they removed a captain of an aircraft carrier over his expressing his worries of readiness with a covid outbreak but not a captain for basically letting his ship burn to the ground how fitting of the navy sure sounds like a bunch of heads should roll IMO
@@GaniscolI agree, at some point the issue is systemic and then the “system” reacts to protect itself. It’s rare for leaders to admit that they were allowing people below them to run amok because they liked the results they were getting until they got burned.
As an armchair expert, the arson is the most understandable part of this. Everything else is what astonished me. The ship should never have been lost. A competent response, particularly from the ships crew should have been sufficient.
Arson is actually the least understandable part of this. Fires on board ships are not uncommon, however we usually catch them before they're very big. The most likely cause in this case is either "hot work" being conducted without a proper fire watch, or spontaneous combustion caused by improper disposal of oily rags. Placing blame on a "disgruntled" junior enlisted sailor is standard practice for naval officers hoping to protect their careers. In the 80's, they did the same thing with the USS Iowa explosion. In that case, they claimed it was caused by a suicidal junior enlisted man over a failed homosexual relationship. Yes, they not only blamed a dead man, but then felt the need to slander him as well.
@T.J. Kong See also McCain, Fitzgerald. The USN's (surface) officer corps is very poorly trained and not ready for any sort of mishap or difficult event/maneuver.
@T.J. Kong Because you can't know what happened to Moskva, but are just a simple troll, feel free to keep your large, yet empty opinion's to yourself. The only thing known about Moskva is, everything Ukropnazis claim is a lie.
@T.J. Kong They're been entirely too much smug commentary from Americans about how badly the Russians have done, when it's clear from so many bits of evidence that have accumulated over the last decade plus that the US military would not do any better fighting a modernized opponent
Sounds like the E-1 is a scapegoat for the institutional problems within the Navy and also the affiliated command structure as well. However, it could still very much be arson, but it sounds like command is taking the full opportunity to not take accountability and instead attempt to point fingers and blame others for their own failure.
The evidence that the disgruntled E1 started the fire barely exists. He was seen in the area by several witnesses, which means those witnesses were also in the area and also could have started the fire. Careless storage of flammable materials is also an entirely plausible cause of the fire.
Sal your 100% on point. You did an excellent job, glad you got it out of your system. As a 32 year veteran firefighter I am exasperated at the apathy and complacency of what you read. I am sure there are many good people in the Navy, but this was just unbelievable. My hope is many good lessons have been learned. So we need to start a go fund me for the rank and file in San Diego to get the adapters they need? I know the boots in the ground would make good use of them despite the incompetent leaders who failed to get those things done ahead of time.
"My hope is many good lessons have been learned". From what we've heard here, and given that no accountability has been taken by those in command at the time of the incident, I rather suspect that no good lessons have been learned.
Just been watching film clips of firefighters on aircraft carriers being attacked by kamikaze pilots in ww2. Incredibly well organised and brave. How has the US navy come to this?
The US Navy care about a lot of things and focuses the ships captains on those. Ask yourself what are the priorities of the US Navy. Where does firefighting (or winning naval battles) appear in Secretary of the Navy's Strategic Guidance? media.defense.gov/2020/May/18/2002301998/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT_OF_THE_NAVY_STRATEGIC_GUIDANCE_FY2020.PDF
Well maybe what can be said is for the past 20 years or more, a lot of general purpose skills have been slowly trivialized and dumbed down over the years. And yes, in some ways, some of these skills and abilities were dumbed down and put down as "not important" and trivial so as to allow "inclusive" and not require the high standards that normally be required.
Snowflake children will grow up without ever having the experience of a spanking when doing wrong. There is your answer to your question about the difference between WW2 sailors and what we have now. In a nutshell.
There is a strange irony. During the Forrestal fire. That taught the Navy so much about fire and damage control. One of the ships that came to her rescue that day was the Bonhomme Richard LHD-6’s predecessor the Bonhomme Richard CV-31
Years ago, when I was in the Navy during the Clinton years, I asked a fellow Senior Enlisted "What's it gonna take for the Navy to recognize the gross incompetence in the officer and enlisted ranks?" He answered, "A ship will have to catch fire and sink at the pier!" That has now happened. And the Navy STILL doesn't get it! Glad I'm retired
Hold on to hair Sal You know it's amazing that the Navy wants to blame the lowest guy on the totem pole regardless of the circumstances. In a way they should thank him for exposing the cluster f***k that was this ship, and probably other ships in the Navy. The guys at the top( CO and XO ) should be taking the blame for this.
How does this video only have 17k views, should have at least 1.5M. As a retired airwing sailor, all I can say about this fire is what a colossal Charlie Foxtrot.
When the US Navy went to the shipyard during 1960's and 1970's there was a always many training sessions and fire protection preparation. We went to fire fighting schools, site training, practiced and practiced and practiced again. We had fires during every overhaul mostly caused by welders. We had someone with equipment nearby at the work site when welders were working. Every fire was out and investigation started within 15 minutes. What is going on today??? It sounds like there is little safety protocol and training.
@@BrianFullerton Both. The USS Canberra CAG-2 was twice during the early 1960's in Portsmouth and the USS Jouett CG-29 was after during the early 1970's in Long Beach. The Canberra was once in drydock and the Jouett was once in drydock. The USS Dahlgren DLG-12 was also in Portsmouth in the 1960's, but not in drydock. It seems the Navy learns and forgets.
What ever happened to the Captain going down with the ship, at least metaphorically? It is similar to other aspects of our society and government where there is plenty of accountability for the little guy, but none for the big guy. If a corporation pollutes and poisons a bunch of people to death, the CEO will likely walk. If you put rat poison in your neighbors coffee, you are going to jail. If your administration invades a country that leads to a million people dying, no consiquences for the president or secretary of state. It seems like if this were WWII or ancient Rome, some people would have fallen on their swords. Everybody wants the prestige and big bucks, but nobody wants the full responsibility. That's my rant. Well done Sal
Sal, Once again you are right on point. In my mind the CO, XO and OOD should all have had their careers ended. They lost their ship, not in combat but, when tied to the pier. The fact that 87% of the fire fighting system was unavailable is incomprehensible. I guarantee that when the ship was at the shipyard NASSCO had fire manifolds and hoses set up throughout the ship. It most certainly was a contractual obligation for NASSCO to provide fire protection. If 87% of the fire stations were out the CO should have asked NASSCO to keep their equipment onboard when the ship moved to yhe Navy pier. I am sure that NASSCO would have found a way to help their best customer. The Bonhomme Richard has two engine rooms. My guess is each engine room has at least two fire pumps, one steam driven and one electric. The electric pumps are most likely driven off emergency switchboards, which are powered by emergency diesel generators. Even if the ship's power was secured the emergency switchboards should have been supplied by shore power. The CO should have been disciplined by the Navy for leaving the ship without 87% of it's fire fighting ability. He should have been court-martialed if there was no water for the remaining fire fighting capabilities. If the pumps were unavailable, other provisions should have been made. Having not made provisions for fire fighting water is a dereliction of duty. Another issue that seems to not have been addressed is why there so much combustible material onboard? It is understood they were in a shipyard type situation. But, with reduced fire fighting capabilities why wasn't there a greater effort to control combustibles? Obstructing the closure of fire doors is a problem, but why wasn't an effort made to limit the ability of fire to spread? The fire triangle includes air, an ignition source and fuel. You can't limit air. The ignition source in this case was, supposedly, arson. The only controllable part of the triangle was fuel. Why wasn't it controlled? I have always had a pet peeve when it comes to cabling and hoses being run through access ways in shipyard. First, it prevents doors from closing. Second, it obstructs safe passage. Third, it increases the likelihood of damage to cabling and hoses. Fourth, with time multiple cables get run for the same job and clutter gets out of control. Provisions should be made both for personnel passage and for separate runs of cables and hoses. Doors and hatches can then be closed. While openings for cables and hoses can't be closed, the areas of the openings can be greatly reduced. One shipyard I was in averaged at least one fire a day due to damaged cables or hoses left in doorways and hatches. There is no question that fireboats are needed in every port that wants to handle cargo snd passengers. Safe operation demands equipment and personnel that are trained in ship firefighting. However, simple common sense is needed to command a vessel and to run a port. In the case of the Bonhomme Richard, the US Navy and it's officers showed a complete lack of simple common sense. It is a miracle no one was seriously hurt. Bob
Sal, I think your analysis of this is spot on. It's clear to me, and I hope is clear to every other viewer, that you are being tough on the Navy because you know how good our Navy can, should, and most be. The USN was once the envy of the world in terms of Damage Control practices. It seems incomprehensible that as we focus again on near-peer naval conflict, that the USN lost a capital ship on the pier side due to a comedy of errors. You are completely right. The Navy needs to clean house, get empty uniforms out of the way, and make room for those more junior seaman and officers that will actually do the job.
How that Captain isn't being court-martialed, along with whomever was involved in FALSIFYING maintenance records is completely beyond me. I said on the last one this was different than the "Swiss Cheese" model of failure, where any one little thing not lining up just a certain way will stop the disaster? This seems more and more like several different interstate highways being paved in parallel as alternate routes to ensure a disaster took place. I also think I'm going to call BS on the idea that a lack of fireboats didn't make a difference.
Sal, Tremendous video and commentary. We live in a society which desires everyone to comes in 1st place. The losers in this comedy of errors are the tax payers. At a cost of $750 million, this fire was an expensive learning curve for the top brass. True leadership is very difficult to find. Thank you!🇺🇸
Sal: You are wrong! I liked the video! I'm not a nobody! I watched both of the videos and I liked the fact that you went into detail about your qualifications as a mariner, a Navy veteran, and a fire fighter. I used the Forrestal fire as the basis for a safety training day for a group of CAP cadets. It's like nothing was learned. A chain of events had to happen to create the conditions for this fire to happen. I understand why you are so fired up about this. We lost a major vessel worth over a billion dollars because of these errors. I hope you make a third video about what the Navy does to address this and prevent it from happening again. Is anything happening? Or are they going to court martial the E1 with a weak case and lose? Thank you for making this video. The point you make needed to be made~!
I remember in boot camp them showing that video of the Forrestal that was quite different than this, that was a long time ago I saw it but didn't they have armed jets on the deck I thought they were doing missions into Vietnam and the fire broke out down in one of those lift decks I don't remember what caused it
@@jaymortensen642 appx 40 yeas since I saw the film. I remember it and more details from added reports. Preparing a group of aircraft to launch an air to ground attack, with fighter cover John McCain was in one of the jets preparing to be launched, almost ready to start engine. One of the fighters across the deck from McCain had an uncommanded missile launch (nobody in cockpit of that airplane at the time) The missile hit a plane appx 2 spots over from McCain's (also not occupied at the time) severely damaging the aircraft and setting it on fire. Jet fuel flowing from that airplanes tanks spreading over the deck, under other aircraft that are fully fueled and armed for an attack mission. (bombs, rockets... fuel) A sailor helps McCain out of his aircraft and away to safety as the fire is spreading under that aircraft. A senior Chief runs toward the fire with a large CO2 extinguisher immediately attacking the fire. (too small.. not enough but he possibly bought a few seconds for others to respond.) A 2000 lb bomb "cooks off' from the heat, throwing an airplane up and almost flipping it. The explosion takes out the Senior Chief and a few others who were starting to bring fire hoses. And it goes downhill from there very fast... Burning jet fuel and bombs rolling in through the hole blown in the flight deck. Uncoordinated attacks on the fire with both water and foam at the same time, with the water washing the foam away and fire burning on top of the water (fuel) spreading the fire rapidly. We almost lost that ship. Many sailors dead. Many aircraft destroyed. Many explosions... Fire spread from flight deck to the lowest decks of the ship. Almost 1/5 of the ship's interior damaged. (but they did get the watertight doors shut and stopped it from spreading further forward... eventually) If not for the active Vietnam War, the ship likely would have been scrapped.
@@fhuber7507 It was 40 years ago I saw it too but thanks for that recap I thought that it was something like that I think they said it was maybe a carrier that had a blacktopped wooden deck too and the oil soaked wood caught fire also. I don't remember them saying McCaine was on there but in 1982 maybe it was not as big a thing, Thanks again for the recap
As an E1 Air Traffic Controller aboard the Essex (LHD-2) I knew how to fight a fire. It was hammered into us every single day. I wasn’t in the Engineering department, wasn’t a member of a damage control party or repair locker. I was just a brand new sailor in Operations who’s Captain cared enough about his crew to LEAD and TRAIN us to man a warship properly. That 19 year old kid hated donning an FFE every three days for a two hour Main Space fire drill but looking back I now understand why we did it.
I just finished watching these two videos. I found out about these videos from a forum for Chief Petty Officers. I share your frustrations. I wish I had a dollar for every wtf moment in these two videos. I am a retired Master Chief. I served for over 30+. I have had extensive shipboard FF experience. I was part of the Damage Control Training Team on my last two ships. both of them LPD's. There needs to be a lot more folks held responsible for this that that SN. This disaster in my mind was totally preventable in my mind. Of the many many things that boggled my mind, two of them stood out. The first was the CDO text messaging the CO/XO. The other was lack of firemain on the pier. I was stationed out of San Diego for 70's. I remember firemain risers on the pier, that we could hook up to risers on the ship to receive firemain from the pier. WTF happened? Outstanding analysis in my opinion. BTW OBA's were still in use when I retired.
Unbelievable. As an HT 2 (Damage Controlmen) from the late 70’s, I find the lack on “On scene response “ incredible. Where is the training in todays navy. It is basic stuff. Good thing this did not happen at sea because you would have multiple fatalities. The navy needs to get its head out it ass and get back to basics.
This is an OUTSTANDING analysis! Totally understand that you are not criticizing but examining the environment/factors that contributed to losing the ship. Thank you for doing it!
To be clear, at 50k GPM, you can supply at least (16) 5" hoses, down the pier, on the ramp, etc. Depending on lift and friction. Even if you don't have the fire boat manifolds, you can pump from a boat to portable draft tanks and then use the engines to supply the hoses down the pier (rural water supply style) until someone makes the manifold. Multi day event here...with people that want to help. And pipefitting, welding and machine shops surrounding the event...
Half day event, were there an incident commander directing resources to work together. Three or more potential rapid attack options, to prevent a larger mess. That much water is potentially 10 million kilocalories a minute of heat dissipation, during a peak period of conversion to steam.
The media were amused that the Russians would rather blame an accidental fire and incompetent damage control for the loss of the Moskva than admit it was due to enemy action. Here's the US showing you how it's done folks.
All of those 36 in the report need to be sacked out of the Navy. That a lowly E1 is the only one on the hook says this is a political coverup. It's almost as if they wanted to lose the ship. There is utterly no excuse for what happened here. None. Every major incident reads like this, military or not. But this has to be one of the worst examples of systematic command failure I've read in a long while.
So this ship was in shambles. The Big Question : How many others? Is The Navy calling these ships "Combat Effective " if so WHO is signing off on that bullshit? They need to be relieved.
As a NAVY VET, this is a disgrace to the branch!! When I was on the USS Benfold, if you had duty, you had two drills!! One was a DC drill and the other was a topside drill. EVERYONE participated!! When we were in dry dock, junior sailors went to school. There also was a ships barge that the duty section slept in. The ships nomenclature in REPAIR LOCKER 5 (main locker) should've been in that locker in case a fire or flood occurred so you know how to set primary, secondary boundries, etc...... Why didn't anyone ring bells to muster the flying squad??!! There's so many issues wrong here, I can go on and on. Where was the sound and security watch? The topside rovers?? I mean nobody noticed something wrong?? THIS IS BULLSHIT!!! The CO, XO, DCA, OOD, CPO's both on duty, CMC, CHENG should ALL BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE!! They're senior guys that have the knowledge and experience. Don't blame this shit on a junior guy. Not surprised but that's the NAVY TODAY!!! All political. This entire command knows it and it showed!!
I really hope the Navy guys watches this and your part 1 as a 3rd party guy who has the experience to know what he is talking about, as your passion shows for sure about how things broke down. Start at the top first and work down. 👍
Again, as a former DC man....the utter failure of leadership in the Damage Control Division is incredible. Utterly incredible. Every E-5 and above in that Division should be drummed out for FAILURE to even do the MINIMUM to help their Ship. I'm sad for that Rate.
Sal, excellent analysis! You are absolutely, 100% correct! Your justifiable outrage is clear, and I really can’t add anything other than my whole hearted support. My feelings are the same as yours. The entire chain of command on BONHOLM RICHARD must be held accountable for the loss of the ship, in peacetime, at the dock. Your comments regarding fireboats are accurate. The same issue has been argued in New London for decades. With the Sun base, Electric Boat, Oil docks, and Pfizer fire boats are crucial to fight a major fire in New London, yet the city of New London and the city of Groton have repeatedly argued that they should not bear the responsibility and that the Navy should maintain fireboats there. The only marine capability that the Navy has are the YTB yard tugs that have limited firefighting capability. That whole fire should be a major wake-up call to the Navy. To say that the crew would have managed a fire at sea, is absurd. They would have lost both the ship and crew lives as well. The decision to remove shore power from the ship ultimately assured the loss of the ship. Had sufficient water been available to fight the fire, it’s likely that the ship would have been flooded and sunk by the inability to get water off of the vessel. The ship probably would have rolled over as the NORMANDIE did in New York when she burned at the dock. NAVESEA needs to address all of these firefighting and damage control issues because they show an alarming lack of readiness throughout the fleet.
There is a very logical reason for there to be an admiral on seen and ultimately in charge of the action. The admiral is rapidly deployed to protect Sec Nav and the Chair of DOD from the flying burning shit. If there were TRUE ACCOUTABILITY in the capitol, BOTH of these persons would be taken out of there place of responsibility and deposited one in the highest Navy Brig and the other in the highest Federal Penitentiary. This is not directly because they were responsible for the Bon Homme Richard tragedy, which they were because it occurred one their Watch, but far more importantly, because they are responsible for the CULTURE of the NAVY and that is what is broken and caused the tragedy of the fire.
Having served on both subs and surface ships, when I got too my first surface ship it amazed me that I wasn't allowed to put out a trash can fire because I wasn't on damage control party. So all the frustrations you are voicing have been going on for decades. The CO was likely one of the navy's golden child on his way to becoming a CVN CO. The BHR is considered a deep draft command.
@@michelenovack575 I was a nuke EM1SS and after getting seriously ill was removed from both subs and had nuke pulled. Once I was made available for full duty, I was assigned to LPD12. The CO was an aviator who had then completed nuclear power school. The LPD was the next step in his path to carrier CO, The CVN COs are commonly aviators qwho follow this career path. At least that was the case in 1994.
I'm not an American, so I don't have the right to tell you what to do. But it's sad to see that failed leadership is still as common as the lack of common sense when it comes to this fire, and the damage that's still being done do the lack accountability. Thanks Sal for the video.
Thank you for this Video! It's fantastic coverage that I haven't seen anywhere else. It's truly amazing how this tragedy should have been avoided with any amount of competency and how no one really responsible for the massive failure at near all levels has had any real punishments
It would be fascinating to know the results if tomorrow, a team of individuals (with authorisation) were to enter a navy ship in all ports at 3AM, walk round the ship, and find a reasonable area for a fire to start, before setting off smoke/... simulants and announcing a drill. Then judging if the response is sufficient to extinguish the fire. (one per port not one per ship so as to not overwhelm local respons)
Former school llbrarian. I'd read of a school in which, during a fire drill, the principas placed a smoke bomb in his wastebasket. Suggested the idea to my principal, he wasn't interested. Thing is in all previous drills everything went well, but when the kids smelled smoke they PANICKED AND RAN IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS. I still think it's a good idea.
Actually, there was sort of. The original Seal Team #6 under Cmdr Richard Marchinco was tasked to sneak in Navy & Marine Corps bases & cause havoc & leave without being caught. Just to test the safety & security measures put into place. Everywhere they did go & pulled off their "bag of tricks" that place failed miserably. they even stole a nuke weapon from a sub.
@@veramae4098 A downside to the emergency drills is that the drill becomes a routine event and the emergency still causes paralysis. This isn't a great example, but driving a truck I have driven by runaway vehicle ramps a few thousand times. I've considered using one a time or two when the brakes were smoking and I was still going faster than I wanted. I always decided to stay on the highway and manage the speed the best I could......because the ramps are there for the REAL emergency. The mental process guiding us through emergencies with the comfort that there is no danger doesn't build the brain synapses to form a connection to a real event.
The frustration is understandable. And its always great to hear the solution, whether the fireboats get aquired or not is unknown. 10 millions to safeguard billions sounds like a value.
Sal. I am not navy, not a firefighter, but I have training in threat and risk management, constructing drills, rural and mountain SAR, and communications. I was almost chewing the carpet on the issues I saw. I am not familiar with some of the terms - your commentary helped. But. To have 14 failed drills with no remediation, to not coordinate, to not use critical elements that were available, air supply, sources of water, etc., to not have the adapters. How can this happen short of incompetence gone to seed? I worked in Caterpillar mfg and parts plants. Emergency equipment, hoses, extinguishers, etc. were checked monthly and fixed if not functioning. I was an office computer programmer. I got extinguisher training periodically. As a supervisor I was trained in employee accountability. I cannot understand the lack op preparation, the seeming lack of concern and the lack of carrying out effective actions. Even I would have known you don't fight a fire from above. Put another way, with a different skillset, a different perspective, I can but support your conclusions, this was a collection of SNAFUs that started long before the fire.
Great video, Sal thanks for this. Would be great if you could do more like these. Plenty of RUclipsrs doing videos on air accidents - I think there is a market for similar with maritime accidents and no better man to talk us through and explain maritime accident reports and what we can learn from them.
As a veteran (1976-80 US Army) I am deeply saddened but not at all surprised by the information you have made public here. As a father of two Navy junior officers about to embark on their first sea tours, destroyer and sub, I can only hope and pray that the US Navy has learned difficult and expensive leasons from this fire. The US military is a large, slow, bureaucratic organization that is slow to learn, slow to improve, and slow to excel in anything out of the ordinary. It takes wartime conditions or large diasters like this for people to get the proper focus to operate "as it should" done. I know this is getting even further out of your area of normal reporting but I would really like to find out more about the current conditions on the aircraft carrier George Washington.
Sir,,, May the God who watched over my four years in the Navy(mid 60's) watch over your boys, and keep them safe, it was an honor to serve,,,,,but those in charge today know nothing about honor..
I feel your frustration immensely. I am a retired damage controlman its like they made every mistake possible. The navy has emergency pumps for fire water p100 and also emergency gas powered compressor for scba but from what ive seen they probably dont work or no one onboard knew to use them or operate them. This blows my mind they had to of been gundecking the shit out of maintenance every fire fighting system has maintenance checks. Jesus back in 2010 i had weekly checks on every scba bottle i would walk the entire ship to make sure they were all in the green. I'm just glad no sailors were lost.
Sal, I'm an Australian who left T.V. on U-Tube and caught both episodes of Lose of Helicopter vessel. Your anger drew me in.Mate, how can you lose a vessel in Port to FIRE? As you got into, I, too, got angry 😠. WHY?May I recommend you do another episode but based on the loss of readiness, lose treasure (MONETARY) considerations, highlighting the incompetence of officers in change, and the scapegoat of the apprenticeship sailor! DO YOUR WORST SAL.Keep up good work!!! 👍
Hi Sal, i'm a officer on LNG tankers and one of my responisibilitys is the FIFI equipment and leading one of the 2 teams on board. It is stunning to hear how the US Navy handles (acceptable) risks. Let alone switching off systems without backup plans! It's crazy to hear this story.
Watched your Bonhomme Richard video. Interesting. I have 3 comments. - Years ago when I (a young Coastie) checked commercial ships for compliance with various requirements, there was a requirement for an “International Shore Connection”. I believe it was a SOLAS requirement. I was surprised to hear from you that a U.S. Navy ship didn’t have something like that. - Lack of comms ability among various organizations. I’m not surprised. Over 40 years ago the USCG was aware of that problem during oil spill responses. CG HQ provided me with a bunch of radios all on a common frequency to loan out to the contractor(s), the state EPA, etc. for use during a response so we could reach each other. Not a perfect answer but it worked. - Mind set. When the ship’s personnel train for what to do IF there is a fire that is different than when they train for WHEN there is a fire. “IF” relates to an unlikely event. “WHEN” relates to something you are going to experience someday so you better be ready.
Way back in the dark ages, I was on-board a ship that was doing a drill. A painter asked me if they could get off, so I asked the control center if they could get him off as a ‘radiological victim’. Since that was not part of the drill, this was not accepted by the control center but it nearly gave them a heart attack. How dare that something not on the script happen.
Great video Sal; no apologies needed nor, should anyone expect one from you. Although I will observe one word was missing from you excellent review of this report - Complacency. I was really intrigued by your little personal introduction at the beginning of this pair of videos. You certainly deserve/earned the right to have your voice heard in the debate over this debacle. I'll put on my old uniform cap to salute you from this side of the pond Sal.
I did 20 years in the Navy, 14 of them on board ships. During that time, and through hundreds of shipboard fire drills, we never drilled with the base fire department. I assume that the CDO, OOD and EDO on BHR had no idea of how to interface with the civilian fire fighters either. This lack of clarity would have the effect of paralyzing the entire fire fighting effort. Problem is, the civilians are paid by the hour and they are unavailable to do their jobs when in training--thus it costs money to run drills. You get what you pay for.
Great report, both parts 1 and 2. I hope some crafty lawyer firm takes on the defense of the sailor charged with this fire. And just rips into the multiple faults of the higher-ups in the navy command structure. Let us see a program on this man. And what is an E1 sailor doing on any ship? There is a great story here. And, yes, why is the ship captain still in the navy and not criminally charged?
An excellent synopsis of the response to the ship fire. You have reported a far sight more than the news media ever did. Unfortunately, the lowest man on the totem pole of rank, assumes the responsibility of what seems to be the lack of oversight, from those in command, into the ship's readiness to fight what was at first a simple fire.
Just watching the video makes my blood boil. Every Admiral that touched this incident should have been called to task at a minimum. Additionally, the Captain is ALWAYS responsible for EVERYTHING that happens to his ship. He should be court martialed (keep in mind that the Court is also a fact finding entity and the Captain doesn't nessasarily need to get punished but from the looks of it he should be packing his bags and exiting stage left ASAP). The Navy looks to be in full CYA mode. Disgraceful. Nimitz and King are turning in their graves.
Really enjoyed the in depth and detailed analyses by a fire fighting expert. I remember at the time of the event thinking WTH at every fresh update. Points to huge problems that must be addressed!
As a former LHD DCA (BATAAN), thank you for the in-depth review. I am as disgusted and appalled by this incident as you were. So much culpability to go around.
After 33 years in various volunteer fire departments, I am proud that we never had a situation like this, where no one had an idea how to perform a size up and initial attack.
I have read many of the CO2 extinguishers had been discharged and not tagged for refill with full ones not being placed in the ready positions. This was done by crew members playing games with them. Criminal actions were unchecked on the ship.
Sal, Thanks it’s a Great report! I’ve been a commercial & Marad ship Captain and I have had bad ship fires. Your discussion is very good and I believe well intended for everyone to learn from these deadly mistakes. There is obviously a terrible command understanding & outrageously poor training involved here. In addition to equipment failures, mistakes by responsible persons must be identified to prevent this from being repeated on another ship. If true, having falsified and missing documents are attempts to have a cover up of facts.
This kind of event provides generational motivation for training excellence at all levels. As you have noted, the initial fire events of WW2 prompted improved procedures and training that saved future vessels. This even provides more contemporary evidence that training diligence is still needed, even in peacetime. My fear is the navy will try to whitewash this event and not use it as an example to train on. The monetary loss of this ship has to be $1.5 B or more, but thankfully, no lives were lost. Hopefully, no one was seriously injured or will suffer from long term disability. All the best.
Thanks Sal. This 2 part video was very informative. As a layman, I believe the Command Officer/Crew has the primary responsibility to coordinate all fire response. The ships crew would have the best knowledge of where the fire started and how to get there.
Sal, First, don't worry about sounding as if you're ranting. Given the nature of this event, everyone should be ranting. Second, the rant is because this is the U.S. Navy! We expect the U.S. Navy to be the best and show the world the professionalism they train for. I live near the Severn River in Maryland. Several years ago a house caught fire. We have no public water, just wells. Hence, no fire hydrants. They dropped a hose down to a waiting vessel in the river and pumped water up (maybe 60 ft vertical) to fight the fire. Many homes around the Severn have no public water. Not as complex as this fire, true, but you still get the idea they knew what they were doing. Keep the ranting up please. We expect our U.S. Navy to do it right.
Sal, both of your commentaries are in 100% agreement with my experience as both a firefighter/chief in a combination department and as a senior civilian with the U.S. Navy - shipyard, major headquarters, and systems command. The document on fireboats illustrated the ignorance and the Navy's inability to fully understand the capabilities of fireboats. The most astounding aspect of this fire is the delay in getting any firefighting agent on the fire. Any firefighter knows the criticality of speedy application of agent at the seat of the fire. Great webinars.
Thanks for your videos about ship. Where were the Commanders? They should have been the persons charged for the lost of the ship, lack of training and inspection of equipment by their personnel. Thanks again for the education of this incident.
Sal both videos are extremely well done. IMO your not armchair quarterbacking. You have spent an enormous amount of time researching this along with countless hours of reading a fire report to give us the insight to exactly how 36 individuals lost a national defense asset critical to the defense of this country and severely limiting our capabilities to defend our interests abroad. The Navy brass will use the E1 as the scapegoat and hold no one else accountable for there udder complete failure in leadership. I would have been even harsher in my assessment of the 36 individuals that all be court martial and convicted, sentenced, and dishonorable discharged from the Navy. No retirement to avoid persecution. But the udder lack of leadership at the top of the Navy is extremely disheartening. Lack of coordination with out side agencies and an overall lack of knowledge is mind numbing. These Navy Officers and Chiefs are solely responsible for the training and preparedness of the crew and have failed all levels. Readiness even in time of maintenance needs to be kept at a high standard. Hoping and praying there isn’t a fire on board during a maintenance is piss poor example of leadership. Last comment and who is the ultimate loser in this The American Tax Payer who will once again have to foot the bill for udder incompetence without consequences for failed leadership form the Senior Brass to include the Secretary of The Navy.
To be clear, my husband and I both served in the Navy. We were both 4.0 sailors. He served eight years in the 1980s and fought in Beruit. I served eight years in the 1980s-90s and fought in Desert Storm. We know the Navy.
Saw the fire from I-5. Later when returning, I exited to Harbor Dr. and stood there taking video on my phone. Yep, the fire spewed black smoke, then white as water hit it, then black again as the fire spread. The whole county stunk of burnt plastic for two days.
Is this a failure in training and preparedness across naval operations, or an isolated case? Heads should roll bottom up to the level of failure. How did a ship with so many inoperable fire stations not have secondary means in place to fight a fire? Mutual aid training should a must occur.
The JAG report Sal is quoted recommended court martialling 30+ officers and senior NCO's, including about half a dozen admirals (most or all of whom retired shortly after the fire, presumably hoping to evade accountability). I can only guess that high command are quashing legal action because they know their own negligence will be brought to light by competent defense lawyers in a trial.
@@Dennis-vh8tz thanks for pointing that info out. I can’t help but think it should not stop until it reaches the top. The fact it didn’t, means it will likely continue.
Not isolated. The khakis in the surface Navy (chiefs/CPO and officers) are not very good. Training is poor, morale is very poor among the sailors (see George Washington), it's almost a surprise stuff like this isn't happening more regularly.
Great report Sal. About 11:29 you speak about using water sucked from San Diego Bay to fight the fire. I have been told by several different fire fighters (Northern Cal.) :We do NOT like using suction pumps to draw water out of Lakes , Creeks/Rivers or Bays. The only answer that they gave me was that the fire pump might be damaged. (happened during the Oakland Hills fire 1991). All of the Pumpers that I have seen in our area do have Suction Hoses and Strainer Filters. ]Note San Francisco is different: SFFD does have Bay riser pipes systems and massive bay water pumping system for fighting fires all over the city.
..." afraid pump might be damaged." In this instance on site risk assessment of $1.5 billion vessel at risk vs risk to pump engine...here's my credit card, hook up the damn pumps NOW!
@@sailorgabbie oh they have strainers. Some have really fancy filters. Except for the city and County of San Francisco fire agencies around here just don’t like siphoning water. And I have no idea why
@@thechancellor3715 well that’s my opinion also. When we had a great Oakland Hills fire there was a small lake right near Highway 24 that was in between the fire. This lake was accessible by firetrucks. When I asked why the lake wasn’t pumped to fight the fire 🔥, A captain at the Oakland fire department told me we were afraid we damaged the pump. There were thousands of homes well over $1 million piece scattered around the area who cares about the pump.
@@edshelden7590 Living in an wide spread dense suburban area with many volunteer FD that have constant donation drives I can understand them keeping a tight watch on expenses in order to keep their jobs....nonetheless when faced with such a monumental loss that attitude needs to be thrown out and just get on with the job with all available resources. Firefighters courage is unquestioned but it's hard to buck the Chief or Fire Marshall at times.
Ex-bubblehead here, the CT was loaded with blazed logs and unsafe maneuvering practices in NAV Dept. Though in one of the USNI articles the CDO had remarked on the DC problems some time before to the upper command level and had been ignored (one of the mitigating circumstances in his court-martial). Also, per USNI the CO and XO did not even assume command. The Operations Officer had to independently step up. Otherwise, I think you nailed it. SDFD seemed to be the only ones with a clue. Final thought, the Miami died for nothing.
The crew of Connecticut knew of the uncharted mount. They were warned about it 24 hours before the hit. The CO also had crashed the boat before in San Diego at the pier. The sacking was 100% justified.
Falsifying reports sounds par for the course. My buddies were always dealing with broken things that the command demanded be fixed. so they just marked them as fixed.
It's not just the Officers lack of leadership, it's also the Chiefs.
they removed a captain of an aircraft carrier over his expressing his worries of readiness with a covid outbreak but not a captain for basically letting his ship burn to the ground how fitting of the navy sure sounds like a bunch of heads should roll IMO
Ya makes me wonder who the co is connected with/ related to at pentagon or white house
Sometimes the failure is so big and widespread that too many heads would roll and therefore no heads roll. Self preservation mentality.
Love the episode your spot on
@@GaniscolI agree, at some point the issue is systemic and then the “system” reacts to protect itself. It’s rare for leaders to admit that they were allowing people below them to run amok because they liked the results they were getting until they got burned.
DEI Navy
As an armchair expert, the arson is the most understandable part of this. Everything else is what astonished me. The ship should never have been lost. A competent response, particularly from the ships crew should have been sufficient.
Arson is actually the least understandable part of this. Fires on board ships are not uncommon, however we usually catch them before they're very big.
The most likely cause in this case is either "hot work" being conducted without a proper fire watch, or spontaneous combustion caused by improper disposal of oily rags.
Placing blame on a "disgruntled" junior enlisted sailor is standard practice for naval officers hoping to protect their careers. In the 80's, they did the same thing with the USS Iowa explosion. In that case, they claimed it was caused by a suicidal junior enlisted man over a failed homosexual relationship. Yes, they not only blamed a dead man, but then felt the need to slander him as well.
Not one person wearing an Annapolis ring will ever bear responsibility.
If a US ship is endangered by a single on board fire, what chance do they stand against an enemy?
@T.J. Kong See also McCain, Fitzgerald. The USN's (surface) officer corps is very poorly trained and not ready for any sort of mishap or difficult event/maneuver.
@T.J. Kong
Because you can't know what happened to Moskva, but are just a simple troll, feel free to keep your large, yet empty opinion's to yourself. The only thing known about Moskva is, everything Ukropnazis claim is a lie.
@T.J. Kong They're been entirely too much smug commentary from Americans about how badly the Russians have done, when it's clear from so many bits of evidence that have accumulated over the last decade plus that the US military would not do any better fighting a modernized opponent
None. The incompetence up and down the command and DC crew is appalling in the extreme.
Sounds like the E-1 is a scapegoat for the institutional problems within the Navy and also the affiliated command structure as well. However, it could still very much be arson, but it sounds like command is taking the full opportunity to not take accountability and instead attempt to point fingers and blame others for their own failure.
I agree, seems like this has been a big problem across our military, and now 'wokeness' at the top is compounding the problem, start firing top brass!
Iowa all over again.
The evidence that the disgruntled E1 started the fire barely exists. He was seen in the area by several witnesses, which means those witnesses were also in the area and also could have started the fire. Careless storage of flammable materials is also an entirely plausible cause of the fire.
I’m wondering if the charges against the E1 will stick in a court marshal
This is common throughout the services, and always has been.
I was a Naval Officer in the 60s and almost cried when I watched the fire on this ship ! Sad ! God Bless 🇺🇸🇺🇸🇺🇸🇺🇸🇺🇸⚓️⚓️⚓️⚓️⚓️
Sal your 100% on point. You did an excellent job, glad you got it out of your system. As a 32 year veteran firefighter I am exasperated at the apathy and complacency of what you read. I am sure there are many good people in the Navy, but this was just unbelievable. My hope is many good lessons have been learned. So we need to start a go fund me for the rank and file in San Diego to get the adapters they need? I know the boots in the ground would make good use of them despite the incompetent leaders who failed to get those things done ahead of time.
"My hope is many good lessons have been learned". From what we've heard here, and given that no accountability has been taken by those in command at the time of the incident, I rather suspect that no good lessons have been learned.
Just been watching film clips of firefighters on aircraft carriers being attacked by kamikaze pilots in ww2. Incredibly well organised and brave. How has the US navy come to this?
The US Navy care about a lot of things and focuses the ships captains on those. Ask yourself what are the priorities of the US Navy. Where does firefighting (or winning naval battles) appear in Secretary of the Navy's Strategic Guidance? media.defense.gov/2020/May/18/2002301998/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT_OF_THE_NAVY_STRATEGIC_GUIDANCE_FY2020.PDF
diversity and inclusion lol
@@crash6674 you won the 'dumbest comment of the year' award
Well maybe what can be said is for the past 20 years or more, a lot of general purpose skills have been slowly trivialized and dumbed down over the years.
And yes, in some ways, some of these skills and abilities were dumbed down and put down as "not important" and trivial so as to allow "inclusive" and not require the high standards that normally be required.
Snowflake children will grow up without ever having the experience of a spanking when doing wrong.
There is your answer to your question about the difference between WW2 sailors and what we have now.
In a nutshell.
Water, water, everywhere, and oh their plight was dire; water, water, everywhere, nor any for the fire.
There is a strange irony. During the Forrestal fire. That taught the Navy so much about fire and damage control. One of the ships that came to her rescue that day was the Bonhomme Richard LHD-6’s predecessor the Bonhomme Richard CV-31
The CO didn't give a crap about his ship, plain and simple...
Years ago, when I was in the Navy during the Clinton years, I asked a fellow Senior Enlisted "What's it gonna take for the Navy to recognize the gross incompetence in the officer and enlisted ranks?" He answered, "A ship will have to catch fire and sink at the pier!" That has now happened. And the Navy STILL doesn't get it! Glad I'm retired
Officers and Chiefs are now only good at covering their ass.
Hold on to hair Sal
You know it's amazing that the Navy wants to blame the lowest guy on the totem pole regardless of the circumstances. In a way they should thank him for exposing the cluster f***k that was this ship, and probably other ships in the Navy.
The guys at the top( CO and XO ) should be taking the blame for this.
and getting jail time
Absolutely. But it need to go down to the E7 to E9 level as well. The Chiefs were absolutely irresponsible.
How does this video only have 17k views, should have at least 1.5M. As a retired airwing sailor, all I can say about this fire is what a colossal Charlie Foxtrot.
When the US Navy went to the shipyard during 1960's and 1970's there was a always many training sessions and fire protection preparation. We went to fire fighting schools, site training, practiced and practiced and practiced again. We had fires during every overhaul mostly caused by welders. We had someone with equipment nearby at the work site when welders were working. Every fire was out and investigation started within 15 minutes. What is going on today??? It sounds like there is little safety protocol and training.
Was that the same prior to and after the FORRESTAL in 1967?
@@BrianFullerton Both. The USS Canberra CAG-2 was twice during the early 1960's in Portsmouth and the USS Jouett CG-29 was after during the early 1970's in Long Beach. The Canberra was once in drydock and the Jouett was once in drydock. The USS Dahlgren DLG-12 was also in Portsmouth in the 1960's, but not in drydock. It seems the Navy learns and forgets.
What ever happened to the Captain going down with the ship, at least metaphorically? It is similar to other aspects of our society and government where there is plenty of accountability for the little guy, but none for the big guy. If a corporation pollutes and poisons a bunch of people to death, the CEO will likely walk. If you put rat poison in your neighbors coffee, you are going to jail. If your administration invades a country that leads to a million people dying, no consiquences for the president or secretary of state.
It seems like if this were WWII or ancient Rome, some people would have fallen on their swords. Everybody wants the prestige and big bucks, but nobody wants the full responsibility.
That's my rant.
Well done Sal
We certainly did not live up to OHP and JPJ that day.
Sal,
Once again you are right on point. In my mind the CO, XO and OOD should all have had their careers ended. They lost their ship, not in combat but, when tied to the pier.
The fact that 87% of the fire fighting system was unavailable is incomprehensible. I guarantee that when the ship was at the shipyard NASSCO had fire manifolds and hoses set up throughout the ship. It most certainly was a contractual obligation for NASSCO to provide fire protection. If 87% of the fire stations were out the CO should have asked NASSCO to keep their equipment onboard when the ship moved to yhe Navy pier. I am sure that NASSCO would have found a way to help their best customer.
The Bonhomme Richard has two engine rooms. My guess is each engine room has at least two fire pumps, one steam driven and one electric. The electric pumps are most likely driven off emergency switchboards, which are powered by emergency diesel generators. Even if the ship's power was secured the emergency switchboards should have been supplied by shore power. The CO should have been disciplined by the Navy for leaving the ship without 87% of it's fire fighting ability. He should have been court-martialed if there was no water for the remaining fire fighting capabilities. If the pumps were unavailable, other provisions should have been made. Having not made provisions for fire fighting water is a dereliction of duty.
Another issue that seems to not have been addressed is why there so much combustible material onboard? It is understood they were in a shipyard type situation. But, with reduced fire fighting capabilities why wasn't there a greater effort to control combustibles? Obstructing the closure of fire doors is a problem, but why wasn't an effort made to limit the ability of fire to spread? The fire triangle includes air, an ignition source and fuel. You can't limit air. The ignition source in this case was, supposedly, arson. The only controllable part of the triangle was fuel. Why wasn't it controlled?
I have always had a pet peeve when it comes to cabling and hoses being run through access ways in shipyard. First, it prevents doors from closing. Second, it obstructs safe passage. Third, it increases the likelihood of damage to cabling and hoses. Fourth, with time multiple cables get run for the same job and clutter gets out of control. Provisions should be made both for personnel passage and for separate runs of cables and hoses. Doors and hatches can then be closed. While openings for cables and hoses can't be closed, the areas of the openings can be greatly reduced. One shipyard I was in averaged at least one fire a day due to damaged cables or hoses left in doorways and hatches.
There is no question that fireboats are needed in every port that wants to handle cargo snd passengers. Safe operation demands equipment and personnel that are trained in ship firefighting. However, simple common sense is needed to command a vessel and to run a port. In the case of the Bonhomme Richard, the US Navy and it's officers showed a complete lack of simple common sense. It is a miracle no one was seriously hurt.
Bob
Add the COB to this list also.
Sal, I think your analysis of this is spot on. It's clear to me, and I hope is clear to every other viewer, that you are being tough on the Navy because you know how good our Navy can, should, and most be. The USN was once the envy of the world in terms of Damage Control practices. It seems incomprehensible that as we focus again on near-peer naval conflict, that the USN lost a capital ship on the pier side due to a comedy of errors. You are completely right. The Navy needs to clean house, get empty uniforms out of the way, and make room for those more junior seaman and officers that will actually do the job.
How that Captain isn't being court-martialed, along with whomever was involved in FALSIFYING maintenance records is completely beyond me.
I said on the last one this was different than the "Swiss Cheese" model of failure, where any one little thing not lining up just a certain way will stop the disaster? This seems more and more like several different interstate highways being paved in parallel as alternate routes to ensure a disaster took place.
I also think I'm going to call BS on the idea that a lack of fireboats didn't make a difference.
Sal,
Tremendous video and commentary. We live in a society which desires everyone to comes in 1st place. The losers in this comedy of errors are the tax payers. At a cost of $750 million, this fire was an expensive learning curve for the top brass. True leadership is very difficult to find. Thank you!🇺🇸
Sal: You are wrong! I liked the video! I'm not a nobody! I watched both of the videos and I liked the fact that you went into detail about your qualifications as a mariner, a Navy veteran, and a fire fighter. I used the Forrestal fire as the basis for a safety training day for a group of CAP cadets. It's like nothing was learned. A chain of events had to happen to create the conditions for this fire to happen. I understand why you are so fired up about this. We lost a major vessel worth over a billion dollars because of these errors. I hope you make a third video about what the Navy does to address this and prevent it from happening again. Is anything happening? Or are they going to court martial the E1 with a weak case and lose? Thank you for making this video. The point you make needed to be made~!
I remember in boot camp them showing that video of the Forrestal that was quite different than this, that was a long time ago I saw it but didn't they have armed jets on the deck I thought they were doing missions into Vietnam and the fire broke out down in one of those lift decks I don't remember what caused it
@@jaymortensen642 ruclips.net/video/HfnlWKdD2fI/видео.html Check out this documentary.
@@jaymortensen642
appx 40 yeas since I saw the film.
I remember it and more details from added reports.
Preparing a group of aircraft to launch an air to ground attack, with fighter cover
John McCain was in one of the jets preparing to be launched, almost ready to start engine.
One of the fighters across the deck from McCain had an uncommanded missile launch (nobody in cockpit of that airplane at the time)
The missile hit a plane appx 2 spots over from McCain's (also not occupied at the time) severely damaging the aircraft and setting it on fire.
Jet fuel flowing from that airplanes tanks spreading over the deck, under other aircraft that are fully fueled and armed for an attack mission. (bombs, rockets... fuel)
A sailor helps McCain out of his aircraft and away to safety as the fire is spreading under that aircraft.
A senior Chief runs toward the fire with a large CO2 extinguisher immediately attacking the fire. (too small.. not enough but he possibly bought a few seconds for others to respond.)
A 2000 lb bomb "cooks off' from the heat, throwing an airplane up and almost flipping it. The explosion takes out the Senior Chief and a few others who were starting to bring fire hoses.
And it goes downhill from there very fast... Burning jet fuel and bombs rolling in through the hole blown in the flight deck.
Uncoordinated attacks on the fire with both water and foam at the same time, with the water washing the foam away and fire burning on top of the water (fuel) spreading the fire rapidly.
We almost lost that ship. Many sailors dead. Many aircraft destroyed.
Many explosions...
Fire spread from flight deck to the lowest decks of the ship.
Almost 1/5 of the ship's interior damaged. (but they did get the watertight doors shut and stopped it from spreading further forward... eventually)
If not for the active Vietnam War, the ship likely would have been scrapped.
@@fhuber7507 It was 40 years ago I saw it too but thanks for that recap I thought that it was something like that I think they said it was maybe a carrier that had a blacktopped wooden deck too and the oil soaked wood caught fire also. I don't remember them saying McCaine was on there but in 1982 maybe it was not as big a thing, Thanks again for the recap
The E-1 was acquitted. Rightly. The culprits are still in the woke Navy, or were allowed to retire.
As an E1 Air Traffic Controller aboard the Essex (LHD-2) I knew how to fight a fire. It was hammered into us every single day. I wasn’t in the Engineering department, wasn’t a member of a damage control party or repair locker. I was just a brand new sailor in Operations who’s Captain cared enough about his crew to LEAD and TRAIN us to man a warship properly. That 19 year old kid hated donning an FFE every three days for a two hour Main Space fire drill but looking back I now understand why we did it.
I just finished watching these two videos. I found out about these videos from a forum for Chief Petty Officers. I share your frustrations. I wish I had a dollar for every wtf moment in these two videos. I am a retired Master Chief. I served for over 30+. I have had extensive shipboard FF experience. I was part of the Damage Control Training Team on my last two ships. both of them LPD's. There needs to be a lot more folks held responsible for this that that SN. This disaster in my mind was totally preventable in my mind. Of the many many things that boggled my mind, two of them stood out. The first was the CDO text messaging the CO/XO. The other was lack of firemain on the pier. I was stationed out of San Diego for 70's. I remember firemain risers on the pier, that we could hook up to risers on the ship to receive firemain from the pier. WTF happened? Outstanding analysis in my opinion. BTW OBA's were still in use when I retired.
I've come to the conclusion that this is McHale's' Navy.
McHale would have fought the fire himself.
"F-Troop" One sympathizes . . .
@@saltyroe3179 Tinker would have rigged something up, but McHale would have been hands on with his men.
Unbelievable. As an HT 2 (Damage Controlmen) from the late 70’s, I find the lack on “On scene response “ incredible. Where is the training in todays navy. It is basic stuff. Good thing this did not happen at sea because you would have multiple fatalities. The navy needs to get its head out it ass and get back to basics.
It sounds like multiple people should be held accountable for This Disaster. Why the ship's Captain has not been dismissed seems unbelievable.
more than likely,,the CO's ass was saved because all the boxes in the feel good department roster had been checked off.
seems the XO and the CO are having problems learning the basic question for their next job, and that is; "do you want frys with that?"
This is an OUTSTANDING analysis! Totally understand that you are not criticizing but examining the environment/factors that contributed to losing the ship. Thank you for doing it!
Falsifying records is called gun decking in the Navy and it's treated very seriously. Depending on the severity heads roll over that.
To be clear, at 50k GPM, you can supply at least (16) 5" hoses, down the pier, on the ramp, etc. Depending on lift and friction.
Even if you don't have the fire boat manifolds, you can pump from a boat to portable draft tanks and then use the engines to supply the hoses down the pier (rural water supply style) until someone makes the manifold. Multi day event here...with people that want to help. And pipefitting, welding and machine shops surrounding the event...
Half day event, were there an incident commander directing resources to work together. Three or more potential rapid attack options, to prevent a larger mess.
That much water is potentially 10 million kilocalories a minute of heat dissipation, during a peak period of conversion to steam.
The media were amused that the Russians would rather blame an accidental fire and incompetent damage control for the loss of the Moskva than admit it was due to enemy action. Here's the US showing you how it's done folks.
I know it's no laughing matter, Sal. I feel your frustration, but it's fun to hear your incredulity and eloquent rip of this report.
All of those 36 in the report need to be sacked out of the Navy. That a lowly E1 is the only one on the hook says this is a political coverup. It's almost as if they wanted to lose the ship. There is utterly no excuse for what happened here. None. Every major incident reads like this, military or not. But this has to be one of the worst examples of systematic command failure I've read in a long while.
So this ship was in shambles.
The Big Question : How many others?
Is The Navy calling these ships "Combat Effective " if so WHO is signing off on that bullshit? They need to be relieved.
As a NAVY VET, this is a disgrace to the branch!! When I was on the USS Benfold, if you had duty, you had two drills!! One was a DC drill and the other was a topside drill. EVERYONE participated!! When we were in dry dock, junior sailors went to school. There also was a ships barge that the duty section slept in. The ships nomenclature in REPAIR LOCKER 5 (main locker) should've been in that locker in case a fire or flood occurred so you know how to set primary, secondary boundries, etc......
Why didn't anyone ring bells to muster the flying squad??!! There's so many issues wrong here, I can go on and on. Where was the sound and security watch? The topside rovers?? I mean nobody noticed something wrong?? THIS IS BULLSHIT!!!
The CO, XO, DCA, OOD, CPO's both on duty, CMC, CHENG should ALL BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE!! They're senior guys that have the knowledge and experience. Don't blame this shit on a junior guy. Not surprised but that's the NAVY TODAY!!! All political. This entire command knows it and it showed!!
I really hope the Navy guys watches this and your part 1 as a 3rd party guy who has the experience to know what he is talking about, as your passion shows for sure about how things broke down. Start at the top first and work down. 👍
Again, as a former DC man....the utter failure of leadership in the Damage Control Division is incredible. Utterly incredible. Every E-5 and above in that Division should be drummed out for FAILURE to even do the MINIMUM to help their Ship. I'm sad for that Rate.
Sal, excellent analysis! You are absolutely, 100% correct! Your justifiable outrage is clear, and I really can’t add anything other than my whole hearted support. My feelings are the same as yours. The entire chain of command on BONHOLM RICHARD must be held accountable for the loss of the ship, in peacetime, at the dock.
Your comments regarding fireboats are accurate. The same issue has been argued in New London for decades. With the Sun base, Electric Boat, Oil docks, and Pfizer fire boats are crucial to fight a major fire in New London, yet the city of New London and the city of Groton have repeatedly argued that they should not bear the responsibility and that the Navy should maintain fireboats there. The only marine capability that the Navy has are the YTB yard tugs that have limited firefighting capability.
That whole fire should be a major wake-up call to the Navy. To say that the crew would have managed a fire at sea, is absurd. They would have lost both the ship and crew lives as well.
The decision to remove shore power from the ship ultimately assured the loss of the ship. Had sufficient water been available to fight the fire, it’s likely that the ship would have been flooded and sunk by the inability to get water off of the vessel. The ship probably would have rolled over as the NORMANDIE did in New York when she burned at the dock.
NAVESEA needs to address all of these firefighting and damage control issues because they show an alarming lack of readiness throughout the fleet.
There is a very logical reason for there to be an admiral on seen and ultimately in charge of the action. The admiral is rapidly deployed to protect Sec Nav and the Chair of DOD from the flying burning shit. If there were TRUE ACCOUTABILITY in the capitol, BOTH of these persons would be taken out of there place of responsibility and deposited one in the highest Navy Brig and the other in the highest Federal Penitentiary. This is not directly because they were responsible for the Bon Homme Richard tragedy, which they were because it occurred one their Watch, but far more importantly, because they are responsible for the CULTURE of the NAVY and that is what is broken and caused the tragedy of the fire.
this severe negligence is becoming more and more passed up every day. Thanks so much for the commentary.
Having served on both subs and surface ships, when I got too my first surface ship it amazed me that I wasn't allowed to put out a trash can fire because I wasn't on damage control party. So all the frustrations you are voicing have been going on for decades.
The CO was likely one of the navy's golden child on his way to becoming a CVN CO. The BHR is considered a deep draft command.
Unless things have changed in the past 5+ years, our Nuclear Navy won’t let that guy near one of their ships.
@@michelenovack575 I was a nuke EM1SS and after getting seriously ill was removed from both subs and had nuke pulled. Once I was made available for full duty, I was assigned to LPD12. The CO was an aviator who had then completed nuclear power school. The LPD was the next step in his path to carrier CO, The CVN COs are commonly aviators qwho follow this career path. At least that was the case in 1994.
Unfortunate liberty taken with the ship's motto: "I have not yet begun to fight." The fire.
I can feel your anger. It gives you focus, makes you stronger.
I'm not an American, so I don't have the right to tell you what to do. But it's sad to see that failed leadership is still as common as the lack of common sense when it comes to this fire, and the damage that's still being done do the lack accountability. Thanks Sal for the video.
American or not,,we have had enough stupid, gutless incompetence,,both in our military,, and unfortunately, our whole society.
Great job Sal of covering the details of this fire, so uncalled for, what a breakdown in communication and authority can do.
Wow I understand why you all worked up!.. Unbelievable...Ty for this video..
Thank you for this Video! It's fantastic coverage that I haven't seen anywhere else.
It's truly amazing how this tragedy should have been avoided with any amount of competency and how no one really responsible for the massive failure at near all levels has had any real punishments
You bring up various good points. The fire suppression failures are mind blowing.
It would be fascinating to know the results if tomorrow, a team of individuals (with authorisation) were to enter a navy ship in all ports at 3AM, walk round the ship, and find a reasonable area for a fire to start, before setting off smoke/... simulants and announcing a drill. Then judging if the response is sufficient to extinguish the fire. (one per port not one per ship so as to not overwhelm local respons)
Former school llbrarian. I'd read of a school in which, during a fire drill, the principas placed a smoke bomb in his wastebasket.
Suggested the idea to my principal, he wasn't interested.
Thing is in all previous drills everything went well, but when the kids smelled smoke they PANICKED AND RAN IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS.
I still think it's a good idea.
Actually, there was sort of. The original Seal Team #6 under Cmdr Richard Marchinco was tasked to sneak in Navy & Marine Corps bases & cause havoc & leave without being caught. Just to test the safety & security measures put into place. Everywhere they did go & pulled off their "bag of tricks" that place failed miserably. they even stole a nuke weapon from a sub.
@@veramae4098 A downside to the emergency drills is that the drill becomes a routine event and the emergency still causes paralysis. This isn't a great example, but driving a truck I have driven by runaway vehicle ramps a few thousand times. I've considered using one a time or two when the brakes were smoking and I was still going faster than I wanted. I always decided to stay on the highway and manage the speed the best I could......because the ramps are there for the REAL emergency. The mental process guiding us through emergencies with the comfort that there is no danger doesn't build the brain synapses to form a connection to a real event.
I think Sal said the crew of this ship failed the previous 17 drills before the fire that destroyed the ship.
@@hewhohasnoidentity4377 but what about the other ships, and how well do the drills capture reality.
The frustration is understandable. And its always great to hear the solution, whether the fireboats get aquired or not is unknown. 10 millions to safeguard billions sounds like a value.
Sal. I am not navy, not a firefighter, but I have training in threat and risk management, constructing drills, rural and mountain SAR, and communications. I was almost chewing the carpet on the issues I saw. I am not familiar with some of the terms - your commentary helped. But. To have 14 failed drills with no remediation, to not coordinate, to not use critical elements that were available, air supply, sources of water, etc., to not have the adapters. How can this happen short of incompetence gone to seed? I worked in Caterpillar mfg and parts plants. Emergency equipment, hoses, extinguishers, etc. were checked monthly and fixed if not functioning. I was an office computer programmer. I got extinguisher training periodically. As a supervisor I was trained in employee accountability. I cannot understand the lack op preparation, the seeming lack of concern and the lack of carrying out effective actions. Even I would have known you don't fight a fire from above. Put another way, with a different skillset, a different perspective, I can but support your conclusions, this was a collection of SNAFUs that started long before the fire.
I didn't say it but heads should be on the block for this and ones above the captain. Someone is asleep at the switch.
Great video, Sal thanks for this. Would be great if you could do more like these. Plenty of RUclipsrs doing videos on air accidents - I think there is a market for similar with maritime accidents and no better man to talk us through and explain maritime accident reports and what we can learn from them.
As a veteran (1976-80 US Army) I am deeply saddened but not at all surprised by the information you have made public here. As a father of two Navy junior officers about to embark on their first sea tours, destroyer and sub, I can only hope and pray that the US Navy has learned difficult and expensive leasons from this fire. The US military is a large, slow, bureaucratic organization that is slow to learn, slow to improve, and slow to excel in anything out of the ordinary. It takes wartime conditions or large diasters like this for people to get the proper focus to operate "as it should" done.
I know this is getting even further out of your area of normal reporting but I would really like to find out more about the current conditions on the aircraft carrier George Washington.
Sir,,, May the God who watched over my four years in the Navy(mid 60's) watch over your boys, and keep them safe, it was an honor to serve,,,,,but those in charge today know nothing about honor..
best 2 videos you have ever posted
Thanks Robert!
I feel your frustration immensely. I am a retired damage controlman its like they made every mistake possible. The navy has emergency pumps for fire water p100 and also emergency gas powered compressor for scba but from what ive seen they probably dont work or no one onboard knew to use them or operate them. This blows my mind they had to of been gundecking the shit out of maintenance every fire fighting system has maintenance checks. Jesus back in 2010 i had weekly checks on every scba bottle i would walk the entire ship to make sure they were all in the green. I'm just glad no sailors were lost.
You are Spot-On Sal. This was a Cluster-F of Tremendous proportions.
Darn, Sal, tell us how you really feel! You are right in my opinion. So did anything change because of this report?
Sal, I'm an Australian who left T.V. on U-Tube and caught both episodes of Lose of Helicopter vessel. Your anger drew me in.Mate, how can you lose a vessel in Port to FIRE? As you got into, I, too, got angry 😠. WHY?May I recommend you do another episode but based on the loss of readiness, lose treasure (MONETARY) considerations, highlighting the incompetence of officers in change, and the scapegoat of the apprenticeship sailor! DO YOUR WORST SAL.Keep up good work!!! 👍
Your critique was wonderful. Everyone involved should be forced to listen to this-twice.
All things considered don't think twice would be enough, I would add thumbscrews to make sure they were paying attention
Hi Sal, i'm a officer on LNG tankers and one of my responisibilitys is the FIFI equipment and leading one of the 2 teams on board. It is stunning to hear how the US Navy handles (acceptable) risks. Let alone switching off systems without backup plans! It's crazy to hear this story.
Watched your Bonhomme Richard video. Interesting. I have 3 comments.
- Years ago when I (a young Coastie) checked commercial ships for compliance with various requirements, there was a requirement for an “International Shore Connection”. I believe it was a SOLAS requirement. I was surprised to hear from you that a U.S. Navy ship didn’t have something like that.
- Lack of comms ability among various organizations. I’m not surprised. Over 40 years ago the USCG was aware of that problem during oil spill responses. CG HQ provided me with a bunch of radios all on a common frequency to loan out to the contractor(s), the state EPA, etc. for use during a response so we could reach each other. Not a perfect answer but it worked.
- Mind set. When the ship’s personnel train for what to do IF there is a fire that is different than when they train for WHEN there is a fire. “IF” relates to an unlikely event. “WHEN” relates to something you are going to experience someday so you better be ready.
Way back in the dark ages, I was on-board a ship that was doing a drill. A painter asked me if they could get off, so I asked the control center if they could get him off as a ‘radiological victim’. Since that was not part of the drill, this was not accepted by the control center but it nearly gave them a heart attack. How dare that something not on the script happen.
I thought this was necessary video, thank you Saul. Constructive criticism should be welcomed by the Navy
Better call Saul!
Great video Sal; no apologies needed nor, should anyone expect one from you. Although I will observe one word was missing from you excellent review of this report - Complacency.
I was really intrigued by your little personal introduction at the beginning of this pair of videos. You certainly deserve/earned the right to have your voice heard in the debate over this debacle.
I'll put on my old uniform cap to salute you from this side of the pond Sal.
Sal, I'm going to use your video as a case study in the importance of training, drills and exercises.
Such a shame about BHR.
I did 20 years in the Navy, 14 of them on board ships. During that time, and through hundreds of shipboard fire drills, we never drilled with the base fire department. I assume that the CDO, OOD and EDO on BHR had no idea of how to interface with the civilian fire fighters either. This lack of clarity would have the effect of paralyzing the entire fire fighting effort. Problem is, the civilians are paid by the hour and they are unavailable to do their jobs when in training--thus it costs money to run drills. You get what you pay for.
Great report, both parts 1 and 2. I hope some crafty lawyer firm takes on the defense of the sailor charged with this fire. And just rips into the multiple faults of the higher-ups in the navy command structure. Let us see a program on this man. And what is an E1 sailor doing on any ship? There is a great story here. And, yes, why is the ship captain still in the navy and not criminally charged?
A young recruit just out of boot camp gets assigned to a ship, fairly common. As the report state a disgruntled BUDS drop out could easily be an E1.
@@paullabarge9640 Another commenter said the young man was busted from E3 to E1.
An excellent synopsis of the response to the ship fire. You have reported a far sight more than the news media ever did. Unfortunately, the lowest man on the totem pole of rank, assumes the responsibility of what seems to be the lack of oversight, from those in command, into the ship's readiness to fight what was at first a simple fire.
Just watching the video makes my blood boil. Every Admiral that touched this incident should have been called to task at a minimum. Additionally, the Captain is ALWAYS responsible for EVERYTHING that happens to his ship. He should be court martialed (keep in mind that the Court is also a fact finding entity and the Captain doesn't nessasarily need to get punished but from the looks of it he should be packing his bags and exiting stage left ASAP). The Navy looks to be in full CYA mode. Disgraceful. Nimitz and King are turning in their graves.
Really enjoyed the in depth and detailed analyses by a fire fighting expert. I remember at the time of the event thinking WTH at every fresh update. Points to huge problems that must be addressed!
As a former LHD DCA (BATAAN), thank you for the in-depth review. I am as disgusted and appalled by this incident as you were. So much culpability to go around.
You got heart , Sal.
After 33 years in various volunteer fire departments, I am proud that we never had a situation like this, where no one had an idea how to perform a size up and initial attack.
What would help, is if people were promoted on how well they do their job, not how much school the went to or how many other peoples jobs they know.
Sal! This was an AWESOME video.
I have read many of the CO2 extinguishers had been discharged and not tagged for refill with full ones not being placed in the ready positions. This was done by crew members playing games with them. Criminal actions were unchecked on the ship.
Sal, Thanks it’s a Great report! I’ve been a commercial & Marad ship Captain and I have had bad ship fires. Your discussion is very good and I believe well intended for everyone to learn from these deadly mistakes. There is obviously a terrible command understanding & outrageously poor training involved here. In addition to equipment failures, mistakes by responsible persons must be identified to prevent this from being repeated on another ship. If true, having falsified and missing documents are attempts to have a cover up of facts.
This kind of event provides generational motivation for training excellence at all levels. As you have noted, the initial fire events of WW2 prompted improved procedures and training that saved future vessels. This even provides more contemporary evidence that training diligence is still needed, even in peacetime. My fear is the navy will try to whitewash this event and not use it as an example to train on. The monetary loss of this ship has to be $1.5 B or more, but thankfully, no lives were lost. Hopefully, no one was seriously injured or will suffer from long term disability. All the best.
Thanks Sal. This 2 part video was very informative. As a layman, I believe the Command Officer/Crew has the primary responsibility to coordinate all fire response. The ships crew would have the best knowledge of where the fire started and how to get there.
Great comments
Your comments were right on! I would add that the principal blame should be directed to the ship's command structure.
Sal,
First, don't worry about sounding as if you're ranting. Given the nature of this event, everyone should be ranting.
Second, the rant is because this is the U.S. Navy! We expect the U.S. Navy to be the best and show the world the professionalism they train for.
I live near the Severn River in Maryland. Several years ago a house caught fire. We have no public water, just wells. Hence, no fire hydrants. They dropped a hose down to a waiting vessel in the river and pumped water up (maybe 60 ft vertical) to fight the fire. Many homes around the Severn have no public water. Not as complex as this fire, true, but you still get the idea they knew what they were doing.
Keep the ranting up please. We expect our U.S. Navy to do it right.
Sal, both of your commentaries are in 100% agreement with my experience as both a firefighter/chief in a combination department and as a senior civilian with the U.S. Navy - shipyard, major headquarters, and systems command. The document on fireboats illustrated the ignorance and the Navy's inability to fully understand the capabilities of fireboats. The most astounding aspect of this fire is the delay in getting any firefighting agent on the fire. Any firefighter knows the criticality of speedy application of agent at the seat of the fire. Great webinars.
at least someone said it publicly
Thanks for your videos about ship. Where were the Commanders? They should have been the persons charged for the lost of the ship, lack of training and inspection of equipment by their personnel. Thanks again for the education of this incident.
Sal both videos are extremely well done. IMO your not armchair quarterbacking. You have spent an enormous amount of time researching this along with countless hours of reading a fire report to give us the insight to exactly how 36 individuals lost a national defense asset critical to the defense of this country and severely limiting our capabilities to defend our interests abroad. The Navy brass will use the E1 as the scapegoat and hold no one else accountable for there udder complete failure in leadership. I would have been even harsher in my assessment of the 36 individuals that all be court martial and convicted, sentenced, and dishonorable discharged from the Navy. No retirement to avoid persecution. But the udder lack of leadership at the top of the Navy is extremely disheartening. Lack of coordination with out side agencies and an overall lack of knowledge is mind numbing. These Navy Officers and Chiefs are solely responsible for the training and preparedness of the crew and have failed all levels. Readiness even in time of maintenance needs to be kept at a high standard. Hoping and praying there isn’t a fire on board during a maintenance is piss poor example of leadership. Last comment and who is the ultimate loser in this The American Tax Payer who will once again have to foot the bill for udder incompetence without consequences for failed leadership form the Senior Brass to include the Secretary of The Navy.
It would be great if you could make a video about the changes and improvements that were made because of this disaster... but I doubt there were any
BRAVO: this video was in no way a rant. Sal, you have a unique perspective as a mariner and a firefighter. Your criticism was spot-on.
This is so bizarre. And I wonder if the craziness with fire management is why the captain was off the hook
Good job brother.
To be clear, my husband and I both served in the Navy. We were both 4.0 sailors. He served eight years in the 1980s and fought in Beruit. I served eight years in the 1980s-90s and fought in Desert Storm. We know the Navy.
Saw the fire from I-5. Later when returning, I exited to Harbor Dr. and stood there taking video on my phone. Yep, the fire spewed black smoke, then white as water hit it, then black again as the fire spread. The whole county stunk of burnt plastic for two days.
Is this a failure in training and preparedness across naval operations, or an isolated case? Heads should roll bottom up to the level of failure. How did a ship with so many inoperable fire stations not have secondary means in place to fight a fire? Mutual aid training should a must occur.
The JAG report Sal is quoted recommended court martialling 30+ officers and senior NCO's, including about half a dozen admirals (most or all of whom retired shortly after the fire, presumably hoping to evade accountability). I can only guess that high command are quashing legal action because they know their own negligence will be brought to light by competent defense lawyers in a trial.
@@Dennis-vh8tz thanks for pointing that info out. I can’t help but think it should not stop until it reaches the top. The fact it didn’t, means it will likely continue.
@T.J. Kong I hope that happens in this case.
Not isolated. The khakis in the surface Navy (chiefs/CPO and officers) are not very good. Training is poor, morale is very poor among the sailors (see George Washington), it's almost a surprise stuff like this isn't happening more regularly.
Great report Sal. About 11:29 you speak about using water sucked from San Diego Bay to fight the fire.
I have been told by several different fire fighters (Northern Cal.) :We do NOT like using suction pumps to draw water out of Lakes , Creeks/Rivers or Bays. The only answer that they gave me was that the fire pump might be damaged. (happened during the Oakland Hills fire 1991).
All of the Pumpers that I have seen in our area do have Suction Hoses and Strainer Filters.
]Note San Francisco is different: SFFD does have Bay riser pipes systems and massive bay water pumping system for fighting fires all over the city.
..." afraid pump might be damaged."
In this instance on site risk assessment of $1.5 billion vessel at risk vs risk to pump engine...here's my credit card, hook up the damn pumps NOW!
A strainer can be placed in line, this is not rocket science.
@@sailorgabbie oh they have strainers. Some have really fancy filters. Except for the city and County of San Francisco fire agencies around here just don’t like siphoning water. And I have no idea why
@@thechancellor3715 well that’s my opinion also. When we had a great Oakland Hills fire there was a small lake right near Highway 24 that was in between the fire. This lake was accessible by firetrucks. When I asked why the lake wasn’t pumped to fight the fire 🔥, A captain at the Oakland fire department told me we were afraid we damaged the pump. There were thousands of homes well over $1 million piece scattered around the area who cares about the pump.
@@edshelden7590 Living in an wide spread dense suburban area with many volunteer FD that have constant donation drives I can understand them keeping a tight watch on expenses in order to keep their jobs....nonetheless when faced with such a monumental loss that attitude needs to be thrown out and just get on with the job with all available resources. Firefighters courage is unquestioned but it's hard to buck the Chief or Fire Marshall at times.
Love and support your take on this
You’re right, I hated this video because it pissed me off too. Hopefully your blood pressure has calmed down by now. Thanks.
Ex-bubblehead here, the CT was loaded with blazed logs and unsafe maneuvering practices in NAV Dept.
Though in one of the USNI articles the CDO had remarked on the DC problems some time before to the upper command level and had been ignored (one of the mitigating circumstances in his court-martial). Also, per USNI the CO and XO did not even assume command. The Operations Officer had to independently step up.
Otherwise, I think you nailed it. SDFD seemed to be the only ones with a clue. Final thought, the Miami died for nothing.
The crew of Connecticut knew of the uncharted mount. They were warned about it 24 hours before the hit. The CO also had crashed the boat before in San Diego at the pier. The sacking was 100% justified.
Falsifying reports sounds par for the course. My buddies were always dealing with broken things that the command demanded be fixed. so they just marked them as fixed.
Well done.