I remember this accident, living close to Heathrow. The Vanguard, advertised by the builders, Vickers, as 'the Whispering Giant was still in operation, mostly as a freighter at the beginning my flying career. The pilot was considered by the enquiry to have suffered 'spatial disorientation' while pitching up, overrotating. Knowledge of the event remained with me as it was significant in promoting some fundamental changes in operations. One, that companies could not dictate landing minima less than that listed by a government authority, the second that companies would discourage pilots from attempting a third approach following two missed approaches. Statistics showed that psychologically, pilots often adopted a determination to make the third attempt successful, resulting in an accident. Unfortunately, even today, this problem is still encountered in some operations, typically when having held too long while hoping for an improvement in the weather, the crew have left themselves short of adequate fuel reserves to reach a suitable alternate destination.
I don’t know if you wrote the crash description, or someone else did, but this part is totally wrong: “although the VSI was showing a large climb rate and the altimeter was showing increasing height, the aircraft was in fact dropping, so the co-pilot kept pulling back. IMPOSSIBLE. If the VSI and Altimeter are both showing a climb, the aircraft IS CLIMBING. Only if the co-pilot is pulling back, with angle of attack exceeding positive lift, (and probably dropping airspeed, though not necessarily) and the VSI showing a DESCENT, and the altimeter DECREASING, is the aircraft descending or dropping. The common misconception is that simply pulling back or pushing forward automatically causes a climb or descent. In reality, the pulling and pushing affects airspeed and g-load, and THIS affects climb or descent. An aircraft can actually CLIMB nose down with the pilot pushing on the elevator control if power is high enough, or power is being advanced, and vice versa, the aircraft can be DESCENDING while pulling back. Anyway, the original statement is utterly wrong and actually impossible.
Flight 706 crashed in Belgium in 1971. This was Vanguard registered G-APEE on a night flight Edinburgh-Heathrow which crashed in fog on arrival in 1965.
Wrong flight number, BE706 was G-APEC which fell apart over Belgian in October 1971, the flight number would have been four numbers (Inter Britain) and since it departed from EDI it would have been BE54__ possibly BE5427.
I used to fly (as passenger) a lot on those days as my father worked for BEA. As they say, Cat 3B was only on the Trident. I certainly recall flying in a Viscount or Vanguard circling and missed approaches in fog, these were terrifying and even the most frequent fliers would be pale by the 3rd attempt. I still travel regularly and nothing since has come close to the fear on the approach to the 3rd attempt in fog. Recall in '65 the pilots are almost all ex-Bomber Command and had a totally different attitude to risk. Many would have flown damaged aircraft home and landed in fog lit by burning oil drums without enough fuel for a go-around. Compared to that Heathrow must have seemed easy so they just went for it. My uncle was on night shift on the ramp waiting for this flight and was one of the first on the scene, he never forgot the sight of the passengers, many still strapped in their seats strewn for 100s of yards along the runway. They looked normal and he ran from one to the next hoping to find someone alive.
That must've been horrific for your uncle. Such a tragic thing to witness. That's a point I never thought of before; that probably these pilots were bomber pilots in their previous life, and that their view and approach to risk had to affect their judgement, even with all the training received in preparation for flying commercially, with regular citizens as passengers. So much for the third time being "the charm".
I suppose in the early flight days there wernt multiple airports to go to. Airplane fire fighting has proberly improved drastically in the kast 50 years
That evening I had been plane spotting at Manchester which had been receiving diversions from mid afternoon. When I got home I was listening to Preston ATC and heard the flight heading south. There were exchanges between the aircraft and other BEA aircraft diverting to Manchester, at least two of which stated that Heathrow visibility was not improving. I lost the aircraft between Lichfield and Daventry due to a combination of VHF rage and the aircraft's altitude. Given the length of the hold and the number of go arounds, I've always put this down as a case of gethomeitis.
It was a nonsense cause! The crew were exhausted and fouled up the go around. They initially pitched up strongly and so climbed too steeply with at the same time too much flap reduction. The pilot allegedly over reacted to the (about 2 seconds) inherent lag in the response of the vertical speed indicator when they were reducing the climb rate and thinking the rate of climb was still high, pitched the nose down too much for too long hitting the ground. The initial strong pitch up made the response lag of the vertical speed indicator much more dangerous. The report said they did not pay enough attention to the attitude instruments which gave instantaneous information.
@@philblinkhorn8304 I suspect that they would be unlikely to divert to MAN without even having a look at LHR first, although it would be a sensible move in retrospect. Do you know if there were many (any) 24hr airports in 1965?
@@givenfirstnamefamilyfirstn3935 Having flown the type for a few months (Air Bridge Carriers) it’s always sad reading such things. There but for the grace of God and all that.
@stephenmckinnell7791 on the contrary. Beeline ops flight planned Manchester as the diversion point as the alternate fields in the London area were either marginal or fog bound. In any case, at the time BEA had no presence at Gatwick, Luton or Stansted. As for 24 hour o peration, Manchester's aerodrome licence stated quite clearly it had to be operational 24/7 and at the time its management were not only keen to handle diversions but pulled out all the stops to facilitate them including having contacts with all the major coach operators to ferry passengers either to Manchester Piccadilly for trains to London or direct to Heathrow and Gatwick. That day over 30 aircraft diverted in.
No kidding: Some years later, a person on board a specific Vanguard of the remaining fleet, whilst talking to other Crewmembers, disappeared suddenly and was identified as the Copilot of this fatal flight in 1965. Crew and maintenance were ordered, never to stay alone on that specific Vanguard.
The BEA Mudguard driver should have diverted to Stanstead, Gatwick, or Luton, commentary so snooty , patronising really ground my gears, but that is what it is like in those dinosaurian days.
@@philblinkhorn8304 Fair enough, but why did the BEA Mudguard driver radio ahead regarding weather at Heathrow, then decide to land at Manchester Ringway if said airport reports good to fair weather conditions?.
@@basiltaylor8910 you seem to be misunderstanding the circumstances. Heathrow had been fog bound since early afternoon, Gatwick, Luton and Stansted were fog bound and, in any case BEA had no presence or handling agent at those airports. I'll reply more fully tomorrow when I can access the official Manchester logs for the day and also my notes from the time.
@@basiltaylor8910 Between 19.44 on October 26 and 03.38 on October 27 Manchester handled 1 Bournemouth diversion and 27 from Heathrow. Of the diversions 17 were BEA including flights originating in Glasgow, Belfast, Leeds, and Dublin - not to mention Manchester departures which attempted to land at Heathrow and returned. Three Tridents diverted in between 21.59 and 23.14 on the basis that the ground visibility at Heathrow from the runway to the gate was unacceptable to the Captains. Two Aer Lingus flights from Dublin and Cork also diverted to Manchester. With that information available to the dispatcher and crew at Edinburgh, the flight was dispatched at 23.17 local. The aircraft crew had communication in flight with other aircraft diverting from Heathrow. The report assumes the final approach was attempted in the light of a successful landing by a Vanguard, though another was forced to overshoot between the successful landing and the fatal approach.
@@davidbeattie1366 The commentary stated that the tail strike occured when the plane was in the process of executing a go-around, not the landing phase. The inference was that the aircraft was too close to the ground when it's nose was pivoted upwards, causing the tail to lower and fatally strike the ground.
I remember this accident, living close to Heathrow. The Vanguard, advertised by the builders, Vickers, as 'the Whispering Giant was still in operation, mostly as a freighter at the beginning my flying career. The pilot was considered by the enquiry to have suffered 'spatial disorientation' while pitching up, overrotating. Knowledge of the event remained with me as it was significant in promoting some fundamental changes in operations. One, that companies could not dictate landing minima less than that listed by a government authority, the second that companies would discourage pilots from attempting a third approach following two missed approaches. Statistics showed that psychologically, pilots often adopted a determination to make the third attempt successful, resulting in an accident. Unfortunately, even today, this problem is still encountered in some operations, typically when having held too long while hoping for an improvement in the weather, the crew have left themselves short of adequate fuel reserves to reach a suitable alternate destination.
The Bristol Britannia was the 'Whispering Giant', not the Vanguard ?
@@AndreA-ke2id Quite right ! Absolutely .. age isn't just catching up, it's overtaking me :>) Well done.
@@jamesgraham6122 I was about to correct you and say it was the Vickers Viscount but I would have been wrong too. It comes to us all 🤪
They say the fog saved the lives of the regular crew, however had the regular crew made it to fly, the odds of a crash would be much less likely
Lucky the dramatic music tells us how to feel about this report.
Loved the Boeing 707 landing at the end. I remember the G force from the full-reverse landings and the way the plane shook. Fun time to be flying.
I don’t know if you wrote the crash description, or someone else did, but this part is totally wrong: “although the VSI was showing a large climb rate and the altimeter was showing increasing height, the aircraft was in fact dropping, so the co-pilot kept pulling back. IMPOSSIBLE. If the VSI and Altimeter are both showing a climb, the aircraft IS CLIMBING. Only if the co-pilot is pulling back, with angle of attack exceeding positive lift, (and probably dropping airspeed, though not necessarily) and the VSI showing a DESCENT, and the altimeter DECREASING, is the aircraft descending or dropping. The common misconception is that simply pulling back or pushing forward automatically causes a climb or descent. In reality, the pulling and pushing affects airspeed and g-load, and THIS affects climb or descent. An aircraft can actually CLIMB nose down with the pilot pushing on the elevator control if power is high enough, or power is being advanced, and vice versa, the aircraft can be DESCENDING while pulling back. Anyway, the original statement is utterly wrong and actually impossible.
Flight 706 crashed in Belgium in 1971. This was Vanguard registered G-APEE on a night flight Edinburgh-Heathrow which crashed in fog on arrival in 1965.
706 has to be the most cursed flight number in history. Airwest two BEA’s.and Proteus. 🎉
Another would be 1907 because Kazakhstan 1907 and Gol 1907 are both massive mid air collisions
Wrong flight number, BE706 was G-APEC which fell apart over Belgian in October 1971, the flight number would have been four numbers (Inter Britain) and since it departed from EDI it would have been BE54__ possibly BE5427.
I used to fly (as passenger) a lot on those days as my father worked for BEA. As they say, Cat 3B was only on the Trident. I certainly recall flying in a Viscount or Vanguard circling and missed approaches in fog, these were terrifying and even the most frequent fliers would be pale by the 3rd attempt. I still travel regularly and nothing since has come close to the fear on the approach to the 3rd attempt in fog. Recall in '65 the pilots are almost all ex-Bomber Command and had a totally different attitude to risk. Many would have flown damaged aircraft home and landed in fog lit by burning oil drums without enough fuel for a go-around. Compared to that Heathrow must have seemed easy so they just went for it. My uncle was on night shift on the ramp waiting for this flight and was one of the first on the scene, he never forgot the sight of the passengers, many still strapped in their seats strewn for 100s of yards along the runway. They looked normal and he ran from one to the next hoping to find someone alive.
Bragger 🙄🙄
That must've been horrific for your uncle. Such a tragic thing to witness.
That's a point I never thought of before; that probably these pilots were bomber pilots in their previous life, and that their view and approach to risk had to affect their judgement, even with all the training received in preparation for flying commercially, with regular citizens as passengers.
So much for the third time being "the charm".
I suppose in the early flight days there wernt multiple airports to go to.
Airplane fire fighting has proberly improved drastically in the kast 50 years
That evening I had been plane spotting at Manchester which had been receiving diversions from mid afternoon. When I got home I was listening to Preston ATC and heard the flight heading south. There were exchanges between the aircraft and other BEA aircraft diverting to Manchester, at least two of which stated that Heathrow visibility was not improving. I lost the aircraft between Lichfield and Daventry due to a combination of VHF rage and the aircraft's altitude. Given the length of the hold and the number of go arounds, I've always put this down as a case of gethomeitis.
Stop bragging 🙄🙄
@AwesomeAngryBiker grow up little boy then you might understand factual information.
Almost the same Co-pilot inputs that crashed Atlas Flt 3591 in Houston On Feb 23,2019. "Somatograpic Illusion "
No Gps in those days...when men were men and women were air hostesses
In fact the localiser at the runway was not working that night, radar guidance was being passed. Time 8:15
🎣😂😂
I doubt any tail strike would have affected the fuel (in the wings) directly. Diverting late at night probably offered few choices.
It was a nonsense cause!
The crew were exhausted and fouled up the go around. They initially pitched up strongly and so climbed too steeply with at the same time too much flap reduction. The pilot allegedly over reacted to the (about 2 seconds) inherent lag in the response of the vertical speed indicator when they were reducing the climb rate and thinking the rate of climb was still high, pitched the nose down too much for too long hitting the ground. The initial strong pitch up made the response lag of the vertical speed indicator much more dangerous. The report said they did not pay enough attention to the attitude instruments which gave instantaneous information.
Manchester had been taking diversions since mid afternoon and continued to do so as and after the aircraft passed within ten miles on its way south.
@@philblinkhorn8304 I suspect that they would be unlikely to divert to MAN without even having a look at LHR first, although it would be a sensible move in retrospect. Do you know if there were many (any) 24hr airports in 1965?
@@givenfirstnamefamilyfirstn3935 Having flown the type for a few months (Air Bridge Carriers) it’s always sad reading such things. There but for the grace of God and all that.
@stephenmckinnell7791 on the contrary. Beeline ops flight planned Manchester as the diversion point as the alternate fields in the London area were either marginal or fog bound. In any case, at the time BEA had no presence at Gatwick, Luton or Stansted. As for 24 hour o peration, Manchester's aerodrome licence stated quite clearly it had to be operational 24/7 and at the time its management were not only keen to handle diversions but pulled out all the stops to facilitate them including having contacts with all the major coach operators to ferry passengers either to Manchester Piccadilly for trains to London or direct to Heathrow and Gatwick. That day over 30 aircraft diverted in.
No kidding: Some years later, a person on board a specific Vanguard of the remaining fleet, whilst talking to other Crewmembers, disappeared suddenly and was identified as the Copilot of this fatal flight in 1965. Crew and maintenance were ordered, never to stay alone on that specific Vanguard.
I heard about this regarding Manchester Airport, think the said aircraft was Echo Mike, which of coarse became a Merchantman.
A very young Peter Snow.
706 was the belgian crash too. cursed number
The BEA Mudguard driver should have diverted to Stanstead, Gatwick, or Luton, commentary so snooty , patronising really ground my gears, but that is what it is like in those dinosaurian days.
@@basiltaylor8910 all were fogbound
@@philblinkhorn8304 Fair enough, but why did the BEA Mudguard driver radio ahead regarding weather at Heathrow, then decide to land at Manchester Ringway if said airport reports good to fair weather conditions?.
@@basiltaylor8910 you seem to be misunderstanding the circumstances. Heathrow had been fog bound since early afternoon, Gatwick, Luton and Stansted were fog bound and, in any case BEA had no presence or handling agent at those airports. I'll reply more fully tomorrow when I can access the official Manchester logs for the day and also my notes from the time.
@@basiltaylor8910 Between 19.44 on October 26 and 03.38 on October 27 Manchester handled 1 Bournemouth diversion and 27 from Heathrow. Of the diversions 17 were BEA including flights originating in Glasgow, Belfast, Leeds, and Dublin - not to mention Manchester departures which attempted to land at Heathrow and returned. Three Tridents diverted in between 21.59 and 23.14 on the basis that the ground visibility at Heathrow from the runway to the gate was unacceptable to the Captains. Two Aer Lingus flights from Dublin and Cork also diverted to Manchester. With that information available to the dispatcher and crew at Edinburgh, the flight was dispatched at 23.17 local. The aircraft crew had communication in flight with other aircraft diverting from Heathrow. The report assumes the final approach was attempted in the light of a successful landing by a Vanguard, though another was forced to overshoot between the successful landing and the fatal approach.
Wow! Autoland in development even in 1965!
I wonder if the designer of the Vanguard became a designer on the Ford Pinto….One tail strike and KA-BOOM!
Sounds more like pilot error. It’s not normal to land on the tail.
Nothing to do with design, the Pilots decision to go round was too late causing the tail end to strike the ground violently.
@@davidbeattie1366 The commentary stated that the tail strike occured when the plane was in the process of executing a go-around, not the landing phase. The inference was that the aircraft was too close to the ground when it's nose was pivoted upwards, causing the tail to lower and fatally strike the ground.
Smiths autoload on the Trident 1 was way ahead of anything anywhere in the world. So reliable that BEA used its benefits in advertising.