GTO2-1-07: Single-Peaked Preferences

Although non-paradoxical preference aggregation is impossible in general settings, it is possible in some restricted settings. This video from Game Theory Online (www.game-theory...) describes one such setting, in which agents are restricted to have "single-peaked preferences" where they prefer outcomes solely based on how close they are to a single favorite outcome. It features Matt Jackson (Stanford).

[@knowltonchan8244]

2:50 "So let's have a peek [peak] at that...". Way to sneak a pun in there, Matt!

[@andreag5080]

Very good! Ty.

[@David-kw5uj]

This method is very nice, but intuitively it works only when we have 3 possible outcomes/candidates, no more. It would be almost impossible, with a large number of voters, to have only sigle-peaked-preferences in the case of 4 or more possible outcomes. Is this intuition correct?

[@alfieking1293]

did you ever find the answer to this?

[@David-kw5uj]

@@alfieking1293 Unfortunately not yet, I focused on other subjects at university.

[@ItsOnlyShift]

Can someone help me please? I need to know has there been any past elections where the “median voter theorem” has helped a candidate win

[@alfieking1293]

did you ever find such an election?

[@habiboorrahman9939]

thanks