@@ThomasTubeHD im not to sure if you should have cussed, besides some people are waching these withother yunger people and like looking at eveyones nice comments
Pirates usually divided their treasure fairly amongst themselves after repairs to the ship and restocking supplies each pirate got 1 share except the captain who got 2, the quartermaster who got 1 and a half, and the carpenter and surgeon who each got 1 and a quarter. This is in general each crew had slightly different rules but the pattern exists
Actually, that would work too, since Bart would be the only one to say nay since he would get 99 if he was captain Daniel would say yes because it's definitely more than one, so would the other two since Bart would become captain by default if Amaro would die and they wouldn't get anything since it would become a tie So technically, yes it would work
Best Hebron wait no it was a joke, also how would amaro be poorer than anyone else, if each pirate gets 20 out of the 100 coins, there would be no remainder, because 100 / 5 = 20.
Or maybe 99.999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999
That would ensure you'd live, since Charlotte and Eliza would both be getting more than if you walked the plank, but remember your secondary goal is to maximize the amount of gold you get to keep for yourself.
Lol I'd didnt know that people say that amaro is a simp😆 Wajt...my name is amara And amaro is similar to amara... Is he somehow my twin in the olden times?😆well the internet says his a simp well I am a simp to so I guess were both twins?? Joke
The fact that they are all great mathematicians and know that each other are too actually helps them. If charlotte and Eliza only get one coin, if they were not great mathematicians, they would vote no because they would be disappointed with only receiving one coin. Funny how that works.
If they were not great mathematicians Amaro's offer would still work because Bart and Charlotte would still vote yes because they wouldn't risk getting killed (that's their primary objective)
Bonus : Now let's say in case of a tie, the captain walks the plank and the next crewmate becomes captain, what would Amaro do? If only Daniel and Eliza remain, Eliza votes Nay to Daniel's plan so she remains alone with 100 coins in pocket. Therefore Daniel wants to avoid being captain at all costs to survive. Charlotte knows that she will therefore have Daniel's support without even needing to offer him money, while Eliza will always vote Nay in hopes of being the last one alive, so Charlotte proposes to keep all the gold herself. To beat that offer, Bart needs to be slightly more generous to get two other votes than his own. Since Charlotte will vote Nay in any case so she can leave with all the gold, he needs to bribe Daniel and Eliza by making them a better offer than Charlotte's, offering one coin to each. Finally, Amaro also needs a total of 3 votes, by making a more interesting offer for 2 of his crewmates. The easiest to bribe is Charlotte, with one coin as she would get nothing if Bart comes to power, and then he needs to bribe either Daniel or Eliza with 2 coins, which is one coin more than Bart's offer, leaving him with 97 coins and high risks of mutiny.
Bonus bonus: Let’s say we have the same scenario, except the captain isn’t allowed to vote. If Daniel and Eliza are the only 2, then Daniel’s plan is garunteed to fail since Eliza holds the only vote. Charolette has a similar problem. She needs both Daniel and Eliza to vote Yarr for her plan to be accepted, but Eliza will still vote Nay. Bart actually has a chance. More than a chance really, since neither Charolette or Daniel want the vote to fail, so they both will vote Yarr without any prompting from Bart. This means Bart will be able to keep all the coins. Now Amaro needs to secure 3 votes to live. He won’t be able to get Bart’s vote, so he needs the rest of the crew on his side. Since none of them get any coins if it moves to Bart, he just needs to offer 1 coin to Charolette, Daniel, and Eliza.
@@MatthewMorris6148 Nice, might as well do Bonus bonus bonus : The captain cannot vote, but in case of a tie he remains the captain. If Daniel is captain, Eliza votes Nay to keep all the gold for herself and he dies. So if Charlotte is captain, she has Daniel's vote in any case, Eliza votes Nay but it's a tie so Charlotte gets to keep all the gold. Bart needs 2 votes, Charlotte will vote Nay to keep the whole booty to herself, so Bart offers 1 coin to Daniel and 1 coin to Eliza. Amaro has to gather 2 votes, so he offers 1 coin to Charlotte and 2 coins to either Eliza or Daniel. We can see that the offers are exactly the same as in the first Bonus (and it keeps on going the same if there are more than 5 crew members) We could also try bonus variations of the 4 situations we've already studied but assuming that in case of a tie between the captain's offer and another's, a crewmate will vote Yarr instead of Nay for the captain
@@arkanys3401 Sure, why not? -I feel like these need labels though because “bonus bonus bonus bonus” is starting to get a bit ridiculous lol.- Edit: I’ve changed my mind, we should just call them “Bonus*X” where X is the number of Bonus’s. The original scenario but the pirates aren’t nearly as bloodthirsty. If only Eliza and Daniel remain will result in Daniel getting all the gold and Eliza getting none. If Charlotte is captain, she gets 99 gold and offers 1 gold to Eliza. If Bart is captain, he just needs to offer 1 gold to either (not both) Daniel or Eliza. Amaro just needs to offer 1 gold to 2 different pirates who aren’t Bart.
@@MatthewMorris6148Bonus*5: Original scenario but once a pirate other than the captain says "yarr" (first pirate in the order to say "yarr" after captain), all the subsequent pirates in that order must say "yarr". If only D and E were there, D will keep all the coins and so if C, D and E were there, C would have to give a coin to E. Now if B, C, D and E were there, B would have to give 2 coins to E and could keep the rest 98 with him. If all of them were there, A would have to give 1 coin to D, 3 coins to E and could keep the rest 96 with him.
+Sniper Game theory is analysis of "Games". Not all "games", however, are games in the regular sense, for example this, and the prisoner's dilemma. For more information: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Game_theory en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nash_equilibrium
Amaro: Gives everyone 20 coins each. Thrown overboard. Amaro: Keeps 98 coins, gives 1 each to Charlotte and Eliza, and nothing to Bart and Daniel. Plan works. Amaro: I'm such a perfect logician.
Yeah I think this riddle is flawed. Even with the 98/1/1 split the other two pirates would know this is the outcome that gets the two yes's so their nays are wasted.
@@RH-nk7eothe riddle already says that the pirates are selfish and bloodthirsty. Amaro wants to get as many coins as can be, so if he can get 98 then he'll go with it
However, if the five of them would be working together again in the future, it now becomes in Amaro's interest to ensure the cooperation of all the crew members and avoid resentment, which makes the case for splitting equally or a less imbalanced distribution. Probably a variation on an infinite prisoner's dilemma.
Only reason they would make it anywhere to begin with is since they are all "perfectly logical", they would basically know what the others of the crew would think and have success as long as they dont try to go off-script and just cooperate
Prisoner’s dilemma’s always end with both parties choosing to Defect (unless you are able to have strategies that are “not perfectly rational.” Rational strategies do not always get the highest outcome, as this video proves, so only irrational strategies allow for maximization). If the other 4 pirates all privately agreed to only accept 20 or more coins, for example, A doesn’t need all of their votes and only has to offer this to two of them. Then each person would benefit from defecting and accepting 19 instead of 20 coins, because if you’re the first to defect then you can ensure you get the coins instead of being passed over. They will then continue undercutting each other until they land at accepting 1 coin
Oddly enough, it barely changes if you flip so ties reject proposals. You'd think it would, since Eliza can now maximize her profits by forcing Daniel to walk the plank (even if his Plan is for E to get 100 while keeping nothing for himself, she'll make him walk anyway out of bloodthirst). So Daniel is extra-motivated to NOT become the Captain. Therefore, Charlotte can actually keep all the coins for herself, and he'll still vote Yar to save himself. Therefore, Bart needs bribe Charlotte and Daniel with only 1 coin apiece, giving Charlotte nothing. Amaro then needs to give either Daniel or Eliza only 1 more coin -- 2 total -- while bribing Charlotte with only 1. He'd still get to keep 97 coins!
In your Plan C where Charlotte keeps all the gold Daniel would actually say no because he would get 0 either way. Doesn't change what the solution is but still felt like mentioning it
@@connormcmahon7980 No, it would not ensure hai death. When only Daniel and Eliza remain, Daniel can propose that Eliza gets all 100. And unless Eliza has a bloodlust, she will let that pass. Because there is nothing specified about bloodlust, Charlotte is better off giving atleast 1 coin to Daniel. Which in turn means that Bart needs to give Daniel 2 coins and Eliza 1 coin to get the vote passed. Which in turn means that Amaro should keep 97, give 1 to Charlotte and 2 to Eliza. Giving 2 to Daniel no longer works. As even Bart would offer 2 to Daniel. And since we don’t know about bloodlust, to be safe Amarro would need to give 3 to Daniel. So, it’s best for Amarro to give 1 to Charlotte and 2 to Eliza
@@connormcmahon7980 You are wrong. Each pirate KNOWS what is at stake for each other pirate. If Daniel gets 0 gold either way, it is stated that he'd rather see the captain walk the plank. It is CHARLOTTE who needs to think about survival first and foremost, and Daniel KNOWS that. Charlotte would not risk NOT giving him the entire treasure in exchange for her own life.
A: "Okay, let's trade this evenly. 20 coins for each!" B: "Y'know, if this fails I could get 99 coins." A: "Okay, none for you, 25 for each!" C, D, and E: "Yaaaay!" B: "Aw, man..."
"Being bloody pirates" Me: a violent intellectual: Eliza, when Daniel force Charlotte to walk the plank, just stab Daniel in the back and take the hat and push him over
Nah, historically, pirate crews traditionally had an agreement of splitting loot evenly, with the Captain getting a share and a half, and the other important command staff (quartermaster, carpenter, boatswain, gunner, etc) getting a share and a quarter. Mostly because, historically, pirate crews were close-knit groups with similar outlooks, rather then a forced assembly of sociopaths.
If they did that, they would die, or the crew would split up, resulting in the only crews to remain be the ones that didnt fight about it and did it fairly. Or very short lasting crews constantly.
Ragnarok Sora Tell that to William Smith, Captain of the British sloop Blessing. The instances are rare, and some aren't even proven, but walking the plank has been documented, which is the whole reason it was there for Charles Ellms and Robert Louis Stevenson to make popular enough for Errol Flynn and Johnny Depp.
Things like this is why pirates established how much they'd get as a contract before the crew is even formed. The typical arrangement is crew get one share, quartermaster gets one and a half shares, and captain gets two shares.
Charan Katakam I kinda solved it, I figured that if I gave 2 pirates 20 coins and the 3rd and the last gets none while I get 60. This way I get at least a lot of gold while ensuring some pirates are still happy and don't try to murder or steal my gold afterwards.
That would work only because Charlotte would say yes to the plan, but that means that Amaro would get less gold. Bart wouldn't vote yes because as long as the turn passes down to him, he can get the most amount of gold. So while yours make sense, it's not the best option.
@@amanilee7708 Being logical merely means they can make perfect decisions towards whatever their goal is. They can each make a perfect decision that puts them in the best spot possible, whether or not they care about others isn't testing for logicality. They don't think impulsively, but rather think out the entire scenario for what best suits them.
@@sharkas9965 to be fair, the only outcome where Eliza is the only one left is if Daniel's plan results in getting 2 Nays (meaning he himself would also vote Nay). So the outcome isn't impossible, just improbable. Remember, having a majority vote or a tie will result in the plan be carried. It doesn't matter who is given priority.
EXACTLY! It was a *huge* mistake for the animator showing Daniel walking the plank! The way the problem was outlined, this would be an impossible outcome! They go out of their way to make sure its totally clear that the pirates are perfectly logical and acting only out of self interest with the primary goal being to stay alive. That makes it totally impossible for a pirate to vote to plank themselves! This erroneous animation at 1:07 was a huge mistake!
I think it was also a mistake (although less severe) at the very end of the video, when they suggested that the remaining pirates should spend some time revising their silly code. If that were an option, the entire puzzle wouldn't work!
I think splitting the gold evenly works even with all the common knowledge stuff. Here's how I found this out: Suppose Amaro splits all the gold evenly. Everyone knows that if he's outvoted, the decision will pass to Bart. If Bart still goes logically and uses his 99-0-1-0 plan, Charlotte, Daniel and Eliza will all have less than 20 coins - what they would have gotten if they had agreed to Amaro's 20-20-20-20-20 plan. Since this ensures Amaro's support, he can give Bart 20 coins and not have to worry about him voting "Nay" because of him getting less than 99 coins (what Bart would have gotten if Amaro went overboard). Therefore, the end result of the election with the 20-20-20-20-20 plan would be Yarr-Nay-Yarr-Yarr-Yarr. Amaro would win the election, stay alive and the distribution would be fair. The fairness is one huge advantage of the 20-20-20-20-20 plan over the 98-0-1-0-1 plan.
It would work but the second objective is to maximize the gold. Aside from being alive, you have to remember these pirates are greedy. Put yourself in Amaro's shoes, why would you give them 20 each when you can be sure that you'll stay alive by giving only one coin to Charlotte and Eliza? Also the rule says each pirate will ALWAYS vote to make the others walk the plank, all other results being equal.
The equitable plan won't work. Everyone wants the treasure all to himself, no one but Daniel benefits from being captain. If Charlotte becomes captain, Eliza gets all the gold because Charlotte would die without her support, there is no reason for Eliza to let her keep 99 pieces when she can have it all in exchange for Charlotte's life, even if accepting 1 piece benefits her more than letting Charlotte die. Charlotte cannot afford to offer her only 1 piece unless Eliza cannot help but accept it, in which case she is NOT a good mathematician. Since Eliza thus profits from Bart's death, he needs to get support from either Daniel or Charlotte both of whom know his plight. Would either be willing to settle for less than the entire treasure when they don't have to? Charlotte may be willing to accept the smallest amount but not if Bart keeps a majority: even knowing that she will have to give the entire treasure to Eliza should Bart die, she might spite him for being unfair and regarding her vote as worth so little, and she knows that he cannot risk offending whomever he needs support from at peril of his life. He might escape death by offering Charlotte 50/50 but it is still a risk. Is it worth it? Let's assume it is and that Daniel would respond similarly. Not knowing if Bart will bribe Daniel or Charlotte, each hopes to profit (separately, only one will benefit) from Amaro's death to the tune of at least 50% of the treasure, and Bart would similarly rather watch Amaro die and then himself offer 50% to Charlotte or Daniel and hope to survive. But Amaro needs support from 2 pirates to prevent his own death. He will have to offer at least 51% (rounding up) to one of the three just mentioned and Bart is the best candidate to accept such a deal. Eliza gets nothing unless Bart dies, but offering her only 1% risks Amaro losing his life while she only loses 1% and gets one step closer to 100%. Amaro MUST offer Eliza enough of the remaining 49% to please her. However, since his life is on the line and not hers, why would she settle for less than the entire remaining 49%. Because she gets nothing from his death? That's HIS problem! He cannot offer her more than 49% and live, but any less risks losing her vote. If Amaro offered everyone 20%, only Eliza might support him since the other 3 are all expecting at least 50% even though not all 3 can get it.
There could be a modification of the game when only remaining pirates vote (except one who proposed the distribution). Then the fourth pirate cannot allow the third one to be killed (because the last one will kill him and take 100%). So the third one may propose distribution 0-0-100-0-0. So the second may propose 0-98-0-1-1 to ensure a positive vote. And the first one may propose either 97-0-1-2-0 or 97-0-1-0-2 to ensure an even vote.
but why at 1:07 would Elisa throw Daniel down? she would say No and Daniel Yes, is a tie. Indeed in the final explanation, it says that it's bad for Elisa to be left alone with Daniel. Clearly, the riddle description tried to avoid/lie about this, in order for the person not to think of the scenario that they are 2 left, and just says "it would go on like that until Elisa is left" which is not true and will never happen
I assume there's no way to subdivide a gold piece. Starting from the end: If it comes down to Daniel, his proposal will always pass because he will vote for it so it will be at least a tie. So he will propose that he gets everything: D:100 E:0 If it comes to Charlotte, she needs 1 vote besides her own, and Eliza is cheapest, so she will propose: C:99 D:0 E:1 Bart needs 1 vote besides his own, and Daniel is cheapest to bribe, so he will propose: B:99 C:0 D:1 E:0 Amaro needs two votes besides his own, so he will propose: A:98 B:0 C:1 D:0 E:1 expecting to win 3:2. (He will be disappointed, because real pirates will never adhere to this insane deal) Interestingly, if there are more than 200 pirates, it doesn't matter what the captain proposes; he always dies.
I think you are referring the last sentence. If so, thank you. You elliptically bring up a subtle point where I was wrong. (Edited: My counts were off by 1) A captain of 202 pirates can offer every other person 1 gold piece, not including himself, and live. So unless bribed, he will vote for the captain of 203 pirates to die. There is no way for the captain of 203 to live if it passes to him. He needs to bribe 101 pirates with 100 coins. So he will vote for the captain of 204 to live even if he isn't bribed. The captain of 204 can live. He still needs 102 pirate votes, but he has his own and he can get 203's vote without a bribe. So he will vote for captain 205 to die unless he is bribed. The captain of 205 is again in an impossible situation - he needs to buy 102 votes with 100 coins. He needs 103 votes counting his own. So captain 205 die if it passes to him, so he will vote for 206 to live, but captain 203 will not. 203 can just wait until it passes to captain 204. So the captain of 206 is still doomed. He gets the one free vote from captain 205; that plus his own plus 100 bribes gives him 102 votes, which is a minority. So he and 205 will vote for captain 207's proposal. A similar fate awaits the captain of 207, who needs 104 votes. Then the captain of 208 can live: He has 4 free votes (himself, 207, 206, and 205) which with the 100 gives him 104. So none of them has any reason to vote for captain 209. It seems like it has to alternate at longer intervals after this. Every time we find a captain who can live, the pool of free votes is reset; every time we don't, it accumulates.
Tehom, you're right: specifically, the pattern continues based on powers of two. Since the pirates from #201 upwards will never get any coins, they will only vote for the last scenario where they won't die. So after #204, the next pirate to survive is the one who can gather 4 votes to counter the 4 votes from #201-204 which they will never get. This is #208, who gets votes from #205, #206, #207 and #208 (their own vote), and offers the evens #2-200 a coin each and gets their votes, since otherwise it would fall down to #204 who gives a coin each to the odds #1-199. But now #201-208 won't vote for any proposal, as the best they can be offered is no coins and survival, which they get under #208. So the pirate after that who can survive needs to gather 8 votes to counter the 8 from #201-208, which is #216. This shows how it plays out (odds = odd pirates #1-199, evens = even pirates #2-200). The next few cases: #201: #201 + odds #202: #202 + evens #204: #203-204 + odds #208: #205-208 + evens #216: #209-216 + odds #232: #217-232 + evens You could write a general formula, but I hope it's obvious from this.
What I learned from this video is that if every human is an expert logician, everyone would agree that trust and loyalty are logically the only way to get the most out of of bloodthirsty democracy. Even that first pirate would choose to share the booty equally, because if he chose to be disloyal and keep even one more coin than is “fair,” the other four would vote him out because they can trust each other to be “fair.”
It doesnt really apply to the real world and only works because the pirates value gold over being bloodthirsty, for example in the real world instead of allowing a 1 gold option you might take the 0 gold instead and vote the stingy captain out because the payoff of being bloodthirsty and showing you disapprove of stingyness would outweight the value of that 1 gold. Never underestimate the power of being petty.
The animation shows a break of the rules of the game. At 0:40 the rules state that at a tie, the coins are divided to plan, but at animation 1:07 it shows Elisa making Daniel walk the plank. There is no voting mechanism where Daniel would have to walk the plank when they are the only 2 left, since there cannot be majority to make him walk the plank (assuming he won’t vote for himself to walk the plank, which would be a break of rule 1).
That's because if they just told you outright that Eliza can never vote off Daniel they'd be giving you a hint. The idea is that you start off with as little information as is necessary to deduce the outcome, which makes the whole thing more of a puzzle.
one problem with the video, the scene where we see E asking D to jump off makes no sense, as D would never vote his own death and a 50/50 vote sees him win. Anyway, have not seen the answer and I say 96 to A 1 to D 3 to E as E is forced to accept (with what I just said, she can't expect to choose how much she gains because when D and E will remain, D will keep everything, so 3 coins is better than 0) and D is forced to accept (C will propose 1 to E and keep 99 and have a majority of votes). This last parenthesis explains that E wouldn't accept one coin from A, as C will propose it to her and wouldn't accept 2, as B would propose it. In conclusion, 96 coins is the best I can come up with.
I reached to same answer! TED-Ed is wrong. Eliza will not accept 1 coin at first round, she will vote NAY for this and wait to Bart offer 98/2 and than vote YARR. Two coins is better than one. Amaro NEEDS to offer 3 to have certainty of he will stay alive (1st rule).
Well, A needs to offer E two coins, since C will offer her 1 anyway so she would turn down A's offer of 1 out of spite apparently, so TED's offer IS wrong. Or am I missing something?
So to generalize it(c = coins, n = # of people), person 1 gives themselves c - floor((n-1)/2) coins, and give every person an even number of turns away from person 1 a single coin. So person 3 gets one coin, person 5 gets one coin, and so on
So, if Bart becomes captain, Charolette and Eliza get nothing, Bart gets 99 coins, and Daniel gets one. But if Amaro stays captain, he gets 98 coins, Bart and Daniel get nothing, and Charolette and Eliza get each get one coin, which is why they say 'Yarr'. Am I right?
That's not as bad as what I was thinking. My genius self was thinking of split it equally 5 ways, just because I was too lazy to come with any other solution🤦🏾♀️
Yeah, I thought this too. In my head it just doesn't make sense to risk your own life by offering the other two just 1 coin. The riddle just doesn't really fit real life, because in this one everyone makes 'rational decisions'. In real life, if even one person isn't 100% rational it wouldn't work.
The 7th rule is interesting because it also implies that each pirate knows that each of the other pirates know that that pirate knows that all the other pirates (can be continued forever) are perfect logicians.
Yeah the whole gold splitting situation wouldn't even be a concern for the pirates because they all know that Amaro is going to suggest a perfect solution from the beginning anyway. Because they're all master logicians who know that they're all master logicians. As soon as they find gold every time they will just immediately assume it's gonna be a 98 0 1 0 1 split lmao. Which suggests to me that Bart and Dennis became pirates just for the fun of it. Because they're men? This puzzle is so sexist! =P
If Amaro is *Meme Man* : Amaro: ill give Charlotte and Eliza 50 coins each. Charlotte and Eliza: YARR!! After 47 seconds: *Amaro steals and has now 100 coins* ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, *STONKS* ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
I mean maybe amaro chooses whether or not to change the plan and he obviously wouldn’t tho I guess the other four pirate could throw him off but if they are perfectly logical then they know that it would end up with Daniel as captain (he can probably overpower Eliza) so Daniel wants to overthrow amaro, but no one else does cause they’ll go off the edge and those three can overpower Daniel and since Daniel knows this he doesn’t try to overthrow amaro
@@thefirsttime7759 i meant they would want more ??????? they would want least 10% smarty pant, but ur still right even if u mis understood what i meant
@@koolstory3867 In these cases, getting 1 coin is the best scenario. So, they hate it, but must accept. Because the next captain would not give anything.
I solved this a little wrong because I thought plans would fail on a tie, not succeed. I came to a pretty similar solution, though. E would obviously vote against any plan by D to be the sole survivor and get all the money, and thus will vote nay to all of the plans. Knowing this, D will agree to any plan C makes to avoid dying, so C's plan would be to take all the money for herself, getting 2 yars from herself and D and a nay from E. B is similar to D, because while D will agree to anything to avoid dying, C and E will vote nay to everything and cause another tie, killing B. Therefore, B will agree to anything A proposed or else they'd be outvoted every time. Finally, A would have a guaranteed yar from B and D, and a guaranteed nay from C and E. All he has to do to avoid a tie is vote yar on his own plan. Thus, A keeps all the money since the rest of the crew are perfectly divided by greed or fear of death from the others. This is strangely still a very interesting puzzle with my misinterpretation lol
I mean I will disagree on A giving everything to himself. Using the tie = loss yes C can give everything to herself and guarantee win as D dies if he becomes captain. However when it comes to B, he can simply give both D and E 1 coin each which guarantees their support. This means A will have to give one coin to C and 2 coins to either D or E.
By pleasing Charlotte and Eliza only, Amaro can get 98 gold and give 1 each to Charlotte and Eliza, Charlotte and Eliza knows if Bart becomes captain, they will get nothing, so voting for Amaro's plan is the best choice for them, even if it's 1 coin, the alternative is worse for them. If Amaro gave everyone 20 equal gold, then - Amaro - Yarr Bart - Nay Charlotte - Yarr Daniel - Yarr Eliza - Yarr Because Charlotte and Eliza would never want Bart to be Captain and Daniel will only get 1 gold if Bart is captain, so Daniel also votes Yarr and Bart votes Nay, because if Amaro's plan is rejected, he is next captain and can get 99 gold instead of now 20, but he also knows everyone else will vote yarr, so probably will say Yarr as well. That's loss for Amaro, that's why pleasing Charlotte and Eliza is the best choice for Amaro and voting Yarr for Amaro's plan is the best choice for Charlotte and Eliza in that case. Amaro will never be rejected in this way, because 3 vote Yarr, so what do you mean?
Lol we played this in my game theory class as an example of why game theory isn’t necessarily accurate to real life. You can bet your britches we killed the captain who suggested this plan.
To be fair, it's said that all the pirates know the others think logically, like them. So Amaro would probably know that the others don't think logically.
@@aurorawizard7045 I mean.. it does kind of bring into question whether or not the way they're behaving is truly logical though - after all, if people who are supposedly behaving irrationally forces all of the others to pay them more because of their irrationality.. then they're ultimately doing a better job at maximizing their profits than someone who was behaving supposedly purely logically.. and if they're ultimately getting paid more because of it (especially when the difference in the amount gained vs. the amount potentially lost is so large - I mean, they only need to get 20 gold coins >1/20 of the time to make up for losing 1 gold coin 100% of the time).. then is it really irrational anymore? It's certainly true that someone that behaves that way would be worse off in a group of people behaving as described in the riddle.. however, the reverse is also true - someone who behaves the way described in the riddle would also perform really terribly in a group of people that don't behave the way described in the riddle, so I don't think it's super clear that it really is the only possible solution.
Yeah otherwise the game changes completely. Eliza will always vote nay because if she is the only one alive she gets it all. Daniel would have to vote yes on Charlotte proposal since otherwise he will die, meaning charlotte stands to earn 100 coins if she get to make the proposal hence she will vote nay until she makes the proposal. This means if Bart makes the proposal all he has to do is give Eliza 1 coin since she know Charlotte will make her earn 0 also he has to give Daniel 1 coin becouse he is blood thirsty. Meaning he stands to earn 98 coins. So when it comes to your proposal you have to give 1 coin to charlotte since she will earn 0 if Bart makes the proposal. You will also have to give Daniel or Eliza 2 coins since they stand to earn 1 coin by voting nay. So if you need a majority vote you miss out on 1 coin.
gulgaffel 1 left: E gets everything. There's nobody to stop her, and she votes yarr to win. 2 left: E votes nay even if D gives her everything. D is done for if this scenario occurs, and E still gets everything. 3 left: D, wanting to survive, votes yarr no matter what. That'll get C the majority for any plan, so C gets everything and D and E get nothing. 4 left: D and E don't want C to become captain, since then they get nothing. Each will vote yarr if they get one coin, and C will always vote nay in an attempt to get everything. B must give 1 coin to both D and E to get a 3/4 majority, in which case C gets nothing. 5 left: A encounters a bit of a problem: he needs two other votes, but there's only one pirate who gets nothing if B becomes captain. As a result, he has a choice! He gives B nothing and C 1 coin, but he must also give an extra 2 coins to either D or E to get a third yarr. The distributions here are: 97 0 1 0 2 (ACE vote yarr) 97 0 1 2 0 (ACD vote yarr) Fictional 6 left: Z is confused why he's before A, and suddenly weird things happen due to the choice. D and E may vote strangely or even based off each others' votes, and Z could try to be safe with [93] 0 1 0 3 3. (ZBDE vote yarr no matter what they think A will do).
Anonymous User Your solution is only correct if there is an extra rule stating that the pirate making the proposal of distribution *isn't* allowed to vote. This is not the case in this video. If there were 6 pirates abcdef, the distribution should be 98 0 1 0 1 0
At first I was confused by the answer too. Then I recalled that the one making the proposal votes as well. It's a very important detail. Otherwise.Elizabeth would have no incentive to say 'Yarr' at any time and Amaro would get away with all 100 gold.
"Each pirate is an expert in logical deduction"
*As pirates are*
Redskull As Pirates *ARRRRR*
Arcarus How did I not think of this 😂
xD
Exactly but I would rather have ........ Oh God dang It they took all the run!
I mean rum
*Pirates A to D fell off the plank*
Eliza: Plan E
Eliza: Nay
Eliza: *Walks off plank leaving the ship empty and no one gets the booty*
My plan
Eliza : ur first Amar
Amar : REVERSE UNO CARD
*Eliza goes first,E to B captains gone*
Amar : YAR!
I feel like tht would be Agatha Kristie's answer
Each pirates must plan to distribution, not execution. Isn't it?
Yohness idk what the fu*k u are talking about,but maybe yesssssss
@@ThomasTubeHD im not to sure if you should have cussed, besides some people are waching these withother yunger people and like looking at eveyones nice comments
Watches a riddle video
*makes no attempt at solving the riddle*
*watches answer anyways*
Ryan Lai that's what I do lol
Lol me too... ;-)
Adomas Dzidolikas derick inoc
*We're all in this together* 😂
Lol me too
Get Mind Blown! Literally.
More important question: Why did Pirates fight over buried treasure when the real treasure was in the friendships they made along the way?
That really sounds like something a 10 year old who watches one piece say.
@@servantofthemostmerciful7985 You are watching OP wrong man hahha If you are telling me about the mugiwaras, remember of Nami hahah
@@servantofthemostmerciful7985 l think it's supposed to be a joke
@@servantofthemostmerciful7985 but he isnt wrong
Pirates usually divided their treasure fairly amongst themselves after repairs to the ship and restocking supplies each pirate got 1 share except the captain who got 2, the quartermaster who got 1 and a half, and the carpenter and surgeon who each got 1 and a quarter. This is in general each crew had slightly different rules but the pattern exists
Me: why not split it equally?
Amaro: *THERE BE NO COMMUNISM ON THIS HERE SHIP*
Funny that actual pirates were pretty much ancoms from how they ran their ships.
The comment "me" is actually the video "Amaro," and the comment "Amaro" is actually the pirates. 1:25
I think it was because each pirate wants as much gold as possible.
Actually, that would work too, since Bart would be the only one to say nay since he would get 99 if he was captain
Daniel would say yes because it's definitely more than one, so would the other two since Bart would become captain by default if Amaro would die and they wouldn't get anything since it would become a tie
So technically, yes it would work
Murcia’
Amaro: hey guys what if we all get 20 coins.
Bart, Charlotte, Daniel, and Eliza: good idea, let's not do it.
No they would go for it
However amaro would be78 gold poorer
Best Hebron wait no it was a joke, also how would amaro be poorer than anyone else, if each pirate gets 20 out of the 100 coins, there would be no remainder, because 100 / 5 = 20.
@@cq.cumber_offishial not 78 poorer than anybody else but 78 poorer than he could have been
@@cq.cumber_offishial He would of gotten 98 coins but if he does that, he would only get 20, being poorer than what he would of been.
Are you sure that you understood the riddle :d
“But being pirates, none of them trust each other. So they can’t collaborate in advance.” That sound like a “you” problem.
Newsies4Lyfe what is a ,,you,, problem
@@jorunholm9060 In other words problem, related to personality of a person.
@Ethan Hinton Yes, since they were almost all democratic people who elect the captain, popularity and trust are needed.
Hi Abbie
@@edub9930 hey
"1 coin ensures their support..."
Ah, so now I see how these pirates got so bloodthirsty.
Yes they got blinded by coins
With blood stains i guess?
Yep
Yep
Thats what happens when you dont accept the communism route
SO TRUE!!! XD 😂
Ted ed: can you solve the pirate riddle?
Me: probably not but I'm going to watch it anyway
Haha that is 100% me
lol me too
Or maybe 99.999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999
Sophia Norris THAT IS SO ACCURATE
SubNex Gaming same!
Me, an unintellectual: everyone gets a fifth
1:24-1:34
That would ensure you'd live, since Charlotte and Eliza would both be getting more than if you walked the plank, but remember your secondary goal is to maximize the amount of gold you get to keep for yourself.
@@Ishtarru I'll just tax them later when I'm on the vessel.
Definitely not an intellectual as an intellectual would actually try to fully understand the situation first.
@@mrflip-flop3198 read his sentence again
1:30 Ok pirates are not the brightest people maybe I could easily trick th-
1:37 Of course they are.
ik right
John Jackson That was funny
John Jackson a
Ur humour is just like mine love u bro 😂👌 lmao
Luka Papež I
Alternative ending: While Amaro is thinking, Royal Navy Pirate Hunters find them
It's a bad day to be a pirate
Chalotte: hey captain, why do I hear "Rule Britannia"?
@@liamnade9099 The one and only true Boss Music
@@liamnade9099
Amaro: Not now Charlotte the canon noises are distracting enough ill have to think how i should distribute this gold
King George: HELLO THERE! *fires cannons*
@@orangelake2268 Bart: oh go-
Amaro: **gives one coin to Eliza and Charlotte**
The whole internet: *S I M P*
😂😂😂
Hahahahaha! Everyone that watches me thinks i'm a lucario simp
I mean they ain't wrong
@@Liliana_the_ghost_cat Ok?
Lol I'd didnt know that people say that amaro is a simp😆
Wajt...my name is amara
And amaro is similar to amara...
Is he somehow my twin in the olden times?😆well the internet says his a simp well I am a simp to so I guess were both twins??
Joke
You’re a little indian boy
1:38 "I'm good at logical deduction... Better put on me glasses."
Got to make sure others now I’m good at logical deduction!
@@cbgaming7209 but bad at eyesight!
The fact that they are all great mathematicians and know that each other are too actually helps them. If charlotte and Eliza only get one coin, if they were not great mathematicians, they would vote no because they would be disappointed with only receiving one coin. Funny how that works.
Yeah
That’s obvious
If they were not great mathematicians Amaro's offer would still work because Bart and Charlotte would still vote yes because they wouldn't risk getting killed (that's their primary objective)
@@chriswatson7965 exactly
Logicians*
Bonus :
Now let's say in case of a tie, the captain walks the plank and the next crewmate becomes captain, what would Amaro do?
If only Daniel and Eliza remain, Eliza votes Nay to Daniel's plan so she remains alone with 100 coins in pocket. Therefore Daniel wants to avoid being captain at all costs to survive. Charlotte knows that she will therefore have Daniel's support without even needing to offer him money, while Eliza will always vote Nay in hopes of being the last one alive, so Charlotte proposes to keep all the gold herself. To beat that offer, Bart needs to be slightly more generous to get two other votes than his own. Since Charlotte will vote Nay in any case so she can leave with all the gold, he needs to bribe Daniel and Eliza by making them a better offer than Charlotte's, offering one coin to each. Finally, Amaro also needs a total of 3 votes, by making a more interesting offer for 2 of his crewmates. The easiest to bribe is Charlotte, with one coin as she would get nothing if Bart comes to power, and then he needs to bribe either Daniel or Eliza with 2 coins, which is one coin more than Bart's offer, leaving him with 97 coins and high risks of mutiny.
Bonus bonus:
Let’s say we have the same scenario, except the captain isn’t allowed to vote.
If Daniel and Eliza are the only 2, then Daniel’s plan is garunteed to fail since Eliza holds the only vote.
Charolette has a similar problem. She needs both Daniel and Eliza to vote Yarr for her plan to be accepted, but Eliza will still vote Nay.
Bart actually has a chance. More than a chance really, since neither Charolette or Daniel want the vote to fail, so they both will vote Yarr without any prompting from Bart. This means Bart will be able to keep all the coins.
Now Amaro needs to secure 3 votes to live. He won’t be able to get Bart’s vote, so he needs the rest of the crew on his side. Since none of them get any coins if it moves to Bart, he just needs to offer 1 coin to Charolette, Daniel, and Eliza.
@@MatthewMorris6148 Nice, might as well do
Bonus bonus bonus :
The captain cannot vote, but in case of a tie he remains the captain.
If Daniel is captain, Eliza votes Nay to keep all the gold for herself and he dies. So if Charlotte is captain, she has Daniel's vote in any case, Eliza votes Nay but it's a tie so Charlotte gets to keep all the gold. Bart needs 2 votes, Charlotte will vote Nay to keep the whole booty to herself, so Bart offers 1 coin to Daniel and 1 coin to Eliza.
Amaro has to gather 2 votes, so he offers 1 coin to Charlotte and 2 coins to either Eliza or Daniel.
We can see that the offers are exactly the same as in the first Bonus (and it keeps on going the same if there are more than 5 crew members)
We could also try bonus variations of the 4 situations we've already studied but assuming that in case of a tie between the captain's offer and another's, a crewmate will vote Yarr instead of Nay for the captain
@@arkanys3401 Sure, why not? -I feel like these need labels though because “bonus bonus bonus bonus” is starting to get a bit ridiculous lol.-
Edit: I’ve changed my mind, we should just call them “Bonus*X” where X is the number of Bonus’s.
The original scenario but the pirates aren’t nearly as bloodthirsty.
If only Eliza and Daniel remain will result in Daniel getting all the gold and Eliza getting none.
If Charlotte is captain, she gets 99 gold and offers 1 gold to Eliza.
If Bart is captain, he just needs to offer 1 gold to either (not both) Daniel or Eliza.
Amaro just needs to offer 1 gold to 2 different pirates who aren’t Bart.
Why is no one talking about deez nuts?
@@MatthewMorris6148Bonus*5:
Original scenario but once a pirate other than the captain says "yarr" (first pirate in the order to say "yarr" after captain), all the subsequent pirates in that order must say "yarr".
If only D and E were there, D will keep all the coins and so if C, D and E were there, C would have to give a coin to E. Now if B, C, D and E were there, B would have to give 2 coins to E and could keep the rest 98 with him. If all of them were there, A would have to give 1 coin to D, 3 coins to E and could keep the rest 96 with him.
If you keep adding pirates, the solution is much the same: Keep the majority and give 1 coin to each pirate with the same parity as you.
Zachary: I need a better life.
What if there is 100 pirates? The captain would be guaranteed to be thrown overboard if everyone played rationally.
@@RGC_animation no, he would keep 51 gold and give 1 gold each to the 49 people an even numbered space away from him
@@Tzunoda 200 pirates
@@RGC_animation when the green eyed prisoners became pirates:
5 great logical mathematicians became pirates waiting to kill each other... ok.. yeah... it’s like the current world.
Disagree respectfully. In the current world all logical mathematicians are dead, killed by illogical uneducated people.
Adrift Guilty True
Adrift Guilty I bet there are a BUNCH of ridiculously smart mathematical ang logic units that aren’t dead like my dad
@@princeaghedo9494 Wow.
And, your dad isnt a pirate, right ?
Sorry for that.
it's like south america :D
Me to myself: can I solve this logic puzzle at 4am?
My brain: ULU
Arr still confuses me
lmao I just watched the ulu one too... the answer made about as much sense as the word ulu.
ulzo
What does ULU mean? They said that you don't know what OZO or ULU means
@@theltshow6781 i ulu know
This would make a great jackbox party pack game, not everyone would be perfect logicians and it’d be funny seeing what plans people make
TNH UR RIGHT OMGG
And of course you could have people willing to play off of spite.
You're giving me _one_ pearl? Out of 100? Sod you. Off the plank you go.
Can I solve the Riddle
-NO
But do I want to see the answer
_YES
My sentiment too T^T these riddles are so good!
AMEY :D hey me too lol
AMEY :D nay walk the plank scurvy DOG
same
Just give them all 20
you know what? If the pirates weren't so greedy, they could all have received 20 coins each
But 20 is less than 98. 🙂 Bad deal for A.
Noooo..
A will die...
Nilaksh Singh I agree
Death is a good alternative to communism
Hakim Bey and all pirate's researchers would agree with you, as I, yarr.
I always get so excited when I see that Ted-Ed makes a riddle video. Then I watch it and have no idea whatsoever on how to actually solve it xD
same
Studying game theory would help
Timothy Heys what is game theory? some sort of math analysis?
+Sniper
Game theory is analysis of "Games". Not all "games", however, are games in the regular sense, for example this, and the prisoner's dilemma. For more information:
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Game_theory
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nash_equilibrium
Sniper game theory is a youtuber
Amaro: Gives everyone 20 coins each.
Thrown overboard.
Amaro: Keeps 98 coins, gives 1 each to Charlotte and Eliza, and nothing to Bart and Daniel.
Plan works.
Amaro: I'm such a perfect logician.
Yeah I think this riddle is flawed.
Even with the 98/1/1 split the other two pirates would know this is the outcome that gets the two yes's so their nays are wasted.
@@RH-nk7eothe riddle already says that the pirates are selfish and bloodthirsty. Amaro wants to get as many coins as can be, so if he can get 98 then he'll go with it
well giving everyone 20 does NOT result in being thrown overboard
If he gives 20 coins each, everyone except for bart would say yarr
@@southfacetarivid5214 that's the thing. Amaro wouldn't do that because that wouldn't be maximizing his profits
"the pirate code is more like guidelines rather than actual rules"
YES
Captain Barbosa
Noice
"The code is the law"
We named the monkey Jack!
You could say he ACEd the game
This comment deserves more likes
I get it.
Huhh 😃😃
Its the worst joke ever. I gave you a like
thanks I hate it
2:33 amaro voted nay for himself?!?
Why would he propose that?
@@sarangtamirisa5090 its an exsample
Ricky Sun Amaro needs to use those coins for therapy
Maybe he said that when he saw the sharks coming
Don't trust anyone, not even yourself...
However, if the five of them would be working together again in the future, it now becomes in Amaro's interest to ensure the cooperation of all the crew members and avoid resentment, which makes the case for splitting equally or a less imbalanced distribution. Probably a variation on an infinite prisoner's dilemma.
Only reason they would make it anywhere to begin with is since they are all "perfectly logical", they would basically know what the others of the crew would think and have success as long as they dont try to go off-script and just cooperate
Prisoner’s dilemma’s always end with both parties choosing to Defect (unless you are able to have strategies that are “not perfectly rational.” Rational strategies do not always get the highest outcome, as this video proves, so only irrational strategies allow for maximization).
If the other 4 pirates all privately agreed to only accept 20 or more coins, for example, A doesn’t need all of their votes and only has to offer this to two of them. Then each person would benefit from defecting and accepting 19 instead of 20 coins, because if you’re the first to defect then you can ensure you get the coins instead of being passed over. They will then continue undercutting each other until they land at accepting 1 coin
Confirm that you have green eyes, then ask the gold to leave
Lmao good reference
LOL
can you explain to me
@@theunknown3645 It's in referemce to this other riddle: ruclips.net/video/98TQv5IAtY8/видео.html
Lol
1:03 WHY THE HECK DANIEL VOTED NAY TO HIS OWN PLAN 😂😂
OMG I just realized that. That doesnt help the confusion.
Kopsir lol i thought the same think😂😂
I.. I don't see it. EDIT: Oh you mean 1:07
it is actually there to confuse people... probably
Kopsir because Daniel doesn't give a fuck
Amaro : I keep 98 coins and give 1 each to Charlotte and Eliza!!
Bart & Daniel : *S I M P*
Yoot this is funny
Twitter be like after like 10 seconds:
Soooo true
yaaaas
Oddly enough, it barely changes if you flip so ties reject proposals. You'd think it would, since Eliza can now maximize her profits by forcing Daniel to walk the plank (even if his Plan is for E to get 100 while keeping nothing for himself, she'll make him walk anyway out of bloodthirst).
So Daniel is extra-motivated to NOT become the Captain. Therefore, Charlotte can actually keep all the coins for herself, and he'll still vote Yar to save himself.
Therefore, Bart needs bribe Charlotte and Daniel with only 1 coin apiece, giving Charlotte nothing.
Amaro then needs to give either Daniel or Eliza only 1 more coin -- 2 total -- while bribing Charlotte with only 1. He'd still get to keep 97 coins!
In your Plan C where Charlotte keeps all the gold Daniel would actually say no because he would get 0 either way. Doesn't change what the solution is but still felt like mentioning it
@@ronorchid793 voting no would ensure his death in the next round, failing his primary objective. Bloodlust doesn't work for him there.
@@connormcmahon7980 oh sorry then
@@connormcmahon7980 No, it would not ensure hai death. When only Daniel and Eliza remain, Daniel can propose that Eliza gets all 100. And unless Eliza has a bloodlust, she will let that pass.
Because there is nothing specified about bloodlust, Charlotte is better off giving atleast 1 coin to Daniel.
Which in turn means that Bart needs to give Daniel 2 coins and Eliza 1 coin to get the vote passed.
Which in turn means that Amaro should keep 97, give 1 to Charlotte and 2 to Eliza.
Giving 2 to Daniel no longer works. As even Bart would offer 2 to Daniel. And since we don’t know about bloodlust, to be safe Amarro would need to give 3 to Daniel.
So, it’s best for Amarro to give 1 to Charlotte and 2 to Eliza
@@connormcmahon7980 You are wrong. Each pirate KNOWS what is at stake for each other pirate. If Daniel gets 0 gold either way, it is stated that he'd rather see the captain walk the plank. It is CHARLOTTE who needs to think about survival first and foremost, and Daniel KNOWS that. Charlotte would not risk NOT giving him the entire treasure in exchange for her own life.
4:26 BUT THAT'S JUST A THEORY, AAAAA GAME THEORY. Thanks for watching
😮
A: "Okay, let's trade this evenly. 20 coins for each!"
B: "Y'know, if this fails I could get 99 coins."
A: "Okay, none for you, 25 for each!"
C, D, and E: "Yaaaay!"
B: "Aw, man..."
Amaro can get more than just 25 coins
He said there can't be bribery or trust or agreement. Here he made an agreement with the others. I still gave you a like though
A:Amaro
B:Bart
C:Charlotte
D:Daniel
E:Eliza
*so we back in the mine*
@@rosehydra5872 *got our pickaxe swinging from*
"Being bloody pirates"
Me: a violent intellectual: Eliza, when Daniel force Charlotte to walk the plank, just stab Daniel in the back and take the hat and push him over
Genius
What if there are 10000 pirates?
Amaro: Guess I’ll die.
“Those got to be the best pirates I’ve ever seen”
“ *So it would seem* “
I knew this comment would be here somewhere!
I think, realistically, they'd skip this process all together and fight for the gold.
Nah, historically, pirate crews traditionally had an agreement of splitting loot evenly, with the Captain getting a share and a half, and the other important command staff (quartermaster, carpenter, boatswain, gunner, etc) getting a share and a quarter. Mostly because, historically, pirate crews were close-knit groups with similar outlooks, rather then a forced assembly of sociopaths.
If they did that, they would die, or the crew would split up, resulting in the only crews to remain be the ones that didnt fight about it and did it fairly. Or very short lasting crews constantly.
+RomLoneWolf23 also pirates never used a plank. that was a myth.
Ragnarok Sora Tell that to William Smith, Captain of the British sloop Blessing.
The instances are rare, and some aren't even proven, but walking the plank has been documented, which is the whole reason it was there for Charles Ellms and Robert Louis Stevenson to make popular enough for Errol Flynn and Johnny Depp.
But .... The Pirates Code ! Nay Forget !
2:32
Why would you reject your own plan?
Matthew Smith don’t trust anyone... not even yourself
U R A PIARATE
@@ainynaeem579 im not going to trust you then
Ainy Naeem that’s a paradox
Things like this is why pirates established how much they'd get as a contract before the crew is even formed. The typical arrangement is crew get one share, quartermaster gets one and a half shares, and captain gets two shares.
"Eliza says nar" now the ship is just floating there
Ship has been waiting for this moment
No the ship gets the gold
Can I solve it
may be
but I won't try and Watch solution
Charan Katakam Soo relatable
When you get back from school mentally damaged but you still attempt this riddle and have a seizure.
Charan Katakam I kinda solved it, I figured that if I gave 2 pirates 20 coins and the 3rd and the last gets none while I get 60. This way I get at least a lot of gold while ensuring some pirates are still happy and don't try to murder or steal my gold afterwards.
That would work only because Charlotte would say yes to the plan, but that means that Amaro would get less gold. Bart wouldn't vote yes because as long as the turn passes down to him, he can get the most amount of gold. So while yours make sense, it's not the best option.
Bart wouldn't vote yes unless Plan A gives Bart all the gold, but Charlotte, Daniel, and Elizabeth would say no.
I rewatch these riddles a lot, I know all the answers yet it is still fun
Same bro
Same here
Same
But sometimes I forget them
Same
@CB gaming what is the ans
Finally, the first riddle I solved.
Taking that class in Game Theory finally became useful in real life :D
A “real life” device with a “real life” video containing a “real life” riddle
yess i learned it in ap micro
Not yet!
my boy ted-ed i live for these riddles
Benjamin Sam you don't have to Imagine. You can clearly see it on a comment
Luka Papež Damn destroyed
“Each pirate is an expert in logic deduction.”
*Can’t distribute gold evenly*
Why would they want to? When you have all of the power, you want to keep as much of it as you can. They're pirates.
Plus there is the assumption where..(I feel lazy to describe it) just watch the video again..
@@pikminman13 it's a bit contradictory in nature. Being greedy and deceitful don't really align with logic.
@@amanilee7708 Being logical merely means they can make perfect decisions towards whatever their goal is. They can each make a perfect decision that puts them in the best spot possible, whether or not they care about others isn't testing for logicality. They don't think impulsively, but rather think out the entire scenario for what best suits them.
It is not that they cannot, it is that they do not want to. Can I call you illogical if you would take 98 gold coins over 1 gold coin?
1:07 this is the point which makes everyone giving wrong answer.
yeah that made me assume that the voter has priority over the plan maker
@@sharkas9965 to be fair, the only outcome where Eliza is the only one left is if Daniel's plan results in getting 2 Nays (meaning he himself would also vote Nay). So the outcome isn't impossible, just improbable. Remember, having a majority vote or a tie will result in the plan be carried. It doesn't matter who is given priority.
EXACTLY!
It was a *huge* mistake for the animator showing Daniel walking the plank! The way the problem was outlined, this would be an impossible outcome!
They go out of their way to make sure its totally clear that the pirates are perfectly logical and acting only out of self interest with the primary goal being to stay alive.
That makes it totally impossible for a pirate to vote to plank themselves!
This erroneous animation at 1:07 was a huge mistake!
I think it was also a mistake (although less severe) at the very end of the video, when they suggested that the remaining pirates should spend some time revising their silly code.
If that were an option, the entire puzzle wouldn't work!
@@xxxxSylphxxxx It is not an impossible outcome, just an improbable one. My comment above explains my reasoning^^
Daniel, a perfectly logical pirate: *proposes a plan just to vote against it and walk the plank, making Eliza the captain*
Perfectly calculated.
"Pirate's life is NOT for me"
All a part of the plan
Beeg Brain.
3:46 I thought it was plan B
Good eyesight m8
HOW DID I NOT NOTICE THAT
@ZK612 wow good catch
Yeah. A green coloured B instead of a pink coloured C
WE GOT DECEIVED
"Each pirate is excellent at logical deduction" of course they are... Cause who isn't right?
Makes more sense if they were all computers.
Robot pirates
Zombie ninja robot pirates, amirite?
Amaro: how about we divide the coins into equal piles?
Pirates: ozo.
We didn't deduce what ozo or ulu meant so ulu
So, does Ozo mean Yar?
Ulu.
Ok, who let Arr on the ship?
Ulu
I think OZO is yes and ULU is no
@@eat-your-glory prove it
I think splitting the gold evenly works even with all the common knowledge stuff. Here's how I found this out:
Suppose Amaro splits all the gold evenly. Everyone knows that if he's outvoted, the decision will pass to Bart. If Bart still goes logically and uses his 99-0-1-0 plan, Charlotte, Daniel and Eliza will all have less than 20 coins - what they would have gotten if they had agreed to Amaro's 20-20-20-20-20 plan. Since this ensures Amaro's support, he can give Bart 20 coins and not have to worry about him voting "Nay" because of him getting less than 99 coins (what Bart would have gotten if Amaro went overboard). Therefore, the end result of the election with the 20-20-20-20-20 plan would be
Yarr-Nay-Yarr-Yarr-Yarr. Amaro would win the election, stay alive and the distribution would be fair. The fairness is one huge advantage of the 20-20-20-20-20 plan over the 98-0-1-0-1 plan.
It would work but the second objective is to maximize the gold. Aside from being alive, you have to remember these pirates are greedy. Put yourself in Amaro's shoes, why would you give them 20 each when you can be sure that you'll stay alive by giving only one coin to Charlotte and Eliza? Also the rule says each pirate will ALWAYS vote to make the others walk the plank, all other results being equal.
Fairness doesn't matter out on the open seas
No honor among thieves mate, and they were going to make Amaro walk the plank anyway if they all were to receive an equal share
@@Tururu134 they wouldn't make Amaro walk the plank in that case because they know Bart would never give them 20 coins
The equitable plan won't work.
Everyone wants the treasure all to himself, no one but Daniel benefits from being captain. If Charlotte becomes captain, Eliza gets all the gold because Charlotte would die without her support, there is no reason for Eliza to let her keep 99 pieces when she can have it all in exchange for Charlotte's life, even if accepting 1 piece benefits her more than letting Charlotte die. Charlotte cannot afford to offer her only 1 piece unless Eliza cannot help but accept it, in which case she is NOT a good mathematician. Since Eliza thus profits from Bart's death, he needs to get support from either Daniel or Charlotte both of whom know his plight. Would either be willing to settle for less than the entire treasure when they don't have to? Charlotte may be willing to accept the smallest amount but not if Bart keeps a majority: even knowing that she will have to give the entire treasure to Eliza should Bart die, she might spite him for being unfair and regarding her vote as worth so little, and she knows that he cannot risk offending whomever he needs support from at peril of his life. He might escape death by offering Charlotte 50/50 but it is still a risk. Is it worth it? Let's assume it is and that Daniel would respond similarly.
Not knowing if Bart will bribe Daniel or Charlotte, each hopes to profit (separately, only one will benefit) from Amaro's death to the tune of at least 50% of the treasure, and Bart would similarly rather watch Amaro die and then himself offer 50% to Charlotte or Daniel and hope to survive. But Amaro needs support from 2 pirates to prevent his own death. He will have to offer at least 51% (rounding up) to one of the three just mentioned and Bart is the best candidate to accept such a deal. Eliza gets nothing unless Bart dies, but offering her only 1% risks Amaro losing his life while she only loses 1% and gets one step closer to 100%. Amaro MUST offer Eliza enough of the remaining 49% to please her. However, since his life is on the line and not hers, why would she settle for less than the entire remaining 49%. Because she gets nothing from his death? That's HIS problem! He cannot offer her more than 49% and live, but any less risks losing her vote.
If Amaro offered everyone 20%, only Eliza might support him since the other 3 are all expecting at least 50% even though not all 3 can get it.
I love when y'all make riddle videos 👌
Ted-ed:can u solve this ridd-
me: daniel's pants are tooo big
Pirates who are good at logic? Okay, I've seen everything.
What about an honest politician?
never seen one of those
And i,ve seen that thus is a paw patrol refrence
Outcome in Reality
Amaro: “The risk I took was calculated but I sure am bad at math”
**proceeds to jump from the plank**
Spoiler: the horses name was Friday
oh come on u spoiled infinity war for me
Broski Nation Spoiler: You died.
Broski Nation funny cause it’s in alphabetical order
Wrong riddle
me to
basically the first man has to impress the girls for his gold and ....
Obama Meme London Your user picture is broken.
i really thought there was a fly on my screen
Anyone notice charlotte's...... You know what......
... The booty
I was gonna give them like, around 80 for me, 0,10,0,10
All I learnt was to name my kid from A 😂
Anirudh Same.
i realise now that naming a kid from A is the way to go lol
naming my kid aaaaaaaaJosh
Aaron.
There could be a modification of the game when only remaining pirates vote (except one who proposed the distribution). Then the fourth pirate cannot allow the third one to be killed (because the last one will kill him and take 100%). So the third one may propose distribution 0-0-100-0-0. So the second may propose 0-98-0-1-1 to ensure a positive vote. And the first one may propose either 97-0-1-2-0 or 97-0-1-0-2 to ensure an even vote.
Looking at the comments, absolutely no one notices the flip off at the end. By the way, great video as always
Abhinav that wasn't flipoff,it was him waving his hands side to side
"It's a good day to be a pirate"
*Hell to the no*
Hey u the the lonely pewdiepie subscriber? i see your profile pic in many youtube videos and your comment. are the one?
+crancket BAT yeahhh boiiii
Is that a glee reference?
Larry Bogs I'm pretty sure it is even if it is accidental
but why at 1:07 would Elisa throw Daniel down? she would say No and Daniel Yes, is a tie.
Indeed in the final explanation, it says that it's bad for Elisa to be left alone with Daniel.
Clearly, the riddle description tried to avoid/lie about this, in order for the person not to think of the scenario that they are 2 left, and just says "it would go on like that until Elisa is left" which is not true and will never happen
Daniel Fazio If there is a tie, the proposal would be accepted, as said in the video.
"But being pirates, none of them trust each other"
Trust your nakama
Dame desu
@@its_Khaid_ahmed daga kotowaru
If there's anyone who solved it on their own, they deserve a Nobel prize.
nope you get a participation trophy, ted-ed is absolutely right. And I solved it on my own, just like many others who watch these videos.
Aww, really? >//////
I solved it.
I did
I solved it
I assume there's no way to subdivide a gold piece.
Starting from the end:
If it comes down to Daniel, his proposal will always pass because he will vote for it so it will be at least a tie. So he will propose that he gets everything:
D:100 E:0
If it comes to Charlotte, she needs 1 vote besides her own, and Eliza is cheapest, so she will propose:
C:99 D:0 E:1
Bart needs 1 vote besides his own, and Daniel is cheapest to bribe, so he will propose:
B:99 C:0 D:1 E:0
Amaro needs two votes besides his own, so he will propose:
A:98 B:0 C:1 D:0 E:1
expecting to win 3:2. (He will be disappointed, because real pirates will never adhere to this insane deal)
Interestingly, if there are more than 200 pirates, it doesn't matter what the captain proposes; he always dies.
Tehom remeber they wont vote to kill themself
I think you are referring the last sentence. If so, thank you. You elliptically bring up a subtle point where I was wrong.
(Edited: My counts were off by 1)
A captain of 202 pirates can offer every other person 1 gold piece, not including himself, and live. So unless bribed, he will vote for the captain of 203 pirates to die.
There is no way for the captain of 203 to live if it passes to him. He needs to bribe 101 pirates with 100 coins. So he will vote for the captain of 204 to live even if he isn't bribed.
The captain of 204 can live. He still needs 102 pirate votes, but he has his own and he can get 203's vote without a bribe. So he will vote for captain 205 to die unless he is bribed.
The captain of 205 is again in an impossible situation - he needs to buy 102 votes with 100 coins. He needs 103 votes counting his own. So captain 205 die if it passes to him, so he will vote for 206 to live, but captain 203 will not. 203 can just wait until it passes to captain 204.
So the captain of 206 is still doomed. He gets the one free vote from captain 205; that plus his own plus 100 bribes gives him 102 votes, which is a minority. So he and 205 will vote for captain 207's proposal.
A similar fate awaits the captain of 207, who needs 104 votes.
Then the captain of 208 can live: He has 4 free votes (himself, 207, 206, and 205) which with the 100 gives him 104. So none of them has any reason to vote for captain 209.
It seems like it has to alternate at longer intervals after this. Every time we find a captain who can live, the pool of free votes is reset; every time we don't, it accumulates.
Tehom, you're right: specifically, the pattern continues based on powers of two. Since the pirates from #201 upwards will never get any coins, they will only vote for the last scenario where they won't die. So after #204, the next pirate to survive is the one who can gather 4 votes to counter the 4 votes from #201-204 which they will never get. This is #208, who gets votes from #205, #206, #207 and #208 (their own vote), and offers the evens #2-200 a coin each and gets their votes, since otherwise it would fall down to #204 who gives a coin each to the odds #1-199.
But now #201-208 won't vote for any proposal, as the best they can be offered is no coins and survival, which they get under #208. So the pirate after that who can survive needs to gather 8 votes to counter the 8 from #201-208, which is #216. This shows how it plays out (odds = odd pirates #1-199, evens = even pirates #2-200).
The next few cases:
#201: #201 + odds
#202: #202 + evens
#204: #203-204 + odds
#208: #205-208 + evens
#216: #209-216 + odds
#232: #217-232 + evens
You could write a general formula, but I hope it's obvious from this.
What I learned from this video is that if every human is an expert logician, everyone would agree that trust and loyalty are logically the only way to get the most out of of bloodthirsty democracy. Even that first pirate would choose to share the booty equally, because if he chose to be disloyal and keep even one more coin than is “fair,” the other four would vote him out because they can trust each other to be “fair.”
It doesnt really apply to the real world and only works because the pirates value gold over being bloodthirsty, for example in the real world instead of allowing a 1 gold option you might take the 0 gold instead and vote the stingy captain out because the payoff of being bloodthirsty and showing you disapprove of stingyness would outweight the value of that 1 gold. Never underestimate the power of being petty.
A “bloodthirsty democracy” is two wolves and a sheep voting on what to have for dinner. Tyranny of the majority.
you're right
the video literally states they won't collaborate because they don't trust each other.
The animation shows a break of the rules of the game. At 0:40 the rules state that at a tie, the coins are divided to plan, but at animation 1:07 it shows Elisa making Daniel walk the plank. There is no voting mechanism where Daniel would have to walk the plank when they are the only 2 left, since there cannot be majority to make him walk the plank (assuming he won’t vote for himself to walk the plank, which would be a break of rule 1).
I noticed that too. Daniel's plan would either get 2 Yay's or a tie. He would only walk the plank if he was suicidal and nay'd his own plan.
i was literally trying to find a comment which mentioned this. I swear i was so confused as well.
That's because if they just told you outright that Eliza can never vote off Daniel they'd be giving you a hint. The idea is that you start off with as little information as is necessary to deduce the outcome, which makes the whole thing more of a puzzle.
“It’s a wonderful day to be a pirate.”
Apart from the fact you have to solve a riddle to survive
one problem with the video, the scene where we see E asking D to jump off makes no sense, as D would never vote his own death and a 50/50 vote sees him win.
Anyway, have not seen the answer and I say 96 to A 1 to D 3 to E as E is forced to accept (with what I just said, she can't expect to choose how much she gains because when D and E will remain, D will keep everything, so 3 coins is better than 0) and D is forced to accept (C will propose 1 to E and keep 99 and have a majority of votes). This last parenthesis explains that E wouldn't accept one coin from A, as C will propose it to her and wouldn't accept 2, as B would propose it. In conclusion, 96 coins is the best I can come up with.
Well, I was close I guess
I reached to same answer! TED-Ed is wrong. Eliza will not accept 1 coin at first round, she will vote NAY for this and wait to Bart offer 98/2 and than vote YARR. Two coins is better than one.
Amaro NEEDS to offer 3 to have certainty of he will stay alive (1st rule).
Imadthebest23 I was wrong. TED's answer is right.
I'm
Well, A needs to offer E two coins, since C will offer her 1 anyway so she would turn down A's offer of 1 out of spite apparently, so TED's offer IS wrong.
Or am I missing something?
All i could come up with was 'if two of you vote yarr I'll give you more coins than the other two'
Amaro seems to be forgetting that the "game" is ongoing, extending beyond the distribution of gold. There's definitely mutiny afoot.
So that means Amaro could get beheaded by the rest of the stubborn scallywags, in his sleep.
No one is going to point out that they used stock image for the coins...
Part of the style dude.
Who care?
same
Your name backwards is Fried Potato
UnknownRager - Gaming, Challenges, and more! And yours backwards is !erom dna ,segnellahC ,gnimaG - regaRnwonknU
Just announcing how proud of myself I am for really giving this a good 20min thought and actually getting it absolutely right
I didn't solve it but it was a really interesting riddle!
Axel Solhall i dont know how but i got it right
So to generalize it(c = coins, n = # of people), person 1 gives themselves c - floor((n-1)/2) coins, and give every person an even number of turns away from person 1 a single coin. So person 3 gets one coin, person 5 gets one coin, and so on
So, if Bart becomes captain, Charolette and Eliza get nothing, Bart gets 99 coins, and Daniel gets one. But if Amaro stays captain, he gets 98 coins, Bart and Daniel get nothing, and Charolette and Eliza get each get one coin, which is why they say 'Yarr'. Am I right?
Willow The Assassin Pretty much, YARR!
Willow The Assassin no
jk you are right
That's really helpful, Carlos. Thanks for showing up.
Thanks for chiming in, Julien. You're truly a paragon of your gender.
Ted-ED: *says the words ‘Game Theory’*
Me: HELLO INTERNET! AND WELCOME, TO GAME THEORY!!
Get that nonsense out of here.
@@Max1996YT no. Keep it here.
Jada Ta yes, keep it here forever
I was looking for this. I’m so glad I found it.
Looks like your code would get Amaro killed in his sleep by angry crew. This is not how you pirate.
Min 1:15 shows that E can vote out D, thus I solved it corrupting C & D.
Amaro: I want 98 coins.
Other pirates: WALK THE PLANK!
😂😂
C and E would not like that to happen cause B will be the next captain and if it is, they'll end up getting nothing so they accept the 1 coin offer
@insomiablaze 1 Yeah. So what?
@insomiablaze 1 Well, girl. Eliza would make it, just with 0 coins.
haha
And here I was thinking I was clever splitting the money with 3/5 and screwing over the other 2 😕
You can have either 33 coins and two allies or 98 coins and 4 people who will plot your death.
@@hgfjhfgify True dat. Always think about the bigger picture.
@@hgfjhfgify "but... but... pirate code..." are the last words you'll hear from the shark's mouth. Both literally and metaphorically.
That's not as bad as what I was thinking. My genius self was thinking of split it equally 5 ways, just because I was too lazy to come with any other solution🤦🏾♀️
Yeah, I thought this too. In my head it just doesn't make sense to risk your own life by offering the other two just 1 coin. The riddle just doesn't really fit real life, because in this one everyone makes 'rational decisions'. In real life, if even one person isn't 100% rational it wouldn't work.
"Can you solve this riddle?"
Me: Well Ozo but actually Ulu.
Lol this meme is has been Ted-Ed-ized.
Yeet this meme is everywhere in Ted's videos😆
4:25 GAME THEORY MENTIONED!!!
But hey
@miscellaneousedits-dm8nd thats just a theory
A GAME THEORY@@JayAitchOhEn
@@marithedurian Thanks for playing.
Im about to ruin that joke that I know for a fact you already know but game theory Is a old form theory which helped people who worked with phycology
The 7th rule is interesting because it also implies that each pirate knows that each of the other pirates know that that pirate knows that all the other pirates (can be continued forever) are perfect logicians.
Yeah the whole gold splitting situation wouldn't even be a concern for the pirates because they all know that Amaro is going to suggest a perfect solution from the beginning anyway. Because they're all master logicians who know that they're all master logicians. As soon as they find gold every time they will just immediately assume it's gonna be a 98 0 1 0 1 split lmao. Which suggests to me that Bart and Dennis became pirates just for the fun of it. Because they're men? This puzzle is so sexist! =P
So like, i always come back to these riddles once in a while. and i skipped ahead a bit and it said
“And his-“
**skip**
“Booty”
and i died
and yo booty, too
doc of derp Go back to grammar class, two Os in too, it’s not to. Used three homophones in one sentence.
@@izzy-artmusicvlogs1234 sry, i get em mixed up
Hmmph! No wonder I’m the smartest one in my school! A fifth grader can’t even spell “safety”! They spell it “safetPA”!! How?! 😯
Plot twist : Captain Jack sparrow swings by ,takes the chest ,makes a joke and leaves quietly yet loudly
If Amaro is *Meme Man* :
Amaro: ill give Charlotte and Eliza 50 coins each.
Charlotte and Eliza: YARR!!
After 47 seconds:
*Amaro steals and has now 100 coins*
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, *STONKS* ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
If there r perfectly logical then they would change the system
Thales pro999 true
I mean maybe amaro chooses whether or not to change the plan and he obviously wouldn’t tho I guess the other four pirate could throw him off but if they are perfectly logical then they know that it would end up with Daniel as captain (he can probably overpower Eliza) so Daniel wants to overthrow amaro, but no one else does cause they’ll go off the edge and those three can overpower Daniel and since Daniel knows this he doesn’t try to overthrow amaro
@@thalespro9995 Nah. When it comes to Charlotte, Elizia will take Charlotte's side. So your deduction is wrong.
Ismail Faalih yeah true
They are logical but they are greedy and bloodthirsty
Turns out the coins were all chocolate😂
*All the more reasons to fight for them*
Did you say....... CHOCOLATE!?
Rachel Sours Yes sir, with or without nuts!
@@HanSanwich with plz
@@HanSanwich CHOCOLATE
If A proposed this IRL, he would be eaten by sharks for sure.
That's because IRL, people aren't perfect logicians.
@@wariolandgoldpiramid uh no why would ppl get only 1 out if 100 while you did work also. That's my take on it.
@@koolstory3867 1 is better than 0 or death. You just proved his point.
@@thefirsttime7759 i meant they would want more ??????? they would want least 10% smarty pant, but ur still right even if u mis understood what i meant
@@koolstory3867 In these cases, getting 1 coin is the best scenario.
So, they hate it, but must accept.
Because the next captain would not give anything.
I solved this a little wrong because I thought plans would fail on a tie, not succeed. I came to a pretty similar solution, though.
E would obviously vote against any plan by D to be the sole survivor and get all the money, and thus will vote nay to all of the plans. Knowing this, D will agree to any plan C makes to avoid dying, so C's plan would be to take all the money for herself, getting 2 yars from herself and D and a nay from E. B is similar to D, because while D will agree to anything to avoid dying, C and E will vote nay to everything and cause another tie, killing B. Therefore, B will agree to anything A proposed or else they'd be outvoted every time. Finally, A would have a guaranteed yar from B and D, and a guaranteed nay from C and E. All he has to do to avoid a tie is vote yar on his own plan. Thus, A keeps all the money since the rest of the crew are perfectly divided by greed or fear of death from the others.
This is strangely still a very interesting puzzle with my misinterpretation lol
I mean I will disagree on A giving everything to himself. Using the tie = loss yes C can give everything to herself and guarantee win as D dies if he becomes captain. However when it comes to B, he can simply give both D and E 1 coin each which guarantees their support. This means A will have to give one coin to C and 2 coins to either D or E.
2:34 amaro just killed himself
so true
Me:
1. Push everyone off the boat
Me:
1. Say you have green eyes
2. Ask the captain to leave
4/5 people said Nay.
Sorry, time to walk the plank.
What if Amaro is the only pirate that thinks logically and everyone else doesn’t accept just because he gets to most of the gold.
By pleasing Charlotte and Eliza only, Amaro can get 98 gold and give 1 each to Charlotte and Eliza, Charlotte and Eliza knows if Bart becomes captain, they will get nothing, so voting for Amaro's plan is the best choice for them, even if it's 1 coin, the alternative is worse for them. If Amaro gave everyone 20 equal gold, then -
Amaro - Yarr
Bart - Nay
Charlotte - Yarr
Daniel - Yarr
Eliza - Yarr
Because Charlotte and Eliza would never want Bart to be Captain and Daniel will only get 1 gold if Bart is captain, so Daniel also votes Yarr and Bart votes Nay, because if Amaro's plan is rejected, he is next captain and can get 99 gold instead of now 20, but he also knows everyone else will vote yarr, so probably will say Yarr as well. That's loss for Amaro, that's why pleasing Charlotte and Eliza is the best choice for Amaro and voting Yarr for Amaro's plan is the best choice for Charlotte and Eliza in that case. Amaro will never be rejected in this way, because 3 vote Yarr, so what do you mean?
Lol we played this in my game theory class as an example of why game theory isn’t necessarily accurate to real life. You can bet your britches we killed the captain who suggested this plan.
To be fair, it's said that all the pirates know the others think logically, like them. So Amaro would probably know that the others don't think logically.
@@aurorawizard7045 I mean.. it does kind of bring into question whether or not the way they're behaving is truly logical though - after all, if people who are supposedly behaving irrationally forces all of the others to pay them more because of their irrationality.. then they're ultimately doing a better job at maximizing their profits than someone who was behaving supposedly purely logically.. and if they're ultimately getting paid more because of it (especially when the difference in the amount gained vs. the amount potentially lost is so large - I mean, they only need to get 20 gold coins >1/20 of the time to make up for losing 1 gold coin 100% of the time).. then is it really irrational anymore?
It's certainly true that someone that behaves that way would be worse off in a group of people behaving as described in the riddle.. however, the reverse is also true - someone who behaves the way described in the riddle would also perform really terribly in a group of people that don't behave the way described in the riddle, so I don't think it's super clear that it really is the only possible solution.
First: confirm u have green eyes
Second: Steal the captains hat and throw them all over board
4:35 I heard the narrator smack his lips
That sound was _quiet._
Irving IV more like that sound wasn't even there in the first place
@@cq.cumber_offishial
It's there, turn your volume way up.
It sounds kind of like walking on stone in minecraft.
@@cq.cumber_offishial turn your volume up and you will hear it or put ur ear on the speaker
No that was me.
finally another riddle!! please do more riddles :)
just realized that by the rule of "if the majority OR tied vote, then goes acording to plan" then the thing can only reach down to 2 pirates and tie
Yeah otherwise the game changes completely. Eliza will always vote nay because if she is the only one alive she gets it all. Daniel would have to vote yes on Charlotte proposal since otherwise he will die, meaning charlotte stands to earn 100 coins if she get to make the proposal hence she will vote nay until she makes the proposal. This means if Bart makes the proposal all he has to do is give Eliza 1 coin since she know Charlotte will make her earn 0 also he has to give Daniel 1 coin becouse he is blood thirsty. Meaning he stands to earn 98 coins. So when it comes to your proposal you have to give 1 coin to charlotte since she will earn 0 if Bart makes the proposal. You will also have to give Daniel or Eliza 2 coins since they stand to earn 1 coin by voting nay.
So if you need a majority vote you miss out on 1 coin.
gulgaffel
1 left: E gets everything. There's nobody to stop her, and she votes yarr to win.
2 left: E votes nay even if D gives her everything. D is done for if this scenario occurs, and E still gets everything.
3 left: D, wanting to survive, votes yarr no matter what. That'll get C the majority for any plan, so C gets everything and D and E get nothing.
4 left: D and E don't want C to become captain, since then they get nothing. Each will vote yarr if they get one coin, and C will always vote nay in an attempt to get everything. B must give 1 coin to both D and E to get a 3/4 majority, in which case C gets nothing.
5 left: A encounters a bit of a problem: he needs two other votes, but there's only one pirate who gets nothing if B becomes captain. As a result, he has a choice! He gives B nothing and C 1 coin, but he must also give an extra 2 coins to either D or E to get a third yarr. The distributions here are:
97 0 1 0 2 (ACE vote yarr)
97 0 1 2 0 (ACD vote yarr)
Fictional 6 left: Z is confused why he's before A, and suddenly weird things happen due to the choice. D and E may vote strangely or even based off each others' votes, and Z could try to be safe with [93] 0 1 0 3 3. (ZBDE vote yarr no matter what they think A will do).
Anonymous User
Your solution is only correct if there is an extra rule stating that the pirate making the proposal of distribution *isn't* allowed to vote.
This is not the case in this video.
If there were 6 pirates abcdef, the distribution should be 98 0 1 0 1 0
I think more information was needed before solving this one; you made it seem like Eliza's one vote was enough for her to just throw Daniel overboard.
At first I was confused by the answer too. Then I recalled that the one making the proposal votes as well. It's a very important detail. Otherwise.Elizabeth would have no incentive to say 'Yarr' at any time and Amaro would get away with all 100 gold.