As an Omnist, I think Panentheism is the ideal theological/metaphysical map for future humanity. Traditional theism effectively divides everything into two, which is a fundamentally dualistic conception of everything... there IS duality and separation in the universe, but positing God as 'external' to to the universe has many flaws. Pantheism makes more sense; but in my estimation, it makes the mistake of presuming that the universe we experience with our sense-perception is 'the whole thing'. I think this would effectively inhibit our ever-expanding understanding of phenomenality; and all evidence points to the idea that there is far more to the universe than we can normatively perceive.
“Pantheism makes the mistake that the universe we experience with our sense perception is the whole thing” Pantheism says cosmos/nature is the whole thing and adds the extra theo/divinity element to it. It says nothing whether it stretches or not beyond what you perceive with your sense perception. Consider the multiverse view. Nature stretches beyond our local universe, but it is still a naturalistic view. Add the theo/divinity element to it and you have pantheism. The way you put it, panentheism is just pantheism. There is no real difference.
@@anteodedi8937 Metaphysically, there is a difference; and if humanity were to adopt one metaphysics over the other -- then I'd wager there would be significant consequences. "It says nothing whether it stretches or not beyond what you perceive with your sense perception." > Correct, it doesn't say it -- it implies it. The take you seem to have appears as one interpretation of pantheism, which is again backing where my criticism lay: the fact that pantheism leaves much implicit (and thus, prone to two or more interpretations). The "universe" we know is not 'the multiverse'; this is a conjecture currently. The "universe" mankind thinks of is the universe which our sense-perception and higher-order sciences/models convey to us. It is rooted and constrained by our senses. Our model of the universe is not 'what could be beyond' -- it's 'what we know to be'. The multiverse view conveys the idea that there may be something 'transcendent' of our current model of the universe (i.e beyond the domain of our normative sense-perception). My problem with a pantheistic metaphysic is this: It runs the risk of mistaking the 'map' for the 'territory itself'. Don't mistake the map for the territory. There must be an explicit notion of transcendence, or else mankind runs the risk of boxing himself in, and then generating mass confusion/shock down the road.
@@Archeidos-Arcana I agree there is a difference, but that leads to two models that fall under pantheism. The disagreement between those models is trivial. Naturalistically speaking: Model 1: Cosmos is the whole thing, but it doesn't stretch beyond what we experience through our senses. Model 2: Cosmos is the whole thing, but it stretches beyond what we experience through our senses, aka multiverse view. If you add the theo/divinity element, then you have two different pantheistic models. I understand transcendence as something that lies beyond cosmos or distinct from cosmos, not something that lies merely beyond what we can experience through our senses, but not beyond cosmos. At least that's what theists have argued for years. I don't see panentheism as an alternative, as fundamentally is either theism or pantheism if you stick to god.
It's a long road to change worldviews. Multiple converging lines reasoning and evidence all point to consciousness as The ontological primitive of reality.
Science is empirical, yes. And as idealists this might make it sound like we, then,, ARE able to have a science that tells us about the nature of reality. But I think we are still left with the behaviors that we then interpret and make arguments about the nature. This is why even in a future where there are ONLY idealists, there will still be massive debates about how to interpret the meaning of nature's behavior.
Seems like maybe the way idealism would most inform science would be how it can provide a rantional for different introspective methodologies and why they can be shedding light on objective reality. If physicalism denies that fundamental patterns can be found via careful observation of highly developed consciousness, well, that's one more strike against it.
Idealism: Metaphysical Idealism is the view that the objective, phenomenal world is the product of an IDEATION of the mind, whether that be the individual, discrete mind of a personal subject, or otherwise that of a Universal Conscious Mind (often case, a Supreme Deity), or perhaps more plausibly, in the latter form of Idealism, Impersonal Universal Consciousness Itself (“Nirguna Brahman”, in Sanskrit).
The former variety of Idealism (that the external world is merely the product of an individual mind) seems to be a form of solipsism. The latter kind of Idealism is far more plausible, yet it reduces the objective world to nothing but a figment in the “Mind of God”. Thus, BOTH these forms of Idealism can be used to justify all kinds of immoral behaviour, on the premise that life is just a sort of dream in the mind of an individual human, or else in the consciousness of the Universal Mind, and therefore, any action that is deemed by society to be immoral takes place purely in the imagination (and of course, those who favour this philosophy rarely speak of how non-human animals fit into this metaphysical world-view, at least under the former kind of Idealism, subjective Idealism). Idealism (especially Monistic Idealism), is invariably the metaphysical position proffered by neo-advaita teachers outside of India (Bhārata), almost definitely due to the promulgation of the teachings in the West of Indian (so-called) “gurus” such as Mister Venkataraman Iyer (normally referred to by his assumed name, Ramana Maharshi). See the Glossary entry “neo-advaita”. This may explain why such (bogus) teachers use the terms “Consciousness” and/or “Awareness”, instead of the Vedantic Sanskrit word “Brahman”, since with “Brahman” there is ultimately no distinction between matter and spirit (i.e. the object-subject duality). At the risk of sounding facetious, anyone can dress themselves in a white robe and go before a camera or a live audience and repeat the words “Consciousness” and “Awareness” ad-infinitum and it would seem INDISTINGUISHABLE from the so called “satsangs” (a Sanskrit term that refers to a guru preaching to a gathering of spiritual seekers) of those fools who belong to the cult of neo-advaita. Although it may seem that in a couple of places in this treatise, that a form of Monistic Idealism is presented to the reader, the metaphysical view postulated here is, in fact, a form of neutral monism known as “decompositional dual-aspect monism” (“advaita”, in Sanskrit), and is a far more complete perspective than the immaterialism proposed by Idealism, and is the one realized and taught by the most enlightened sages throughout history, especially in the most “SPIRITUAL” piece of land on earth, Bhārata. Cf. “monism”. N.B. The Idealism referred to in the above definition (and in the body of this book) is metaphysical Idealism, not the ethical or political idealism often mentioned in public discourse (e.g. “I believe everyone in society ought to be given a basic income”). Therefore, to distinguish between sociological idealism and philosophical Idealism, the initial letter of the latter term is CAPITALIZED.
monism: the view in metaphysics that reality (that is, Ultimate Reality) is a unified whole and that all existing things can be ascribed to or described by a single concept or system; the doctrine that mind and matter are formed from, or reducible to, the same ultimate substance or principle of being; any system of thought that seeks to deduce all the varied phenomena of both the physical and spiritual worlds from a single principle, specifically, the metaphysical doctrine that there is but one substance, either mind (idealism) or matter (materialism), or a substance that is neither mind nor matter, but is the substantial ground of both. Cf. “dualism”. To put it simply, whilst materialists/physicalists/naturalists believe that the ground of being is some kind of tangible form of matter (or a field of some sort), and idealists/theists/panpsychists consider some kind of mind(s) or consciousness(es) to be most fundamental, MONISTS understand that Ultimate Reality is simultaneously both the Subject and any possible object, and thus one, undivided whole (even though it may seem that objects are, in fact, divisible from a certain standpoint). The descriptive term favoured in the metaphysical framework proposed in this Holy Scripture is “Brahman”, a Sanskrit word meaning “expansion”, although similes such as “Sacchidānanda” (Eternal-Conscious-Peace), “The Tao” and “The Monad” are also satisfactory. Perhaps the oldest extant metaphysical system, Advaita Vedānta, originating in ancient Bhārata (India), which is the thesis promulgated in this treatise, “A Final Instruction Sheet for Humanity”, is a decompositional dual-aspect monist schema, in which the mental and the physical are two (epistemic) aspects of an underlying (ontic) reality that itself is neither mental nor physical, but rather, psychophysically neutral. On such a view, the decomposition creates mutually-exclusive mental (subjective) and physical (objective) domains, both of which are necessary for a comprehensive metaphysical worldview. The mere fact that it is possible for Awareness to be conscious of Itself, implies that, by nature, Ultimate Reality is con-substantially BOTH subjective and objective, since it would not be possible for a subject to perceive itself unless the subject was also a self-reflective object. The term “transjective” has been coined by contemporary scholars to account for precisely this reality. This subject-object duality, and the notion of the transjective, is foundational to a complete understanding of existence/beingness. Therefore, it seems that the necessary-contingent dichotomy often discussed by philosophers in regards to ontology, is superfluous to the concept of monism, because on this view, BOTH the subjective and the objective realities are essentially one, necessary ontological Being(ness). In other words, because you are, fundamentally, Brahman, you are a necessary being and not contingent on any external force. This concept has been termed "necessitarianism" by contemporary philosophers, in contradistinction to "contingentarianism" - the view that at least some thing could have been different otherwise - and is intimately tied to the notions of causality and determinism in Chapters 08 and 11. Advaita Vedānta (that is, dual-aspect Monism) is the only metaphysical scheme that has complete explanatory power. Hypothetically, and somewhat tangentially, one might question thus: “If it is accurate to state that both the Subject of all subjects and all possible objects are equally ‘Brahman’ (that is, Ultimate Truth), then surely that implies that a rock is equally valuable as a human being?”. That is correct purely on the Absolute platform. Here, in the transactional world of relativity, there is no such thing as equality, except within the conceptual sphere (such as in mathematics), as already demonstrated in more than a couple of places in this Holiest of Holy Books, “F.I.S.H”, especially in the chapter regarding the spiteful, pernicious ideology of feminism (Chapter 26). Cf. “advaita”, “dualism”, “Brahman/Parabrahman”, “Saguna Brahman”, “Nirguna Brahman”, “subject”, “object” and “transjective”.
Epistemic structural realism would I see be a version of structuralism that would be compatible with pantheism or panentheism or the concept of the absolute
The One of platonism is beyond being and all description, the absolute, the monad, the simple are all rough synonyms for this principle. If mind were the fundamental principle that would entail the fundamental principle being a complex being, (the thinker-the object of thought- the action of the thinker thinking the object of the thought). The error in idealism is the same as the error in Abrahamic religion. It makes the fundamental principle a COMPLEX BEING not an ultimately simple principle like Platonism or vedantic works. This is an issue because we have a perfectly coherent theory of Emanationism in Platonism that all subsists on the principle of the one, from this we rationally and necessarily derive the forms, numbers, reason, logos, structure. this is were idealism has its problem because it just posits mind as the fundamental principle and provides no philosophical justification for it other than it’s the only explanation for the soul, mind, reason, free will, etc but the mistake lies in assuming that mind is actually what is most fundamental. Idealism ontologically starts at a more immanent point than does Platonism.
As an Omnist, I think Panentheism is the ideal theological/metaphysical map for future humanity. Traditional theism effectively divides everything into two, which is a fundamentally dualistic conception of everything... there IS duality and separation in the universe, but positing God as 'external' to to the universe has many flaws.
Pantheism makes more sense; but in my estimation, it makes the mistake of presuming that the universe we experience with our sense-perception is 'the whole thing'. I think this would effectively inhibit our ever-expanding understanding of phenomenality; and all evidence points to the idea that there is far more to the universe than we can normatively perceive.
“Pantheism makes the mistake that the universe we experience with our sense perception is the whole thing”
Pantheism says cosmos/nature is the whole thing and adds the extra theo/divinity element to it. It says nothing whether it stretches or not beyond what you perceive with your sense perception.
Consider the multiverse view. Nature stretches beyond our local universe, but it is still a naturalistic view. Add the theo/divinity element to it and you have pantheism.
The way you put it, panentheism is just pantheism. There is no real difference.
@@anteodedi8937 Metaphysically, there is a difference; and if humanity were to adopt one metaphysics over the other -- then I'd wager there would be significant consequences.
"It says nothing whether it stretches or not beyond what you perceive with your sense perception."
> Correct, it doesn't say it -- it implies it.
The take you seem to have appears as one interpretation of pantheism, which is again backing where my criticism lay: the fact that pantheism leaves much implicit (and thus, prone to two or more interpretations).
The "universe" we know is not 'the multiverse'; this is a conjecture currently. The "universe" mankind thinks of is the universe which our sense-perception and higher-order sciences/models convey to us. It is rooted and constrained by our senses. Our model of the universe is not 'what could be beyond' -- it's 'what we know to be'. The multiverse view conveys the idea that there may be something 'transcendent' of our current model of the universe (i.e beyond the domain of our normative sense-perception).
My problem with a pantheistic metaphysic is this: It runs the risk of mistaking the 'map' for the 'territory itself'. Don't mistake the map for the territory. There must be an explicit notion of transcendence, or else mankind runs the risk of boxing himself in, and then generating mass confusion/shock down the road.
@@Archeidos-Arcana I agree there is a difference, but that leads to two models that fall under pantheism. The disagreement between those models is trivial.
Naturalistically speaking:
Model 1: Cosmos is the whole thing, but it doesn't stretch beyond what we experience through our senses.
Model 2: Cosmos is the whole thing, but it stretches beyond what we experience through our senses, aka multiverse view.
If you add the theo/divinity element, then you have two different pantheistic models.
I understand transcendence as something that lies beyond cosmos or distinct from cosmos, not something that lies merely beyond what we can experience through our senses, but not beyond cosmos. At least that's what theists have argued for years.
I don't see panentheism as an alternative, as fundamentally is either theism or pantheism if you stick to god.
panentheism reminds me of acts 17:28
It's a long road to change worldviews. Multiple converging lines reasoning and evidence all point to consciousness as The ontological primitive of reality.
Science is empirical, yes. And as idealists this might make it sound like we, then,, ARE able to have a science that tells us about the nature of reality. But I think we are still left with the behaviors that we then interpret and make arguments about the nature. This is why even in a future where there are ONLY idealists, there will still be massive debates about how to interpret the meaning of nature's behavior.
Seems like maybe the way idealism would most inform science would be how it can provide a rantional for different introspective methodologies and why they can be shedding light on objective reality. If physicalism denies that fundamental patterns can be found via careful observation of highly developed consciousness, well, that's one more strike against it.
Idealism:
Metaphysical Idealism is the view that the objective, phenomenal world is the product of an IDEATION of the mind, whether that be the individual, discrete mind of a personal subject, or otherwise that of a Universal Conscious Mind (often case, a Supreme Deity), or perhaps more plausibly, in the latter form of Idealism, Impersonal Universal Consciousness Itself (“Nirguna Brahman”, in Sanskrit).
The former variety of Idealism (that the external world is merely the product of an individual mind) seems to be a form of solipsism.
The latter kind of Idealism is far more plausible, yet it reduces the objective world to nothing but a figment in the “Mind of God”.
Thus, BOTH these forms of Idealism can be used to justify all kinds of immoral behaviour, on the premise that life is just a sort of dream in the mind of an individual human, or else in the consciousness of the Universal Mind, and therefore, any action that is deemed by society to be immoral takes place purely in the imagination (and of course, those who favour this philosophy rarely speak of how non-human animals fit into this metaphysical world-view, at least under the former kind of Idealism, subjective Idealism).
Idealism (especially Monistic Idealism), is invariably the metaphysical position proffered by neo-advaita teachers outside of India (Bhārata), almost definitely due to the promulgation of the teachings in the West of Indian (so-called) “gurus” such as Mister Venkataraman Iyer (normally referred to by his assumed name, Ramana Maharshi). See the Glossary entry “neo-advaita”.
This may explain why such (bogus) teachers use the terms “Consciousness” and/or “Awareness”, instead of the Vedantic Sanskrit word “Brahman”, since with “Brahman” there is ultimately no distinction between matter and spirit (i.e. the object-subject duality).
At the risk of sounding facetious, anyone can dress themselves in a white robe and go before a camera or a live audience and repeat the words “Consciousness” and “Awareness” ad-infinitum and it would seem INDISTINGUISHABLE from the so called “satsangs” (a Sanskrit term that refers to a guru preaching to a gathering of spiritual seekers) of those fools who belong to the cult of neo-advaita.
Although it may seem that in a couple of places in this treatise, that a form of Monistic Idealism is presented to the reader, the metaphysical view postulated here is, in fact, a form of neutral monism known as “decompositional dual-aspect monism” (“advaita”, in Sanskrit), and is a far more complete perspective than the immaterialism proposed by Idealism, and is the one realized and taught by the most enlightened sages throughout history, especially in the most “SPIRITUAL” piece of land on earth, Bhārata. Cf. “monism”.
N.B. The Idealism referred to in the above definition (and in the body of this book) is metaphysical Idealism, not the ethical or political idealism often mentioned in public discourse (e.g. “I believe everyone in society ought to be given a basic income”).
Therefore, to distinguish between sociological idealism and philosophical Idealism, the initial letter of the latter term is CAPITALIZED.
monism:
the view in metaphysics that reality (that is, Ultimate Reality) is a unified whole and that all existing things can be ascribed to or described by a single concept or system; the doctrine that mind and matter are formed from, or reducible to, the same ultimate substance or principle of being; any system of thought that seeks to deduce all the varied phenomena of both the physical and spiritual worlds from a single principle, specifically, the metaphysical doctrine that there is but one substance, either mind (idealism) or matter (materialism), or a substance that is neither mind nor matter, but is the substantial ground of both. Cf. “dualism”.
To put it simply, whilst materialists/physicalists/naturalists believe that the ground of being is some kind of tangible form of matter (or a field of some sort), and idealists/theists/panpsychists consider some kind of mind(s) or consciousness(es) to be most fundamental, MONISTS understand that Ultimate Reality is simultaneously both the Subject and any possible object, and thus one, undivided whole (even though it may seem that objects are, in fact, divisible from a certain standpoint).
The descriptive term favoured in the metaphysical framework proposed in this Holy Scripture is “Brahman”, a Sanskrit word meaning “expansion”, although similes such as “Sacchidānanda” (Eternal-Conscious-Peace), “The Tao” and “The Monad” are also satisfactory.
Perhaps the oldest extant metaphysical system, Advaita Vedānta, originating in ancient Bhārata (India), which is the thesis promulgated in this treatise, “A Final Instruction Sheet for Humanity”, is a decompositional dual-aspect monist schema, in which the mental and the physical are two (epistemic) aspects of an underlying (ontic) reality that itself is neither mental nor physical, but rather, psychophysically neutral. On such a view, the decomposition creates mutually-exclusive mental (subjective) and physical (objective) domains, both of which are necessary for a comprehensive metaphysical worldview. The mere fact that it is possible for Awareness to be conscious of Itself, implies that, by nature, Ultimate Reality is con-substantially BOTH subjective and objective, since it would not be possible for a subject to perceive itself unless the subject was also a self-reflective object. The term “transjective” has been coined by contemporary scholars to account for precisely this reality.
This subject-object duality, and the notion of the transjective, is foundational to a complete understanding of existence/beingness.
Therefore, it seems that the necessary-contingent dichotomy often discussed by philosophers in regards to ontology, is superfluous to the concept of monism, because on this view, BOTH the subjective and the objective realities are essentially one, necessary ontological Being(ness). In other words, because you are, fundamentally, Brahman, you are a necessary being and not contingent on any external force. This concept has been termed "necessitarianism" by contemporary philosophers, in contradistinction to "contingentarianism" - the view that at least some thing could have been different otherwise - and is intimately tied to the notions of causality and determinism in Chapters 08 and 11.
Advaita Vedānta (that is, dual-aspect Monism) is the only metaphysical scheme that has complete explanatory power.
Hypothetically, and somewhat tangentially, one might question thus: “If it is accurate to state that both the Subject of all subjects and all possible objects are equally ‘Brahman’ (that is, Ultimate Truth), then surely that implies that a rock is equally valuable as a human being?”. That is correct purely on the Absolute platform. Here, in the transactional world of relativity, there is no such thing as equality, except within the conceptual sphere (such as in mathematics), as already demonstrated in more than a couple of places in this Holiest of Holy Books, “F.I.S.H”, especially in the chapter regarding the spiteful, pernicious ideology of feminism (Chapter 26).
Cf. “advaita”, “dualism”, “Brahman/Parabrahman”, “Saguna Brahman”, “Nirguna Brahman”, “subject”, “object” and “transjective”.
If the One has a *fundamental' predisposition to self-locate via dissociation, you get a a person-relation from the start. That be my view.
Epistemic structural realism would I see be a version of structuralism that would be compatible with pantheism or panentheism or the concept of the absolute
Is idealism open to structural realism an relational metaphysics
What was Fichte's argument that the notion of personhood is there are at least two?
I don’t think we can coherently say that mind would give rise to a completely separate ontological substance.
The One of platonism is beyond being and all description, the absolute, the monad, the simple are all rough synonyms for this principle.
If mind were the fundamental principle that would entail the fundamental principle being a complex being, (the thinker-the object of thought- the action of the thinker thinking the object of the thought).
The error in idealism is the same as the error in Abrahamic religion. It makes the fundamental principle a COMPLEX BEING not an ultimately simple principle like Platonism or vedantic works.
This is an issue because we have a perfectly coherent theory of Emanationism in Platonism that all subsists on the principle of the one, from this we rationally and necessarily derive the forms, numbers, reason, logos, structure. this is were idealism has its problem because it just posits mind as the fundamental principle and provides no philosophical justification for it other than it’s the only explanation for the soul, mind, reason, free will, etc but the mistake lies in assuming that mind is actually what is most fundamental. Idealism ontologically starts at a more immanent point than does Platonism.
Let me know if I have
strawman’d your position
Process not substance