Sir Julian Corbett, Limited War, and a Strategy for Maritime States
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- Опубликовано: 25 июл 2024
- Who is Julian Corbett and why is he often seen as a foil to Mahan in naval strategy? This video attempts to go through Corbett's naval strategy and his attempt to apply Clausewitz's ideas to the maritime circumstances of the UK. Arguing against the idea that Britain needed to engage in large-scale fighting in Europe, Corbett outlined a strategy where Britain could instead exploit its geographical and maritime superiority to win wars cost-effectively.
SCRIPT: strategosstuff.blogspot.com/2...
All errors are my own. I apologize for the bad sound quality.
▬ CHAPTERS ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬
0:00 - Introduction
1:45 - Clausewitz: Absolute War & Limited War
2:59 - Corbett: The Limited Form
6:01 - Limited War: Clausewitz & Escalation
7:36 - Limited War: Corbett & Strategic Isolation
10:30 - The Limited Form in Unlimited War
13:36 - Conclusion
▬ SOURCES ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬
Corbett J. Principles of Maritime Strategy. Dover Publications 2004.
Lambert A (ed). 21st Century Corbett. Naval Institute Press 2017.
Widen J. Theorist of Maritime Strategy. Routledge 2016.
Chandler D. The Campaigns of Napoleon. Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1995.
Kennedy P. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Vintage Books 1989.
Lambert A. The Crimean War. Ashgate Publishing 2011.
Lambert A. 'Rescuing Maritime Strategy from the Continental Commitment',
podcasts.ox.ac.uk/index.php/r...
▬ ATTRIBUTIONS ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬
Google Maps
Wikipedia (Basic facts etc.)
Made using Powerpoint 2013.
british strategy: be an island
Step two: Do NOT not be an Island.
US strategy: Use 2 oceans as your buffer zone with 2 relatively weak neighbors.
Be an impervious island.
Step 3: have lots of coal and iron in your island.
Step 4 be at war/alliance with either Germany or France, but not at the same time.
The Brits had mastered the limited war concept very well which led to their overall success in the 18th and 19th Century. Even with set back (Boer Wars, Indian Mutiny etc.) they managed to reason their way out instead of blind determination to revenge their pride. This was a sharp contrast to Imperial Japan who didn't know how to walk away.
Too much honor is at stake for Japan XDDD
The IJN got drunk over their easy victories over Qing Dynasty and the Russians, in both cases, they are small conflicts, and are won by one or a few decisive battle. The IJN wanted to do the same thing to the USN, which didn’t work at all, because America can play the waiting game and out-produce Japan easily.
@@s.31.l50 indeed. I like to say Japan got drunk on "victory disease".
Imperial Japan also didn't give itself the option to walk away beyond a certain point. Though to be fair this was at basically just before colonialism failed so they were doomed either way.
@Thisis Gettinboring Probably, yes. The colonies were always going to close the gap. Their population easily out-scaled Europe, their economic power and self sufficiency would follow. War exhaustion was just a catalyst, and the US was very much pro-colonial.
1:15 "For Corbett such an outlook threatened to drag Britain into a war of attrition that would not only be costly but also unwinnable given its smaller population and declining relative industrial strength"
They should have listened.
Are you from Kaiserreich?
@@mustafmustaf5583 WW1 was called the 'suicide of europe' for a reason.
unlimited war:
Attrition of manpower and ressources
limited war:
attrition of finances
This video is great. Thanks a lot for doing it. It also somewhat resonates with 36 stratagems - like "attacking something the enemy holds dear" applies both to Crimean War, and to "Besiege Wèi to rescue Zhào" strategy. I guess it might be interesting to analyze if other examples correspond to some other strategies as well.
The best example of "Limited War", IMO, was the Italo-Turkish war (1910-1912) as a nation with very limited resources in terms of war supplies and staying power, by exerting a strangling effect over its supplies and commercial routes in the red sea and in the western Mediterranean, forced a well entrenched power (albeit not to its brightest times) out of the war, making the war effort simply "not worth it"
Awesome, I subscribed yesterday even though I thought the channel was dead. Great content! Homeland thesis brought me here.
Thanks! I won't lie, figuring out how to present Corbett's ideas (I eventually ditched his operational stuff) and linking them back to Clausewitzian logic was not easy. I hope something useful was learnt.
Bruh, what does the f in weeZy f baby stand for?
One option for limited war is to go for decisive "counter mobility" attacks that control where the enemy can actually make a stand, and make surrender preferable to actually doing so.
Incredible information and graphics as always; thanks for the amazing content!
A very interesting video! Thank you for this.
these videos are always soooo good
are you a Staff College lecturer cuz the level of your thinking is very advanced. Please do one on Germany 1914 ]apologies to Indie Neidell\ and Germany 1938
Just discovered your videos. Amazing work, keep it up! If I may recommend, make some with other strategists like Paul Kennedy, Colin Gray and Hew Strachan
This channel is awesome
Excellent
Very enjoyable
Russia, which is a land power, has developped a similar strategy in our modern times, thanks to strong rocket artillery forces, s-300 anti-air rockets, A2/AD systems, decent air force and cheap and efficient submarines, combined with a large nuclear triad, which disincourages any country from trying a land invasion of Russia.
Thanks to modern technology, Russia today behaves more as an island than as a continental power.
The war in Syria showed that pretty well.
That's actually a great example of thinking about Corbett in the modern era, and is part of the reason why in the modern era, Corbett can be seen as a more relevant alternative to Mahanian ways of thinking.
I'm not sure that's what's kept countries from invading Russia post-WW2. The lessons of Napoleon and the Eastern Front haven't been forgotten.
@@RonJohn63 History kept countries away from even trying to.
@@tudormardare66 except for the Golden Horde.
@@RonJohn63 They went from the other side, as the Huns did too.
yeah, that whole limited war thing worked out real well for Argentina. remember the Falklands?
I think limited war worked quite well for Argentina during the falklands war, think about how the Royal Navies immense caution in deploying their aircraft carriers, out of fear of one being hit by an exorcet missile, something Argentina only had four of. The threat of these four missiles (at comparatively little expense to Argentina) vastly delayed the British recapture of the islands.
@@-caesarian-6078 No it didn't, the threat was assessed to be from iron bombs and not the scarce exocet's, which intelligence reports had determined could not be operated by the Fuerza Aeria as the Aerospaciale engineers were instructed by their government not to give any assistance to ground crew in making them operational. The theoretical threat diminished substantially as they were gradually expended against destroyers. The ground invasion was not put back.
It worked out better than escalating the war would have.
If you haven't already, could you do a video on Alfred Thayer Mahan?
Yes I plan on doing Mahan at some point.
Idk if you still read this comment, but the war in Ukraine Right now is a perfect example of limited war being escalated, Russia intended this as a limited war, we can see from the fact that Russia didn't mobilize it's population, and it even doesn't mobilize it's entire peace time army, we can also see it from Putin demands towards Ukraine, which is Recognition of separatist of Donetsk and luhansk people's republic, recognition of Crimea and guarantee to not Join NATO, the aim of this war is purely territorial and political and not absolute goal such as regime change or total occupation of Ukraine
and we can see Ukraine, being the inferior one here, tried to escalate it more, by using international plaforms, diplomatic relationship, and information warfare to directly or indirectly influence the outcome and direction of the war, and we already see it in forms of weapon shipments, economic sanction and Ukrainian attempts to install a no fly zone
The apparent attempt to take Kiev from the north in the first days isn't at all a sign of limited aims. Even if the Russians expected the Ukrainians to fold before they had to storm Kiev, the fact that Russia made a real attempt to take the capital immediately with paratroopers taking the airport just outside shows that they were completely willing to jump to an unlimited war. By withdrawing so completely from the north and north-east they may be signalling that they are scaling back their aims to a more limited war but the Ukrainians are still treating it as unlimited.
Great video, you should upload more often.
That last bit at the end was especially interesting. What do you mean by “post-Clausewitzian” War?
C. Smith Since 1949, Clausewitz's logic of absolute war - utmost effort aiming at the total destruction of the enemy - has meant nuclear annihilation.
So it's common for strategists to talk about a Post-Clausewitzian Era: either denying Clausewitz entirely (Luttwak), focusing on the ideas of Limited War (Osgood channeling Corbett), or trying to shoehorn Clausewitzian ideas beyond what the philosopher probably intended ("the center of gravity in insurgencies is hearts and minds" etc. - Harry Summers)
Strategy Stuff Strategy Stuff My understanding of Clausewitz’s conception of absolute war is that in practice it was intended to mean the complete annihilation of the enemy’s political authority and power, not the actual country or nation as is what would likely happen in a full scale nuclear conflict. The genocidal-unlimited War isn’t something that happens often- the vast majority of wars don’t look like the eastern front in WWII.
War is the extension of policy by other means, so total war means the total imposition of one actors policy and the annihilation of the other’s.
I’m coming at this from my own reading of Clausewitz as well as the teaching of Dr. Andrew Wilson at the US Naval War College. I think we are still very much in a Clausewitzian era and that total war still occurs fairly often. The war to remove Sadam and liquidate his party, for example. Or the various revolutionary wars being fought in Nepal, The Philippines, etc. for examples of non-state actors doing it.
I’m going to look more into these folks who argue for post-Clausewitzian war, thanks for replying.
C. Smith I think your interpretation of Clausewitz is certainly valid, many people support your position, and C still has relevancy in the modern day.
For me tho, I see Cs aim as to train generals for 'short, sharp' wars that prevent devolution into attritional or guerrilla warfare - so to avoid situations like Iraq II or Vietnam where EVEN when we are tac/ops superior we stillachieve suboptimal results (core Q of Harry Summers). C of course knew that Prussia could not win such wars.
So for C, his strat is to a) destroy the enemys ability to resist and b) make sure the enemy feels he has lost and doesn't just stall in the hope of attriting away forces. Given early 19thC industrial capacity, replacing an army takes forever and so annihilation produced real decisions. But nowadays industrial capacity is strong enough that even the USSR's loss of millions in 1941 did not produce decision. And how is it possible to annihilate the enemy resistance decisively when the enemy army is the population (the waning days of Nazi Germany and the Communist ideal)? C's absolute war was neither total war nor annihilationist but modern mobilization capacity seems to have it trend in that direction.
There's also the logic of escalation and the idea that states will try and one up each other to gain advantage. Uncontrolled, this will mean targeting the home front with nuclear weapons.
But of course this only applies to nuclear states and maybe nuclear war shouldn't be considered within the C paradigm. As mentioned, Harry Summers and other neoClausewitzians have applied C's insights to the wars you mentioned.
With respect to your fine work, I believe that you have misread Corbett's impact on British strategy and doctrine (the latter being far more significant in his eyes). Corbett was in fact listened to (he was arguably Britain's important strategic planner at the dawn of WWI), but the political considerations (notably the alliance with the French - always a bad idea as Rowan Atkinson reminds us!), the political and institutional conflict between the Army (largely Tory) and the Navy (largely Liberal, much like Corbett himself), and the almost inconceivable weakness of the political leadership at the time. One can also point to the behavior of numerous bad actors (Churchill comes immediately to mind, though Custace, Beresford, Kitchener, et. al. deserve their own share of the blame), but to suggest that Corbett wasn't taken seriously is to misread the situation.
Might I respectfully suggest that Andrew Lambert's magisterial ""The British Way of War" would be a useful text here.
Please keep up your fine work, I have found it quite intriguing, and an excellent basis for introducing others into the intricacies of how strategy developed, and continues to develop.
But, in WW1 the technological development of naval mines, Whitehead torpedoes, and submarines, and the Kiel Canal, made a British "Baltic" strategy, or any strategy of direct threats to the German coast, a non-starter. A full-blooded economic strangulation of Germany turned out to be politically/internationally unacceptable (Lambert's "Planning Armageddon"), and France lacked the manpower and firepower to guarantee its survival, or at least ability to defend Paris, in the long-term. The Ottoman Empire turned out to be a tougher nut to crack than some (i.e., Churchill, maybe Fisher) had thought in 1915, and Austria was able to hang on against Italy (11 Battles of the Isonzo, culminating in 1917 at Caporetto, the 12th Battle of the Isonzo), preventing decisive action from the South against the Central Powers, or a massive resupply of Russia through the Straits to keep it in the war. But, leaving France to bleed out was also unacceptable So by late 1915 it is hard to see what alternatives the UK actually had. Hence, Kitchener's New Army, the Somme, Passchendaele, etc. More intelligent, realistic tactics in 1916-17 would have been hugely desirable, might have saved 200,000 British Empire lives, but all armies were feeling their way in a new landscape and the old cult of the offensive died hard.
Realistically, once Britain decided to go to war on August 3, 1914, and after the Germans were stopped at the Marne five weeks later, it is hard to see how the next 3 years could have been much different. Alternative histories become more imaginable after the Russian (February) Revolution...
@Alexander Kerensky I’m having a hard time imagining circumstances in which the Dardanelles landings would have gone any better, without drastically altering the operation as a whole. Landing troops that far from one’s own bases and so close to the enemy’s support bases was doomed to fail. The lack in preparation and the fact many soldiers had no fighting experience didn’t help either, but they’re probably not the factors that doomed the landings in the first place.
I think an offensive that could have had much more potential with even just basic planning was the Italian offensives in the Alps. If they had not been planned in the stupidest way imaginable they could have possibly taken Austria out of the war at a time where it was under pressure by Russia.
@Alexander Kerensky Well put. I think pretty much any alternative would have been ultimately better than Gallipoli honestly.
make a video for greek and turkey navy for nowdays conflict
In world war one Germany was taking out Britain's arch rival, France and was seriously crippling its newest international rival, Russia. The choice Britain made to fight Germany cost Britain its empire, its influence and gave the US the opportunity to supplant Britain as the dominant naval power. This was a choice that Britain made, it could have stayed out and reaped the benefits instead, like the US did (getting involved only at the very end, suffering minimal losses).
I think you are missing the point of Britain's choice to enter the war. Britain relied on an unstable Europe for success. If Britain didn't enter the war, France and Russia both would have fallen, which would have meant the continent would be entirely dominated by the Prussian aristocracy.
Britain's key aim at the time was to ensure that no single power held control on continental europe. Through this light, they're only option was to defend France and support Russia in order to ensure there was no single dominant force in europe.
A united europe under Germany would have been able to topple Britain's empire quite easily, cutting it's trade to the colonies etc.
@@lawrencesmeaton6930 same thing that the US does now instead of Britain, preventing an Euro-Asian collaboration at all costs. For the same reason.
This suggests that France and Russia were Britain’s main rivals. In terms of industry and naval power, Germany was their primary European rival - one that threatened to upset the European balance of power, which Britain wished to maintain. Allying Germany in WW1 would’ve been like allying France in the Napoleonic Wars. And Britain didn’t lose its empire after WW1 - it grew it at the expense of Germany and the Ottoman Empire.
@@vathek5958 Britain fought an intermittent war with France for centuries for the colonization of the world and tensions were high all the way into the late 1890s when two columns of French and British troops almost engaged each other in Sudan ... there was a historical long lasting enmity between them. Britain also fought the Russians for at least half a century blocking their access to the sea, manifesting itself in the Crimean War and the Great Game played around Afghanistan.
Germany was a new upstart power that had no real history of confronting the British in fact they have been in an alliance for most of their history, Hannover being the origin place for the British monarchs and Germans fighting alongside the British all though these centuries ... that enmity was sudden and had no history ... Germany had no serious naval power to challenge Britain and was a very late entry into the colonization game as well. The real enemy of Britain was the other large naval power that would take over its global empire and influence and that was never going to be Germany.
Momentarily it would have seemed that Britain won the war but it exhausted itself and created a weakness that all colonies would soon exploit. The real winner of the war was the power that only entered towards the end when it did not have to invest much but it gained everything and more.
@@andraslibal Yes, as you say, Britain had a history of warfare and rivalry with France and Russia. That does not change the fact that Germany was the rising threat. Their industry outpaced all other European powers and yes, they were indeed a serious naval power. The dreadnaught had made all earlier ships functionally obsolete (negating the power of Britain's more established navy - both powers were effectively building a modern navy from scratch) and after the Anglo-German naval arms race, Germany had the second largest navy in Europe. True they were not a serious colonial contender - they were too late to the game - but the threat they posed was to the European balance of power, not to Britain's colonies.
Britain was indeed exhausted by the war - all its major participants were - but its grip on its empire was still generally strong until WW2. Of course, there are exceptions to this, e.g. Ireland. And did America capitalise on their WW1 success? No, it went into isolation for twenty years and only took a prominent global position in the aftermath of WW2. Anyway, is your argument that Britain would have maintained its empire up until today if it had joined Germany in WW1? Decolonisation was surely inevitable - Britain's exhaustion after WW2 and to an extent after WW1 was merely a catalyst.
Though this book offered some insight, there are some serious flaws in its assumptions and derivation. F
irstly, for peninsular war, the French can reinforce Spain/Portugal by land through the Pyrenees. The major reason French did not do that is because on the Eastern Front it has to keep massive army to cater the threat from Austria (in 1809) and Russia, instead of blockage by British. The British also attempted a landing to support Austria in the fifth coalition, but without the support of land forces of other powers, failed.
For WWI, the British did try the 'limited war' approach in the Dardanelles expedition operation but failed miserably. It was difficult to British to not mobilize fully as a continental power does if it wants to protect/show support to its allies. If france fails it is clear that British cannot threaten Germany on its own (as proven in WWII after France lost before intervention by US & USSR).
In the peninsular war and WWII, the British strategically retreated after initial failure in battle on land in Spain (1808) and France (1940), then re-landed and won the war the the help of local Spanish/ US troops. It can be concluded that Britain as a seapower will have to rely on a continental power to threaten other continental power, thought the 'limited warfare' approach did offer a cost-effective way to protect its homeland, and wait for the appropriate timing (i.e. alliance with other continental power) to beat its enemy, in addition to tie down more enemy troops and facilitate expedition actions.
11:10, oops on the Bosphorus...
How about protracted war, is it a limited war or absolute war?
In the thumbnail, why isn't there the Hudson bay or the great lakes?
Laziness I guess
@@StrategyStuff it is greatly disturbing
War... *HAS CHANGED!*
I just go straight to unlimited war in crusader kings 2. I don't think that game would support limited vs total war
It does if you can get the enemy to escalate and send their forces to attack you at home while you send a force to get to your target and siege it down then engage with the bulk of your forces at home while things tick in your favor
@@GAndreC that's difficult since the AI usually sticks all of the troops together although you are right
To make it easier you can move your capital to an island and if they Do not have enough ships to carry all their armies but still have access to ships capable of fitting some of their units they will send piece meal stacks that you can outnumber and outmaneuver locally great way eat land off the Germans Italy or Spain and more of a gamble against the Roman or Abbasid/Fatimid empire
But have taken a few single counties or duchies this way as well as religious order titles even when outnumbered 4 or 6 to 1 that said getting an organizer siege leader that chinese bomb thing and a leader with fighting bonuses in the territory in question help too (mountains and forests is best a a plains or narrow flank leader will do wonders in flat terrain)
Your biggest threat on those big posibly suicidal wars is having things going your way and then other AI attacking since you can spare units for a secondary conflict and due to your big war it looks to them as a good move
Cannot spare extra units was what I meant to say as always though make sure to stockpile gold when possible in preparation for the big war and have a bit leftover since the war can be long due to the time it takes to tick and that some times you are outnumbered to a point that you cannot get local superiority and it becomes a hold the war target and ninja your occupied holdings when the bulk of the enemy moves away
That strategic theory is almost assuming that naval superiority exists as a given and for free. It basically goes to crap if France or Germany can build more ships, or if the continental powers can bring in other island nations with large navies, such as early 20th century Japan or the USA. If Napoleonic France was able to control the seas, the British troops would be on the home island, and France could snipe the British colonies, or even Ireland or the Scottish islands, at their leisure.
The British Napoleonic theory assumes that the continental allies are able to hold back the enemy power on the continent, and the enemy power can't just steamroll over other nations, capture foreign ship yards, and out build the British fleet. Historically, Napoleon conducted negotiated relatively limited treaties with his enemies, leaving Prussia and Austria as still major powers under their traditional dynasties, and leaving Russia virtually untouched in 1812. In other words, it is assuming that the balance of power mechanics are in place, and the diplomatic condition hasn't evolved into two bipolar alliance systems.
It doesn’t go to crap because France and Germany and continental powers not maritime powers, Germany had admitted defeat in the naval arms race against Britain some years prior. Building ships saps resources that would go to the army which makes France and Germany (continental powers) have a weakened army and prone to invasion. Had Germany built a navy, France and Russia would have an easier time of invading, if France built a navy, Italy or Germany would have an easier time of invading France.
@@rossthomson1958The combined Franco-Spanish fleet was able to challenge the British fleet during the Napoleonic Wars, and if Trafalgar went a different way, Napoleon could have been ruler of the waves. Likewise, Germany was able to threaten the British fleet in WWI. After WWI, the UK navy was limited by treaty to the size of the American navy, and the British navy is currently 5th place in the world by total tonnage, behind the USA, Russia, China and Japan.
The assumption of British naval dominance assumed that the situation on Europe would be stable, and also that the Euro-centric order would remain. Basically, it is one of things that was eternal until it wasn't. The British dominance of the seas did in fact collapse in the 1920's.
@@blkgardner challenge it yes, defeat it no. To challenge the Royal Navy they themselves were defeated.
@@blkgardner ruling the seas would be a very very bad idea for napoleon, it would remove resources that would go to his army which was France best and primary source for fighting.
@@blkgardner Russia and China doctrine is different, Russia goal is fire as many anti ship missiles as possible and hope your enemy doesn’t strike back, china navy doesn’t have long reach they can’t travel 1000 miles out of the cost of china.
how the FUCK does your channel not have more viewers
The map on the thumbnail hurst
Why the chinese studied colbert? Because Modern China has secured all their geographical barriers except the ones at sea (Diaoyu/Senkaku, South China Sea, and Taiwan), same thing like the US after owning California. Only Russia who can invade China, and currently Russia is friendly so no problem for turning into a hybrid land-maritime power.
the russians cant invade china even if they wanted to.
@@mxn1948 eventhough they can't. Out of all countries its russia that can cause serious damage to china. Or russia can allow itself as springboard for other powerfull country to attack china.
Japan could wipe the floor with china. Japan's massive navy could blockade china from the oil that they import. Without which China's own military would be dead in the water within months
Corbett's "theory" only works if you ALREADY have defensive depth. Then it is not a theory, but DUH, defense = time to pick battles.
Bro what is up with the map on the thumbnail. The more I look the worse it gets. Scandinavia is gone, so are the great lakes, the Arabian peninsula, the Antilles are too large and a ton are missing, the Atlantic isn't that big, etc. Chill video though.
Yes I would have told old me to change the thumbnail too…
Vikings did limited war.. ;)
Remember children, Mahan > Corbett
Wow look who it is
@@RTSG_Prism the Mahanian crusader
@@the_vadym Don't forget, cruiser warfare is indecisive.
@@RTSG_Prism A sea is not a barrier, a sea is a road
Sorry, I suck....but you don't do the topic any justice. Thanks for trying,
It’s ironic because you didn’t do your rebuttal any justice. Thanks for trying,