Coming from an RAF family, I think as many others that the big wing was a BIG mistake, It was tragic that AVM Park and AOC Dowding were made to pay the price for this failure-Bader and Leigh-Mallory should have been sacked for what they did!
Even today after exhaustive research and analysis its conclusively proven the tactics devised and use by Dowding and Park were the ONLY and CORRECT ones that could have been successfully used. In this sense the "big wing" concept was wrong. However, the value in "big wings" IMHO was two-fold: 1) purely through maintaining the morale, and determination "to see it through" of the British public by seeing hordes of Spitfires and Hurricanes flying about (and largely doing bugger all!!), and, 2) eroding the morale of both the German fighter and bomber pilots. "Big wings" were later proven to be counter-productive, by the horrendous fighter losses due to the policy of offensive sweeps by the RAF in 1941-2, which - incidentally - caused Bader to be shot down and become a POW.
@@idleonlooker1078 With regard to the "shooting down" of Bader -it's a few years ago now but I read that Bader was actually shot down by a Sgt. Pilot from his own squadron as he thought he was attacking a lone Me109. Bader evidently had the habit off flying off on his own. No German pilot ever claimed he had shot Bader down -which would have been a great coup for the Luftwaffe.
I like the way Sir Keith Park is labeled as a winner. He goes here, he wins; he goes there he wins. An absolutely outstanding leader but is little known and recognized in NZ.
He’s not sufficiently recognised by the Brits either. He’s not on the window in Westminster Abbey with the other heroes of the B of B and they put his statue in an obscure part of town.
But he HAS got a very good Memorial Statue, in your country. Google it. Surely, your education system educates your young, about the huge contribution, your country has made in both world wars and beyond?
@@MrDaiseymay Have given his statue outside the Thames Town Hall a pat or two over the years. However, no one is taught anything about NZ's contribution outside ANZAC, because our teachers, like everywhere, are woke socialists.
I've seen his uniform and Medals in Auckland. He was a laid back and modest guy who didn't like fuss but did find the lack of honest respect a bit hard too take.
The evidence is very strong . 12 group did not support 11 group as Dowding ordered them to . Leigh Mallory 's big wings did not cover 11 group's airfields while 11 group's planes were attacking the Luftwaffe . The big wing theory was completely wrong . One only has to read Len Deighton's and other excellent books on the subject to see that Dowding was right and Leigh Mallory was wrong .
Am I right in assuming you mean the big wing could have been an effective back up to small groups of fighters making an initial assault while the big wing formed up and was then able to attack German planes? One of the accounts I read claimed 11 Group couldn't count on getting support from 12 Group so I am a little sympathetic to this point of view.
they wore not getting support from 12 group because did not alert 12 group till after all their squadron wore launch then they want 12 group wave a magic wand they need to alert 12 group much earlier so 12 group could have formed big wings they only called 12 group when the german wor about 5 minute out 11 group air base wore to close enemy there was no way to defend those bases
Hm... Big Wing is show of hands type of move/end game move. It would have doomed Britain if it had been adopted at the start, as it would give Germany a good view of what Britain could muster. Ironically it seems Dowding refusing it and Mallory eventual overrule of the former allowed it to be deployed at the best time for Big Wing to be utilized.
group 11 air base was to close and they didnot talk to group12 till the german over their bases grouphad no time with the earlier alert the british could have massedtheir plane agaist raid used their few planestoout number the german at the raid but group cause squadron attackthe german when the german have the numbers
I admire Bader's personal courage and as a fighter ace. But he was dead wrong to support Mallory's big wing strategy. Downing had limited planes flown by exhausted pilots that were difficult to replace. He choose the middle course to have smaller groups of fighters disrupt the German bomber fleets, and prevent them from bombing, even though it resulted in less kills. That provided a precious reserve of planes to be available intercept other incoming German planes suddenly appearing. If the RAF committed too many of its fighters to intercept one German bomber sortie, it would result in gaps to cover other targets from being attacked. It took a long time for the British fighters to reach altitude and location, so again, committing so many of the few squadrons they had would result in wasted fuel and time to respond to to other attacks. More kills would not have discouraged Hitler from invading England. It was the survival of the RAF to maintain air superiority over Britain that made him change his mind, among other things, to invade. Hitler rightly feared the British fleet, and without air superiority so the Luftwaffe could sink the British ships, Operation Seal Lion could not succeed. Downing and Parks deserved better for saving Britain, and taking care of their pilots who fought outnumbered and with great fatigue. Mallory was a egotist bucking for promotion who did not carry the burden that Downing did.
Well said!! I would only add that Dowding and Park's handling of the Battle of Britain culminated in the FIRST victory against Hitler - which ultimately lead to victory for the allies. 👍
Dowding reported to the Air Ministry around Sep 12th: 'I am sure that L-Mallory is thinking on the right lines'. Dowding's successor Douglas wrote on Dec 17th: 'I am convinced we must try and get larger formations of fighters against the enemy mass formations...We must give the AOC 12 Group's proposals every possible support.'
@Sean M I was waiting to see if someone would mention that. Whilst as POWs in Colditz, his batman refused repatriation back to the UK to ensure Bader got the help he needed. This even included putting Bader on his back and carrying him up flights of stairs after his bath. In all his post-war interviews Bader never once mentioned this man's name, nor paid tribute to him - Bader simply forgot him in his single-minded pursuit in cultivating his popular image.
This is basic Sun Tzu: When outnumbered, do not attack en force. Instead, hit and run. Save your resources while exacting maximum damage on an overextended enemy.
Especially when the Luftwaffe had not been given drop tanks, so their time over Britain was critically short - and quite a few ditched in the channel due to fuel exhaustion. If Goering had had the wits to order drop tanks in 1940, the whole tactics for the Battle of Britain would have been entirely different; as it was, it was a battle of attrition - Dowding understood that; Leight-Mallory did not.
The problem was not so much that the English were outnumbered, but that the Germans had the tactical initiative: they decided when to attack and where. When the plans became apparent, there was limited time to respond to them, and fighters needed to be spread out geographically to be quick enough to catch them in time. The Big Wing hindered at the flexibility that is required to respond effectively to attacks. The only thing that saved Britain was Hitlers decision to become predictable in focusing on London. And, of course the Dowding system, that was incredibly effective in directing Britain's fighter resources. Leigh-Mallory might as well have been a German spy for the good he did.
Great Comment - this is exactly what Park was doing - hit and run . Also, recall Park had the experience of being a fighter pilot during WW I. But he made the serious mistake of forgetting his wife's Birthday on Sept. 15th.
@@dafyddllewellyn6636 mallory knew that to that why he wanted big wings to knock down more enemy planes dowding air bases wore to close to the enemy made it impossible to defend need to leave those field move to 12 area build big wings when the german are first detected thing is 12 group was not alerted till the german almost cross the coast so did not have time organize big fly them where the german
@@TheEvertw they wore not alerted early enough to get formed before the german bombed their target 11 group airbases wore to close to german to defend proper radars in group 11 wore not talking to group 12 group 11 did not not alert 12 group early enough
Hugh Dowding was the unsung hero of WW II. Without him Fighter Command would not have existed in the form it did or the air defences of Britain itself. He prevented Churchill from sending most of Fighter Command to France in the summer of 1940 and made sure it was used in the most effective way possible during the Battle of Britain. As a reward he was "retired' from command after the battle by Churchill who never forgave him for preventing the deployment of more British fighters to France. And Mallory who likely would have lost the battle with his tactics took over.
No, Dowding was already on his second extension and was due to retire in November anyways. If you want to lay blame for lack of Spitfires, Look up Lord Nuffield (William Morris of Morris Motors) who lobbied for and was given the task of construction of Castle Bromwich Factory in 1938. He covertly delayed contruction and thus prevented production of Spitfires for 2 years until he was fired and Supermarine took over in June 1940. One wonders how many Hawker Siddeley stocks he had bought.
@@bobsakamanos4469 He was kicked out the door without so much as a "thank you" by Chruchill right after winning the crtical Battle of Britain. Without Dowding Fighter Command would not have existed in the form it did with the excellent and highly flexible command and control system that made it so effective in combat against German airpower over the UK. The guy who Churchill replaced Dowding with would have lost the battle with his idiotic "big wing" tactics that would have allowed German Luftwaffe formations to hit their targets and be gone long before his massive formations even reached the battle. And it was only Dowding who stood in the way of Churchill sending everything Britain had in the way of fighter squadrons in a hopeless mission to stop the fall of France. It wouldn't have mattered if there were many more Spitfires available at that time if Churchill sent them all to be lost in France leaving the UK wide open to a German invasion. And the Hurricanes did fine in the battle shooting down 3/4s of the Luftwaffe kills.
@@dougcoombes8497 firstly, it was Lord Trenchard who worked behind the scenes to replace Dowding and Newall and installed his own people. Secondly, I don't know where you kids get your stats - pseudo-documentaries no doubt. Hurricanes shot down about 54% of e/a, yet they comprised 65% of the RAF fighter strength. They had the worst kill ratio of the battle, were obsolete, burnt more than a few of its pilots, and the RAF knew it. Shame on Hawker for sitting on their asses for 4 years without properly upgrading it.
@@bobsakamanos4469no evidence that he bought stocks at Hawker at all. Stop speculating As much as how great the Spitfire was, the Hurricane was a quicker, cheaper and easier aircraft to build.
Answer to the question: 1 - In the case of 12 group (N of Thames) during the Battle of Britain, YES it was a mistake. It took too long to assemble, and the time taken in forming up the big formations seriously reduced the already short duration of the fighters' flying time. Most times it arrived too late anyway. 2 - It finally had a great effect toward the end of the Battle of Britain, and finally "put the tin lid" on the Luftwaffe's loss in morale. The Luftwaffe crews had been told that there weren't many RAF fighters left, and when they were met over London by a huge Big Wing, that helped to end the BB. 3 - The background to the Big Wing was Leigh-Mallory's opposition to ACM Dowding. Dowding's tactic of sending a handful of fighters to the right place at the right moment was correct. It was the Luftwaffe's aim at that time to bring the RAF to a battle which they (Luftwaffe) believed they could win. The RAF at this time couldn't afford the attrition which this would have caused. Remember that at this time the Luftwaffe had many more aircraft, flown by experienced pilots (ex-Spanish Civil War and Poland) using much more effective tactical formations. Once the RAF had learned to give up tight Vic formations they improved their tactical situation.
The other issue was they used a mix of aircraft- the Spitfires climbed and cruised at different rates than the Hurricanes......further disrupting co-ordination
The wing first flew as 3 squadrons only on 7th September, having had 3 days to put the wing together. The other two were assigned only on 9 September and it flew as 5 during the BofB only on the 15th September. Not entirely convinced that one week's and one day's operations are a reasonable basis to judge whether the actual idea was sound or not. But by all accounts, Leigh-Mallory was a nasty piece of work, and it is hard to not have that taint this topic.
I worked at the IWM Duxford for many years, and the overblown reputation and status of Bader was well known. The man was an unbearable prat who was always selfish, rude and narcissistic. Many many pilots were far superior in their skills and achievements, and what is not well known is the fact that his selfishness by diving in to get a German already being shot down by an RAF fighter led to him being shot down by friendly fire.
It is not well known that Bader's batman in captivity could have been returned to Britain in a POW swap but Bader insisted he needed him & vetoed the exchange.
Bader was a ballsy aggressive Fighter Pilot, but his ability to see the big picture, & think strategically like Dowding,was in his Legs lost in a typical disregard of orders.
Almost everything Leigh-Mallory did was wrong. The Big Wing, its successor "Circuses" and "Rodeos" into France (which killed hundreds of pilots, to little effect), the decision not to develop the long-range escort Spifires in 1942, the erasure of Park and Dowding from the Official History of the BoB, and even his final, terminal decision to have himself and his family flown across the Alps in atrocious weather. The Americans had bad WW2 leaders (Clark, King), but so did we Brits.
A disadvantage of the big wing is that all aircraft are either in the sky or on the ground being refuelled/rearmed. With Dowding sending up seperate squadrons there could be a new squadrn taking over as another squadron goes back for refuelling etc so there would always be aircraft available in the air..
The big wing had its problems, but the Germans hated it. The German bomber pilots accused their fighters of not protecting them. It was then ordered by Georing that the fighters stayed close to the bombers. This of course meant that the fighters had even less flying time. This fact is in the film the Battle Of Britain. Another huge factor was apart from Bader and his men and the Polish, the RAF weren't getting in close enough. Once this was sorted that the fighters got in close and things improved. Another point is that many of the German bombers dropped their bombs anywhere and ran for home when they saw their escorts that were low on fuel, returned home.
the problem was 12 group was launch when the german first detected but till after they cross the channel they did have time to truly form these big wings 11 group wanted to defend airfeilds that wore to close the germans they should pulled back all the plane to 12 group area had the radar pass on them earlier
@@brucenadeau2172 Copy and pasting the same thing over and over again does not help your argument in the least. In fact it makes you look more like a dumb parrot than someone with serious scholarly knowledge. If you have access to historical documents or on the ground testimony to support your thesis, kindly post links to those sources and take the skipping needle off the record!
@@brucenadeau2172 That's madness. The role of 11 Group was to defend the Southeast England, including ports, as well as London - which they did successfully by using the Dowding System. Pulling them back would have left a huge area of England exposed. The Big Wing simply took far too long to organize before it could be employed, when a rapid response was called for.
One of the saddest things about it was that they didn't make Dowding a Marshall of the Royal Air Force, even though the King suggested it to Curchill, but those in the RAF high command blocked it. Dowding had a habbit of rubbing senior commanders up the wrong way, going as far back as Trenchard in the First World War, who used to call him Dismal Jimmy. I think Dowding was one of a rare breed who did and said the right thing even if it offended, what a debt of gratitude we owe Stuffy and those who served under him.
@@MrDavidht Absolutely correct!! Both Dowding and Park were the right men, at the right place, at the right time to fight the Battle. People should not forget that it was due to their handling of the Battle which culminated in the first defeat suffered by Hitler, that laid the foundation for the ultimate allied victory. 👍
@@MrDavidht Totally agree, but have been there in Government too! Doing the right thing and' flying your own Kite' never gets you too far!!! Although the job gets done !!! Mallory never learn the lesson and when he took over after the B of B he made the same mistakes as Goering in sending fight sweeps over the channel so our fighters have very little time in combat!!! Remember reading comments by the proponents of the Big Wing that better to shoot more German planes down even after they had dropped their bombs than shoot them down piece meal before they attacked. It was OK for 12 group to get their squadrons up to height but took time that was'nt available to 11 group. Dowding and Park were spot on.
After the Battle of Britain the proponents of the Big Wing tried to justify themselves by using them for fighter sweeps over the Channel in 1941. These were known as 'Circuses' and suffered horrendous losses. They wasted precious veteran pilots and Spitfires that were desperately needed overseas where pilots in their old fighters were getting slaughtered. However the Spitfires were retained at home for these disastrous Big Wing Circuses until 1942. So you should probably have mentioned the Big Wing's terrible post-1940 legacy.
The Air Ministry insistence in keeping vast numbers of fighters and fighter-bombers in Britain, when air support was desperately needed in the Mediterranean, was little short of criminal. At times, it is difficult to determine whose side the Air Ministry was actually on!
@@dovetonsturdee7033, not just the Med if even 1/4 of the planes lost in the Rubarb raids over Northern France had been sent to Malaya the RAF would have had both a qualitative and quantitative advantage over the Japanese and considering how precious the Japanese logistics train as it is highly likely it could have prevented the fall of Singapore and thus thrown the whole Japanese offensive in South East Asia into chaos potentially stopping it dead during the battles in DEI.
@@dovetonsturdee7033, not just the Med if even 1/4 of the planes and experienced pilots lost in the Rhubarb raids over Northern France had been sent to Malaya the RAF would have had both a qualitative and quantitative advantage over the Japanese and considering how precious the Japanese logistics train as it is highly likely it could have prevented the fall of Singapore and thus thrown the whole Japanese offensive in South East Asia into chaos potentially stopping it dead during the battles in DEI.
@@jonsouth1545 I have always wondered if the Air Ministry regarded the British Army and Navy as greater enemies than the Germans, Japanese, and Italians. Certainly, in the years between the wars, when the AM had control of naval aviation, it systematically destroyed the Fleet Air Arm and reduced Coastal Command to virtual impotence.
My first introduction to Bader was through the Film, "Reach for the Sky!" Made in 53? Though I'm not quite that old, I saw it as a boy in the early 60s on TV. He lost his legs doing something he had been ordered not to do. His bloody minded fight to walk without a stick, getting back into the RAF, his POW years are all admirable in a way. Later on in life I picked up a Pilot who flew in his squadron in my cab. He was a Bastard to work for he said, but also inspirational. For many years he could be seen promoting this or that charity or his war service. I still find his bloody minded determination admirable. But. I read up on the Dowding system and Bader and Lee malory big wing. The film makes it seem so reasonable as Kenneth Moore jabs his pipe in his hand and points out, "if only we had more up there the more we could shoot down!" But the reality is we all know it took too long to form up and often the German planes were on their way home before the big Wing got there. Lee mallory was, as has already been said probably just using Bader to take a crack at Park and Dowding. I sometimes wonder if Bader ever realised, they had been right, and he wrong. By the way in the film he states that it was WW1 pilots that first used the big wing idea Bader just built it up. It could just be they didn't want to credit an Italian in the Film or was there some small truth to it? By the way I don't assume the Film is all true, it's a film. I'm just saying it was my first introduction to Bader.
Bader was an "advisor" on the film and had many arguments with the production company about how he was being portrayed. They became so frustrated with him they threatened to kick him off the film altogether. It was Kenneth More who begged him to rein his neck in and behave after all, being kicked off the making of a film about yourself isn't good publicity.
Bader spoke at my school speech day one year. No point to my post other than I just felt like putting it out there. When I think back on it reminds me of the film "If".
I think that it was Leigh-Mallory who must take most of the blame here...he had never flown a fighter in combat, he was a bomber man, and hugely ambitious...he didnt care how many people he trod on to climb the greasy pole of command, and would use anything or anyone to ensure that he got there. So using a bolshie awkward, yet charismatic , newly promoted Squadron Leader to advance your case was just what he was looking for... I do think the Big Wing idea was sound, just not in Summer 1940. But for Bader to admit that his idea was a little premature, was never going to happen. But if Bader wasnt a bloody minded so and so, then he would never have made it out of wheelchair in 1931, let alone fly a Spitfire 8 years later. Bader was hero, but heroes are rarely perfect..
I was in the ATC (air cadets) in the seventies. Two of our lads were planespotting at a local airport. A light aircraft went the wrong way down a taxi way and bloody nearly ran into the two lads. Ten minutes later, the pilot walked to them and sincerely apologised. He admitted he'd f*cked it up, and said how stupid he'd been. The pilot was Douglas Bader. This demonstrates Bader himself could make silly errors, but he was never harder on other people than he was on himself. If he made an error, he had the guts and masculinity to apologise and admit his own stupidity. One of the two ATC lads later became an RAF Tornado pilot.
Actually, Dowding appointed Leigh - Mallory to be in charge of 12 Group. Rather than being appreciative and cooperative, Leigh - Mallory was out to get Dowding for not appointing him to 11 Group. So here is Britain fighting for survival, the Luftwaffe is trying to get air superiority, and Leigh - Mallory is focused on his ego and his career. ... and then he helped push Dowding and Park out. There are no words that accurately describe the likes of Trafford Leigh - Mallory.
I got one REMF!! Rear echelon MFer. His a courtier not a warrior like Dowding and Park and I'm sure that rankled. Dowding and Park 2 of Britain's/NZ's finest.
Bader, as a Wing Commander, had no place in this discussion. He was a pretty self confident, not to say bumptious, man who was out of his league among the Air Marshalls and AVMs. Anyone else would have been told to wind his neck in. Leiigh Mallory was an ambitious man and used Bader to cast doubt on Dowding's strategy. The real conflict was between LM and Parkes.
I have read that Bader was keen on the big wings as he couldn't scramble quickly, as Park demanded of his squadrons in 11 Group, because of his disability. So the slow build-up of the big wings suited him and his desire to get into the fight.
You clearly have no military experience. Subordinate commanders are often brought into high level meetings to provided testimony and insight. The Big Wing was timely as more Spitfires came off the production line and was the greatest psy ops victory of the battle and deflated LW morale completely. It also saved the lives of inexperienced replacement pilots. The worst thing about it was the use of the slower Hurricanes. The real villain was Trenchard in the House of Lords, who had been at odds with Dowding since WWI, when he removed him from operations for being too concerned with the attrition of pilots.
My brother married the daughter of a Czech fighter pilot, who flew in Bader's squadron. He did not like Bader, who he said "was not a nice man." He went on to senior rank in the RAF and flew in Korea. Bader was, I have heard many times, shot down by one of his own flight. He insisted on being carried around the prison camp by an RAF medical assistant, refusing to use his much-vaunted artificial legs. In 1943 the Germans offered to exchange the medical assistant for one of their own, but Bader refused to let him go home. The day the camp was liberated was the last time Bader had anything to do with the unfortunate man. He didn't even say thank you to him. Not a nice man at all.
Wars are not necessarily won by "nice men". That's a contemporary mindset(especially in the schools and media), which is promulgating the smear campaign against men like Bader. Never judge another until you've walked in their shoes (or tin legs).
Wars aren't won by your school teachers. Most of the personnel in WWII were not disciplined regular force types and many behaved as civilians in uniform.
As well stated by Stephen Bungay Dowding created the weapon and Park wielded it. Park's decision making was incredible...both in the Battle of Britain and later in Malta.
Park's arrival in Malta was long after most of the LW had left for N.Africa. Woody Woodhall was the hero of Malta and Park continued to use his Big Wing there.
Sadly, Park and Dowding were shat upon from a great height by the hierarchy, who saw political advantage in supporting a perceived hero in the shape of Bader backed by the arrogance of Leigh-Mallory. The fact remains that the Dowding system was the ONLY way to successfully fight the Battle of Britain, which required a quick and varied response in order of to have fighters vector effectively into bomber groups BEFORE they reached their targets. The big wing took far too long to assemble and frequently reached their targets after they had dropped their bombs on London and later on 11 Group airfields. It seems to me the both methods had their strong suits but for different battle scenarios but the Air Ministry was wrong to put the blame on Keith Park and Hugh Dowding. Another case of politics trumping common sense. Had Dowding and Park been withdrawn earlier in favour of Leigh-Mallory, Britain would have lost the Battle of Britain. As it was, it was only the capricious nature of the dictatorHitler directing his focus onto the Russian front that allowed Britain to regroup and gain that vital respite.
they had no chance to work because 12 group was not alrted the german wore almost over dry land dowding system worked for small raid but for big raid his single squadrons lacked punch to make a dent in the big raids
@@brucenadeau2172 I'm sorry Bruce but you've proven once again that you're an utter historic moron. Of course Dowding and Park were capable of assembling large attack forces. Who do you think conducted the Battle of Britain Day.
It was not only a very bad idea, but Leigh-Mallory constantly lied about how successful the big wing was and lied about Parks and Dowding behind their backs to Churchill and others.
Leigh Mallory jumped on Barder's idea to stab Dowding and Park in the back. Leigh Mallory seems to have been a nasty bit of work. Even by the time of D-Day Leigh Mallory was basically sidelined as being useless. He didn't even have the decency to be killed in action but being killed in a transport aircraft crash. Bader's association with Leigh Mallory just shows the sort of personality he was.
Yeh Bader was a nasty piece of work too. Definitly had a cluster B personality style at the minimum. Of course being basically abandoned by his mother increased the odds of that happening. During his captivity as a POW he never once ever thanked his appointed Batman for carrying him up or down stairs & bathing him
@Oldschool Canuck I have read that Bader never passed up a chance to pull rank and thought that he should be the first one home after being released from Colditz even though there were prisoners that were there longer than he was. I'm not really knocking the man or his heroism but he wasn't perfect. From what I'm reading in the above comments, the Big Wing did leave the RAF rather vulnerable and Dowding tried to prevent that.
@@lawrencelewis2592 i read Reach for the Sky when i was 12, my impression re Bader when freed from Colditz was his intent to get back in a fighter plane asap, tho i seem to remember he failed to take another active part.
@Oldschool Canuck Let me quote from "The Colditz Myth" by S.P. McKenzie, written in 2004. Page 146: "When I first got to Colditz, remembered Alec Ross, "I thought this is going to be a good place" noting that everyone was on first-name terms. He was less than happy when the legless Douglas Bader, to whom he was assigned as personal batman, blocked his repatriation as a member of the RAMC in 1943. "Hauptmann Pupke came into the courtyard and he called me down. "Good news, Ross, " he said, "You're going home." Douglas Bader happened to be there, and said, "No he's bloody not. He came here as my lackey and he'll stay as my lackey." As a result, "I had to stay another two bloody years when I could have gone home with the rest of my mates." Sounds like pulling rank to me.
Dowding’s system was essentially a guerrilla attack against an often numerically superior force. It’s classic hit and run warfare, and frankly, groundbreaking.
Not much different from what North Vietnam did against the USAF,with mig 17s,19s and a limited number of mig 21s using guerrilla tactics and hit and run strikes proved highly effective…against a numerical (and to a degree)technological superior enemy…
If you count only fighters the Luftwaffe did not have significant numerical superiority. Most of the aircraft that RAF shot down were bombers. Stukas were really easy targets.
Badger was my childhood hero. He lost me forever when I watched his ‘This is Your Life’. They had the elderly French woman who hid him in her house but was found by the Nazis and the woman spent the rest of the war in a concentration camp. The show was the first time Badger had seen her since they were both taken away. I thought the first thing he would have done after the War would have been to go to France and thank her, but alas not. That told me that Badger was all about himself, and everything I’ve read since, other than Reach For The Sky has only reinforced my view.
In the book Reach for the Sky, it does say that Bader called in on the French woman and her husband after his release from Colditz. The young Frenchman (the lady's son) who helped Bader get from the hospital to their house, had not been seen since they were captured by the Germans. Bader also appeared before the French court as a character witness for the daughter Lillie the nurse who arranged for Bader's escape and who the Germans forced to betray her family. Remember that sometimes stuff is said on TV for dramatic effect, rather than the truth.
There are several clear chapters to the Battle of Britain. 1. The Dunkirk Evacuation ie The Miracle, and the calm weather at the critical time was the real miracle. 2. The Convoy Fight. This was the preliminary skirmishing prior to "the real battle" but ships, sailors, aircraft and pilots were lost. Just why those Convoys had to keep sailing up through the English Channel within easy reach of the Luftwaffe has never been adequately addressed. 3. 11 Group Airfields, and the Radar Towers. This is when the Battle of Britain truly begins and it is a critical part of the battle. It was vital that 11. Group respond to every raid, but even so placing 12 fighters against 100 plus or 200 plus enemy aircraft is not really putting the odds in the favour of your pilots. 24 aircraft evens up the odds a little at first contact. What was Not helping the RAF was not sending more fighters into each battle once the Me 109s flying Top Cover had joined the battle and lost the height advantage and had been dispersed. Sending new "8 hours on Spitfires" pilots as replacements to 11. Group Squadrons was wasteful in the extreme as the majority were shot down on their first few sorties. 4. TARGET London. When the Battle moved to the attacks on London is when bigger numbers would have really counted. The raids were already being attacked as they flew in over the coast and the Me 109s were busy trying to intercept the RAF fighters while watching their fuel guages. For the Bomber pilots who had been told that the RAF was on it's "last legs", to be flying towards London and then be confronted by a large number of RAF fighters before they attacked, would have been very demoralising and hard to comprehend. There was a raid attacked by Bader where they were called early enough to get airborne and correctly vectored into position Above the German bombers. A head on attack was made and the effect was to break up the incoming Luftwaffe raid. Bader and his pilots realised that the risk of a head on collision was there, but was outweighed by the psychological impact of the show of numbers and the commitment to making a diving head-on attack. The breaking up of a raid like this is not necessarily reflected in the numbers of aircraft shot down but making a bomber formation dump their bombs early and then turn for home has to count for something? Like I said at the beginning, many factors were at play in this Battle for Britain. Mark from Melbourne Australia.
As usual Dunkirk overshadows the weeks afterwards when other evacuations took place and both the remnants of the BEF and RAF continued to fight on until the French surrender. Worth pointing out that 242 (Canadian) squadron was one of the last units out of France after forming part of the air-cover over St Nazaire. Bader taking over command after they got back to the UK.
Nothing would have pleased the crack Luftwaffe fighter squadrons more than large numbers of hastily trained RAF pilots presenting themselves to be shot down in dogfights over England. They were confident that their aircraft and training would see them defeat the RAF under such combat conditions. It was the foolish requirement of Goering that the fighters stay close to the bombers, after early heavy losses, that allowed the RAF to achieve a reasonable kill ratio against the German fighter force. The RAF's small fighter arm was brilliantly conserved by Dowding and handled with great expertise by Keith Park. DB should have stuck to his best role as an inspirational and talented fighter leader in the air and left the strategic thinking to those with real experience in such matters. Trafford Leigh Mallory on the other hand played a sinister role in this tale with clear grievances resulting in his relegation to No12 Group AOC when he clearly relished the fame and notoriety of the splendidly led 11 Group under Keith Park.
Takeoff of the Wing was delayed when waiting for Bader to fly in (he insisted to lead the formation). After takeoff it took normally 20 minutes for the Wing to form up and leave Duxford. 12 Group, Big Wing or not, had a longer distance to cover than 11 Group. Most of the time 11 Group requested 12 Group's help when the Germans were already over Kent. 11 Group knew when raids were forming up over France. The Wing (if activated in time and better organized than it was by LM) would most probably have been more effective against large and concentrated German formations than Park's individual squadrons which had to fight bombers and fighters simultanously. The Wing's Spitfire squadrons could deal with the fighters and the Hurricanes with the bombers. And there were always fighters with enough ammunition left to deal with stragglers. The Big Wing was also good for RAF morale and bad for Luftwaffe morale. Against smaller raids Park's system was certainly more agile and better dispersed against attack. The Luftwaffe started to use 50+ fighter formations from 1943 on, in 1944 organised into battle groups ('Gefechtsverband'). Galland prepared even for a big blow ('Grosser Schlag') with 1 000+ fighters in 1944 (though Hitler would disperse these fighters for the Ardennes offensive).
He was a brave and commendable pilot, but his thinking was flawed in so many areas. A lot of his reputation was built on the cult of personality. With Mallory’s political shenanigans and taking over from Dowding and Park, led us to losing so many quality pilots in the ensuing ‘rodeos and circus’ tactics. The man was a liability…
Obviously that novelty of self sealing fuel tanks on German bombers memo never reached Bader. I have read several first hand accounts of BoB fighter pilots pouring 5+ second bursts into He 111's and having no effect. Thank Christ we evolved the Spit into Mk5 guise with cannon and machine guns.
Bob Tuck was a big advocate of arming our fighters with Canon, always remember him getting bounced by 3 me 109s in his hurricane and even though they shot his craft full of holes he knocked 2 down and damaged the 3rd before he bailed out, what a guy
@@beaujeste1 Bader sounds like one of those personality disordered types who behave with a reckless disregard for their own or anyone else's safety. It's not so much bravery as just lacking a sense of fear. Psychopaths share that trait. Such people can be very useful in a war but you wouldn't want them around otherwise. His combat record wasn't that good and whatever PR use he had was probably outweighed by his arrogant dogmatism in colluding with Leigh-Mallory to disobey Dowding. Churchill was a little bit like Bader but with far more redeeming qualities. Alanbrooke, along with a host of others, had to devote a dis-proportionate amount of effort to counteracting Churchill's desire to invade Norway. IMO Bader wanted to implement fighter sweeps over France to indulge his own personal desire to fight. The huge losses would have convinced a normal person to change course.
Sort of. He was correctly against 20mm canon in 1940 when they were prone to jamming. He was skeptical about them in 1941, because he initially wasn’t convinced that the jamming issue had been sufficiently resolved to make them reliable. However I think he was on record as supporting them in principle and I believe that at the time he was shot down he was due to take delivery of a spit with canon.
Dowding's and Park's tactical plan was to attack the German bombers *before* they had dropped their payload on the target. Having to wait for the big wings to assemble often meant that if the enemy bombers were caught, they had already dropped their bombs.
@@AudieHolland but dowding tactics did not shot down the bombers it just cause then to dump their load and head for home to come back tomorrow mallory wanted to shoot down the bombers group 11 bases wore to far forward to protect poper and they did not talk to 12 till it was to late if they passed on contact to 12 group earlier they could been off the ground and formed up for battle
@@brucenadeau2172 All Dowding had to make sure, was that the RAF survived untill September. Come September, the weather would go bad to worse, making an invasion an absolute impossibility. And if you think about it, what were the Germans going to do once they had landed a few divisions in England? Hunt the English resistance all the way up to Hadrian's Wall, while the British Home Fleet was making mince meat out of the badly improvised German 'invasion fleet?'
The four finger configuration proved to be the best. The problem with a big wing is that all of the aircraft are concentrated and cannot cover anywhere near as much area as many small wings.
11 group was to far forward if the german had not switched target 11 group was finished the thing is there should not have been any sqandron so far forward group 12 did not get the alert till it was to later
@@brucenadeau2172what else would they do? Leave the South-East undefended and exposed? Also 11 Group DID call 12 Group to help them but took far too long to come to their assistance. I don't think you have any understanding of the Battle of Britain.
Leigh-Mallory wasn't very bright, he allowed himself to be led by the nose by Bader. Later in the war L-M failed to ensure our fighter squadrons were trained for ground attack to enable them to support the army after D-Day. The RAF Desert Airforce had done a great job supporting the army in north Africa under Mary Cunningham. Leigh-Mallory didn't get on with 'Mary' so failed to make use of his knowledge Despite knowing the problems of daylight bombing that the Germans had in 1940, L-M sent fighters to escort slow bombers over France following the Battle of Briton. Hundreds of aircrew were killed for no gain. Bader was thoroughly disliked by members of the RAF, both servicemen and officers. Instead of doing his duty, he was a gong chaser, who somehow managed to get the ear of Churchill for his own ends.
Excellent video once captions are turned on. Otherwise had difficulty unerstanding Craig. Have always thought TLM was the principal instigator of the Big Wing. While the video covers old ground there is still something to be learned. My understanding is that the poor treatment Dowding received after the Battle was due to the lack of an effective night fighter force when the enemy resorted to the Blitz.
But Dowding was working on the nightfighter issue and had the right idea to deal with the threat, plus all of the pieces to do it well into final development (Decent twin engined / two man crew aircraft (Beaufighter), passable Airborne Radar (AI Mk IV) and direct control of the Intercept from the Radar Screen itself (AMES MK 8 GCI Radar).
Leigh Mallory in front of Park and Dowding,is reported as saying that I would rather shoot down one plane after its hit it's target than 5 before to which Park replied the targets are my airfields. The idea of the big wing was ridiculous because it took time to gather the formation which meant that the first planes were using up fuel in the process
Surely that was the other way round?as he would be saying I'd rather shoot down 1/5th of what they were shooting down? obviously though,if you were shooting 5 planes down instead of 1 they'd be less planes available to bomb the next day?a much higher attrition rate.
@@Trebor74 I don't know if Mallory actually said that but whether he did or not, doesn't change the fact that the big wing idea was not popular amongst a lot of the pilots that fought in the battle.
Important was the fact of getting fighters up and at 'em ASAP was that it broke up the raid, disrupted the flight to the target, potentially saving productive assets from destruction and enhancing the consumption/wastage of Luftwaffe fuel reserves. They had little reserve for extra time over Britain, if they wanted to get home. By the time the Big Wing got itself organised and airborne, the Luftwaffe had possibly hit their targets and the BW could chase unloaded bombers home. Not an efficient use of precious resources. All well expressed below.
It is important that bomber formations are broken up as quickly as possible. Even if you can't prevent them reaching the target area it may still be possible to stop them dropping the bombs where they want to. It also makes life difficult for the enemy escort fighters because their bombers are all over the place. Dowding and Park knew this and acted accordingly (and successfully). Their sidelining was an act of petty jealousy and political scheming - fuelled by Churchill's mania for aggressive action.
I once had the great fortune to meet a WW2 ex-RCAF fighter pilot (and inveterate excaper) and asked him his opinion of Park and Leigh-Mallory. Park was, he said, a gentleman who cared deeply about his pilots while Leigh-Mallory was a "self-aggrandising @#?!". Dowding? The man who saved Britain but was never given the true honour that he deserved. And Bader? - "Bader wasn't Kenneth More" and "if he had been THAT good he wouldn't have crashed and lost his legs in the first place!" There was an interesting documentary some years back about Colditz. Bader's batman had the opportunity to be repatriated to the UK but Bader wouldn't allow it . . . because he needed somebody to carry him upstairs to his bath.
The history of air-to-air combat had already judged the Big Wing to be a bad idea before the end of WW2. Look at it from the pilot's point of view: in Dowding and Park's method, a small number of RAF aircraft would attack a huge Luftwaffe formation, so that if an aircraft appeared in an RAF gun sight, it was almost certainly one from the Luftwaffe. The risk of shooting one's colleagues down was minimal. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe fighter pilots had a heck of a job finding RAF aircraft among the vast cloud of their own. The effect was that RAF fighter pilots had far more shooting opportunities than did their opponents. With the Big Wing, this was not so. We may observe that Dowding and Park understood statistical probability, and that Leigh-Mallory and Bader did not.
@@brucenadeau2172 Probably because the positions were reversed. The USN in that case was on the offensive as the Luftwaffe had been in the Battle of Britain, and their strategy was similar to the Luftwaffe's: use a large force so that even in the event of attrition, some of the force will get through. The outcomes were different because whereas in the Luftwaffe case the attrition rate was unsustainable, in the USN case it was not. The fortunes of war, eh?
I am reminded of the fate of Admiral Jellicoe after Jutland in WW1, he essentially withheld his forces from pursuing the High Seas Fleet, an action that, with their retreat being covered by torpedo boats and submarines, could have cost the Royal Navy several valuable warships. Instead Admiral Beatty, who commanded the battlecruiser squadren, had born the brunt of the German's fire and in the process lost three of his Battlecruisers due to incompetence and poor signalling. Still Jellicoe was replaced by Beatty after the battle even though with the benefit of hindsight he was by far the more effective commander.
Jellicoe was appointed First Sea Lord in November 1916, scarcely a demotion. At least, Beatty never had the "chance" to show his elan in charge of Grand Fleet.
@@Wombat1916 For which the common sailors of the RN were doubtless grateful. Had the High Seas Fleet had their 1918 "death sortie" that the Kaiser wanted while Beattie was in charge on the front line it would have been a bloodbath. He was like those Western Front Generals that used to use their soldiers like cannon fodder. At least with Jellicoe running the show on the water they stood a chance, one he was promoted out of the way well ...
Downing and Park excluded, the phrase 'Lions led by Donkeys' really does apply to the people setting strategy of the RAF. Leading up to the war they believed that the bomber would always get through, they complained when Max Aten prioritised fighter production, and the big wing is typical of the thinking. True it must have been very disheartened for Luftwaffe pilots after being told the RAF was on its last legs to see that many airplanes coming up, but it was always late, the planes they claimed had already dropped their bombs. Keith Parks strategy meant at times 3 or 4 squadrons could be vectored on to the enemy, the big wing was inflexible when flexibility was needed.
Almost everybody believed that the bomber would always get through. The Lions Led by Donkeys canard stems from the 1st World War and is a load of garbage. Haig was pushed into fighting the battle of the Somme before he had the chance to train his army. The British learned quickly and by the end of the war they were by far the most efficient force on the Western Front.
I don't know if it's been voiced elsewhere but, from my readings the Big Wing was an impractical, egotistical f-up which, if allowed to continue unchecked, would have wasted precious men and machines in fruitless cavalry charges against opponents who had already achieved their bombing objectives, at a time when we couldn't afford such losses. Don't forget, the objective in 1940 wasn't to fight German fighters, but to protect England from a pre-invasion bombing campaign as effectively as possible with the minimum possible loss of men and planes, an objective which Dowding's tactics ultimately achieved (nothing could have stopped the Blitz, as would also be the case when the Allies began successfully bombing Germany). If the practice had been continued, the Luftwaffe would simply have changed their raiding tactics to put second waves of bombers over 12 Group fields when the entire circus had landed, with devastating results. They were already trying to do this in Kent, but the rotational system of small formations from multiple fields ultimately proved a successful deterrent to this. Many died though, air and ground crew alike. From many years away, had Leigh Mallory prevailed, the "best" outcome would have been the deserved destruction of his tactical reputation. The worst would have been the loss of the Battle. The few prevailed; the many, in the form of large cumbersome and basically unmanageable formations, probably would have not...and, being born in 1947, I might have grown up speaking German.
except group12bases wore outside fighter range they would be wiped by group13 that is the thing britian had depth by basing their fighter sofar forward they almost lost the battle
Grew up with Bader as a hero, met him twice at RAF Coltishall while serving as ground crew on the BBMF, by the second meeting decided I did not like him.
@@bosoerjadi2838 I suppose the main thing was that he left the RAF in 1945, I met him in the 70's and he still expected to be treated like he was still a group captain. You always felt he was talking down to you. I expect he treated officers differently, A hero yes , a nice man to the lower ranks no
@@davegoldsmith4020 Thank you very much for sharing. I guess it illistrates that the Romans were right to have a slave continuously remind their conquering heroes that (even) they are mortal.
Bader’s bravery and braggadocio could not be questioned, the same cannot be said of his judgement. Look at the Air Ministry meeting where the question of armament was discussed. Stanford Tuck arguing for 20mm canons and Bader for .303 🤦♂️
Another factor was Bader's frustration that he could not be transferred to command an 11Group Squadron/Wing (where all the real action was) because he could not meet the required scramble time because of his legs, so he had to find a way of being noticed!
Lets be blunt - Bader liked the Big Wing because he got to command it, he would never let it go to 11 Group without him and if we'd found him his own little airfield and personal squadron on the Sussex/Kent coast to just add to his score he'd have had no interest in anything else...he was NOT Kenneth Moore. Leigh-Mallory liked it because it helped his self serving campaign to oust Dowding for himself, which worked. Dowding was treated very badly and it is always shameful when people self serve during wartime (like Market-Garden, conceived just to stop Patton and put all resources in one mans hands..).
For the Battle of Britain it was not a good idea, the circumstances and the nature of the battle made it inappropriate. But in the right circumstances and with the right resources and guidance, Big wings could work and made sense. Just that it didn't make sense in the Battle of Britain.
Big wing was complicated and a waste of resources (namely aviation fuel spent during form up.) Dowd had it right leave it to individual squadrons get in the air intercept the target as quickly as possible
Even more to the point, a damaged German bomber that has to dump its bombs over the sea or farm land and break off for its base in France is a mission-kill and out of the fight for at least a day or two. 11 Group didn't need to destroy every German aircraft to win the battle, rather they just needed to prevent the Germans winning, that's the advantage of fighting a defensive battle.
Sorry, that didn't come across well enough- seemed clear in my head, not so much when I read it back. The Big Wing would very likely have shot down more German bombers. But doing so AFTER they had already dropped their payloads on either RAF airfields or London would have been a net loss. Better to drive them off and break up their formation without shooting them down if it prevents a successful bombardment.
@@daveharrison4697 while either scenario works, shooting down the bombers was the winning strategy, a cripple that makes it home could be repaired and put back in the air. Germany did not have the raw industrial capacity to keep up with losses if they had kept on. Not too mention building fighters is cheaper then bombers so that put the British at the advantage.
@@patrickradcliffe3837 True. But if the RAF airfields had been put out of action, the aircraft industry had suffered significant damage etc. etc... Ultimately it was the attrition of aircrew rather than aircraft that was the deciding factor in both material and morale dimensions. Little known fact: even at the worst heights of the Battle of Britain the RAF was sending fighter pilots who had completed the required tour length back to flight schools to teach new pilots air combat tactics. Despite the losses sustained at the end of the Battle of Britain, Fighter Command was actually stronger. 11 Group had been mauled but not broken, 10 and 12 Groups were essentially untouched, the training and manufacturing pipelines were in better health, and reserve squadrons were being built up, though needing more flying and combat training. The Luftwaffe on the other hand basically never recovered from its aircrew losses in the Battle of Britain. Alas the RAF then seemed to throw away a hugely potent advantage with fighter sweeps over France and the Bomber Command campaigns.
@@daveharrison4697 - Exactly. The object was to stop the Luftwaffe from gaining air superiority over the skies of Britain - while stopping the Luftwaffe from bombing shipping ports, airfields and munitions factories. Dowding was endlessly attempting to keep track of accurate numbers of RAF fighter command resources ( pilot losses, exhausted squadrons and number of fighter plane replacements ). Fighter Command had to continue to exist and being out numbered 4 to 1 could not get drawn into a battle of attrition. . Where as Shoto Douglas and Leigh - Mallory incorrectly thought the object was to shoot down the Luftwaffe "on mass" so they would give up. .
Dowding and Park Saved the UK, their ideas and system worked. A very ungrateful Air Minister and Prime Minister, got rid of them both with out the thanks and recognition they deserved
Well Trenchard, Salmond, Portal and Churchill's scientific advisor Lindemann were all pushing for a bomber campaign. Also, Trenchard , Sinclair, Shoto Douglas and Leigh - Mallory had it in for Dowding. But the RAF simply did not have the night time navigational technology to accurately hit industrial targets. Based on previous events, I seriously doubt Dowding would have supported the losses and in ability to hit strategic targets of the RAF 's night time bomber campaign. So Trenchard and Salmond pushed Chief Air Marshall Newall out , and replaced him with Portal, before Dowding's term at Fighter Command was over - thus blocking Dowding being promoted to that position. As much as Churchill admired Dowding, IMO he went along with this because of the political fall out of Luftwaffe's night time bombing, to keep the peace in the RAF and because Churchill would have wanted a bomber campaign. After Dowding got pushed out , Churchill tried to get positions for Dowding but was blocked by those in the Air Ministry .
I am ex R.A.F. and Proud of having served...It hurts to have to say this But Bader and Trafford Leigh-Mallory should have been Court Marshalled for Insubordination and mutiny by disregarding Hugh Dowding's orders that his duty was to Defend 11 Groups airfields.
From what I've seen, heard & read about Douglas Bader - he wasn't actually anything special as an actual pilot. Most other pilots have said that he was a self centred, rude & narcissistic arsehole.
The biggest single tactical change that the RAF made early on during the war was to ditch the outdated and flawed ViC formation in favour of the finger 4. The ViC was great for air shows etc but a total disaster when it came to dog fighting, as both wing men had to keep a constant eye on the lead aircraft.
The Vic was only informally ditched by some squadrons during the BoB, the real change didn’t happen until 1941. Malan’s squadron was one of the first to adopt the finger 4 during the BoB. Most of the others modified the Vic to put increased focus on the watching out for the aircraft in front, and ditching the tail end Charlie. So for a squadron of 9 aircraft the lead plane was protected by the three planes behind on on each side and so on. Instead of the vulnerable tail end Charlie the two most rearward planes would watch out over each other. When contact was made the front most plane in each of the three lines would become the principle attacker, with the following two keeping watch for the plane ahead.
Possibly, although “dog fighting” was not the prime role of the RAF during the Battle of Britain. Their aim was to destroy as many German bombers as possible and the “vic” formation was superior for this purpose, it pays to remember the bombers do the damage and the fighters are there just to protect them. It was only when twelve group wanted to pursue shooting down fighters that the “finger four” formation (essentially one plane guarding another) became more common. The concept of “dog fighting” whilst good for story books is actually the last thing any Air Force desires - just as the last thing any tank commander wants to fight is another tank. Which is best? Well the vic formation is used around the world now and the finger four isn’t.
The greatest contribution that the Big Wing made to the Battle of Britain was likely psychological. One author commented that the Luftwaffe pilots, having flown through 11 Group's guerilla tactics would have been shocked to encounter 12 Group's massed planes over London. This may have affected their morale. Apart from that, it was a waste of time. And Dowding and Park's treatment following the battle was appalling. And the assistance that Brand's 10 Group gave to Park of 11 Group is seldom mentioned.
Logic tells you that after a big wing has formed up, they all have to land and refuel and rearm at the same time. That would have been suicide in 11 group since the Germans would have caught them on the ground with no one defending. The big wing concept was a luxury that 12 group could afford so long as they didn't have to take part in any fighting.
Think its important to understand the differences in strategic objectives. Goering wanted air superiority over the skies of Britain. Dowding wrote in August 1941, " The destruction or paralysis of fighter command was therefore an essential prerequisite to the invasion of these Islands." Dowding was very aware of pilot numbers, projected loss rates, and that the Luftwaffe out numbered RAF fighter command 4 to 1. Add to this , Park also made it clear that RAF fighters were to go after the bombers before they hit their targets and to stay clear of the 109's - ignore Kesselring's 109 feints or sweeps. . Where as Shoto Douglas and Leigh Mallory held the strategic view that the Luftwaffe would give up if their losses were excessive. . Shoto Douglas and Leigh - Mallory were wrong because the objective was to preserve fighter command, in order to stop the Luftwaffe from gaining air superiority, while preventing Luftwaffe bombers from hitting their targets. . As for Bader , as a group captain, it was none of his business to initiate a tactic that would affect strategy. ... and Bader testifying at the Air Council meeting on November 24th, 1940 supporting the "Big Wing" clearly indicates he was an a**. Dowding and Park were told to pack their bags shortly after this meeting.
I seem to remember that the pre-war RAF fighter tactics were based around something called the 'Area Attack', whereby a fighter squadron would fly and attack in formation, directed by the squadron leader...
I think they were called "The fighter attacks" and there were a number of them. If you were flying along in your vic of three planes and spotted an enemy at say 5000ft below and 1000yds to port beam the leader would say "fighter attack 7" and that would be the cue for a pre arranged intercept maneuvre. So very cumbersome and removes any element of surprise / initiative from the attack. Going back to the basic pair and abandoning the vic was also very helpful. Johnny Johnson goes into it in some detail in his excellent book "Full Circle"
@@johneyton5452 the novelist derek robinson i think his name was goes into the fighting area attack in his excellent novel piece of cake.cumbersome and left vulnerable to opposing fighters.
@@johneyton5452 they made a mini series as well. They used spitfires instead of hurricanes probably because couldnt find enough hurricanes.good stuff takes a squadron from france to the battle of britain. Hard to tell who the protagonist was. You attached than he bites it.
@@derricklarsen462 I vaguely remember that. In the first episode the Sqn Ldr is talking to the chaps and casually falls off his plane wing and breaks his neck.
At 7:23 Luftwaffe losses 175. Actual losses 60. "The Narrow Margin - The Battle of Britain and the Rise of Air Power" Derek Wood and Derek Dempster (c) 1961 page 353
The Big Wing was deployed at just the right time, when the LW thought the RAF was on its knees and Spitfire production was increasing quickly. The use of the Big Wing in Sep was the biggest psy ops victory of the battle and saved numerous lives of young inexperienced replacement pilots. The big mistake was using a mix of Spits and Hurri's, with Spits having to always wait for the Hurricanes to climb and/or pursue. The idea of fighter control from an on-scene commander is valid, with Sqns being directed for various combat tasks and others providing top cover.
You summed up very well: the Big Wing was good for public morale with overclaims, so it helped the war effort but on the expense of 11 Group and Dowding. Churchill was the master of hearts, Park was the master of air tactics. Both had its place in victory.
We'll never know for sure but the Big Wing may have had enough impact on the Germans to persuade them to make a "tactical withdrawal" from the Battle of Britain. Their intelligence told them the RAF was on its knees, yet here were huge formations of fighters opposing them. Whatever your view, the RAF done a magnificent job against a formidable enemy, I get emotional just seeing a Spitfire or Hurricane in flight! Sixty plus in formation would have been a sight to behold.
There has always been an opinion that Sir Keith Parks (Kiwi) should have had a statue on the last remaining point of Nelson’s Column.... ‘cause Parks was the flyboy that saved the United Kingdom from becoming another German state!!!!! Oh what kiwis have achieved!!! Regards Ian 👨🎤😇🤔👍😎⚠️✊🇺🇦✊🇳🇿
@@GregWampler-xm8hv sorry dude Sir Keith Parks was a kiwi!!!! New Zealander!!!! And he won the Battle of Britain before Lee Malory got his plane off the ground!!! Regards Ian 👨🎤🇳🇿😎👍🍸🍸
The historical fact of the matter is that Dowding and Park won the 'Battle of Britain'. Mallory and Bader played politics and cost the lives of many pilots in their 'Big Wing' raids over Europe afterwards. History clearly shows, that despite Dowding and Park being subsequently betrayed, they did the job when the world so desperately needed them. God Bless em' All.
The advantage that the attacker has over the defender is that until late in the battle the defender does not know the target of the attack. The disadvantage of the attacker is that they have limited time over the target area, so the attack is basically a hit-and-run . So in this context since the Big Wing is messy and takes too long to assemble the basic advantage the defender had is thrown away ; by the time they are assembled the enemy has dropped its bombs and is preparing to run. It's often forgotten that enemy fighters pose no threat to ground defences - they are there to defend the bombers. Being the gung-ho group that fighter pilots very often were, they would choose to attach the attacking fighters rather than what should be their primary target the bombers. To decide whether or not the Big Wing concept was good or bad, it's only necessary to review how German defences developed during the later Allied Bombing Offensive against Germany waged by the RAF and USAAF. Various tactics were used and developed by the Germans. None of them ever used the Big Wing concept.
german sure did use the big wing on defense the pulled their plane back to the german border and waited till the fighter escort broke off and head for home then attacked the bomber that is what the raf should have done pulled back in land 12 group was not alerted till the german bomber wore almost to their target
@@brucenadeau2172 Although I referred to German defence tactics later in the war, this may have been misleading. In the interval between 1940 and 1944/45 both sides had had the opportunity to learn from their previous mistakes. The RAF had developed better bombs, better bombers and above all sophisticated Pathfinder techniques. On the other hand the Germans had experimented and adapted, making changes in their tactics in response to the technical innovations as they were introduced by the RAF. Air defence against bombers has two main components, artillery, known usually in this content as ' FLAK ' - a word adopted from a phrase in the German language - and night fighters. None of the three or four types of RAF bomber in use were equipped with belly turrets and were as a result vulnerable to attack by a night fighter from below. If such an attack occurred before the bomber had dropped its bombs there was grave danger that the crew of the night fighter might also be taken out by the exploding bombs just above them. For this reason the fighters would prefer to attack the bombers on their homeward leg. The German defences had to coordinate the night fighters with their FLAK batteries, which were radar guided. The FLAK guns had to avoid shooting down their own night fighters, and the basic way this was done was to limit the height of the FLAK and require the night fighter to operate above that height. It should therefore be obvious that the tactics adopted by the RAF defences in 1940 bear no comparison withe the bombing of Germany 4 or five years later. RAF defence in 1940 was primitive, and heavily dependent on early and accurate detection of the incoming bombers. There were two components to this detection - visual by the Observer Corps, and the Chain Home radar towers. Deployment of the fighter force had to be rapid and accurate. This was not practical using the Big Wing concept.
Is there any evidence that the Big Wing overclaimed *more* than 11 group units did? All RAF units overclaimed, despite best efforts, but unless 12 group overclaimed more, you can't use overclaiming to discount their effectiveness. The other factor this video glosses over somewhat is that it might have been the wrong tactic for defending airfields from multiple small raids, but (accidentally!) the right one for defending London.
Wasn't this war gamed after the war, using Galland and other German Luftwaffe leaders. Using the Bigwing tactics resulted in the destruction of the RAF on the ground.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Correct! The RAF held the German bombers and fighters away from the beaches which allowed the men to evacuate without being bombed and strafed.
No, Operation Sealion was wargamed in 1974 at Sandhurst, the senior commanders being experienced WW2 commanders such as, on the German side, Galland & Ruge. In order to allow some level of fighting on land, the Germans were (falsely) given a landing window of opportunity when the actual dispositions of the Royal Navy were artificially adjusted, moving them further away than had been the reality. The result? The German first wave landed on 22 September, at dawn. Two days later, the RN anti-invasion forces arrived (17 cruisers and 57 destroyers, with smaller support vessels, which was actually reasonably accurate), annihilating German transports in the Channel. The last pockets of German resistance, out of ammunition and supplies, surrendered on 28 September. Apart from the fact that the RN anti-invasions forces were, in the main, based at the Nore, Portsmouth, & Plymouth, rather than further away as in the game, no-one seriously quibbled about the result.
@@idleonlooker1078 Yes. The criticism was that the RAF weren't in the skies over Dunkirk. That is because they were inland somewhat engaging the Luftwaffe. Major Werner Kreipe said "the days of easy victory were over. At Dunkirk we met the RAF head on!".
The whole big wing drama was a psyop designed to confuse the German high command and have them believe that fighter command was fractured and on the verge of a critical error in tactics and strategy. It worked. The big wing also fostered the illusion of greater strength in numbers when in fact fighter command was maxed out. Undoubtedly there were incompetent career officers in the RAF but luckily those idiots rarely go to the front line. Large formations do create confusion but then that's the whole point of stirring up the hornet's nest. The mission is abandoned as panic overrides it.
Yes Park and Dowding were badly delt to after winning the battle with their tactics. Park did return to New Zealand and serve on the Auckland city council where he was instrumental in getting Auckland international Airport up and running. As a kiwi I m immensely proud of him..and what he achieved
Perhaps an analysis of 1941 fighter sweeps over occupied Europe in a future video the main benefit of which would seem to be getting Bader into a POW camp and out of the way!
The Big Wing was a terrible idea, it had never worked in air exercises because it took too long to assemble and was too large to control. While Bader was assembling his Big Wing, 11 Group airfields were being destroyed. The sad fact is that Trafford Leigh Mallory and Bader were playing politics in the RAF, lying about its effectiveness. Sholto Douglass became involved and he wanted Dowdings job. Shortly after the Battle of Britain was won, Hugh Dowding and Keith Park were sacked and Douglass and Leigh Mallory replaced them. In an act of pure vindictiveness, Douglass and Leigh Mallory left out the names of Dowding and Park in the after battle report. Churchill scorned their report and had it rewritten giving Dowding and Park full credit.
One important part of this video is highlighting that 3/5ths of squadrons were hurricanes. Hurricanes needed the Spitfires to go after fighters why they went after the bombers. But it was coordinating too many at once. A bunch of "small wings" hitting the same flight of aircraft would have work.
Big Wing sounded like a strategy where huge swarms of enemies would come and end the battle of the day. The issue is the enemy gets to decide when and you have to scramble all the fighters up in the air for a formation. Big Wing is a show ender, not a show starter. Also a key thing here is that Germany though the RAF was on its last legs with Dowdings Net. If they had gone with Big Wing they surely would have decided a change of tactics on the final day of the battle.
Lee-Mallory & Bader's 'Big Wing' concept was implaccably flawed - rendezvous of so many aircraft - & the most significant factor - time, was not on their side, & as such 11 Group suffered the consequences. Lee-Mallory & Douglas' (not bader) pernicious backroom politics shamefully denegrated two of the most important commanders - Dowding & Park, & what disgusts me most is the belated tribute to Dowding, in 1988. Without those two leaders, the Battle Of Britain may well have been lost.
I can see the theory that a larger number of intercepting fighters will shoot down a larger number of bombers, but the time involved to get them into place is a significant downside - and there is the adage "no battle plan survives contact with the enemy". But in my unexperienced opinion wouldn't it be preferable to have fighter squadrons hit the bomber (and escort force) continually to run the escort force ragged and therefore be able to inflict serious damage upon the bombers?
You're right in the sense to over extend the German fighters, but the problem with a big wing is that when all these fighters are defenceless on the ground refuelling and rearming at the same time, all it needed was another raid to come in to wallop the fighters while on the ground. This flaw was clearly recognised by Park and Dowding. That's why they sent small formations to disperse the raids and disorganise the German fighters. Then while that small formation landed to refuel and rearm, they ensured another small formation was airborne to protect them and attack the next raid coming in. 👍
During the filming of the movie "The Battle of Britain", the name Leigh Mallory fell. James (Ginger) Lacey, immediately stated, "Leigh Mallory was a clot!" To continue, Mallory once requested volunteers. Yet no one was willing. So Mallory, according to Lacey remarked, "lack of moral fibre." Leaving Lacey with the answer, maybe, but no lack of brains! Ps, R.S. Tuck was present when this occurred, who looked shocked at Gingers remarks.
At 2 minutes you mention Italo Balbo as Fascist. You really ought to do a bit more research before making incorrect statements like this. Balbo was Italian and was probably assassinated in the mid 1930s for opposing Mussolini. Hardly Fascist. Be fair to the man. And the next contributor almost corrects you.
He was one of the 4 orchestraters of Mussolini's march on Rome, he was a literal member of the National Fascist Party, and he was heir apparent to Mussolini himself. Also the claims he was assassinated have been thoroughly debunked lol
Thanks for that Driverman - recently I have noticed early signs of casual "research" and political correctness in IWM features, these people should be unreproachable in their accounts!
Main problem seemed to be that by the time they'd formed up and got into a favourable position, the Germans had come, dropped their bombs and were on their way back. This may have been fine for increasing your score, and arguably for attrition of experienced enemy aircrew, but as a means of defending the country against enemy attack it was utterly hopeless. Bader (autocorrects to Vader ☺) was one of the greatest examples of the overblown "hero" (largely self promoted) if you ask me.
@@brucenadeau2172 The Big Wing took time to form up. There is no way 11 group could have alerted 12 group in time because, by the time the Wing had formed up, the Germany bombers would have bombed the airfileds and left. The Dowding method would have hit the bombers BEFORE they bombed. Big Wings, if effective, would only catch the bombers AFTER they bombed. All this has been analysed; see "The Most Dangerous Enemy" for details. You really like repeating rubbish without reason nor substantiation.
Douglas Barder should have been stood down from having any contact with the RAF. He argued incessantly for the big wing, long after it was shown to be killing pilots and letting bombers through. He couldn't accept he was a fool. Great stress as he had endured, frequently reduces the IQ. He seems to have become irrational and bitter.
The big wing was a waste of time . The Radar chain could only look forward and the air defense relied on the observer corps for enemy aircrafts height and course . A single squadron could take off when scrambled in a few minutes but still took a fair amount of time to climb to 20,000ft . especially Hurricanes that were slow compared to Spitfires. It took Baders big wing about 30 minutes to assemble and climb to operating altitude . During that period bombers could have flown 80 miles . Rarely mentioned is how often fighter squadrons failed to see the Germans because they were vectored to the wrong place .
The BOB was about one and only one dynamic. PILOTS! Sheer numbers and better equipment were the only factors. The Luftwaffe had a major problem, low fuel capacity for the 109. You can shoot down Do17s, 111s, and Ju88s to your hearts content so long as the 109s are out of gas. And that is exactly what the RAF did. The big wing was clumsy, but it put a lot of hurricanes in contact with german bombers with no escort. The result is history.
All this talk about the Battle of Britain and no mention of Sailor Malan ? He also fiercely disapproved the big wing and when Bader was shot down was in the forefront of getting rid of it.
@@nerdyali4154 When Bader got shot down Malan was so against this big wing that he banned it. It was only towards the end of the war that Command began using it
If I'm attacking a force that puts up a big wing, I'll time a second, bigger attack to coincide with the big wing having to be on the ground refuelling/re-arming. This tactic was used by the Allies well enough when the bombers were going the other way. Rule One: never go up against someone who is seen and sees himself as a hero. You'll always lose no matter how right you are.
Your observation to send in another raid to wallop the fighters when on the ground was clearly recognised by Park and Dowding. That's why they sent small formations to disperse the raids, and then ensured another small formation was airborne to protect those now landing to refuel and rearm. 👍
I think the shock value to the Germans made it worthwhile. Weren't they told that the RAF was on its knees? The trouble with a big wing is all your aircraft are either in the air or on the ground. There was also the value of hitting the bombers on their way home. A bomber downed or badly damaged today, isn't coming back tomorrow
As the Luftwaffe continued to target 11 Group's airfields, the Critical Period became ever more critical. This post will analyze what FC could have done to mitigate the situation. First however, a few brief words on the German performance. Basically they were not making any major operational mistakes. Their only blunder was Luftwaffe intelligence, which had severely underestimated the number of aircraft the British had available. By the end of August Luftwaffe intelligence reports stated that Dowding had between 300-400 aircraft available. In reality this was the number of aircraft 11 Group had available, FC had about 700 aircraft. Of these about 60% were Hurricanes, 40% Spitfires (at the beginning of the Battle the ration had been 66%:33%). Based on these false figures, the Germans believed the other groups had been severely depleted to concentrate whatever the aircraft it had left in 11 Group. One of the reasons they underestimated FC's strength was the fact that the British continued to intercept in small formations. The German assumption was that they didn’t have enough planes to do anything else, since common sense indicated that if you attack in greater numbers, you do so. It was this estimate that led Kesselring to believe that if he succeeded in overwhelming 11 Group, he would have overwhelmed all of FC. His goal was to steadily increase the strain on 11 Group until it cracked, by constantly attacking it throughout the day, using dense tightly packed formations of bombers and fighters (3-4 fighter per bomber). His thinking was that as long as FC kept intercepting in small, single unit squadrons usually from below, the fact that his new tactics deprived his fighters of the advantage of flying above the bombers at high altitude didn’t seem too important, as they were still usually above the British squadrons intercepting them. The important thing to him was that the new formations were succeeding in breaking through the fighter screen and reaching their designated targets, often with devastating results. His fighters were paying a heavy price, but the bombers were getting through, and that was the main thing. Let's get back to FC. Despite realizing that the Luftwaffe had adopted a new strategy centered on targeting his group, Park did not change his tactics in any way. In theory he called for two squadron formations, one Spits, one Hurricanes, but his insistence that his pilots prioritize rapid interceptions meant that most of the time squadrons did not have time to get into two squadron formations, and intercepted in single squadron formations, usually from below. LM realized that the new German strategy required a new British response. He, together with Douglas Bader, who was the first British commander to suggest Big Wing formations, came up with an alternative strategy, to optimally utilize the fact that 12 Group's was unlikely to sustain major attacks, because it was beyond 109 range. Since the German fiasco of the 15th of August, there had been no unescorted daylight raids. The result was what has become known as the Big Wing strategy. It was far from perfect, with significant flaws that meant it could not, in its original form, provide FC with a viable alternative. However, it did get some key fundamentals correct, and therefore had the potential to provide the basis for developing a viable, rapidly implementable alternative strategy for FC. The key fundamental was that the radar based defense system meant that for the first time in military history, the first force to engage the enemy did not have to be the one closest to him, because radar negated proximity. The importance of this cannot be overstated. 11 Group's proximity to the southern coast mean, according to the age old traditions of warfare, that it would have to be the first to face the enemy. Dowding tended to give his senior officers significant latitude in carrying out their assigned missions in a way that brings Lee to mind. Since the assumption was that 11 Group, being closest to the enemy, would always be the one to engage first, Dowding gave Park the latitude to run not just run 11 Group, but in effect the entire Battle. Since 11 Group had the least warning time, as it was closest to the Germans, it's understandable that Park prioritized rapid interception above all else. The problem was that like Dowding, he failed to recognize that radar meant that just because his group was the closest to the Germans did not mean he had to bear the brunt of the Battle. His tactics were suitable for his battle, but the radar based Dowding System meant there was no reason to make the entire Battle his battle. Dowding had a justified reputation for possessing a superior intellect, which he fully justified by being the first senior officer to fully comprehend the potential of radar, and to conceptualize, develop and implement an innovative entirely novel defense system based on it. Despite this, he failed to realize that the system he had devised negated the principle of proximity. This LM and Bader got. The map below details the range of British radar, which was the key to developing a viable alternative strategy.
The key elements of what could have been a viable alternative strategy based on a significantly modified version of the thinking at 12 Group (based on the LM-Bader strategy) were as follows: 1. Radar was able to first spot the enemy formations while they were still getting organized over northern France. If it took time for British wings to get themselves organized before they could engage, the Germans had an even bigger problem, as their formations were bigger, and included lumbering bombers. The fact that the Luftwaffe never provided its fighters with radios enabling them to communicate directly with the bombers they were flying with made a bad situation worse. 2. Abandon the most exposed 11 Group airfields such as Manston, Hawkinge and Lympne. Their locations precluded any possibility of squadrons defending them ever being able to intercept from equal or superior height. It must be remembered that even a relatively fast aircraft like the Spitfire had a relatively slow climb rate. The squadrons that had been operating those airfields would be redeployed to the ring of 11 Group bases that surrounded London, such as Kenley, Redhill, Hornchurch, Gravesend, West Malling, Stapleford and North Weald, or to 12 Group. 3. Change the proximity paradigm which dictated that 11 Groups fighters must be the ones to engage the Germans first. As soon as radar had spotted German formations still organizing over France, 12 Group would launch two Big Wings. Each wing would contain 3 squadrons, 2 Hurricane, 1 Spitfire, reflecting the fact that the Hurricane- Spitfire ratio was 2:1. (Bader's attempts to command a 5 squadron wing showed that anything bigger than a 3 squadron formation was impractical, despite claims to the contrary). At the same time 11 Group would launch an additional 2 wings from its less exposed northern bases, giving them the time they needed to form up and encounter the Germans before they reached their targets. Since the most exposed and vulnerable targets would no longer be in use (fake planes could be deployed on theme to fool the Germans - think of Patton's pre- D Day fake army), the real targets, further north would take the Luftwaffe formations longer to reach, as they were further north. It should be remembered that apart from the no longer operational (as per item 2) air bases, there weren't that many really valuable targets close to the coast, except the Spitfire factory at Southampton, so even if the Germans got to the south eastern coast before the defending fighters could engage them, it wouldn't have matter much. Britain could afford bombed countryside more than FC could afford the unsustainable pilot attrition Park's tactics caused. 4. Given the range of radar, these early launched wings would have enough time to assemble so they would be able to intercept the Germans halfway between the coast and London, at maximum advantage, from above or equal altitude, and because of their greater numbers, sustain less losses while bringing down at least marginally more enemy planes than single squadron formations (post War research has proven that although Big Wings did not have the massive kill rates they had been credited with, but did sustain less losses). 5. The two groups together had 34 first line aircraft (Spitfire or Hurricane) equipped squadrons, 21 in 11 Group, 13 in 12 Group. Between them, the two groups could easily have launched 6 such wings (18 squadrons), and still have plenty of fighters in reserve should a second wave of attacks be launched before the first wings would have had time to rearm and refuel (it's important to remember that 12 Group was for the most part safe from attacks). 6. As soon as the early launched wings were airborne, the rest of 11 Groups squadrons would be launched as required to provide the close cover to the airfields Park justifiably wanted. Such a strategy would have offered several advantages. While a 3 squadron wing did not down 3 times and many enemy aircraft as a single squadron (the numbers were 1.5 more kills per squadron compared to single squadron formations), the wings sustained far less casualties. Since FC's Achilles Heel was pilot attrition, which nearly caused its defeat, just for this reason alone this strategy should have been adopted. If during the first 10 days of the Critical Period FC losses would have been 10%-20% less for the same number of kills, it would have made a world of difference, and FC would never have found itself on the ropes as it did during the first and second weeks of September. Why wasn't this strategy adopted? That's for the next post.
A long time ago an ex RAF veteran told me of when he was standing in a group of fellow "erks" on an active WW2 aerodrome, a dog was seen running across the grass runway, Bader shouted "Somebody get that dog" no one moved quick enough Bader got into a vehicle chased the dog down ran over and killed it, I suppose that's what it takes to be a fearless leader of men.
The big wing was popular with those who thought big was better. Yet, this would not have worked and did not work very well in the Battle of Britian. Fortunately, that battle was over before Dowding was removed. Churchhill removing Dowding was repaid to him when he lost his seat in parliment right after the war.
The Big wing sounds like something many modern CEO's would like. Easy to understand & explain, easy to control, very impressive to onlookers. But falls flat on its face when you look at the details & consequences.
IMHO, Hugh Dowding was right... at the time of greatest crisis. Rapid response to incoming raids means that the raids were broken up & disrupted. The Big Wing concept was great for publicity but took far too long to assemble & as you pointed out, too unwieldy to be effective. Later on, it had merits but Hugh Dowding's avowed aim was to keep the RAF in the fight, something he achieved. For the first time in its existence, the Luftwaffe got a bloody nose.
he fail to alert 12 group in a timely manner if his vow was to keep the raf in the fight then why did keep his plane so for forward that the base wore almost knock out 12 group was not alerted till the german almost on top of their target
To point out, there are some E pens sill in existence in Britain. If you go to google earth, and look 1/2 way between Perranporth and St. Agnes, Cornwall, you'll see a WW II RAF airfield. At the southern end , you'll see what looks to be ant antenna's - but they are E pens.
the "big wing" was a terrible idea. too long to assemble. easily visible on radar. also panned with a few sly lines of dialogue in the "battle of britain" film. bader was also not liked much when he was in a german PoW camp by fellow allies. he considered himself above the rest and never thanked anyone. compared to hugh dowdings "hit and run" tactics that never let the germans rest a moment (german pilots on record say they much preferred the big wing to shoot at - more targets + more tired pilots).
Thanks for watching! Let us know what you think of the Big Wing and what you want us to look at next!
Yeah all about the Victor's!
Coming from an RAF family, I think as many others that the big wing was a BIG mistake, It was tragic that AVM Park and AOC Dowding were made to pay the price for this failure-Bader and Leigh-Mallory should have been sacked for what they did!
Hmm I think the big wing whilst a mistake is nothing compared to the priority of bombers first.
Even today after exhaustive research and analysis its conclusively proven the tactics devised and use by Dowding and Park were the ONLY and CORRECT ones that could have been successfully used. In this sense the "big wing" concept was wrong. However, the value in "big wings" IMHO was two-fold:
1) purely through maintaining the morale, and determination "to see it through" of the British public by seeing hordes of Spitfires and Hurricanes flying about (and largely doing bugger all!!), and,
2) eroding the morale of both the German fighter and bomber pilots.
"Big wings" were later proven to be counter-productive, by the horrendous fighter losses due to the policy of offensive sweeps by the RAF in 1941-2, which - incidentally - caused Bader to be shot down and become a POW.
@@idleonlooker1078 With regard to the "shooting down" of Bader -it's a few years ago now but I read that Bader was actually shot down by a Sgt. Pilot from his own squadron as he thought he was attacking a lone Me109. Bader evidently had the habit off flying off on his own. No German pilot ever claimed he had shot Bader down -which would have been a great coup for the Luftwaffe.
I like the way Sir Keith Park is labeled as a winner. He goes here, he wins; he goes there he wins. An absolutely outstanding leader but is little known and recognized in NZ.
He’s not sufficiently recognised by the Brits either. He’s not on the window in Westminster Abbey with the other heroes of the B of B and they put his statue in an obscure part of town.
The Battle of Britain movie correctly immortalised Park and Dowding
But he HAS got a very good Memorial Statue, in your country. Google it. Surely, your education system educates your young, about the huge contribution, your country has made in both world wars and beyond?
@@MrDaiseymay Have given his statue outside the Thames Town Hall a pat or two over the years. However, no one is taught anything about NZ's contribution outside ANZAC, because our teachers, like everywhere, are woke socialists.
I've seen his uniform and Medals in Auckland. He was a laid back and modest guy who didn't like fuss but did find the lack of honest respect a bit hard too take.
The evidence is very strong . 12 group did not support 11 group as Dowding ordered them to . Leigh Mallory 's big wings did not cover 11 group's airfields while 11 group's planes were attacking the Luftwaffe . The big wing theory was completely wrong . One only has to read Len Deighton's and other excellent books on the subject to see that Dowding was right and Leigh Mallory was wrong .
Am I right in assuming you mean the big wing could have been an effective back up to small groups of fighters making an initial assault while the big wing formed up and was then able to attack German planes?
One of the accounts I read claimed 11 Group couldn't count on getting support from 12 Group so I am a little sympathetic to this point of view.
Concerning actual BoB , suggest reading The Most Dangerous Enemy by Stephen Bungay - its excellent.
they wore not getting support from 12 group because did not alert 12 group till after all their squadron wore launch then they want 12 group wave a magic wand
they need to alert 12 group much earlier so 12 group could have formed big wings
they only called 12 group when the german wor about 5 minute out
11 group air base wore to close enemy there was no way to defend those bases
Hm... Big Wing is show of hands type of move/end game move. It would have doomed Britain if it had been adopted at the start, as it would give Germany a good view of what Britain could muster. Ironically it seems Dowding refusing it and Mallory eventual overrule of the former allowed it to be deployed at the best time for Big Wing to be utilized.
group 11 air base was to close and they didnot talk to group12 till the german over their bases grouphad no time
with the earlier alert the british could have massedtheir plane agaist raid used their few planestoout number the german at the raid but group cause squadron attackthe german when the german have the numbers
I admire Bader's personal courage and as a fighter ace. But he was dead wrong to support Mallory's big wing strategy. Downing had limited planes flown by exhausted pilots that were difficult to replace. He choose the middle course to have smaller groups of fighters disrupt the German bomber fleets, and prevent them from bombing, even though it resulted in less kills. That provided a precious reserve of planes to be available intercept other incoming German planes suddenly appearing. If the RAF committed too many of its fighters to intercept one German bomber sortie, it would result in gaps to cover other targets from being attacked.
It took a long time for the British fighters to reach altitude and location, so again, committing so many of the few squadrons they had would result in wasted fuel and time to respond to to other attacks. More kills would not have discouraged Hitler from invading England. It was the survival of the RAF to maintain air superiority over Britain that made him change his mind, among other things, to invade. Hitler rightly feared the British fleet, and without air superiority so the Luftwaffe could sink the British ships, Operation Seal Lion could not succeed.
Downing and Parks deserved better for saving Britain, and taking care of their pilots who fought outnumbered and with great fatigue. Mallory was a egotist bucking for promotion who did not carry the burden that Downing did.
Well said!! I would only add that Dowding and Park's handling of the Battle of Britain culminated in the FIRST victory against Hitler - which ultimately lead to victory for the allies. 👍
Dowding reported to the Air Ministry around Sep 12th: 'I am sure that L-Mallory is thinking on the right lines'. Dowding's successor Douglas wrote on Dec 17th: 'I am convinced we must try and get larger formations of fighters against the enemy mass formations...We must give the AOC 12 Group's proposals every possible support.'
@Sean M I was waiting to see if someone would mention that. Whilst as POWs in Colditz, his batman refused repatriation back to the UK to ensure Bader got the help he needed. This even included putting Bader on his back and carrying him up flights of stairs after his bath. In all his post-war interviews Bader never once mentioned this man's name, nor paid tribute to him - Bader simply forgot him in his single-minded pursuit in cultivating his popular image.
@Sean M A very interesting, and perceptive, observation!! Thanks! I never thought of it like that before. 👍
@Sean M ---Bader was a bit of a chump from what I've heard, He just happened to be on our side.
This is basic Sun Tzu:
When outnumbered, do not attack en force. Instead, hit and run. Save your resources while exacting maximum damage on an overextended enemy.
Especially when the Luftwaffe had not been given drop tanks, so their time over Britain was critically short - and quite a few ditched in the channel due to fuel exhaustion. If Goering had had the wits to order drop tanks in 1940, the whole tactics for the Battle of Britain would have been entirely different; as it was, it was a battle of attrition - Dowding understood that; Leight-Mallory did not.
The problem was not so much that the English were outnumbered, but that the Germans had the tactical initiative: they decided when to attack and where. When the plans became apparent, there was limited time to respond to them, and fighters needed to be spread out geographically to be quick enough to catch them in time.
The Big Wing hindered at the flexibility that is required to respond effectively to attacks. The only thing that saved Britain was Hitlers decision to become predictable in focusing on London. And, of course the Dowding system, that was incredibly effective in directing Britain's fighter resources.
Leigh-Mallory might as well have been a German spy for the good he did.
Great Comment - this is exactly what Park was doing - hit and run .
Also, recall Park had the experience of being a fighter pilot during WW I.
But he made the serious mistake of forgetting his wife's Birthday on Sept. 15th.
@@dafyddllewellyn6636 mallory knew that to that why he wanted big wings to knock down more enemy planes
dowding air bases wore to close to the enemy made it impossible to defend
need to leave those field move to 12 area build big wings when the german are first detected
thing is 12 group was not alerted till the german almost cross the coast so did not have time organize big fly them where the german
@@TheEvertw they wore not alerted early enough to get formed before the german bombed their target
11 group airbases wore to close to german to defend proper
radars in group 11 wore not talking to group 12 group 11 did not not alert 12 group early enough
Hugh Dowding was the unsung hero of WW II. Without him Fighter Command would not have existed in the form it did or the air defences of Britain itself. He prevented Churchill from sending most of Fighter Command to France in the summer of 1940 and made sure it was used in the most effective way possible during the Battle of Britain. As a reward he was "retired' from command after the battle by Churchill who never forgave him for preventing the deployment of more British fighters to France. And Mallory who likely would have lost the battle with his tactics took over.
No, Dowding was already on his second extension and was due to retire in November anyways.
If you want to lay blame for lack of Spitfires, Look up Lord Nuffield (William Morris of Morris Motors) who lobbied for and was given the task of construction of Castle Bromwich Factory in 1938. He covertly delayed contruction and thus prevented production of Spitfires for 2 years until he was fired and Supermarine took over in June 1940. One wonders how many Hawker Siddeley stocks he had bought.
@@bobsakamanos4469 He was kicked out the door without so much as a "thank you" by Chruchill right after winning the crtical Battle of Britain.
Without Dowding Fighter Command would not have existed in the form it did with the excellent and highly flexible command and control system that made it so effective in combat against German airpower over the UK.
The guy who Churchill replaced Dowding with would have lost the battle with his idiotic "big wing" tactics that would have allowed German Luftwaffe formations to hit their targets and be gone long before his massive formations even reached the battle.
And it was only Dowding who stood in the way of Churchill sending everything Britain had in the way of fighter squadrons in a hopeless mission to stop the fall of France.
It wouldn't have mattered if there were many more Spitfires available at that time if Churchill sent them all to be lost in France leaving the UK wide open to a German invasion.
And the Hurricanes did fine in the battle shooting down 3/4s of the Luftwaffe kills.
@@dougcoombes8497 firstly, it was Lord Trenchard who worked behind the scenes to replace Dowding and Newall and installed his own people.
Secondly, I don't know where you kids get your stats - pseudo-documentaries no doubt. Hurricanes shot down about 54% of e/a, yet they comprised 65% of the RAF fighter strength. They had the worst kill ratio of the battle, were obsolete, burnt more than a few of its pilots, and the RAF knew it. Shame on Hawker for sitting on their asses for 4 years without properly upgrading it.
@@bobsakamanos4469no evidence that he bought stocks at Hawker at all. Stop speculating
As much as how great the Spitfire was, the Hurricane was a quicker, cheaper and easier aircraft to build.
@@Frserthegreenengine LOL, 20's contruction made it about 900 lb heavier. You've really tipped your hand there. Clearly, you're a troll.
Answer to the question:
1 - In the case of 12 group (N of Thames) during the Battle of Britain, YES it was a mistake. It took too long to assemble, and the time taken in forming up the big formations seriously reduced the already short duration of the fighters' flying time. Most times it arrived too late anyway.
2 - It finally had a great effect toward the end of the Battle of Britain, and finally "put the tin lid" on the Luftwaffe's loss in morale. The Luftwaffe crews had been told that there weren't many RAF fighters left, and when they were met over London by a huge Big Wing, that helped to end the BB.
3 - The background to the Big Wing was Leigh-Mallory's opposition to ACM Dowding. Dowding's tactic of sending a handful of fighters to the right place at the right moment was correct. It was the Luftwaffe's aim at that time to bring the RAF to a battle which they (Luftwaffe) believed they could win. The RAF at this time couldn't afford the attrition which this would have caused. Remember that at this time the Luftwaffe had many more aircraft, flown by experienced pilots (ex-Spanish Civil War and Poland) using much more effective tactical formations. Once the RAF had learned to give up tight Vic formations they improved their tactical situation.
Part of the problem with the Big Wing was that they were released late by the Controllers. Other times 11. Group was slow to ask for assistance.
@@markfryer9880 Yes, that could contribute to their lateness, but all the other disadvantages remain.
The big wing took too long to assemble
The other issue was they used a mix of aircraft- the Spitfires climbed and cruised at different rates than the Hurricanes......further disrupting co-ordination
The wing first flew as 3 squadrons only on 7th September, having had 3 days to put the wing together. The other two were assigned only on 9 September and it flew as 5 during the BofB only on the 15th September. Not entirely convinced that one week's and one day's operations are a reasonable basis to judge whether the actual idea was sound or not.
But by all accounts, Leigh-Mallory was a nasty piece of work, and it is hard to not have that taint this topic.
I worked at the IWM Duxford for many years, and the overblown reputation and status of Bader was well known. The man was an unbearable prat who was always selfish, rude and narcissistic. Many many pilots were far superior in their skills and achievements, and what is not well known is the fact that his selfishness by diving in to get a German already being shot down by an RAF fighter led to him being shot down by friendly fire.
Oh, I didn't know FF was what got Bader
I have read one theory that it was his wingman that shot Bader down.
@@martincaines2128 Sounds like someone was a bit pissed with the boss. An "accident"
It is not well known that Bader's batman in captivity could have been returned to Britain in a POW swap but Bader insisted he needed him & vetoed the exchange.
Bader was a ballsy aggressive Fighter Pilot, but his ability to see the big picture, & think strategically like Dowding,was in his Legs lost in a typical disregard of orders.
Almost everything Leigh-Mallory did was wrong. The Big Wing, its successor "Circuses" and "Rodeos" into France (which killed hundreds of pilots, to little effect), the decision not to develop the long-range escort Spifires in 1942, the erasure of Park and Dowding from the Official History of the BoB, and even his final, terminal decision to have himself and his family flown across the Alps in atrocious weather. The Americans had bad WW2 leaders (Clark, King), but so did we Brits.
A disadvantage of the big wing is that all aircraft are either in the sky or on the ground being refuelled/rearmed. With Dowding sending up seperate squadrons there could be a new squadrn taking over as another squadron goes back for refuelling etc so there would always be aircraft available in the air..
A guerilla response.
The big wing had its problems, but the Germans hated it. The German bomber pilots accused their fighters of not protecting them. It was then ordered by Georing that the fighters stayed close to the bombers. This of course meant that the fighters had even less flying time. This fact is in the film the Battle Of Britain. Another huge factor was apart from Bader and his men and the Polish, the RAF weren't getting in close enough. Once this was sorted that the fighters got in close and things improved. Another point is that many of the German bombers dropped their bombs anywhere and ran for home when they saw their escorts that were low on fuel, returned home.
the problem was 12 group was launch when the german first detected but till after they cross the channel they did have time to truly form these big wings
11 group wanted to defend airfeilds that wore to close the germans
they should pulled back all the plane to 12 group area had the radar pass on them earlier
@@brucenadeau2172 Copy and pasting the same thing over and over again does not help your argument in the least. In fact it makes you look more like a dumb parrot than someone with serious scholarly knowledge. If you have access to historical documents or on the ground testimony to support your thesis, kindly post links to those sources and take the skipping needle off the record!
@@brucenadeau2172 That's madness. The role of 11 Group was to defend the Southeast England, including ports, as well as London - which they did successfully by using the Dowding System. Pulling them back would have left a huge area of England exposed. The Big Wing simply took far too long to organize before it could be employed, when a rapid response was called for.
Totally magic. Dowding and Keith Park won the battle. Leigh Mallory would have lost it
It's not that simple as there are many factors at play.
One of the saddest things about it was that they didn't make Dowding a Marshall of the Royal Air Force, even though the King suggested it to Curchill, but those in the RAF high command blocked it. Dowding had a habbit of rubbing senior commanders up the wrong way, going as far back as Trenchard in the First World War, who used to call him Dismal Jimmy. I think Dowding was one of a rare breed who did and said the right thing even if it offended, what a debt of gratitude we owe Stuffy and those who served under him.
@@MrDavidht Absolutely correct!! Both Dowding and Park were the right men, at the right place, at the right time to fight the Battle. People should not forget that it was due to their handling of the Battle which culminated in the first defeat suffered by Hitler, that laid the foundation for the ultimate allied victory. 👍
@@MrDavidht Totally agree, but have been there in Government too! Doing the right thing and' flying your own Kite' never gets you too far!!! Although the job gets done !!!
Mallory never learn the lesson and when he took over after the B of B he made the same mistakes as Goering in sending fight sweeps over the channel so our fighters have very little time in combat!!!
Remember reading comments by the proponents of the Big Wing that better to shoot more German planes down even after they had dropped their bombs than shoot them down piece meal before they attacked.
It was OK for 12 group to get their squadrons up to height but took time that was'nt available to 11 group. Dowding and Park were spot on.
@@idleonlooker1078 --And Kieth Park went on to lead the fight to save Malta
The treatment of Keith Park by the RAF was shameful.
I'm ashamed to say he's also mostly unknown to the average person in his home country.
and Dowding
@@johneyton5452 He should be as well known as Freyberg, sadly most young Kiwis wouldn't know who he was either.
Dowding even more so. There ought to be a monument equivalent to the one for Nelson, because Britain owes as much to Dowding as they did to Trafalgar.
Keith Park needs to be known, as the Kiwi that saved Britain.
After the Battle of Britain the proponents of the Big Wing tried to justify themselves by using them for fighter sweeps over the Channel in 1941. These were known as 'Circuses' and suffered horrendous losses. They wasted precious veteran pilots and Spitfires that were desperately needed overseas where pilots in their old fighters were getting slaughtered. However the Spitfires were retained at home for these disastrous Big Wing Circuses until 1942. So you should probably have mentioned the Big Wing's terrible post-1940 legacy.
The Air Ministry insistence in keeping vast numbers of fighters and fighter-bombers in Britain, when air support was desperately needed in the Mediterranean, was little short of criminal. At times, it is difficult to determine whose side the Air Ministry was actually on!
@@dovetonsturdee7033, not just the Med if even 1/4 of the planes lost in the Rubarb raids over Northern France had been sent to Malaya the RAF would have had both a qualitative and quantitative advantage over the Japanese and considering how precious the Japanese logistics train as it is highly likely it could have prevented the fall of Singapore and thus thrown the whole Japanese offensive in South East Asia into chaos potentially stopping it dead during the battles in DEI.
@@dovetonsturdee7033, not just the Med if even 1/4 of the planes and experienced pilots lost in the Rhubarb raids over Northern France had been sent to Malaya the RAF would have had both a qualitative and quantitative advantage over the Japanese and considering how precious the Japanese logistics train as it is highly likely it could have prevented the fall of Singapore and thus thrown the whole Japanese offensive in South East Asia into chaos potentially stopping it dead during the battles in DEI.
@@jonsouth1545 I have always wondered if the Air Ministry regarded the British Army and Navy as greater enemies than the Germans, Japanese, and Italians. Certainly, in the years between the wars, when the AM had control of naval aviation, it systematically destroyed the Fleet Air Arm and reduced Coastal Command to virtual impotence.
@@dovetonsturdee7033 I often refer to the Air Ministry as Germany's greatest weapon, far more effective than the U-boat or the Tiger tank etc
My first introduction to Bader was through the Film, "Reach for the Sky!"
Made in 53? Though I'm not quite that old, I saw it as a boy in the early 60s on TV.
He lost his legs doing something he had been ordered not to do.
His bloody minded fight to walk without a stick, getting back into the RAF, his POW years are all admirable in a way.
Later on in life I picked up a Pilot who flew in his squadron in my cab.
He was a Bastard to work for he said, but also inspirational.
For many years he could be seen promoting this or that charity or his war service. I still find his bloody minded determination admirable.
But.
I read up on the Dowding system and Bader and Lee malory big wing. The film makes it seem so reasonable as Kenneth Moore jabs his pipe in his hand and points out, "if only we had more up there the more we could shoot down!"
But the reality is we all know it took too long to form up and often the German planes were on their way home before the big Wing got there.
Lee mallory was, as has already been said probably just using Bader to take a crack at Park and Dowding.
I sometimes wonder if Bader ever realised, they had been right, and he wrong.
By the way in the film he states that it was WW1 pilots that first used the big wing idea Bader just built it up.
It could just be they didn't want to credit an Italian in the Film or was there some small truth to it?
By the way I don't assume the Film is all true, it's a film.
I'm just saying it was my first introduction to Bader.
Bader was an "advisor" on the film and had many arguments with the production company about how he was being portrayed. They became so frustrated with him they threatened to kick him off the film altogether. It was Kenneth More who begged him to rein his neck in and behave after all, being kicked off the making of a film about yourself isn't good publicity.
Bader spoke at my school speech day one year. No point to my post other than I just felt like putting it out there. When I think back on it reminds me of the film "If".
@@buonafortuna8928 For all his arrogance I would've liked the opportunity to shake his hand and thank him for what he did.
I think that it was Leigh-Mallory who must take most of the blame here...he had never flown a fighter in combat, he was a bomber man, and hugely ambitious...he didnt care how many people he trod on to climb the greasy pole of command, and would use anything or anyone to ensure that he got there. So using a bolshie awkward, yet charismatic , newly promoted Squadron Leader to advance your case was just what he was looking for... I do think the Big Wing idea was sound, just not in Summer 1940. But for Bader to admit that his idea was a little premature, was never going to happen. But if Bader wasnt a bloody minded so and so, then he would never have made it out of wheelchair in 1931, let alone fly a Spitfire 8 years later. Bader was hero, but heroes are rarely perfect..
I was in the ATC (air cadets) in the seventies. Two of our lads were planespotting at a local airport. A light aircraft went the wrong way down a taxi way and bloody nearly ran into the two lads. Ten minutes later, the pilot walked to them and sincerely apologised. He admitted he'd f*cked it up, and said how stupid he'd been. The pilot was Douglas Bader. This demonstrates Bader himself could make silly errors, but he was never harder on other people than he was on himself. If he made an error, he had the guts and masculinity to apologise and admit his own stupidity.
One of the two ATC lads later became an RAF Tornado pilot.
Actually, Dowding appointed Leigh - Mallory to be in charge of 12 Group.
Rather than being appreciative and cooperative,
Leigh - Mallory was out to get Dowding for not appointing him to 11 Group.
So here is Britain fighting for survival, the Luftwaffe is trying to get air superiority,
and Leigh - Mallory is focused on his ego and his career.
... and then he helped push Dowding and Park out.
There are no words that accurately describe the likes of Trafford Leigh - Mallory.
Yes, Leigh-Mallory comes across as jealous schemer.
There are words to describe Leigh-Mallory and Bader but they are not fit for polite publication.
Their were also questions on Leigh Mallory and his courage
I got one REMF!! Rear echelon MFer. His a courtier not a warrior like Dowding and Park and I'm sure that rankled.
Dowding and Park 2 of Britain's/NZ's finest.
Nonsense. Dowding's terms of service had already been extended twice and was due to retire in Oct 1940 anyway.
Bader, as a Wing Commander, had no place in this discussion. He was a pretty self confident, not to say bumptious, man who was out of his league among the Air Marshalls and AVMs. Anyone else would have been told to wind his neck in. Leiigh Mallory was an ambitious man and used Bader to cast doubt on Dowding's strategy. The real conflict was between LM and Parkes.
I have read that Bader was keen on the big wings as he couldn't scramble quickly, as Park demanded of his squadrons in 11 Group, because of his disability. So the slow build-up of the big wings suited him and his desire to get into the fight.
@@MrDavidht He, Bader factored that in by having his aircraft as close as possible to the dispersals hut.
You clearly have no military experience. Subordinate commanders are often brought into high level meetings to provided testimony and insight. The Big Wing was timely as more Spitfires came off the production line and was the greatest psy ops victory of the battle and deflated LW morale completely. It also saved the lives of inexperienced replacement pilots. The worst thing about it was the use of the slower Hurricanes.
The real villain was Trenchard in the House of Lords, who had been at odds with Dowding since WWI, when he removed him from operations for being too concerned with the attrition of pilots.
My brother married the daughter of a Czech fighter pilot, who flew in Bader's squadron.
He did not like Bader, who he said "was not a nice man." He went on to senior rank in the RAF and flew in Korea. Bader was, I have heard many times, shot down by one of his own flight. He insisted on being carried around the prison camp by an RAF medical assistant, refusing to use his much-vaunted artificial legs. In 1943 the Germans offered to exchange the medical assistant for one of their own, but Bader refused to let him go home. The day the camp was liberated was the last time Bader had anything to do with the unfortunate man. He didn't even say thank you to him.
Not a nice man at all.
Wars are not necessarily won by "nice men". That's a contemporary mindset(especially in the schools and media), which is promulgating the smear campaign against men like Bader. Never judge another until you've walked in their shoes (or tin legs).
Wars aren't won by your school teachers. Most of the personnel in WWII were not disciplined regular force types and many behaved as civilians in uniform.
As well stated by Stephen Bungay Dowding created the weapon and Park wielded it. Park's decision making was incredible...both in the Battle of Britain and later in Malta.
he was so good at malta when america risked wasp fairy in spits the first 50 got blasted the day they arrived
wasp had to be risked again
Park's arrival in Malta was long after most of the LW had left for N.Africa. Woody Woodhall was the hero of Malta and Park continued to use his Big Wing there.
Sadly, Park and Dowding were shat upon from a great height by the hierarchy, who saw political advantage in supporting a perceived hero in the shape of Bader backed by the arrogance of Leigh-Mallory. The fact remains that the Dowding system was the ONLY way to successfully fight the Battle of Britain, which required a quick and varied response in order of to have fighters vector effectively into bomber groups BEFORE they reached their targets. The big wing took far too long to assemble and frequently reached their targets after they had dropped their bombs on London and later on 11 Group airfields.
It seems to me the both methods had their strong suits but for different battle scenarios but the Air Ministry was wrong to put the blame on Keith Park and Hugh Dowding. Another case of politics trumping common sense. Had Dowding and Park been withdrawn earlier in favour of Leigh-Mallory, Britain would have lost the Battle of Britain. As it was, it was only the capricious nature of the dictatorHitler directing his focus onto the Russian front that allowed Britain to regroup and gain that vital respite.
they had no chance to work because 12 group was not alrted the german wore almost over dry land
dowding system worked for small raid but for big raid his single squadrons lacked punch to make a dent in the big raids
@@brucenadeau2172 I'm sorry Bruce but you've proven once again that you're an utter historic moron. Of course Dowding and Park were capable of assembling large attack forces. Who do you think conducted the Battle of Britain Day.
It was not only a very bad idea, but Leigh-Mallory constantly lied about how successful the big wing was and lied about Parks and Dowding behind their backs to Churchill and others.
Yeah. Dowding and Park were poorly treated after the Battle. Leigh-Mallory was better suited as a politician than an RAF commander.
Leigh Mallory jumped on Barder's idea to stab Dowding and Park in the back. Leigh Mallory seems to have been a nasty bit of work. Even by the time of D-Day Leigh Mallory was basically sidelined as being useless. He didn't even have the decency to be killed in action but being killed in a transport aircraft crash. Bader's association with Leigh Mallory just shows the sort of personality he was.
Yeh Bader was a nasty piece of work too. Definitly had a cluster B personality style at the minimum. Of course being basically abandoned by his mother increased the odds of that happening. During his captivity as a POW he never once ever thanked his appointed Batman for carrying him up or down stairs & bathing him
@Oldschool Canuck I have read that Bader never passed up a chance to pull rank and thought that he should be the first one home after being released from Colditz even though there were prisoners that were there longer than he was. I'm not really knocking the man or his heroism but he wasn't perfect.
From what I'm reading in the above comments, the Big Wing did leave the RAF rather vulnerable and Dowding tried to prevent that.
Yes indeed.
@@lawrencelewis2592 i read Reach for the Sky when i was 12, my impression re Bader when freed from Colditz was his intent to get back in a fighter plane asap, tho i seem to remember he failed to take another active part.
@Oldschool Canuck Let me quote from "The Colditz Myth" by S.P. McKenzie, written in 2004. Page 146:
"When I first got to Colditz, remembered Alec Ross, "I thought this is going to be a good place" noting that everyone was on first-name terms. He was less than happy when the legless Douglas Bader, to whom he was assigned as personal batman, blocked his repatriation as a member of the RAMC in 1943. "Hauptmann Pupke came into the courtyard and he called me down. "Good news, Ross, " he said, "You're going home." Douglas Bader happened to be there, and said, "No he's bloody not. He came here as my lackey and he'll stay as my lackey." As a result, "I had to stay another two bloody years when I could have gone home with the rest of my mates."
Sounds like pulling rank to me.
Dowding’s system was essentially a guerrilla attack against an often numerically superior force. It’s classic hit and run warfare, and frankly, groundbreaking.
And provided a "target rich" environment
You see another aircraft...start your attack
Then ID it as friend or foe
Chances are...it's enemy
That is an interesting overview and would seem accurate way at looking at the early days of the battle
The same thing with the Boer war
Not much different from what North Vietnam did against the USAF,with mig 17s,19s and a limited number of mig 21s using guerrilla tactics and hit and run strikes proved highly effective…against a numerical (and to a degree)technological superior enemy…
If you count only fighters the Luftwaffe did not have significant numerical superiority. Most of the aircraft that RAF shot down were bombers. Stukas were really easy targets.
Video on Keith Park please
Badger was my childhood hero. He lost me forever when I watched his ‘This is Your Life’. They had the elderly French woman who hid him in her house but was found by the Nazis and the woman spent the rest of the war in a concentration camp. The show was the first time Badger had seen her since they were both taken away. I thought the first thing he would have done after the War would have been to go to France and thank her, but alas not. That told me that Badger was all about himself, and everything I’ve read since, other than Reach For The
Sky has only reinforced my view.
Much like the present day tory party; pompous and privileged.
@@royfearn4345 whereas the Labour party wanted to ignore a democratic vote because they didn't like the answer?mmm,seems an easy choice
I watched that program on YT- Adolf Galland was quite a character, wasn't he?
@@lawrencelewis2592 indeed Galland became friends with british ace stamford tuck after the war. barder not so much :p
In the book Reach for the Sky, it does say that Bader called in on the French woman and her husband after his release from Colditz. The young Frenchman (the lady's son) who helped Bader get from the hospital to their house, had not been seen since they were captured by the Germans. Bader also appeared before the French court as a character witness for the daughter Lillie the nurse who arranged for Bader's escape and who the Germans forced to betray her family.
Remember that sometimes stuff is said on TV for dramatic effect, rather than the truth.
There are several clear chapters to the Battle of Britain.
1. The Dunkirk Evacuation ie The Miracle, and the calm weather at the critical time was the real miracle.
2. The Convoy Fight. This was the preliminary skirmishing prior to "the real battle" but ships, sailors, aircraft and pilots were lost. Just why those Convoys had to keep sailing up through the English Channel within easy reach of the Luftwaffe has never been adequately addressed.
3. 11 Group Airfields, and the Radar Towers. This is when the Battle of Britain truly begins and it is a critical part of the battle. It was vital that 11. Group respond to every raid, but even so placing 12 fighters against 100 plus or 200 plus enemy aircraft is not really putting the odds in the favour of your pilots. 24 aircraft evens up the odds a little at first contact.
What was Not helping the RAF was not sending more fighters into each battle once the Me 109s flying Top Cover had joined the battle and lost the height advantage and had been dispersed. Sending new "8 hours on Spitfires" pilots as replacements to 11. Group Squadrons was wasteful in the extreme as the majority were shot down on their first few sorties.
4. TARGET London. When the Battle moved to the attacks on London is when bigger numbers would have really counted. The raids were already being attacked as they flew in over the coast and the Me 109s were busy trying to intercept the RAF fighters while watching their fuel guages. For the Bomber pilots who had been told that the RAF was on it's "last legs", to be flying towards London and then be confronted by a large number of RAF fighters before they attacked, would have been very demoralising and hard to comprehend. There was a raid attacked by Bader where they were called early enough to get airborne and correctly vectored into position Above the German bombers. A head on attack was made and the effect was to break up the incoming Luftwaffe raid. Bader and his pilots realised that the risk of a head on collision was there, but was outweighed by the psychological impact of the show of numbers and the commitment to making a diving head-on attack.
The breaking up of a raid like this is not necessarily reflected in the numbers of aircraft shot down but making a bomber formation dump their bombs early and then turn for home has to count for something?
Like I said at the beginning, many factors were at play in this Battle for Britain.
Mark from Melbourne Australia.
As usual Dunkirk overshadows the weeks afterwards when other evacuations took place and both the remnants of the BEF and RAF continued to fight on until the French surrender. Worth pointing out that 242 (Canadian) squadron was one of the last units out of France after forming part of the air-cover over St Nazaire. Bader taking over command after they got back to the UK.
Nothing would have pleased the crack Luftwaffe fighter squadrons more than large numbers of hastily trained RAF pilots presenting themselves to be shot down in dogfights over England.
They were confident that their aircraft and training would see them defeat the RAF under such combat conditions. It was the foolish requirement of Goering that the fighters stay close to the bombers, after early heavy losses, that allowed the RAF to achieve a reasonable kill ratio against the German fighter force. The RAF's small fighter arm was brilliantly conserved by Dowding and handled with great expertise by Keith Park. DB should have stuck to his best role as an inspirational and talented fighter leader in the air and left the strategic thinking to those with real experience in such matters. Trafford Leigh Mallory on the other hand played a sinister role in this tale with clear grievances resulting in his relegation to No12 Group AOC when he clearly relished the fame and notoriety of the splendidly led 11 Group under Keith Park.
Takeoff of the Wing was delayed when waiting for Bader to fly in (he insisted to lead the formation). After takeoff it took normally 20 minutes for the Wing to form up and leave Duxford. 12 Group, Big Wing or not, had a longer distance to cover than 11 Group. Most of the time 11 Group requested 12 Group's help when the Germans were already over Kent. 11 Group knew when raids were forming up over France. The Wing (if activated in time and better organized than it was by LM) would most probably have been more effective against large and concentrated German formations than Park's individual squadrons which had to fight bombers and fighters simultanously. The Wing's Spitfire squadrons could deal with the fighters and the Hurricanes with the bombers. And there were always fighters with enough ammunition left to deal with stragglers. The Big Wing was also good for RAF morale and bad for Luftwaffe morale.
Against smaller raids Park's system was certainly more agile and better dispersed against attack.
The Luftwaffe started to use 50+ fighter formations from 1943 on, in 1944 organised into battle groups ('Gefechtsverband'). Galland prepared even for a big blow ('Grosser Schlag') with
1 000+ fighters in 1944 (though Hitler would disperse these fighters for the Ardennes offensive).
Bader was also against, arming Spitfires with 20mm cannons, he thought 8, 0.303 were good enough, thank god he was made a POW.
He was a brave and commendable pilot, but his thinking was flawed in so many areas.
A lot of his reputation was built on the cult of personality.
With Mallory’s political shenanigans and taking over from Dowding and Park, led us to losing so many quality pilots in the ensuing ‘rodeos and circus’ tactics. The man was a liability…
Obviously that novelty of self sealing fuel tanks on German bombers memo never reached Bader. I have read several first hand accounts of BoB fighter pilots pouring 5+ second bursts into He 111's and having no effect. Thank Christ we evolved the Spit into Mk5 guise with cannon and machine guns.
Bob Tuck was a big advocate of arming our fighters with Canon, always remember him getting bounced by 3 me 109s in his hurricane and even though they shot his craft full of holes he knocked 2 down and damaged the 3rd before he bailed out, what a guy
@@beaujeste1 Bader sounds like one of those personality disordered types who behave with a reckless disregard for their own or anyone else's safety. It's not so much bravery as just lacking a sense of fear. Psychopaths share that trait. Such people can be very useful in a war but you wouldn't want them around otherwise. His combat record wasn't that good and whatever PR use he had was probably outweighed by his arrogant dogmatism in colluding with Leigh-Mallory to disobey Dowding. Churchill was a little bit like Bader but with far more redeeming qualities. Alanbrooke, along with a host of others, had to devote a dis-proportionate amount of effort to counteracting Churchill's desire to invade Norway.
IMO Bader wanted to implement fighter sweeps over France to indulge his own personal desire to fight. The huge losses would have convinced a normal person to change course.
Sort of. He was correctly against 20mm canon in 1940 when they were prone to jamming. He was skeptical about them in 1941, because he initially wasn’t convinced that the jamming issue had been sufficiently resolved to make them reliable. However I think he was on record as supporting them in principle and I believe that at the time he was shot down he was due to take delivery of a spit with canon.
"Large amounts of aircraft?" Large numbers of aircraft.
Dowding's and Park's tactical plan was to attack the German bombers *before* they had dropped their payload on the target.
Having to wait for the big wings to assemble often meant that if the enemy bombers were caught, they had already dropped their bombs.
i guess if you shoot the empty ones down today, they cant come back full of bombs tomorrow
@@anthonyjennis3332 So there is no point shooting down fully loaded bombers before they destroy British homes, factories and people?
also they did not pass on alerts to 12 group till the german wore almost to their target
@@AudieHolland but dowding tactics did not shot down the bombers it just cause then to dump their load and head for home
to come back tomorrow
mallory wanted to shoot down the bombers
group 11 bases wore to far forward to protect poper and they did not talk to 12 till it was to late
if they passed on contact to 12 group earlier they could been off the ground and formed up for battle
@@brucenadeau2172 All Dowding had to make sure, was that the RAF survived untill September.
Come September, the weather would go bad to worse, making an invasion an absolute impossibility.
And if you think about it, what were the Germans going to do once they had landed a few divisions in England?
Hunt the English resistance all the way up to Hadrian's Wall, while the British Home Fleet was making mince meat out of the badly improvised German 'invasion fleet?'
The four finger configuration proved to be the best. The problem with a big wing is that all of the aircraft are concentrated and cannot cover anywhere near as much area as many small wings.
11 group was to far forward if the german had not switched target 11 group was finished
the thing is there should not have been any sqandron so far forward
group 12 did not get the alert till it was to later
The finger-four configuration was a German invention.
@@brucenadeau2172what else would they do? Leave the South-East undefended and exposed?
Also 11 Group DID call 12 Group to help them but took far too long to come to their assistance.
I don't think you have any understanding of the Battle of Britain.
Leigh-Mallory wasn't very bright, he allowed himself to be led by the nose by Bader. Later in the war L-M failed to ensure our fighter squadrons were trained for ground attack to enable them to support the army after D-Day. The RAF Desert Airforce had done a great job supporting the army in north Africa under Mary Cunningham. Leigh-Mallory didn't get on with 'Mary' so failed to make use of his knowledge
Despite knowing the problems of daylight bombing that the Germans had in 1940, L-M sent fighters to escort slow bombers over France following the Battle of Briton. Hundreds of aircrew were killed for no gain.
Bader was thoroughly disliked by members of the RAF, both servicemen and officers. Instead of doing his duty, he was a gong chaser, who somehow managed to get the ear of Churchill for his own ends.
LOL, uneducated rant.
@@bobsakamanos4469 And you're what? Lard arsed keyboard warrior ?
Excellent video once captions are turned on. Otherwise had difficulty unerstanding Craig.
Have always thought TLM was the principal instigator of the Big Wing. While the video covers old ground there is still something to be learned. My understanding is that the poor treatment Dowding received after the Battle was due to the lack of an effective night fighter force when the enemy resorted to the Blitz.
But Dowding was working on the nightfighter issue and had the right idea to deal with the threat, plus all of the pieces to do it well into final development (Decent twin engined / two man crew aircraft (Beaufighter), passable Airborne Radar (AI Mk IV) and direct control of the Intercept from the Radar Screen itself (AMES MK 8 GCI Radar).
Park - “He was a New Zealander but …”? He went on to air command in vital Malta and then SE Asia.
Doesn't matter where he came from he was one of the family that made up the great British Empire. Humble thanks R.I.P Heroes All.
Leigh Mallory in front of Park and Dowding,is reported as saying that I would rather shoot down one plane after its hit it's target than 5 before to which Park replied the targets are my airfields. The idea of the big wing was ridiculous because it took time to gather the formation which meant that the first planes were using up fuel in the process
Surely that was the other way round?as he would be saying I'd rather shoot down 1/5th of what they were shooting down? obviously though,if you were shooting 5 planes down instead of 1 they'd be less planes available to bomb the next day?a much higher attrition rate.
@@Trebor74 I don't know if Mallory actually said that but whether he did or not, doesn't change the fact that the big wing idea was not popular amongst a lot of the pilots that fought in the battle.
@@Trebor74 ----The alleged statement didn't make sense to me either .
Important was the fact of getting fighters up and at 'em ASAP was that it broke up the raid, disrupted the flight to the target, potentially saving productive assets from destruction and enhancing the consumption/wastage of Luftwaffe fuel reserves. They had little reserve for extra time over Britain, if they wanted to get home. By the time the Big Wing got itself organised and airborne, the Luftwaffe had possibly hit their targets and the BW could chase unloaded bombers home. Not an efficient use of precious resources. All well expressed below.
It is important that bomber formations are broken up as quickly as possible. Even if you can't prevent them reaching the target area it may still be possible to stop them dropping the bombs where they want to. It also makes life difficult for the enemy escort fighters because their bombers are all over the place. Dowding and Park knew this and acted accordingly (and successfully). Their sidelining was an act of petty jealousy and political scheming - fuelled by Churchill's mania for aggressive action.
I once had the great fortune to meet a WW2 ex-RCAF fighter pilot (and inveterate excaper) and asked him his opinion of Park and Leigh-Mallory. Park was, he said, a gentleman who cared deeply about his pilots while Leigh-Mallory was a "self-aggrandising @#?!".
Dowding? The man who saved Britain but was never given the true honour that he deserved.
And Bader? - "Bader wasn't Kenneth More" and "if he had been THAT good he wouldn't have crashed and lost his legs in the first place!"
There was an interesting documentary some years back about Colditz. Bader's batman had the opportunity to be repatriated to the UK but Bader wouldn't allow it . . . because he needed somebody to carry him upstairs to his bath.
The history of air-to-air combat had already judged the Big Wing to be a bad idea before the end of WW2. Look at it from the pilot's point of view: in Dowding and Park's method, a small number of RAF aircraft would attack a huge Luftwaffe formation, so that if an aircraft appeared in an RAF gun sight, it was almost certainly one from the Luftwaffe. The risk of shooting one's colleagues down was minimal. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe fighter pilots had a heck of a job finding RAF aircraft among the vast cloud of their own. The effect was that RAF fighter pilots had far more shooting opportunities than did their opponents. With the Big Wing, this was not so.
We may observe that Dowding and Park understood statistical probability, and that Leigh-Mallory and Bader did not.
if it was so bad why did the us navy use on the raid on truk a big fighter wing broke japanese fighter back over truk in feb 1944 in one day
dowding did not alert 12 group till it was to later to launch
@@brucenadeau2172 Probably because the positions were reversed. The USN in that case was on the offensive as the Luftwaffe had been in the Battle of Britain, and their strategy was similar to the Luftwaffe's: use a large force so that even in the event of attrition, some of the force will get through.
The outcomes were different because whereas in the Luftwaffe case the attrition rate was unsustainable, in the USN case it was not. The fortunes of war, eh?
@@brucenadeau2172 Not true.
I am reminded of the fate of Admiral Jellicoe after Jutland in WW1, he essentially withheld his forces from pursuing the High Seas Fleet, an action that, with their retreat being covered by torpedo boats and submarines, could have cost the Royal Navy several valuable warships. Instead Admiral Beatty, who commanded the battlecruiser squadren, had born the brunt of the German's fire and in the process lost three of his Battlecruisers due to incompetence and poor signalling. Still Jellicoe was replaced by Beatty after the battle even though with the benefit of hindsight he was by far the more effective commander.
“There's something wrong with our bloody ships today”. No sir, you.
Jellicoe was appointed First Sea Lord in November 1916, scarcely a demotion. At least, Beatty never had the "chance" to show his elan in charge of Grand Fleet.
@@Wombat1916 For which the common sailors of the RN were doubtless grateful. Had the High Seas Fleet had their 1918 "death sortie" that the Kaiser wanted while Beattie was in charge on the front line it would have been a bloodbath. He was like those Western Front Generals that used to use their soldiers like cannon fodder. At least with Jellicoe running the show on the water they stood a chance, one he was promoted out of the way well ...
@@Wombat1916 In corporate America when people screw up they get promoted upwards lol.
Regardless of any of Beattie's flaws, I don't think he can really be blamed for the design problems that led to the loss of the three battlecruisers.
Downing and Park excluded, the phrase 'Lions led by Donkeys' really does apply to the people setting strategy of the RAF. Leading up to the war they believed that the bomber would always get through, they complained when Max Aten prioritised fighter production, and the big wing is typical of the thinking. True it must have been very disheartened for Luftwaffe pilots after being told the RAF was on its last legs to see that many airplanes coming up, but it was always late, the planes they claimed had already dropped their bombs. Keith Parks strategy meant at times 3 or 4 squadrons could be vectored on to the enemy, the big wing was inflexible when flexibility was needed.
Almost everybody believed that the bomber would always get through. The Lions Led by Donkeys canard stems from the 1st World War and is a load of garbage. Haig was pushed into fighting the battle of the Somme before he had the chance to train his army. The British learned quickly and by the end of the war they were by far the most efficient force on the Western Front.
I don't know if it's been voiced elsewhere but, from my readings the Big Wing was an impractical, egotistical f-up which, if allowed to continue unchecked, would have wasted precious men and machines in fruitless cavalry charges against opponents who had already achieved their bombing objectives, at a time when we couldn't afford such losses. Don't forget, the objective in 1940 wasn't to fight German fighters, but to protect England from a pre-invasion bombing campaign as effectively as possible with the minimum possible loss of men and planes, an objective which Dowding's tactics ultimately achieved (nothing could have stopped the Blitz, as would also be the case when the Allies began successfully bombing Germany).
If the practice had been continued, the Luftwaffe would simply have changed their raiding tactics to put second waves of bombers over 12 Group fields when the entire circus had landed, with devastating results. They were already trying to do this in Kent, but the rotational system of small formations from multiple fields ultimately proved a successful deterrent to this. Many died though, air and ground crew alike. From many years away, had Leigh Mallory prevailed, the "best" outcome would have been the deserved destruction of his tactical reputation. The worst would have been the loss of the Battle. The few prevailed; the many, in the form of large cumbersome and basically unmanageable formations, probably would have not...and, being born in 1947, I might have grown up speaking German.
Geoff Barry: well said!
except group12bases wore outside fighter range they would be wiped by group13
that is the thing britian had depth by basing their fighter sofar forward they almost lost the battle
Grew up with Bader as a hero, met him twice at RAF Coltishall while serving as ground crew on the BBMF, by the second meeting decided I did not like him.
I'm sorry, but I have to ask since you've actually met him: what specifically made you dislike him?
@@bosoerjadi2838 I suppose the main thing was that he left the RAF in 1945, I met him in the 70's and he still expected to be treated like he was still a group captain. You always felt he was talking down to you. I expect he treated officers differently, A hero yes , a nice man to the lower ranks no
@@davegoldsmith4020 Thank you very much for sharing. I guess it illistrates that the Romans were right to have a slave continuously remind their conquering heroes that (even) they are mortal.
Bader’s bravery and braggadocio could not be questioned, the same cannot be said of his judgement.
Look at the Air Ministry meeting where the question of armament was discussed. Stanford Tuck arguing for 20mm canons and Bader for .303 🤦♂️
Another factor was Bader's frustration that he could not be transferred to command an 11Group Squadron/Wing (where all the real action was) because he could not meet the required scramble time because of his legs, so he had to find a way of being noticed!
Lets be blunt - Bader liked the Big Wing because he got to command it, he would never let it go to 11 Group without him and if we'd found him his own little airfield and personal squadron on the Sussex/Kent coast to just add to his score he'd have had no interest in anything else...he was NOT Kenneth Moore. Leigh-Mallory liked it because it helped his self serving campaign to oust Dowding for himself, which worked. Dowding was treated very badly and it is always shameful when people self serve during wartime (like Market-Garden, conceived just to stop Patton and put all resources in one mans hands..).
That's an understatement. It was an absolutely batshit idea. I don't think anyone even pretends otherwise these days.
LOL, uneducated rant.
For the Battle of Britain it was not a good idea, the circumstances and the nature of the battle made it inappropriate.
But in the right circumstances and with the right resources and guidance, Big wings could work and made sense. Just that it didn't make sense in the Battle of Britain.
Big wing was complicated and a waste of resources (namely aviation fuel spent during form up.) Dowd had it right leave it to individual squadrons get in the air intercept the target as quickly as possible
Even more to the point, a damaged German bomber that has to dump its bombs over the sea or farm land and break off for its base in France is a mission-kill and out of the fight for at least a day or two. 11 Group didn't need to destroy every German aircraft to win the battle, rather they just needed to prevent the Germans winning, that's the advantage of fighting a defensive battle.
Sorry, that didn't come across well enough- seemed clear in my head, not so much when I read it back. The Big Wing would very likely have shot down more German bombers. But doing so AFTER they had already dropped their payloads on either RAF airfields or London would have been a net loss. Better to drive them off and break up their formation without shooting them down if it prevents a successful bombardment.
@@daveharrison4697 while either scenario works, shooting down the bombers was the winning strategy, a cripple that makes it home could be repaired and put back in the air. Germany did not have the raw industrial capacity to keep up with losses if they had kept on. Not too mention building fighters is cheaper then bombers so that put the British at the advantage.
@@patrickradcliffe3837 True. But if the RAF airfields had been put out of action, the aircraft industry had suffered significant damage etc. etc... Ultimately it was the attrition of aircrew rather than aircraft that was the deciding factor in both material and morale dimensions. Little known fact: even at the worst heights of the Battle of Britain the RAF was sending fighter pilots who had completed the required tour length back to flight schools to teach new pilots air combat tactics. Despite the losses sustained at the end of the Battle of Britain, Fighter Command was actually stronger. 11 Group had been mauled but not broken, 10 and 12 Groups were essentially untouched, the training and manufacturing pipelines were in better health, and reserve squadrons were being built up, though needing more flying and combat training. The Luftwaffe on the other hand basically never recovered from its aircrew losses in the Battle of Britain. Alas the RAF then seemed to throw away a hugely potent advantage with fighter sweeps over France and the Bomber Command campaigns.
@@daveharrison4697 - Exactly. The object was to stop the Luftwaffe from gaining air superiority over the skies of Britain - while stopping the Luftwaffe from bombing shipping ports, airfields and munitions factories.
Dowding was endlessly attempting to keep track of accurate numbers of RAF fighter command resources ( pilot losses, exhausted squadrons and number of fighter plane replacements ).
Fighter Command had to continue to exist and being out numbered 4 to 1 could not get drawn into a battle of attrition.
.
Where as Shoto Douglas and Leigh - Mallory incorrectly thought the object was to shoot down the Luftwaffe "on mass" so they would give up.
.
Dowding and Park Saved the UK, their ideas and system worked. A very ungrateful Air Minister and Prime Minister, got rid of them both with out the thanks and recognition they deserved
Well Trenchard, Salmond, Portal and Churchill's scientific advisor Lindemann were all pushing for a bomber campaign. Also, Trenchard , Sinclair, Shoto Douglas and Leigh - Mallory had it in for Dowding.
But the RAF simply did not have the night time navigational technology to accurately hit industrial targets.
Based on previous events, I seriously doubt Dowding would have supported the losses and in ability to hit strategic targets of the RAF 's night time bomber campaign. So Trenchard and Salmond pushed Chief Air Marshall Newall out , and replaced him with Portal, before Dowding's term at Fighter Command was over - thus blocking Dowding being promoted to that position. As much as Churchill admired Dowding, IMO he went along with this because of the political fall out of Luftwaffe's night time bombing, to keep the peace in the RAF and because Churchill would have wanted a bomber campaign. After Dowding got pushed out , Churchill tried to get positions for Dowding but was blocked by those in the Air Ministry .
I am ex R.A.F. and Proud of having served...It hurts to have to say this But Bader and Trafford Leigh-Mallory should have been Court Marshalled for Insubordination and mutiny by disregarding Hugh Dowding's orders that his duty was to Defend 11 Groups airfields.
From what I've seen, heard & read about Douglas Bader - he wasn't actually anything special as an actual pilot. Most other pilots have said that he was a self centred, rude & narcissistic arsehole.
The biggest single tactical change that the RAF made early on during the war was to ditch the outdated and flawed ViC formation in favour of the finger 4. The ViC was great for air shows etc but a total disaster when it came to dog fighting, as both wing men had to keep a constant eye on the lead aircraft.
So glad that somebody has pointed this out.
The Vic was only informally ditched by some squadrons during the BoB, the real change didn’t happen until 1941. Malan’s squadron was one of the first to adopt the finger 4 during the BoB. Most of the others modified the Vic to put increased focus on the watching out for the aircraft in front, and ditching the tail end Charlie. So for a squadron of 9 aircraft the lead plane was protected by the three planes behind on on each side and so on. Instead of the vulnerable tail end Charlie the two most rearward planes would watch out over each other. When contact was made the front most plane in each of the three lines would become the principle attacker, with the following two keeping watch for the plane ahead.
Possibly, although “dog fighting” was not the prime role of the RAF during the Battle of Britain. Their aim was to destroy as many German bombers as possible and the “vic” formation was superior for this purpose, it pays to remember the bombers do the damage and the fighters are there just to protect them. It was only when twelve group wanted to pursue shooting down fighters that the “finger four” formation (essentially one plane guarding another) became more common. The concept of “dog fighting” whilst good for story books is actually the last thing any Air Force desires - just as the last thing any tank commander wants to fight is another tank.
Which is best? Well the vic formation is used around the world now and the finger four isn’t.
And Bader was also heavily in favor of the "finger four" over the "vic" so he could be right sometimes.
The RAF Tried this Stunt in NW Australia with miserable results against Long Range IJN A6M3 Zeros and GRM Betty Bombers.
The greatest contribution that the Big Wing made to the Battle of Britain was likely psychological. One author commented that the Luftwaffe pilots, having flown through 11 Group's guerilla tactics would have been shocked to encounter 12 Group's massed planes over London. This may have affected their morale. Apart from that, it was a waste of time. And Dowding and Park's treatment following the battle was appalling. And the assistance that Brand's 10 Group gave to Park of 11 Group is seldom mentioned.
Agreed, little is mentioned of Brand's efforts in covering the ports and coastal towns and airfields when 11 Group was engaged
Logic tells you that after a big wing has formed up, they all have to land and refuel and rearm at the same time. That would have been suicide in 11 group since the Germans would have caught them on the ground with no one defending. The big wing concept was a luxury that 12 group could afford so long as they didn't have to take part in any fighting.
Think its important to understand the differences in strategic objectives.
Goering wanted air superiority over the skies of Britain.
Dowding wrote in August 1941, " The destruction or paralysis of fighter command was therefore
an essential prerequisite to the invasion of these Islands."
Dowding was very aware of pilot numbers, projected loss rates, and that the Luftwaffe
out numbered RAF fighter command 4 to 1.
Add to this , Park also made it clear that RAF fighters were to go after the bombers before they hit their targets
and to stay clear of the 109's - ignore Kesselring's 109 feints or sweeps.
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Where as Shoto Douglas and Leigh Mallory held the strategic view that the Luftwaffe would
give up if their losses were excessive.
.
Shoto Douglas and Leigh - Mallory were wrong because the objective was to preserve fighter command,
in order to stop the Luftwaffe from gaining air superiority,
while preventing Luftwaffe bombers from hitting their targets.
.
As for Bader , as a group captain, it was none of his business to initiate a tactic that would affect strategy.
... and Bader testifying at the Air Council meeting on November 24th, 1940 supporting the "Big Wing"
clearly indicates he was an a**. Dowding and Park were told to pack their bags shortly after this meeting.
I seem to remember that the pre-war RAF fighter tactics were based around something called the 'Area Attack', whereby a fighter squadron would fly and attack in formation, directed by the squadron leader...
I think they were called "The fighter attacks" and there were a number of them. If you were flying along in your vic of three planes and spotted an enemy at say 5000ft below and 1000yds to port beam the leader would say "fighter attack 7" and that would be the cue for a pre arranged intercept maneuvre. So very cumbersome and removes any element of surprise / initiative from the attack. Going back to the basic pair and abandoning the vic was also very helpful. Johnny Johnson goes into it in some detail in his excellent book "Full Circle"
@@johneyton5452 the novelist derek robinson i think his name was goes into the fighting area attack in his excellent novel piece of cake.cumbersome and left vulnerable to opposing fighters.
@@derricklarsen462 I'll look it up . Thanks.
@@johneyton5452 they made a mini series as well. They used spitfires instead of hurricanes probably because couldnt find enough hurricanes.good stuff takes a squadron from france to the battle of britain. Hard to tell who the protagonist was. You attached than he bites it.
@@derricklarsen462 I vaguely remember that. In the first episode the Sqn Ldr is talking to the chaps and casually falls off his plane wing and breaks his neck.
At 7:23 Luftwaffe losses 175. Actual losses 60.
"The Narrow Margin - The Battle of Britain and the Rise of Air Power" Derek Wood and Derek Dempster (c) 1961 page 353
The Big Wing was deployed at just the right time, when the LW thought the RAF was on its knees and Spitfire production was increasing quickly. The use of the Big Wing in Sep was the biggest psy ops victory of the battle and saved numerous lives of young inexperienced replacement pilots.
The big mistake was using a mix of Spits and Hurri's, with Spits having to always wait for the Hurricanes to climb and/or pursue. The idea of fighter control from an on-scene commander is valid, with Sqns being directed for various combat tasks and others providing top cover.
You summed up very well: the Big Wing was good for public morale with overclaims, so it helped the war effort but on the expense of 11 Group and Dowding. Churchill was the master of hearts, Park was the master of air tactics. Both had its place in victory.
Very interesting, thank you! - but why is the video of Craig Murray in mirror image? (check out the clock behind him...)
sure glad this one was close-captioned!
We'll never know for sure but the Big Wing may have had enough impact on the Germans to persuade them to make a "tactical withdrawal" from the Battle of Britain. Their intelligence told them the RAF was on its knees, yet here were huge formations of fighters opposing them. Whatever your view, the RAF done a magnificent job against a formidable enemy, I get emotional just seeing a Spitfire or Hurricane in flight! Sixty plus in formation would have been a sight to behold.
"Achtung! here come the last 50 British fighters AGAIN "
@@stormywindmill Seems like the last 50 British fighters was too much for them chap.🇬🇧
Very good arguments against the big wing, but what were the perceived advantages of it? Did it just look intimidating, or impressive from the ground?
There has always been an opinion that Sir Keith Parks (Kiwi) should have had a statue on the last remaining point of Nelson’s Column.... ‘cause Parks was the flyboy that saved the United Kingdom from becoming another German state!!!!!
Oh what kiwis have achieved!!!
Regards Ian 👨🎤😇🤔👍😎⚠️✊🇺🇦✊🇳🇿
Keith Park was an outstanding commander one of Britain's very best.
@@GregWampler-xm8hv sorry dude Sir Keith Parks was a kiwi!!!! New Zealander!!!!
And he won the Battle of Britain before Lee Malory got his plane off the ground!!! Regards Ian 👨🎤🇳🇿😎👍🍸🍸
The historical fact of the matter is that Dowding and Park won the 'Battle of Britain'. Mallory and Bader played politics and cost the lives of many pilots in their 'Big Wing' raids over Europe afterwards. History clearly shows, that despite Dowding and Park being subsequently betrayed, they did the job when the world so desperately needed them. God Bless em' All.
Why is the image with the Duxford curator mirrored? Have a look at the clock and text on books. Other then that great review of the big wing.
The advantage that the attacker has over the defender is that until late in the battle the defender does not know the target of the attack. The disadvantage of the attacker is that they have limited time over the target area, so the attack is basically a hit-and-run . So in this context since the Big Wing is messy and takes too long to assemble the basic advantage the defender had is thrown away ; by the time they are assembled the enemy has dropped its bombs and is preparing to run.
It's often forgotten that enemy fighters pose no threat to ground defences - they are there to defend the bombers. Being the gung-ho group that fighter pilots very often were, they would choose to attach the attacking fighters rather than what should be their primary target the bombers.
To decide whether or not the Big Wing concept was good or bad, it's only necessary to review how German defences developed during the later Allied Bombing Offensive against Germany waged by the RAF and USAAF. Various tactics were used and developed by the Germans. None of them ever used the Big Wing concept.
german sure did use the big wing on defense the pulled their plane back to the german border and waited till the fighter escort broke off and head for home then attacked the bomber
that is what the raf should have done pulled back in land
12 group was not alerted till the german bomber wore almost to their target
@@brucenadeau2172 Although I referred to German defence tactics later in the war, this may have been misleading. In the interval between 1940 and 1944/45 both sides had had the opportunity to learn from their previous mistakes. The RAF had developed better bombs, better bombers and above all sophisticated Pathfinder techniques. On the other hand the Germans had experimented and adapted, making changes in their tactics in response to the technical innovations as they were introduced by the RAF.
Air defence against bombers has two main components, artillery, known usually in this content as ' FLAK ' - a word adopted from a phrase in the German language - and night fighters. None of the three or four types of RAF bomber in use were equipped with belly turrets and were as a result vulnerable to attack by a night fighter from below. If such an attack occurred before the bomber had dropped its bombs there was grave danger that the crew of the night fighter might also be taken out by the exploding bombs just above them. For this reason the fighters would prefer to attack the bombers on their homeward leg. The German defences had to coordinate the night fighters with their FLAK batteries, which were radar guided. The FLAK guns had to avoid shooting down their own night fighters, and the basic way this was done was to limit the height of the FLAK and require the night fighter to operate above that height.
It should therefore be obvious that the tactics adopted by the RAF defences in 1940 bear no comparison withe the bombing of Germany 4 or five years later. RAF defence in 1940 was primitive, and heavily dependent on early and accurate detection of the incoming bombers. There were two components to this detection - visual by the Observer Corps, and the Chain Home radar towers. Deployment of the fighter force had to be rapid and accurate. This was not practical using the Big Wing concept.
@@crustyoldfart You make the mistake of assuming that Bruce Nadeau has the ability to see the obvious.
Bader's only aim was to get Bader in the fight and promote his image . He as not in the fight and wanted to be,
Is there any evidence that the Big Wing overclaimed *more* than 11 group units did? All RAF units overclaimed, despite best efforts, but unless 12 group overclaimed more, you can't use overclaiming to discount their effectiveness. The other factor this video glosses over somewhat is that it might have been the wrong tactic for defending airfields from multiple small raids, but (accidentally!) the right one for defending London.
Enjoyed your video and I gave it a Thumbs Up
Wasn't this war gamed after the war, using Galland and other German Luftwaffe leaders. Using the Bigwing tactics resulted in the destruction of the RAF on the ground.
Yes it was RAF learnt from the Luftwaffe
If Germany had finished off Dunkirk and had long range bombers it would have been a different matter!
Oom Gawie,
Germany couldn't finish off Dunkirk. They tried, and failed. The RAF was in part responsible.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Correct! The RAF held the German bombers and fighters away from the beaches which allowed the men to evacuate without being bombed and strafed.
No, Operation Sealion was wargamed in 1974 at Sandhurst, the senior commanders being experienced WW2 commanders such as, on the German side, Galland & Ruge.
In order to allow some level of fighting on land, the Germans were (falsely) given a landing window of opportunity when the actual dispositions of the Royal Navy were artificially adjusted, moving them further away than had been the reality.
The result? The German first wave landed on 22 September, at dawn. Two days later, the RN anti-invasion forces arrived (17 cruisers and 57 destroyers, with smaller support vessels, which was actually reasonably accurate), annihilating German transports in the Channel. The last pockets of German resistance, out of ammunition and supplies, surrendered on 28 September.
Apart from the fact that the RN anti-invasions forces were, in the main, based at the Nore, Portsmouth, & Plymouth, rather than further away as in the game, no-one seriously quibbled about the result.
@@idleonlooker1078
Yes. The criticism was that the RAF weren't in the skies over Dunkirk. That is because they were inland somewhat engaging the Luftwaffe.
Major Werner Kreipe said "the days of easy victory were over. At Dunkirk we met the RAF head on!".
The whole big wing drama was a psyop designed to confuse the German high command and have them believe that fighter command was fractured and on the verge of a critical error in tactics and strategy.
It worked.
The big wing also fostered the illusion of greater strength in numbers when in fact fighter command was maxed out.
Undoubtedly there were incompetent career officers in the RAF but luckily those idiots rarely go to the front line.
Large formations do create confusion but then that's the whole point of stirring up the hornet's nest. The mission is abandoned as panic overrides it.
Yes Park and Dowding were badly delt to after winning the battle with their tactics. Park did return to New Zealand and serve on the Auckland city council where he was instrumental in getting Auckland international Airport up and running. As a kiwi I m immensely proud of him..and what he achieved
Perhaps an analysis of 1941 fighter sweeps over occupied Europe in a future video the main benefit of which would seem to be getting Bader into a POW camp and out of the way!
Shot down by friendly fire.
The Big Wing was a terrible idea, it had never worked in air exercises because it took too long to assemble and was too large to control. While Bader was assembling his Big Wing, 11 Group airfields were being destroyed. The sad fact is that Trafford Leigh Mallory and Bader were playing politics in the RAF, lying about its effectiveness. Sholto Douglass became involved and he wanted Dowdings job. Shortly after the Battle of Britain was won, Hugh Dowding and Keith Park were sacked and Douglass and Leigh Mallory replaced them. In an act of pure vindictiveness, Douglass and Leigh Mallory left out the names of Dowding and Park in the after battle report. Churchill scorned their report and had it rewritten giving Dowding and Park full credit.
One important part of this video is highlighting that 3/5ths of squadrons were hurricanes. Hurricanes needed the Spitfires to go after fighters why they went after the bombers. But it was coordinating too many at once. A bunch of "small wings" hitting the same flight of aircraft would have work.
Big Wing sounded like a strategy where huge swarms of enemies would come and end the battle of the day. The issue is the enemy gets to decide when and you have to scramble all the fighters up in the air for a formation. Big Wing is a show ender, not a show starter.
Also a key thing here is that Germany though the RAF was on its last legs with Dowdings Net. If they had gone with Big Wing they surely would have decided a change of tactics on the final day of the battle.
Lee-Mallory & Bader's 'Big Wing' concept was implaccably flawed - rendezvous of so many aircraft - & the most significant factor - time, was not on their side, & as such 11 Group suffered the consequences. Lee-Mallory & Douglas' (not bader) pernicious backroom politics shamefully denegrated two of the most important commanders - Dowding & Park, & what disgusts me most is the belated tribute to Dowding, in 1988. Without those two leaders, the Battle Of Britain may well have been lost.
I can see the theory that a larger number of intercepting fighters will shoot down a larger number of bombers, but the time involved to get them into place is a significant downside - and there is the adage "no battle plan survives contact with the enemy". But in my unexperienced opinion wouldn't it be preferable to have fighter squadrons hit the bomber (and escort force) continually to run the escort force ragged and therefore be able to inflict serious damage upon the bombers?
You're right in the sense to over extend the German fighters, but the problem with a big wing is that when all these fighters are defenceless on the ground refuelling and rearming at the same time, all it needed was another raid to come in to wallop the fighters while on the ground. This flaw was clearly recognised by Park and Dowding. That's why they sent small formations to disperse the raids and disorganise the German fighters. Then while that small formation landed to refuel and rearm, they ensured another small formation was airborne to protect them and attack the next raid coming in. 👍
During the filming of the movie "The Battle of Britain", the name Leigh Mallory fell. James (Ginger) Lacey, immediately stated, "Leigh Mallory was a clot!" To continue, Mallory once requested volunteers. Yet no one was willing. So Mallory, according to Lacey remarked, "lack of moral fibre." Leaving Lacey with the answer, maybe, but no lack of brains! Ps, R.S. Tuck was present when this occurred, who looked shocked at Gingers remarks.
At 2 minutes you mention Italo Balbo as Fascist. You really ought to do a bit more research before making incorrect statements like this. Balbo was Italian and was probably assassinated in the mid 1930s for opposing Mussolini. Hardly Fascist. Be fair to the man. And the next contributor almost corrects you.
He was one of the 4 orchestraters of Mussolini's march on Rome, he was a literal member of the National Fascist Party, and he was heir apparent to Mussolini himself. Also the claims he was assassinated have been thoroughly debunked lol
Thanks for that Driverman - recently I have noticed early signs of casual "research" and political correctness in IWM features, these people should be unreproachable in their accounts!
Main problem seemed to be that by the time they'd formed up and got into a favourable position, the Germans had come, dropped their bombs and were on their way back. This may have been fine for increasing your score, and arguably for attrition of experienced enemy aircrew, but as a means of defending the country against enemy attack it was utterly hopeless. Bader (autocorrects to Vader ☺) was one of the greatest examples of the overblown "hero" (largely self promoted) if you ask me.
that was because 11 group did not alert them till the german wore almost to the target
@@brucenadeau2172 The Big Wing took time to form up. There is no way 11 group could have alerted 12 group in time because, by the time the Wing had formed up, the Germany bombers would have bombed the airfileds and left.
The Dowding method would have hit the bombers BEFORE they bombed. Big Wings, if effective, would only catch the bombers AFTER they bombed. All this has been analysed; see "The Most Dangerous Enemy" for details.
You really like repeating rubbish without reason nor substantiation.
@@brucenadeau2172 You keep saying that. And you are incorrect each time.
Douglas Barder should have been stood down from having any contact with the RAF. He argued incessantly for the big wing, long after it was shown to be killing pilots and letting bombers through. He couldn't accept he was a fool. Great stress as he had endured, frequently reduces the IQ. He seems to have become irrational and bitter.
The big wing was a waste of time . The Radar chain could only look forward and the air defense relied on the observer corps for enemy aircrafts height and course . A single squadron could take off when scrambled in a few minutes but still took a fair amount of time to climb to 20,000ft . especially Hurricanes that were slow compared to Spitfires. It took Baders big wing about 30 minutes to assemble and climb to operating altitude . During that period bombers could have flown 80 miles . Rarely mentioned is how often fighter squadrons failed to see the Germans because they were vectored to the wrong place .
The BOB was about one and only one dynamic. PILOTS! Sheer numbers and better equipment were the only factors. The Luftwaffe had a major problem, low fuel capacity for the 109. You can shoot down Do17s, 111s, and Ju88s to your hearts content so long as the 109s are out of gas. And that is exactly what the RAF did. The big wing was clumsy, but it put a lot of hurricanes in contact with german bombers with no escort. The result is history.
All this talk about the Battle of Britain and no mention of Sailor Malan ? He also fiercely disapproved the big wing and when Bader was shot down was in the forefront of getting rid of it.
A lot of people who weren't in command positions weren't mentioned. Your point?
@@nerdyali4154 When Bader got shot down Malan was so against this big wing that he banned it. It was only towards the end of the war that Command began using it
@@ivanhardman4576 By the end of the war the tactic was irrelevant as by that point even squadron-level formations were seen as too big.
If I'm attacking a force that puts up a big wing, I'll time a second, bigger attack to coincide with the big wing having to be on the ground refuelling/re-arming. This tactic was used by the Allies well enough when the bombers were going the other way.
Rule One: never go up against someone who is seen and sees himself as a hero. You'll always lose no matter how right you are.
Your observation to send in another raid to wallop the fighters when on the ground was clearly recognised by Park and Dowding. That's why they sent small formations to disperse the raids, and then ensured another small formation was airborne to protect those now landing to refuel and rearm. 👍
@@idleonlooker1078 Quite. Dowding/Park = smart; Leigh-Mallory/Bader = not so much.
I think the shock value to the Germans made it worthwhile. Weren't they told that the RAF was on its knees? The trouble with a big wing is all your aircraft are either in the air or on the ground. There was also the value of hitting the bombers on their way home. A bomber downed or badly damaged today, isn't coming back tomorrow
As the Luftwaffe continued to target 11 Group's airfields, the Critical Period became ever more critical. This post will analyze what FC could have done to mitigate the situation.
First however, a few brief words on the German performance. Basically they were not making any major operational mistakes. Their only blunder was Luftwaffe intelligence, which had severely underestimated the number of aircraft the British had available. By the end of August Luftwaffe intelligence reports stated that Dowding had between 300-400 aircraft available. In reality this was the number of aircraft 11 Group had available, FC had about 700 aircraft. Of these about 60% were Hurricanes, 40% Spitfires (at the beginning of the Battle the ration had been 66%:33%). Based on these false figures, the Germans believed the other groups had been severely depleted to concentrate whatever the aircraft it had left in 11 Group. One of the reasons they underestimated FC's strength was the fact that the British continued to intercept in small formations. The German assumption was that they didn’t have enough planes to do anything else, since common sense indicated that if you attack in greater numbers, you do so.
It was this estimate that led Kesselring to believe that if he succeeded in overwhelming 11 Group, he would have overwhelmed all of FC. His goal was to steadily increase the strain on 11 Group until it cracked, by constantly attacking it throughout the day, using dense tightly packed formations of bombers and fighters (3-4 fighter per bomber). His thinking was that as long as FC kept intercepting in small, single unit squadrons usually from below, the fact that his new tactics deprived his fighters of the advantage of flying above the bombers at high altitude didn’t seem too important, as they were still usually above the British squadrons intercepting them. The important thing to him was that the new formations were succeeding in breaking through the fighter screen and reaching their designated targets, often with devastating results. His fighters were paying a heavy price, but the bombers were getting through, and that was the main thing.
Let's get back to FC. Despite realizing that the Luftwaffe had adopted a new strategy centered on targeting his group, Park did not change his tactics in any way. In theory he called for two squadron formations, one Spits, one Hurricanes, but his insistence that his pilots prioritize rapid interceptions meant that most of the time squadrons did not have time to get into two squadron formations, and intercepted in single squadron formations, usually from below.
LM realized that the new German strategy required a new British response. He, together with Douglas Bader, who was the first British commander to suggest Big Wing formations, came up with an alternative strategy, to optimally utilize the fact that 12 Group's was unlikely to sustain major attacks, because it was beyond 109 range. Since the German fiasco of the 15th of August, there had been no unescorted daylight raids.
The result was what has become known as the Big Wing strategy. It was far from perfect, with significant flaws that meant it could not, in its original form, provide FC with a viable alternative. However, it did get some key fundamentals correct, and therefore had the potential to provide the basis for developing a viable, rapidly implementable alternative strategy for FC.
The key fundamental was that the radar based defense system meant that for the first time in military history, the first force to engage the enemy did not have to be the one closest to him, because radar negated proximity.
The importance of this cannot be overstated. 11 Group's proximity to the southern coast mean, according to the age old traditions of warfare, that it would have to be the first to face the enemy.
Dowding tended to give his senior officers significant latitude in carrying out their assigned missions in a way that brings Lee to mind. Since the assumption was that 11 Group, being closest to the enemy, would always be the one to engage first, Dowding gave Park the latitude to run not just run 11 Group, but in effect the entire Battle.
Since 11 Group had the least warning time, as it was closest to the Germans, it's understandable that Park prioritized rapid interception above all else. The problem was that like Dowding, he failed to recognize that radar meant that just because his group was the closest to the Germans did not mean he had to bear the brunt of the Battle. His tactics were suitable for his battle, but the radar based Dowding System meant there was no reason to make the entire Battle his battle.
Dowding had a justified reputation for possessing a superior intellect, which he fully justified by being the first senior officer to fully comprehend the potential of radar, and to conceptualize, develop and implement an innovative entirely novel defense system based on it. Despite this, he failed to realize that the system he had devised negated the principle of proximity. This LM and Bader got.
The map below details the range of British radar, which was the key to developing a viable alternative strategy.
The key elements of what could have been a viable alternative strategy based on a significantly modified version of the thinking at 12 Group (based on the LM-Bader strategy) were as follows:
1. Radar was able to first spot the enemy formations while they were still getting organized over northern France. If it took time for British wings to get themselves organized before they could engage, the Germans had an even bigger problem, as their formations were bigger, and included lumbering bombers. The fact that the Luftwaffe never provided its fighters with radios enabling them to communicate directly with the bombers they were flying with made a bad situation worse.
2. Abandon the most exposed 11 Group airfields such as Manston, Hawkinge and Lympne. Their locations precluded any possibility of squadrons defending them ever being able to intercept from equal or superior height. It must be remembered that even a relatively fast aircraft like the Spitfire had a relatively slow climb rate. The squadrons that had been operating those airfields would be redeployed to the ring of 11 Group bases that surrounded London, such as Kenley, Redhill, Hornchurch, Gravesend, West Malling, Stapleford and North Weald, or to 12 Group.
3. Change the proximity paradigm which dictated that 11 Groups fighters must be the ones to engage the Germans first. As soon as radar had spotted German formations still organizing over France, 12 Group would launch two Big Wings. Each wing would contain 3 squadrons, 2 Hurricane, 1 Spitfire, reflecting the fact that the Hurricane- Spitfire ratio was 2:1. (Bader's attempts to command a 5 squadron wing showed that anything bigger than a 3 squadron formation was impractical, despite claims to the contrary). At the same time 11 Group would launch an additional 2 wings from its less exposed northern bases, giving them the time they needed to form up and encounter the Germans before they reached their targets. Since the most exposed and vulnerable targets would no longer be in use (fake planes could be deployed on theme to fool the Germans - think of Patton's pre- D Day fake army), the real targets, further north would take the Luftwaffe formations longer to reach, as they were further north. It should be remembered that apart from the no longer operational (as per item 2) air bases, there weren't that many really valuable targets close to the coast, except the Spitfire factory at Southampton, so even if the Germans got to the south eastern coast before the defending fighters could engage them, it wouldn't have matter much. Britain could afford bombed countryside more than FC could afford the unsustainable pilot attrition Park's tactics caused.
4. Given the range of radar, these early launched wings would have enough time to assemble so they would be able to intercept the Germans halfway between the coast and London, at maximum advantage, from above or equal altitude, and because of their greater numbers, sustain less losses while bringing down at least marginally more enemy planes than single squadron formations (post War research has proven that although Big Wings did not have the massive kill rates they had been credited with, but did sustain less losses).
5. The two groups together had 34 first line aircraft (Spitfire or Hurricane) equipped squadrons, 21 in 11 Group, 13 in 12 Group. Between them, the two groups could easily have launched 6 such wings (18 squadrons), and still have plenty of fighters in reserve should a second wave of attacks be launched before the first wings would have had time to rearm and refuel (it's important to remember that 12 Group was for the most part safe from attacks).
6. As soon as the early launched wings were airborne, the rest of 11 Groups squadrons would be launched as required to provide the close cover to the airfields Park justifiably wanted.
Such a strategy would have offered several advantages. While a 3 squadron wing did not down 3 times and many enemy aircraft as a single squadron (the numbers were 1.5 more kills per squadron compared to single squadron formations), the wings sustained far less casualties. Since FC's Achilles Heel was pilot attrition, which nearly caused its defeat, just for this reason alone this strategy should have been adopted. If during the first 10 days of the Critical Period FC losses would have been 10%-20% less for the same number of kills, it would have made a world of difference, and FC would never have found itself on the ropes as it did during the first and second weeks of September.
Why wasn't this strategy adopted? That's for the next post.
Which one of the Shelby brothers did Craig Murray play in Peaky Blinders? (I cannot understand him!)
A long time ago an ex RAF veteran told me of when he was standing in a group of fellow "erks" on an active WW2 aerodrome, a dog was seen running across the grass runway, Bader shouted "Somebody get that dog" no one moved quick enough Bader got into a vehicle chased the dog down ran over and killed it, I suppose that's what it takes to be a fearless leader of men.
What a cruel man! Did he have to kill the dog?
It wasn't bloody half Sir Keith's airfields are getting it, Gordon Bennett
The big wing was popular with those who thought big was better. Yet, this would not have worked and did not work very well in the Battle of Britian. Fortunately, that battle was over before Dowding was removed. Churchhill removing Dowding was repaid to him when he lost his seat in parliment right after the war.
The Big wing sounds like something many modern CEO's would like. Easy to understand & explain, easy to control, very impressive to onlookers. But falls flat on its face when you look at the details & consequences.
IMHO, Hugh Dowding was right... at the time of greatest crisis. Rapid response to incoming raids means that the raids were broken up & disrupted. The Big Wing concept was great for publicity but took far too long to assemble & as you pointed out, too unwieldy to be effective. Later on, it had merits but Hugh Dowding's avowed aim was to keep the RAF in the fight, something he achieved. For the first time in its existence, the Luftwaffe got a bloody nose.
he fail to alert 12 group in a timely manner
if his vow was to keep the raf in the fight then why did keep his plane so for forward that the base wore almost knock out
12 group was not alerted till the german almost on top of their target
To point out, there are some E pens sill in existence in Britain. If you go to google earth, and look 1/2 way between Perranporth and St. Agnes, Cornwall, you'll see a WW II RAF airfield. At the southern end , you'll see what looks to be
ant antenna's - but they are E pens.
I think the situation was made worse by Bader's boss, Leigh - Mallory, who was a very ambitious man.
My wife’s birthday! Battle of Britain day !?
Yes.
the "big wing" was a terrible idea. too long to assemble. easily visible on radar. also panned with a few sly lines of dialogue in the "battle of britain" film. bader was also not liked much when he was in a german PoW camp by fellow allies. he considered himself above the rest and never thanked anyone. compared to hugh dowdings "hit and run" tactics that never let the germans rest a moment (german pilots on record say they much preferred the big wing to shoot at - more targets + more tired pilots).