Prokhorovka: Chances of a German Breakthrough?
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- Опубликовано: 19 окт 2024
- Dr. Roman Töppel addresses the question if the Germans had the chance of an operational breakthrough after the Battle of Prokhorovka, which was part of the Battle of Kursk (Operation Zitadelle).
"I've heard arguments that there was a reasonable chance for an operational breakthrough after prokhorovka, given the damage to Rotmistrov's tank army and Rodimtsev's corps in the actions surrounding Prokhorovka. What is Dr. Toppel's opinion regarding German operational potentials in this situation, and what potential ramifications do you think this might have had? From my understanding the present orthodox American historiography is that the Germans had little to no chance of meaningful success, however I found myself unable to meaningfully comment when it was challenged. I'd love to see your commentary!"
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» SOURCES «
New Article by Dr. Roman Töppel here: www.tandfonlin...
Töppel, Roman: Kursk 1943. The Greatest Battle of the Second World War. Helion: Warwick, UK: 2018.
Glantz, David M. (ed.) ; Orenstein, Harold S. (ed.): The Battle for Kursk 1943. The Soviet General Staff Study. Frank Cass: Portland, OR, USA: 1999 (1990).
Hartmann, Christian: Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg. Front und militärisches Hinterland 1941/42. De Gruyter Oldenbourg: 2010.
Sharp, Charles C.: The Soviet Order of Battle. World War II. An Organizational History of the Major Combat Units of the Soviet Army. Volume II: “School of Battle”. The Tank Corps and Tank Brigades January 1942 to 1945, George F. Nafziger: 1995.
Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathan M.: The Battle of Kursk. University of Kansas Press: United States, 1999.
Zamulin, Valeriy: The Battle of Kursk. Controversial and neglected Aspects. Helion & Company: England, 2017.
Zetterling, Niklas; Frankson, Anders: KURSK 1943 - A Statistical Analysis
Glantz, David M.: Colossus Reborn. The Red Army at War, 1941-1943. University Kansas Press: Kansas, US, 2005
![Wiz Khalifa - Khalifa's Home [Official Music Video]](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/wnrLCTe0Nz4/mqdefault.jpg)
Update from Roman Töppel (I post since there seems to be some issues with the comments, see his original comment below)
P.S. (18 December 2021): The article is now available
in German:
www.portal-militaergeschichte.de/http%3A//portal-militaergeschichte.de/toeppel_prochorowka
and in English:
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13518046.2021.1990559?tab=permissions&scroll=top
Stay safe and Merry Christmas!
Roman
You know you're a panzer nerd when you laugh about Manstein's handwriting in his war diary! This is why I love this channel!
That's where the magic of real research happens!
I've read in some book that Operation Citadel was like an attempt by a well-trained man to smash a brick wall with his forehead by running into it, and behind that wall there was a man with an axe waiting for him anyway.
That's fairly apt I would have said.
More like ten men with machine guns.
G'day,
That's hilarious..., because it's true.
But then again, the whole idea of obediently shooting at designated Strangers (the "Enemy"..., Any Me perhaps), because some Politician has said that the National Honour depends on having somebody die gallantly in a ditch, bravely fighting over some place on the Map which they'd never heard of, prior to deployment...; is the kind of Enterprise wherein, as the British Military puts it -
"If you can't take a joke..., well then you never should've enlisted, chum....!"
Just(ifiably ?) sayin,
Take it easy...
;-p
Ciao !
@@WarblesOnALot only boomers would try and make any me into enemy.
@@purplefood1
G'day,
Thou art clearly a halfwit..., in that the "Post War Baby Boomers" were born in the DECADE following VE-Day & VJ-Day...; so from 10 years & 9 months after Adolf Shit himself, as everyone does - when they shoot themself..., to 10 years & 9 months after the Fat Man Plutonificated Nagasaki.
So according to the absolutist Doctrine, everybody born on Earth between February 1946 & May 1956 was termed "A Baby Boomer...
The theory being that their conception resulted from an uncontained Lust-Attack upon their Parents' realisation that WW-2 was over & therefore it was "Safe" to finally fcuk each other and commence breeding.
My father was born in 1909, and for the ENTIRE era of the Baby Boomers' Birth he was married to his first wife - who died in 1958.
My mother was born in 1936, so she was 9 years old in1945 when WW-2 expired...
I wasn't born until 1961, FIVE YEARS after the last actual Baby Boomer stuck their Head between their maternal Labia.
My generation, born between 1956 & 1966 or actually 1968..., we're the SPACE KADETZ, mate...; born from Dien Bien Phu to the Tet Offensive...., weaned on the Cuban Missile Crisis & Kennedy's killing....
We watched the Moonlanding on the TV in the Primary School, and we watched the Battle of Long Tan & saw the Tet Offensive at home..., I wanted to march in the Vietnam Moratorium Marches, but I didn't live within hundreds of miles of where anybody was demonstrating..., we were hitting Pubety watching Watergate and the Fall of Saigon..., we were the Children who LISTENED to the Hippies, who warned that the EcoGnomie of the Global Village was destroying the Biosphere.
And that, Pilgrim, is why you work to pay the Taxes which fund my Pension, for sitting under a Gumtree in the Forest, hand-feeding bread to the Wildlife which comes to share my every Sundown....
I may well be many things..., but NEVER a Baby Boomer.
I remember going to School in the 1960s & 1970s..., and spent a formative Decade being taught WHY I was NOT any kind of a Baby-Boomer.
So, therefore, thus, and because..., you may take your erroneous assertions, and cordially stuff them backwards up whichever Bodily Orofice you might find the most painful - the better to ensure that ye never forget the lesson.
Hmmmmmnn...(?) !
Begone.
;-p
Ciao !
MHV content is always educational but I do not joke when I say: When Dr. Töppel is w/ MHV I break out the paper & take notes. All this knowledge is just oustanding, thanks so much MHV & Dr. Töppel.
Note that Dr. Roman Töppel did not receive the questions before my visit, so he had no time to prepare.
Dr. Roman Töppel's book on the Battle of Kursk is available in English, German, French and a few other languages. Check it out on amazon.
Here is the English version of his talk at the Panzermuseum 2017: www.academia.edu/35771728/Prokhorovka_12_July_1943_The_Myth_Is_Dead_-_Long_Live_The_Myth_September_2017_
Fair enough. I guess a prepared answer wasn't practical. We just like to pretend such speeches are spontaneous, even if that is impossibly hard. I should read more...
G'day,
For whatever it's worth, I reckon he did quite well...; in the discipline of Medicine they have what they call "Examination in Viva" - involving 3 or 5 Examiners asking questions of the Candidate...; it's interesting to view a Professor of German Military History effectively sitting Viva on detailed minutiae of Adolf's Grand World Discovery Tour...
Yay Team !
Keep on keeping on.
;-p
Ciao !
In short, you can't have a pincer movement with only one pincer.
Which worked ONCE...France 1940
They pushed down the channel from the Netherlands
@@outdatedtank4542 Mainly they severed the Brits from the French, using the geography to their favor along with complete surprise. This wasn't going to happen at Kursk.
@@terraflow__bryanburdo4547 yeah
A pincer movement with only one pincer is a hammer and anvil operation.
(like the Sichelschnitt in France)
I am sure that I am not the only one who sits watching these conversations totally amazed and engrossed. A big thanks to both of you. Hopefully, RUclips will begin to wake up to the fact that this is what makes YT worthwhile - not talking heads, but intelligent people sharing what they have discovered (and how to check the data independently).
And not to mention the Soviet offensive at the Orel Salient, named Operation Kutuzov, right in the , almost,unprotected, back of the Northern German pincer . Model only just succeeded in withdrawing his troops from the salient, so saving them from complete destruction. So there is no question about a possible German breakthrough from the twelfth of July 1943 at Kursk. (Source; ‘ Kursk, the German view’ Steven H. Newton)
You guys need to review the Decisive Campaigns game series.
Especially Barbarossa
Even if both pincers would have succeeded in breaking through and encircling the salient, would that even have meant victory? The Red Army did, after all, have mechanized armies ready to attack to the North and the South of the salient, and attack they did once Citadel was called off, or (iirc) in the case of the North, even before it was called off. If the German pincer arms had pushed on and even succeeded in breaking through, wouldn't they just have dug themselves a deeper hole and gotten encircled and cut off themselves?
The drastic difference between soviet and german casualties in tanks maybe partly explained, that battlefield was held by germans, and after a battle they towed their damaged tanks and blowed damaged soviet tanks. So lightly damaged german tanks were restored, and soviet tanks were completely destroyed.
I dont think it's even that, the main reason, IMO, is that the Russians was still sending to the front this large formations with no training at all in mid 1943.
@@redspark2009 I said one of the reason. The other reason is that Stavka and Stalin personally was very nervous that germans breakthrough through the whole line of soviet defence - so 5th Guard army was send to the battle whithout reconnaissance and was met by german antitank artillery and suffered heavy casualties.
@@spqr1945 , you are right about that, and as Mr. Toppel states in his book the Russian command had the bad habit of counterattacking the head of the German attack instead of exploring the soft exposed flanks.
Attacking the resting positions of 2nd SS Corps in an uncoordinated maneuver in bad (and very exposed) terrain was a mistake that lead to such disproportionate losses.
Thanks for you comment m8
Still with such large difference in tactical skill which makes an incredible 39:1 difference in casualties, one would think its hard to comprehend how the following Soviet operation Rumyantsev for retaking Kharkov was a success when it was again Germans defending and having the battlefield control, not running into soviet minefields and antitank trenches. I therefore have high skepticism over these German statistics.
I'm rocking my PzKpfw VI Ausf. E shirt today. I thought at first i'd eventually get tired of explaining to everybody what it means, but i really don't. Spreading my love of history never gets old
Get ready for Sabaton fans. Oh, I'm one of them.
*Fields of Prokhorovka, where the heat of battle burned!*
*Suffered heavy losses, the tide of war was turned!*
Man, i love your videos with Dr. Toppel. You should make some sort of mega-documentary on the Battle of Kursk with maps, testimonies, day by day developements and else... You may say i'm a dreamer, but i'm sure i'm not the only one ☺
Great video, interesting and fun to watch. I am now curious about what Mansteins handwriting looks like!
Even if a breakthrough had occured it would not have mattered. The Soviet attacks on the Northern flank of the German lines above the bulge threatened complete annihilation of half the German forces and isolation of the Panzer forces that did break through.
There was never a chance once the battle began it was the Death Ride of the Panzer Army, nothing more.
OUTSTANDING. And we hear live what we read about losses in Dr. Toppel's paper. The fact of great reserves, lines and oustanding preparations, is new and valuable infor.
"Guess the victory...(puts sunglasses on) wasn't so lost." YEEEEAAAAAAHHHHH
Germany ran out of oil in late 1941, Barbarossa was supposed to drive towards the oil in Caucasus as hitler wanted but his generals wanted to fight wasteful encirclement battles on way to moscow and lenigrad,they had no idea what war takes on economic scale,this is why hitler always said his generals betrayed him,after october 1941 the Germans lost the war due to oil shortages not the snow,so any chance of germans doing anything after that was hopeless
Very good analysis - thank you.
This is the best example of what happens when you telegraph your punch !
Another great interview that shows fact and professionalism) Like B says in video, all the details covered.
wow really love your interviews with Dr toppel.Please do more. Any chance future videos will talk about 1, why the Germans decided to attack the strongest defense as opposed to a flanking/ attack the rear? 2, details on the German debate on whether to attack at all. Hope your trip to usa was good.
Thanks for your insight, Dr. Toppel. They were brave men biting off more than they could chew.
Thank you for your sober and informed analysis.
The Germans lost only 5 panzers at Prokhorovka?! That is amazing! Of course, one starts to think of the Axis possibilities from there, but as Dr. Toeppel points out, the Germans could not carry out a double-envelopment of the Kursk salient, with only 1 offensive arm. Perhaps just as astounding is how even 80 years after the war, so much misinformation continues on as fact in historiography.
Is it possible to hear some more about the forthcoming publication of Manstein's original diary from the time? When is it scheduled to be released?
Cheers and thanks for some great videos!
In the soviet union,
Summer 1943,
Tanks line up in thousands,
As far the eye can see...
Ready for the onslought,
Ready for the fight
Waiting for the axis
To march into the trap
So, if I'm understanding this correctly, both sides very likely had major intelligence failures at and around Prokhorovka. The Germans were surprised by the 5th Guards Tank Army and had no idea after smashing the armored counter-attack that the Soviets still had plenty of reserves in or moving towards the area. The Soviets (if we give the most charitable interpretation, given how hard it is for Western historians to access Russian archives even today) see the German assault stop after Prokhorovka, assume there is a causal connection between the end of the assault and their counter-attack, and then begin to accept the more ludicrous kill-claims filtering up from lower commands (perhaps some deliberately inflated, but many made quite honestly, as Bismarck notes frequently in his Military Aviation History videos).
As a result, the German General "Blame Hitler" Wehrmacht apologists can claim for years after the war that they were on the verge of victory when 'that moron Hitler' called off the offensive, and more chauvinistic Russian historians to this day claim that Soviet forces won a great tactical and operational victory at Prokhorovka, when neither is true (The Soviets did not stop Manstein as they arguably had Model in the north, and Manstein could have continued the advance, although it would have ultimately been pointless). The Germans could not win, but they were defeated strategically by the Soviets, who not only could continue to defend Kursk pretty much indefinitely but had the resources to launch offensives that would take them to the Dnieper by the end of the year.
mensch1066 No, the german lost. This isn't a game, there is no "kill ratio". There is objectives. The soviets acomplished the objective of holding the ground. The german didn't acomplish their objective of breaking in. The end. If you want to learn more tankarchives.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-of-tanks-history-section.html?m=1
@@markcorrigan3930 read what he wrote again. He didn't say the Germans won.
Purplefood You read it again. He said the soviets didn't won a tactical victory. They did, they held the line.
Well first, what are Whermacht apologists?
They clearly state in the first minutes of the video, that even the russians claimed a narrow defeat of the germans, people just researched at the wrong place...
@@markcorrigan3930 a tactical victory can be taking a street or a trench. The Germans managed a minor breakthrough but in the scale of the soviet defenses it was kinda pathetic. It was a tactical victory but an essentially useless one given how the Northern force seems to have been spanked.
According to a book I have on the Soviet Order Of Battle for Prokhorovka the 5th Guards tank army was behind the lines in reserve and when the SS units started making headway Romistrov was ordered to move up and reinforce Prokorovka as fast as possible. The Soviets did a forced road march to their area and arrived less than 24 hours before the battle. Romitstrov had already decided that the Soviets would have to close to point blank range as soon as possible to minimize German high velocity guns and to make it harder for Germans to support their tanks.
The Soviets had deployed forward observers to watch the German lines and early in morning of the battle (5am? ) the Soviets observers reported lots of plumes of smoke as the Germans were starting their tanks to prepare for the days offensive. The Germans were just starting to move forward when Romstrov gave the order "Stahl!, Stahl!, Stahl!" and I think it was purple flares were launched and suddenly a almost endless wave of t-34's and T-70M's rushed over the hill. Most of the Germans tanks were overloaded with extra ammo in expectation of the days fighting which is part of the reason the Germans were able to inflict such heavy casulties.
General Hausser did not believe the reports of so many Soviet vehicles knocked out and went to inspect the scene for himself and was stunned at so many tanks knocked out. IIRC the Soviets suffered 653 tanks knocked out, mostly T-34/76's and T-70M's, the Germans suffered 34 tanks knocked out, mostly PzIII's and IV's. What made a difference in the battle was that in two days The 5th Guards tank Army was back to strength and the Germans struggled to replace their losses. Keep in mind that the Soviets did not control the battlefield after so were not able to recover the tanks knocked out that day. In less than a week Germans were forced to begin retreating and Soviets were probably able to recover a number of those vehicles.
Despite years of propaganda Tigers were not part of this battle and were to the left holding a bridgehead over Psel river from Soviet counter attacks. The two Panther battalions operational were not involved either as both were even farther to the left assigned to Panzergrenadier Division Grossdeutchland.
Manstein thought he could have a breakthrough after mauling the 5th Guards Tank Army. Little did he know, the Soviets had a whole reserve front prepared just to counterattack.
Love your videos with Dr. Toppel.
That battle began between Prokhorovka and the Oktiabrskii State Farm and the Stalinsk Collective which the Germans had captured the previous night.
The Germans apparently fell back from these positions to behind an anti-tank trench.
Though Wittmann's Tigers and other tanks probably started the day being replenished south of the anti-tank ditch.
Excellent video!
Fascinating material and review.
Another great video!
Well, that's another book on Kursk I'm going to have to buy...
Damn mhv, you lookin swole
do u lift?
@bender rodriguez nah bro, he found his grandfather pervitin. Marching powder is more of a south American thing
Is always nice to see Dr. Roman.
They also exacerbate the numbers. I have seem people claiming that there were like 6000+ tanks fighting in Prokhorovka alone 😂
Many thanks for the way you guys speak english. You speak clearly and short. My english is not that good, yet I can understand almost everything you guys saying and learn more of WWII.
Rotmistrov and Rodimtsev. Doesn't get more Slavic sounding than that, at least to these Midwestern ears!
I read to books on the subject while in the Army in the 90s. One by a German author and one by a Soviet. The German author said that Citadel was NOT ill advised but was too ambitious. The Soviet author, a former army officer, said that had the Germans been able to press for a few more days, the 5th Guards Tank Army, sent to blunt the Germans at Prokhorovka, was near its end in reserves and the Germans weren't suffering the loses they had thought.
I asked you a long time ago to do a video on strategy and tactics of rear-guard actions of the Wehrmacht. The "fighting" retreat to the Dnieper is a good example. Rommel's retreat after El Alamein would be another. The Wehrmacht had to become very good at rear-guard actions. I'd like to hear about it.
Good video
On the big 3 turning points (Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk), the SU did not really score a definite strategic decisive victory in any of them. These turning points became famous largely becos these events marked the points when significant German advances were halted.
The inability of the Germans to hold off the soviet steamroller after Kursk showed the resource constraints. Therefore a Prokhorova breakthru, while theoretically possible, would not have meant a big change to the strategic balance of power.
Can you do the equivalent of this for the Waterloo campaign? There are so many misconceptions about that. Even Napoleon says stupid things.
I don't know which Russian historians dr.Toppel refers to but those that I know don't try to repeat 50 years old myths.
@Thomas Neumann In this video, Myagkov says Soviets lost 500 tanks, Germans 300 tanks, probably taking into account damaged tanks, not only totally destroyed.
Dr Toppel says about 5 vs 196 total losses, he doesn't say anything about number of damaged tanks.
I don't see how the video link you posted proves Dr. Toppel's point, also counting only totally damaged tanks doesn't look like a good method for me, because who has the possibility to evacuate tanks after the battle, will probably restore most of them, it doesn't say anything about battle efficiency of one side or the other.
@Thomas Neumann Then the problem is what period to count and in what area, there's some confusion about this between Russian and Western historians. I don't think that Dr. Toppel's statement is correct as he and "Russian historians" he talks about may simply speak about different things in time and scale.
For example, Zamulin says that Prokhorovka battle started on 10 and ended on 16 of July.
@@AlexanderSeven II.SS.PzK. had about 20 afv's as overall losses. 5-6 of them being total losses and the rest damaged.
My understanding was that the southern pincer had good initial success due to them changing their codes prior to the battle and that this left the Soviet forces less prepared for their attack than in the north where the codes remained the same. If this is indeed the case I can't help wondering if the northern pincer could have achieved similar results if they too had changed their codes?
Excellent interview! :)
Check out David M. Glantz's lecture on the Battle of Kursk: ruclips.net/video/H1_JyTFbgcs/видео.html
Some interesting points:
1. While German tactical intelligence was excellent, its operational and strategic intelligence was lousy.
2. After the Prokhorovka, Rotmistrov was chewed out by Stalin for losing so many tanks, although he still maintained command over the 5th Guards Tank Army.
3. Shortly before the Prokhorovka, Soviet Bryansk and Western Fronts launched offensive operation (Operation Kutuzov) against German 2nd Panzer Army in order to capture Orel. The 2nd Panzer Army could not hold the Orel salient. By the way, German 9th Army's advance from the north lost momentum even before the Soviet onslaught against the 2nd Panzer Army.
4. In Manstein's 'Lost Victory', there is a page that shows the southern half of the Eastern Front. In this map, 7 Soviet armies in the reserve were not shown!
5. A major problem for the Germans in Operation Zitadelle was lack of infantry. As the Germans advanced, they had to detach Panzergrenadiers to guard the flanks of the spearheads, thereby weakening the spearheads the more they advanced. By contrast, 5th Guards Tank Army was accompanied by 5th Guards Army.
6. The Soviets did not rely solely on infantry, antitank guns, and field artillery to stop the Germans. They had several tank corps and tank brigades which were assigned to put pressure on the flanks of German spearheads. Meanwhile, heavy tank and self-propelled gun regiments were used to reinforce Soviet infantry as needed.
Great video,, so it seems even if Manstein committed XXIV Panzer Corps (5th SS Wiking, 17th & 23rd Panzer), a total of some 140 Panzers, they could not have broken into the soviet operational depths.
Two Myths Busted in the Same Video! - Amazing!
Still 5 tanks for 190 is very impressive even by German standards.
Regarding Model and discussion with AH and other Generals about the depth of the Soviet defensive lines, I once read Model challenged another General to a duel when he though he had impugned his honour. Only seen it written once in all my reading. AH apparently stopped the duel. Listening to the above, perhaps it was Von Kluge?
Is it true that the Donaudampfschiffahrtsgesellschaftskapitän introduced aircraftcarriers to the Austro-Hungarian navy?
That word hurts my brain
@@glowingpeople1 Rindfleischetikettierungsüberwachungsaufgabenübertragungsgesetz
Well.. better than fighting at Prokhorovka isn’t it?
Ok Central Europeans, calm down
I thought Russian words were long but German makes me wanna put my head on the table.
I'dd add a slight variation about the Soviet further defensive lines - those lines beyond the first and second lines were not so well developed. While the Soviets could rapidly improve the third line, the others could not be so quickly brought up to the same status. All that said, the Germans were not able to complete Zitadelle (as Manstein's diary notes) as the northern wing of the attack had failed and (as noted here) the Soviets still possessed extensive reserves.
How did they get a 60:1 kill ratio? Is this just the German method of only recording tanks which were lost beyond repair? Or did they do the usual thing of luring enemy tanks to where they could hit them with artillery and pak fronts?
The only time that Zhukov convinced Stalin to be in a clear defensive position
Is my conclusion right that Manstein meant with not having the forces to close up with Model that he simply had not the forces to secure a defensive front behind his main armor force beyond Kurk? So even if his armor spearhead smashed everything before until it reach Model's troop, the Soviets would just have closed in behind it and reopened cut supply lines into the Kursk pocket or allow the troops to fight their way out of the pocket.
Who had air superiority over the area? They Germans were entirely unable to get even a few airial recon missions over it? I should think that trenches in steppe lands would be easy to spot from the sky.
BY this time of the war even large Russian tank formations were able to move mostly undetected, reconnaissance probably would spot a few tanks but the actual size of units involved was probably very hard to figure out.
Ok yeah the Soviet lied about the German losses, but shouldn‘t the winner be determined by who holds the ground in this case? Did the Germans hold Prokorovka after this engagement?
About the tanks destroyed ratio, isn't there a big discrepancy between how Soviets and Germans treated disabled tanks? I've read that Soviet practice was to pull the transmission and write off the rest of the vehicle, while Germans were much more obsessive about salvaging entire vehicles therefore counting far fewer "losses".
thought so too, but from a paper I read a few days ago, it seems the difference at least for "total loss" / "unrecoverable loss" is marginal or non-existent.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized Interesting. Could you link that paper, or do a talk about it? It's a little discussed topic that can shed a lot of light on how these battles are viewed.
I will likely make a video about it, could be on Tuesday, but very likely take a while til it is out.
Two issues. First, we don't know the actual losses of Germans at Prokhorovka. The "5 tanks" stuff is nonsense that no serious historian accepts. The fact that Toppel uses this number, is of great discredit to him (but of great help to get your nonsense published in DW or on youtube). It is incomplete documentation of only 1 German unit. So it's simply not a reflection of total German losses there. All we know about July 12 (the actual leading up to and following Prokhorovka spanned more than 1 day)...is the number of available German tanks from July 11 compared to July 13. There's a difference of about 100 tanks there. But even that doesn't imply a loss number, since many units received reinforcements during those days. Second issue is simply about who remains on the battlefield. A tank with a thrown track can be a "loss" if it has to be abandoned and not recovered...as would have been the case with Soviet tanks on July 12 (that may not mean that a few days later when the Soviets advanced, they may not have recovered some of them again); while a German tank with a dead crew and a turret that needs to be replaced may simply be a "long-term repair" tank and not a loss if recovered. And a third issue is the composition of Soviet tanks during that battle. Nearly half were light T-70 tanks (whereas the Germans had an insignificant number of light tanks there). So everything is apples and oranges in general. But, don't expect serious analysis on youtube...this is all intended for "shock" and getting views, not serious historical analysis. Overall, MHV is slowly shifting towards the typical youtube trend of nonsensical content for the sake of views (and this video is not the first or the worst example of this trend).
Well, I have also read a great deal on this Attack, I do not claim to be "expert". But to just give you the "Salient" point. The southern attack was met by strong Russian tank forces, unable to stop the panzers, they went right to their reserve of 600-800 tanks. which was their Ace in the hole, after this encounter their losses were in the hundreds and had nothing else to throw in , then Hitler called off the attack. To which Manstein said " I have the wolf by the ears I should be allowed to destroy the remainder of his operational and reserve tanks " Have you ever come across this passage ?
FIELDS OF PROKHOROVKA, WHERE THE HEAT OF BATTLE BURNED
In my amateur opinion: no. Germans would fail going further after Prokhorovka. They were at risk of encirclement. Model's Tigers and Ferdinands were smashed on the north by Russians headed by smart commander Rokossovski (our Polish guy). By the way , you may make a film about him 🙂 best regards. Good discussion!
Nice!
I know it’s not completely relevant to Kursk but I’m looking for like a top 5 best books for the Eastern Front (preferably in depth) but otherwise I’d be very interested in books on specific units as well. so far I haveThunder in the East on my list
Any news on Romans translation of Mansteins diary?
I disagree that this was a Soviet defeat. Sure the 5th Guards tank army was defeated but _this was as far as the Germans got._ In terms of the result, it doesn’t matter how many tanks were destroyed: the Germans got no further. The Soviet defences separated the tanks from the infantry, while there were plenty of Red Army soldiers still on the battlefield. When the attacker is stopped and goes no further, it is a defeat for the attacker.
Sure, this was very much a Pyrrhic victory for the armed Army but it was a victory nonetheless. I know I’ll get called names like “comrade” or “commie” and such for saying this but remember, I’m not talking about numbers of tanks. I’m not disputing that. I’m calling the result based on what happened. The Germans went away. They got no further.
Germany could've won if the nazis invented time travel and went back in time to redirect the Tunguska Bolide into Moscow.
loooooool
Tsungusk was directed at the sky not at the ground.
@@Zero11s the force of the explosion wiped out 50 miles worth of forest and cooked the area beneath the explosion.
@Temple of Ridicule agreed. The Nazi defeat was inevitable.
@@cleanerben9636 space is a physcially impossible fantasy world, earth is flat
Was Martin Caiden responsible for a lot of the myth? He tended to to overdramatize all of his books although they made great reading and at least in aviation he had a lot of knowledge. But his book "The Tigers Are Burning" about Kursk seemed overripe.
Will you join fairtube and the IGM youtubers Union?
Or leave this monopoly and use MediaGoblin
Tank losses are a little like assessing fighter losses during dog fights. An advancing Tiger might be engaged by 4/5 anti tank guns on a PAK front...one shot might damage its tracks forcing it to halt, and all the guns that engaged the Tiger might claim it as a " kill". If the Russians were driven back they would report it as such, even though the tank would be back in action later in the day. And then there's propaganda....
Theres a massive glaring misnote when regarding tanks in ww2, and that is the large number of tanks that were recovered, during the battle of kursk the soviets lost 2300 tanks from three tank armies but these same tank armies recovered over 1300 tanks back again the following days as the Germans evacuate their salients in late july, sometimes recovery rates were as high as 70% during ww2.
The German eastern armies remind me of TFS' Father Anderson.
"Where the hell is Alucard?"
"Oh, him? I killed him!"
"Killed him?!"
"Cut off his bloody head."
"Oh. Well, that's step one. What about two through ten?"
"... ah, Christ!"
Read with interest Doctor Toeppel, book, would it be fair to say the Prokhorovka engagement was a tactical failure but strategic success for the Soviet Army the advancement stopped and the next day the German Armies began their fighting withdrawal.
Whilst the SS Leibstandarte advanced, the issue was the flanks which were exposed because of the attacks on SS Das Reich and Totenkopf. Is it not true the first problem was the 9th Army was effectively stopped with the XXXXVIII Panzer Corp and Army Detachment Kempf being warned down by attention, such when the Soviets went on the offensive there were no reserves to stop them. The second problem being the Luftwaffe was not able to get air superiority over the Soviet Airforce for the first time. The third, which appears to be consistent throughout the war, from the Battle of Britain on wards, the Wehrmacht were over optimistic on their abilities to succeed against their understanding “intelligence” of the abilities of their enemies to withstand them.
As the Doctor read, “our armoured Forces by General Sir G.leQ Martel, 1946,” when he was part of the British military mission in Russia page 248 to 274, which covers Kursk and the subsequent advancement, his conclusions for the success are interesting, when considering the modern historians view, surprisingly similar. Worth a read if you can find a copy.
DC No, the german lost. tankarchives.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-of-tanks-history-section.html?m=1
@@markcorrigan3930 You know that's a translation of a Russian article, right? That's based on the exact same Soviet/Russian historiography that Toeppel's research has pretty thoroughly rubbished.
mensch1066 the only thing toeppel did was translate german generals diaries
@@markcorrigan3930 I read his book. Did you? Because here and elsewhere you come across as a Russobo troll who is butthurt that your chosen narrative about a battle that happened 74 years ago isn't being reinforced. Toeppel did not just translate German generals' diaries. In most cases he is actively suspicious of them and in others contradicts what they say. You are confusing him with the first generation of Western historians who took people like Manstein and Guderian as gospel truth. Toeppel cites quite a number of Soviet/Russian sources. Should he perhaps have cited more? Very possibly. But I don't think you came here to make good faith arguments.
mensch1066 If I was a troll would be sending links, arguing?. No, I would be insulting, wich I didn't . You on the other hand "rubished". And you are the one butthurt who cant accept the fact the german lost the battle and the war. But if you think im arguing in bad faith I will stop writing in your comment.
Where should they have gotten even after a break through?
Just 20 km and running out of gaz.
Sovjet reserves would arrive earlier provided with supplies by americans.
Where would the german army have ended after a break through in bastogne?
Of cause on the coast or on the way - but encircled.
Things might only have changed with japanese invasion into the sojetunion in late 1941 or without BARBAROSSA. ... which would mean endless reserves for african campaign or a 1941 succesfull british invasion before US could get a foot on european soil.
Without an ally in europe the american presudent could not explain what for american soldiers were send to war and dying, same as in Vietnam.
But another great interview with Dr. Roman Toepel whose name I now can remember without the "Tölpel" mismatch before.
A German invasion of Britain in 1941 would result in a lot of dead Germans. Best option would have been what they went for in regards to trying to starve the UK into submission.
If you still had a full head of hair would you grow a ponytail like 25% of all youngish historians.
If the Germans would have been able to employ say 500 Tigers and 500 panthers at Kursk the outcome may have been different. Both of these tanks however were overly complex which caused production of them to take much longer, also both of these so called wonder weapons were also maintenance nightmares!
If the Soviets had produced also a big number of IS-2 the Germans would have also lost...
I have a Video request could you maybe please make a Video about why German Intelegence was so bad
I would argue that 'Russians historians still cling to the theory about victory at Prokhorovka' is very big generalization. Lead Russian specialist - Zamulin - on Kursk battle for sure does not. Other prominent historians like Alexey Isaev also do not support such a view.
Dr. Toppel uses mostly information provided by Boris Sokolov, well known Russian historical freak. I think it explains a lot.
Hitler sounds like a smart guy, the more I learn about him.
Goes to show how hatred can ruin a healthy mind.
But then again that is how super villains are made.
His book looks really good but definitely will be my most expensive book lol
It is good
The problem for the Germans to me was that when you fight a war of annihilation when the Russians were able to regroup this bitter battle of attrition highly favored the Russians no use in giving up one hundred tanks so what as long as you have more and they did
Basically Germany went HAM after being suprised.
Rusky bs bias flies in and says naah-uhhh Germans were hella prepared so us Ruskys actually went HAM..........Classic Rusky.
learn to write, learn to think, never comment on anything again.
@@Lauv I'm good chief thanks.
So, what you're saying is...
Comrades, PrOkhorovka, not ProkhorovkA. Rotmistrov is correct)
Steppe Front (Aka the Ghost front)
Please make a Video were you take on TIK Like you once did with lindybeige and his stupid Bren vs Spandau Video!
All hail the Man of Beige!
I would love to see a discussion/argument with TIK.
Yes, but actually no.
5:34 “it makes no sense to send further tanks in”. We are still talking about the Russians right?
Mius and Izyum spoiling attacks. No. Way.
Into the motherland the Germany army marchs!
Based on Mansteins assessment after the encounter at Prokhorovka if Hitler hadnt withdrawn the 2nd SS Panzer Korps they might have made an operational victory preventing the Soviet summer offensive.
4:04 the russian historians have access to Sekrit Documents™
@Thomas N. the Sekrit Documents that let the russian vehicles be more powerful than they really were
no
TIK wouldn't approve this video!!!!
why is that?
@@Nonsense010688 TIK has really gone off the deep end recently.
@@coryfice1881 deep end in what direction?
@@Nonsense010688 The holy shit what are you doing direction.
6:50
its just the saying of the germans. we destroy 12 russian divisions and the russians just replace them with another 12 divisions
russia fought harder and longer then ANYBODY thought they would when you look how they fought in ww1, winterwar, against japan interwar.
Hmm maybe a war of annihilation isn't such a good idea after all.
Note that the political situation in Russia was very weak during Nikolas II's reign, which made succes possible
@@kstreet7438 only the soviets were able to recover from that losses and the vast space of the SU and the logistics thats getting worse for the germans didnt allow germany to steamroll the entire soviet union.
@@ignacejespers8201 then what about the winterwar? soviet units fight horible there because they lack the right wappons to fight that war,that climate and that enemy.
@@marxel4444 Winter war suffered because of a lack of officers, a new doctrine eing put into practice, a process of rearmament and more generally Stalin
World of tanks fans intwensify (prokhorovka is the name of a map in WoT)
Prokhorovka is my least favourite map on wot hehe
Victors get to write history
You need to find some more serious historians. This "5 losses" from the Germans myth is indication we're not dealing with a serious historian. That is "irrecoverable losses" from only 1 division, not the whole German force there. The issue is several fold. First, there is the issue of how one counts a "loss" (Germans and Soviets used different criteria). Second, the issue of who remains on the battlefield (and recovers their losses). For example, the Soviets counted "destroyed" tanks as those that either were not repairable, or which had to be send back to the factor to be rebuild (i.e. long-term repair). Thus, a long-term repair tank was still counted as "destroyed" by Soviets. Germans did not count those as "destroyed". Hence, everytime one compares tank losses between the two, they are not comparable figures due to different criteria. Second, yes the Soviets lost more tanks, primarily because they made no territorial gains and the damaged tanks (which otherwise could have been recovered), were left on the German side. The Germans could recover their "damaged" vehicles, rebuild them, and hence no actual "loss" (even though they were battlefield losses). But certainly not "5"...again that's only for 1 German unit, and only those that could not be rebuild even at a factory. The other issue is that nearly half of Soviet tanks at Prokhorovka were light T-70 tanks (so losses obviously would have been higher). For the record, according to Soviet archives, Soviet losses were about 183 tanks (marked as "burned"), and 145 "damaged" (although again, they were left behind). Real German "losses" are impossible to determine due to absence of documentation for all German units (i.e. the exact opposite of what this "historian" claims), although estimated at about 100 (based on number of available vehicles between July 11 and 12). Where again, the word "lost" or "destroyed" has to be defined. It is not so simple.