US Navy Finally Announces Punishments for Bonhomme Richard Fire, Two Years After Ship's Loss
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- Опубликовано: 22 май 2024
- US Navy Finally Announces Punishments for Bonhomme Richard Fire, Two Years After Ship's Loss
🚨🚨🚨Check out two earlier videos on the Timeline and Fire Analysis🚨🚨🚨
Part 1 - The Timeline - • Bonhomme Richard Fire ...
Part 2 - Analysis, Commentary & FIREBOATS! - • Bonhomme Richard Fire ...
What's Going on With Shipping?
July 16, 2022
In this episode, Sal Mercogliano - former merchant mariner, firefighter, and maritime historian at Campbell University - looks at the final disposition of punishments against the personnel involved in the firefighting efforts on board USS Bonhomme Richard during the fire of July 2020.
#USNavy #BonhommeRichard #fire #damagecontrol #navy
00:00 Introduction
01:38 USNI News on Punishments
05:27 Defensenews on New Details on BHR Fire
08:56 Command Report on BHR Fire, Analysis & Conclusion
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What's Going on With Shipping Bonhomme Richard Playlist
• Bonhomme Richard
Navy Announces Punishments for Bonhomme Richard Fire, SECNAV Censures Former SWO Boss
news.usni.org/2022/07/15/navy...
New details emerge about the 2020 Bonhomme Richard fire, ahead of censure of three-star
www.defensenews.com/naval/202...
USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) JAGMAN Investigation
www.secnav.navy.mil/foia/read...
That was MY ship!! I was a Damage Controlman (Shipboard Firefighter) and I was a Plankowner on BHR!! From 2000 to 2004, that was MY ship!! Watching her burn truly broke me! My blood, sweat and tears were on that ship, along with all my plankowner shipmates!!
My other two videos will make you feel worse.
@@wgowshipping I’m watching part 2 right now, I just finished part 1. As a BHR (Bonhomme Richard) Plankowner and Damage Controlman, watching and listening to the $#!+ show about the BHR command is beyond frustrating to hear! Back when I was on BHR my chain of command, from CO, XO, CHENG (Chief Engineer), DCA (Damage Control Assistant), and all my fellow Damage Controlmen, and all my other shipmates would have NEVER EVER let this happen to OUR ship!! This horrible incident was a complete breakdown and a pure lack of command and control from the BHR command!! The fact that the BHR command never took control and even any accountability of the incident is the main reason why BHR was lost!! I was a firefighter after I got out of the Navy, and as a firefighter we were always taught, make sure command is established and MAINTAINED AT ALL TIMES!! Plus, you’re right, the DCA SHOULD have know what fire stations were OOC, and they should have made “jumpers” from in service stations to OOC stations, by running hoses to those stations!! This whole incident frustrates and pisses me off to no avail!! I could go on and on about this!
But you did an outstanding job breaking this down!!
Thank you for your service! We need more people like you!! 🇺🇸
Thank you for serving on that great Navy ship. My heart goes out to you (SIR) as a plank owner. This saddened me to think of what you saw of her. And. That the ship was a total Loss. Thank you for caring for her in your time aboard.
Lotsa 'Lack Of's' involved in this Clam-ality !
I retired from a different Navy back in 95. Fire fighting was first and foremost in our training. Before we went to a ship we went to fire fighting school, every time we went to a new squadron we went to fire fighting school. We drilled until fire fighting was second nature and if we failed a drill we repeated the drill, day and night until we passed the drill. No commanding Officer should have ever allowed that situation on his ship. That is a gross failure of the command and that should be where the buck stops. They fined the Captain of the ship but that doesn't pay the tax payers back for his negligent loss of the vessel, or the nation back for loss of security by weakening our Navy when ship building is at an all time low in the US. They better look hard and wide at Navy fire fighting and every other aspect of readiness because we are weaker by the day as a nation.
I was in the Navy 1980 ~ '85 and went to three different fire fighting schools and countless drills while at sea. It almost seems today's Navy forgot about that.
My mind is blown that so many damage control stations were out of service.
I don’t know exactly what a damage control or firefighting station is. But I wonder how it’s possible to leave a maintenance period without putting them back into service. That just sounds crazy.
How dare you say, “Ship building is at an all time low in the U.S.”
Every time I say that, trying to make a positive change, every retired Navy veteran attacks me.
@@randallsluder8289 Facts is facts...
I served aboard USS Ranger. During my time we had two fires happen, one serious in the number 2 main machinery room and one relatively minor in the officers wwrdroom. In both case the fires were contained and put out with minimal damage beyond the directly affected areas. Well, leadership quality flows down hill and with presidents like Obama and Biden, this is what you get.
On virtually every ship I ever served on (I did 20 years) Firefighting and Damage Control was practiced till we could almost do it in our sleep. It didn’t matter what your rating was, your pay grade was, whether you were an officer or enlisted, you were trained. Period. It was drilled into our skulls “Once the fire breaks out/the missile hits there is no one here but us. We put the fire out/stop the flooding or the ship sinks. How long can you tread water? It’s just that simple.” And Woe to the officer who tried to “Pull Rank” on a Firefighting or Damage Control Team Leader! No mercy was shown. That’s the way I remember it; that’s the way it should be.
As ships company I was Repair 7, in port fire party while moored on duty days. General quarters in port to keep all teams reporting manned and ready mininimal times, in port fire party muster on the pier, there we check all gear for operation and readiness
Dr. Sal -
A very thorough, but extremely exasperating review of a debacle. I spent 22 years as a Naval Aviator, but I had two ship’s company tours in there. Both ships went through Comprehensive Overhauls while I was onboard. You are so right about fires while the contractors are onboard. The guys they hire as welders are pretty top notch, the guys they hire as fire watch, not so much. The Flying Squads on both ships got a workout almost daily, to the point that we’d cancel scheduled drills since they’d already proved they knew what they were doing. As CDO I always knew where we had potential fire main issues due to ongoing work. Not because I was forehanded, but because the COs and XOs were, as well as some exceptional DCAs and Chief Engineers.
Had two experiences on my last ship (a CV at North Island) where the Federal Fire response was abysmal. Both were pierside HAZMAT issues and the responding Federal Firefighters were woefully untrained.
Fast forward and I’m the XO at a base during regionalization. The guy they picked to be the Southwest Regional Fire Chief in charge of Federal Fire on 9 bases was from San Diego, the same Chief whose guys didn’t know what PCBs were or what happens when venting LOX mixes with spilled oil. He was a skilled politician but not any kind of leader. I could go on, but suffice it to say when you promote a skilled politician rather that a knowledgeable, forehanded leader, you’ll have a well polished posterior, but you’d better hope nothing bad happens.
The BHR fire is chickens coming home to roost. Thanks for a very enlightening, but extremely disappointing, review of an incident that was bound to happen.
Budget cuts to fight ground wars in someone else’s country.
I know this was a year ago. But from an enlisted guy there is a difference in leadership and it is obvious. I was fortunate to have served under two captains who went on to become cno and their leadership style was night and day from the other guys. Roughead assumed command and we immediately got underway more often and were drilling twice as much. Enlisted guys notice. And we also all know this fire was failure of the leadership.
Well said. The enlisted guys here who are whining about this being due to diversity and a "woke" Navy don't know WTF they're talking about. The problem is very real, but has nothing to do with "wokeness" whatever TF they think it means. I'm a civilian hawespiper, same as a Navy mustang.
Bonhomme Richard Captian in 1779: I have not yet begun to fight!
Bonhomme Richard Captian in 2022: I have not yet begun to fight the fire!
This is horrible comedy, but so so relevant.
A Billion here a Billion there, pretty soon its some serious money. The failures of the entire ships command structure as well as its immediate next level command should have been court-martial for losing this ship.
@@michaelholden5131 Losing a ship, that's a tragedy those in charge are out of the Navy. The contractors who built the Independance and Freedom class LCS deserve prison time for losing not just one ship, but dozens. They are scrapping LCS ships while building new ones.
@twotone3471 Were there serious deficiencies in the Class?
The loss of the Bonhomme Richard is a failure of the highest magnitude by those whose who are sworn to command and lead. Retirement is no shield that prevents prosecution for gross neglect and command incompetence. I fully agree that Littoral Combat Ships are a boondoggle of an immense porpotion; however, the Navy asked for and has bought these little crappy ships and inspite of the know design and manufacturers problems it continues to procure them. Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Navy as well as CNO need to be held accountable for the LCS but we all know that because of jobs and politics it ain't gonna happen. A capital ship of the US Navy burning to a total loss while tied to a pier at the Premier Naval installation on our West coast is not a tragedy; but rather a full blown no BS failure. Lock them up. You want to wear stars and bars and draw the pay and perks then accept the responsibility for your failures to lead and train to mitigate disasters.
Welcome to the new Navy. Add this to the details of the collisions of two destroyers in 2017 (USS McCain and USS Fitzgerald) and you begin to see a lack of readiness going on.
I was a junior officer in the Royal Navy and I'm shocked by the sheer incompetence. On every ship, I've ever served on damage control and fire fighting training happened multiple times a week.
Almost daily drills underway except in warzone or in tight areas of passage, too, but daily import aboard the destroyer and the aircraft carrier that I was on as an USN engineering rate. Blows my mind at the billions of dollars embarrassment this shows as wasted but does not solve.
Yes, but thats in a real navy not the USN.
this wasn’t a normal situation, it wasn’t in port like normal: it was undergoing refit. things would be vastly different if it was a normal berthing in its homeport
@@bostonrailfan2427 that was their home port.
Yep. Gotta use _extra_ water to cool down the electricity ⚡⚡🤤
The crew did exactly what they were trained to do during an emergency, they gathered together and gave each other a family hug.
As a former sailor I was shocked by the loss of the ship. When I served on the Yorktown CG 48 we had fire drills everyday in port and mandatory fire and dc schools every 18 months. Every sailor is a fire fighter!
Wow Sal. Thanks for your coverage.
I am shocked and disgusted at the failure of command with the BHR disaster. There's no reason, good or bad, for that casualty to have happened.
A SR was blamed for arson.
None of his shipmates caught his actions either at the time or right after.
Ship's company tried to put the fire out, raised the alarm, but failed to access their ready resources to continue fighting the fire.
Civilian fire fighters took over and instead of ship's company sticking in to assist they abandoned ship.
Where were the spare hoses from other repair lockers? Where were the air movers, manual air movers like the lamm air mover? Where were the exhaust fans? Why wasn't ship's company in their firefighting gear? Why weren't there hydrants on the pier? Why couldn't other ships assist?
VAdm Brown alerted 3rd fleet, but they said, "she's in maintenance, it's not our problem." Really?
VAdm Brown called on a RAdm to come in to take leadership. Why wasn't that effective?
I can't belive the CO, XO, CDO, & Engineer just walked away.
As an ex-Avaition Electronics Technician (AT), I can confirm the Navy’s love of alphabetic acronyms.
What does NAVY stand for?
Never Again Volunteer Yourself
I'm sure you know what the anagram FTN means.
@@tombombadil3185 I love the f*ckin' Navy and the the Navy loves f*ckin' me.
I am currently stationed on the IWO (Jima LHD-7) currently dry docked. and we have learned the lesson, we perform drills everyday.
Gator Navy!
Well done Sal, don't back off, we need more citizens like you that take the time and energy to investigate issues like this, thank you.
Veteran US Here! I've been through my fare share of drydock and dockside major and minor maintenance. I've fought shipboard fires and I couldn't believe that the Navy lost a ship that was dockside! Was no one trained in shipboard fire fighting? Did the duty crews never hold Damage Control drills? Those on fire watch in the effected areas, Repair Locker Leaders, Damage Control Central, XO and CO... every single one of them should have completed their DCPQS... Where were the P250s... heads should have rolled because of this Bravo Sierra😡 No LOI, No LOR, No NJP... UCMJ or Summery Dismissal without retirement benefits 😡
Thank you for your analysis of the San Diego Federal Fire Department. As a retired Civil Service Navy employee I can say you have hit the big nail right on the head.
Allow me to be blunt, the military command from E-4 to to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs absolutely hate having any civilians on their bases and especially on their ships.
In my years as a Federal employee of which many were spent as a Federal Firefighter until I suffered a career ending injury fighting a brush fire, I experienced many times this same problem between civilian Federal Fire Fighters and civilian hating military members doing every thing that they can to stop Base Civilian Firefighters from taking charge of the incidence.
I can guarantee that nothing will change. The U.S. Navy and the entire military structure will never get their pompous heads out of their righteous asses. They know everything and they will never allow any civilians to take charge of any emergency.
Thank you for the comments on the Government group not working well with others. I remember the same thing happened at the plane going into the Pentagon. I watch on TV a civilian FF talk about coming to blows with a Marine who wants to go back into the Pentagon to get other Marines out. The civilian FF was thinking about the collapse of cement.
As an old broken down sailor vintage 60's through 80's, I find it appalling that a ship could be lost in that way. I recall an emphasis on firefighting and general DC during my time, and during yard availability an increase in fire watches and drills. Navy seems to have lost sight of the basics. Enjoy your content.
This WOKE & Politically Correct Social Experiment that was forced onto the services has been in the works at least the last 10 or 15 years. The military is and has been a "Social Experiment" for at least the last 10 years, and it's only getting worse... God help us if we ever have a REAL shooting war... The soldiers, and Sailors and Marines with TWO MOMMIES or TWO Daddies are going to turn tail & run, if they don't FREEZE in place because something or someone TRIGGERED them.... Pathetic !!!
On my last boat USS McCampbell DDG-85 we put a HEAVY emphasis on damage control,especially after mccain and fitzgerald were hit.worst year of my life as an engineer but ill tell you what,we had a small oil leak in shaft alley,20 mins later the leak was patched and not a drop of oil left in the bilge,another time we had a small electrical fire in laundry,the whole ship was on station and accounted for in 6 mins.to me its not the navy but the co/xo as well as the DCTT.
Agreed.
This was also my experience from 87 thru 96. Ex-BT2(SW) here.
As a HT2 I too am at a loss to understand the crew running away. We did daily fire fighting drills for each duty section. WHAT THE "F"
When we went to dry dock we had logs kept as to where any hot work was to be done. Required fire watches etc... I was on the team that went around and would secure a welding machine or torch set that we found without proper fire watches set. It is your goddamned home !!!!
The USS Yorktown was hit by a 500 pound bomb and she was in and out of drydock in 72 hours to participate in the Battle of Midway. Nowadays a fire takes out a multi-billion dollar ship and she has to be scrapped? Damn, we've really become a bunch of woosies.
Look at the LCS ships. Crews too small to be effective to keep the ship afloat if there is battledamage with crew causuties.
@@shauny2285 Aren't those the ones that are so poorly designed that they are destroying themselves?
@@J-1410yes and theyre also being decommissioned i think
And many of those responsible have DoD and Defense job using the military clearance system as well as the identity theft that NAVY does on advance STEM veterans.
@@ElectricProductions2they’re scrapping the old ones only. The government is forcing them to build more new hulls (which in fairness we do need, and the ship building industry needs to gear up again) which are ditching the multi mission thing and going to be permanently fitted out for more specific tasks. They also solved some of the more egregious nonsense.
It’s a shame between that and Zumwalt we lost 2 decades of build advantage over the opposition. The DDG1000s in particular could have worked if they hadn’t cut the numbers so much that they became ludicrously expensive single units.
For years I have watched incident investigators, both government and private industry, concentrate more on whose fault it was, and rarely on "What Happened". We, as a society, need to concentrate on fixing the what, and then worry about the who in an accident.
But then we might have to spend a lot of money on things that if implemented correctly will never be used. And that does not have a lobby.
It is a western tradition that someone hang before the problem is fixed. It has only got worse with the gender politics now seen in the military.
Fixing the what is exactly what has made commercial flying safer, to bad it isn't applied to private flying as well as other areas.
I just have this mental block on how you can assign blame without knowing what happened. As much as anything else, this is a ship *at berth* which was lost to fire, and if there's one thing the Navy should excel at, it's firefighting.
I also notice some companies declare bankruptcy or some divisions dissolved last year. However, they are probably back to their old tricks to reestablish the incompetence that caused this 2 billion dollar lost. Commanding Officer of NAVSEA SYSTEM SAN DIEGO, Commanding Officer SHORE INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY (SIMA) NAVSTA, Commanding Officer 32nd Naval Station, San Diego, and their associate chain of commands should be held accountable for the culture incompetence and other crimes such as identity theft, hiring illegal aliens, "switch roo" of official documents, fraud, waste and abuse. Sorry this is what a GLOBAL PANDEMIC DOES. It exposes lies. PS...Some of many NAVAL Contractors who hire unqualified veterans, underqualified people (skipping out on training), stolen identities (especial those with REAL US Accredited STEM Degrees), illegal aliens and etc..have also led to long term economic drain of the area. A 2 billion dollar carrier is no laughing matter.
So, they thought they could release that report on a Friday - and sneak it past Sal Mercogliano?? Not A Chance! Points very well made Sir. As a Firefighting Captain for 25 years I think you know a few things about which you speak. Thank you Professor.
Releasing reports and bad news on a Friday is standard Government operating procedure.
As a former Damage Controlmen in the Navy (under the SUPREME Tutelage of Chief Pollock and DCA's Mister Powers and Mister Aros we would have NEVER RESTED if the crew had been THAT bad at basic Damage Control. It's Ludacris that the Command failed the Crew and the Traditions of the Navy in this manner. Criminal. Those Zeroes should be in jail.
Oddly enough, and speaking from experience, most drills are Not at Port with full compliment of crew. Just saying. Civies were everywhere too.
you never did it while the ship was in repair…
@@bostonrailfan2427 Yes, yes we did. We went through three Ships repair availabilities while I was onboard. We couldn't go into the Dry Docks because we were the only LSD that was able to fucking move under it's own power.
We had half the ship shut down and the crew still living on board.
Don't tell me what I did or didn't do.
Training in the Navy has gone downhill for years, they are more worried peoples feelings than being military force.
Guess no one was reprimanded at NTC for not.providing sufficient fire training as I got there in the 70s everyone got it
My awareness of this sorry state started in 2013 with Chancellorsville getting hit by the Navy's own targeting drone she was tracking. The first problem was that the drone went rogue (not responding) in the first place. The training and decision making problems occurred both on shore - with some CF about defective drone control stations - and shipboard. Since it was a tracking/targeting exercise the CIWS *was* operating and apparently tracking - but it was not set to auto-engage. Now they reportedly had something like 39 seconds from the time the drone was known rogue and its strike on the ship. Not an eternity, but plenty of time for a well-trained, competent and confident crew to engage the CIWS and destroy the drone.
That Chancellorsville incident turned out to be minor with the later Fitz and McCain collisions at sea. By the time of this LHD-6 fire at port, this big shakeup and re-focus on training and operations was supposed to have already happened. Shake. My. Head.
You aren't joking Boilerman.. Good buddy of mine just retired as a CMC and he told me that the woke BS has consumed the military..
@@reologan4262 Just out of curiosity: why does it seem that the RN and Australian Navy can deal with it better?
@@lutomson3496 sadly just think how much time and money "saved" by not fire & safety training, damage control ?
Spot on!
For what its worth, the designer of the Normandie was in New York, and told those in charge to open open sea cocks to let the ship settle on the bottom in an upright condition to prevent it from rolling over. His pleadings were disregarded with the obvious results. In my damage control training, the Normandie was used as an example of what can happen to a ship if you keep pumping water on a fire without regard for what it's doing to the stability.
What happened to DCPQS ( more navy letters)? implemented in the early 1970's all hands after reporting onboard had a set number of days to have their Damage Control Personal Qualification Standards signed off or some punitive action wold result. This was required even if you had just come off a ship of the same class. This covered things like where the fire pumps were how to light them off, the basic firemain and dewatering systems ad so on. when signing off Deck and Ops types I would often get complaints like," Why do I have to Know where that bilge suction valve is, I work topside?". To which I would responde, " So you can keep this ship afloat after most of us snipe have been killed!".
When I was in the Navy , I was a BT ,trained at fleet fire fighting school , San Diego , and was in my duty section , in port fire party , we mustered twice a duty day , and drilled one a duty day , and drilled to use our shipboard fire and flooding gear , where each repair lockers were , as well as where each fire hose station , and foam control stations were and how to activate and run them
We also trained for flooding and how to use portable pumps for dewatering spaces , and even draught from harbor for fire fighting
We also ran drills for rescue and assistance , for other ships in berth , and had kits of hoses , fittings , spanners pumps , desmoke fans and fittings , emergency breathing equipment and back up supplies
The first response to the fire should have been calling away the ship board flying squad fire fighters and back up of other duty section fire parties
The ships HT's should know , by daily briefings , what the status of the fire fighting system is , and what systems are available to use , in adjoining spaces , in the event of fire . If there was welding or cutting being done a fire watch is required to be above , below , and either side , with charged Co 2 , Purple K bottles , buckets of sand or fire twin agent hoses ready ,
The entire incident was a cluster f..k,
Aff Co 2 or halon systems should have been activated ASAP , rescue and assistance parties should have been called out from the 2 destroyers and portable pumps draughting from the bay using the P 250 pumps I helped rig them up and do it at pier 6 . 4 or 6 inch lines could have been lowered from the BHR and connected to pumps from the tugs , to the ship board system and through Y gates supply water the fire fighters, from ahead of and aft of the fire zone
The current uniform known as Blue berries need to be replaced ASAP I was issued the blue Utilities uniform in 72 as per Z gram what ever . We hated them , over the denim pants and chambray shirts
The Utilities were permapress poly blends , that stained , did not breath in high humidity , were hot , and not fire retardant , and would cling to your body and melt to you in a fire , yes , there are fire proof turn out gear in the repair lockers ,
Fire at sea , and in port are a sailors worst fear , but we trained for them . I served on 4 in port fires , in the yards at NSTSD and we had them out in less than a half hour
6YO BT over here, Gary...truer statements in your post have yet to be read. BTW, The Bonhomme Richard's Command Master Chief had started as a BT. He forgot a lot of things along the way, IMHO.
As a retired CPO, (served 1983 - 2004) I served on 7 different ships, 2 CV, 2 FF, 1 BB 1 AO, 1 LHA and 1 LSD. I include all the types of ships to show you I was in every community except submarine (Surface shooter Navy, Amphib Navy, Airdale Navy, Auxiliary Navy). Without a doubt I can say that Carriers were the most squared away and on their game. Pilots know safety and the lessons from Oriskany, Forrestal and Enterprise fires in Vietnam were still being enforced in the 1990's. Unfortunately Bonhomme Richard is not an aircraft carrier, even though she looks like one. She is an Amphibious Assault Ship, a card carrying member of the Gator Navy. If you know about the Navy, you know the Amphib ships are considered bottom tier for Surface Warfare Officers (SWO's). If you are a hard charging SWO, you want to stay on Cruisers and Destroyers and you want to stay in the AEGIS radar mafia. 30 knots, gas turbines and a large Combat Systems Department helping you to defend the Carrier group and launch Tomahawk strikes against enemy land targets. In 1995, I transferred from USS Constellation (CV-64), which was 34 years old at the time, to USS Tarawa (LHA-1) which was a ship similar to Bonhomme Richard and about 20 years old. I could not believe the poor material condition of Tarawa, which had recently completed a year long overhaul in Long Beach. The ship was dirty, it seemed all original equipment was broken or degraded and the crew morale was lower than whale***t. There was absolutely no pride on the ship and it was very disorganized. Duty section musters were a joke, no one knew who was qualified in what systems and shipboard communications were poor with broken phones throughout and very few sound powered phones. As a PO1 at the time, I stood watch as the Junior Officer of the Deck on the ships lower brow in the Lower Vehicle Decks. I was normally by myself, with no way to communicate with the Quarterdeck up in the hangar bay, yet I had most of the crew and contractor workers coming through my post. I also had all the ships supplies, hazmat and stores which came through this location. Needless to say, if an emergency had arose, I would have been unable to take much action. For my entire two years on Tarawa, I saw things get actually worse as we deployed and then went into a maintenance period in San Diego. Duty section personnel routinely left the ship to go to the PX, or went home at night without permission. When Bonhomme Richard caught fire, I could see the parallels to my experience onboard Tarawa. In 2002, I reported aboard USS Rushmore (LSD-47) as a CPO. Rushmore was only 10 years old at the time, with a much smaller crew than Tarawa, so I thought things would be good. Unfortunately it was worse in most ways. The ship was undermanned, experiencing multiple engineering difficulties, very dirty, rusty and same as Tarawa, most installed equipment was broken or degraded. It was a challenge to even muster the duty section each day, and try to get them into a complete uniform. My point of this long winded story is to say this: The Amphibious Navy is always the bottom of the barrel in the Navy. The officers who stay in the Gator Navy are usually pretty lax by the time they are CO/XO, because thats just how things are in the amphibs. My CO of Tarawa used to come to work at 0900 each day! He promptly left at 1630 and never came in on a weekend to check on things. The large amphibs like Bonhomme Richard are usually run with a Surface Warfare and an Aviator in the CO/XO roles. They alternate so that when one CO leaves his XO moves up to become the CO. This is an aviation procedure that the flyboys brought over from their squadron ways. It is to provide the aviation officer a chance to gain the experience as an XO for 18-24 months in running a large surface ship before they become the CO. This means your Surface Warfare CO is a Captain who is probably retiring after the CO tour and has been in amphibs for a long time. Your XO would then be an aviator new to running a surface ship, with little experience in firefighting, damage control or shipboard routines. Add in a wardroom of officers who probably didn't pick the amphib navy, and a CPO mess that is dysfunctional, having given up on running THEIR ship and you have the perfect equation for the Bonhomme Richard disaster. I can assure you that right now most of the large deck amphib assault ships are run just like Bonhomme Richard was two years ago, like Rushmore was run in 2002 and Tarawa in 1995. Lance Schoenbaum SMC(SW/AW) USN Retired
Lance...thanks for the candid assessment.
An addition to the list of carrier fires: USS Kitty Hawk CV-63 in 1973.
Hey Chief, that's a horrifying story. My time overlapped yours (1986-1990), and spent over 2 years of that on an LPH. I must have been very lucky because my experience was nothing like yours. The ship was old and often in poor repair, scheduled maintenance periods were usually cut short and they'd end up patching things together, but the SWO officers were generally good (I was Supply Corps. . . bad color vision!), and I consider our Captain as the greatest leader I have known. He and the XO were helicopter pilots, and later this Captain went on to command an LHA. The CO prior to him was a survivor of the Forrestal incident, the first thing he said to me when I reported aboard was the priorities of fire fighting and DC.
Unfortunately I have heard stories like yours, some of the old LSDs we worked with barely functioned.
I was stationed on a wooden hulled MSO (minesweerper).
We were extremenely conscious of fire.
The duty section on board (any ship) should be able to handle DC duties.
The Watch, Quarter and Station Bill is set up to be able to have qualified crew on board.
We spent some time in drydock in Subic Bay, PI (1960's) and we had fire main pressure from the pier.
I find it hard to comprend how the crew was totally unprepared to handle this emergency!
Total failure of command as well!
Certainly a differet Navy now!
When you think about it starts to make some sense
If for punishment Duty the incompetent officers were to remain on board during the refit well the competent officers were giving something more important to do
I hope this is the last time anyone makes that mistake
@@jamesricker3997 Unfortunately we may never know!
I have to admit, I love it when Sal goes on a rant.
Thank you for focusing on this disaster. It is immensely important and also a fail that the public is not keenly aware of this incident and similarly focused on the investigation. A 1 billion dollar major surface warship was completely lost through sheer incompetence! If it had been sunk by a terrorist attack or instigation by a near peer nation it would be on bumper stickers across the country, “Remember the BR!” And would be a cause for war. I’m in a totally different branch of the military but as a SNCO in the AF with almost 19 years I take a lot of lessons from this incident and apply them as much as I can to my trade, laser focusing on training and a culture that values technical competency and the sustaining of the fighting spirit in our armed forces.
I am equally appalled that this disaster took place.
Thank you for this report, Sal.
I served several years in submarines. The most important training exercise is fire fighting including classroom training with examinations and qualifications to serve on damage control teams.
After every drill, we engaged in a "hot wash" to discuss what was right and wrong and who did or should not have taken a certain action.
Drills were undertaken that deliberately prevented seasoned, reliable sailors from accessing the points of fire so as to train the juniors more effectively.
At times, we covertly got a bunch of juniors in the torpedo room or even the mess desks and would surprise them with a fire drill.
The drills were very seriously run including sound power and other methods of communication being disallowed: it was totally up to the sailors trapped at the fire sight to get the job done.
There were failures, but after that, certain juniors would step up and lead and succeed.
Eventually, the crew became very well trained, self-sufficient, seasoned, capable, mature professionals.
Would sail with them again, anytime.
The surface Navy seems to lack certain types can-do spirit whereas submarine sailors have a must-do no matter what, frame of mind.
imo: the entire BHR crew let their ship mates down, themselves, and they let go what it means to
GO NAVY
What a shame.
Thanks for reporting this, Sal.
Thank you, Sal, that is certainly eye opening. I was a Naval officer during the Vietnam War, serving on the Bon Homme Richard (CVA-31) (an Essex class carrier) and my GQ station was as damage control officer of the repair station for the forward third section of the aircraft carrier, from the hanger deck to the keel. I can tell you we took damage control very seriously! I am aghast at what happened to the Bonhomme Richard. I agree, there is no excuse.
The USS Missouri grounding occurred 17 January 1950 when the battleship USS Missouri (BB-63) ran aground while sailing out of Chesapeake Bay. No one was injured, but the battleship remained stuck for over two weeks before being freed from the sand. The ship was so damaged that she had to return to port and enter dry dock for repairs.
After the battleship was freed, a naval court of inquiry found Captain William D. Brown and a handful of other naval officers guilty of negligence. Brown was moved down 250 places on the promotion list, effectively ending his naval career.
You are ABSOLUTELY CORRECT Sal!
If this mess is representative of the overall training standard, rather than an isolated exception, it's clearly not the same Navy I served in so long ago. In those days, it was understood that saving your ship might well involve risking your life, no matter your rank. I hope this was an aberration.
Check out Texas Uvalde school shooting .
I am equally appalled. Veteran of the 600 Ship navy here.
“The US Navy is not prepared to execute its mission.” Yes, precisely correct. I spent most of six years shipboard as a machinist’s mate in the 70s, and as bad as that was, that Navy would still have been able to fight. The one we have now, from all I hear and read, has become a sort of social justice laboratory with bureaucrats and politicians, in and out of uniform, in charge of things. Our chief potential opponent, China’s navy, ought to be no match for ours for a whole lot of reasons, but they’re going to be a far more dangerous opponent because of our own incapacity.
Watch as the 2 navies are simultaneous defeated without a shot fired. One from tofu dreg construction and fatalistic crewman, the other from having the most advanced warships and least prepared crew of this century.
But DC isn't nearly as important as getting pronouns right.
I was also an MM in the early 80's. There are two types of rates; you are either a fireman or a seaman. MM's are fireman and we had all the tools to kill a fire. Water, PKP, AFFF, Halon and CO2. The brass of the ship did not have enough people on duty stations and let the firefighting equipment to be disabled; thereby putting the ship in jeopardy. We trained all the time to put out fires on a regular basis! Fires can kill a ship and we knew that! However, DC with stupid young ensigns could not understand. Young stupid officers.
I'm watching this in absolute shock. I was on the USS Wasp LHD-1 from 94-97 and I wasn't a great sailor, I didn't like the Navy or the way they handled people. But I'll be damned if I wouldn't have donned an FFE/OBA and gotten on a hose team. But it sounds like the officers were more concerned about not getting written up for making a decision that could result in deaths than in doing their jobs. They did a great job hiding this though, it's the first I've heard about it. And this as we are bumping up against the PLA Navy in the South China Sea. Not good.
Take comfort in the fact that all other navy's are worse.
As a civilian, I was shocked that the shipped burned. Now I am shocked by the failure of command. Very disappointing
@@tedmoss That's the only comfort we have now, that the other guys are more incompetent than we are right now!
Our leadership and training are at the worst point in 50 years.
The last 30 years of mediocre Rep and Dem admins, political correctness/Woke/social justice BS, and our own complacency after the Cold War was "won" have led us to this.
There are RUclipsrs who are ex-military that say one thing in their videos but their online commentary on other media platforms convey a different picture of the person. There's a tendency of people to "tow the line," "say the correct thing," and not buck ranks when their livelihoods and pensions may be at risk!
It looks like we'll have to be burned again before we remember the lessons we shouldn't have forgotten!
As a Captain, I will never make a decision that may end in deaths just to save a ship. Ships are replaceable lives are not. My main concern is to completely abandon ship without losing anyone.
The pla navy fire suppression team, damage control party method:.throw sailors bodies on the fire to smother it, or plug a hull breach..alive or dead..we have more than we need says xi dipeng
Way back in 1973, on my Tin Can. We were woken at 03;:00. Fire Fire Fire in the boiler room! (It took a short second to realize no one said , this is a drill.) The fire was out by the time we got to GQ. Fuel was spraying on to our 1200PSI Boiler. I still thank them to this day for my life❤️
Garcia class frigate?
I'm a Navy Vet. Over half of the brass is worse than useless, has been for decades. Once again, the brass is busy covering their ass and trying to blame some poor enlisted personnel for their failure. The Navy should FIRE all the paper pushing "woke" brass, (NO retirement, either), there should NEVER be more Captains than ships, much less admirals.
Sal is on fire about this fire and deservedly so. This is a mass of screw-ups on an epic level. Diligence on the crew's part would have stopped this fire in its tracks. That's a top down issue and needs to be addressed. We need our armed forces back from the abyss they have fallen into.
You're right and the first step to getting back to building combat readiness is building more inclusive bathrooms and using correct pronouns. The enemy will never know what hit them.
I know of an Army kid who today is still in boot camp but has already displayed more intelligence than anyone aboard this boat did during this incident.
Even if their wearing high heels at least teaching them where the water mains and pumps are; who knows maybe they will by accident get the "wet stuff on the red stuff".
I love when you get so involved in your favorite subjects, the US NAVY.
Great update Sal. The fact that during training exercises "the crew had failed to meet the standard time for applying firefighting agent on the seat of the fire on 14 consecutive occasions," is just amazing. How can those in charge allow these failures without making changes or corrective actions immediately. BTW nice t-shirt, got to love any school with a camel as a mascot.
I don't know where things have gone wrong and I can't speak for the Navy. However, I was a NCO in the Army from the late 70's into the 90's. My entire time in the Military the main focus was readiness to the highest level, anything else was unacceptable. Readiness meaning training, equipment, physical fitness, combat readiness, being fit to fight, etc...This was taught in Basic Training and continued at all levels of NCO academies or at any school I attended. I don't see how any Petty Officer (NCO) at any level would accept anything like what was going on aboard this Vessel.
I was also in the Army, but 88 through 96. And you are so right! So is this the new Kinder, Inclusive, and stress card using US Military now? Things like this do not bode well for our military. Especially on the post service end of the deal, the US is failing our service men and women on both fronts now, it seems. I mean I expect the butter balls and the rest of the brass to keep their heads up their @$$ but the NCO's should have been on top of this. Maybe it's just the Navy, but all the NCO's I ever worked with were some of the best and knowledgeable in the field. Hell, the NCO's even put us WO's to shame "sometimes" lol. Thanks for keep the heat no this Sal, love the vid's as always!
They were probably all attending pronoun seminars and too busy to be bothered with damage control.
I went to basic Training in 1975 Fort Jackson SC. We always had a FIRE WATCH walking. I was NG so on summer camp back at Virginia. We still had a Fire watch. In the barracks where we stayed 6 years after basic Training.
When this first happened, I told my wife exactly how they needed to deal with this fire. Nothing I said was done. Had it been, we would still have that ship in service. Pensions should be lost over this. All the way up chain of command. The CNO is also at fault for not keeping the people under him trained properly. Every man and women in the Navy work for him.
Let him and others loose all retirement and privileges.
Woulda been able to be saved if the ship actually had fire suppression systems which were still OOC across the entire ship
I never understood how the Navy could lose a ship tied to a pier. Look at how the Navy saved ships like the USS Franklin and USS Bunker Hill during WWII. Of course those guys were part of the Greatest Generation.
Different Navy back then
Outstanding analysis here!
“DEI” has hollowed out the Navy!
Can't imagine the lack of training that led to the loss, how is the rest of the fleet? Scary.
I think it might also have something to do with the competence level of the officers in charge
The more competent officers were transferred off the ship while she was being refitted , because the Navy had more important things for them to do
Incompetence is now the norm in the military. This starts at the top not the bottom.
Good afternoon Sal.... I really enjoyed this video on the Bonhomie Richard LHD-6... It was terrible what happened to that ship because I was part of the commissioning crew when she came over from the East to San Diego.... Yes a lot of things could have been done that could have prevented that fire from getting out of control... When I was in the Navy I served on CV-62 and her... We took firefighting very serious back then even in Port.. I was part of crashing salvage on both ships... I have to see I was trying to fight the fires on the flight deck and import I was trying to fight the fires internally.... And I know they had more than enough sailor to start fighting that fire... But from what it sounds like they didn't know how to fight that fire.... To see your ship to go out like that to the point that nobody tried to save her is just heartbreaking.... Because one way they could have got more water on the fires no one even thought of this not even crashing salvage to take their fire trucks from the flight deck or are they hangar Bay and take them into the well deck and lower the stern gate and draw water from right behind the ship because they are equipped to do that they have an inch and a half and a 3 in adapters on them and A triple F..... And the other firefighting equipment that they could use in the well deck is known as a p-52 pump it's a small portable water pump that uses an inch and a half hose they could have put those on the stern gate and got water into the into the ship... But nobody did that.. the shipboard crew that was a board and damage control should have known that... Because they had 80% of their firefighting capabilities turned off that right there is a big red flag.... And the captain could have ordered the dropping of the stern gate and the flooding of the well deck then they wouldn't have to worry about it outside sources that much. Not even damage control suggested that that is what pisses me off is because my training was a lot different than this generation is training... They could have done more to save that Ship... So please keep up the good work.. I was a A
I served on the Kearsarge LHD3, same class and on the fire party.
Due to her structural similarities I can see all this unfolding in my mind’s eye.
I was in the Navy from 1980-1994. On board my first ship(CVN), I was the on-scene leader of a repair party for 3 years. Duty sections were drilled in fire fighting every duty day. Our repair party was drilled every day for 2 weeks straight every year when we went to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Every day for 2 weeks straight!!!!! There is no excuse why the duty section couldn't handle this fire. When we returned from deployments, I and many other personnel would volunteer to go to fire fighting school. I always did every time. That way, you become skilled and gain experience fighting fires. Extremely important when you're deployed.
Ike?
Yes Sir!!@@edwardcook7673
It would be interesting if the shore base federal fire after 2 years if they have adapters to connect to a ship or if they have requested them?
On the aviation side of things, there is an expression:
"The NATOPS [handbook] has been written in blood" as Naval Aviation only became safer, through revising procedures and training, upgrades to systems and equipment. Notably, The fire on the USS Oriskany in 1966 changed aircraft ordinance standards. UẞS Forrestal had a major fire in 1967, while the Oriskany fire was still being reviewed. These were pivotal events that made naval aviation safer for all crew involved.
My Uncle was on the Oriskany when that fire happened. Dumb ammo handler got a lanyard from a flare caught on door to magazine. He tossed it into the magazine. If he tossed down passageway they would have saved lives.
@@kevinsantascott3688 I Was on the Ranger in 76 when we had a flare locker go up just under the flightdeck. They called general quarters and we had to go up and move a bunch of the aircraft by hand from over the top of the fire. When I was in, we were constantly drilling on putting out fires. Oh, by the way. We were in port at the time.
What sticks out at me in reading the LOI is the usual tangled USN command structure while in the shipyard. However the shipyard is responsible for the safety of the ship in the yard as the crew is mostly reassigned. I don’t see that considered in the LOI. That said the CO BHR is where the buck stops and the blame sits as far as the chain of command but it remains to be seen if the CO BNR had the resources to do the job.
In my opinion, probably not from other cases that happened in US history. For example, some major companies declared bankrupcties, reorgainized, swapped location with other division, and etc...after the event. In fact, after two years they are trying to reestablish their culture. More heads should roll since 2 billion dollars is no laughing matter especially a carrier. PS they forgot the various "Reserve Units" (ie...NAVY, ARMY, AIR FORCE, COAST GUARD and etc...Maybe not US SPACE FORCE since they are a new branches and probably identity the unemployed "black listed officers" who did noting but have been Identity Theft by the other services).
Every time I hear about this fire the incompetence and negligence boggles my mind. The ship's low readiness might _partially_ excuse the CDO (depending on his shipboard position), but not the XO and Captain, as they are ultimately responsible for the poor readiness. And what is wrong with USN culture that a vice admiral, the Surface Warfare Boss no less, is worrying about the bureaucratic niceties of the chain of command when telling anyone, let alone surface warfare officers, to do their job in an emergency?
Discipline by admiral's mast looks to me like an attempt to minimize public scrutiny - especially from the mainstream media.
Absolutely. Once a fire starts, the order is already given - go after the fire and flooding. And be dammed asking for "new" permissions, attack the problem now. Failure to carry out those already given orders is a serious breach and should receive serious punishments. The only acceptable excuse is someone higher forbids initiating and continuing the firefighting and patching and dewatering efforts.
Who intervened and denied the fire team's assault on the fire?
What happened to the immediate and controlling actions by the duty section before that?
All of those are the order - no "new orders" needed
If the problem started before that, who from, and why, did the crew - from the CO, XO, Cheng, DCA, and down are in the loop and on the hook - permit this issue to persist?
It takes TEN MINUTES to weld two non matching fittings together to give complete water service to the ship!
Thank you Sal. This was a bad situation at the time. Glad to hear the update!!
Happy Weekend!!
I am a marine electrician, I helped build the Macon island in Mississippi and worked on the bon homme Richard in San Diego. I quit the job just weeks before the fire, it was a major heart break.
Your analysis of Bonhomme Richard fire was the first video I saw from you prof Sal. Been with you ever since 👍👍
The larger a bureaucracy grows, the more adverse it is to necessary reforms. The US Navy is no exception. See "The National Interest" article "Does the US Navy Have Too Many Admirals?" by James McClane & Kevin Eyer, October 21, 2019.
Does the Admirals and General have too many advance business degree people and business degree versus STEM degrees? Look at the head of the Joint staff...and also look at the names of some they use...either dead people or people they pretend are illegal aliens or they steal other people assets....
@@rgloria40 I have no idea what point you are attempting to convey.
The US Navy is smaller than it has been since before WWII. All the commands have been shrunk and consolidated to the point that single admirals at the top of both fleets combined. Bureaucracy was not the cause of this calamity. Complacency and lack of professionalism is. (old salt).
They probably need more Warrants and E-7's.
@@KB4QAA Just an excuse. Most supertanker have a crew of less than 50 people. Automation
I made two Westpac cruises on the BonnHomme Richard, when it was CVA 31 our Fighter Sqd. Was VF 51, we had Fire drills. Damage control drills a lot, was a tight ship, made a cruise on USS Ticonderoga CVA 14, same Fighter Sqd 1958
Great job Sal!! Keep the pressure on, this needs to change.
It's unbelievable that this happened while the ship was in port. Everyone on board is supposed to have training on fire fighting. I went to three fire fighting schools before I got to my ship.
Can't believe they tried to frame a INNOCENT man. Really scary and frightening what huge government can try to do to innocent victims!!!!!
Wow, thanks for the follow-up. I was wondering what would happen.
Your channel is the best , and most underrated channel on RUclips. I feel so much wiser after every episode. Much love from Melbourne Australia
Thank you for keeping us informed.
Loved the comment,
"This issue will make me lose my hair!"
"Oops, too late."
😆
Sounds like we need a version of the NTSB to investigate USN incidents. In order to enact meaningful changes, all contributing factors need to be examined and acknowledged.
There will never be an equivalent of the NTSB for military incidents. The DOD can hide behind national security claims. In this situation the functions of the NTSB have been completed just as thoroughly by other agencies. The primary difference is there is no investigation docket released to the public. I'm okay with that. I don't think there is a legitimate national security concern with releasing the information, but I don't think anyone needs to see the ship's CO's full medical history or the testing methodology used to determine the heat tolerance of vessel components.
IMO the fire was a clear sign of a complete failure of the interagency coordination system and the Navy specifically. Very similar to the Uvalde shooting. There were multiple responding agencies trained to work together, but when the time came nobody was in charge. The training in both situations seems to be treated as a box being checked and not as an opportunity to gain confidence in the ability to perform in a real event.
I'm really bothered by the failure of the civilian population as a whole. I'll admit that before seeing the 2 videos Sal did, I didn't know the name of the ship. I just knew of some kind of barge or something in San Diego burned for a couple days. I don't think most people know about it.
That is a problem. Sailors can't come to the media and express safety concerns like we can. They can't just quit because their chain of command isn't enforcing safety requirements. This event cost the country an expensive vessel. It showed us severe failures of government. It appears nothing is being done about it. Most of the country is unaware of the failures that happened. That is a problem.
I believe that watching the 2 videos Sal did on the fire should be required to maintain US citizenship. If you want to benefit from the US military then you should have to be aware of what is happening.
@@hewhohasnoidentity4377 This, along side the litany of LCS failures, fire is something the House and Senate should be asking the Navy about during appropriation hearings - is there any point in paying for ships if you're just going to incinerate them?
@@Dennis-vh8tz Congress has spent the last decade more interested in spending their time discussing previous administrations.
It's not like Congress talking to the Navy would do any good. Congress will force the purchase of what the lobbyists want and tell the Navy to make it work.
Sounds like some other crime like identity theft, conflict of interest from another country, and etc...or...it can be just the power of pussy.
I don't think more gov't bureaucracy is the answer.
A terrific report, Sal. Thanks again.
I was a Hull Maintenance Technician on a ship in the early 70s. HT were trained as firefighters as well back then (DC school at Treasure Island). I was assigned as #1 nozzleman on duty nights/days. We had drills where we put on OBAs (Oxygen Breathing Apparatus) but I don't remember having firefighting coats, boots or gloves. Glad we never had a fire in the 3-1/2 years I was aboard.
Excellent analysis and review of all available information. I read the NAVY Times article featuring ADM Brown and was appalled at the lack of decisive leadership and unwillingness to act. I think you are doing a great job and should continue to beat the drum that lessons need to be learned and changes must be made lest this happens again even though it should not have happened in the first place. Keep up the good fight.
Taking a deep breath to watch this. I couldn't finish watching Salvatore's _first_ episode of the BRF ("F" = fiasco.) Sooo many things were wrong from the outset. I've been out of the Navy for _decades,_ and I still couldn't tolerate the story. Thanks, Sal. I hope this BRF thing ends with teachable moments for all _"who go down to the sea in ships."_
(Note: the quote refers to those who go _out_ to sea, not who go _down in_ the sea. Think of going downriver, past the bar... (No! Not _that_ bar, you alky! The *sand* bar, dammit!))
After watching: *BZ, Sal.* You hit many nails on the head. I'm glad my thinking has not strayed from the path.
I'll drink to that!
@@scottscouter1065 thanks. It does help to know there are others out there of a similar mind. I'm not totally off my rocker yet!
I was on USS Ranger from '84 to '88 as an IS. I was on the Rescue and Assistance detail, (supplementary duty section firefighters) and trained each duty night in-port until it was muscle memory. The loss of this ship left me shocked and appalled. A capital ship lost in port. What the actual f**k?! Thanks for your research and report on this matter.
Your passion keeps us coming back.
As a retired Navy Officer, I was both shocked and embarrassed by this incident and its aftermath. There was a tremendous emphasis on damage control during the time I served and I don't know what changed to allow this disaster to take place but it's my hope that a Flag Officer of sufficient influence and stature is working on practical solutions to the glaring deficiencies that allowed this debacle to occur and that he or she has a competent staff to assist. I also wonder about revisions to the screening and training pipeline of COs. I know that the CO was a helicopter pilot and not a SWO but many helicopter pilots spend years at sea on warships and should have the capacity to deal with crises of many kinds. Maybe revisions to the screening process are worth a look as well.
We always had a combat fighter pilot in command, they knew what they were doing.
Well said Sal
One of your best, Sal!
Sal, Excellent Job.. i am subscribed now because you are AWSOME..!! Great Job on this by you !!
“NO EXCUSES, PERIOD!!” In the interim the Navy ought to learn about the “chain of custody”. Someone🤔 failed to secure forklifts that were a possible ignition source for this fire.
Thanks Sal, Cheer's 🇺🇲👍🏻
great job as always thank you
Thank you Sal. You hit the nail on the head. The current Navy is more concerned about be liberally correct than being able to do the Job.
Great content and good analysis that we need to understand this mess. The Navy has some big fixin’ to do right now.
FUBAR at its best.
Basically lack of good housekeeping, training and material status of ship firefighting system coming out of the yard doomed the ship. Basically if your ship is at an increased risk, you have to take steps to mitigate the risk.
PS - lessons learned if no action is taken are just lessons observed.
Excellent video and commentary.
Well done, Sal. Thanks for the details on this fire. Incredible that it took two years to issue this report! Did the Navy learn from this experience?
Ships, though they be inanimate objects, speak to the crew. They say "here are the parameters, here are the forces, find your options, drill your responsibilities, learn the mechanics, get along with each other no matter what, keep yourself healthy, communicate communicate communicate, join the team or get off the ship." Poor Bonhomme Richard, no one listened.
Sadly, the times of Admiral King and Admiral Lee are long gone ...
Excllent breakdown . Thank you sir
THANK YOU FOR SPEAKING TRUTH (AND COMMON SENSE) TO POWER!!!
Great analysis Sal! Very sad commentary on the Navy's ability to address these serious situations. Makes one almost feel it is a hopeless situation within the current political climate. Easier to make a report and point a finger at personnel but lacks any constructive basis for repairing the problems that created this debacle. The captain was probably plugged into the good ol' boy network and got a pass to full retirement and benefits. That stinks. It really undermines the process of culpability. You are spot on with your criticisms.
He probably has a job lined up with a defense contractor or as a talking head.
Who backs the co up when he or she points out that the yard's plan for ensuring ship safety is inadequate, and to fix it will add millions in cost to multiple other entities not on the ship and not in the ship's command? CO has a lot of power. But not enough power or influence up to tackle big parts of the problem. Does not forgive things like his units training and dc readiness. But it is more than just the co.
What happened to "The Buck Stops Here"?
I have to admit to laughing when I heard that some of the punishments were Letters of Instruction. The ship caught fire and bured to the point where it had to be decommissioned and then scrapped and someone got an LOI. Amazing!
I’m a Navy veteran and I notice Navy news as much as i can..This wouldn’t have happened when I was a sailor.
great report
"CLUSTER...." It was that.
Peacetime Admirals at work here.
Great breakdown, Captain!
I subscribed as a result of watching your reports on the Key Bridge collapse. They are more informative than anything ive watched.
Thank you for covering this story so well. And, you're so right that the Navy has not learned any lessons. Sadly, there are many other lessons they haven't learned either. The LCS debacle. The F-14 replacement due in just a "few more decades." The Columbia SSBN which is falling behind (and going over budget). The SSN(X) which is delayed. The DDG-1000 which was designed around an advanced 155 mm weapon ... that is being removed from the only three ships built. The maintenance that is not being done fleet wide. And, the FFG-62 which is going to be "on time" or maybe "one year late" or ... no, no, wait ... it will be "three years late (at least)." The FFG-62 is doing "this well" because it was going to be a slightly modified existing design (in service elsewhere for over a decade). Now it's admitted that the Connie's will be an 85% new ship. Not sure if that means they are keeping the original anchors and gangway or what. Anyway, "lessons learned?" Not the USN.
I agree with all your points from a very uneducated position(former Army officer doesn't give me much experience in the area) but I do think from what I have read that Vice Admiral (retired) has some strong points. Note that the report chooses to ding a guy that is out of the picture and has little or no influence. Gutless on the part of the NAVY to point the finger at a retired guy and not currently serving FOGOs.
Time really flies. I remember watching those vids back when Sal put them up. It seems like yesterday. This post is mostly to feed the algorithm and partly to say thanks to SaL for teaching me about shipping for the last several years.
Great analysis Sal, it drives me nuts too.
The Navy needs to make massive shifts in the way it does things around these vessels and establish sane parameters for fire-fighting when in maintenance. The fact that 1) there were no adapters and 2) fire stations were out of commission are inexcusable.