How would naval powers of reacted if the Royal Navy had the Incomparable Class Battlecruiser? Does this WW2 refit design from World of Warships seem feasible? in place of the 15 QF 4-inch Naval Guns are 22 QF 4-inch Mark 21 Dual-Purpose Naval Guns in 11 twin-turrets. The 9 47mm QF 3-pounder AA Guns swapped for a mixed battery of 4 octuple 40mm QF 2-pounder Mk.8 Pom-Poms, 4 single and 12 twin 40mm Bofors and 26 single and 8 twin 20mm Oerlikons. The torpedo battery of 8 single 18-inch submerged torpedo tubes for a pair of QR Mk.2 quadruple 21-inch torpedo tubes.
A fascinating look at Mahan - thank you! It leaves me pondering WWII, though; Mahan's logic certainly seemed logical if one didn't obsess over single glorious battles, and yet - were there decisive battles, in the end? The British sank Bismark, but still had to fear Tirpitz. The Battle of the Atlantic seems like it might qualify, in a strange way, but it's certainly a very long battle if it counts. Even Midway, while a victory, didn't especially leave the US in an unassailable position of power until later in the Pacific. Oddly enough, it seems perhaps the campaign against the Italians might almost count the most - even if their battleships weren't sunk, the loss of their cruiser force left them holed up and the allies much freer in their operations for the remainder.
"A ship that is the fastest, strongest and best armored is a jack of all trades master of none amd you will only afford 2 of them" yamato and musashi say hi
@@stamasd8500 But Bismark and Tirpitz were just the equal of British and American battleships, not really superior to them. And of course both those countries had dozens of battleships while the Germans only had two. At least the two Japanese megaships were superior to any thing else in the world and they were backed up by other conventionally sized battleships in the IJN.
American steel was actually a higher quality than the steel used in yamato and musashi. The 16 in guns on the Iowa class also had surprisingly close performance to the 18 in guns on the yamatos when using certain ammunition. Armor was still not as strong as yamato, but the Iowa class was not helpless against the yamatos. Also, the iowas had better gunnery.
A misattribution of ressources and effort. Passing grades are what you should aim for not excellence on top of a list only good for putting into a frame on your wall. As school isn't really preparing you for professional life anyway, the ranking order at the end of it is such an overhyped nonsense. And how many officers became famouse despite being the lowest percentiles of their class just goes to prove that. Excellence in the classroom does not driectly correlate to excellence on the battlefield. Sun Tzu must deeply disapprove of such vanity!
Thank you for this. Control of the seas was always his point, not solely decisive battle. People have never read his books so they assume they know. Thank you for bringing this out.
I mean, hearing more of a breakdown of Mahan's battle tactics: they're still absolutely taught and utilized today. Dude was ahead of his time in many ways.
Yep. Whether he was right or wrong and despite what he himself said about the superiority of the practical over the theoretical, it is a joy to hear about someone clever enough to simplify naval doctrine into a small number of abstract and ‘theoretical’ concepts.
@@hisdadjames4876 Superiority in numbers, in limited engagements is absolutely important. I mean, it's really in WW1-2 that you see that fire and maneuver, or a variety of other tactics really develop. At least for land troops.
@@gregorywright4918 He himself made that case, since he analyzed in his first book what the RN had been doing. He took the RN as an institution as a case study so to speak and in fact he very often explicitly refers to the general spirit of the RN and compares it to the French or Spanish navy
@@VersusARCH Though their thinking was: 3: America would feel it is too expensive to take control of the sea and give up. 4: Much Honour! The problem being that by going all in and waging total war on their opponent, the IJ did not seem to concieve that their opponent would be willing to do the same in return. Maybe they didn't pay enough attention to the first world war being a sign that imperialist wars of shorter but intense conflict were over, instead they bought into their own propaganda. Likely an issue of the younger generation being raised under such an environment. I do feel that IJN had some understanding that they had to do something with their control over the sea, but they were never going to be able to due to resource, industry, manpower, etc for a long enough period of time.
Ok, this perspective on Mahan's writings will now change my course on naval domination in Civilization 5 game playing as Mongolia, thanks Drach for the timing!
@@hugor1338 They would often do escorts for a sudden and unprepared landings. They would only use submarines are coastal patrols and not put them out ahead of any fleet or independent skirmishes. Aircraft carriers would be sometimes used as escort carriers, or purely raiding strikes against cities, they can't do both, has to do only one. Destroyers as escort fleets that are carrying landing units and battleships can be very dangerous, but also they won't surrender so they can also easily be killed, but depending on the difficulty, they would also be the first to retreat without any cover from either smaller vessels. This is what Ive observed with any difficulties against AIs, mostly above Normal difficulty. Overall, yes, I'd say very often they are broken; sending the fleets out in the open without proper cover, sea or air, and lack of plan, just throw them like theyre mass charging with infantry. But also, very often they make use of the French doctrine well by massing smaller vessel storming
I wrote my history master’s thesis on the fortification of the Puget Sound in the 1890’s as a result of US overseas ambitions. It was really cool to learn that Mahan was the head of the group of naval officers in charge of scouting locations for what would eventually become the Bremerton naval yard. I discovered lots of primary sources from him. Fascinations stuff.
@@bgclo It looks like only Washington State University has copies of "The Militarization of the Puget Sound: A Gateway to the Pacific, 1880-1900". I searched the ProQuest theses database and it is not available.
Hmm so checking I think my thesis is available on WSU library's website. It should be open access. If not, it might be behind a paywall and only available to students/ professors or people who pay for a prescription. If people are interested in purely the fortifications of the Puget Sound I suggest checking out a book titled Battle Ready: The National Coast Defense System and the Fortification of Puget Sound, 1894-1925 by David Hansen. I live in the Seattle area so it was cool to do this research.
Ill add in that I worked in the archives at the university and WSU was lucky enough to have original volumes of Brassey's Naval Annual which was really helpful and easy to become sidetracked with!
Mahan: You must make sure your naval bases are an asset and not a liability that can turn against you. Russian Navy at Port Arthur: какие? HET! (What? No!)
Yup, instead of trying to lease Port Arthur they should have made a huge heating plant in St Petersburg and layed heating pipes along the bottom of the Baltic sea to prevent it from freezing over the winter...
The misinterpretation of Mahan is oddly-similar to the same misinterpretations of Clausewitz, whose comments on the primacy of defense were thoroughly-ignored by readers obsessed with his efforts to write about a strong offense. Everyone just assumed since he hadn't finished his book before he died, that he was going to correct his early "error" of the primacy of defense when he put everything together (despite that being one of the only bits that he *had* finished, the first chapter being the only completed one). Just as Japan charged after decisive battle without sufficient consideration towards control of the sea, WWI saw most of its members joining with the belief that strong morale and espirit de corps would somehow defeat a tactically-superior defensive position, despite their inspiration claiming the opposite. And in both cases, the leading torch-bearers for the theories (Japan and Germany) won a great victory against an unprepared opponent to validate these (Franco-Prussian War and Russo-Japanese War).
@@jamesharding3459 You already seem to know how to use "Google Search" and "Wikipedia". Now apply that knowledge to actually make a point in reference to a previous statement so you can start a discussion. 😅
Japan's decisive battle strategy worked at Tsushima, where Russia served the battle on a plate. Japan aimed at Midway being a decisive battle, and had the advantage, but mismanaged the setup, which resulted in a mismanaged battle. I think the key takeaway is that there is more to a decisive battle than the decisive battle, if you will. 1) Japan didn't use all readily available forces at Midway because "the book" said you can't "mix and match" carrier air groups, which effectively left one carrier (a fifth carrier) with a full air complement parked in port in Japan. Japan also left part of its fleet behind at sea. Japan still had strong tactical superiority at the point of battle, and then proceeded to misuse it. 2) Japan had inadequate command communications with its carrier air groups - and knew it beforehand, but didn't address it. When American air attacks arrived over the carriers stochastically in time (something the "by the book" Japanese would never do), the air umbrella overcommitted to the attackers' destruction, which certainly worked in the short run but resulted in another American air attack arriving after the air umbrella was critically depleted of altitude and fuel. Of course, those American air attacks were possible because American codebreaking gave America enough information to set up to find the Japanese fleet. 3) Japan over prioritized bombing Midway Island, which was not a truly urgent operation, over naval battle on which the war hinged. See #2 above, where the information Japan inadvertently gave America by planning to bomb Midway was worth far more than even capture of Midway would have been, and where Japanese carrier preparations to refuel and rearm bombers or the carrier air umbrella meant the carriers were uniquely vulnerable (with fuel and bombs exposed) at exactly the wrong time.
My old US Foreign Policy professor would appreciate this video as he consider's Mahan's book to be one of the most influential books in history, only surpassed by the Bible and Quran. He also stated that Mahan disliked serving on coal fired ships, as the smoke dirtied up white uniforms. No doubt something any sailor could sympathize with.
Modern white uniforms are still annoying in that it's very easy to get them dirtied up. You will absolutely notice every damned spec of dust and dirt that gets on them.
So basically Mahan has a bad reputation because people grossly oversimplify his ideas and when the public looks at the compressed of his ideas they call him dumb . Thank you for showing us that Mahan was leagues ahead of his contemporaries and deserves more recognition for this by the wider public
Huh? The Kido Butai almost always sortied en masse. The Yamato and Musashi spent much of the war in port because of fuel limitations. When the IJN separated forces, like at Leyte or Midway, it was to launch coordinated attacks. Unfortunately, their planners were too clever by half and the units could not execute on the intricate schedules required. Contrast that with the USN: Fast carriers here, Jeep carriers elsewhere, Oldendorf someplace else, Taffy's galore, and Halsey off over the horizon chasing chimeras and typhoons. About the only time the USN wasn't split up was when it was riding at anchor in Ulithi.
@@quackbury9413 3 seperate fleets, far removed from each other in the Battle of the Philipine sea, no unified command, commanders that didn't like each other.
@@derrickstorm6976 Mahan isn't remotely Indian. Just that hearing someone say 'Admiral the Great' made great contributions to naval theory makes me smirk.
@@derrickstorm6976 the word navy comes from the hindi word "nou" which means navies originated in india..actually everything on this planet originated in india,including the planet itself and mahan was also indian,i m also indian and so are you
Mahan: You should set things up to induce the enemy into a decisive sea battle, so you can control the sea. And through control of the sea, you will ultimately win the war, thus maritime strategy is the most important element of your national strategy. Everyone Doing/Teaching Mahan: DECISIVE SEA BATTLE WINS THE WAR.........REEEEEEEEEEEE Mahan: Sigh
Not to mention - You must be prepared, have bases, supply lines, and a means of supporting your military throughout a long campaign. *IJN: So you're saying bombing pearl harbor will fix our oil issues? BRILLIANT!*
People hear/read what they already *want* to read or hear. Because of course, OUR country is so great and awesome we have GOT to win so what he *must* mean is that what *we* do is what will win. Yeah, sorry about that, Alfred.
Mahan is an example of a historian not only chronicling history, but affecting it. Kaiser Wilhelm II, a disciple of Mahan said. “I am just now not reading but devouring Captain Mahan’s book, and am trying to learn it by heart.” Germany's attempt to build a fleet to rival Britain's was the most significant factor in Britain increasing its own fleet and coming to regard Germany as a threat. It may be that no Mahan, no Jutland.
I absolutely LOVE it! Finding this channel was like when I go to a garage sale or a thrift store and I find something AMAZING that I never knew existed and never knew I needed it until I found it. ⚓️
Mahan, Jesus, and so many other great figures of history: "You must consider multiple angles and nuance!" Popular thinking: "No, thank you. We will hold you in esteem, but will distill your excellent thinking down to a single-factor, all-white/all-black decision tree
"This summary only scratches the surface..." yeah and my head's still hurting anyway! that said though, amazing detail and summary for something so complex. Looks like I need to re-do my creative writing...again
This was a really good video. A good explanation of something far more complex that most people just summarize incorrectly. Thank you drak for this great video.
Drach, would you perhaps be interested in going trough and breaking down the designs of various ships that appear in the Pirates Of The Caribbean movies. I’d honestly love to what you think of each ship in design and what flaws they would have.
@@Gotterdammerung05 To be fair to Sun Tzu, he was writing at a time when the study of warfare was considerably less advanced than it is now. Stuff that seems obvious to us wasn't necessarily obvious to people at the time who didn't have the extra 2500 years of accumulated knowledge that we do.
@@katherinespezia4609 oh I know, I was being a smartass. A lot of it is stuff that seems obvious in retrospect, like gravity or electricity, but wasn't at the time. And a lot of it is solid doctrinal advice on things like logistics or defeat in detail and the like.
@@katherinespezia4609 You’d be surprised how often that gets overlooked. We take, say, the importance of supply lines and good intel for granted, but someone had to be the first to come up with that.
@@katherinespezia4609 A great deal of what seems unquestionably obvious to observant, thinking, usefully educated folk still seems, in the sight of unobservant, unthinking and impractically educated people, to be a vaguely threatening, ominously glowing, shapeless but imaginatively malleable mass floating at the edge of perception and just beyond comprehension.
This is the best single introduction to and analysis of Mahan I’ve ever seen. The illustrative photo selections are likewise perfect. As always, thank you Drach.
Well, I've learned a lot more about what Mahanian thinking actually is supposed to be and just how badly many have misinterpreted it. Gotta say the man was a lot more brilliantly analytical than I could have imagined.
Excellent summary of the Thoughts of Chairman Mahan. I always though a book on his legacy should have been written entitled "The Influence of History on Seapower"
Thank you for an excellent summary of Mahan's thinking. I recently picked up an old copy of Origins of Maritime Strategy, that mentions Mahan here and there. So this was helpful in fully grasping what I'm reading
Drach, your research efforts are astounding. Your knowledge, and the many avenues you have to inform the public, is greatly appreciated. I believe your fan base, and any future gains in viewership, would offer you many thankyous and a hope that you keep up the good work. Cheers, mate! (Canada)
Thank you for this. Most discussion of Mahan I have read minimalizes his lasting impact. He is almost dismissed because 2 generations later, the ships he espoused where eclipsed. That last bit you quoted read like a description of how the USA dismantled Imperial Japan in WW2. We didn't even have to land troops to force an abject surrender. That is what a crushing Naval victory looks like.
Outstanding overview of AT Mahan... And in a mere 31 mins! I'd add that one can approach ATM from many angles. One aspect of his importance is that he wrote for the 1890s-era Industrial Age, esp focused on basic energy (ie, coal/steam), plus iron/steel and machinery. When ATM advocated for a large Navy, he was telling many important people, in both politics and business, exactly what they wanted to hear. And not just USA/UK; his books were published in German, Russian, French, Turkish, Japanese and many other languages. Hence, the political-economic interpretation of ATM was that in many ways national power depends on sea power. And sea power depends on the industrial base back home, along with the ability to conduct expeditionary-scale logistics to connect the economy to the far distant ships and guns. In other words, an aspiring nation was compelled to maintain a permanent revenue flow for shipyards, steel, machinery, workers; essentially a permanent industrial base of vast scale. And this was music to the ears of both politicians and anyone who could convince a government that they or their business supplied what a Navy needed.
You just continue to produce outstanding material. Thank you. Mahan's personal story around his name is pretty amusing considering he has US Military Academy (West Point) roots and after two years at Columbia attended the US Naval Academy (Annapolis). The names Thayer and Mahan are instantly recognizable to a West Pointer, but neither for him.
I love this! You have done a great job of laying out Mahan’s views. I’ve been saying he’s misunderstood for years and oversimplified. But, frankly I have nowhere near your eloquence and methodical approach. I can point out bits and pieces as a counter argument for that specific discussion, but not an overarching argument like yours. This has been saved for whenever he comes up as I will point to it.
It’s tough to surprise your enemies for a decisive battle when you let yourself get fooled over a water tanker. And later your opponents seeing you coming with their radars. 🤷🏽♂️
@@cartmann94 To be fair, the US was in the defensive at the start of the war and wasnt going to commit their remaining units unless they were forced. Also the US realized they could just starve Japanese strong points and push then back, there was no need for the USN to keep a decisive battle when they could just push then out. This is why Yamamoto was trying to force the US into a battle were they had to commit the majority of their Pacific fleet otherwise what happen would happen, US industrial capacity would simply make the USN outnumber the IJN. Also they werent "fooled" by a water tanker, you must be thinking about Midway, Japan was using JN-25 code that wasnt entirely broken by the US and the USN knew there was a massive attack planed against target "AF", Midway send a emergency report saying their water purification system had broken down to see of they were AF, Japanese then reported that AF was having water issues that mean AF was Midway allowing the USN to prepare. The Battle of Midway could had still gone both ways at that point. Also Midway wasnt the decisive battle Yamamoto was attempting to get, it was part of it since occupying Midway would force the USN into counterattack because it threaten Hawaii as he was hoping to get USN to commit their forces with the IJN in a defensive position in Midway, not that it would matter because even if the US lost Midway and was forced out of Hawaii unless Japan could invade the West Coast it was just a matter of time, the US could always wait as Japan had no realistic way to attack the West Coast.
... Well, the Jeune Ecole approach using submarines in the end didn't work for the Germans in either of the world wars (although they probably had no better alternative)... While the Kantai Kessen approach worked for the Japanese twice before (vs China and vs Russia).
Excellent job as always. Thank you for putting this together. As you imply, Mahan is routinely dismissed in many of today's navies, the U.S. Navy chief among them. This is unfortunate. For what it's worth, I commend two additional books to your attention. First is Mahan's "Some Neglected Aspects of War." This was published in 1907 and shows a significantly matured thinking on Mahan's part. Written for the 1907 Hague Convention, it explores the implications of seapower vs a globalized economy. In particular, the last two chapters (one by Corbett, the other by Mahan) are relevant. The second book is Jon Sumida's excellent "Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command". As the title suggests, Sumida's work explores the education of naval officers--in the same vein as your point about war preparation. Thanks again. G
Mahan's books get mentioned in passing quite a lot in international relations theory classes (particularly his influence on strategic thinking around WW1 and 2, but also as a basis for some modern theories/policies), so I appreciate this overview of what he actually says in those books.
The impact of serving during the American Civil War can certainly be seen in Mahan's work. A couple of examples off the cuff: 1)The North's blockade of the South certainly helped win the war, and that success was based on the North's superior control of the seas off the South's coasts. Something Mahan would have had plenty of time to contemplate while bobbing up and down in the blockading squadron. 2) Pursuing the enemy after a decisive victory. This lesson could have been learned by Mahan through paying attention to warfare strategy during the war. While not naval in nature, generals McClellan (Antietam) and Meade (Gettysburg) were both widely derided for not pursuing Lee (and a chance to end the war by destroying Lee's army) after their victories. Lincoln must have understood the need to pursue and destroy after a victorious battle. Lincoln's correct belief that General Grant would pursue Lee is why Grant was promoted to lieutenant general, with command over all US armies, and it was Grant's dogged pursuit of Lee's army that ultimately led to the North winning the war. Speaking of lieutenant generals, George Washington understood this basic concept during the Revolutionary War, albeit in reverse, when he realized that as long as he had a viable army in the field, he had not lost the war.
It's an interesting irony that Grant actually moved U.S. military strategy away from what might be superficially called a "single decisive battle" concept. Prior to Grant, the war in the East mostly consisted of a campaign of a few weeks or months culminating in one or two major battles...and those battles determined in a few days which side "won" or "lost" the campaign for that year or that season. Grant was the one who brought in the idea of a full campaign with objectives that would supersede and carry beyond the results of any single battle. No one battle Grant fought against Lee was truly decisive (Appomattox was much more of a pursuit than a real battle), but Grant's overall campaign of 1864-5 was decisive because he successfully used multiple battles and the movements between battles to force Lee into a steadily worse and eventually untenable position. In a way, Grant used a land version of what Mahan would later call "control of the sea".
@@Wolfeson28 Yes, Grant understood total warfare on a grand scale, and yes, no single battle Grant fought against Lee was decisive, but that was not for a lack of trying. Grant did not withdraw from engaging Lee's army in the manor of previous Union generals. Instead he would withdraw to try and turn Lee's flank to gain advantage and clinch a decisive victory. Grant's inability to do so is a testament to Lee and his army's abilities. Grant's actions, exemplified in the number of Union casualties at Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor, bear this out. Grant wanted a quick end to the war, not a situation like the siege he commanded at Vicksburg, which was tough on him personally. When Lee's army withdrew from the siege of Petersburg it was because it was in such a poor state that it could no longer hold its position. At that point, Lee knew he could not win against Grant's superior force on the open battlefield, which is why he surrendered at Appomattox.
Small point I wanted to make, Meade was under direct orders to keep himself between Washington DC and General Lee, which is why he didn’t give chase. And he did stay in command of the Army of the Potomac for the remainder of the war, Grant was put ABOVE Meade as commander of all armed forces in the east.
@@nukclear2741 I'm guilty of gross oversimplification and you're absolutely right, Meade was commander of the Army of the Potomac until the war's end, but Grant's promotion to Lt. General and his placement of his headquarters at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac effectively reduced Meade's command. The period after the Battle of Gettysburg has been relatively recently revisited in the book by Jeffrey Hunt "Meade and Lee After Gettysburg: The Forgotten Final Stage of the Gettysburg Campaign, from Falling Waters to Culpeper Court House, July 14-31, 1863." Here is a summary from the website savasbeatie.com: "Contrary to popular belief, once Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia slipped across the swollen Potomac back to Virginia the Lincoln administration pressed George Meade to cross quickly in pursuit-and he did. Rather than follow in Lee’s wake, however, Meade moved south on the east side of the Blue Ridge Mountains in a cat-and-mouse game to outthink his enemy and capture the strategic gaps penetrating the high wooded terrain. Doing so would trap Lee in the northern reaches of the Shenandoah Valley and potentially bring about the decisive victory that had eluded Union arms north of the Potomac." Meade was fighting two wars after Gettysburg: The Civil War and a not so civil war with politicians in the city he was defending. I think it is fair to say that while he didn't win either of these with his reputation unscathed, neither did he lose. Lincoln, for his part, was under intense political pressure with the impending election in 1864 to end the war as quickly as possible. At this point in the war, he had lost his patience with ANY perceived dillydallying by his top commanders. In Grant, he believed he had a general who would deliver the knockout punch.
very nice discussion...I read his book years ago and it was clear control of the seas was his issue 'not the big battle' . If has had known had WW1 and WW2 submarines would develop he would have a whole book on how to use them for 'control of the seas'
And yes indeed now that you mention it - I would be very interested in an entirely separate video about the United States Navy versus Royal Navy war plan...!
Just as Mahan figured it out - a comparably cost-effective alternative to sea transport in the form of RAILWAYS was invented and began to be widely used...
Railways were well established by this point. Shipping is still cheaper though. Consider the existence of more carriers on the Great Lakes. Iron ore could be shipped by rail from the Misabe Range of Minnesota to steel mills on the Great Lakes. And in winter it can be. But once the Lakes are open for shipping the ore boats go back into operation. Plus in Mahan's time rail transportation of bulk materials (ore, coal, crude oil, stone etc) was actually more expensive than today when looking at cost per ton in constant dollars.
@@mpetersen6 Very true, but his overall argument about the importance of internal communications and transport infrastructure has proven very accurate. For example, one major weakness of France during the Napoleonic Wars was they didn't have very good internal transport networks, so a lot of their ability to build fleets and actually prepare them for sea was cut off once their coastal shipping was shut down by the Royal Navy blockades. At the time Mahan was writing, shipping had been the dominant form of transport throughout virtually all of history, and rail was only just breaking out of its infancy. However, his arguments point the way towards the massive expansion of railroads and the development of national highway systems in the following century.
I find the man brilliant. What he would have done with computers ... So many variables, sets and subsets and hierarchies. I can picture him educating WOPR.
I agree with your analysis of Mahanian doctrine. The point is control of the sea which ensures freedom of action. Freedom of action gives you the greatest flexibility in fighting a war. The more options you have to win a war, the more likely you are to be successful. The decisive battle is just the most obvious way to win oceanic control. I'd argue that Mahanian doctrine can also be applied to air, land, and space warfare too. Battlefield control provides your forces freedom to act which gives you flexibility to pursue the national interest. The large, Waterloo style land battle might be the fastest way to gain land supremacy, but a prolonged campaign of hit and run skirmishes can just as surely eliminate an adversarial army. In the air, complete destruction of the enemy air force in a major clash can work, but you can also use a prolonged bombing campaign to continually force the adversary to sortie their planes giving you the opportunity to shoot them down with escorts. Battlefield control is king. With it, you dictate a war. Without it, you are at the mercy of the enemy.
I much prefer this kind of video to the dry dock vids. Sure, the stories of ships is interesting but it just goes in one ear and out the other for me. this kind of stuff just sticks with me better
Mahan's father, Dennis Hart Mahan (1802-1871), is also worthy of mention. He was a professor of engineering at West Point 1830-1871. A. T. Mahan may have gone to the Naval Academy to rebel against his father. The elder Mahan killed himself in 1861 by jumping into a steamboat's paddlewheel when he was about to be forced into retirement.
![[SFM] Risky Recital](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/RzNkY1_Nk3o/mqdefault.jpg)
Pinned post for Q&A :)
Does the Royal Navy have lack of escort ship problem today like they had in WW2?
How would naval powers of reacted if the Royal Navy had the Incomparable Class Battlecruiser?
Does this WW2 refit design from World of Warships seem feasible?
in place of the 15 QF 4-inch Naval Guns are 22 QF 4-inch Mark 21 Dual-Purpose Naval Guns in 11 twin-turrets.
The 9 47mm QF 3-pounder AA Guns swapped for a mixed battery of 4 octuple 40mm QF 2-pounder Mk.8 Pom-Poms, 4 single and 12 twin 40mm Bofors and 26 single and 8 twin 20mm Oerlikons.
The torpedo battery of 8 single 18-inch submerged torpedo tubes for a pair of QR Mk.2 quadruple 21-inch torpedo tubes.
A fascinating look at Mahan - thank you! It leaves me pondering WWII, though; Mahan's logic certainly seemed logical if one didn't obsess over single glorious battles, and yet - were there decisive battles, in the end? The British sank Bismark, but still had to fear Tirpitz. The Battle of the Atlantic seems like it might qualify, in a strange way, but it's certainly a very long battle if it counts. Even Midway, while a victory, didn't especially leave the US in an unassailable position of power until later in the Pacific. Oddly enough, it seems perhaps the campaign against the Italians might almost count the most - even if their battleships weren't sunk, the loss of their cruiser force left them holed up and the allies much freer in their operations for the remainder.
Giuseppe Bavastro VS Thomas Cochrane in a duel who would win
if the 54 triple 25mm Type 96 AA Gun of Yamato had been radar directed could they have been more lethal to the USN air attack during ten go?
The theme begins to play, and my little girl jumps up shouting BATTLESHIPS!
You raised your daughter well!
Ahh man that's an awesome dad moment!
Awe...that's too cute
That’s great 😁
When I play cold waters my daughter says 'aye, aye captain'
"A ship that is the fastest, strongest and best armored is a jack of all trades master of none amd you will only afford 2 of them" yamato and musashi say hi
Bismarck and Tirpitz wave back.
@@stamasd8500 But Bismark and Tirpitz were just the equal of British and American battleships, not really superior to them. And of course both those countries had dozens of battleships while the Germans only had two. At least the two Japanese megaships were superior to any thing else in the world and they were backed up by other conventionally sized battleships in the IJN.
Frigates, destroyers and cruisers of today have identical capabilities and the lines getting thinned into microscopic level
American steel was actually a higher quality than the steel used in yamato and musashi. The 16 in guns on the Iowa class also had surprisingly close performance to the 18 in guns on the yamatos when using certain ammunition. Armor was still not as strong as yamato, but the Iowa class was not helpless against the yamatos. Also, the iowas had better gunnery.
That quote speaks volumes about todays US Navy, and the death spiral of overspending its in...
“Coming in second in his class.”
Admiral King: Respectable.
I thought your last name was "Peese"
I've been misspelling all these years. So sorry.
😜
Drach: "Creditable" 😎
Stonewall Jackson: "Commendable".
A misattribution of ressources and effort. Passing grades are what you should aim for not excellence on top of a list only good for putting into a frame on your wall. As school isn't really preparing you for professional life anyway, the ranking order at the end of it is such an overhyped nonsense. And how many officers became famouse despite being the lowest percentiles of their class just goes to prove that. Excellence in the classroom does not driectly correlate to excellence on the battlefield.
Sun Tzu must deeply disapprove of such vanity!
@@Ugly_German_Truths Point well taken and remember, Benedict Arnold was Commandant of West Point. Yikes.
Thank you for this. Control of the seas was always his point, not solely decisive battle. People have never read his books so they assume they know. Thank you for bringing this out.
I mean, hearing more of a breakdown of Mahan's battle tactics: they're still absolutely taught and utilized today. Dude was ahead of his time in many ways.
Yep. Whether he was right or wrong and despite what he himself said about the superiority of the practical over the theoretical, it is a joy to hear about someone clever enough to simplify naval doctrine into a small number of abstract and ‘theoretical’ concepts.
@@hisdadjames4876 Superiority in numbers, in limited engagements is absolutely important. I mean, it's really in WW1-2 that you see that fire and maneuver, or a variety of other tactics really develop. At least for land troops.
He wasn't ahead of his time. His teachings are just timeless. They apply to basically all eras of naval combat.
You could make a case to say the the RN had been using Mahanian concepts since the 1600s...
@@gregorywright4918 He himself made that case, since he analyzed in his first book what the RN had been doing. He took the RN as an institution as a case study so to speak and in fact he very often explicitly refers to the general spirit of the RN and compares it to the French or Spanish navy
"Mahanian thinking" as espoused by people who never got Mahan:
1.) Prepare for Decisive Battle.
2.) Have Decisive Battle.
3.) ???
4.) Profit.
Examples including the IJN.
3a) Exercise command of the sea, to your advantage.
@@gokbay3057 Assuming much?
Hannibal: 'Wheres my profit at?'
@@VersusARCH
Though their thinking was:
3: America would feel it is too expensive to take control of the sea and give up.
4: Much Honour!
The problem being that by going all in and waging total war on their opponent, the IJ did not seem to concieve that their opponent would be willing to do the same in return. Maybe they didn't pay enough attention to the first world war being a sign that imperialist wars of shorter but intense conflict were over, instead they bought into their own propaganda. Likely an issue of the younger generation being raised under such an environment.
I do feel that IJN had some understanding that they had to do something with their control over the sea, but they were never going to be able to due to resource, industry, manpower, etc for a long enough period of time.
Drach you single handedly make me look forward to Wednesdays, thank you.
Eastern standard time the upload is at 7am. Perfect for my drive to work
Perhaps we should ask him to release on Mondays... not much to look forward to on Mondays 😔
It is Wednesday's my dudes!
The Rum Rations are the highlight of any week.
Same
Ok, this perspective on Mahan's writings will now change my course on naval domination in Civilization 5 game playing as Mongolia, thanks Drach for the timing!
Same: genuinely playing Mongolia at the moment
Just avoid running into the Devine Wind.
Civ AI is so broken - at sea, does it ever attack?
@@hugor1338 They would often do escorts for a sudden and unprepared landings. They would only use submarines are coastal patrols and not put them out ahead of any fleet or independent skirmishes. Aircraft carriers would be sometimes used as escort carriers, or purely raiding strikes against cities, they can't do both, has to do only one. Destroyers as escort fleets that are carrying landing units and battleships can be very dangerous, but also they won't surrender so they can also easily be killed, but depending on the difficulty, they would also be the first to retreat without any cover from either smaller vessels. This is what Ive observed with any difficulties against AIs, mostly above Normal difficulty.
Overall, yes, I'd say very often they are broken; sending the fleets out in the open without proper cover, sea or air, and lack of plan, just throw them like theyre mass charging with infantry. But also, very often they make use of the French doctrine well by massing smaller vessel storming
I never took it that the base line of Mahan was "single decisive battle." I always took it as "he who controls the sea, wins the war in the end."
You just outscored all the cadets of the pre-WW2 Japanese Naval Academy.
I wrote my history master’s thesis on the fortification of the Puget Sound in the 1890’s as a result of US overseas ambitions. It was really cool to learn that Mahan was the head of the group of naval officers in charge of scouting locations for what would eventually become the Bremerton naval yard. I discovered lots of primary sources from him. Fascinations stuff.
is your thesis published? would love to know more about the decisions behind the triangle of forts and the "disappearing'' guns!
@@bgclo It looks like only Washington State University has copies of "The Militarization of the Puget Sound: A Gateway to the Pacific, 1880-1900". I searched the ProQuest theses database and it is not available.
super cool, I had no idea he was involved out here, (though in hindsight, the shear scale of what was built certainly mirrors his writings.)
Hmm so checking I think my thesis is available on WSU library's website. It should be open access. If not, it might be behind a paywall and only available to students/ professors or people who pay for a prescription. If people are interested in purely the fortifications of the Puget Sound I suggest checking out a book titled Battle Ready: The National Coast Defense System and the Fortification of Puget Sound, 1894-1925 by David Hansen. I live in the Seattle area so it was cool to do this research.
Ill add in that I worked in the archives at the university and WSU was lucky enough to have original volumes of Brassey's Naval Annual which was really helpful and easy to become sidetracked with!
Mahan: You must make sure your naval bases are an asset and not a liability that can turn against you.
Russian Navy at Port Arthur: какие? HET! (What? No!)
Yup, instead of trying to lease Port Arthur they should have made a huge heating plant in St Petersburg and layed heating pipes along the bottom of the Baltic sea to prevent it from freezing over the winter...
Not to rain on your parade, but какие means "which", as in which naval bases. If you want what, that's что. Что? Нет! Никогда! (What? No! Never!)
@@VersusARCH Can't remember the last time the baltic sea froze, and i live right next to the bloody thing. :o
@@DenDodde The gulf of Finland freezes quite hard. Especially 100-200 years ago.
@@DenDodde There's this little thing called global warming which might have had an effect.
The misinterpretation of Mahan is oddly-similar to the same misinterpretations of Clausewitz, whose comments on the primacy of defense were thoroughly-ignored by readers obsessed with his efforts to write about a strong offense. Everyone just assumed since he hadn't finished his book before he died, that he was going to correct his early "error" of the primacy of defense when he put everything together (despite that being one of the only bits that he *had* finished, the first chapter being the only completed one).
Just as Japan charged after decisive battle without sufficient consideration towards control of the sea, WWI saw most of its members joining with the belief that strong morale and espirit de corps would somehow defeat a tactically-superior defensive position, despite their inspiration claiming the opposite. And in both cases, the leading torch-bearers for the theories (Japan and Germany) won a great victory against an unprepared opponent to validate these (Franco-Prussian War and Russo-Japanese War).
My main takeaway from Clausewitz was that war is, at its heart, just a continuation of politics by other means.
@@jamesharding3459 You already seem to know how to use "Google Search" and "Wikipedia".
Now apply that knowledge to actually make a point in reference to a previous statement so you can start a discussion. 😅
Edward Lemming What?
Confirmation bias is strong in japan that time lol
Japan's decisive battle strategy worked at Tsushima, where Russia served the battle on a plate. Japan aimed at Midway being a decisive battle, and had the advantage, but mismanaged the setup, which resulted in a mismanaged battle. I think the key takeaway is that there is more to a decisive battle than the decisive battle, if you will.
1) Japan didn't use all readily available forces at Midway because "the book" said you can't "mix and match" carrier air groups, which effectively left one carrier (a fifth carrier) with a full air complement parked in port in Japan. Japan also left part of its fleet behind at sea. Japan still had strong tactical superiority at the point of battle, and then proceeded to misuse it.
2) Japan had inadequate command communications with its carrier air groups - and knew it beforehand, but didn't address it. When American air attacks arrived over the carriers stochastically in time (something the "by the book" Japanese would never do), the air umbrella overcommitted to the attackers' destruction, which certainly worked in the short run but resulted in another American air attack arriving after the air umbrella was critically depleted of altitude and fuel. Of course, those American air attacks were possible because American codebreaking gave America enough information to set up to find the Japanese fleet.
3) Japan over prioritized bombing Midway Island, which was not a truly urgent operation, over naval battle on which the war hinged. See #2 above, where the information Japan inadvertently gave America by planning to bomb Midway was worth far more than even capture of Midway would have been, and where Japanese carrier preparations to refuel and rearm bombers or the carrier air umbrella meant the carriers were uniquely vulnerable (with fuel and bombs exposed) at exactly the wrong time.
My old US Foreign Policy professor would appreciate this video as he consider's Mahan's book to be one of the most influential books in history, only surpassed by the Bible and Quran.
He also stated that Mahan disliked serving on coal fired ships, as the smoke dirtied up white uniforms. No doubt something any sailor could sympathize with.
Modern white uniforms are still annoying in that it's very easy to get them dirtied up. You will absolutely notice every damned spec of dust and dirt that gets on them.
Yeah I hated having to wear those damn things. They look great, but walking across the hangar to a watch station was risky as hell lol.
So basically Mahan has a bad reputation because people grossly oversimplify his ideas and when the public looks at the compressed of his ideas they call him dumb . Thank you for showing us that Mahan was leagues ahead of his contemporaries and deserves more recognition for this by the wider public
WWII Japanese interpretation of Mahan Doctrine:
"We will concentrate our forces for a decisive battle... BY SPLITTING THEM UP!"
Because USN, RN, and essentially any other sizeable navy were so much different?
@@VersusARCH they weren't trying to have a decisive battle though. The Japanese were doing everything in their power to force a decisive battle
Huh? The Kido Butai almost always sortied en masse. The Yamato and Musashi spent much of the war in port because of fuel limitations. When the IJN separated forces, like at Leyte or Midway, it was to launch coordinated attacks. Unfortunately, their planners were too clever by half and the units could not execute on the intricate schedules required. Contrast that with the USN: Fast carriers here, Jeep carriers elsewhere, Oldendorf someplace else, Taffy's galore, and Halsey off over the horizon chasing chimeras and typhoons. About the only time the USN wasn't split up was when it was riding at anchor in Ulithi.
@@quackbury9413 3 seperate fleets, far removed from each other in the Battle of the Philipine sea, no unified command, commanders that didn't like each other.
@@quackbury9413 4 fleets if you count the decoy force
Holland faced "a Britain shaped problem".
Funny and accurate description.
It's like when History Matters said that the Ottomans had "trouble come knocking, this time in the shape of a boot, a boot called Italy"
@@victoriacyunczyk British Dry tone makes it 10 times better
@@ShahjahanMasood agreed
Mahan literally means 'Great' in Hindi.
So atleast whatever impact he had, it was pretty great.
"at least whatever impact" lol Indians promoting anything remotely Indian
@@derrickstorm6976 Is that such a bad thing?
अच्छा ठीक
@@derrickstorm6976 Mahan isn't remotely Indian. Just that hearing someone say 'Admiral the Great' made great contributions to naval theory makes me smirk.
@@derrickstorm6976 the word navy comes from the hindi word "nou" which means navies originated in india..actually everything on this planet originated in india,including the planet itself and mahan was also indian,i m also indian and so are you
One of the few channels where I’m able to safely click “like” before the video actually starts.
Somehow this seems a most Drachifelian of episodes and I'm almost surprised it wasn't done years ago.
A well done summarization. An important additional tenet is that "The seat of purpose is on the land." BZ Drach.
Quite so. Just as air superiority is there to support and deliver the ground victory.
@@Simon_Nonymous Indeed. It's not over until the PBI own it.
Mahan: You should set things up to induce the enemy into a decisive sea battle, so you can control the sea. And through control of the sea, you will ultimately win the war, thus maritime strategy is the most important element of your national strategy.
Everyone Doing/Teaching Mahan: DECISIVE SEA BATTLE WINS THE WAR.........REEEEEEEEEEEE
Mahan: Sigh
Not to mention - You must be prepared, have bases, supply lines, and a means of supporting your military throughout a long campaign. *IJN: So you're saying bombing pearl harbor will fix our oil issues? BRILLIANT!*
People hear/read what they already *want* to read or hear. Because of course, OUR country is so great and awesome we have GOT to win so what he *must* mean is that what *we* do is what will win.
Yeah, sorry about that, Alfred.
its not suprising many people to this day don't understand sun Tzu art of war book
Mahan is an example of a historian not only chronicling history, but affecting it.
Kaiser Wilhelm II, a disciple of Mahan said. “I am just now not reading but devouring Captain Mahan’s book, and am trying to learn it by heart.”
Germany's attempt to build a fleet to rival Britain's was the most significant factor in Britain increasing its own fleet and coming to regard Germany as a threat.
It may be that no Mahan, no Jutland.
Or a version that would have been better for everyone- no Kaiser Wilhem II, no Jutland😉
I find it incredible that so many people tune in to listen to sometimes OVER FIVE HOURS of Naval History. ❤️😎💪
I'm one of them. Still listening to Drydock episodes in my car.
I absolutely LOVE it!
Finding this channel was like when I go to a garage sale or a thrift store and I find something AMAZING that I never knew existed and never knew I needed it until I found it. ⚓️
Mahan, Jesus, and so many other great figures of history: "You must consider multiple angles and nuance!"
Popular thinking: "No, thank you. We will hold you in esteem, but will distill your excellent thinking down to a single-factor, all-white/all-black decision tree
Brutal. But true.
Well of course, all that reading and thinking is hard.
Very entertaining and educational. I hope you plan on doing more Soviet Navy videos in the future, if at all possible.
"This summary only scratches the surface..."
yeah and my head's still hurting anyway! that said though, amazing detail and summary for something so complex. Looks like I need to re-do my creative writing...again
This was a really good video. A good explanation of something far more complex that most people just summarize incorrectly.
Thank you drak for this great video.
"Get decisive battle, ho boom."
Love Drachinifel's wit
It was enjoyable to hear you talking about a Great Great Great Uncle. Thank you for doing this video.
Drach, would you perhaps be interested in going trough and breaking down the designs of various ships that appear in the Pirates Of The Caribbean movies. I’d honestly love to what you think of each ship in design and what flaws they would have.
I would like to say Thank You, you add just enough humor into your videos to keep it interesting and every video is informative and a learning lesson
It would be funny if anyone were remembered for their theories on war which amounted to little more than "it's in your best interest to win".
I mean Sun Tzu most of the time. "don't fight if you're weaker". Thanks boss.
@@Gotterdammerung05 To be fair to Sun Tzu, he was writing at a time when the study of warfare was considerably less advanced than it is now. Stuff that seems obvious to us wasn't necessarily obvious to people at the time who didn't have the extra 2500 years of accumulated knowledge that we do.
@@katherinespezia4609 oh I know, I was being a smartass. A lot of it is stuff that seems obvious in retrospect, like gravity or electricity, but wasn't at the time. And a lot of it is solid doctrinal advice on things like logistics or defeat in detail and the like.
@@katherinespezia4609 You’d be surprised how often that gets overlooked. We take, say, the importance of supply lines and good intel for granted, but someone had to be the first to come up with that.
@@katherinespezia4609 A great deal of what seems unquestionably obvious to observant, thinking, usefully educated folk still seems, in the sight of unobservant, unthinking and impractically educated people, to be a vaguely threatening, ominously glowing, shapeless but imaginatively malleable mass floating at the edge of perception and just beyond comprehension.
I had heard about Mahan a lot growing up. This level of detail, though, was never given. Thanks for this, Drac.
Lol I have a paper due on Mahan and Corbett’s writings next month, perfect timing as always Drach
I'm always amazed at how great works get synopsized in one, often wrong, sound bite.
Malthus is another such author. I read his _Essay on the Principle of Population,_ and I discovered that almost no one was correctly describing it.
This is the best single introduction to and analysis of Mahan I’ve ever seen. The illustrative photo selections are likewise perfect.
As always, thank you Drach.
In reference to bases, and putting too much stock in one in particular, I couldn’t help but think of Singapore in early 1942.
Well, I've learned a lot more about what Mahanian thinking actually is supposed to be and just how badly many have misinterpreted it. Gotta say the man was a lot more brilliantly analytical than I could have imagined.
Don't mind me, just feeding the algorithm. It needs comments like the kamtchatka needs japanese torpedo boats rumors
Psst, Just to feed the algorithm it's kaMchatka
Peace mate :)
Edit:spelling sigh.
Hey, guys, Did you see that Torpedo Boat off the port side?!
@@cideryeti7957 i really need to proof read myself... Fixed, thx !
@@pegzounet No worries mate :)
A half hour video on Mahan. God I love this channel!
Excellent summary of the Thoughts of Chairman Mahan. I always though a book on his legacy should have been written entitled "The Influence of History on Seapower"
Thank you for an excellent summary of Mahan's thinking. I recently picked up an old copy of Origins of Maritime Strategy, that mentions Mahan here and there. So this was helpful in fully grasping what I'm reading
@Drachinifel Nice Job, Mate... thank you for all that you do for those of us in the Naval-History Community.
The US Navy has carried on Mahan's habit of running into things in recent years
Maybe your best work yet. We've lost Hornfisher but Drach has seriously raised his game. Well done, sir.
Drach, your research efforts are astounding. Your knowledge, and the many avenues you have to inform the public, is greatly appreciated. I believe your fan base, and any future gains in viewership, would offer you many thankyous and a hope that you keep up the good work. Cheers, mate! (Canada)
Thank you for this. Most discussion of Mahan I have read minimalizes his lasting impact. He is almost dismissed because 2 generations later, the ships he espoused where eclipsed.
That last bit you quoted read like a description of how the USA dismantled Imperial Japan in WW2. We didn't even have to land troops to force an abject surrender. That is what a crushing Naval victory looks like.
Nothing better than waking up to the sound of Mahan’s impact on naval history
Outstanding overview of AT Mahan... And in a mere 31 mins! I'd add that one can approach ATM from many angles. One aspect of his importance is that he wrote for the 1890s-era Industrial Age, esp focused on basic energy (ie, coal/steam), plus iron/steel and machinery. When ATM advocated for a large Navy, he was telling many important people, in both politics and business, exactly what they wanted to hear. And not just USA/UK; his books were published in German, Russian, French, Turkish, Japanese and many other languages. Hence, the political-economic interpretation of ATM was that in many ways national power depends on sea power. And sea power depends on the industrial base back home, along with the ability to conduct expeditionary-scale logistics to connect the economy to the far distant ships and guns. In other words, an aspiring nation was compelled to maintain a permanent revenue flow for shipyards, steel, machinery, workers; essentially a permanent industrial base of vast scale. And this was music to the ears of both politicians and anyone who could convince a government that they or their business supplied what a Navy needed.
Listening to your content while working till 3am. Keep up the great work
Glad to hear there's more of us like that :D
A beautiful synopsis of Mahan. The man was a deep thinker and cannot be summarized with one sentence. This got me to subscribe.
You just continue to produce outstanding material. Thank you. Mahan's personal story around his name is pretty amusing considering he has US Military Academy (West Point) roots and after two years at Columbia attended the US Naval Academy (Annapolis). The names Thayer and Mahan are instantly recognizable to a West Pointer, but neither for him.
Dennis Hart Mahan was Alfred's father.
These are the sort of videos I like from you drach... I learn so much.
By far the best narrative voice on YT!
I love this! You have done a great job of laying out Mahan’s views. I’ve been saying he’s misunderstood for years and oversimplified. But, frankly I have nowhere near your eloquence and methodical approach. I can point out bits and pieces as a counter argument for that specific discussion, but not an overarching argument like yours. This has been saved for whenever he comes up as I will point to it.
5:34 - View of the coaling station at Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii (USA), from the top of radio tower No.1. August 1919
US Library Of Congress
Thanks for the eye opening & informative show.
Mayan was a good strategist,ahead of its time.
"Decisive battle"
IJN: _I'll take your entire stock_
What you heard was" I'll take a lot of decisive battles". What I said was I'll take all the decisive battles.
And were then given essentially 0 decisive battles by their enemies. Oops.
It’s tough to surprise your enemies for a decisive battle when you let yourself get fooled over a water tanker. And later your opponents seeing you coming with their radars. 🤷🏽♂️
@@cartmann94 To be fair, the US was in the defensive at the start of the war and wasnt going to commit their remaining units unless they were forced.
Also the US realized they could just starve Japanese strong points and push then back, there was no need for the USN to keep a decisive battle when they could just push then out.
This is why Yamamoto was trying to force the US into a battle were they had to commit the majority of their Pacific fleet otherwise what happen would happen, US industrial capacity would simply make the USN outnumber the IJN.
Also they werent "fooled" by a water tanker, you must be thinking about Midway, Japan was using JN-25 code that wasnt entirely broken by the US and the USN knew there was a massive attack planed against target "AF", Midway send a emergency report saying their water purification system had broken down to see of they were AF, Japanese then reported that AF was having water issues that mean AF was Midway allowing the USN to prepare. The Battle of Midway could had still gone both ways at that point.
Also Midway wasnt the decisive battle Yamamoto was attempting to get, it was part of it since occupying Midway would force the USN into counterattack because it threaten Hawaii as he was hoping to get USN to commit their forces with the IJN in a defensive position in Midway, not that it would matter because even if the US lost Midway and was forced out of Hawaii unless Japan could invade the West Coast it was just a matter of time, the US could always wait as Japan had no realistic way to attack the West Coast.
... Well, the Jeune Ecole approach using submarines in the end didn't work for the Germans in either of the world wars (although they probably had no better alternative)... While the Kantai Kessen approach worked for the Japanese twice before (vs China and vs Russia).
Sir Julian Corbett demands equal time!
This is true. I have volume one of his "History of naval operations in the russo-japanese war". Can recommend.
the channel "strategy stuff" has done one video on him. very power-point savvy, might I add.
@@blazodeolireta Saw the video. Very interesting.
Thanks!
Thank you, Drachinifel.
Excellent job as always. Thank you for putting this together. As you imply, Mahan is routinely dismissed in many of today's navies, the U.S. Navy chief among them. This is unfortunate. For what it's worth, I commend two additional books to your attention. First is Mahan's "Some Neglected Aspects of War." This was published in 1907 and shows a significantly matured thinking on Mahan's part. Written for the 1907 Hague Convention, it explores the implications of seapower vs a globalized economy. In particular, the last two chapters (one by Corbett, the other by Mahan) are relevant. The second book is Jon Sumida's excellent "Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command". As the title suggests, Sumida's work explores the education of naval officers--in the same vein as your point about war preparation. Thanks again. G
Thanks. I did, indeed, sorely need a dose of otherness to handle my life today and this monography covers such need wonderfully.
Mahan's books get mentioned in passing quite a lot in international relations theory classes (particularly his influence on strategic thinking around WW1 and 2, but also as a basis for some modern theories/policies), so I appreciate this overview of what he actually says in those books.
I didn't realize it until now, but this is the topic I've been waiting for ever since I found your channel
Brilliantly explained, thank you very much!
Excellent as always, Thanks Drach.
The impact of serving during the American Civil War can certainly be seen in Mahan's work. A couple of examples off the cuff:
1)The North's blockade of the South certainly helped win the war, and that success was based on the North's superior control of the seas off the South's coasts. Something Mahan would have had plenty of time to contemplate while bobbing up and down in the blockading squadron.
2) Pursuing the enemy after a decisive victory. This lesson could have been learned by Mahan through paying attention to warfare strategy during the war. While not naval in nature, generals McClellan (Antietam) and Meade (Gettysburg) were both widely derided for not pursuing Lee (and a chance to end the war by destroying Lee's army) after their victories. Lincoln must have understood the need to pursue and destroy after a victorious battle. Lincoln's correct belief that General Grant would pursue Lee is why Grant was promoted to lieutenant general, with command over all US armies, and it was Grant's dogged pursuit of Lee's army that ultimately led to the North winning the war. Speaking of lieutenant generals, George Washington understood this basic concept during the Revolutionary War, albeit in reverse, when he realized that as long as he had a viable army in the field, he had not lost the war.
It's an interesting irony that Grant actually moved U.S. military strategy away from what might be superficially called a "single decisive battle" concept. Prior to Grant, the war in the East mostly consisted of a campaign of a few weeks or months culminating in one or two major battles...and those battles determined in a few days which side "won" or "lost" the campaign for that year or that season. Grant was the one who brought in the idea of a full campaign with objectives that would supersede and carry beyond the results of any single battle. No one battle Grant fought against Lee was truly decisive (Appomattox was much more of a pursuit than a real battle), but Grant's overall campaign of 1864-5 was decisive because he successfully used multiple battles and the movements between battles to force Lee into a steadily worse and eventually untenable position. In a way, Grant used a land version of what Mahan would later call "control of the sea".
@@Wolfeson28 Yes, Grant understood total warfare on a grand scale, and yes, no single battle Grant fought against Lee was decisive, but that was not for a lack of trying. Grant did not withdraw from engaging Lee's army in the manor of previous Union generals. Instead he would withdraw to try and turn Lee's flank to gain advantage and clinch a decisive victory. Grant's inability to do so is a testament to Lee and his army's abilities. Grant's actions, exemplified in the number of Union casualties at Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor, bear this out. Grant wanted a quick end to the war, not a situation like the siege he commanded at Vicksburg, which was tough on him personally. When Lee's army withdrew from the siege of Petersburg it was because it was in such a poor state that it could no longer hold its position. At that point, Lee knew he could not win against Grant's superior force on the open battlefield, which is why he surrendered at Appomattox.
Small point I wanted to make, Meade was under direct orders to keep himself between Washington DC and General Lee, which is why he didn’t give chase. And he did stay in command of the Army of the Potomac for the remainder of the war, Grant was put ABOVE Meade as commander of all armed forces in the east.
@@nukclear2741 I'm guilty of gross oversimplification and you're absolutely right, Meade was commander of the Army of the Potomac until the war's end, but Grant's promotion to Lt. General and his placement of his headquarters at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac effectively reduced Meade's command.
The period after the Battle of Gettysburg has been relatively recently revisited in the book by Jeffrey Hunt "Meade and Lee After Gettysburg: The Forgotten Final Stage of the Gettysburg Campaign, from Falling Waters to Culpeper Court House, July 14-31, 1863." Here is a summary from the website savasbeatie.com: "Contrary to popular belief, once Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia slipped across the swollen Potomac back to Virginia the Lincoln administration pressed George Meade to cross quickly in pursuit-and he did. Rather than follow in Lee’s wake, however, Meade moved south on the east side of the Blue Ridge Mountains in a cat-and-mouse game to outthink his enemy and capture the strategic gaps penetrating the high wooded terrain. Doing so would trap Lee in the northern reaches of the Shenandoah Valley and potentially bring about the decisive victory that had eluded Union arms north of the Potomac."
Meade was fighting two wars after Gettysburg: The Civil War and a not so civil war with politicians in the city he was defending. I think it is fair to say that while he didn't win either of these with his reputation unscathed, neither did he lose. Lincoln, for his part, was under intense political pressure with the impending election in 1864 to end the war as quickly as possible. At this point in the war, he had lost his patience with ANY perceived dillydallying by his top commanders. In Grant, he believed he had a general who would deliver the knockout punch.
IJN : Decisive Battle
USN: How about A Endurance Battle.
The Battle of Attrition was always in America's favor... Nimitz and King knew this; as well as Yamamoto.
Sprint v Marathon.
I believe that this is a serious, considered explication of Mahan's first book. It was much easier than trying to read it. Thanks
I thoroughly enjoyed this one!!!
Haha decisive battle go boom 💥 brilliant line
Cliffs Notes by Drach.
Nice way to sail into Wednesday.
I like the cartoon "To the Czars peace picnic", with Crozier and his patented disappearing gun carriage, having heard so much about him on C&Rsenal.
Great video, I learned what Mahan’s actual ideas were instead of the normal “lots of ships go boom”.
Excellent narration.
Thank you for your hard work.
Awesome video as always!
very nice discussion...I read his book years ago and it was clear control of the seas was his issue 'not the big battle' . If has had known had WW1 and WW2 submarines would develop he would have a whole book on how to use them for 'control of the seas'
And yes indeed now that you mention it - I would be very interested in an entirely separate video about the United States Navy versus Royal Navy war plan...!
This was very interesting-as is basically all your content!
A wonderful example of surface level bullet points and a wisdom level understanding of the principles involved.
Manhan: creates decisive naval battle theory.
IJN: TAKE ALL MY MONEY GOOD MAN!!!!!
"Decisively more than just battles..." I see what you did there, and I appreciate it ;)
Thank you for this video. It is very helpful.
I really enjoyed this, I hope to see more of these kinds of breakdowns of influencial minds.
Nice one Drach.
Just as Mahan figured it out - a comparably cost-effective alternative to sea transport in the form of RAILWAYS was invented and began to be widely used...
Railways were well established by this point. Shipping is still cheaper though. Consider the existence of more carriers on the Great Lakes. Iron ore could be shipped by rail from the Misabe Range of Minnesota to steel mills on the Great Lakes. And in winter it can be. But once the Lakes are open for shipping the ore boats go back into operation. Plus in Mahan's time rail transportation of bulk materials (ore, coal, crude oil, stone etc) was actually more expensive than today when looking at cost per ton in constant dollars.
@@mpetersen6 Very true, but his overall argument about the importance of internal communications and transport infrastructure has proven very accurate. For example, one major weakness of France during the Napoleonic Wars was they didn't have very good internal transport networks, so a lot of their ability to build fleets and actually prepare them for sea was cut off once their coastal shipping was shut down by the Royal Navy blockades.
At the time Mahan was writing, shipping had been the dominant form of transport throughout virtually all of history, and rail was only just breaking out of its infancy. However, his arguments point the way towards the massive expansion of railroads and the development of national highway systems in the following century.
Great lecture, thank you.
I find the man brilliant. What he would have done with computers ... So many variables, sets and subsets and hierarchies. I can picture him educating WOPR.
Up for it! G'mornin!
I agree with your analysis of Mahanian doctrine. The point is control of the sea which ensures freedom of action. Freedom of action gives you the greatest flexibility in fighting a war. The more options you have to win a war, the more likely you are to be successful. The decisive battle is just the most obvious way to win oceanic control. I'd argue that Mahanian doctrine can also be applied to air, land, and space warfare too. Battlefield control provides your forces freedom to act which gives you flexibility to pursue the national interest. The large, Waterloo style land battle might be the fastest way to gain land supremacy, but a prolonged campaign of hit and run skirmishes can just as surely eliminate an adversarial army. In the air, complete destruction of the enemy air force in a major clash can work, but you can also use a prolonged bombing campaign to continually force the adversary to sortie their planes giving you the opportunity to shoot them down with escorts. Battlefield control is king. With it, you dictate a war. Without it, you are at the mercy of the enemy.
Great video, as usual.👍
Great work Sir thank you
Thanks Drach!
I'm curious if you, Drach, planned on releasing this video around the same time as the Mahan lecture by the Command and General Staff College?
ruclips.net/video/pMZ8E8a5JQc/видео.html
Had no idea actually :D
Mahan lays out what has historically been recipe for victory, but politicians start cooking before checking the ingredient list..
I much prefer this kind of video to the dry dock vids. Sure, the stories of ships is interesting but it just goes in one ear and out the other for me. this kind of stuff just sticks with me better
Mahan's father, Dennis Hart Mahan (1802-1871), is also worthy of mention. He was a professor of engineering at West Point 1830-1871. A. T. Mahan may have gone to the Naval Academy to rebel against his father. The elder Mahan killed himself in 1861 by jumping into a steamboat's paddlewheel when he was about to be forced into retirement.