Bonhomme Richard Fire Investigation: Part 1 - The Timeline | What's Going on With Shipping?
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- Опубликовано: 20 сен 2024
- Bonhomme Richard Fire Investigation: Part 1 - The Timeline
What's Going on With Shipping?
May 5, 2022
In this episode, Sal Mercogliano - former merchant mariner and maritime historian - explores the timeline and issues behind the July 12, 2020 fire on board USS Bonhomme Richard in San Diego, California. The episode investigates how the actions (and inactions) taken that day along with the four areas identified in the JAGMAN investigation - Material Condition, Training and Readiness, Shore Establishment Support and Oversight.
Part 2 will provide analysis and commentary and discuss the recent study that examined the Navy's Waterborne Firefighting Capability.
#BonhommeRichard #fire #Navy
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Study on Navy’s Waterborne Firefighting Capability After Bonhomme Richard Loss
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Long Chain of Failures Left Sailors Unprepared to Fight USS Bonhomme Richard Fire, Investigation Finds
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In the early 1970s, I was on the aircraft carrier Saratoga. We were deployed to Vietnam and we were at R and R and anchored at Singapore harbor. One of the high-pressure fuel lines ruptured in one of the main machinery rooms of which there are four. A major fire started. Unlike the Bonhomme Richard, this fire was quickly handed. The Damage Control Teams quickly responded and handled the fire. The only loss of life was to 3 people that failed to evacuate spaces that were overcome with smoke. The ship had over 4,000 men (no women) with around a third or more ashore in Singapore at the time of the fire. If you have ever been aboard a US Navy ship when the Boatswain Mate comes over the 1MC and blows his pipe and announces that there is “A class Bravo Fire” in the main machinery room, your heart will leap and you respond with what you are required to do.
I have never been in the Navy but have been on large Sealift ships in Army as well as JFK for a visit in when it did a fairwell tour 2007, and various Museum Ships....
If I am told to go anywhere to investigate a fire I go with at least Fire Extinguisher
You are totally right, I’m at a lost for words at how a small fire grew to destroy an entire LHD that wasn’t at sea, wasn’t full of vehicles or aircraft, no large stores of ammo, etc., etc., etc., I know for a fact my duty section wouldn’t have allowed this to happen if we had to go find buckets or wet paper towels.
Went thru that on the Foresstall. Boiler room fire during emergency relite drills. Went to GQ and circle william due to toxic smoke.30 sailors in a flight deck maintenance compartment and we got a big dose of carbon dioxide poisoning cause room was watertite and vents turned off due circle william
We were all out when they opened the door. Fresh air hit like cold water!!!
Was aboard the Kitty Hawk ‘65-67’ Was fog nozzle man on a JP4 fuel fire and another fire of mag wheel locker and fuel fire. All hands evolution and hours rotating hose teams.
Excellent video. As a retired USCG officer, all I can say is what a complete mess! What could have been a minor incident was allowed to result in complete loss of a Naval Vessel AT THE DOCK! The ship’s crew is 100% to blame from the CO all the way down. Readiness status was 0. Poorly trained personnel. Not even knowing how to properly dress for fire duty? WTF? I don’t fault the Fed fire force. Their job is shoreside fires. I give props to SDFD for doing what they could to make up for the lack of command response but the Navy crew.
Heads have to roll here. The CO bears the ultimate responsibility for the state of the ship and lack of readiness. I’m my opinion, his career is over. Same for XO and CDO. All have to take the fall for this.
And Sal, I agree with you. Texting the CO that his ship is on fire? Are you kidding me? I swear this is a generational thing. I can’t imagine anyone over the age of 40 thinking that was a good idea.
No it’s not a generational thing, that’s a stupidity thing, I’m a millennial and if I had to contact the CO about a fire the last thing I’m going to do after sending the MOW to his house, and calling him 500 times, is send him a text.
Agreed lol, it has nothing to do with generation. I assure you of that.
I am a retired merchant mar officer, also ex Navy, and former volly EMS, and am amazed at the glaring problems here. No fire plan in a container attached to the gangway? That's required. No hose adapters? Every repair locker should have a set and so should Fed fire.
Radio interoperability is required per FEMA, so how is it these agencies still fumble this essential task? We never learn do we?
The navy does not have or need to hose adapters do to us have all the same house onboard. The fire plan is held at each repair locker and at the quarterdeck with OOD(Officer of the Deck). I have been stationed on a sister ship to the BHR. I did a shift on the fire and I have trained for the firefighting in a shipyard event.
Everyone treats dry dock and refit time like an enormous vacation and this problem showed up here
Everyone lies is more like it. For example, the number of veterans and military wives...on their resume like have medical degree, computer scientist or engineering degree
"Dear Captain, the ship is on fire 🙁". Lol
I am not kidding...I must know what is in that tweet!
What I wanted to say was:
"Dear Captain, Ship is on fire ☹. Career is now 💩!
@@wgowshipping sadly his career was not shitcanned. that is the most utterly unbelievable part of this. did he have photos of all his senior commanders in compromising positions or what?
Navy normally fires Captains for passing gas the wrong way, let alone letting their ship burn at the pier.
Being personally involved during my navy days with aircraft carriers, I found no fault with your analysis. What one has to understand about a/c carriers is they are a fire waiting to happen. They are loaded with fuel, oil, ordinance and even spare parts for aircraft ( some of which are made from magnesium, a metal that once is ignited, is almost impossible to put out). Aircraft carrier fires are extremely hard to put out. Even recent ones like the USS Forrestal (we called it the forest fire or "zippo" in the navy) raged on for days and was probably only prevented from exploding due to the lack of 115-145 avgas (the little that was aboard was very quickly first smothered with co2 then jettisoned). This is not even including the aircraft themselves, which in this case weren't aboard in large numbers. Yes, more firefighting equipment is needed, but one of things that is most helpful is that the crews of the ships must be very highly trained (even we "airedales" were trained in shipboard firefighting) and yes, in this case lot of the crew was not there and the powerplant was "cold iron" (sailors, man the pumps). Like a lot of tragedies, this was a series of errors, lack of training and just bad luck. Look at the history of aircraft carriers and most were lost due to fire or scuttled after becoming burnt out hulks (they even took some of the ships that came alongside to help fight the fire with them).
No attack intended. I'd have thought that every aspect of fire and damage control including training is aimed at reducing the influence of "plain bad luck". At sea (and in the air), you only have what and who you brought with you, so you make it the best you can by building competence and awareness - you manage your luck.
The Forrestal was a "recent" one? My friend, that was 55 years ago :P
Incredible report Sal.
It seems there were multiple break downs of procedures and personnel.
The fact 80% of the fire stations on board were out of service with nothing set up as an auxillary, falls completely on the CO and XO. There are lot things the Navy needs to learn and correct from this.
Well, the USN "reflex" is to shield the COs.
@@GilmerJohn Especially on Sunday morning?
Absolutely incredible how many things went wrong. Cant wait for part 2
It took two missiles to destroy the cruiser Moskva. Our boats are all sitting ducks.
@Lurking Grue I remembered the strike when it happened. Fortunately only one exploded. The superstructure is aluminum. Great save by the crew. I saw some video from visiting American sailors that had been onboard the Moskva pointing out the the ship had poor compartment isolation ability to fight fire.
Thanks for your input.
Fire on a ship seems like a clusterfuck of epic proportions.
Glad more people weren't hurt.
It’s seems like they are trying to create a syllabus for a class of how to destroy a ship by fire.
As a former sub sailor the analysis of shipboard fire resonates. Your analysis is well thought out and intelligent. We need to be honest in after action analysis and there will always be finding that are painful to hear.
Sal,
The connector to mate ship fire mains to shore fire mains on commercial vessels, and I assume naval vessels, is an International Shore Connection. For commercial vessels it is required by USCG rules. It is also required by the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention. These connection flanges are housed at the fire control station and at the equivalent to a shoreside standpipe. They make it possible to connect different types of hoses together.
I can't fathom not having shoreside fire hydrants along the piers. I also find it curious that a ship that is alongside a pier that is not fully operational was not connected to a shoreside fire hydrrant. I am sure that when the ship was at NASSCO it was connected.
I find it surprising that one of the fire department pumpers did not put a suction hose into the water and start pumping from San Diego Bay. Had the Bon Homme Richard had it's fire pumps their source of water would have been the Bay.
I spent my career working for oil companies and their tankers. Although I am what I refer to as a textbook (naval architect and marine engineer) engineer and was never trained as a fire fighter, I spent my career working to prevent fires and making sure the best equipment was available for extinguishing a fire should it occur.
I find it very difficult to believe that vessel designed to carry navy distillate fuel (NDF), jet fuel (JP4 & JP5), diesel fuel, bombs, and other ammunition was not trained and prepared to fight a fire. It is scary that they were not trained to work with shoreside fire departments.
Our tax dollars at work.
Bob
1970 boot camp fire school we went through the smoke chamber hanging onto the person ahead of you. "Short shallow breaths! Short breaths!" the instructor shouted. The boiler room fire chamber actually had burning fuel in the bilge, and was let cook until the door was hot enough to make the water steam when it was cooled prior to entry. We stepped onto a grated deck sweeping the fire ahead of us with a fog nozzle, and again, " Short breaths! Keep low!" the instructor yelled. We were scared as hell, and the main reason I went ahead was that I didn't think that the Navy had a vested interest in killing me. We trained in an array of fire scenarios, all with real fire and just water. No computer operated gas valves, the fire only went out when you put it out! Granted we coughed up black boogers for the next week.
Onboard ship fire fighting PPE was a long sleeved shirt buttoned tight to the neck with the collar flipped up, white hat rolled down over the ears with your pants tucked into your socks. An OBA (rebreather) , and asbestos gloves ( yes real asbestos) rounded out to ensemble.
PPE vast improvements for sure. Not sure if the SCBA is an improvement over the OBD other than that it is a positive pressure system. The down side is the weight, short mission time, and a multitude of high pressure vessels that will become bombs in a fire, plus the time it takes to recharge each cylinder. The OBA had up to an hour of operating time, replacement canisters were quickly changed out, at about the size of a cereal box large quantities could be stored, and didn't pose an explosion hazard.
I remember the term, "A chain of uneventful circumstances, or the Swiss cheese model" where all the holes have to line-up in order for the outcome. There appears to have been so many individual and organizational failing which demands that thing must go far beyond pinning arson on one individual.
PS: Piers #1 & #2 were pretty much home for the two ships I served on. I recognized the area in the pictures immediately.
I served on an aircraft carrier in the 80s, every time I hear about this fire my soul hurts. Well done presentation, Sal, thank you.
The reason shipboard and FFD fittings are different threads is that shipboard is salt water and FFD is fresh water. I grew up around the navy in the San Diego Bay area, served in the navy in the mid 80s (on submarines) and them worked for the navy as a DOD Police Officer up to the mid-90s. Up to the mid 60s the FFD was a saltwater department and every pier at NAS North Island and 32nd Street Naval Station had a saltwater fire main. In the 60s FFD converted to fresh water to be compatible with city and county fire departments. The saltwater fire mains were removed as the piers and docks were updated over time, but no new freshwater mains were installed sense the ships couldn't use them. Fresh water mains are near the piers but not on them. And why wasn't the well deck opened to allow the fire boats to run lines and support the firefighting effort through it???
Ok, everyone agrees they are different... Why not carry adaptors on the trucks?
Good job Sal..the adapter situation is unbelievable. Another option the local fireboats on the west coast train on is supplying water from the fire boats to ldh on the dock. Very standard drill. The move to small 50' or less fireboats in areas with large ships is a bad idea. The ship was also wide open with zero boundaries set and cables and cords running throughout. They couldn't close the doors if they wanted to This thing was over by 0833. Glad you are reviewing it. Btw my dad was on carriers in Vietnam. He told me they averaged 35 fires a day on the birdfarms. All small until they weren't. Don't forget about the Enterprises big fire as well.
I was an 80’s era sailor. EVERYONE Goes to firefighting school . There are huge red flags all over this mess. Protocol was broken so many times.
Hell, we got a 3hr course in "Fire Fighting" at RTC Great Mistakes during 2 months in '06. Boot does not train in necessary skills anymore.
@@ligmasack9038 I had fire fighting training at RTC Great Lakes too, in '64. Real oil burning, real smoke and heat. I wonder if they still do it that way?
@@lewwolfgang9958 Not anymore, they just have you spray a Hose for around 45 sec. and then the Gas Flame magically just goes out. lol
Part of that firefighter training is how to isolate a bad section of firemain and jumper around it.
I guess it's not just the Russian Army that is staffed by officers who graduated from the Three Stooges military academy. The US Navy obviously sent its officers to the same academy. Your description of the timeline is accurate but shocking. The ineptitude of the officers and crew on the aircraft carrier is incredible. Where was the ship's captain in all this? Did the OOD really think that sending a text was the proper way to notify the Captain that the ship was on fire? Where was the ship's damage control staff? It sounds like only the San Diego Fire Dept had the skill/motivation to start fighting the fire, but were being kept from doing so by the Navy's fire crews This is so sad.
IIRC the captain was on leave, ashore at his family home.
He finally showed up, wearing a flight suit??? WTF??
I’ve been both an Amphib and Base XO. This report made my head hurt. I was always uncomfortable when the was something in vehicle stowage when the sprinkler systems were out of service. Ensured there were fire watches posted with fire hoses positioned if the sprinklers were OOC with stuff in the vehicle stowage
@James Bird Sir, you brought back a distant memory from my 2nd night in the U. S. Army, May 1968, Fort Ord, CA. The new Recruits (aka Maggots) were housed in two-story 1938 "temporary" barracks made from kindling wood. I was assigned a two hour Fire Watch detail to walk around and inside each building, both floors with a red billy club and a red helmet liner. Every few barracks was a rack with a suspended iron triangle for us to "raise the alarm." My first responsibility ...
wow!! 16 minutes between first sign and calling out FIRE, as a former volunteer firemen, that's a ridiculous amount of time to have passed - if you've ever been in a burn room for training, 2-3 minutes is plenty for a fire with tons of combustible material to get completely out of hand - you're on a floating building -a fire is such a damn big deal :( and still no real response until 26 minutes
We were supposed to be at Battle Stations in 90 seconds. 16 minutes us forever. I get they were in port but that's unimaginable.
As a landlubber from Scotland, still think this must be a script for a Stan laurel and Oliver Hardy film
Having been through a few shipyard evolutions and fought a fire at sea I can say being in the yards is chaos and most critical crew members are at school or leave. In my time firefighting wasn't a priority until a few weeks before you set sail. All the hatches are open and cabling/ventilation is blocking most hatches. When something like this happens you don't have multiple fire teams ready and you need several as in a confined space a team won't last long in contact with the fire so they need to rotate in and out. Hopefully this is a wake up call for command and they will address this. At sea we have the best damage control in the world, in the yards it is non existent.
I worked for Newport News Shipbuilding working aircraft carrier new construction. Ships in shipyards have pieces of systems operational. We install temporary systems to provide capability, but they do not look at the ship as a whole. There are plenty of combustible materials and temporary electric power, welding cables, and vent ducts running through every hatch so that sealing a compartment is damn near impossible. Watertight integrity does not exist either.
I was in the Navy 1968-1972, and this doesn't even sound like the navy i was in. but then ask any old guy and you'll hear it ain't the same world as 1972.
I've been a career FF and volunteer for 30 years, with degrees in FF technology and Emergency Management. Your analysis and interpretation is SPOT ON !!!!! Well done !!!!
Thank you very much for providing this truthful information on shipping! 👍🇺🇸🇺🇸🇺🇸
Good for you in laying out your experiences as a firefighter, but it’s the internet…there will always be a segment of haters. Push on. You’ve indicated this is your perspective and it could be flawed. So be it. I appreciate hearing your perspective.
The time of Aquarius. The truth will come out. Thank you for your work, getting mad is needed at times.
I'm an Airman currently in the Navy, very new to the Navy, in fact I only enlisted last year... I had no idea the switch from Blueberries to NWUs was related to melting. No one has told me this, and as far as I've heard from any sailors, senior enlisted too, is that the switch was related to some obviously bullshit "Blueberries blend in with the water which is bad for man overboard" (obviously bullshit because we still wear navy blue coveralls on deployment which blend in with the sea even more effectively), they even told us this lie in Boot Camp. The Navy from the top down keeps us very low intelligence on so many things, almost intentionally.
This is simply insane. I've heard of the "Swiss Cheese" model for disasters where any one little thing that didn't go wrong would have prevented the incident. This case is closer to the Chunnel where you have three huge parallel openings leading to disaster.
Having served in the Royal Australian Navy for around 20 years and being a firefighter for 20 years the response and subsequent actions in this incident have blown my mind. What a clusterf%%^k! Vey well documented and I look forward to watching the second half.
Texting the CO is hilarious. Thanks for another great video.
@43:40 The 2h delay in activating the shipboard fire suppression system (AFFF) made me want to bark in rage too!
Your knowledge of both ships and firefighting is helpful in understanding what happened - for example the importance of water supplies.
Retired RN CPO here. I ran small ships helicopter flights, we were all trained in fire fighting, and damage control, plus first aid. As Fleet Air Arm, we were also trained in aicraft fire fighting, in my day it was using real fuel fires in a ship superstructure mock up. Later in one of these gas fired super damage control trainers. Watched both of your videos, and have been absolutlely astounded by the total lack of professionalism and risk mitigation planning displayed by the USN over this fire. The first thing a RN ship did after tying up was to test the gas turbine powered emergency fire pump that was sited somewhere on the upperdeck. The ships also exercised with the local Fire Service on a regular basis.
Thank you Sal. I’m sitting here in a stunned stupor. Perhaps I’m effectively channeling the Command and Control of this event.
A salt water fire service would often use bronze fittings while a fresh water service would use aluminium alloy -likely not the same threads.
The big airport fire trucks carry around 2 minutes worth of high grade foam If the fire isn't under control in 90 seconds it's too late.
Thanks for your informed insights. Looking forward to your analysis of a very complicated situation.
The fire and damage control school I attended 45 years ago had a simulator built 15° to the horizontal - amazing the effect that has on your situational awareness in smoke. The best simulators at that time could be adjusted "on the fly".
When I was on LHD3, we held fire drills each day inport -- even in the shipyard.
acsxfan1, RIGHT!!! Don't know what kind of shit happened to this command. I want to know where was the sound and security watch? Topside rovers?? I mean come on, nobody rang bells for the flying squad??
BEST OF that I've seen yet. Attaboi.
I'm just "Joe-bag-a-donuts" here. I have no marine or firefighting experience, except for a couple of fire-fighting training sessions in refineries. That said, on a micro level, I'm, astounded at the dis-connects at every step to fight this fire. 1) dis-similar fire threads and no adaptors 2) the fractured command [3} structure, 3) inability to communicate among the command structures 4) lack of initial recognition that the 'fog' may be something that needed to be investigated and passed to the OOD 5) TEXTING the Captain? Really? Texting the Captain of the ship? And, as your video shows, the list of screw-ups' goes on.
On a macro level, what is the USN doing about these things? We've seen ship collisions, maintenance deferrals, crew issues, (See George Washington CVN 73), what's going on with the USN? Too woke to be a "Global Force For Good" anymore? Can the USN really be the USN, or is it being turned into a woke yachting club.
Get ready if not already for the USN to go CYA on this one. Jag will put out long list of how well it went The officers will move on to other ships in the USN Then get a cushy over paid job with a defense contractor
I'm like you, but from the underground mining world. This is very informative. I can't get it through my head, when Sal said they handed the fire fighting effort command, over to Fed Fire???? It's a good thing I was sitting down watching this.
I agree about the complacency going on, WTH are they thinking with?
What You Haven’t Seen RUclips channel just posted -
Engine Fire Aboard Containership “President Eisenhower”.
Completely different scenario but as noted, fire is the most dangerous event on a ship. Worth a view.
What a cluster... I served on a ship during a major maintenance period and sometimes we had to take damage control equipment out of service. When we did, we made sure everyone in the duty section know what was available and what was not. We pre-planned our response on which fire stations we would use in certain parts of the ship if the one we would normally use was out of service. It sounds like there was complacency among the crew and the chain of command.
From my understanding, the AFFF & Fire Suspresion systems were off line as they were having different sections of piping replaced. Wnen I was at MCAS Yuma, [as a crash fire rescueman] we made sure our hoses worked with the base fire dept's hoses & trucks.
This fire has highlighted how unprepared America Ports are for a major fire....
If they can handle 1 ship on fire, then how bad will it be if China did a surprise attack.
Setting multiple ships on fire!
I had duty that day and was stationed on the BHR. Would love to talk with somebody that has a platform about the events leading up too during and after the fire. Great video!!
Email me at mercoglianosal@gmail.com
As a merchant mariner and career firefighter I appreciate your perspective and thanks for this conten
Great videos. My husband is a 60 year veteran of fire department. Was totally horrified at the sheer number of things that went wrong. I hope a few people learned something from this.
Wow. As a retired Air Force fighter pilot I've read and been involved in my share of investigations and accident reports. This is is huge.
Thank you for this great analysis!
Not at all familiar with your world, but find your analysis and channel fascinating. Thanks,
While I don't normally do shipyard work, I spent this winter working on a destroyer at Naval Station Everett. The Navy has learned their lesson, a temporary fire main was installed throughout the ship, fed by pumps on the pier. The crew drilled almost every day, with the base fire department & another ship often participating.
I would think that they would have tubrodraft available.
Our rural fire company has one on every pumper and tanker and a spare on our brush truck. A good operator can maintain better than 1000 gallons per minute when they are set up properly.
Volunteer fire fighter for 45 years of that cheif engineer for 15
5/5/22...excellent report Sal..unbelievable series of compounded problems...thx for analyzing this messy 'inside-the-Navy' fire fighting procedures on board ship. Hope investigation cleans up this situation & implements Navy wide.👍👍👍🧑🏭
Impressive piece of work. I live in San Diego and have serious contacts in & around the Navy here - it would be inappropriate for me to identify them. They remain privately angry, embarrassed - and deeply informed - by what happened. I am floored time & again by failures regards the fire response. Your report included several revelations that were truly breathtaking. I had to walk away from this video 3 separate times to cool off.
The smoke/air pollution impact of the BH fire was epic. It had regional impact across the Greater San Diego metro area for several days. That morning the fire erupted I thought there was a severe electrical fire somewhere near our home. I live 15 miles NE of Naval Station San Diego...
It took me a while to put this together. The last straw was the Navy report that they had adequate fireboat protection in their harbors.
Love your video, will leave a comment on part 2. What a great job so far!
New channel for me. Thanks Sam. Awesome content. Facts are important
During my shipyard period (1999) we always had to have temporary fire mains installed for every deactivated DC station. Maybe because it was a nuclear aircraft carrier (CVN 72) a lot of extra precautions were taken.
Really appreciate your walkthrough of the event.
PS - doubt radio communications would be usable once you entered the ship, past a certain point, given that the entire structure is made of metal.
Ships have repeaters all over the ship for the hydra radios
@@Joe-bm4wx - Thanks for the reference. Reading the brochure ware on this radio system it is light years ahead of what we had to work with when I was serving in USN. Will go back and read the report more closely and see what was said about radio system usage.
Sal,
I covered the stuff you talked about in this viedo yesterday at duty section turnover as I will continue to do. We spend way more time talking about force protection than fire response usually. I now believe that they are at-least equally important to cover on a regular basis. Thank you for your well-articulated knowledge and eye-opening commentary. This video is a great product that the Navy ought to utilize for training.
Sailed msc 5 years this is absolutely unacceptable readiness, day one I got fitted for a turn out gear, and every drill our locker was the first to have a team ready to attack the fire. Time is your enemy with a shipboard fire 👍 great work
Excellent reporting.
Awesome job on the breakdown of this fire!
I am a retired USCG BMC, & 15 years MM, Deck Officer. Wow, the incompetence, lack of coms & lack perpetration for this kind of emergency is staggering! Sad very sad!
On the water issue, is there a reason that sea water could not have been used?
My thoughts exactly! Why are you running hose back when you are standing over a virtually unlimited supply of water?
The ramp that goes from the welldeck to the hanger is a major design flaw...
The welldeck is filled with flammable liquids, fuel/hydraulic oil etc.
If you have a fire in the welldeck. That ramp become a giant chimney.
Drawing the heat and flames directly to the hanger!!
The hanger is filled with flammable liquids and explosives...
Also the on the side of the ramp are doors that lead to crew quarters, the medical bay.
This gives the fire even more opportunity to spread around the ship.
They need to redesign the ramp.
Otherwise this will happen again!
I have one word: wow !!!
Thanks for sharing, Sal
Ever since the NORMANDIE, and probably long before, the Navy has sought to divert blame for its mistakes for pierside fires on the city fire department.
Problems of incompatible Fire Hose Connections are not not a new problem. The Oakland Hills Fire Storm October 19 - 20 1991. Was a major problem with Mutual Aid from different cities and counties.
The OOD should have called the Ships Duty Fire Party away at 0810 and not Damage Control Center. The Command Duty Officer in my opinion did not do their job. The Bonhomme Richard had an obvious major housekeeping problem. The lack of adequate water for fighting fire should never have been allowed by the Ship's Crew. I look at this and I just shake my head.
Sal, Great report! Thanks for doing this. Having said that, I was a little lost during the ship geography section. In the future, it would be great if you could add a highlight or use a mouse pointer each time you refer to a location, especially when you say 'here' when making the reference. Looking forward to Part 2!
I know this is an old video, but in Navy boot camp we all watch the USS Forestall fire during DC/Fire Fighting week. John McCain speaks on the video. That SN who was on his way to get a snack fubared. Fire is the most dangerous and worst thing on board (as you mentioned Sal) and all-hands immediately. No matter how small or large. I spent most of my career as a Green-side Corpsman, very little time on ships, and I never forgot this!
Former DCA and naval officer in the 80s. I read the reports of the fire and now your recap. The phrase, "Monkey #$%*()^ a football" seems to come closest to describe what happened. This fire was not some giant conflagration when the crew had time and should have knocked it down. The fact the ship did not have an active fire main with stations set up for the yard period is appalling. When in shipyard for 14 months in Bremerton we had an entire temporary fire main and stations set up throughout the ship during this overhaul. This is a direct result of a command negligence afloat and ashore. It reflect extremely poorly on the state of the navy today. Now we cannot even stop Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. We are a joke.
Navy likes to find a scapegoat and stick with that target regardless of reality unless forced to look at reality.
I was in the Navy and got to see a few of their "investigations."
The timeline you have provided, and especially timelines along with the lack of knowledge of crew and command is staggering and the ships capacity to fight fire is a travesty. I’m glad someone is providing an non-filtered overview of the failure in operational readiness. Maybe it will lead to true change.
The Officer in Charge of Common Sense was on leave ?
You were right, you said reading the report page after page it kept getting worse. I thought how bad could it be, I was yelling at the TV when you said at 9:51 San Diego fire was first to get an attack going. Losing a capital ship at port. Unbelievable.
Great timeline and application of Incident Command System (ICS) failures. Looking forward to Part 2. Thank you.
I sure hope some people will be fired over this incompetent handling of this fire
I can only think amongst other things,the text message was one of the things of why a billion dollar ship was damaged beyond repair.
The many helicopters on North Island could provide a huge amount of water on the fire. But they provided nothing for a long time, apparently because nobody told the one or two squadrons that were trained in firefighting to respond. The squadrons have more things to do than they have time to do, so if you don't tell them to respond they will keep doing the things their boss wants them to do.
Agree for brush fires but a helicopter would only be dropping water on the flight deck which would just flow off the deck edge. If the fire was on top of the flight deck yes calling on helicopters would have helped
Im currently a BM with MSC, but during my time as an AB, i attended Advanced firefighting and damage control and sailed as Fire Marshal on AKEs and AOs. When i heard this fire was STILL out of control on the second day, i was shocked and all i could think about was how many things HAD to have been done incorrectly for that to happen.
Fast forward a couple of years and i was sailing AB(W) on the USS Miguel Keith, formally USNS and i had to do fire drills with the Navy Sailors on the ship.
After watching and participating in 3 drills, i walked off the 4th drill...
Making entry without checking temps
Lack of boundary cooling
Horrible communication between hose teams
Nonchalant attitudes from team leaders and repair locker leaders
Making entry from above a simulated fire
Slow response time
These were just SOME of the issues that i saw with their drills...
Seeing all those issues made me wonder how the HELL something like the BHR fire hadn't happened sooner!
My understanding was/is that they were just trying to cool the hull so it would keep its temper & control the spread of radiant heat through the hull to other portions of the ship. But is was too little & way too late
I read the material covering the US FORESTALL FIRE. I had did this as a result of McCain was getting a lot heat from that politically stating that he had started that fire. In fact in was again The US Navy allowing shortcuts to arm jets. But as a result of this the US Navy reinforced the need for every Sailor go through Fire Fighting Training, be assigned to a specific team, train on that team continuously to ensure that every sailor knows where he/she should report to in case of a fire.
As a Navy Veteran that was taught the hard learned lessons of the Enterprise and Forrestal fires. And a retired civilian firefighter. The number of red flags I was seeing while watching the fire and hearing the stories from the SDFD guys. It seems to me many of that ship’s company lacked the training the Navy gave me and the Federal guys seems to know what they were doing. As was noted they lacked the ability to interconnect hoses, lack of cross org communication, and common terms. It seems like the enter agency drills that I observed in the 80’s are no longer done?
This is so good Sal! How much are you going to charge the Navy for the analysis? It's worth good money! Bye the bye, all the C&C snafus are average for this scenario. Dockside just from refit. OOD? Who gets the duty? 3rd or 4th officer. The one that can't tie their shoes. "Surely they can't f. u. this up!" Wanna bet? The sailors too. They're on someone's list while the rest of the crew is on shore leave, baby sitting the construction crew. This is not the A Team. or B Team. Probably somewhere down around Q. So you no longer have a boat. Bravo!
An addressable fire alarm system's signal line circuit (SLC) uses 18/2 or 16/2 cable. You can run a lot of cable and get a robust temporary fire alarm system. Tie into a radio transmitter and you are covered.
watching through your back catalogue here Sal and my god that was an utter debacle from start to finish. allowing 87% of the fire stations to be out of service was ridiculous.
whoever called that evacuation got the timing just right and saved a lot of lives.
what a dogs breakfast. only cost a couple of billion dollars to the taxpayer
As a NAVY VET, this is a disgrace to the branch!! When I was on the USS Benfold, if you had duty, you had two drills!! One was a DC drill and the other was a topside drill. EVERYONE participated!! When we were in dry dock, junior sailors went to school. There also was a ships barge that the duty section slept in. The ships nomenclature in REPAIR LOCKER 5 (main locker) should've been in that locker in case a fire or flood occurred so you know how to set primary, secondary boundries, etc......
Why didn't anyone ring bells to muster the flying squad??!! There's so many issues wrong here, I can go on and on. Where was the sound and security watch? The topside rovers?? I mean nobody noticed something wrong?? THIS IS BULLSHIT!!!
The CO, XO, DCA, OOD, CPO's both on duty, CMC, CHENG should ALL BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE!! They're senior guys that have the knowledge and experience. Don't blame this shit on a junior guy. Not surprised but that's the NAVY TODAY!!! All political. This entire command knows it and it showed!!
i'm shocked at all of this. how in god's name have we allowed any of this to take place?!.
Love the LEGO Maersk!
7:10 as someone who has a relative who works in the Hampton shipyard’s I know what happens. Sailors get pissed off when they’ve been out for longer than they’re supposed to be. Then a few days out from port someone sets a fire so they get to go home while the ship is being repaired. He said you wouldn’t believe the stuff they’ll do to not go back out.
There is a profound applicable line from the classic movie "Cool Hand Luke" -- " What we have heah is failyuh to comm-un-i-cate."
Beat ya to it 3 days ago :-)
Good timeline and points taken. We could smell the smoke pretty good and it dulled the sun till the wind shifted. Even with the sad state of parts of our military this cluster of an operation is unbelievable. This is a top-down issue. The system is broken and needs some major repairs. It's a shame to see a ship go down this way. Part two should be a real bloodbath.
I am old enough to remember in my time in the Navy a captain was able to direct damage control while keeping the ship afloat returning hostile fire and maintaining headway at sea with no help in sight. Remember after the Oriskany fire everyone on carriers had to go to firefighting school. Were ships officers better in my time?
Sam, Really enjoyed this analysis. Much reminds me of the circumstances of the loss of French Line Normandie/USS Lafayette on 9 February 1942 -incompatibility with fire hydrants, on board fire station, fire boats, lack of coordination etc. Just crazy.
S Payne Designer Cunard Queen Mary 2
Very interesting. As with most major disasters, there was an entire chain of decisions, events and failings that contributed to this loss.
This is unbelievable. The navy of the country that criticised and ridiculed French firefighters for failing to extinguish the fire at the Notre Dame in Paris, the navy that excelled in damage control management at the Battle of Midway manages to lose a ship at the pier in the middle of a naval base.
Once upon a time there was a comic book called "Howard the Duck". And Howard kept getting in difficult situations. During one, at the end of the page, Howard looks up at the audience and asks "Have you noticed that each page ends up worse than the one before?" That about sums it up.
Extremely educational. The long pants grew to short pants and are coming back for a hard look. Well I wonder what changes on the different scales and levels are needed?
I didn't realize there had been an explosion. Thanks for sharing this.
I have enjoyed your videos. Especially this one. I work in Telecom in RTP and have been working on a communication system for the Fireman, Police and EMTs. I would enjoy talking with you on it. Having incompatible radios is one of the requirements we are looking to fix across the nation.
The date of the fire and dates of action of original GoodHomey are interesting!!!
Another interesting fire was on carrier GW. Met Dea ship on way to Japan... Fire blamed on lubricant. Carrier captain and xo punted, ship back to port... Dea had just come from Cartagena...
"I have not yet begun to fight!" that certainly rang true - will they build another namesake? $1,600,000,000 to replace,but the unit cost and availability expense is additional to a replacement.