machiavelli also wrote a book on military strategic thinking called The Art of War (Dell'arte della guerra). The Prince is more about political theory, and actually has a lot in similar with Carnegie's How to Win Friends and Influence People, the latter is much more simplistic though.
Sea lanes of communication (SLOC) are absolutely essential to free navigation of the world's oceans and seas. As a retired Marine I assure you that sea power is key...
@@TheTariqibnziyad Why? Capitalism is the only economy type that actually works in the long run. Communism/Socialism only works in the short run. (see EVERY nation that tried to use C/S as an economic system). This is NOT something that can be scoffed at as un-politically correct. This is based upon Human Nature. A human is born selfish, and no matter what they are taught, will revert to Me-Me-Me if given the opportunity. This is why ALL Communist states had a fascist and repressive government, to FORCE their people to work for the state. And as soon as the thumb is off of them, they revert to Capitalism and Free Market economies.
I have an issue with your analysis on the efficiency of waterborne shipping. We are talking about seaborne shipping, NOT domestic waterborne. The data you used are a direct copy of the wikipedia page "Energy efficiency in transport," but mislabeled waterborne, as if all waterborne has the same cost. The 217 BTU/ton-mile is largely referring to shipping throughout navigable rivers such as the Mississippi River Basin. The same wikipedia page suggests that the Emma Maersk can do 74 kJ per tonne-km. If we convert to BTU/ton-mile by multiplying by roughly 1.36 we get a value of roughly 100 BTU/ton-mile. I still agree with your assertion, but by showing how disparately unequal the efficiency in transport costs are better portrays how advantageous it is to trade by sea.
I still wondered how much more profitable it still would be to trade via rail (like a net stretching whole of Europe-Asia-Africa and possibly to Americas via Berring) when actually counting the miles in total. Of course maintenance of said tracks through extreme climates would need a different dimension altogether but nevertheless...
@@minzblatt It cost about $2000 to ship a container from China to Europe by ship, and $8000 by rail. However, it take about ~60 days for ships and only ~10 days for rail. So this means bulk goods are done by ships, while more time sensitive goods by rail.
@@WangGanChang but important here is that ships can go as fast as rail, ships move slower by choice because they exploit physics of a huge mass traveling through liquid. Once you accelerate the container ship, it will take a huge force to bring it to a stop and friction on the water, while not non-existent, is still relatively tiny at slow speeds compared to rolling wheel on a rail. So ships will use tiny amount of power to counteract the speed lost due to friction and almost drift through the sea, while a locomotive has no choice but to pump more and more power to keep it going.
@@lollertoaster it takes several full trains to load one ship. Rails can only handle a certain number of trains over a given distance. Rails also need ongoing maintenance. Ships last up to twenty years. They can sail at any time to any port. The only possible advantage to trains could be a future of electrified rail systems based on renewable energy sources. Until then, ships are preferred.
@@martinthemillwright we currently use both, and will continue to as there’s advantages to both. Ships also need ongoing maintenance. They don’t just get made and sail for 20 years without a checkup. They cannot sail at any time to any port. Many ports don’t have the facilities required to unload container ships, and they can only have so many in port at any given time. In a perfect world ships > trains. However, we don’t live in a perfect world.
But this statement at face value is categorically incorrect - a sea is very much a barrier without the technology to cross it. No caveat was given, so it can only he understood at the surface. For all world history thousands of years, it has been a barrier
My old college professor may explode if he sees this on YT. He had an entire series on gunboat diplomacy and naval strategy in from the 1700s to present, and Mahan was his Clausewitz. Great video!
As a USAF officer, I read Mahan’s “Influence of Sea Power . . .” in the mid 1980’s. This is an excellent summary, but the real gem is at the end when the narrator equates command of space/air as the new “sea power”. I have the highest respect for my naval colleagues and I know they will object, but highly maneuverable hypersonic nuclear glide vehicles and multiple hypersonic cruise missiles hugging the surface of the water are making carrier groups obsolete-in spite of defensive missiles, automated guns, and electronic counter-measures. Witness the Moskva and US naval defense simulations. A strong navy is necessary, but will increasingly rely on missile-armed submarines and smaller guided missile cruisers. Given the increasing range of anti-ship missiles, foreign and choke-point basing rights will become increasingly valuable. I wish my brave naval colleagues the best-they are going to need it.
As expected of a AF officer, great comment. The Ukraine theater seems to highlight this with Russia having its naval gems get hit by missiles and drones. Real talk yall are completely brave and it's probably just true that War is more crazy now then ever. The Dday boys will always be heroes. But yall are just the best in history. God Bless the USA!!!
I disagree that airspace is less relevant than sea. Of course there is less trade that goes via plane (the goods might be more valueable, but I think trade via air is still less than sea). However, controlling the airspace lets you control land, sea, and air trade. Germany in WW2 basically learned a bitter leason by not being able to effectively protect air space. Any form of land transport or industry was vulnerable from attacks. If a countries air space is controlled by an enemy, its power is decreased by a lot more than when just sea trade is effected.
I think one factor which is much more prominent in airspace that at sea is area denial. Even if you have no air force you could have a lot of anti-air forces (missiles) which would deny the enemy control of the air without taking control of it yourself
I think your point is correct: air supremacy has little direct strategic effect (in the Mahanian sense) since air commerce is relatively minor; BUT controlling air does result in an impact on sea/land commerce.
Airspace is more of a battlefield and much less so an strategical space. Airspace can be used to hit the enemy at great distance, possibly with devastating effects, but mostly is about controlling land and seas, mostly from land. So in the end it goes back to "expanded" fort-based coastal defense.
But bare in mind, in Mahan's time. The Navy was the first line of defense. It's technically still is but air power (Air Force) has pretty much became the true first line of defense. Satelites in space are generally under Air Force supervision. Nobody can hide an invasion force anymore. You would have to destroy or cripple the satelite surveillance. But doing that you will still trigger the enemies defenses. They would know something is wrong.
I would say ....maybe. Submarines played a devastating role in WWII, especially the vastly underrated effect of US submarines in the Pacific. There has been widespread speculation about the obsolescence of traditional sea power and sea control doctrine with modern technology. Now, certainly Mahan was correct in his time and in his foreseeable future, but how far his analysis remained or remains relevant is open to argument.
I would agree with Charles here. Air power away from the coast I would put under sea power whether that be ship launched missiles or carrier-based aircraft. If you look at all major Wars since the history of sea power was written the victors did end up gaining control of the sea in decisive battle or the losers ended up largely ignoring sea power until the war started. If you look at the Cold War and the battle strategies of the Cold War the Russians wanted to deny a decisive battle long enough to get to the Rhine or even Spain. The United States on the other hand wanted complete control of the sea to hold up Russian resources in other areas and other fronts to minimize land loss in Europe. Submarines in World War II although I am a Submariner and admit that submarines played a decisive role in the Pacific and the Atlantic turning points in the war were won on decisive battles for example Coral Sea Midway battle for the Atlantic. Air power is an extension of the land and sea space it is more of a multiplier to the land sea Battle as opposed to a battle space that can deliver victory.
@@adam12o8 Yes! Eliminating the Soviet Navy or cripple the Soviet Red Banner Fleet in the Baltic Sea was crucial for the US Navy and British! Without doing that, Soviet Fleet in the Atlantic can wreck havoc on US and British supply chain. Not enough manpower or equipment would be sufficient enough to keep the Soviet Army and WARSAW PACT forces at bay. Blocking off the Soviet Fleet in the Black Sea would've been easier because of Turkey's geographic location.
Wait... so the decisive battle theory wasn't dead then, because since aircraft carriers were the capital ships of WWII, Midway was actually the decisive battle.
I feel like if you play EU4 alot, you just learn all of the geopolitical grand strategy stuff by default lol. I never even knew about any of these theories or concepts, but I used this strategy in EU4 alot. Whenever I played a country that had significant coastline but a smaller navy than my enemies, I concentrated my navy to be able to defend my coastline in a limited effort to prevent war exhaustion and lose of wealth to my country and defeat the enemies navy piecemeal, by sniping random ships and eventually building a large enough navy to be able to gain full control of the sea against my enemies. Blockades are an easy way to gain wealth from your enemies as well as lowering their war support. I rarely split up my navies and would always just concentrate it into one death stack and decisively crush the enemy navy and then try my best to completely blockade the coastlines to drain wealth as well as prevent the enemy navy from consolidating. Obviously it's not as realistic as IRL, but I think it's a good simulation of geopolitics and war.
At the start of WW1 the Germans were surprised as instead of a close blockade, the British Grand Fleet sailed up to the Orkneys base Scapa Flow. The point was to deny piecemeal victories, screen with fast ships while any German force risked interception by the doom stack.
I think most paradox grand strategy games end up with similar results. HOI4 is litterally WW2 simulator, and has lots of various strategies that mimic real world ones. Even Stellaris has this emergent strategy, the fastest way to win a war is to doom stack and rush down enemy shipyards so they cant reinforce, but you have to juggle the "geography" of the hyperlane network, multi front wars, and the AIs fleet or multiple fleets, also ship speed can be huge and multiple fast fleets can achieve your main goals of denying space to your enemies faster than the doom stack that has capital ships that are better equiped for "decisive battles". I think the main difference for games is that depending on how much you are willing to micromanage determines how much weaker than the enemies capital fleet you are willing to go. But IRL you obviously would be willing to be super micro managey to ensure the best possible outcome. (Obviously trusting officers below you to do their job in not getting killed by the enemy death stack)
the primary inconvenience of a doomstack approach IRL is logistics. i haven't played EU4 but i think there is a supply mechanic in CK3: each tile of land provides some amount of supply for an army atop it, and if the army's requirements exceed the supply for that tile, they eventually take attrition damage. doomstacks consume more supply, of course. similarly, an army marches on its stomach. oceanic units have limited food by default, so the way to defeat a naval doomstack would be to deny battle and intercept its supplies. theoretically. moreover, i'd think a doomstack has its uses only when victory is objective-oriented. they can capture a location and hold it. if the enemy is not based in an area, and somehow has the mobility to escape and reestablish itself elsewhere, then moving the doomstack will be rather clumsy. i can't think of an oceanic scenario where this could happen, though. ever chase down a bunch of smaller enemies with one stack? that can be expensive IRL.
@@danielk.english6004 But that's why faster screening forces are used, engaging those risks interception by the doom fleet. Effectively the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow base denied the German Empire fleet access to ocean, stopping the attack on supply. It made the German Empire fleet a waste of resources.
Grand strategy games, namely the ones made by Paradox like EU and HOI, are based on these principles and theories. It's like figuring out 2+2=4 by doing the math questions before reading the book on why (which when you get down to mathematic proofs is actually basically how we are taught math, at least in most of NA).
I would argue that the German U-boat operations don't disprove Mahan at all. With the Allies having definitive sea control in the Atlantic, the Germans were barely able to slow down Allied shipping and made no significant impact on the outcome of the war. In contrast, American submarines had a much greater impact on Japanese shipping, possibly due to the US Navy being able to contest sea control more directly.
@David Edbrooke, you are correct that Japan failed to protect their shipping, and that is part of my point. Let's talk about why. Japan made the strategic decision to focus their limited naval resources on the decisive battle. Any resources spent protecting convoys would have compromised their ability to defeat the American fleet. I believe Japan made the correct choice here. Had Japan convinced the US to peace out of the war in the first six months, as was the plan, the merchant losses during that time would have been of limited consequence. Merchant losses only start to become a problem if the war drags on into a war of attrition. If you think Japan could have won a war of attrition, I present you with this video: ruclips.net/video/l9ag2x3CS9M/видео.html While Japans odds of winning the decisive battle were slim, they were the best odds Japan could hope for. diverting resources to protect convoys would hurt those odds. If Japan didn't have their hands full dealing with the American carriers and surface ships, they would have been able to properly deal with American submarines. My point is, the effectiveness of submarines is linked to the capabilities and threat of the main concentrated force.
Roger Coulombe The Japanese had no chance in a Protracted war trouble only one man knew it! Yamamoto! I agree with you but if you do that you’re initial strike needed to include the invasion and occupation of midway at least better still Hawaii. I think however America would be like Rome against Hannibal not accept defeat and build up for a re take so same ending!!
Yamamoto wasn't the only one that knew it, he just knew it best, since he had first hand experience. the opening should have been handled differently, so as not to hand the US a rallying cry on a silver platter. Japan needed the American public to believe it was in their best interest to cut their losses, mind their own business, and not interfere with Japan. They needed it to be someone else's fight, not America's. Instead Japan went and made things personal, getting a "fat man" and a "little boy" as a reward. even then the odds were always going to be terrible.
@@rogercoulombe3613 If you look at the actions taken in the fist 9 months of the war Japan didn't have it's hand full and could have done a lot more. Also the Navy was short of fast supply ships to keep the fleet operational especially oilers to supply fuel to ships and gasoline for aircraft. so sinking those ships would have done a lot to delay any major actions by the US such as Guadalcanal.
Quite fascinating, Mr Stuff -- especially for those of us who went thru US Army OCS training 50+ years ago (likely before you were born). Your presentation gives me a sense of the differences between land & sea military confrontations. Concentration of force is still important, but if the military forces are on the open seas one need not be worried by being boxed in by a swamp on one side & steep foothills on the other (as was the case in many battles between the Romans & the barbarians during the primacy of the Roman Empire).
Just going to throw this out there, and you can either read it or disregard it, but I went to high school with someone related to Alfred Thayer Mahan. Her last name (now her maiden name) was the same as his, and after I'd studied about the "Great White Fleet" in history class, I thought, "Wait a minute, does that mean....?" Sure enough, when I asked her if they were indeed related, she replied, "Yes, he's my great-uncle."
"...space is probably a more mahanian environment after water..." you should do a meme video like Caspian Report did for Game of Thrones, but this time about applying Mahanian strategy to a major battle from the Halo series; "The Grand Strategy of the UNSC, 2525 - 2557".
I wanna see a strategic analysis of the grand strategy of the galactic republic and later galactic empire in their wars throughout the starwars franchise now...
The Covenant War lasted from 2525 to 2552. The grand strategy of UNSC at that time was to hide and concentrate their forces. Human warship could only win against Covenant ships if they had 3:1 to superiority. After the war, grand-strategy of the UNSC has two prongs. The lost colonies in essence formed a empty frontier, in some ways similar to the American frontier. Most of them were glassed but that is an opportunity as well. Rehabilitating planets like Reach would need a lot of mid- and high-tech tools. Which Earth and other surviving planets would gladly sell. It would be similar to the Oregon Trail. Any individual or group that is willing to take the trip to Reach or Harvest would be given land for free. I think the salvaging the remains of the previous colony can also act as a good starter industry. To the lost colonies, add all the colonisable planets. You could even count poorly defended former Covenant planets. This wave of colonisation will fuel the economy of the UNSC. The second prong of the post-war UNSC grand-strategy is the destabilization of former Covenant forces. The revanchist feelings and fear in humans is a huge reason for this. But at the same time, UN high command is somewhat rational. Former covenant forces were not in a position to threaten UNSC. But they could threaten the human settlers which would slow down the colonization process and thus the economy of the core worlds. This is why UNSC supports the enemies of its supposed allies.
Haven't actually read Mahan yet, but I read a book awhile ago called "Mayday: The Decline of America's Naval Supremacy" (2014) by Seth Cropsey that introduced me to his ideas. I've thought of it once or twice since then, especially since Cropsey talked a lot about China's growing navy; predictions that seem to be becoming more and more true. This was an excellently organized presentation that has rinued my interest on the topic. Also: WOW this is a great channel I just stumbled upon
Just a thought: would love to see a video on the logistics and strategy of Alexander the Great’s ... life? Wars? Battles? Long march? Whatever it should be called, it is fascinating and more complex strategically, particularly the logistics and social change aspects than many people realize. It seems to me it was much much more than his skilled army, tactics, and dash.
Feel like Mahan is just repeating the strategy of the Royal Navy throughout the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. Engage the French in a decisive battle. Win, then blockade his ports till he has built another comparable (but far less experienced force) and then reengage and claim another win. Continue this cycle until your enemy is broke and sues for peace.
Well, yes, Mahan reports what worked for the British. But until he came along, nobody had actually codified that strategy into a coherent argument applicable to other conflicts and other powers.
Mahan's big stroke of genius was applying island geopolitics to isolated continental powers like the US. The flipside of Mahan's thinking was that any power that could attain a continental hegemony in Eurasia like the US did in the western hemisphere would be a threat. Hence the US's growing intervention in the Eastern Hemisphere to prevent hegemonies from occuring.
The notion of choke points has always fascinated me. The British brilliantly achieved extraordinary control of sea lanes by seizing such points around the globe:Singapore, Suez, Capetown, Aden, Ceylon, Gibraltar, Persia-Iraq,.Hong Kong, etc. I wish the analysis had considered this as a global strategy pursued by Britain before World War I.
Thanks for the video. I have a couple questions: (1) What makes a good port? (2) If you have blockaded the enemy's entire coast, is a decisive battle still desirable (according to Mahan)?
Sorry for late reply. 1) Good port is a technical Q, but it is a) fit for purpose, b) accessible, c) close to necessary resources. 2) No, as mentioned in the French invasion of Ireland example. For M battle is means to end. Once end is achieved, no blockade necessary
Hi! I really enjoyed the video. I have studied this topic extensively in university and I actually talked about the point you made at 27:20 in regard to the German U-Boat theme fairly extensively in relation to Mahan. Essentially, I see the U-Boat campaign as similar to the way you discussed the French commerce raiders in the war against Britain. Even if the Germans sunk 30% of allied cargo in 1942 (which I don't remember the number, but it probably was more like 10-15% anyway), to your point, Britain could still project power to neutral countries and make known that joining the enemy will not be tolerated. The issue of sea control on an operational level was rarely in doubt, but German U-Boats could win on a tactical level.
Here in Colombia we suffered Mahan and Roosevelt's ideas... The Panama Channel was our biggest strategical asset and we lost it... oh well... at least we can still use the theories of these great Admiral to become a bigger regional naval power :) Greetings my friend.
Columbia did not have control of the panama canal because their was no panama canal when Columbia controlled the area call Panama. The reason the USA supported tha Panamanians to revolt and supported them was that Columbia wanted to control the canal and Roosevelt couldn't see spending that kind of money and giving someone else control.
Fantastic channel for all things strategy. Please make more videos and in time better graphics when reasonable. Thank you for the videos I watch them all!
Regarding submarine warfare, you might examine the US in the Pacific, during WW2. Japan was crippled, and made rapidly vulnerable because of the success of the US submarine fleet.
Interestingly enough, Mahan had a similar logic when arguing for US Navy buildup during the late 19/early 20C: if the US built to a certain proportion of the UK fleet, it would actually enhance its hemispheric control because the UK would concede. The difference was: 1) Mahan clearly advocated US alignment with the UK; and 2) Mahan argued that the US had high political leverage over the UK in Canada. Obviously from a narrow Mahanian standpoint, building a weaker battlefleet that can't actually seize sea control is NOT ideal. But from a broader standpoint, the idea of a credible naval threat forcing a UK-German rapprochement is NOT entirely without merit, as Mahan's advocacy showed. BUT 1) the perception of German weltpolitik would have been a massive obstacle and 2) Germany/the German fleet was in that awful position where it didn't actually pose enough of a direct threat to the UK, BUT was strong enough to be considered the main enemy. Tirpitz's Plan did nothing to help in these 2 points.
Great stuff as always. I would pay a dollar or two every video if you'd set up a patreon account for yourself. Obviously, making these videos is not your job or anything like that, but i think some money would benefit you and the quality of your videos. ( even though the latter is pretty high in terms of beeing informative and nice to watch at.)
You missed some points on this one: 1) The use of guerre de course by the USA against Imperial Japan in 1942-1945 2) Effective blockades which effect strategic changes despite absnse of a "decisive battle". Cuba 1960 or so, but also Germany 1914-1918 (UK surface blockade, German submarine blockade). Also Union blockade of Confederacy 1860-1865 3) Failure of Japan in 1941 to win despite a clear crushing decisive battle (Pearl Harbor). I don't think this video effectively resolves either "guerre de course" or "decisive battle theory" whether by rejecting one, embracing the other, or somehow synthesizing them.
1. Guerre de course is more use of commerce raiders. Like what the Germans did in the Atlantic. The main difference between the German U-Boat campaign and the American submarine campaign against Japan is that the US used its submarines in a far more systematic manner to blockade the Japanese home islands. What we see is the US stationing submarines all around the Japanese home islands as well as along known trade routes linking Japan to its empire. So the US submarine campaign was more of a blockade instead of what Mahan described as a Guerre de course. 2. The decisive battle is really a product of two naval powers clashing. A decisive battle did not happen with Cuba because cuba had no Navy that it could effectively protect its ships with. Also, decisive battle is generally taken to mean one where one side is destroyed. However, a decisive battle just means it decides the course of the war. In WWI, the early naval battles in the North Sea, especially Jutland could be considered decisive because the Germans were unable to break the British blockade. So while the battles did not bring a quick end to the war, they did ensure that Britain retained its control of the seas. 3. The thing about decisive battle is that it assumes one side is able to take control of the seas thus denying them to the enemy. Pearl Harbor was not decisive because the US was still able to maintain control of the sea lanes around its territorial waters. At no point, was America's economy directly threatened by Japanese naval power. Japan diminished America's ability to conduct offensive operations in the Pacific allowing them to seize territory but they were never able to take away America's ability to utilize the sea lanes in the Pacific to further its war goals. Japan could hurt the US but could never achieve a true decisive victory.
Avalanche041 very good stuff that I wish I had been able to say myself :D though I must slightly disagree with the statement on japan being incapable of a true “decisive victory”. While certainly incapable of disrupting economic activity to the US mainland, a “decisive battle” (say at midway) that the Japanese had planned -and hoped- for in the event of war certainly could’ve affected any future American operations into the Japanese-controlled territories in SEA, and while in hindsight it’s very easy to say the idea of a more “limited war” (yes I watched his other video, but I also have a personal passion on Japanese history in this era) America that Japan had hoped for was completely out of the question, especially after Pearl Harbor. One must still acknowledge that even in the event of the bare minimum of things the Japanese planned *actually* going their way, US operations would still be extremely hampered without a real Pacific Fleet (in the event of this theoretical Midway Japanese victory) for upwards of another 6 months, thus having a significant, even if eventually undone, effect on the war. Sidenote: Japanese sub design leading up to the war were actually quite decent and comparable (and in some aspects, slightly better) than their contemporaries and they maintained a sizable fleet of them prior to war. However their strategy *literally* did not attempt to use these outside of fleet harassment/scouting (the ships sunken after major battles like Yorktown were largely targets of opportunity in what was still considered a “fleet support” role) prior to their much desired “decisive battle”. As such their possible effects on Americans logistics in the Pacific, while non-existent and unlikely to change under any circumstance by that time, should still be quantified and pondered upon.
@@whyus2000 Within the context of Mahanian theory, a decisive battle would be one where Japan essentially destroyed America's ability to conduct any operations in the Pacific. Or at the very least, took away America's ability to interfere with Japanese operations. But even had the US lost at Midway, the US Navy still had a number of strategic assets at its disposal to continue to conduct operations in the Pacific. Japanese submarines were comparable to most other nations submarines. Maybe even a little better in some cases as you said. The problem for Japan is that they held the same view the US did prior to the war of submarines being used as scouts for the main battle fleet. So Japan never really developed a doctrine for using their submarines to target a nations supply lines. But even if the Japanese had done this, one has to wonder how effective it would have been. The American submarine campaign had the advantage of knowing where the Japanese merchant ships were going to be. There are basically only three exits out of Japans inland sea and these were under constant watch by American submarines. Japanese submarines on the other hand would have to watch Pearl Harbor, Puget Sound, San Diego Harbor and spread their efforts over a much wider area than what the US submarines had to patrol. The US also had its code breaking advantage which we could use to vector submarines to intercept enemy fleet and convoy movements. The Japanese would be hunting blind. So even if the Japanese had developed a proper commerce raider submarine doctrine, its effects probably would not have been as spectacular as what the Germans and Americans had been able to accomplish.
@@Avalanche041 Totally agree with the point you make. If anyone is interested they should remember that non of the carriers were sunk and that many of the Battle ships that were sunk were raised and pit back into active service. The Japanese had only hit the front line of american power and not it's base, as the war showed by such things as the Essex Swarm,
@@whyus2000 even with a Midway victory or even in the unlikely invasion and holding of the Hawaiian Islands the only thing that would have was to move the center of American activity to San Diego too far for the Japanese to do real damage to Americas industrial might. This opinion was held by Admiral Yamamoto who told this to the Japanese government. they ignored his warning thinking that they could get the Americans to agree to a treaty if they could cause enough pain to the USA.
I am interested by your ending. It occurred to me early in the video that the Mahanian view of the sea is very comparable to how space warfare would most likely be handled. Any sources that you suggest for looking into that system?
John Collins’ Military Geography for Professionals and the Public has a section on space. It’s been a while since I’ve read that, but if I recall he sees space strategy as being fairly positional: if not on planets, then on Lagrange Points
If that was it I would say we, the US, would be little different than Russia. What makes the US different is that it has a waterway passage that is navigable and bisects the nation in half, the Mississippi River system. This allows the interior to be as productive and almost efficient cost wise as the coasts. This fact makes the horrible cost burden of a permanent blue water navy not only an option but achievable long term without the economic destruction of the nation. At the start of WWII Japan had one of the best and most modern navies in the world, but getting it crippled their economy.
@@soyusmaximus7176 The issue with "lucky" is it ignores that the amarican system of government allowed for the large nation to work and be stable, exept for a single issue of states rights vs the possibility of slavery being abolished.
U-boats to me, don't invalidate mahan, but they're an asymmetric threat that basically forces the superior navy to disproportionately invest in the response (note this does not apply for modern nuclear submarines!). During WW2 provided the germans would have skipped investing in a surface fleet and just gone balls to the walls nothing but U-boats, I think they could have strangled the UK in the early stages of WW2 before the US was invested. The issue here is disproportionate investment. The UK could NOT invest in the sheer numbers of ships required to protect their convoys alone in the early stages of the war. That said, once the US was in the war, the US could afford the disproportionate investment needed to counter the U-boats. A modern nuclear sub on the other hand is not an asymmetric weapon. A single nuclear sub can eliminate entire fleets unless they also have comparable submarines to deal with them. In fact the only limitation of a nuclear sub is really in force projection for attacking land targets, and that's really because a sub just isn't going to be as flexible and responsive as a carrier. They're harder to resupply and rearm, so even an SSGN while it could wipe out a whole bunch of strategic targets with cruise missiles, it can't really provide any tactical level responsiveness for land attack. A nuclear sub is the trump card of the ocean, if you don't have one, you are going to be incapable of having blue-water sea control (you could still control choke points/brown water with a diesel sub). This is why Russia invested so much in nuclear submarines, because it allowed them to at least have parity with the US navy at sea, even if they didn't have the kind of force projection that the US navy did (e.g. no carriers and stuff). A diesel sub on the on the hand and is more of an asymmetric weapon. By itself it can't control the open sea (predominately due to limited mobility when submerged which is a REQUIREMENT for survivability in the modern era), but you can definitely control choke points and brown water type environments. A diesel sub is a lot more like a sniper, in that it can control a local environment and that it requires a disproportionate amount of effort to deal with one, but that due its limited mobility is more localized in where it can go (e.g. a sniper on foot isn't going to move 50 miles to snipe another target by himself). This makes them very suited for nations like Turkey that need to defend a local area with a lot of choke points (e.g. suez, med, bosporus), or potentially any country that doesn't need to attack someone halfway around the world. They're cheap, hard to deal with, but they're more of a defensive platform.
@@reesehendricksen269 Because the U.S. was getting extorted. Choices were killing the pirates (the only self-respecting choice), keep buying them off, or stop trading in the Med.
I think Mahan strategy is more relevant now then compared to 20th Century with the rise of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to challenged the dominance of the United States Navy (USN) in the Pacific and living in a country that is part of this region. I think his thesis is also relevant to non-US Allies, especially rebuilding a navy from scratch after decades of neglect and being over reliant on Allies rather then maintaining if not expanding the navy of my country.
26 years later we avenged this heinous act! We had other reasons and provocations, but this was still remembered at the time. We almost completely destroyed the Spanish Navy! They have never been a threat again!👍
Read up on the effectivness of the CSS Alabama. 1 commerce raider damn near stopped all trade for the North. Merchant ship Captains were afraid to go to sea. Great piece of Naval history.
Ironically the Japanese, who were also highly convinced of Mahanian theory, sought to force a decisive battle at Midway against the US carrier fleet. As we all know, that's just what they got.
@odegaard We'll see what comes out of them, but it does seem that the ghost of Thucydides looms over the Pacific. America would need to commit serious naval power to the region to match China's single ocean focused fleet. Not today, but sooner than we may realize.
MadM0nte America won’t fight alone. America will be aiding a coalition of all the islands from japan to Indonesia against the Chinese as almost all are US Allies. A cheap land based blockade will start against the Chinese. And short of large nukes there’s nothing the Chinese can do
@@Bobelponge123 the problem with that idea is that many nations depend on china for much of their production capacity so that by blockading them will hurt the other nations greater than China. it is also very difficult to cripple country of large size such as the united states, China or Russia because in many cases the resources needed to sustain there economies lies with in their borders.
@@Bobelponge123 I am not referring to external supply chains but the ones internal to China or the US. within there borders there they have enough resources to supply the needs of their war effort and population even if on a reduced level. The problem since the second world war is that these supply routes are now vulnerable to aircraft and missile interdiction.
What was the Geo-Political idea behind the Roman practices of enforced/encouraged urbanisation, and 'The Grain Dole'. What were the effects of the former and why did it seem nearly exclusively roman? And how wasn't the cost of the latter way greater than its benefit in Imperial times?
Mahan's theory was based on the notion that the sea was big, and sensor range was small. Because of that, once a commercial ship got loose, it had almost no chance of being intercepted until it once again approached a key port. With radar and aircraft, the sensor range is quite large. With space, the sensor range is miniscule and the number of possible orbital approaches is nearly infinite.
Mahan was indeed correct, but not profound, all one had to do was use their eyes and look at the Royal Navy's dominance of the world to see what he wrote was true. In fact million of British, Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese had come to this view before him.
But nobody wrote a treaty. It's like saying that politics war already Machiavellan before Machiavelli: of course, Machiavelli just explained and systematized all that, but nobody we know had done before him.
@@LuisAldamiz No one wrote treatise but Britain spents 12.5% of the GDP of the British Empire on the navy each year, a somewhat more substantial recognition than a treatise.
@@Fiddling_while_Rome_burns - Treatise, true, not "treaty". TY for the correction. As for the rest if some piece of Horatio Nelson would have survived Trafalgar, maybe he would have written something in his retirement, who knows? The fact is that nobody did. The rest is like saying Machiavelli is non-interesting because there was Machiavellism befor him, or Sun Tzu is pointless because there was war long before he lived, etc. Well, they are relevant and so is Mahan.
I think that the U-boat campaign is supporting Mahan's theory - after the convoy system was established, U-boats were unable to continue their free reign of raiding British shipping, and the overall damage they did was inconsequential - however, the ability of the British navy to outright deny Germany the access to vital resources, such as oil and rubber, proved to be one of the downfalls of Germany in the end. I also think that your view of trade as being fairly inconsequential for modern economies is a little flawed - since in the times of total mobilization, trade is means of acquiring a strategic resource that your nation does not otherwise possess, and disrupting it instantly damages the enemy's ability to wage war.
If I gave you the view that trade is inconsequential to modern economies, I can only apologize cause that's 100% NOT what I mean. What I was presenting is Corbett's argument that maritime blockade is NOT strategically decisive - he argues that because economies are NOT usually linked that directly to the sea, blockade results in slow attrition, not decisive overthrow. I think we should assess commerce raiding in short- and long-run terms. Sure, in the medium-run the Allies managed to counter the U-Boat threat. BUT at the tail end of the '1st Happy Time' c. early 1941, Adm Stark of USA calculated that the UK would net lose 25% of its merchant fleet annually and so was making policy on the assumption that the UK might surrender on that account. Privateering during the US Revolutionary War and War of 1812 also sapped UK war determination by jacking up insurance premiums (to like 30% of the entire cargo) amongst the influential merchant class. It's important to know that raiding as a long-term strategy is NOT very viable. BUT as Keynes said, "in the long-run we are all dead". If we can take advantage of the strategic shocks generated by short-term raiding to generate real political gains, there's NO reason why raiding CAN'T be an alternative strategy to sea control.
The convoy system BY NO MEANS rendered U-boats ineffective. This would be an extremely skewed and incorrect view of your own. I can't fathom how you arrived at such a conclusion and what evidence you possibly examined. You probably ignored all the anti-submarine tech; all the anti-submarine tactics; all the air patrol system; all the code-breaking; all the lack of emphasis in U-boat production -- ie. everything? The damage by U-boats was also not inconsequential -- just look up the tonnage sunk; and remember to look at the periods. Again, "the overall damage they [U-boats] did was inconsequential" is an extremely skewed and incorrect view of your own. Submarine warfare introduces an asymmetrical dynamic in naval interactions, ie. submarines can be low cost relative to surface combatants (but submarine tech cost >>> anti-submarine tech), can be next to impossible to interdict, while the utility can be high. It is probably the best to think of submarine warfare -- or the asymmetrical nature of it -- as something Mahan's system didn't address.
@@StrategyStuff Have to agree with this view. Short-term raiding strategies can be viable. One major problem with those that I see is that they usually revolve around the enemy being largely unprepared to counter the threat. Which means that an enemy with strong intelligence and naval power would be able to stop raiders dead in their tracks.
@@ecpgieicg precisely- it was technology (airborne radar) and Bletchley that stopped the uboat menace, not convoying. Other simple changes were to paint the wing's underside of British aircraft from black to a much lighter color making them harder to spot from the surface. Convoying just brought out wolfpacks.
"BUT NO effect on war ability" Simply no way of telling just how much or little effect it had on war ability, given your explanation If there had been NO commerce raiding, would the war possibly not ended sooner? The correct conclusion must be " In this example of the efficacy of commerce raiding, it was not enough to stop all war ability. Further was the pre- war commerce so important to Britain that disruption there of would have any marked effect. Possibly at the time Britain produced 99.9% of all its requirements internally. If they where 100% dependent on imports then the loss of even a small number of commercial vessels , might have been enough to eliminate all war ability If you want to call yourself the "Strategy Stuff", then presumably you want to have all your facts, analysis and explanation absolutely correct.
Awesome video as usual! Speaking of techonlogical developing, do you think that aircraft militaries will make naval combat obsolete by becoming cheaper and/or more efficient?
Especially in this age where there are so many 'moving parts' to battle - equipment, communications, political considerations, NOT to mention tactical-level actions - I would be highly skeptical of any untested claim that X would make Y obsolete. I am thinking of A2/AD here and 'carrier-killer' missiles.
Whoa there. Germany almost brought England to its knees in the Great war by ship sinking. The convoy system was forced onto the navy by the realization that without changing the ratio of sinking's vs. new ships, England would not be able to feed itself within a year. Eric Geddes may very well have saved his nation with the convoy system he insisted on.
Admiral Mahan was one of the outstanding naval thinkers of his time. Could you please do a video on his contemporaries , Sir John Fisher , Alfred von Tirpitz , and Boué de Lapeyrere ? Thank you for your video.
Please continue making videos like these. You will never be as great as the geopolitics pop channels with 5-10 minute videos, but you will have a dedicated well-read fanbase. My assumption is you never did it for the big views or money anyways. You'd be making fail compilations and news vids if you cared about those.
It appears to me that submarine raiding in the world wars is actually pretty much on point with his theory that a large navy is used to deny trading access to the enemy. True, it avoids the decisive battle part that everyone seems to think is the center piece of his theory. But if sea power is about having advantageous trade because you deny the enemy access to that trade, the submarines seem to have done a pretty good job.
If victory is not assured - either in the local battle or he greater war - it is often wiser to conserver your strength and withdraw, until such a time as you gain the desicive advantage
It should be noted that, while U-boats did inflict heavy damage on the Allies in both world wars, the Allied blockade of Germany was even more effective, completely removing their ability to sustain the wars.
Any signs of life? I know you're a Hong Kong citizen and are most likely hard at work saveguarding your liberty. However do you still have plans to pick up the channel again when things calm down? You're by far the best indepth geopolitical channel on youtube.
Fun fact: While Theodore Roosevelt had been heavily inspired by Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Mahan himself had found the inspiration for his naval treatise from Theodore Roosevelt's The Naval War of 1812.
So was Kaiser Wilhelm II.
Didn't TR write that when he was 10 or something?
@@elisekehle8520 22
source?
circle jerk? 😂
It's interesting how similar Mahan's Sea Power is to Sun-Tzu's Art of War in terms of its goals. Both works were originally intended to address immediate and specific situations; Mahan wanted to promote the reform of his own military service branch, while Sun-Tzu was essentially writing a job application. And yet, both works have found applications well beyond the situations they were written for, albeit complete with the potential for misapplication that's probably inherent to such popularity.
Machiavelli’s the Prince (a book full of strategic thinking) as well was a job application towards the Medici family who ruled Florence Italy at the time.
@@Sea_ss Maybe (it's very debatable if he wanted a job with the Medici's, who had been enemies. The dedication may have just been to keep himself from getting tortured by the Medicis, more), but Machiavelli also wrote a book on military strategic thinking called The Art of War (Dell'arte della guerra). The Prince is more about political theory, and actually has a lot in similar with Carnegie's How to Win Friends and Influence People, the latter is much more simplistic though.
Word salad. At least YOU are impressed.
Sea lanes of communication (SLOC) are absolutely essential to free navigation of the world's oceans and seas. As a retired Marine I assure you that sea power is key...
And the Arctic, the future Sea Way!
THE SEA IS NOT A BARRIER, THE SEA IS A ROAD - ALFRED THAYER MAHAN.
Damn man chill with the capitalisation.
Essex-spam time !
@@TheTariqibnziyad Why? Capitalism is the only economy type that actually works in the long run. Communism/Socialism only works in the short run. (see EVERY nation that tried to use C/S as an economic system). This is NOT something that can be scoffed at as un-politically correct. This is based upon Human Nature. A human is born selfish, and no matter what they are taught, will revert to Me-Me-Me if given the opportunity. This is why ALL Communist states had a fascist and repressive government, to FORCE their people to work for the state. And as soon as the thumb is off of them, they revert to Capitalism and Free Market economies.
@@HemlockRidge lol
@@HemlockRidge Lmao take your meds, he said capitalization
Mahan was a genuine genius his work is still relevant today and I recommend reading the influence of sea power it’s fantastic.
An extremely underrated influential man. Because of him the entire global status quo shifted
I have an issue with your analysis on the efficiency of waterborne shipping. We are talking about seaborne shipping, NOT domestic waterborne. The data you used are a direct copy of the wikipedia page "Energy efficiency in transport," but mislabeled waterborne, as if all waterborne has the same cost. The 217 BTU/ton-mile is largely referring to shipping throughout navigable rivers such as the Mississippi River Basin. The same wikipedia page suggests that the Emma Maersk can do 74 kJ per tonne-km. If we convert to BTU/ton-mile by multiplying by roughly 1.36 we get a value of roughly 100 BTU/ton-mile. I still agree with your assertion, but by showing how disparately unequal the efficiency in transport costs are better portrays how advantageous it is to trade by sea.
I still wondered how much more profitable it still would be to trade via rail (like a net stretching whole of Europe-Asia-Africa and possibly to Americas via Berring) when actually counting the miles in total. Of course maintenance of said tracks through extreme climates would need a different dimension altogether but nevertheless...
@@minzblatt It cost about $2000 to ship a container from China to Europe by ship, and $8000 by rail. However, it take about ~60 days for ships and only ~10 days for rail. So this means bulk goods are done by ships, while more time sensitive goods by rail.
@@WangGanChang but important here is that ships can go as fast as rail, ships move slower by choice because they exploit physics of a huge mass traveling through liquid. Once you accelerate the container ship, it will take a huge force to bring it to a stop and friction on the water, while not non-existent, is still relatively tiny at slow speeds compared to rolling wheel on a rail. So ships will use tiny amount of power to counteract the speed lost due to friction and almost drift through the sea, while a locomotive has no choice but to pump more and more power to keep it going.
@@lollertoaster it takes several full trains to load one ship. Rails can only handle a certain number of trains over a given distance. Rails also need ongoing maintenance. Ships last up to twenty years. They can sail at any time to any port. The only possible advantage to trains could be a future of electrified rail systems based on renewable energy sources. Until then, ships are preferred.
@@martinthemillwright we currently use both, and will continue to as there’s advantages to both.
Ships also need ongoing maintenance. They don’t just get made and sail for 20 years without a checkup.
They cannot sail at any time to any port. Many ports don’t have the facilities required to unload container ships, and they can only have so many in port at any given time.
In a perfect world ships > trains. However, we don’t live in a perfect world.
Remember children: a sea is never a barrier, a sea is always a road.
Praise be Alfred Thayer Mahan. His testaments shall never be forgotten.
Amen.
A sea is definitely often a barrier, those absolute one-liners are never useful.
@@g-rexsaurus794 Those who try to use the sea as an instrument of isolation soon realize their foe has already put the sea into his own service
Mahan was ok
@@the_vadym Like Germans did when invaded Britain. Just a big highway from Calais to Dover :-)
But this statement at face value is categorically incorrect - a sea is very much a barrier without the technology to cross it. No caveat was given, so it can only he understood at the surface. For all world history thousands of years, it has been a barrier
My old college professor may explode if he sees this on YT. He had an entire series on gunboat diplomacy and naval strategy in from the 1700s to present, and Mahan was his Clausewitz.
Great video!
As a USAF officer, I read Mahan’s “Influence of Sea Power . . .” in the mid 1980’s. This is an excellent summary, but the real gem is at the end when the narrator equates command of space/air as the new “sea power”. I have the highest respect for my naval colleagues and I know they will object, but highly maneuverable hypersonic nuclear glide vehicles and multiple hypersonic cruise missiles hugging the surface of the water are making carrier groups obsolete-in spite of defensive missiles, automated guns, and electronic counter-measures. Witness the Moskva and US naval defense simulations. A strong navy is necessary, but will increasingly rely on missile-armed submarines and smaller guided missile cruisers. Given the increasing range of anti-ship missiles, foreign and choke-point basing rights will become increasingly valuable. I wish my brave naval colleagues the best-they are going to need it.
As expected of a AF officer, great comment. The Ukraine theater seems to highlight this with Russia having its naval gems get hit by missiles and drones. Real talk yall are completely brave and it's probably just true that War is more crazy now then ever. The Dday boys will always be heroes. But yall are just the best in history. God Bless the USA!!!
Never heard of the man until now, thanks for the video!
Most significant naval strategist of the 19th Century. His father, Dennis Hart Mahan, was a brilliant engineer.
It’s interesting to see how Mahan is getting a lot of attention recently in the YT channels. Great work, keep up the history!
I disagree that airspace is less relevant than sea. Of course there is less trade that goes via plane (the goods might be more valueable, but I think trade via air is still less than sea). However, controlling the airspace lets you control land, sea, and air trade. Germany in WW2 basically learned a bitter leason by not being able to effectively protect air space. Any form of land transport or industry was vulnerable from attacks. If a countries air space is controlled by an enemy, its power is decreased by a lot more than when just sea trade is effected.
I think one factor which is much more prominent in airspace that at sea is area denial. Even if you have no air force you could have a lot of anti-air forces (missiles) which would deny the enemy control of the air without taking control of it yourself
I think your point is correct: air supremacy has little direct strategic effect (in the Mahanian sense) since air commerce is relatively minor; BUT controlling air does result in an impact on sea/land commerce.
Airspace is more of a battlefield and much less so an strategical space. Airspace can be used to hit the enemy at great distance, possibly with devastating effects, but mostly is about controlling land and seas, mostly from land. So in the end it goes back to "expanded" fort-based coastal defense.
Having SAMS though and arming ships with missiles that have aa capabilities is basically the land fort edition of aa though = cheaper
In a rock chucking contest it's best to be at the top of the well
I think in the end Mahan was proved correct.
Also, with the aircraft carrier air power and sea power have become closely linked.
But bare in mind, in Mahan's time. The Navy was the first line of defense. It's technically still is but air power (Air Force) has pretty much became the true first line of defense. Satelites in space are generally under Air Force supervision. Nobody can hide an invasion force anymore. You would have to destroy or cripple the satelite surveillance. But doing that you will still trigger the enemies defenses. They would know something is wrong.
I would say ....maybe. Submarines played a devastating role in WWII, especially the vastly underrated effect of US submarines in the Pacific. There has been widespread speculation about the obsolescence of traditional sea power and sea control doctrine with modern technology. Now, certainly Mahan was correct in his time and in his foreseeable future, but how far his analysis remained or remains relevant is open to argument.
I would agree with Charles here. Air power away from the coast I would put under sea power whether that be ship launched missiles or carrier-based aircraft. If you look at all major Wars since the history of sea power was written the victors did end up gaining control of the sea in decisive battle or the losers ended up largely ignoring sea power until the war started. If you look at the Cold War and the battle strategies of the Cold War the Russians wanted to deny a decisive battle long enough to get to the Rhine or even Spain. The United States on the other hand wanted complete control of the sea to hold up Russian resources in other areas and other fronts to minimize land loss in Europe. Submarines in World War II although I am a Submariner and admit that submarines played a decisive role in the Pacific and the Atlantic turning points in the war were won on decisive battles for example Coral Sea Midway battle for the Atlantic. Air power is an extension of the land and sea space it is more of a multiplier to the land sea Battle as opposed to a battle space that can deliver victory.
@@adam12o8 Yes! Eliminating the Soviet Navy or cripple the Soviet Red Banner Fleet in the Baltic Sea was crucial for the US Navy and British! Without doing that, Soviet Fleet in the Atlantic can wreck havoc on US and British supply chain. Not enough manpower or equipment would be sufficient enough to keep the Soviet Army and WARSAW PACT forces at bay. Blocking off the Soviet Fleet in the Black Sea would've been easier because of Turkey's geographic location.
Wait... so the decisive battle theory wasn't dead then, because since aircraft carriers were the capital ships of WWII, Midway was actually the decisive battle.
love the content, some of the best stuff of youtube.
Please subscribe! Waiting on him to get a video production team
Do you have lectures of mahan lessons pratical use in WW1 regards
I feel like if you play EU4 alot, you just learn all of the geopolitical grand strategy stuff by default lol.
I never even knew about any of these theories or concepts, but I used this strategy in EU4 alot.
Whenever I played a country that had significant coastline but a smaller navy than my enemies, I concentrated my navy to be able to defend my coastline in a limited effort to prevent war exhaustion and lose of wealth to my country and defeat the enemies navy piecemeal, by sniping random ships and eventually building a large enough navy to be able to gain full control of the sea against my enemies.
Blockades are an easy way to gain wealth from your enemies as well as lowering their war support.
I rarely split up my navies and would always just concentrate it into one death stack and decisively crush the enemy navy and then try my best to completely blockade the coastlines to drain wealth as well as prevent the enemy navy from consolidating. Obviously it's not as realistic as IRL, but I think it's a good simulation of geopolitics and war.
At the start of WW1 the Germans were surprised as instead of a close blockade, the British Grand Fleet sailed up to the Orkneys base Scapa Flow.
The point was to deny piecemeal victories, screen with fast ships while any German force risked interception by the doom stack.
I think most paradox grand strategy games end up with similar results. HOI4 is litterally WW2 simulator, and has lots of various strategies that mimic real world ones.
Even Stellaris has this emergent strategy, the fastest way to win a war is to doom stack and rush down enemy shipyards so they cant reinforce, but you have to juggle the "geography" of the hyperlane network, multi front wars, and the AIs fleet or multiple fleets, also ship speed can be huge and multiple fast fleets can achieve your main goals of denying space to your enemies faster than the doom stack that has capital ships that are better equiped for "decisive battles".
I think the main difference for games is that depending on how much you are willing to micromanage determines how much weaker than the enemies capital fleet you are willing to go. But IRL you obviously would be willing to be super micro managey to ensure the best possible outcome. (Obviously trusting officers below you to do their job in not getting killed by the enemy death stack)
the primary inconvenience of a doomstack approach IRL is logistics.
i haven't played EU4 but i think there is a supply mechanic in CK3: each tile of land provides some amount of supply for an army atop it, and if the army's requirements exceed the supply for that tile, they eventually take attrition damage. doomstacks consume more supply, of course.
similarly, an army marches on its stomach. oceanic units have limited food by default, so the way to defeat a naval doomstack would be to deny battle and intercept its supplies. theoretically. moreover, i'd think a doomstack has its uses only when victory is objective-oriented. they can capture a location and hold it. if the enemy is not based in an area, and somehow has the mobility to escape and reestablish itself elsewhere, then moving the doomstack will be rather clumsy. i can't think of an oceanic scenario where this could happen, though. ever chase down a bunch of smaller enemies with one stack? that can be expensive IRL.
@@danielk.english6004 But that's why faster screening forces are used, engaging those risks interception by the doom fleet. Effectively the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow base denied the German Empire fleet access to ocean, stopping the attack on supply. It made the German Empire fleet a waste of resources.
Grand strategy games, namely the ones made by Paradox like EU and HOI, are based on these principles and theories. It's like figuring out 2+2=4 by doing the math questions before reading the book on why (which when you get down to mathematic proofs is actually basically how we are taught math, at least in most of NA).
I would argue that the German U-boat operations don't disprove Mahan at all. With the Allies having definitive sea control in the Atlantic, the Germans were barely able to slow down Allied shipping and made no significant impact on the outcome of the war. In contrast, American submarines had a much greater impact on Japanese shipping, possibly due to the US Navy being able to contest sea control more directly.
The Japanese did not do anything to stop American boats, no convoy or coastal protection that would have helped.
@David Edbrooke, you are correct that Japan failed to protect their shipping, and that is part of my point. Let's talk about why.
Japan made the strategic decision to focus their limited naval resources on the decisive battle. Any resources spent protecting convoys would have compromised their ability to defeat the American fleet. I believe Japan made the correct choice here. Had Japan convinced the US to peace out of the war in the first six months, as was the plan, the merchant losses during that time would have been of limited consequence. Merchant losses only start to become a problem if the war drags on into a war of attrition. If you think Japan could have won a war of attrition, I present you with this video: ruclips.net/video/l9ag2x3CS9M/видео.html While Japans odds of winning the decisive battle were slim, they were the best odds Japan could hope for. diverting resources to protect convoys would hurt those odds.
If Japan didn't have their hands full dealing with the American carriers and surface ships, they would have been able to properly deal with American submarines. My point is, the effectiveness of submarines is linked to the capabilities and threat of the main concentrated force.
Roger Coulombe The Japanese had no chance in a Protracted war trouble only one man knew it! Yamamoto! I agree with you but if you do that you’re initial strike needed to include the invasion and occupation of midway at least better still Hawaii. I think however America would be like Rome against Hannibal not accept defeat and build up for a re take so same ending!!
Yamamoto wasn't the only one that knew it, he just knew it best, since he had first hand experience. the opening should have been handled differently, so as not to hand the US a rallying cry on a silver platter. Japan needed the American public to believe it was in their best interest to cut their losses, mind their own business, and not interfere with Japan. They needed it to be someone else's fight, not America's. Instead Japan went and made things personal, getting a "fat man" and a "little boy" as a reward. even then the odds were always going to be terrible.
@@rogercoulombe3613 If you look at the actions taken in the fist 9 months of the war Japan didn't have it's hand full and could have done a lot more. Also the Navy was short of fast supply ships to keep the fleet operational especially oilers to supply fuel to ships and gasoline for aircraft. so sinking those ships would have done a lot to delay any major actions by the US such as Guadalcanal.
Quite fascinating, Mr Stuff -- especially for those of us who went thru US Army OCS training 50+ years ago (likely before you were born). Your presentation gives me a sense of the differences between land & sea military confrontations. Concentration of force is still important, but if the military forces are on the open seas one need not be worried by being boxed in by a swamp on one side & steep foothills on the other (as was the case in many battles between the Romans & the barbarians during the primacy of the Roman Empire).
Bro your videos are some of the best on RUclips
Take your time we all understand the best stuff takes forever to make
Just going to throw this out there, and you can either read it or disregard it, but I went to high school with someone related to Alfred Thayer Mahan. Her last name (now her maiden name) was the same as his, and after I'd studied about the "Great White Fleet" in history class, I thought, "Wait a minute, does that mean....?" Sure enough, when I asked her if they were indeed related, she replied, "Yes, he's my great-uncle."
Yes, but how big was her fleet?
@@MrLemonbaby From my interactions with her, I'm not sure if she had quite the same level of maritime experience as her great-uncle.
This is a really cool channel. Thanks for making it.
I love how Canada is called frontier.
No Man's Land. :D
It really was back then
@@Longlius still is. More than 85% of Canada's population is within 90 miles of the US boarder. For obvious reasons.
@@annexcanada9987 lol your name
Thanks for another great video! So glad a channel like yours exists.
Another standout video. Thank you. It's baffling that you have so few subs.
What happened to this channel? No video for 5 months? You produce good quality content. Please don't stop
I live in Hong Kong so... that’s why. Practical experience with strategy, you can call it
@@StrategyStuff Oh, I see. Stay safe, man.
"...space is probably a more mahanian environment after water..." you should do a meme video like Caspian Report did for Game of Thrones, but this time about applying Mahanian strategy to a major battle from the Halo series; "The Grand Strategy of the UNSC, 2525 - 2557".
By no means do the same for starwars. It does not come out well for the franchise.
I wanna see a strategic analysis of the grand strategy of the galactic republic and later galactic empire in their wars throughout the starwars franchise now...
The Covenant War lasted from 2525 to 2552. The grand strategy of UNSC at that time was to hide and concentrate their forces. Human warship could only win against Covenant ships if they had 3:1 to superiority.
After the war, grand-strategy of the UNSC has two prongs. The lost colonies in essence formed a empty frontier, in some ways similar to the American frontier. Most of them were glassed but that is an opportunity as well. Rehabilitating planets like Reach would need a lot of mid- and high-tech tools. Which Earth and other surviving planets would gladly sell. It would be similar to the Oregon Trail. Any individual or group that is willing to take the trip to Reach or Harvest would be given land for free. I think the salvaging the remains of the previous colony can also act as a good starter industry. To the lost colonies, add all the colonisable planets. You could even count poorly defended former Covenant planets. This wave of colonisation will fuel the economy of the UNSC.
The second prong of the post-war UNSC grand-strategy is the destabilization of former Covenant forces. The revanchist feelings and fear in humans is a huge reason for this. But at the same time, UN high command is somewhat rational. Former covenant forces were not in a position to threaten UNSC. But they could threaten the human settlers which would slow down the colonization process and thus the economy of the core worlds. This is why UNSC supports the enemies of its supposed allies.
Probably the best breakdown of Mahanian theory on youtube
Great stuff. I really hope you come back to RUclips.
Haven't actually read Mahan yet, but I read a book awhile ago called "Mayday: The Decline of America's Naval Supremacy" (2014) by Seth Cropsey that introduced me to his ideas. I've thought of it once or twice since then, especially since Cropsey talked a lot about China's growing navy; predictions that seem to be becoming more and more true.
This was an excellently organized presentation that has rinued my interest on the topic.
Also: WOW this is a great channel I just stumbled upon
Just a thought: would love to see a video on the logistics and strategy of Alexander the Great’s ... life? Wars? Battles? Long march? Whatever it should be called, it is fascinating and more complex strategically, particularly the logistics and social change aspects than many people realize. It seems to me it was much much more than his skilled army, tactics, and dash.
Very wise
How about Cyrus II the Great?
Feel like Mahan is just repeating the strategy of the Royal Navy throughout the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. Engage the French in a decisive battle. Win, then blockade his ports till he has built another comparable (but far less experienced force) and then reengage and claim another win. Continue this cycle until your enemy is broke and sues for peace.
Well, yes, Mahan reports what worked for the British. But until he came along, nobody had actually codified that strategy into a coherent argument applicable to other conflicts and other powers.
Mahan's big stroke of genius was applying island geopolitics to isolated continental powers like the US. The flipside of Mahan's thinking was that any power that could attain a continental hegemony in Eurasia like the US did in the western hemisphere would be a threat. Hence the US's growing intervention in the Eastern Hemisphere to prevent hegemonies from occuring.
The notion of choke points has always fascinated me. The British brilliantly achieved extraordinary control of sea lanes by seizing such points around the globe:Singapore, Suez, Capetown, Aden, Ceylon, Gibraltar, Persia-Iraq,.Hong Kong, etc. I wish the analysis had considered this as a global strategy pursued by Britain before World War I.
The history of eastern Europe is largely the struggle for control over the Dardanelles.
Outstanding primer on Mahan! Thank you.
Thanks for the video. I have a couple questions: (1) What makes a good port? (2) If you have blockaded the enemy's entire coast, is a decisive battle still desirable (according to Mahan)?
Sorry for late reply. 1) Good port is a technical Q, but it is a) fit for purpose, b) accessible, c) close to necessary resources. 2) No, as mentioned in the French invasion of Ireland example. For M battle is means to end. Once end is achieved, no blockade necessary
Hi! I really enjoyed the video. I have studied this topic extensively in university and I actually talked about the point you made at 27:20 in regard to the German U-Boat theme fairly extensively in relation to Mahan. Essentially, I see the U-Boat campaign as similar to the way you discussed the French commerce raiders in the war against Britain. Even if the Germans sunk 30% of allied cargo in 1942 (which I don't remember the number, but it probably was more like 10-15% anyway), to your point, Britain could still project power to neutral countries and make known that joining the enemy will not be tolerated. The issue of sea control on an operational level was rarely in doubt, but German U-Boats could win on a tactical level.
Here in Colombia we suffered Mahan and Roosevelt's ideas... The Panama Channel was our biggest strategical asset and we lost it... oh well... at least we can still use the theories of these great Admiral to become a bigger regional naval power :) Greetings my friend.
Columbia did not have control of the panama canal because their was no panama canal when Columbia controlled the area call Panama. The reason the USA supported tha Panamanians to revolt and supported them was that Columbia wanted to control the canal and Roosevelt couldn't see spending that kind of money and giving someone else control.
Fantastic channel for all things strategy. Please make more videos and in time better graphics when reasonable. Thank you for the videos I watch them all!
Regarding submarine warfare, you might examine the US in the Pacific, during WW2. Japan was crippled, and made rapidly vulnerable because of the success of the US submarine fleet.
Nice video man. True insight in how the world is governed rather than just capilatist/communist cover ups
Love your videos they offer knowledge and ideas.
This was excellent. Greatly enjoying these videos
Thank you for this excellent exposition.
So, how much value do you place on von Tirpitz’ Risk Theory within this context?
Interestingly enough, Mahan had a similar logic when arguing for US Navy buildup during the late 19/early 20C: if the US built to a certain proportion of the UK fleet, it would actually enhance its hemispheric control because the UK would concede. The difference was: 1) Mahan clearly advocated US alignment with the UK; and 2) Mahan argued that the US had high political leverage over the UK in Canada.
Obviously from a narrow Mahanian standpoint, building a weaker battlefleet that can't actually seize sea control is NOT ideal. But from a broader standpoint, the idea of a credible naval threat forcing a UK-German rapprochement is NOT entirely without merit, as Mahan's advocacy showed. BUT 1) the perception of German weltpolitik would have been a massive obstacle and 2) Germany/the German fleet was in that awful position where it didn't actually pose enough of a direct threat to the UK, BUT was strong enough to be considered the main enemy. Tirpitz's Plan did nothing to help in these 2 points.
Great stuff as always. I would pay a dollar or two every video if you'd set up a patreon account for yourself. Obviously, making these videos is not your job or anything like that, but i think some money would benefit you and the quality of your videos. ( even though the latter is pretty high in terms of beeing informative and nice to watch at.)
Or if we all subscribe, RUclips will one day pay him to get a video production assistant !!
You missed some points on this one:
1) The use of guerre de course by the USA against Imperial Japan in 1942-1945
2) Effective blockades which effect strategic changes despite absnse of a "decisive battle". Cuba 1960 or so, but also Germany 1914-1918 (UK surface blockade, German submarine blockade). Also Union blockade of Confederacy 1860-1865
3) Failure of Japan in 1941 to win despite a clear crushing decisive battle (Pearl Harbor).
I don't think this video effectively resolves either "guerre de course" or "decisive battle theory" whether by rejecting one, embracing the other, or somehow synthesizing them.
1. Guerre de course is more use of commerce raiders. Like what the Germans did in the Atlantic. The main difference between the German U-Boat campaign and the American submarine campaign against Japan is that the US used its submarines in a far more systematic manner to blockade the Japanese home islands. What we see is the US stationing submarines all around the Japanese home islands as well as along known trade routes linking Japan to its empire. So the US submarine campaign was more of a blockade instead of what Mahan described as a Guerre de course.
2. The decisive battle is really a product of two naval powers clashing. A decisive battle did not happen with Cuba because cuba had no Navy that it could effectively protect its ships with. Also, decisive battle is generally taken to mean one where one side is destroyed. However, a decisive battle just means it decides the course of the war. In WWI, the early naval battles in the North Sea, especially Jutland could be considered decisive because the Germans were unable to break the British blockade. So while the battles did not bring a quick end to the war, they did ensure that Britain retained its control of the seas.
3. The thing about decisive battle is that it assumes one side is able to take control of the seas thus denying them to the enemy. Pearl Harbor was not decisive because the US was still able to maintain control of the sea lanes around its territorial waters. At no point, was America's economy directly threatened by Japanese naval power. Japan diminished America's ability to conduct offensive operations in the Pacific allowing them to seize territory but they were never able to take away America's ability to utilize the sea lanes in the Pacific to further its war goals. Japan could hurt the US but could never achieve a true decisive victory.
Avalanche041 very good stuff that I wish I had been able to say myself :D though I must slightly disagree with the statement on japan being incapable of a true “decisive victory”.
While certainly incapable of disrupting economic activity to the US mainland, a “decisive battle” (say at midway) that the Japanese had planned -and hoped- for in the event of war certainly could’ve affected any future American operations into the Japanese-controlled territories in SEA, and while in hindsight it’s very easy to say the idea of a more “limited war” (yes I watched his other video, but I also have a personal passion on Japanese history in this era) America that Japan had hoped for was completely out of the question, especially after Pearl Harbor. One must still acknowledge that even in the event of the bare minimum of things the Japanese planned *actually* going their way, US operations would still be extremely hampered without a real Pacific Fleet (in the event of this theoretical Midway Japanese victory) for upwards of another 6 months, thus having a significant, even if eventually undone, effect on the war.
Sidenote: Japanese sub design leading up to the war were actually quite decent and comparable (and in some aspects, slightly better) than their contemporaries and they maintained a sizable fleet of them prior to war. However their strategy *literally* did not attempt to use these outside of fleet harassment/scouting (the ships sunken after major battles like Yorktown were largely targets of opportunity in what was still considered a “fleet support” role) prior to their much desired “decisive battle”. As such their possible effects on Americans logistics in the Pacific, while non-existent and unlikely to change under any circumstance by that time, should still be quantified and pondered upon.
@@whyus2000 Within the context of Mahanian theory, a decisive battle would be one where Japan essentially destroyed America's ability to conduct any operations in the Pacific. Or at the very least, took away America's ability to interfere with Japanese operations. But even had the US lost at Midway, the US Navy still had a number of strategic assets at its disposal to continue to conduct operations in the Pacific.
Japanese submarines were comparable to most other nations submarines. Maybe even a little better in some cases as you said. The problem for Japan is that they held the same view the US did prior to the war of submarines being used as scouts for the main battle fleet. So Japan never really developed a doctrine for using their submarines to target a nations supply lines. But even if the Japanese had done this, one has to wonder how effective it would have been. The American submarine campaign had the advantage of knowing where the Japanese merchant ships were going to be. There are basically only three exits out of Japans inland sea and these were under constant watch by American submarines. Japanese submarines on the other hand would have to watch Pearl Harbor, Puget Sound, San Diego Harbor and spread their efforts over a much wider area than what the US submarines had to patrol. The US also had its code breaking advantage which we could use to vector submarines to intercept enemy fleet and convoy movements. The Japanese would be hunting blind. So even if the Japanese had developed a proper commerce raider submarine doctrine, its effects probably would not have been as spectacular as what the Germans and Americans had been able to accomplish.
@@Avalanche041 Totally agree with the point you make. If anyone is interested they should remember that non of the carriers were sunk and that many of the Battle ships that were sunk were raised and pit back into active service. The Japanese had only hit the front line of american power and not it's base, as the war showed by such things as the Essex Swarm,
@@whyus2000 even with a Midway victory or even in the unlikely invasion and holding of the Hawaiian Islands the only thing that would have was to move the center of American activity to San Diego too far for the Japanese to do real damage to Americas industrial might. This opinion was held by Admiral Yamamoto who told this to the Japanese government. they ignored his warning thinking that they could get the Americans to agree to a treaty if they could cause enough pain to the USA.
This is incredible! Might we see more theory videos like this in the future?
Yes, but not this year.
I am interested by your ending. It occurred to me early in the video that the Mahanian view of the sea is very comparable to how space warfare would most likely be handled. Any sources that you suggest for looking into that system?
John Collins’ Military Geography for Professionals and the Public has a section on space. It’s been a while since I’ve read that, but if I recall he sees space strategy as being fairly positional: if not on planets, then on Lagrange Points
@@StrategyStuff Thanks!
The U.S. is unique because it is the only major power straddling an entire continent AND with ports on the two major oceans.
America is the most geographically lucky country of all time. The indigenous material and manpower of a continent, with the security of an island.
Perhaps today but not in the past: it was Spain !!
If that was it I would say we, the US, would be little different than Russia. What makes the US different is that it has a waterway passage that is navigable and bisects the nation in half, the Mississippi River system. This allows the interior to be as productive and almost efficient cost wise as the coasts. This fact makes the horrible cost burden of a permanent blue water navy not only an option but achievable long term without the economic destruction of the nation.
At the start of WWII Japan had one of the best and most modern navies in the world, but getting it crippled their economy.
Russia with a * and both have access to 3 if you include the artic
@@soyusmaximus7176 The issue with "lucky" is it ignores that the amarican system of government allowed for the large nation to work and be stable, exept for a single issue of states rights vs the possibility of slavery being abolished.
This is exceptional.
U-boats to me, don't invalidate mahan, but they're an asymmetric threat that basically forces the superior navy to disproportionately invest in the response (note this does not apply for modern nuclear submarines!). During WW2 provided the germans would have skipped investing in a surface fleet and just gone balls to the walls nothing but U-boats, I think they could have strangled the UK in the early stages of WW2 before the US was invested. The issue here is disproportionate investment. The UK could NOT invest in the sheer numbers of ships required to protect their convoys alone in the early stages of the war. That said, once the US was in the war, the US could afford the disproportionate investment needed to counter the U-boats.
A modern nuclear sub on the other hand is not an asymmetric weapon. A single nuclear sub can eliminate entire fleets unless they also have comparable submarines to deal with them. In fact the only limitation of a nuclear sub is really in force projection for attacking land targets, and that's really because a sub just isn't going to be as flexible and responsive as a carrier. They're harder to resupply and rearm, so even an SSGN while it could wipe out a whole bunch of strategic targets with cruise missiles, it can't really provide any tactical level responsiveness for land attack. A nuclear sub is the trump card of the ocean, if you don't have one, you are going to be incapable of having blue-water sea control (you could still control choke points/brown water with a diesel sub). This is why Russia invested so much in nuclear submarines, because it allowed them to at least have parity with the US navy at sea, even if they didn't have the kind of force projection that the US navy did (e.g. no carriers and stuff).
A diesel sub on the on the hand and is more of an asymmetric weapon. By itself it can't control the open sea (predominately due to limited mobility when submerged which is a REQUIREMENT for survivability in the modern era), but you can definitely control choke points and brown water type environments. A diesel sub is a lot more like a sniper, in that it can control a local environment and that it requires a disproportionate amount of effort to deal with one, but that due its limited mobility is more localized in where it can go (e.g. a sniper on foot isn't going to move 50 miles to snipe another target by himself). This makes them very suited for nations like Turkey that need to defend a local area with a lot of choke points (e.g. suez, med, bosporus), or potentially any country that doesn't need to attack someone halfway around the world. They're cheap, hard to deal with, but they're more of a defensive platform.
Cant wait till your next video
Ah Good old days when america was just a normal country with normal power and Influence
And when great powers thrust millions of lives into wars ever few years
America was never normal, they had declared two wars on the Berber Pirates of Africa for the harassment of trade.
@@mig-stallion1359 You mean like Russia?
@@reesehendricksen269 Because the U.S. was getting extorted. Choices were killing the pirates (the only self-respecting choice), keep buying them off, or stop trading in the Med.
I think Mahan strategy is more relevant now then compared to 20th Century with the rise of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to challenged the dominance of the United States Navy (USN) in the Pacific and living in a country that is part of this region. I think his thesis is also relevant to non-US Allies, especially rebuilding a navy from scratch after decades of neglect and being over reliant on Allies rather then maintaining if not expanding the navy of my country.
Dude this video is one of u r best.. And the slow diction is a plus 🌹
This is a great video ! Good job !
I would love to see a video extrapolating Mahanian theory to develop a doctrine of space naval warfare.
26 years later we avenged this heinous act! We had other reasons and provocations, but this was still remembered at the time. We almost completely destroyed the Spanish Navy! They have never been a threat again!👍
Interesting note at the end about space being Mahanian. Would there be a video about space strategy in the future?
The 'space' section of John Collins' 'Military Geography' is quite interesting so maybe...
Nice work and excellent elocution.
This channel is great
hmm…interesting, thanks youtube for the recommendation!
I just bought the Mahan and Corbett books during the video :)
Another masterpiece!
This is really interesting. I'm glad I stumbled on the channel
You should do a review of Sun Tzu’s Art of War or the strategy of the North Vietnamese during the Vietnam War!!!!
Read up on the effectivness of the CSS Alabama.
1 commerce raider damn near stopped all trade for the North.
Merchant ship Captains were afraid to go to sea.
Great piece of Naval history.
Ironically the Japanese, who were also highly convinced of Mahanian theory, sought to force a decisive battle at Midway against the US carrier fleet. As we all know, that's just what they got.
@odegaard We'll see what comes out of them, but it does seem that the ghost of Thucydides looms over the Pacific. America would need to commit serious naval power to the region to match China's single ocean focused fleet. Not today, but sooner than we may realize.
MadM0nte America won’t fight alone. America will be aiding a coalition of all the islands from japan to Indonesia against the Chinese as almost all are US Allies. A cheap land based blockade will start against the Chinese. And short of large nukes there’s nothing the Chinese can do
@@Bobelponge123 the problem with that idea is that many nations depend on china for much of their production capacity so that by blockading them will hurt the other nations greater than China. it is also very difficult to cripple country of large size such as the united states, China or Russia because in many cases the resources needed to sustain there economies lies with in their borders.
@@richardmeyeroff7397 in wartime with China most East Asian supply chains would break down, making that unlikely
@@Bobelponge123 I am not referring to external supply chains but the ones internal to China or the US. within there borders there they have enough resources to supply the needs of their war effort and population even if on a reduced level. The problem since the second world war is that these supply routes are now vulnerable to aircraft and missile interdiction.
I like the idea of US Trade being carried on US made ships with US crews.
Interesting for the analysis of the conflicts in the south-china-sea!
Wait.... he came up with the idea that wealth equaled power- Brilliant!
What was the Geo-Political idea behind the Roman practices of enforced/encouraged urbanisation, and 'The Grain Dole'.
What were the effects of the former and why did it seem nearly exclusively roman? And how wasn't the cost of the latter way greater than its benefit in Imperial times?
Mahan's theory was based on the notion that the sea was big, and sensor range was small. Because of that, once a commercial ship got loose, it had almost no chance of being intercepted until it once again approached a key port. With radar and aircraft, the sensor range is quite large. With space, the sensor range is miniscule and the number of possible orbital approaches is nearly infinite.
Mahan was indeed correct, but not profound, all one had to do was use their eyes and look at the Royal Navy's dominance of the world to see what he wrote was true. In fact million of British, Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese had come to this view before him.
But nobody wrote a treaty. It's like saying that politics war already Machiavellan before Machiavelli: of course, Machiavelli just explained and systematized all that, but nobody we know had done before him.
@@LuisAldamiz No one wrote treatise but Britain spents 12.5% of the GDP of the British Empire on the navy each year, a somewhat more substantial recognition than a treatise.
@@Fiddling_while_Rome_burns - Treatise, true, not "treaty". TY for the correction.
As for the rest if some piece of Horatio Nelson would have survived Trafalgar, maybe he would have written something in his retirement, who knows? The fact is that nobody did. The rest is like saying Machiavelli is non-interesting because there was Machiavellism befor him, or Sun Tzu is pointless because there was war long before he lived, etc. Well, they are relevant and so is Mahan.
I think that the U-boat campaign is supporting Mahan's theory - after the convoy system was established, U-boats were unable to continue their free reign of raiding British shipping, and the overall damage they did was inconsequential - however, the ability of the British navy to outright deny Germany the access to vital resources, such as oil and rubber, proved to be one of the downfalls of Germany in the end.
I also think that your view of trade as being fairly inconsequential for modern economies is a little flawed - since in the times of total mobilization, trade is means of acquiring a strategic resource that your nation does not otherwise possess, and disrupting it instantly damages the enemy's ability to wage war.
If I gave you the view that trade is inconsequential to modern economies, I can only apologize cause that's 100% NOT what I mean. What I was presenting is Corbett's argument that maritime blockade is NOT strategically decisive - he argues that because economies are NOT usually linked that directly to the sea, blockade results in slow attrition, not decisive overthrow.
I think we should assess commerce raiding in short- and long-run terms. Sure, in the medium-run the Allies managed to counter the U-Boat threat. BUT at the tail end of the '1st Happy Time' c. early 1941, Adm Stark of USA calculated that the UK would net lose 25% of its merchant fleet annually and so was making policy on the assumption that the UK might surrender on that account.
Privateering during the US Revolutionary War and War of 1812 also sapped UK war determination by jacking up insurance premiums (to like 30% of the entire cargo) amongst the influential merchant class.
It's important to know that raiding as a long-term strategy is NOT very viable. BUT as Keynes said, "in the long-run we are all dead". If we can take advantage of the strategic shocks generated by short-term raiding to generate real political gains, there's NO reason why raiding CAN'T be an alternative strategy to sea control.
The convoy system BY NO MEANS rendered U-boats ineffective. This would be an extremely skewed and incorrect view of your own. I can't fathom how you arrived at such a conclusion and what evidence you possibly examined. You probably ignored all the anti-submarine tech; all the anti-submarine tactics; all the air patrol system; all the code-breaking; all the lack of emphasis in U-boat production -- ie. everything? The damage by U-boats was also not inconsequential -- just look up the tonnage sunk; and remember to look at the periods. Again, "the overall damage they [U-boats] did was inconsequential" is an extremely skewed and incorrect view of your own.
Submarine warfare introduces an asymmetrical dynamic in naval interactions, ie. submarines can be low cost relative to surface combatants (but submarine tech cost >>> anti-submarine tech), can be next to impossible to interdict, while the utility can be high. It is probably the best to think of submarine warfare -- or the asymmetrical nature of it -- as something Mahan's system didn't address.
@@StrategyStuff Have to agree with this view. Short-term raiding strategies can be viable.
One major problem with those that I see is that they usually revolve around the enemy being largely unprepared to counter the threat. Which means that an enemy with strong intelligence and naval power would be able to stop raiders dead in their tracks.
@@ecpgieicg
precisely- it was technology (airborne radar) and Bletchley that stopped the uboat menace, not convoying. Other simple changes were to paint the wing's underside of British aircraft from black to a much lighter color making them harder to spot from the surface. Convoying just brought out wolfpacks.
Thank You! well done. How about znalysis of U.S. vs. China in S china sea?
"BUT NO effect on war ability" Simply no way of telling just how much or little effect it had on war ability, given your explanation
If there had been NO commerce raiding, would the war possibly not ended sooner? The correct conclusion must be " In this example of the efficacy of commerce raiding, it was not enough to stop all war ability.
Further was the pre- war commerce so important to Britain that disruption there of would have any marked effect. Possibly at the time Britain produced 99.9% of all its requirements internally. If they where 100% dependent on imports then the loss of even a small number of commercial vessels , might have been enough to eliminate all war ability
If you want to call yourself the "Strategy Stuff", then presumably you want to have all your facts, analysis and explanation absolutely correct.
Do the grand strategy of Germany
The strategy of modern greece from 1821-the end of ww2
the strategy of byzantium
Very educative
Still makes a lot of sense today.
Nice video. New subscriber. I am a military enthusiast, army veteran
You deserve more subscribers
Awesome video as usual! Speaking of techonlogical developing, do you think that aircraft militaries will make naval combat obsolete by becoming cheaper and/or more efficient?
Especially in this age where there are so many 'moving parts' to battle - equipment, communications, political considerations, NOT to mention tactical-level actions - I would be highly skeptical of any untested claim that X would make Y obsolete. I am thinking of A2/AD here and 'carrier-killer' missiles.
Did you work with CaspianReport on their latest episode?
NOT the Cold War one. I really need to finish the Peloponnesian War series first.
😂😂😂 fun too 👊
Whoa there. Germany almost brought England to its knees in the Great war by ship sinking. The convoy system was forced onto the navy by the realization that without changing the ratio of sinking's vs. new ships, England would not be able to feed itself within a year. Eric Geddes may very well have saved his nation with the convoy system he insisted on.
Nice content, thanks! :)
Awesome video man, Props from a U.S. Navy sailor lol
Boat ⛵️
Admiral Mahan was one of the outstanding naval thinkers of his time. Could you please do a video on his contemporaries , Sir John Fisher , Alfred von Tirpitz , and Boué de Lapeyrere ? Thank you for your video.
Great job
Please continue making videos like these. You will never be as great as the geopolitics pop channels with 5-10 minute videos, but you will have a dedicated well-read fanbase. My assumption is you never did it for the big views or money anyways. You'd be making fail compilations and news vids if you cared about those.
It appears to me that submarine raiding in the world wars is actually pretty much on point with his theory that a large navy is used to deny trading access to the enemy. True, it avoids the decisive battle part that everyone seems to think is the center piece of his theory. But if sea power is about having advantageous trade because you deny the enemy access to that trade, the submarines seem to have done a pretty good job.
If victory is not assured - either in the local battle or he greater war - it is often wiser to conserver your strength and withdraw, until such a time as you gain the desicive advantage
Then when your enemy will withdraw
It should be noted that, while U-boats did inflict heavy damage on the Allies in both world wars, the Allied blockade of Germany was even more effective, completely removing their ability to sustain the wars.
It only makes sense to do a video on an opposite view point aka the World Island and Heartland theory.
My video on Mackinders Heartland Theory: m.ruclips.net/video/ZL8TLiOcF6c/видео.html
Who controls the space trade lanes controls space.
Spice
Well how would "space control" be achieved and maintained?
The German failure of commerce raiding to significantly alter the course of either world war lends credence to Mahan's views on the matter.
Still waiting on the next video :)
Any signs of life? I know you're a Hong Kong citizen and are most likely hard at work saveguarding your liberty. However do you still have plans to pick up the channel again when things calm down?
You're by far the best indepth geopolitical channel on youtube.
Great video
9:50-10:01 that’s exactly what the USA and Japan South Korea and Australia are doing to China 🇨🇳 called the “first island chain”