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There was a philosophical difference in design, Americans focused on aircraft designs that protected the plane and pilot with armor plating in strategic locations around the cockpit, and things like self-sealing fuel tanks. This necessitated heavier aircraft and developed much more powerful engines to push them which lead to very powerful heavily protected fighters and bombers that could survive sometimes extreme damage and still bring the pilot home. Japan instead focused on speed and maneuverability, and sacrificed the same safety issues paramount to US designs to save weight and allow for shorter assembly time. This was common in both fighter and bomber design. The biggest shortcoming of this became very apparent early in the war when the AVF forces (Flying Tigers) in China quickly realized that the bombers and fighters were extremely vulnerable to catching fire and burning if hit from leaking fuel, and that the Japanese pilots had no protection and that if the cockpit area was hit it usually would kill or injure the pilot due to lack of pilot protection. This ended up being the critical factor, as the war progressed US Pilots got far more experienced and skilled because their aircraft were more likely to bring them back safely, whereas the most skilled Japanese pilots died off early in the war, leaving Japan with an increasingly poorly trained fighter pilot pool flying what were becoming dangerously outdated aircraft. As good as an aircraft the Zero was, it was technically totally outclassed by the time the Corsair and Hellcat arrived. Alot of this *is* mentioned in the video, its a fascinating history of how the two powers differed in thinking.
Less of a philosophical difference and more of a workaround. To attain the desired performance and range with a mediocre engine, you have to cut weight from somewhere.
Japanese view: Big guns mean little if you can't get them on target. American view: Getting guns on target means little if you can't take down your target.
+MiguelPmpM While the P40 was inferior to many aircraft like the Zero the AVF in China showed that with a skilled pilot and appropriate tactics the P40 could master the Japanese. Also the Japanese Navy got most of the Zeros, the army air corps in China got older models that were clearly inferior to the P40.Also the P40 got upgraded to the far better Kitty Hawk and stayed in production throughout most of the war.
Bad Kitty No Milk Tonight Well, to be fair if you have a captured version of an enemy aircraft,it helps a lot (for later in the war)! With the AVF (I had always heard it as AVG, but same difference I suppose), the Japanese were pretty unfamiliar with the P40 and the US pilots were pretty unfamiliar with the Zero at first. Then it was just a matter of who figured out who's plane first.
Very nice, but I think you missed the biggest single factor: The U.S. went to considerable trouble to protect and preserve their pilots while the IJN -- in particular -- considered pilots to be as expendable as the average infantryman. The IJN opted for range and speed instead of protection on its planes and make no effort to recover pilots shot down or otherwise lost in operations. USN planes were given increasing amounts of armor in addition to self-sealing gas tanks. Submarines, flying boats, and PT boats were routinely deployed by the USN to recover their downed air crews as the Japanese looked on in amazement. It's my belief that this was an unanticipated consequence of the civil indoctrination campaign -- intended to provide an infantry willing and even eager to give up its life for the Emperor. When this attitude expanded to highly trained airmen and even high ranking officers, like the (at least three) naval officers who insisted on going down with their ships at Midway, the cost of an eagerly self-sacrificing infantry proved too costly for the over all Japanese war effort. The three great generals who unified Japan would have mocked this notion of honorable death as that is not the way you win wars.
Exactly. At the start of the war, the Japanese had many more experiences and skilled pilots than the US. As the war progressed, the US pilot corps increased in number as well as average skill and experience. As this was happening, the Japanese pilot corps continued to lose it's skilled pilots. The Japanese doctrine of completing the mission over all else, especially the lives of the aircrew, led inevitably to the US dominating the air with experienced pilots while the Japanese were scraping the bottom of the barrel for whoever they could find to fly the planes.
The airmen were as expendable as the infantrymen, and the infantry were as expendable as ammunition. One officer fought an amazing defense until continuing to fight was hopeless and strategically pointless, and led an amazing breakout to save 2/3 of his men. His enemy, General Zhukov, thought both the defense and the breakout were so capably led that the officer deserved a medal. The Japanese instead forced him to commit suicide in disgrace for fleeing the battlefield.
I work in manufacturing. I am no longer on the assembly line but I was. Hard for others to understand the mind numbing same repetition over and over and over. Day after day. Unless you do it you don't really know what a hell it can be. Now think about this. You manufacture say guns. Day after day you do the same thing over and over, year after year to help the war. The detail to accuracy in the barrel. Butt stock. Springs. Putting it all together. Package. Ship. Mind numbing dock work over and over loading boats, day after day. Boat goes 1,000 miles. Unloads. Someone carries all this heavy equipment into battle. Through jungle. Up the side of a mountain. After the battle Americans enter a cave. Find tons of guns and ammo left behind. Why???? 10 different types of ammo. 12 different types of guns. Nothing works in any other gun. This type of ammo only works in this type of gun and no other. So Japanese took what they could use and left the rest. So 1/2 their ammo gets left behind. Unusable, unless you want to carry 8 guns into battle. And all that work. From the factory. Hand carried through a jungle, up the side of a mountain. Just to be left. All that effort in vain. How do you win a war like that?? You don't.
You have a good point, but don't forget these same Japanese (and later the NVA who copied them in some ways) were able to dismantle and HAND CARRY complete artillery pieces up and down mountains, through swamps and jungle while subsisting on a few handfuls of rice. Their fighting spirit was their secret weapon, they thought.
@@CarrotConsumer perhaps you meant t say, “They never won a major battle against the U.S. during the Vietnam Conflict”, because they sure as fuck rolled over SVN, then Cambodia (to take out Pol Pot), and they shut down a Chinese incursion. Their predecessor organization handed the French their asses on a plate.
We could use some German efficiency at the dinner table. Eating inefficiently leads to enlarging the stomach, increased appetite, plus, you get fat. Eating involves chewing, and there are 3 ways of chewing. 2 of them are extreme. At the extremes are the anorexic, who chews the heck out of food before swallowing, and the people who wolf their food, wolfers, who swallow chunks of food, which often have to be washed down with a drink, usually a sugar drink. Sounds crazy, but do you know of the "hunger hormones"? Your doctor will tell you to go on a diet, like mine did, and stay silent about the hunger hormones. Google search them and find out something you never knew before. I posted this up in another discussion group, and a medical student replied that he knew about "hunger hormones" and I could get screwed, although his wording was a little sharper. They tell med students, but how does that help you control your weight? It doesn't. All your doctor will say is "You're obese, and you have to go on a diet". Weight loss diets fail at a 90% rate, in part, because people don't understand about satiation at a meal. Google "hunger hormones", it will only be a few sentences to explain them, and it will take you by surprise. Afterwards, respond and I'll submit the easiest, most sustainable way to lose weight. Preview: it's sustainable because there is very little change to your normal, delicious diet. And you can eat "on the run", like busy people do, and stay on your diet. Call my bluff. I lost 50 lbs in one year.
@@dennisschell5543 - Virtually no one. That's safe to say, as almost nobody would read such a long winded comment. Did you read it all? Do you think you have to fill your belly to quench your hunger?
I have viewed only a handful of these lessons, but have benefited from watching these few. The mastery of the content is simply fantastic. The heavy German perhaps Austrian accent only adds to the entertainment value. Thank you for sharing your knowledge in English. Also, I am probably most impressed that you keep these very complex topics simplified into just a few minute presentations. Well done. Well done indeed.
Pretty thorough for such a short video. I would like to add a few details I've read from many places but have never seen in one place. Japan having few natural resources, built their planes light and purposefully used engines that used less fuel. Majority of IJN pilots were enlisted. Aircraft commanders of the larger planes often were no even pilots. Bad or unreasonable orders coming in from above could not be challenged. An example of this would be during the Guadalcanal campaign, Zero pilots were forbidden to drop their external fuel tanks due to a shortage of these items, but in doing so, they negated the advantage of manueverabilty (3g max limitiation on the Zero with Fuel tanks). This made it much easier for the clumsier Wildcat to shoot them down. Also flying around with a bomb full of fuel vapors is asking for trouble. The Japanese sent aircraft engineers to Germany and the Germans shipped engines to Japan during the war by submarine. The Ki-60 Hien (codenamed Tony) was a Japanese design following the German idea of armor and speed first, manueverability second. It first flew in early 1941, but for some reason was never produced in large quantities. Japanese pilots were still stuck in WW1 style thinking and prized manueverability over all else so the flimsy Oscar was relied upon. The Zero had some real problems as a gun platform. The 20mm barrels were cut down thus reducing muzzle velocity and accuracy. The rounds carried were only 120 in the early models. Visibility over the nose was not good and in a turning fight you would lose site of the enemy under your nose. Some ace pilots were known to crank their seat up as high as it would go in order to see over the nose and fire by looking over the sight. Firing the nose mounted 7.7mm machine gun filled the cockpit with fumes. Also the Zero lacked a pressure carburetor in early war, so negative G caused fuel starvation. Finally, there was no training squadron for pilots in the rear. New pilots had to learn their skills in combat--therefore they were killed before they could absorb what they learned.
Japanese philosophy at the advent of war reminds me very much of the philosophy of the Confederate States as the broke away from the United States at the advent of the Civil War. Both realized that they were markedly inferior in population, industrial capacity and wealth but, both espoused that their elan and the fighting capability of their fighting forces could make up for the deficiencies in those areas. Both had the vain hope that they could achieve enough success early in the war to make the United States sue for peace on their terms. The Japanese spent the major part of the war seeking the "Decisive Naval Battle" like their victory at Tsushima over the Russians. Neither the Japanese nor the Southern States were equipped and ready for a protracted war against an enemy that would not give up despite early defeats like the Battle of Bull Run in the Civil War and Pearl Harbor or the Philippines in WW-II...
Financial mis-management was an additional factor in US Civil War. Cotton was the Confederate’s main money earner. When the war began they put up prices which initially gave them a boost. But the high prices allowed cotton competition to come in and prices collapsed. That loss of income took them out of the war.
@@Dave5843-d9m The Confederacy was so in need of the cash from cotton that it sacrificed food crop acreage to grow more cotton. That resulted in the South's in ability to feed an army in the field. Southern troops were distracted by their need to find food.
This is a good comparison. Lee thought the north lacked resolve about slavery and dissolution of the Union. He should have talked to Lincoln first. Lee believed if he bloodies the north's nose quickly and early, the North would sue for peace, as you state. It was seriously wrong as far as Lincoln was concerned. I don't think the Japanese truly understood how much manufacturing power the US could bring to this war. The Germans really didn't either. When you read the history of the manufacturing side of WW II, who, before it actually happened, would have believed that ocean going ships would be built in Colorado for the war effort? America had a lot of people with great imaginations given a chance to go after problems no one else had previously imagined. The Japanese knew they needed to win quickly, or atleast, get a peace treaty. Not catching the aircraft carriers at Pearl, and sinking so much of the capital fleet in shallow waters so that it could be refloated and repaired was a huge error on their part.
@@cdjhyoung Nazi Germany secret service had no clue just how industrialized the Soviet Union ... and they probably had no clue about the US either. Imho were morons who thought they were "the master race" and therefore didn't even bother to find out how good their opponents were. The whole reason the Kriegsmarine used submarines was because Nazi Germany could only fever dream about competing on the ocean surface with the Royal & US navies.
@@adamcrookedsmile It wasn't only the German and Japanese war planners that couldn't see the potential industrial might of the US or USSR. Charles Lindberg toured pre-war Germany and was terrified at what he saw. He returned to the US and tried to use his renown as a public figure to keep the US out of a European war. He was painted in the press and a coward and a traitor when in reality he thought the huge head start the Germans had in building up their military would over run the US before we could build to respond. He was neither a coward nor a traitor. He just didn't have all the available facts. If Germany or Japan could have effectively attacked the manufacturing areas of the US, and I don't mean just terror raids, this whole discussion may have come out differently. Being out of reach for either country to do anything but sink ships off our shores allowed the US factories to really produce, unlike the German and Japanese industries that were under steady attack day and night starting in January, 1943.
I have to say I think you have ignored one important aspect of what was going on. The US was going through and cycling its pilots. That meant that the the newly trained pilots straight out of the academy had much better ideas of enemy doctrine than the IJN pilots ever did. The US Navy pilots, if not pilots in general knew what to expect and they knew how to counter it. So once you add in the good, but not great aircraft, the limited number of pilots and the mismanagement of pilots, the Marianas Turkey shoot is not just a likely outcome, but something that is inevitable. I would also add that US naval, carrier, damage control doctrine was also significantly superior and to not think it as a factor is being somewhat unkind. The idea of flooding the aviation fuel tanks with carbon dioxide to prevent secondary fires gave the US ships far greater resilience. This itself doesn't sound like much, but if you can save a ship, that means you can save the crew. When you save the crew, you save the skills they have. This means that more pilots, those who are awaiting refits, reloads, refueling, could get out should a carrier be attacked. Compare to one of the IJN heavy carriers, lost to secondary explosions as craft were being fitted with anti-air ammunition and their anti-ship munitions left out and in the open.
***** Did I say inexperienced? I said the American pilots were knowledgeable of the enemy doctrine. They had active combat vets who were able to say 'this is how the enemy fights' and that intelligence helped make the most of their skills. In comparison, IJN doctrine allowed their pilots to whittled down to an ineffective force and so, had their knowledge lost.
Excellent post. The Japanese left their experienced pilots on the line until they would be eventually killed. As you said, the US was able to leverage the experience of their pilots by rotating them back to the States to train the next crop of pilots.
It a strategy game called hearts of iron 4. Its about supplying your troops with weapons etc to win the war whilest simultanously having command over the course of the war.
Excellent analysis. The argument of lack of an effective pilot training program early in the war was quite crucial. When the IJNAF and IJAAF realized they were running out of experienced pilots (1943) it was too late to bring up sufficient numbers of new recruits up to standard to counter the massive air onslaught from the US.
I JUST WANTED TO SAY HOW EXCELLENT ALL YOUR VIDEOS ARE. Each one is well paced, gets right to the heart of the matter and supports itself with quotes and facts.
Superb analysis, video, and presentation, as always. Another major factor in the failure of Japan's air forces was their wholly inadequate pilot recovery. Saburo Sakai, one of Japan's greatest pilots - and one who survived the war - mentions it in his fine book.
i can't believe there are people who do not understand your accent. Not only if your accent perfectly easy to understand, it is also a lovely accent. Also great videos
thank you! I stopped caring once someone wrote a similar comment on a channel of a native speaker with almost radio quality voice... also not sure if it is intended, but your main youtube channel page is empty, had the same problem once you need to add some playlists etc.
The Japanese pilots (especially Japanese Navy pilots) were too strictly selected and too well trained at the beginning of WW-II. It took too long to train a very limited number of aviators, which could not replace the losses incurred.
Saburo Sakai's war diaries also report ridiculously high standards for japanese pilots, and they also mention the lack of parachutes in japanese planes. These were additional reasons for the rapid depletion of skilled japanese fighter pilots.
It would be a great idea to make a series on re-fighting battles with modern info. For example, knowing what we know today how could a D-day attack be improved? Where would it take place? What forces would be used? How would you improve the tactics?
Yeah, each D-Day landing craft should have been equiped with smoke mortars it would have saved alot of lives in Omaha Beach. Simple fix I don't why they didnt think about it back then.
What I like about Military History Visualized, is that he starts the discussion, by presenting the major aspects and then a vast number of military historians, in their comments, fill in an enormous amount of additional material. Hence by viewing, then reading the comments, one gains so much knowledge in a short period of time.
yeah, one which could transport two planes at a time. which was also highly prone to naval bombardment during take-off. a useless design but it undoubtedly served as a basis for bigger submarine designs and eventually nuclear submarines
Those planes were actually good, that they don't need to warm up before take off so they can take off immediately. Airplanes that time need to "warm up"
I come to this piece late, but I only began my study of the Pacific War about 2 years ago. MARVELOUS analysis of factors which, due to my scattershot approach, I was just beginning to come to on my own, but with a mass of additional factors I had not remotely begun to arrive at. This is enhanced by a multitude of equally perceptive viewer comments. Thank you for this, whoever you are. I shall subscribe immediately-I have a lot of catching up to do.
I love these videos. Your approach of just preventing hard data with very little unsubstantiated opinion is a joy. And no, this Birt doesn't find your accent at all hard to understand!
thank you, from the large amount of data I "gathered", native speakers seem to have little to no trouble understanding my accent... so it might not be my English capabilities that are the problem. And yes accents can be hard to understand, I remember have quite some troubles with Will Smith in the movie Ali.
Watching this it is very obvious that you've put a lot of time and thought into your presentation and I enjoyed it. However I was surprised that you did not include the main reason for many of the Japanese Empire's military mistakes/shortcomings. They believed that the naval war with the US would be short...They believed that the Pearl Harbor attack would cripple the US Navy's ability to prevent their seizing of pretty all of the South Pacific east to the Marshall Islands (they were correct in that assumption). They also believed that by the time the US Navy was in a position to contest them again they would in such a position of strength that the US would hesitate to respond militarily and that from this position they could negotiate some type of truce or cessation of hostilities (they were incorrect in this assumption). The IJN believed that they had the time to work a lot of these things out...They actually did not.
It took about 3 months to change a factories production from one type of aircraft to a new type. Numbers were important considering Japans industrial capacity at the time was much less than even Britain's. The loss of a quarter of a years production from a factory would have been hard to justify
In regards to Savo Island, a video I watched on the subject had said one US warship got a shot off on the bridge that contained the maps necessary to safely navigate, without those the fleet commander was hesitant to push forward as night gave way to light
So much detail! Love it - the level of analysis is fantastic! Have you read 'The End of the Imperial Japanese Navy' (1956) by Masanori Ito? It's a fascinating insight into the decisions of the Japanese Naval leadership during the war. If you can get hold of a copy I would highly recommend it! Keep up the good work friend!
Wolfelaw22. Many observers overrated the Japanese army and under-rated the Soviet force. At the battle of Nomonhan, in 1939, the Russian army crushed the Japanese army it was facing. This was a little known war but should have suggested to the world that the Soviet forces should not be under-rated; this became obvious only after the battle of Stalingrad in late 1942 and ending in January, 1943, a huge defeat for the Germans. From that point on, the entire war moved westward, freeing Russia from the Japanese occupation and saddling the German forces with huge casualties. Don't forget-the Russian dictator had no electorate he had to please so he could sacrifice thousands of men without fear of criticism. I do not know if anyone else has mentioned it but the destruction of the Japanese fleet of merchant ships, principally by the US, throughout World War 2 weakened the entire country.. Japan suffered serious shortages of food and war materiel; the Yamato was sent on a suicide mission because there was enough fuel for only a one way trip.
When speaking about the Zero fighter. You may have missed a vital point! The Japanese air arms spent most of their time flying over water and one very important piece of equipment on the Zero was it's fuel gage it was wildly inaccurate. Just why this was so and why itr was not corrected I have been unable to find out. This piece of intelligence wasw provided fror me by a Japanese Naval pilot in the 1960s (Yes I am that old LOL)
pff, well, large...hmm. " The 24 attack Swordfish came from 813, 815, 819, and 824 Naval Air Squadrons. The small number of attacking warplanes raised concern that Judgment would only alert and enrage the Italian Navy without achieving any significant results"... "The first wave of 12 aircraft,".... wow, impressive..2 waves of 12 aircraft.
Lord Shadoko but were actually battlecruisers..and most of them were repaired within a month..the fourth wasn't but that was due to expenses (and lower priority in wareffort) ,not due to severity of damage.
ODDBALL SOK Well, not exactly...the "Littorio", "Conte di Cavour" and "Caio Dullio" were battleships, and they were either sank or heavily damaged. Half of the Italian battle fleet was out of order for at least 6 months, to the cost of two Swordfish taken down. Hell, it was so successfull, the Japanese took inspiration from Judgment for the Pearl Harbor attack (which was, contrary to Taranto, half a failure).
Taranto archieved a lot if you look at the limited planes involved, and the loss of only 2 aircraft. But only one of the battleships hit was actually sunk, and one other was out of action for the rest of the war. All the others were repaired rather quickly. A strike from a single carrier can hardly be called a large strike. Even if successful.
The Japanese zero was pretty dominant until a functional/repairable one was found upside down on a beach. Excellent essay, the graphics work really well also.
thank you for a well done video, and your visual aids, that at first I thought wtf, work really well .this is the first of your vids I have watched. have you or could you please do one on Sir John Monash, the man that changed military tactics possibly more than any other single general yet is largely forgotten. thanks again on such a clear and concise video.
I pride myself on knowing much about WW2 in the pacific and I assumed that you were going to concentrate on attrition and lack of protection in the Japanese planes. I was happily wrong and although I was aware of many of the things you discussed, you put it together in a lucid and comprehensive presentation. I knew I subscribed to your channel for a reason. 😁
Admiral Yamamoto, the premier strategist, made it clear that they only had 6 months to maybe a year before the industrial capacity of the U.S. would prevail. He studied in America, traveled extensively, and saw first hand the enormous manufacturing potential they would be up against and had no illusions about what would result in a prolonged war. Especially since they had to commit such a large amount of men and material to China. Resources they desperately needed to fight the Pacific War.
Any successor to the A6M would have required a more powerful engine, which was the major issue, not the plane itself. Heck, with the Homare engine being only 30mm wider than the Sakae one, it could have been fitted to a structurally modified A6M.
The problem is that the engine for the Zero was a reproduced P&W radial design, so Japan did not have the engine expertise. Aircraft development is all about available power. B17 vrs Lancaster vrs B29 for instance. B17 designed around 750Hp engines. Lancaster designed around 1300Hp engines and the B29, designed around 2200Hp engines.
What a confused nation. The army was determined to commit suicide via Soviet Steamroller, the Navy was determined to commit suicide via American Airpower. They were screwed either way.
LOL, thanks, yeah, luckily a few months ago one of "them", asked Magz to add subtitles, because he claimed that Magz speaking too fast or something. Seriously, Magz is probably news anchor quality or above... thus, they are either not really capable or just trolls. The good news, there is plenty of manpower for the penal companies :)
+Military History Visualized I am my brazilian, english is my second language. It is a bit hard to understand but not impossible. It is fine but subtitles would be helpful.
As allows well thought out and presented. The Japanese were inflexible in their planning. What has always struck me as odd is Japan is an island nation with out a strong merchant navy. With out a strong merchant Navy an Island nation will starve in the end.
But from 1800-1868 Japan was a virtual closed self sustaining islands nation. It's main colonies were close, like Korea and Manchuria which did not require large fleets. Import from further away was often from industrialized nations who could supply their own shipping and probably cheaper. So prior to WOII there was no need for a bigger merchant fleet. And remember Japan is 1,5 to 2 times bigger then Great Britain. And wet rice-fields are much more productive then wheat farms. But also more vulnerable to air attack when constructed in hilly terrain. So in the end starvation would be a thread.
Thought Japan started the war with the USA because of increasing US sanction which meant that Japan could only keep fighting in the China for another year. If Japanese high command expected a fast victory over China starting a war with USA would be illogical in almost any Japanese thought process.
Also their cruelty in Chna really hardened the resolve of the Chinese resistance especially after Nanking. The simplest way to explain their defeat is that they tried to bite more than they could chew. They conquered Manchuria which is bigger than Japan itself and instead of consolidating their hold, they decided to try to conquer some more leading to a reaction in Washington to apply crippling sanctions.
Excellent presentation. I am a Retired Navy Man and student of WW-2 and have met many of the famous Naval Aviators of that war, including but certainly not limited to Admiral John Thatch, originator and developer of the "Thatch Weave". I also had a discussion with Captain Elliott Buckmaster who was Commanding Officer of USS Yorktown when she was sunk at the Battle of Midway. He was also C.O. of USS Franklin when she received intense battle damage during a fighter sweep against the main Japanese Island of Honshu on 19 March 1946.. A asked Captain Buckmaster, in his opinion, what would have happened if the Japanese had initiated the Kamikaze attacks earlier (using lesser trained airmen for that purpose) when they still had an effective nucleus of trained and experienced combat pilots as well as aircraft that were equal, if not superior to the U.S. Navy aviators. I suggested that these more able pilots could have flown cover for the Kamikaze pilots. Certainly, the Kamikaze pilots with Zero aircraft, manned by experienced combat aviators, flying cover against the Wildcat; would have fared better than untrained pilots flying the Zero and other aircraft against the far more numerous and better Hellcat fighters. These Kamikaze pilots later in the war were facing the U.S. Fleets with far better air combat air control capabilities than these fleets had earlier. Captain Buckmaster told me, that in his opinion, that would have made it very difficult for the U.S. Navy. As an example, the Japanese Navy left one carrier back in Japan instead of adding it to the Midway operation because, due to manpower losses at the Coral Sea Battle they could not supply the personnel for it's air group. Having that fifth carrier manned by easily trained Kamikaze pilots might very well have turned the balance at Midway.
answer to your last statement. Japanese navy has a strict deployment code, that a pilot is stuck to the same ship. In US equivalent term, this means a York Town pilot can only be deployed with Yorktown and never with Enterprise. Hence leaving one of their carrier at home doing nothing during Mid-way. Would it make any difference, possibly not if Japanese command is similarly lack flexibility on their 1st wave of attack. In ideal world they could have assign 3 carriers for self-defence and the rest for midway bombing, but they simply won't.
Excellent combination of discussion and video demonstration to illustrate a point and visualize an example of the subject at hand. I like this channel very much! A great combination of classroom instruction and discussion combined with visual examples to show how things worked in combat conditions. Thanks and keep 'em coming!
Ha. You marines and navy forget how much you were all getting your asses handed to you until the government put the army in control of the pacific theater - MacArthur. Another marine myth busted
Probably you don't check comments for old videos like this, but I was thinking about your videos of ship sinkings over the course of the war and thought of something that would be equally visual but even more revealing: Naval strength by type for each side month (or week) by month from '41 through '45. You would see carriers drop to near 0 for both navies in 1942 and then the separation in '44 and '45. Also, and I don't know how you would "visualize" this, I think President Roosevelt was a huge factor in the early success of the US Navy -- both in supporting Nimitz and in pressing for the Independence class light fleet carriers. The success of the US Navy was a team effort with Roosevelt very much working behind the scenes.
10:25 I want to engage with something you say real quick concerning your error listed here a, "Lack of Foresight" by the Japanese air forces in this case. I recall in the Operation Barbarossa video as well as the German Luftwaffe that one key principle to consider to avoid fatalism was that every general fights the last war. I feel a more appropriate interpretation given that principle would be something that can be applied to the Allies as well in some operations. In Operation Market Garden, a the operational failures there can be attributed to a common mistake the Allies made even in the Italian campaign. As Steven Ross in his book, "American War Plans, 1941-1945: The Test of Battle" the Allies failed to account for the "independent will of the enemy". From what you explained in this video, Operation Barbarossa, and the Luftwaffe video, it appears more fitting to state rather than a lack of foresight for any given side, it was a lack of crediting the opponent with the ability to adapt and make those early changes to secure victory.
Can you make a video about how the Japanese combined fleet success initially? Kinda want to hear more about the axis power's glorious side, although we can learn from their failures...thx a lot from the video tho :)
Yeah, the Japanese navy early on in the war was far superior to the U.S. and Australian navies. They had superior night fighting capabilities with the use of low light aiming systems. They would use it to ambush convoys in the middle of the night. I recall one documentary I watched where spotters on an American cruiser were using search lights and they suddenly saw a Japanese cruiser appear alongside of them and open up in a broadside barrage. People who ever told they were going into the Pacific campaign early on in the war were terrified of what was considered a Japanese juggernaut.
I'd say they were TRAGIC heroes, after all the reason they willingly gave their lives in suicide runs was that they had been heavily indoctrinated into thinking it was the obvious and virtuous thing to do. Many of the more experienced Japanese pilots thought the whole kamikaze thing was a colossal waste of equipment and manpower, a pile of bullshit that proved to be just that and almost wiped out an entire generation of young citizens. Their act per se was indeed heroic, the problems lie in the reasons they were pushed to do it.
+Bart Bols Nope, it was an objective lie that the US wanted to destroy Japan and all of its culture like those pilots were taught. They were "trained" _specifically_ to throw their lives away, whereas the D-day soldiers were trained to _fight_ and survive as long as possible to fight some more.
Yes this is a good analysis of what happened, but even if the Japanese had been able to upgrade their aircraft over the course of the war, they would still have faced the training problem because the United States submarine blockade of Japan greatly limited fuel that reached their islands. Thus petrol for training pilots would still be a limiting factor. From my perspective Japan was doomed from the start and no strategy could halt the eventual onslaught from the United States. If instead, however, Japan had only attacked the European powers colonies (e.g. Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, etc.), then there would have been a greatly different outcome. The United States would likely have remained out of the conflict and the European powers were overwhelmed by the war in Europe, thus unable to respond. So Japan could have obtained the southeastern Asia empire its navy envisioned, even if it's industrial output was smaller and aircraft improvements more modest.
I have to respectively correct and/or disagree where applicable. This may cover the supporting reasons for the failures of the air forces, but it doesnt cover the main reasons which are a lot simpler to realize in hindsight. First, lets remember the whole reason for Japanese involvement in the first place: The acquisition of oil fields in China. Stratagists will agree any country that is this deficient for purposes of invading another country is already at a disadvantage. Second, being an island country their resources were severely limited, specifically in steel production. Although they did build massive military forces overall, it did come at a cost. In this case, equipment durability. Take for instance the mainstay of the navy, the "Zero". It was a terror of the sky and able to out maneuver anything the Allies could muster for two years, true. But it suffered from almost non-existant armoring. Like most aircraft, it was little more than a frame and skin with no protection to the pilot, engine, or fuel tanks. In contrast, American aircraft were hit more often but were more survivable and repairable. Three, Admiral Yamamoto knew American production capabilities and its will to win when its back was against the wall. Despite his talent and ability of those under him, he was totally opposed to initiating hostilities based on this reason and the fact that secretly he knew the Emporor was strategically wrong for entering war in the first place. He even forcasted his own defeat with haunting accuracy, "I shall run wild for six months...". The exit stratagy was not for defeat of the U.S. but for stalemate which in itself was self-defeating. No matter how good the resources or how many, it would eventually be a futile effort by the policies very design. Four, the failure of the destruction of the carrier forces at Pearl Harbor meant the U.S. had a strong foothold in the Pacific until forces could be built up. And lastly, the Battle of Midway was truly the turning point for the three years that followed. The Japanese did not expect the Yorktown to be present thanks to the superhuman efforts of the repair crews after the Battle of Coral Sea, the breaking of Naval Intelligence of Japanese Naval and Diplomatic Codes, and the errors in field tactics which wasted valuable time for critical attacks. And lets not forget that at Midway not only did the Japanese Navy lose four of their main carriers, but 3500 Naval personal which consisted a bulk of their most experienced pilots. Without them, they pretty much had to start over. Even the best planes are worthless at that point.
Very sound points, just one little thing: the Emperor (as far as we know) was not the main advocate for Japan's military effort. Yamamoto was basically forced to plan the attack on Pearl by the newly-self-appointed military government, which was mostly composed of Army brass (Tojo and the like), the Emperor didn't really have the authority nor the capability to stop the Hawks after the Nakasone cabinet had gone down the drain.
+Will Winters There were no significant developed oil fields in China worth Japan provoking war with the western powers. Weren't you instead thinking of the oil fields in British-held Burma, and in the Dutch East Indies?
+BattleRock & could you also make a video on early cold war Nuclear weapon delivery systems used by all factions & what Nuclear strike strategies were intended for use, (ensurance of MAD theory)
Very well then, best of luck and I look forward to seeing your future videos on the topics. What subjects are the focus of the videos you are working on currently?
+BattleRock actually I am undecided, probably a short video on aces vs. average pilots, did a script a few weeks ago, mostly concerned with selling my stuff before moving, organizing my trip and what books to copy/scan before I leave. Tomorrow I will go to the library to continue checking some books on my first checklist of about 100 titles... the second checklist is still unprinted and growing. So no big topics, mostly information gathering.
so will the video differences between Aces & Newer pilots include comparisons from both the global conflicts(WW 1&2)? Thank You for having the time to answer the comments to your videos, you seem incredibly busy with projects & important studies! Once again thank you & best of luck with everything & I look forward to your future content :)
+Dark X Yes please, everybody knows that Italy had plenty of problems in WW2, but few people know exactly why. Often people call them cowards without knowing that Italian soldiers often had been in front lines for months even in quiet periods, while British, even in quiet periods, did not keep units in front line for more than twelve days without 4 days of rest. There were Italian divisions that had been fighting for more than twenty four months in the front line, and that had greatly exceeded the theoretical 200 days which American and British experts had set as maximum limit of physical and psychologial resistance in battle, after which, according to them, the soldier becomes exhausted and militarily inefficient. In direct quote from www.scribd.com/doc/9344344/Italian-Army-in-Wwii
Saying that the Mitsubishi Zero should have had a successor lined up in 1942 is not really true. In 1942, it was the best performing aircraft in the Pacific rim, bar none. The USA was forced to develop aircraft like the Corsair to compete with it, whereas the Japanese Navy had no incentive to replace it until after it lost air superiority, and even then it was still a good plane even if it was no longer the world-beater it had been. It did suffer from a weakness that was a matter of Japanese design philosophy that was mostly adopted by the navy. The Zero was made to be as light and maneuverable as possible, which meant that it had little to no armor, and lacked self-sealing fuel tanks. The navy felt that high performance was an armor more effective than metal would provide, and at first it seemed to work. But when the US-made aircraft matched or exceeded the Zero's performance while carrying armor, the flaw proved fatal. Many a Japanese pilot died in combat because bullets passed through their aircraft like it wasn't there, or burst into flames after only a few hits. The Japanese army had different philosophies, and their aircraft were generally better protected, especially later in the war. Another major contributing factor in the defeat of Japanese and German air power was a policy both followed and failed to change when conditions merited change. They tended to keep their pilots in combat until they died or were incapacitated by injuries to the point of no longer being able to fly. The USA had a different policy which proved to be a decisive factor. US pilots were kept in combat until they had a certain number of victories, or until they gained a certain notoriety. Then they were rotated back to the US on war bond tours and to train new pilots, passing on what they had learned instead of wasting the experience. Because of that, new US pilots went into combat knowing things that Japanese and German replacement pilots either learned the hard way, or died before learning at all. This resulted in the combat effectiveness of new US pilots continually improving over the course of the war, while the initial skills of Axis pilots grew worse and worse. The end result was that by 1944, most of the Axis pilots who started the war were dead and the Axis air forces were pathetically unskilled when compared to how good they were in 1940. That was more important than industrial capacity -- Both Germany and Japan were making new aircraft and putting them into service right up until the war ended. But that meant little when the men they were stuffing into the cockpits barely knew how to fly them, much less be effective in combat.
And for what do you issue specifications? There was virtually nothing the Zero faced in 1942 that could touch it. Development of replacement models in wartime is almost always a reaction to something the opposition has put in the field to counter your stuff. Until then, there's not only no incentive to design something new, there's no point because you haven't a clue as to which way to go with it.
***** Development is not strictly limited to what you face in combat. Development is based on the same thing that drives the original peace time design. There are always ways to make things better. Simple things like engine design improvements, aerodynamic improvements, whatever. You take what makes the existing model great and improve it. All design cannot be reactionary. That's just poor planning. Your contention ultimately makes no sense. It makes it sound like anyone who's ahead in the arms race is doomed to fall behind because the catastrophic success they experienced in superior design leaves them flat footed in knowing where to turn to next.
Except that that's exactly what happens in real life, and was just as true today as it was then. Even in peacetime, nations don't rely on small tweaks and tinkering. They have to have something to tell their designers to do. So they look at what both their likely enemies and their friends are doing, and attempt to extrapolate what would be needed to beat it. In 1942, the US didn't have anything in the field that could beat a Zero, and the Japanese couldn't just tell their designers "make it better". The return would be a question of "how?" And yes, war is very much a issue of "we do something, and they counter it, and then we counter their counter." Russia and Germany have a great example of that. When Operation Barbarossa kicked off, Russia had the greatest tank army in the world on paper. But they didn't have the best trained crews, enough fuel and ammo for those crews to train to be better, and their force was mainly made up of light tanks that didn't stand a chance against the Panzers when they did take the field. So the Germans had a major advantage until in desperation, the Russians designed and put the T-34 into production in record time. Then all of a sudden, the German superiority disappeared. They had to scramble to develop models of their tanks to counter what the Russians had done to get it back. That made the Russians improve their own tanks, and so it kept going for the rest of the war. I could easily point out similar arms races in just about any war in history. They just about all had them, and they all boil down to the same formula: If you're winning, you don't think you need new, more expensive weapons. It isn't until you start losing that it becomes a priority, and then you do what you have to do to counter whatever new weapon your enemy fielded and made you start losing.
***** What happens is not the same as analyzing it as reasonable. No design reaches mass production without already being in some way obsolete to its designer. There are always things to improve, things to add or change. One doesn't need combat performance trials to know that giving it a more powerful lighter engine would help. One doesn't need to see an ASDIC deployed to escorts to know that being able to dive deeper for longer is beneficial. When a German military leader decided that he absolutely had to have radios in all of his tanks it was forethought. When the US sent a design request that lead to the B-29 in 1938 they had forethought that predated any of the counter play of the strategic bombing war yet ended up being decisively important in the conduct of the final stages of the pacific theatre's air campaign. So for every example of where planning failed its easy to find examples of where forethought lead to astounding success.
Since you mentioned it, you should analyze the Battle of Guadalcanal. Given the on-paper virtual parity between the opposing forces and the fact it was a truly 3-dimensional air-land-sea battle with constant combat in all 3 areas rather than having clearly separate air, sea and land phases as in almost every other battle, it's great armchair general material.
RUclips's ad policies are getting out of hand, thus sadly, I have to adapt my financial strategy if I want to continue this channel.
Please, support properly sourced Military History on Patreon! Every $ helps: patreon.com/mhv/
I'll provide you with some money only when someone will develop a digital currency designed specifically for the Internet. Believe me, I have absolutely nothing against you and the rest of youtubers whose work I highly appreciate, it's just a matter of principle
Bitcoin?
H
man RUclips are greedy bastards.
I'll say it so you don't have to
Military History Visualized I
There was a philosophical difference in design, Americans focused on aircraft designs that protected the plane and pilot with armor plating in strategic locations around the cockpit, and things like self-sealing fuel tanks. This necessitated heavier aircraft and developed much more powerful engines to push them which lead to very powerful heavily protected fighters and bombers that could survive sometimes extreme damage and still bring the pilot home. Japan instead focused on speed and maneuverability, and sacrificed the same safety issues paramount to US designs to save weight and allow for shorter assembly time. This was common in both fighter and bomber design. The biggest shortcoming of this became very apparent early in the war when the AVF forces (Flying Tigers) in China quickly realized that the bombers and fighters were extremely vulnerable to catching fire and burning if hit from leaking fuel, and that the Japanese pilots had no protection and that if the cockpit area was hit it usually would kill or injure the pilot due to lack of pilot protection. This ended up being the critical factor, as the war progressed US Pilots got far more experienced and skilled because their aircraft were more likely to bring them back safely, whereas the most skilled Japanese pilots died off early in the war, leaving Japan with an increasingly poorly trained fighter pilot pool flying what were becoming dangerously outdated aircraft. As good as an aircraft the Zero was, it was technically totally outclassed by the time the Corsair and Hellcat arrived. Alot of this *is* mentioned in the video, its a fascinating history of how the two powers differed in thinking.
Less of a philosophical difference and more of a workaround. To attain the desired performance and range with a mediocre engine, you have to cut weight from somewhere.
Japanese view: Big guns mean little if you can't get them on target.
American view: Getting guns on target means little if you can't take down your target.
In general P-40s were rubbish but held on. Rugged planes can survive longer and fight longer.
+MiguelPmpM While the P40 was inferior to many aircraft like the Zero the AVF in China showed that with a skilled pilot and appropriate tactics the P40 could master the Japanese. Also the Japanese Navy got most of the Zeros, the army air corps in China got older models that were clearly inferior to the P40.Also the P40 got upgraded to the far better Kitty Hawk and stayed in production throughout most of the war.
Bad Kitty No Milk Tonight Well, to be fair if you have a captured version of an enemy aircraft,it helps a lot (for later in the war)!
With the AVF (I had always heard it as AVG, but same difference I suppose), the Japanese were pretty unfamiliar with the P40 and the US pilots were pretty unfamiliar with the Zero at first. Then it was just a matter of who figured out who's plane first.
Very nice, but I think you missed the biggest single factor: The U.S. went to considerable trouble to protect and preserve their pilots while the IJN -- in particular -- considered pilots to be as expendable as the average infantryman. The IJN opted for range and speed instead of protection on its planes and make no effort to recover pilots shot down or otherwise lost in operations. USN planes were given increasing amounts of armor in addition to self-sealing gas tanks. Submarines, flying boats, and PT boats were routinely deployed by the USN to recover their downed air crews as the Japanese looked on in amazement.
It's my belief that this was an unanticipated consequence of the civil indoctrination campaign -- intended to provide an infantry willing and even eager to give up its life for the Emperor. When this attitude expanded to highly trained airmen and even high ranking officers, like the (at least three) naval officers who insisted on going down with their ships at Midway, the cost of an eagerly self-sacrificing infantry proved too costly for the over all Japanese war effort.
The three great generals who unified Japan would have mocked this notion of honorable death as that is not the way you win wars.
Oda Nobunaga, is not impressed by your "Honorable Deaths". :)
Exactly. He would have seen it the same way Halsey did. You want to make the other SOB die an honorable death and live to fight another day.
Exactly. At the start of the war, the Japanese had many more experiences and skilled pilots than the US. As the war progressed, the US pilot corps increased in number as well as average skill and experience. As this was happening, the Japanese pilot corps continued to lose it's skilled pilots. The Japanese doctrine of completing the mission over all else, especially the lives of the aircrew, led inevitably to the US dominating the air with experienced pilots while the Japanese were scraping the bottom of the barrel for whoever they could find to fly the planes.
Absolutely right!
The airmen were as expendable as the infantrymen, and the infantry were as expendable as ammunition. One officer fought an amazing defense until continuing to fight was hopeless and strategically pointless, and led an amazing breakout to save 2/3 of his men. His enemy, General Zhukov, thought both the defense and the breakout were so capably led that the officer deserved a medal. The Japanese instead forced him to commit suicide in disgrace for fleeing the battlefield.
I work in manufacturing. I am no longer on the assembly line but I was. Hard for others to understand the mind numbing same repetition over and over and over. Day after day. Unless you do it you don't really know what a hell it can be. Now think about this. You manufacture say guns. Day after day you do the same thing over and over, year after year to help the war. The detail to accuracy in the barrel. Butt stock. Springs. Putting it all together. Package. Ship. Mind numbing dock work over and over loading boats, day after day. Boat goes 1,000 miles. Unloads. Someone carries all this heavy equipment into battle. Through jungle. Up the side of a mountain. After the battle Americans enter a cave. Find tons of guns and ammo left behind. Why???? 10 different types of ammo. 12 different types of guns. Nothing works in any other gun. This type of ammo only works in this type of gun and no other. So Japanese took what they could use and left the rest. So 1/2 their ammo gets left behind. Unusable, unless you want to carry 8 guns into battle. And all that work. From the factory. Hand carried through a jungle, up the side of a mountain. Just to be left. All that effort in vain. How do you win a war like that?? You don't.
You have a good point, but don't forget these same Japanese (and later the NVA who copied them in some ways) were able to dismantle and HAND CARRY complete artillery pieces up and down mountains, through swamps and jungle while subsisting on a few handfuls of rice. Their fighting spirit was their secret weapon, they thought.
@@fazole the NVA won because they have a similar firepower to an American unit. M48? T-55, F-4? MiG-21
@@3dcomrade The NVA never won a major military engagement. Attributing their success to equipment isn't right.
@@CarrotConsumer perhaps you meant t say, “They never won a major battle against the U.S. during the Vietnam Conflict”, because they sure as fuck rolled over SVN, then Cambodia (to take out Pol Pot), and they shut down a Chinese incursion. Their predecessor organization handed the French their asses on a plate.
@@3dcomrade nah. Not even close to being the reason.
When a man with a German accent starts talking about inefficiency, you damned well listen!
;)
We could use some German efficiency at the dinner table. Eating inefficiently leads to enlarging the stomach, increased appetite, plus, you get fat.
Eating involves chewing, and there are 3 ways of chewing. 2 of them are extreme. At the extremes are the anorexic, who chews the heck
out of food before swallowing, and the people who wolf their food, wolfers, who swallow chunks of food, which often have to be washed down with a drink, usually a sugar drink.
Sounds crazy, but do you know of the "hunger hormones"? Your doctor will tell you to go on a diet, like mine did, and stay silent about the hunger hormones. Google search them
and find out something you never knew before. I posted this up in another discussion group, and a medical student replied that he knew about "hunger hormones" and I could get
screwed, although his wording was a little sharper. They tell med students, but how does that help you control your weight? It doesn't. All your doctor will say is "You're obese, and you have to go on a diet". Weight loss diets fail at a 90% rate, in part, because people don't understand about satiation at a meal. Google "hunger hormones", it will only be a few sentences to explain them, and it will take you by surprise. Afterwards, respond and I'll submit the easiest, most sustainable way to lose weight. Preview: it's sustainable because there is very little change to your normal, delicious diet. And you can eat "on the run", like busy people do, and stay on your diet. Call my bluff. I lost 50 lbs in one year.
@Some Guy - that's because Hitler was an Austrian megalomaniac.
@@mu99ins who cares?!?
@@dennisschell5543 - Virtually no one. That's safe to say, as almost nobody would read such a long winded comment. Did you read it all? Do you think you have to fill your belly to quench your hunger?
I have viewed only a handful of these lessons, but have benefited from watching these few. The mastery of the content is simply fantastic. The heavy German perhaps Austrian accent only adds to the entertainment value. Thank you for sharing your knowledge in English. Also, I am probably most impressed that you keep these very complex topics simplified into just a few minute presentations. Well done. Well done indeed.
Pretty thorough for such a short video. I would like to add a few details I've read from many places but have never seen in one place. Japan having few natural resources, built their planes light and purposefully used engines that used less fuel. Majority of IJN pilots were enlisted. Aircraft commanders of the larger planes often were no even pilots. Bad or unreasonable orders coming in from above could not be challenged. An example of this would be during the Guadalcanal campaign, Zero pilots were forbidden to drop their external fuel tanks due to a shortage of these items, but in doing so, they negated the advantage of manueverabilty (3g max limitiation on the Zero with Fuel tanks). This made it much easier for the clumsier Wildcat to shoot them down. Also flying around with a bomb full of fuel vapors is asking for trouble.
The Japanese sent aircraft engineers to Germany and the Germans shipped engines to Japan during the war by submarine. The Ki-60 Hien (codenamed Tony) was a Japanese design following the German idea of armor and speed first, manueverability second. It first flew in early 1941, but for some reason was never produced in large quantities. Japanese pilots were still stuck in WW1 style thinking and prized manueverability over all else so the flimsy Oscar was relied upon.
The Zero had some real problems as a gun platform. The 20mm barrels were cut down thus reducing muzzle velocity and accuracy. The rounds carried were only 120 in the early models. Visibility over the nose was not good and in a turning fight you would lose site of the enemy under your nose. Some ace pilots were known to crank their seat up as high as it would go in order to see over the nose and fire by looking over the sight. Firing the nose mounted 7.7mm machine gun filled the cockpit with fumes.
Also the Zero lacked a pressure carburetor in early war, so negative G caused fuel starvation. Finally, there was no training squadron for pilots in the rear. New pilots had to learn their skills in combat--therefore they were killed before they could absorb what they learned.
5:44
"HMS Prince of Vales!"
as a Velshman, i laughed quite a bit
Japanese philosophy at the advent of war reminds me very much of the philosophy of the Confederate States as the broke away from the United States at the advent of the Civil War.
Both realized that they were markedly inferior in population, industrial capacity and wealth but, both espoused that their elan and the fighting capability of their fighting forces could make up for the deficiencies in those areas.
Both had the vain hope that they could achieve enough success early in the war to make the United States sue for peace on their terms.
The Japanese spent the major part of the war seeking the "Decisive Naval Battle" like their victory at Tsushima over the Russians. Neither the Japanese nor the Southern States were equipped and ready for a protracted war against an enemy that would not give up despite early defeats like the Battle of Bull Run in the Civil War and Pearl Harbor or the Philippines in WW-II...
Financial mis-management was an additional factor in US Civil War. Cotton was the Confederate’s main money earner. When the war began they put up prices which initially gave them a boost. But the high prices allowed cotton competition to come in and prices collapsed. That loss of income took them out of the war.
@@Dave5843-d9m The Confederacy was so in need of the cash from cotton that it sacrificed food crop acreage to grow more cotton. That resulted in the South's in ability to feed an army in the field. Southern troops were distracted by their need to find food.
This is a good comparison. Lee thought the north lacked resolve about slavery and dissolution of the Union. He should have talked to Lincoln first. Lee believed if he bloodies the north's nose quickly and early, the North would sue for peace, as you state. It was seriously wrong as far as Lincoln was concerned.
I don't think the Japanese truly understood how much manufacturing power the US could bring to this war. The Germans really didn't either. When you read the history of the manufacturing side of WW II, who, before it actually happened, would have believed that ocean going ships would be built in Colorado for the war effort? America had a lot of people with great imaginations given a chance to go after problems no one else had previously imagined. The Japanese knew they needed to win quickly, or atleast, get a peace treaty. Not catching the aircraft carriers at Pearl, and sinking so much of the capital fleet in shallow waters so that it could be refloated and repaired was a huge error on their part.
@@cdjhyoung Nazi Germany secret service had no clue just how industrialized the Soviet Union ... and they probably had no clue about the US either. Imho were morons who thought they were "the master race" and therefore didn't even bother to find out how good their opponents were. The whole reason the Kriegsmarine used submarines was because Nazi Germany could only fever dream about competing on the ocean surface with the Royal & US navies.
@@adamcrookedsmile It wasn't only the German and Japanese war planners that couldn't see the potential industrial might of the US or USSR. Charles Lindberg toured pre-war Germany and was terrified at what he saw. He returned to the US and tried to use his renown as a public figure to keep the US out of a European war. He was painted in the press and a coward and a traitor when in reality he thought the huge head start the Germans had in building up their military would over run the US before we could build to respond. He was neither a coward nor a traitor. He just didn't have all the available facts.
If Germany or Japan could have effectively attacked the manufacturing areas of the US, and I don't mean just terror raids, this whole discussion may have come out differently. Being out of reach for either country to do anything but sink ships off our shores allowed the US factories to really produce, unlike the German and Japanese industries that were under steady attack day and night starting in January, 1943.
I have to say I think you have ignored one important aspect of what was going on. The US was going through and cycling its pilots. That meant that the the newly trained pilots straight out of the academy had much better ideas of enemy doctrine than the IJN pilots ever did. The US Navy pilots, if not pilots in general knew what to expect and they knew how to counter it.
So once you add in the good, but not great aircraft, the limited number of pilots and the mismanagement of pilots, the Marianas Turkey shoot is not just a likely outcome, but something that is inevitable.
I would also add that US naval, carrier, damage control doctrine was also significantly superior and to not think it as a factor is being somewhat unkind. The idea of flooding the aviation fuel tanks with carbon dioxide to prevent secondary fires gave the US ships far greater resilience. This itself doesn't sound like much, but if you can save a ship, that means you can save the crew. When you save the crew, you save the skills they have. This means that more pilots, those who are awaiting refits, reloads, refueling, could get out should a carrier be attacked. Compare to one of the IJN heavy carriers, lost to secondary explosions as craft were being fitted with anti-air ammunition and their anti-ship munitions left out and in the open.
Oh God, here's the inexperienced pilot bs again.
***** Did I say inexperienced?
I said the American pilots were knowledgeable of the enemy doctrine. They had active combat vets who were able to say 'this is how the enemy fights' and that intelligence helped make the most of their skills.
In comparison, IJN doctrine allowed their pilots to whittled down to an ineffective force and so, had their knowledge lost.
he covered all the things you mention, you just didn't notice.
Excellent post. The Japanese left their experienced pilots on the line until they would be eventually killed. As you said, the US was able to leverage the experience of their pilots by rotating them back to the States to train the next crop of pilots.
This really makes me want to play hoi4.
+Badpak
SOOOOON, can't wait for its release.
D-day blahhh! Release date should have been May 10th.
May 10th 2015 you mean?
+Badpak I have not heard of this game, what is it, and what is it like?
It a strategy game called hearts of iron 4. Its about supplying your troops with weapons etc to win the war whilest simultanously having command over the course of the war.
Excellent analysis. The argument of lack of an effective pilot training program early in the war was quite crucial. When the IJNAF and IJAAF realized they were running out of experienced pilots (1943) it was too late to bring up sufficient numbers of new recruits up to standard to counter the massive air onslaught from the US.
I JUST WANTED TO SAY HOW EXCELLENT ALL YOUR VIDEOS ARE. Each one is well paced, gets right to the heart of the matter and supports itself with quotes and facts.
Glad you like them!
Superb analysis, video, and presentation, as always. Another major factor in the failure of Japan's air forces was their wholly inadequate pilot recovery. Saburo Sakai, one of Japan's greatest pilots - and one who survived the war - mentions it in his fine book.
i can't believe there are people who do not understand your accent. Not only if your accent perfectly easy to understand, it is also a lovely accent. Also great videos
thank you! I stopped caring once someone wrote a similar comment on a channel of a native speaker with almost radio quality voice...
also not sure if it is intended, but your main youtube channel page is empty, had the same problem once you need to add some playlists etc.
is that on google+ or youtube
youtube
thanks man i had no idea. I just spend 20 mins trying to figure out how to change it and I couldnt. I dont upload anymore so I dont mind xD
wait i think i did it
This is why I love this channel it puts both sides into perspective
Excellent overview, concisely covering all cause-and-effect issues.
Author, thanks for the subtitles! They are usefull for those, who doesn't know english well enougth (subscriber from Russia)
another excellent report. I've been a history buff most of my life, and I find these videos to be refreshing and most informational
+Randall Coon thank you!
What an excellent video! Well sourced, carefully presented. You Tube cries out for superior producers like you.
The Japanese pilots (especially Japanese Navy pilots) were too strictly selected and too well trained at the beginning of WW-II. It took too long to train a very limited number of aviators, which could not replace the losses incurred.
Is this what you do in all your videos? Because it's even handed, accurate, informative, and straightforward.
Subbed!
thank you, yeah mostly, some have stronger visualization aspects for organization or numbers and there is an occasional joke video.
welcome!
+Military History Visualized I honestly don't know how you make these so frequently, congrats from the UK
being crazy for sure helps ;)
For a short vid, you managed to hit all the salient points. Good job.
Ironically for a channel called Military History Visualized, there is a surprisingly small number of visuals.
Good analysis, it looks behind individual battles and analyses the nuts and bolts that contributed to the outcome of the conflict.
A very thorough analyse , thank you for posting.
Saburo Sakai's war diaries also report ridiculously high standards for japanese pilots, and they also mention the lack of parachutes in japanese planes. These were additional reasons for the rapid depletion of skilled japanese fighter pilots.
As always, interesting and informative, great stuff!!
Japan knew how to fight battles, she just didn't know how to fight a war.
Love this series, and this is a stand-out episode. Very informative and interesting.
This is my 2nd time watching this video. This is a superb analysis of the Japanese Air Forces in World War II. Well done.
thanks
Just came over your channel by accident... And after 1 video i subed! :D Nice job!
thank you and welcome!
Same here... Im wondering how i didnt stumbled upon this channel earlier
Same here - just encountered this one, going to watch more.
I'm the 87981th subscriber.
I sense some serious binge watching in my future, this was a great video.
Thank you for these videos I love your work your doing the world a great service.
It would be a great idea to make a series on re-fighting battles with modern info. For example, knowing what we know today how could a D-day attack be improved? Where would it take place? What forces would be used? How would you improve the tactics?
Yeah, each D-Day landing craft should have been equiped with smoke mortars it would have saved alot of lives in Omaha Beach. Simple fix I don't why they didnt think about it back then.
What I like about Military History Visualized, is that he starts the discussion, by presenting the major aspects and then a vast number of military historians, in their comments, fill in an enormous amount of additional material. Hence by viewing, then reading the comments, one gains so much knowledge in a short period of time.
Fun fact the Japanese also had Submarine Aircraft Carriers
yeah, one which could transport two planes at a time. which was also highly prone to naval bombardment during take-off. a useless design but it undoubtedly served as a basis for bigger submarine designs and eventually nuclear submarines
the i-400 Sentoku
3 planes at a time actually. :)
Yes they had 60 000 miles or range at a certain speed and factor miles or kilometers, as far as I know miles, correct me if I'm wrong.
Those planes were actually good, that they don't need to warm up before take off so they can take off immediately. Airplanes that time need to "warm up"
I come to this piece late, but I only began my study of the Pacific War about 2 years ago.
MARVELOUS analysis of factors which, due to my scattershot approach, I was just beginning to come to on my own, but with a mass of additional factors I had not remotely begun to arrive at.
This is enhanced by a multitude of equally perceptive viewer comments.
Thank you for this, whoever you are. I shall subscribe immediately-I have a lot of catching up to do.
I really liked the presentation and explanations in this video, will definitely subscribe.
Concise, thoughtful and accurate. Well done!
Fantastic video! I really enjoyed it, very informative and interesting.
thank you!
I love these videos. Your approach of just preventing hard data with very little unsubstantiated opinion is a joy. And no, this Birt doesn't find your accent at all hard to understand!
thank you, from the large amount of data I "gathered", native speakers seem to have little to no trouble understanding my accent... so it might not be my English capabilities that are the problem. And yes accents can be hard to understand, I remember have quite some troubles with Will Smith in the movie Ali.
Great information, thanks.
As always, very nicely done.
Watching this it is very obvious that you've put a lot of time and thought into your presentation and I enjoyed it. However I was surprised that you did not include the main reason for many of the Japanese Empire's military mistakes/shortcomings. They believed that the naval war with the US would be short...They believed that the Pearl Harbor attack would cripple the US Navy's ability to prevent their seizing of pretty all of the South Pacific east to the Marshall Islands (they were correct in that assumption). They also believed that by the time the US Navy was in a position to contest them again they would in such a position of strength that the US would hesitate to respond militarily and that from this position they could negotiate some type of truce or cessation of hostilities (they were incorrect in this assumption). The IJN believed that they had the time to work a lot of these things out...They actually did not.
excellent research sir.
It took about 3 months to change a factories production from one type of aircraft to a new type. Numbers were important considering Japans industrial capacity at the time was much less than even Britain's. The loss of a quarter of a years production from a factory would have been hard to justify
In regards to Savo Island, a video I watched on the subject had said one US warship got a shot off on the bridge that contained the maps necessary to safely navigate, without those the fleet commander was hesitant to push forward as night gave way to light
another excellent video. keep it up!
This is an excellent analysis. It built on content that I already knew and further elaborated on areas where I had less knowledge.Thanks
So much detail! Love it - the level of analysis is fantastic! Have you read 'The End of the Imperial Japanese Navy' (1956) by Masanori Ito? It's a fascinating insight into the decisions of the Japanese Naval leadership during the war. If you can get hold of a copy I would highly recommend it! Keep up the good work friend!
Wolfelaw22. Many observers overrated the Japanese army and under-rated the Soviet force. At the battle of Nomonhan, in 1939, the Russian army crushed the Japanese army it was facing. This was a little known war but should have suggested to the world that the Soviet forces should not be under-rated; this became obvious only after the battle of Stalingrad in late 1942 and ending in January, 1943, a huge defeat for the Germans. From that point on, the entire war moved westward, freeing Russia from the Japanese occupation and saddling the German forces with huge casualties. Don't forget-the Russian dictator had no electorate he had to please so he could sacrifice thousands of men without fear of criticism. I do not know if anyone else has mentioned it but the destruction of the Japanese fleet of merchant ships, principally by the US, throughout World War 2 weakened the entire country.. Japan suffered serious shortages of food and war materiel; the Yamato was sent on a suicide mission because there was enough fuel for only a one way trip.
Excellent video, I thoroughly enjoyed it.
Sir... You have gain another subscriber!!!
Thanks for the video, I feel more intelligent for it, an occurrence that so often eludes me.
wtf
reddit.com/r/iamverysmart
When speaking about the Zero fighter. You may have missed a vital point! The Japanese air arms spent most of their time flying over water and one very important piece of equipment on the Zero was it's fuel gage it was wildly inaccurate. Just why this was so and why itr was not corrected I have been unable to find out. This piece of intelligence wasw provided fror me by a Japanese Naval pilot in the 1960s (Yes I am that old LOL)
Another hilarious icon at 14:00. Bravo, mate.
Britain was able to launch large carrier strikes by 1940 (they were pretty outdated planes but British raid on Taranto proved they could do it).
pff, well, large...hmm.
" The 24 attack Swordfish came from 813, 815, 819, and 824 Naval Air Squadrons. The small number of attacking warplanes raised concern that Judgment would only alert and enrage the Italian Navy without achieving any significant results"...
"The first wave of 12 aircraft,"....
wow, impressive..2 waves of 12 aircraft.
That sunk or heavily damaged 4 battleships...
Lord Shadoko
but were actually battlecruisers..and most of them were repaired within a month..the fourth wasn't but that was due to expenses (and lower priority in wareffort) ,not due to severity of damage.
ODDBALL SOK
Well, not exactly...the "Littorio", "Conte di Cavour" and "Caio Dullio" were battleships, and they were either sank or heavily damaged. Half of the Italian battle fleet was out of order for at least 6 months, to the cost of two Swordfish taken down. Hell, it was so successfull, the Japanese took inspiration from Judgment for the Pearl Harbor attack (which was, contrary to Taranto, half a failure).
Taranto archieved a lot if you look at the limited planes involved, and the loss of only 2 aircraft. But only one of the battleships hit was actually sunk, and one other was out of action for the rest of the war. All the others were repaired rather quickly.
A strike from a single carrier can hardly be called a large strike. Even if successful.
The Japanese zero was pretty dominant until a functional/repairable one was found upside down on a beach. Excellent essay, the graphics work really well also.
thank you!
thank you for a well done video, and your visual aids, that at first I thought wtf, work really well .this is the first of your vids I have watched. have you or could you please do one on Sir John Monash, the man that changed military tactics possibly more than any other single general yet is largely forgotten. thanks again on such a clear and concise video.
Very good presentation! Causes and effects clearly focused. Great.
I pride myself on knowing much about WW2 in the pacific and I assumed that you were going to concentrate on attrition and lack of protection in the Japanese planes. I was happily wrong and although I was aware of many of the things you discussed, you put it together in a lucid and comprehensive presentation. I knew I subscribed to your channel for a reason. 😁
Likewise, a year later.
Thank you, MHV!!
Admiral Yamamoto, the premier strategist, made it clear that they only had 6 months to maybe a year before the industrial capacity of the U.S. would prevail. He studied in America, traveled extensively, and saw first hand the enormous manufacturing potential they would be up against and had no illusions about what would result in a prolonged war. Especially since they had to commit such a large amount of men and material to China. Resources they desperately needed to fight the Pacific War.
Well done!
Very good overview.
Any successor to the A6M would have required a more powerful engine, which was the major issue, not the plane itself. Heck, with the Homare engine being only 30mm wider than the Sakae one, it could have been fitted to a structurally modified A6M.
Hmm, good point.
The problem is that the engine for the Zero was a reproduced P&W radial design, so Japan did not have the engine expertise. Aircraft development is all about available power. B17 vrs Lancaster vrs B29 for instance. B17 designed around 750Hp engines. Lancaster designed around 1300Hp engines and the B29, designed around 2200Hp engines.
very good overview. thanks
What a confused nation. The army was determined to commit suicide via Soviet Steamroller, the Navy was determined to commit suicide via American Airpower. They were screwed either way.
Love the music! As a student for many years of WWII aviation history your videos are informative, filling in some of the details.
ppl are talking shit, i can understand you fine. maybe cuz we both from Australia.... see what i did there? lol.. no but really you're fine mate.
LOL, thanks, yeah, luckily a few months ago one of "them", asked Magz to add subtitles, because he claimed that Magz speaking too fast or something. Seriously, Magz is probably news anchor quality or above... thus, they are either not really capable or just trolls. The good news, there is plenty of manpower for the penal companies :)
+Military History Visualized I am my brazilian, english is my second language. It is a bit hard to understand but not impossible. It is fine but subtitles would be helpful.
I am not an Australian and english is my second language but I can understand him clearly.
Australia is not Austria, though they are both wonderful countries.
Very well presented.
Strategic and Operational factors are crucial to a nation's Total War effort. You have illustrated this effectively.
As allows well thought out and presented. The Japanese were inflexible in their planning. What has always struck me as odd is Japan is an island nation with out a strong merchant navy. With out a strong merchant Navy an Island nation will starve in the end.
But from 1800-1868 Japan was a virtual closed self sustaining islands nation. It's main colonies were close, like Korea and Manchuria which did not require large fleets. Import from further away was often from industrialized nations who could supply their own shipping and probably cheaper. So prior to WOII there was no need for a bigger merchant fleet.
And remember Japan is 1,5 to 2 times bigger then Great Britain. And wet rice-fields are much more productive then wheat farms. But also more vulnerable to air attack when constructed in hilly terrain. So in the end starvation would be a thread.
They were really, really counting on a speedy Chinese capitulation. That would have eliminated supplies as an issue.
Thought Japan started the war with the USA because of increasing US sanction which meant that Japan could only keep fighting in the China for another year. If Japanese high command expected a fast victory over China starting a war with USA would be illogical in almost any Japanese thought process.
Bart Hoving He makes a fantastic point in this video; that the army and navy high commands were on completely different wavelengths.
Also their cruelty in Chna really hardened the resolve of the Chinese resistance especially after Nanking. The simplest way to explain their defeat is that they tried to bite more than they could chew. They conquered Manchuria which is bigger than Japan itself and instead of consolidating their hold, they decided to try to conquer some more leading to a reaction in Washington to apply crippling sanctions.
What a fine analysis! Concise and clear. I love the "subtle" (non-verbal anyway) use of the butchered turkey spitted on a sword...
Excellent presentation. I am a Retired Navy Man and student of WW-2 and have met many of the famous Naval Aviators of that war, including but certainly not limited to Admiral John Thatch, originator and developer of the "Thatch Weave". I also had a discussion with Captain Elliott Buckmaster who was Commanding Officer of USS Yorktown when she was sunk at the Battle of Midway. He was also C.O. of USS Franklin when she received intense battle damage during a fighter sweep against the main Japanese Island of Honshu on 19 March 1946..
A asked Captain Buckmaster, in his opinion, what would have happened if the Japanese had initiated the Kamikaze attacks earlier (using lesser trained airmen for that purpose) when they still had an effective nucleus of trained and experienced combat pilots as well as aircraft that were equal, if not superior to the U.S. Navy aviators. I suggested that these more able pilots could have flown cover for the Kamikaze pilots. Certainly, the Kamikaze pilots with Zero aircraft, manned by experienced combat aviators, flying cover against the Wildcat; would have fared better than untrained pilots flying the Zero and other aircraft against the far more numerous and better Hellcat fighters. These Kamikaze pilots later in the war were facing the U.S. Fleets with far better air combat air control capabilities than these fleets had earlier. Captain Buckmaster told me, that in his opinion, that would have made it very difficult for the U.S. Navy.
As an example, the Japanese Navy left one carrier back in Japan instead of adding it to the Midway operation because, due to manpower losses at the Coral Sea Battle they could not supply the personnel for it's air group. Having that fifth carrier manned by easily trained Kamikaze pilots might very well have turned the balance at Midway.
answer to your last statement. Japanese navy has a strict deployment code, that a pilot is stuck to the same ship. In US equivalent term, this means a York Town pilot can only be deployed with Yorktown and never with Enterprise. Hence leaving one of their carrier at home doing nothing during Mid-way. Would it make any difference, possibly not if Japanese command is similarly lack flexibility on their 1st wave of attack. In ideal world they could have assign 3 carriers for self-defence and the rest for midway bombing, but they simply won't.
Excellent combination of discussion and video demonstration to illustrate a point and visualize an example of the subject at hand. I like this channel very much! A great combination of classroom instruction and discussion combined with visual examples to show how things worked in combat conditions. Thanks and keep 'em coming!
Good analysis, but you overlooked the most important factor in the victory: Jesus.
Lol, just playing. It was the Marines.
Jesus Puller ;)
OORAH, Jesus Puller xD
Those Jar Heads only got there because of the Navy
Ha. You marines and navy forget how much you were all getting your asses handed to you until the government put the army in control of the pacific theater - MacArthur. Another marine myth busted
OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOORRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRAAAAAAAAAAA
ah lovely topic! I truly love your science based character in your Videos :)
The Japanese Navy was very much influenced by the work of Alfred Thayer Mahan.
And, it the end, it cost them the war...
Probably you don't check comments for old videos like this, but I was thinking about your videos of ship sinkings over the course of the war and thought of something that would be equally visual but even more revealing: Naval strength by type for each side month (or week) by month from '41 through '45. You would see carriers drop to near 0 for both navies in 1942 and then the separation in '44 and '45.
Also, and I don't know how you would "visualize" this, I think President Roosevelt was a huge factor in the early success of the US Navy -- both in supporting Nimitz and in pressing for the Independence class light fleet carriers. The success of the US Navy was a team effort with Roosevelt very much working behind the scenes.
10:25 I want to engage with something you say real quick concerning your error listed here a, "Lack of Foresight" by the Japanese air forces in this case.
I recall in the Operation Barbarossa video as well as the German Luftwaffe that one key principle to consider to avoid fatalism was that every general fights the last war. I feel a more appropriate interpretation given that principle would be something that can be applied to the Allies as well in some operations.
In Operation Market Garden, a the operational failures there can be attributed to a common mistake the Allies made even in the Italian campaign. As Steven Ross in his book, "American War Plans, 1941-1945: The Test of Battle" the Allies failed to account for the "independent will of the enemy". From what you explained in this video, Operation Barbarossa, and the Luftwaffe video, it appears more fitting to state rather than a lack of foresight for any given side, it was a lack of crediting the opponent with the ability to adapt and make those early changes to secure victory.
One technological thing that I’d add. Proximity fuses allied ship borne AA had a massive effect.
Yes you play warthunder
affirmative
yes, sir
Very well done. In depth. Thoughtful.
Can you make a video about how the Japanese combined fleet success initially? Kinda want to hear more about the axis power's glorious side, although we can learn from their failures...thx a lot from the video tho :)
+jackdavid3141 yeah, definitely at one point. Yeah, some Axis success videos are definitely necessary too.
Yeah, the Japanese navy early on in the war was far superior to the U.S. and Australian navies. They had superior night fighting capabilities with the use of low light aiming systems. They would use it to ambush convoys in the middle of the night. I recall one documentary I watched where spotters on an American cruiser were using search lights and they suddenly saw a Japanese cruiser appear alongside of them and open up in a broadside barrage. People who ever told they were going into the Pacific campaign early on in the war were terrified of what was considered a Japanese juggernaut.
Wow, keep this up! Complete and concise.
yesterday I was at the USS Lexington, they have a Japanese flag in the spot that a kamikaze hit the ship. it's pretty cool.
+Bart Bols
I wouldn't say heroes, cause a hero would fight for a just cause. He was a victim to a barbaric nation if anything.
I'd say they were TRAGIC heroes, after all the reason they willingly gave their lives in suicide runs was that they had been heavily indoctrinated into thinking it was the obvious and virtuous thing to do. Many of the more experienced Japanese pilots thought the whole kamikaze thing was a colossal waste of equipment and manpower, a pile of bullshit that proved to be just that and almost wiped out an entire generation of young citizens. Their act per se was indeed heroic, the problems lie in the reasons they were pushed to do it.
Bart Bols Except they tried to help the Japanese, but they decided to jump into the ocean.
+Bart Bols Nope, it was an objective lie that the US wanted to destroy Japan and all of its culture like those pilots were taught. They were "trained" _specifically_ to throw their lives away, whereas the D-day soldiers were trained to _fight_ and survive as long as possible to fight some more.
Bart Bols Are SS soldiers heroes then?
Outstanding!! Well Done.
Yes this is a good analysis of what happened, but even if the Japanese had been able to upgrade their aircraft over the course of the war, they would still have faced the training problem because the United States submarine blockade of Japan greatly limited fuel that reached their islands. Thus petrol for training pilots would still be a limiting factor.
From my perspective Japan was doomed from the start and no strategy could halt the eventual onslaught from the United States. If instead, however, Japan had only attacked the European powers colonies (e.g. Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, etc.), then there would have been a greatly different outcome. The United States would likely have remained out of the conflict and the European powers were overwhelmed by the war in Europe, thus unable to respond. So Japan could have obtained the southeastern Asia empire its navy envisioned, even if it's industrial output was smaller and aircraft improvements more modest.
The Axis overall were doomed to fail.
The US would have not tolerated such aggression and would have entered the war anyway
I could've used your help when I was in my Methods of Modern Warfare class. You just earned a new subscriber!
I have to respectively correct and/or disagree where applicable.
This may cover the supporting reasons for the failures of the air forces, but it doesnt cover the main reasons which are a lot simpler to realize in hindsight.
First, lets remember the whole reason for Japanese involvement in the first place: The acquisition of oil fields in China. Stratagists will agree any country that is this deficient for purposes of invading another country is already at a disadvantage.
Second, being an island country their resources were severely limited, specifically in steel production. Although they did build massive military forces overall, it did come at a cost. In this case, equipment durability. Take for instance the mainstay of the navy, the "Zero". It was a terror of the sky and able to out maneuver anything the Allies could muster for two years, true. But it suffered from almost non-existant armoring. Like most aircraft, it was little more than a frame and skin with no protection to the pilot, engine, or fuel tanks. In contrast, American aircraft were hit more often but were more survivable and repairable.
Three, Admiral Yamamoto knew American production capabilities and its will to win when its back was against the wall. Despite his talent and ability of those under him, he was totally opposed to initiating hostilities based on this reason and the fact that secretly he knew the Emporor was strategically wrong for entering war in the first place. He even forcasted his own defeat with haunting accuracy, "I shall run wild for six months...". The exit stratagy was not for defeat of the U.S. but for stalemate which in itself was self-defeating. No matter how good the resources or how many, it would eventually be a futile effort by the policies very design.
Four, the failure of the destruction of the carrier forces at Pearl Harbor meant the U.S. had a strong foothold in the Pacific until forces could be built up.
And lastly, the Battle of Midway was truly the turning point for the three years that followed. The Japanese did not expect the Yorktown to be present thanks to the superhuman efforts of the repair crews after the Battle of Coral Sea, the breaking of Naval Intelligence of Japanese Naval and Diplomatic Codes, and the errors in field tactics which wasted valuable time for critical attacks.
And lets not forget that at Midway not only did the Japanese Navy lose four of their main carriers, but 3500 Naval personal which consisted a bulk of their most experienced pilots. Without them, they pretty much had to start over. Even the best planes are worthless at that point.
* Respectfully, not respectively.
Very sound points, just one little thing: the Emperor (as far as we know) was not the main advocate for Japan's military effort. Yamamoto was basically forced to plan the attack on Pearl by the newly-self-appointed military government, which was mostly composed of Army brass (Tojo and the like), the Emperor didn't really have the authority nor the capability to stop the Hawks after the Nakasone cabinet had gone down the drain.
Thats the problem when a religious leader lives and leads in and from isolation. Take your example of choice on that one.
***** Precisely.
+Will Winters
There were no significant developed oil fields in China worth Japan provoking
war with the western powers. Weren't you instead thinking of the oil
fields in British-held Burma, and in the Dutch East Indies?
Good video, I appreciate your work.
Could you visualize the doctrine & failures of the british armored division's during the great war & WW2 with an example of the changes made post WW2?
+BattleRock & could you also make a video on early cold war Nuclear weapon delivery systems used by all factions & what Nuclear strike strategies were intended for use, (ensurance of MAD theory)
+BattleRock at some point, but first a need to do basic videos on those topics first, unless I find a great article that does that comparison itself.
Very well then, best of luck and I look forward to seeing your future videos on the topics.
What subjects are the focus of the videos you are working on currently?
+BattleRock actually I am undecided, probably a short video on aces vs. average pilots, did a script a few weeks ago, mostly concerned with selling my stuff before moving, organizing my trip and what books to copy/scan before I leave. Tomorrow I will go to the library to continue checking some books on my first checklist of about 100 titles... the second checklist is still unprinted and growing. So no big topics, mostly information gathering.
so will the video differences between Aces & Newer pilots include comparisons from both the global conflicts(WW 1&2)?
Thank You for having the time to answer the comments to your videos, you seem incredibly busy with projects & important studies!
Once again thank you & best of luck with everything & I look forward to your future content :)
very very interesting. very in-depth analysis. there is more to warfare than meets the eye.
"*also know as the UFO to older War Thunder players"
haha
A very nice overview of not just the Japanese Air Force, but of Japan's overall failure in general.
Thanks for posting.
Do italy next
+Dark X Yes please, everybody knows that Italy had plenty of problems in WW2, but few people know exactly why. Often people call them cowards without knowing that Italian soldiers often had been in front lines for months even in quiet periods, while British, even in quiet periods, did not keep units in front line for more than twelve days without 4 days of rest. There were Italian divisions that had been fighting for more than twenty four months in the front line, and that had greatly exceeded the theoretical 200 days which American and British experts had set as maximum limit of physical and psychologial resistance in battle, after which, according to them, the soldier becomes exhausted and militarily inefficient.
In direct quote from
www.scribd.com/doc/9344344/Italian-Army-in-Wwii
italy said never join ww2
like the others I just found your channel. Wow! Fantastic research coupled with great presentation. I think I will be busy for the next several hours!
Saying that the Mitsubishi Zero should have had a successor lined up in 1942 is not really true. In 1942, it was the best performing aircraft in the Pacific rim, bar none. The USA was forced to develop aircraft like the Corsair to compete with it, whereas the Japanese Navy had no incentive to replace it until after it lost air superiority, and even then it was still a good plane even if it was no longer the world-beater it had been.
It did suffer from a weakness that was a matter of Japanese design philosophy that was mostly adopted by the navy. The Zero was made to be as light and maneuverable as possible, which meant that it had little to no armor, and lacked self-sealing fuel tanks. The navy felt that high performance was an armor more effective than metal would provide, and at first it seemed to work. But when the US-made aircraft matched or exceeded the Zero's performance while carrying armor, the flaw proved fatal. Many a Japanese pilot died in combat because bullets passed through their aircraft like it wasn't there, or burst into flames after only a few hits. The Japanese army had different philosophies, and their aircraft were generally better protected, especially later in the war.
Another major contributing factor in the defeat of Japanese and German air power was a policy both followed and failed to change when conditions merited change. They tended to keep their pilots in combat until they died or were incapacitated by injuries to the point of no longer being able to fly.
The USA had a different policy which proved to be a decisive factor. US pilots were kept in combat until they had a certain number of victories, or until they gained a certain notoriety. Then they were rotated back to the US on war bond tours and to train new pilots, passing on what they had learned instead of wasting the experience.
Because of that, new US pilots went into combat knowing things that Japanese and German replacement pilots either learned the hard way, or died before learning at all. This resulted in the combat effectiveness of new US pilots continually improving over the course of the war, while the initial skills of Axis pilots grew worse and worse. The end result was that by 1944, most of the Axis pilots who started the war were dead and the Axis air forces were pathetically unskilled when compared to how good they were in 1940.
That was more important than industrial capacity -- Both Germany and Japan were making new aircraft and putting them into service right up until the war ended. But that meant little when the men they were stuffing into the cockpits barely knew how to fly them, much less be effective in combat.
If you're not lining up a replacement while your current model is dominant then yes you're making a mistake.
And for what do you issue specifications? There was virtually nothing the Zero faced in 1942 that could touch it.
Development of replacement models in wartime is almost always a reaction to something the opposition has put in the field to counter your stuff. Until then, there's not only no incentive to design something new, there's no point because you haven't a clue as to which way to go with it.
***** Development is not strictly limited to what you face in combat. Development is based on the same thing that drives the original peace time design. There are always ways to make things better. Simple things like engine design improvements, aerodynamic improvements, whatever. You take what makes the existing model great and improve it. All design cannot be reactionary. That's just poor planning.
Your contention ultimately makes no sense. It makes it sound like anyone who's ahead in the arms race is doomed to fall behind because the catastrophic success they experienced in superior design leaves them flat footed in knowing where to turn to next.
Except that that's exactly what happens in real life, and was just as true today as it was then. Even in peacetime, nations don't rely on small tweaks and tinkering. They have to have something to tell their designers to do. So they look at what both their likely enemies and their friends are doing, and attempt to extrapolate what would be needed to beat it. In 1942, the US didn't have anything in the field that could beat a Zero, and the Japanese couldn't just tell their designers "make it better". The return would be a question of "how?"
And yes, war is very much a issue of "we do something, and they counter it, and then we counter their counter."
Russia and Germany have a great example of that. When Operation Barbarossa kicked off, Russia had the greatest tank army in the world on paper. But they didn't have the best trained crews, enough fuel and ammo for those crews to train to be better, and their force was mainly made up of light tanks that didn't stand a chance against the Panzers when they did take the field.
So the Germans had a major advantage until in desperation, the Russians designed and put the T-34 into production in record time. Then all of a sudden, the German superiority disappeared. They had to scramble to develop models of their tanks to counter what the Russians had done to get it back. That made the Russians improve their own tanks, and so it kept going for the rest of the war.
I could easily point out similar arms races in just about any war in history. They just about all had them, and they all boil down to the same formula: If you're winning, you don't think you need new, more expensive weapons. It isn't until you start losing that it becomes a priority, and then you do what you have to do to counter whatever new weapon your enemy fielded and made you start losing.
***** What happens is not the same as analyzing it as reasonable. No design reaches mass production without already being in some way obsolete to its designer. There are always things to improve, things to add or change. One doesn't need combat performance trials to know that giving it a more powerful lighter engine would help. One doesn't need to see an ASDIC deployed to escorts to know that being able to dive deeper for longer is beneficial.
When a German military leader decided that he absolutely had to have radios in all of his tanks it was forethought. When the US sent a design request that lead to the B-29 in 1938 they had forethought that predated any of the counter play of the strategic bombing war yet ended up being decisively important in the conduct of the final stages of the pacific theatre's air campaign.
So for every example of where planning failed its easy to find examples of where forethought lead to astounding success.
Since you mentioned it, you should analyze the Battle of Guadalcanal. Given the on-paper virtual parity between the opposing forces and the fact it was a truly 3-dimensional air-land-sea battle with constant combat in all 3 areas rather than having clearly separate air, sea and land phases as in almost every other battle, it's great armchair general material.
"Unable to create new models and versions"? are you forgetting the Ki-84????????
Subbed after a half video, great Job!