Peace to all of you! May our minds and hearts overflow with the radiant light of Christ. I am happy that they are having these conversations. I find myself hovering awkwardly between gratitude, on one hand, that they have avoided the usual gross misrepresentation of Catholic teaching, and on the other hand, irritation that half as much scrutiny is given to their own theology as to Catholic theology - a theology worked out continuously, since the time of the Apostles, by minds greater in number and stature. Each of these episodes feels like a recapitulation of the Reformation - not so much a careful sorting, wheat from chaff, of the vast whole of Catholic theology from the beginning, but a rejection at the source, in practice if not in principle, a ‘starting from scratch’ by men who know less about the thing being reformed, than a self-taught lay person such as myself. I give them credit for having hosted at least two highly-respected Catholic theologians on the program - they were very charitable and hospitable to the friars. Even as I work to believe the best, according to Paul’s exhortation on love - I do not think their misunderstandings are deliberate - I am compelled for the sake of truthfulness to draw attention to two areas: 1) the chain of being, and 2) concupiscence in the Catholic view. Message me if you are interested in further conversation (there is no need to drag down the comment section). Aquinas, following Aristotle and others, upholds Tipton’s observation that there are, in one sense, only two kinds of things: uncreated and created. Aquinas observes that within created reality there are different kinds of beings, and there are gradations of perfection within each kind (one man can be more righteous than another), as well as among the kinds, as a human being - a bearer of God’s image because he has knowledge and freewill - is greater than a mouse. Scripture teaches as much. At the bottom of the chain of being is inanimate stuff - a stone, a lake, a cloud. Dynamic in their own right, especially as we discover more at the subatomic level, these beings are relatively simple and monotonous in their perfection, and they serve higher forms. Next we have living things without sense powers. These make use of inanimate matter - photons, water, minerals, carbon dioxide. Plants grow and reproduce themselves, which is a higher kind of perfection - more autonomous and active, rather than being acted upon passively like matter, and they make use of matter. And they give higher delight to man and beast alike, and nourish bodies. They are stunningly diverse, beautiful, and complex. Though part of the vast co-dependent web of all created nature, they are self-directed and internally organized - a seed contains the intelligible part for its specific growth, the information as DNA, and the external goods of water, sunlight, etc. only provide the general conditions for their development. Animals have all the perfection and dignity of plants, and other perfections in addition: they have a nervous system and sense powers allowing them to interact vibrantly with the environment. They can move themselves to procure food, protection, and shelter. They have an inner life of memory and animal emotions like fear, sadness, and joy. They care for their young and use sound to communicate. They use plants as food. Humans have all of this, but the animal life in us is vastly elevated by the image of God - a spiritual part, consisting of intelligence and will. We can know and love God. Angels are higher than man in one sense - they share with us the spiritual part that makes us image-bearers, but they are ontologically more simple and therefore more like God. Although we know of nothing higher than an angel, we don't want to say that God could not have created a more perfect or more glorious being - in fact the possibility seems to follow from God's quasi-infinite elevation above all things. For Aquinas, God is not part of this chain of being but outside of it, giving being to the whole thing as wholly other and absolutely ontologically perfect. Nonetheless, the chain is real. In Catholic theology and philosophy, there is no “dimensionalism” as Van Til understands it, and as some Eastern traditions have it. Man does have intelligence and freewill - that’s the “inner light” which Tipton and Carlton speak of with such suspicion (I can't see why), although for Catholics this does not give us the ability to jump rungs of the ladder, as if to cast off our bodies and become angels (that would make us less than we are, since God created our spiritual soul as ordained to exist embodied, and as such man is a “pontifex”, or bridge, between the visible and invisible world, exercising dominion over the earth and glorifying God by means of his embodied life). Likewise, angels cannot become God. The chain of being demarcates various created natures, kinds of beings which are specifically and essentially different. Do Catholics think there is a kind of assimilation of man to God? Yes! We follow Peter on this one - as he says, “we become partakes (participants) in the divine nature.” There is much to be said about what this is and is not; but if you brand this as “mutualism” and denounce it automatically as unsalvageable, take it up with Peter! That assimilation to life with God is possible because God willed it. It does not change God in his very being, and while it transforms us, it does not make us literal Gods. It is only possible with enormous grace. Do you still doubt the possibility of radical union of man with God? Consider the incarnation, in which God took on a human nature without contradiction or the diminution of his divinity. God became man, the better to raise man up to life with God.
Bavinck helpfully summarizes the Neoplatonic and Pseudo-Dionysian hierarchy of being and the defective doctrine of the image of God (and the corresponding need for the donum superadditum) that we reference in this and many other discussions of traditional Roman Catholic theology regarding nature, grace, and glory. He begins: “Grace, in the thinking of Rome, is, in the first place, a supernatural quality added to human beings by which they are in principle taken up into a supernatural order, become partakers of the divine nature, of the vision of God, and are able to perform supernatural acts such as by a condign merit deserve eternal life. . . Grace creates in humans a kind of being by which, in a totally special way, they are divinized. It elevates them "into the divine order." It cannot make them into God but does put them in a very special relation to the Deity. It does not merely raise persons-with all their capacities-to the highest pinnacle of which they are by nature capable, for in that case they would not exceed their natural perfection. But inasmuch as in the strict sense grace is supernatural, it elevates them to a level above their nature, above the nature of angels, above all nature, above actual creation, and also above all possible natures.” (RD 3, 576-77). Applying this notion of grace to the beatific vision, he observes, "Every vision of God, then, always requires an act of divine condescension, a revelation by which God on his part comes down to us and makes himself knowable. Matthew 11:27 [“All things have been handed over to me by my Father; and no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him”] remains in force in heaven. A corollary of vision of God in his essence would be the deification of humanity and the erasure of the boundary between the Creator and the creature. . . . For in (traditional) Catholic theology human beings are raised above their own nature by a supernatural gift (donum supernaturale), thus actually making them different beings, divine and supernatural humans (homo divinus et supernaturalis). But regardless of how high and glorious Reformed theologians conceived the state of glory to be, human beings remained human even there, indeed raised above “their natural position” but never “above their own kind” and “that which is analogous to that.” Humanity’s blessedness indeed lies in the “beatific vision of God,” but this vision will always be such that finite and limited human nature is capable of it. A divinization, such as Rome teaches, indeed fits into the system of the Pseudo-Dionysian hierarchy but has no support in Scripture.“ (RD, 2 190-191). He adds, “But Rome views this final human destiny, which has been realized by Christ, as a Neoplatonic vision of God and a mystical fusion of the soul with God. And that is not what Scripture teaches. All the benefits that Christ has acquired for his own are not just bestowed in the state of glory but are in principle already granted here on earth (1 Cor. 2:9) and do not, even according to Rome, include the vision of God per essentiam. (RD 2, 542-543)." Thus, in conclusion, Bavinck says, “All this is enough to show that the Roman Catholic doctrine of the image of God is inherently incomplete and in part for that reason fails to satisfy the theological mind.“ (RD, 2, 542).
Vos brilliantly sets the natural religious intrinsicism of the deeper Protestant conception of the image of God over against the supernatural religious extrinsicism of traditional Roman Catholic theology. This is among his most penetrating insights from the RD 2. Reformed Forum featured Vos’ “deeper Protestant conception” and set it in contrast to traditional Roman Catholicism (and Barth!) in the 2018 conference. Vos from RD 2, Q 18: “18. Why is this doctrine of the image of God of such great importance for theology? It is self-evident that by “image of God” is expressed what is characteristic of man and his relation to God. That he is God’s image distinguishes him from animals and all other creatures. In the idea that one forms of the image is reflected one’s idea of the religious state of man and of the essence of religion itself. a) According to the Roman Catholic conception, as we saw, imago, “image,” has another meaning than similitudo, “likeness.” Man was created with the “image.” So by nature he is God’s image-bearer. Now we have already seen that with “image” is meant the metaphysical correspondence of the human spirit with God. According to Rome, the natural relationship to God exists in the fact that in this way he is similar to Him. There is no thought of a close relationship between man and God, of a similarity of communal endeavor by the human will being subject to God. For all this belongs to the similitudo [likeness], and this, otherwise called justitia originalis, “original righteousness,” is called an added gift, donum superadditum. Only by something that raises him above his created nature does man become a religious being, able to love, to enjoy his God, and to live in Him. Out of this follows entirely the externalist character of Roman Catholic religion. It becomes something added to man, that he has but is not identified with him, does not enter into his essence. That man is like God in this natural sense is a purely deistic relationship. There is room for something else if with the imago the similitudo would also be added as naturally belonging to the conception of man. b) The Roman Catholic denial of the utter inability of man in his fallen state and its weakened conception of original sin is likewise connected to this teaching concerning the image of God. According to Rome, man can only lose what was not essential to him, namely the supernaturally added gifts, the dona superaddita. Because of his fall, these are lost. The essence of man, the imago, consisting in formal existence as spirit, in the liberum arbitrium [freedom of the will], remained. Because, however, there was no inner connection between the similitudo and the imago, the removal of the former cannot essentially change the latter. The liberum arbitrium might be weakened a little; in reality it is unharmed. In other words, by loosening the moral powers from the will, from the capacity of the will, and by denying that the former are natural in man, Rome has in principle appropriated the Pelagian conception of the will as liberum arbitrium. That capacity of free will has remained, and with that the possibility that man, even after the fall, can do something good. c) In both respects mentioned, the Protestant, and more specifically the Reformed, doctrine of the image of God is different than the Roman Catholic doctrine. That man bears God’s image means much more than that he is spirit and possesses understanding, will, etc. It means above all that he is disposed for communion with God, that all the capacities of his soul can act in a way that corresponds to their destiny only if they rest in God. This is the nature of man. That is to say, there is no sphere of life that lies outside his relationship to God and in which religion would not be the ruling principle. According to the Roman Catholic conception, there is a natural man who functions in the world, and that natural man adopts a religion that takes place beyond his nature. According to our conception, our entire nature should not be free from God at any point; the nature of man must be worship from beginning to end. According to the deeper Protestant conception, the image does not exist only in correspondence with God but in being disposed toward God. God’s nature is, as it were, the stamp; our nature is the impression made by this stamp. Both fit together. d) If then the image of God and original righteousness are to be identified, if life in communion with God belongs to nature of man and can nowhere be excluded, and if now by sin this original righteousness is lost, then the consequences will be twofold: 1. By falling away from something to which he was wholly disposed, which constitutes his proper and highest destiny, man will be changed in the deepest depths of his being; a radical reversal will take place within him. What clings to us outwardly can be removed without making us different inwardly. On the other hand, what coheres with every part of our spiritual organism can, if it is withdrawn, only bring about a powerful revolution by which the organism itself becomes disorganized. The loss of original righteousness follows spiritual death, because death in its essence is disorganization, a process of dissolution. From this one can assess most clearly the Protestant and Roman Catholic conceptions concerning the capability of man to do spiritual good in his fallen state. According to us, man is dead and therefore does no good toward God. According to Roman Catholics, he is weakened or ill but nonetheless still always capable with his free will to move himself to do good. 2. The fact that original righteousness belongs to the nature of man has yet another consequence. Because the being of man was placed from the beginning in a necessary relation with God, because he is made in the image of God in the stricter sense and this image is his nature, sin therefore cannot be just a mere privation. This would mean that something that belongs to his nature can be removed and the rest left undamaged. This is impossible. Man has to be in relation with God in everything he is and does. So, if original righteousness falls away, unrighteousness replaces it as the natural state. That is, sin is a positive principle of enmity against God, as Paul taught us about the mind of the flesh. If the image of God, original righteousness, had not been the nature of man, perhaps he might have been able to remain in a neutral standpoint. Now, the latter is cut off. He is either positively good or positively evil; there is no middle state. One can therefore say that the deeper conception of sin, especially of original sin, that rules in Protestant theology flows directly from the view one has of the original state before the fall. e) If the question is posed how man can lose what belongs to his nature and whether he has lost his human nature by the fall, then that must be answered with a twofold observation: 1. The image in the broader sense has not been lost, and given also that his nature existed in that sense, it has remained at least to that extent. 2. The moral quality of the capacities of man is certainly fallen, but that it belongs to his nature is also seen in the fact that man could not remain neutral. He must either stand for God in original righteousness or against Him in natural unrighteousness. This characteristic of his nature does not take away that man in all his being and acting takes a position toward God. When he is sinful and in conflict with God, he is still morally toto genere [as to entire genus] something other than an animal that exists in puris naturalibus [in a purely natural state]. f) One will now, after all that has been said, understand why a diverging opinion concerning the image of God must be formed by the Socinians and Arminians. They could not choose the Roman Catholic supernaturalism. Neither was inborn virtue (= original righteousness) a concept that fit with their line of thinking. As a consequence of this, there was no other way out than to limit the image of God in a religiously neutral sense to dominion over the lower creatures. For, according to the Socinians and Arminians, the state of rectitude is a state of neutrality, of innocence, which had not yet been determined for virtue or for sin. g) It requires no detailed demonstration that what has been said is of importance not only for determining the relationship of man to God in the abstract, but also is of the utmost moment for soteriology-what concerns God’s work of grace that must renovate the image in man.” (Vos, Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 2, 12-15).
@@vanttil101 On the supernatural - Bavinck says that grace, for Catholics, is “a supernatural quality added to human beings by which they are in principle taken up into a supernatural order.” ‘Supernatural order’ has a very specific meaning for us. Ludwig Ott summarizes: “the ordination of rational creatures to a supernatural final goal” (Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, Book Two, Section II, Ch II, 16). The supernatural therefore presupposes the natural, and is something in us and relative to our particular nature, which is different from the nature of a stone. Considered in Himself, God is not supernatural - he is not beyond his own Nature. The Fathers use the image of the red-hot glow of iron, which comes from the outside, by heat, imparting a quality which the iron is made to accept but without which it can exist still as iron. Heat transforms the iron without changing its nature. There are things which are called absolutely supernatural, and things which are supernatural as to their mode. An example of the former is the triune personality of God - supernatural not because the human can by no means come to know that God is triune, or because Adam did not, but supernatural because it is wholly beyond his unaided powers - man requires the gift of faith, or vision, or some other covenantal revelation. He cannot know this from studying nature, or from the three states of matter and a triple point where they all coexist, or because the love of a man and woman produces a third. He cannot know by this means that God is triune, but he can know many other things, as many who are reprobate, and very hardened against God, can be brilliant mathematicians, doctors, and the like. An example of something which is supernatural as to its mode, is a miraculous healing - the thing itself which is restored, sight, is entirely natural in man, but the mode or manner of restoration is the omnipotence of God intervening directly and beyond physical laws and processes, though not contrary to them. A few remarks, in summary, about the Catholic view of the supernatural: 1) That the supernatural is beyond the powers of nature, does not preclude that nature has a certain receptivity to the supernatural. 2) “The supernatural is not superadded merely externally to nature, but affects it intrinsically. It permeates the being and powers of nature, and perfects it either within the created order [helping man to do something which he could do naturally but with difficulty, or only under certain circumstances], … or through elevation into the divine order of being and activity” (FCD, Book Two, Section II, Ch II, 17). Another image used by the Fathers is a plant grafted onto a tree. This is one response to the charge of extrinsicism - we might concede that in one sense it is extrinsic, as coming from without and from a God who is radically beyond any created nature. But because our nature was created by God as open to radical elevation, it is not wholly extrinsic or violent or super-added externally. It operates within the depths of man’s being to transform and elevate. 3) God has conferred on man a supernatural destiny. “Man’s final end consists in a participation by him in God’s vision of Himself. The attainment of this end by men gives glory to God and fills man with supernatural happiness” (FCD, Book Two, Section II, Ch II, 17). Man’s natural end is subordinate to his supernatural end. “Man, by reason of his whole dependence on God, is bound to strive after the supernatural destination determined for him by God. If he neglects this, he cannot reach the natural goal either” (FCD, Book Two, Section II, Ch II, 17). Because of this subordination of man’s natural end to the supernatural - because God has in fact conferred on us a supernatural destiny - there is no neutrality for man, as if he could decline the offer for supernatural life and seek a natural contentment with no regard for God. And, because he is turned away from God in seeking a merely natural happiness, his life will be full or disorder. Another way of thinking about the dichotomous nature of friendship with God - saved or unsaved - is by the requirement of spiritual birth, or rebirth into the supernatural order of life with God, the seed of everlasting life. The non-neutrality arises as much from the absence of something in man as by man’s constitution or disposition. 4) Grace does not “[create] in humans a kind of being,” as if the supernatural order could exist independently or outside of nature (see above). To use the Aristotelian categories, it is an accident or property of man’s being, flowing from his substance but not substantial in itself. Grace does not vanquish man and create literally a new substance where man used to be. 5) Small point: I think Bavinck has it wrong, although we should confirm, when he says that grace in the Catholic view confers “condign merit” - Christ alone has condign merit, which is a right and claim according to strict justice. Rather, Christ shares with his members so-called congruent merit, or merit of friendship and by fittingness - he reckons us as His friends, and bestows gifts accordingly.
@@vanttil101 On the Beatific Vision - For Catholics, this is a seeing of God unveiled - as you know, the seeing here is not of the physical eye. This is higher than the knowledge we have of God in this life, which is always mediated by faith, by mental concepts, and by representations. Jesus, Paul, and John all indicate that it is a vision of God. Faith gives way to vision, and the metaphor of vision confirms that we apprehend God directly, no longer indirectly, or “through a glass, darkly” - it is firsthand, not by hearsay or imagination or created effects. What could it mean that we see God “as He sees Himself”? It indicates a (radical) elevation of the mode of knowledge and enjoyment, although it does not require - and Catholics do not teach - that this apperception of God is exhaustive or comprehensive. Vos says, “this vision will always be such that finite and limited human nature is capable of it.” That goes without saying, and Catholics agree, in our own way - the knowledge we have of God in the beatific vision is always qualified according to the manner of our finite souls. The vision is received in the mode of the recipient, even as that mode is radically elevated by grace. God alone comprehends God. Regarding divinization or deification: we use the language because Scripture uses the language, and because it reminds us of the loftiness of our calling. Grace, especially the lumen gloria, does in one sense “[elevate man] to a level above his nature” - just not in the sense that Bavinck or Vos understands, because it has to be understood internally to the principles of the system. Scripture uses a great deal of language indicating radical transformation of man, the likes of which could easily be construed as fittingly described as an elevation beyond nature. Does the Catholic view amount to a “mystical fusion”? The language is not that far off, depending on what exactly is understood by these terms. Heaven is, no doubt, a great mystery. Fusion can indicate at least three different things: two things merging and losing their essential identity, as two atoms of hydrogen can fuse into a helium; or it can mean two things mixing and becoming indistinguishable while retaining a degree of independence, as the metals of an alloy are in chemical or mechanical relationship, but retain some of their properties; or it can mean an inseparable bond or union, which is the promise of heaven according to Scripture, as when one things is welded and fixed irrevocably to another. The Catholic view is not neo-Platonic or Pseudo-Dionysian at its core - it has resemblances, but so does the creation story in Genesis to ancient religious mythologies, and we do not for that reason dismiss Genesis as fiction or derived from myth. “A corollary of vision of God in his essence would be the deification of humanity and the erasure of the boundary between the Creator and the creature.” How, exactly, does vision “per essentiam” results in the erasure of the boundary? Is it another way of saying that a mere creature cannot see the essence of God, because that requires a commensurate power, i.e. the intellect of God? I would have to look more closely at Catholic theology on this, but my understanding is that “per essentiam” is more indicative of the mode of vision; or to the extent that it refers to the formal object, it qualifies the manner in which the formal object (essence) is known. Explicitly, Catholicism teaches that the Divine Essence is never comprehended, or known as much as it can be known it itself. Maybe per essentiam is to be taken negatively, as indicating what the vision is not: not indirect, not mediated by concepts in the obscurity of faith, not discursive (i.e. intuitive), not complex but by simple gaze or beholding. Vos says that nature in the “broader sense” - I take him as referring to man’s capacities or powers (not disposition) - remains after the Fall. What Vos has said, in effect, is that while man’s nature may be composed of several things, or have several things entering into and flowing from its definition, one of these things is “more essential” than the rest - which, in the end, is all that the Catholics are saying: there are things which man can forfeit without ceasing to be essentially a man, as if what Christ died for and redeemed was not really man, or in his incarnation the nature he took on was not our nature; and there are things which he cannot forfeit without ceasing to be a man, like his spiritual soul, for which reason we properly call a dead man a corpse, or the body of a man. I wish I could say something about the other areas, especially soteriology, but I would rather treat in depth than breadth, and there is only so much time and space. Also, I think the nature/grace questions (and eschatology) might be more fundamental. But I’m not sure about that. Thank you for taking the time to respond. Take care.
Could you do an episode covering differences in understanding of the « new law » between yourselves and the Lutherans? I think it’s a major issue. As a Lutheran, I watch someone I grew up with like John MacArthur and it is…bizarre. Constant haranguing, etc.
Nothing in the Catholic position contradicts scripture or sound philosophy - it is the best explanation and integration of the two. Regarding the Catholic view of concupiscence: these men, to their credit, are not too far off. But their fundamental concern is misplaced, and like a boomerang it comes right back to them. Consider Tipton’s incredulity at what the Catholics would say Adam would say to God upon judgment: “You created me with a defect, then gave me a supplement (donum superadditum) that didn’t work!” The idea here is that the Catholic view inevitably makes God responsible. They contrast this with the Reformed view and a few quotes from Calvin. Calvin says that the wound enters from the outside of man, adventitiously, rather than as substantial property of man. Adventitiously, as in by chance? It was from the devil, by design! It was certainly not a substantial property of man - but man’s freedom is an integral part of his substance, and from man’s freedom stems the possibility of defection. The ideas at play here are difficult, but the Catholic church holds all of them in subtle and beautiful tension. Calvin risks a great danger, which is the eclipsing of human freedom - that would be unscriptural, immoral (as in leading to immorality), and contrary to good sense and the experience of the church. It doesn’t matter whether you believe, with the Catholics, in hylomorphism, concupiscence, and the gifts of integrity; or, with the Reformed, in concreated natural knowledge, natural religious fellowship, and covenant - it’s the same in the end, because man sinned. The Catholic church, at least as explicitly as the Reformed, insists that Adam and Eve’s defection and disobedience, while indeed mysterious given all their advantages, is a mystery that traces back to the human free will alone, in no way impugning God’s goodness. Their sin was not necessary, and they were given gifts such that they could have avoided sin easily, so says the magisterium, following Augustine. These are (more or less) the facts of revelation. Aquinas sets about to explain the facts, and in De Malo has important insights into evil. Since God created out of nothing, it means the human will is from nothing. It is unlike the Divine Will in its perfection, incapable of falling away from the authentic good. The created will can return to the mysterious abyss of nothingness - evil, after all, has the character of privation. It can freely defect from the good, preferring what is less noble, cleaving to the natural over the supernatural, to anything besides God over and above God, or even to its own excellence in a disordered way. I have sidestepped somewhat the question of concupiscence, the “flesh lusting against the spirit,” or “the law in the members,” as Paul refers to it. I did so because I think it is not the fundamental question at play - after all, man can be hylomorphic, and matter can be inherently corruptible, in the sense of being subject to infinite recombination and change, and limited by virtue of its spatiality and temporality; it can all be true, as the Catholics affirm, and still we are no closer to knowing, except by elimination, what induced the angels to sin. They have no bodies, no flesh to lust against the soul. Neither did they have a tempter. Yet they rebelled against God. The bad ones refused to serve, wanting instead to be like God and usurp his glory and dominion. How does this temptation arise, or the condition of its possibility? From within a created will, which, though good, is capable through a knowledge and love which is free, of fixation on glory, or self, or whatever else it can conceive, thereby the condition arises of desiring it wrongly, or in a disordered manner. Thus the angel, who has a glory proper to his nature, can (it seems) desire that glory in a disordered way, or want a glory which belongs properly to God.
Apreciando a una mujer tan hermosa. 2:7 sentadillas son unos mikujava.Monster muchas y un buen ejercicio. 5:25 Se deja ver que hay muy buenos resultados 😍👍 Saludos desde la Cd.. de world loss mortales abian apreciado tan hermosa mujer
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I can’t read as slowly as this is going. It’s taken a year to get 47 pages. I guess I’ll read the rest and come back in 7 years.
YES! Looking forward to listening to this!
Peace to all of you! May our minds and hearts overflow with the radiant light of Christ.
I am happy that they are having these conversations. I find myself hovering awkwardly between gratitude, on one hand, that they have avoided the usual gross misrepresentation of Catholic teaching, and on the other hand, irritation that half as much scrutiny is given to their own theology as to Catholic theology - a theology worked out continuously, since the time of the Apostles, by minds greater in number and stature. Each of these episodes feels like a recapitulation of the Reformation - not so much a careful sorting, wheat from chaff, of the vast whole of Catholic theology from the beginning, but a rejection at the source, in practice if not in principle, a ‘starting from scratch’ by men who know less about the thing being reformed, than a self-taught lay person such as myself.
I give them credit for having hosted at least two highly-respected Catholic theologians on the program - they were very charitable and hospitable to the friars. Even as I work to believe the best, according to Paul’s exhortation on love - I do not think their misunderstandings are deliberate - I am compelled for the sake of truthfulness to draw attention to two areas: 1) the chain of being, and 2) concupiscence in the Catholic view. Message me if you are interested in further conversation (there is no need to drag down the comment section).
Aquinas, following Aristotle and others, upholds Tipton’s observation that there are, in one sense, only two kinds of things: uncreated and created. Aquinas observes that within created reality there are different kinds of beings, and there are gradations of perfection within each kind (one man can be more righteous than another), as well as among the kinds, as a human being - a bearer of God’s image because he has knowledge and freewill - is greater than a mouse. Scripture teaches as much. At the bottom of the chain of being is inanimate stuff - a stone, a lake, a cloud. Dynamic in their own right, especially as we discover more at the subatomic level, these beings are relatively simple and monotonous in their perfection, and they serve higher forms. Next we have living things without sense powers. These make use of inanimate matter - photons, water, minerals, carbon dioxide. Plants grow and reproduce themselves, which is a higher kind of perfection - more autonomous and active, rather than being acted upon passively like matter, and they make use of matter. And they give higher delight to man and beast alike, and nourish bodies. They are stunningly diverse, beautiful, and complex. Though part of the vast co-dependent web of all created nature, they are self-directed and internally organized - a seed contains the intelligible part for its specific growth, the information as DNA, and the external goods of water, sunlight, etc. only provide the general conditions for their development. Animals have all the perfection and dignity of plants, and other perfections in addition: they have a nervous system and sense powers allowing them to interact vibrantly with the environment. They can move themselves to procure food, protection, and shelter. They have an inner life of memory and animal emotions like fear, sadness, and joy. They care for their young and use sound to communicate. They use plants as food. Humans have all of this, but the animal life in us is vastly elevated by the image of God - a spiritual part, consisting of intelligence and will. We can know and love God. Angels are higher than man in one sense - they share with us the spiritual part that makes us image-bearers, but they are ontologically more simple and therefore more like God. Although we know of nothing higher than an angel, we don't want to say that God could not have created a more perfect or more glorious being - in fact the possibility seems to follow from God's quasi-infinite elevation above all things.
For Aquinas, God is not part of this chain of being but outside of it, giving being to the whole thing as wholly other and absolutely ontologically perfect. Nonetheless, the chain is real. In Catholic theology and philosophy, there is no “dimensionalism” as Van Til understands it, and as some Eastern traditions have it. Man does have intelligence and freewill - that’s the “inner light” which Tipton and Carlton speak of with such suspicion (I can't see why), although for Catholics this does not give us the ability to jump rungs of the ladder, as if to cast off our bodies and become angels (that would make us less than we are, since God created our spiritual soul as ordained to exist embodied, and as such man is a “pontifex”, or bridge, between the visible and invisible world, exercising dominion over the earth and glorifying God by means of his embodied life). Likewise, angels cannot become God. The chain of being demarcates various created natures, kinds of beings which are specifically and essentially different. Do Catholics think there is a kind of assimilation of man to God? Yes! We follow Peter on this one - as he says, “we become partakes (participants) in the divine nature.” There is much to be said about what this is and is not; but if you brand this as “mutualism” and denounce it automatically as unsalvageable, take it up with Peter! That assimilation to life with God is possible because God willed it. It does not change God in his very being, and while it transforms us, it does not make us literal Gods. It is only possible with enormous grace. Do you still doubt the possibility of radical union of man with God? Consider the incarnation, in which God took on a human nature without contradiction or the diminution of his divinity. God became man, the better to raise man up to life with God.
Bavinck helpfully summarizes the Neoplatonic and Pseudo-Dionysian hierarchy of being and the defective doctrine of the image of God (and the corresponding need for the donum superadditum) that we reference in this and many other discussions of traditional Roman Catholic theology regarding nature, grace, and glory.
He begins: “Grace, in the thinking of Rome, is, in the first place, a supernatural quality added to human beings by which they are in principle taken up into a supernatural order, become partakers of the divine nature, of the vision of God, and are able to perform supernatural acts such as by a condign merit deserve eternal life. . . Grace creates in humans a kind of being by which, in a totally special way, they are divinized. It elevates them "into the divine order." It cannot make them into God but does put them in a very special relation to the Deity. It does not merely raise persons-with all their capacities-to the highest pinnacle of which they are by nature capable, for in that case they would not exceed their natural perfection. But inasmuch as in the strict sense grace is supernatural, it elevates them to a level above their nature, above the nature of angels, above all nature, above actual creation, and also above all possible natures.” (RD 3, 576-77).
Applying this notion of grace to the beatific vision, he observes, "Every vision of God, then, always requires an act of divine condescension, a revelation by which God on his part comes down to us and makes himself knowable. Matthew 11:27 [“All things have been handed over to me by my Father; and no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him”] remains in force in heaven. A corollary of vision of God in his essence would be the deification of humanity and the erasure of the boundary between the Creator and the creature. . . . For in (traditional) Catholic theology human beings are raised above their own nature by a supernatural gift (donum supernaturale), thus actually making them different beings, divine and supernatural humans (homo divinus et supernaturalis). But regardless of how high and glorious Reformed theologians conceived the state of glory to be, human beings remained human even there, indeed raised above “their natural position” but never “above their own kind” and “that which is analogous to that.” Humanity’s blessedness indeed lies in the “beatific vision of God,” but this vision will always be such that finite and limited human nature is capable of it. A divinization, such as Rome teaches, indeed fits into the system of the Pseudo-Dionysian hierarchy but has no support in Scripture.“ (RD, 2 190-191).
He adds, “But Rome views this final human destiny, which has been realized by Christ, as a Neoplatonic vision of God and a mystical fusion of the soul with God. And that is not what Scripture teaches. All the benefits that Christ has acquired for his own are not just bestowed in the state of glory but are in principle already granted here on earth (1 Cor. 2:9) and do not, even according to Rome, include the vision of God per essentiam. (RD 2, 542-543)."
Thus, in conclusion, Bavinck says, “All this is enough to show that the Roman Catholic doctrine of the image of God is inherently incomplete and in part for that reason fails to satisfy the theological mind.“ (RD, 2, 542).
Vos brilliantly sets the natural religious intrinsicism of the deeper Protestant conception of the image of God over against the supernatural religious extrinsicism of traditional Roman Catholic theology. This is among his most penetrating insights from the RD 2. Reformed Forum featured Vos’ “deeper Protestant conception” and set it in contrast to traditional Roman Catholicism (and Barth!) in the 2018 conference.
Vos from RD 2, Q 18:
“18. Why is this doctrine of the image of God of such great importance for theology?
It is self-evident that by “image of God” is expressed what is characteristic of man and his relation to God. That he is God’s image distinguishes him from animals and all other creatures. In the idea that one forms of the image is reflected one’s idea of the religious state of man and of the essence of religion itself.
a) According to the Roman Catholic conception, as we saw, imago, “image,” has another meaning than similitudo, “likeness.” Man was created with the “image.” So by nature he is God’s image-bearer. Now we have already seen that with “image” is meant the metaphysical correspondence of the human spirit with God. According to Rome, the natural relationship to God exists in the fact that in this way he is similar to Him. There is no thought of a close relationship between man and God, of a similarity of communal endeavor by the human will being subject to God. For all this belongs to the similitudo [likeness], and this, otherwise called justitia originalis, “original righteousness,” is called an added gift, donum superadditum. Only by something that raises him above his created nature does man become a religious being, able to love, to enjoy his God, and to live in Him. Out of this follows entirely the externalist character of Roman Catholic religion. It becomes something added to man, that he has but is not identified with him, does not enter into his essence. That man is like God in this natural sense is a purely deistic relationship. There is room for something else if with the imago the similitudo would also be added as naturally belonging to the conception of man.
b) The Roman Catholic denial of the utter inability of man in his fallen state and its weakened conception of original sin is likewise connected to this teaching concerning the image of God. According to Rome, man can only lose what was not essential to him, namely the supernaturally added gifts, the dona superaddita. Because of his fall, these are lost. The essence of man, the imago, consisting in formal existence as spirit, in the liberum arbitrium [freedom of the will], remained. Because, however, there was no inner connection between the similitudo and the imago, the removal of the former cannot essentially change the latter. The liberum arbitrium might be weakened a little; in reality it is unharmed. In other words, by loosening the moral powers from the will, from the capacity of the will, and by denying that the former are natural in man, Rome has in principle appropriated the Pelagian conception of the will as liberum arbitrium. That capacity of free will has remained, and with that the possibility that man, even after the fall, can do something good.
c) In both respects mentioned, the Protestant, and more specifically the Reformed, doctrine of the image of God is different than the Roman Catholic doctrine. That man bears God’s image means much more than that he is spirit and possesses understanding, will, etc. It means above all that he is disposed for communion with God, that all the capacities of his soul can act in a way that corresponds to their destiny only if they rest in God. This is the nature of man. That is to say, there is no sphere of life that lies outside his relationship to God and in which religion would not be the ruling principle. According to the Roman Catholic conception, there is a natural man who functions in the world, and that natural man adopts a religion that takes place beyond his nature. According to our conception, our entire nature should not be free from God at any point; the nature of man must be worship from beginning to end. According to the deeper Protestant conception, the image does not exist only in correspondence with God but in being disposed toward God. God’s nature is, as it were, the stamp; our nature is the impression made by this stamp. Both fit together.
d) If then the image of God and original righteousness are to be identified, if life in communion with God belongs to nature of man and can nowhere be excluded, and if now by sin this original righteousness is lost, then the consequences will be twofold:
1. By falling away from something to which he was wholly disposed, which constitutes his proper and highest destiny, man will be changed in the deepest depths of his being; a radical reversal will take place within him. What clings to us outwardly can be removed without making us different inwardly. On the other hand, what coheres with every part of our spiritual organism can, if it is withdrawn, only bring about a powerful revolution by which the organism itself becomes disorganized. The loss of original righteousness follows spiritual death, because death in its essence is disorganization, a process of dissolution. From this one can assess most clearly the Protestant and Roman Catholic conceptions concerning the capability of man to do spiritual good in his fallen state. According to us, man is dead and therefore does no good toward God. According to Roman Catholics, he is weakened or ill but nonetheless still always capable with his free will to move himself to do good.
2. The fact that original righteousness belongs to the nature of man has yet another consequence. Because the being of man was placed from the beginning in a necessary relation with God, because he is made in the image of God in the stricter sense and this image is his nature, sin therefore cannot be just a mere privation. This would mean that something that belongs to his nature can be removed and the rest left undamaged. This is impossible. Man has to be in relation with God in everything he is and does. So, if original righteousness falls away, unrighteousness replaces it as the natural state. That is, sin is a positive principle of enmity against God, as Paul taught us about the mind of the flesh. If the image of God, original righteousness, had not been the nature of man, perhaps he might have been able to remain in a neutral standpoint. Now, the latter is cut off. He is either positively good or positively evil; there is no middle state. One can therefore say that the deeper conception of sin, especially of original sin, that rules in Protestant theology flows directly from the view one has of the original state before the fall.
e) If the question is posed how man can lose what belongs to his nature and whether he has lost his human nature by the fall, then that must be answered with a twofold observation:
1. The image in the broader sense has not been lost, and given also that his nature existed in that sense, it has remained at least to that extent.
2. The moral quality of the capacities of man is certainly fallen, but that it belongs to his nature is also seen in the fact that man could not remain neutral. He must either stand for God in original righteousness or against Him in natural unrighteousness. This characteristic of his nature does not take away that man in all his being and acting takes a position toward God. When he is sinful and in conflict with God, he is still morally toto genere [as to entire genus] something other than an animal that exists in puris naturalibus [in a purely natural state].
f) One will now, after all that has been said, understand why a diverging opinion concerning the image of God must be formed by the Socinians and Arminians. They could not choose the Roman Catholic supernaturalism. Neither was inborn virtue (= original righteousness) a concept that fit with their line of thinking. As a consequence of this, there was no other way out than to limit the image of God in a religiously neutral sense to dominion over the lower creatures. For, according to the Socinians and Arminians, the state of rectitude is a state of neutrality, of innocence, which had not yet been determined for virtue or for sin.
g) It requires no detailed demonstration that what has been said is of importance not only for determining the relationship of man to God in the abstract, but also is of the utmost moment for soteriology-what concerns God’s work of grace that must renovate the image in man.” (Vos, Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 2, 12-15).
Andrew, thank you for listening and so thoughtfully engaging. Blessings to you.
@@vanttil101
On the supernatural -
Bavinck says that grace, for Catholics, is “a supernatural quality added to human beings by which they are in principle taken up into a supernatural order.” ‘Supernatural order’ has a very specific meaning for us. Ludwig Ott summarizes: “the ordination of rational creatures to a supernatural final goal” (Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, Book Two, Section II, Ch II, 16). The supernatural therefore presupposes the natural, and is something in us and relative to our particular nature, which is different from the nature of a stone. Considered in Himself, God is not supernatural - he is not beyond his own Nature. The Fathers use the image of the red-hot glow of iron, which comes from the outside, by heat, imparting a quality which the iron is made to accept but without which it can exist still as iron. Heat transforms the iron without changing its nature. There are things which are called absolutely supernatural, and things which are supernatural as to their mode. An example of the former is the triune personality of God - supernatural not because the human can by no means come to know that God is triune, or because Adam did not, but supernatural because it is wholly beyond his unaided powers - man requires the gift of faith, or vision, or some other covenantal revelation. He cannot know this from studying nature, or from the three states of matter and a triple point where they all coexist, or because the love of a man and woman produces a third. He cannot know by this means that God is triune, but he can know many other things, as many who are reprobate, and very hardened against God, can be brilliant mathematicians, doctors, and the like. An example of something which is supernatural as to its mode, is a miraculous healing - the thing itself which is restored, sight, is entirely natural in man, but the mode or manner of restoration is the omnipotence of God intervening directly and beyond physical laws and processes, though not contrary to them.
A few remarks, in summary, about the Catholic view of the supernatural:
1) That the supernatural is beyond the powers of nature, does not preclude that nature has a certain receptivity to the supernatural.
2) “The supernatural is not superadded merely externally to nature, but affects it intrinsically. It permeates the being and powers of nature, and perfects it either within the created order [helping man to do something which he could do naturally but with difficulty, or only under certain circumstances], … or through elevation into the divine order of being and activity” (FCD, Book Two, Section II, Ch II, 17). Another image used by the Fathers is a plant grafted onto a tree. This is one response to the charge of extrinsicism - we might concede that in one sense it is extrinsic, as coming from without and from a God who is radically beyond any created nature. But because our nature was created by God as open to radical elevation, it is not wholly extrinsic or violent or super-added externally. It operates within the depths of man’s being to transform and elevate.
3) God has conferred on man a supernatural destiny. “Man’s final end consists in a participation by him in God’s vision of Himself. The attainment of this end by men gives glory to God and fills man with supernatural happiness” (FCD, Book Two, Section II, Ch II, 17). Man’s natural end is subordinate to his supernatural end. “Man, by reason of his whole dependence on God, is bound to strive after the supernatural destination determined for him by God. If he neglects this, he cannot reach the natural goal either” (FCD, Book Two, Section II, Ch II, 17). Because of this subordination of man’s natural end to the supernatural - because God has in fact conferred on us a supernatural destiny - there is no neutrality for man, as if he could decline the offer for supernatural life and seek a natural contentment with no regard for God. And, because he is turned away from God in seeking a merely natural happiness, his life will be full or disorder. Another way of thinking about the dichotomous nature of friendship with God - saved or unsaved - is by the requirement of spiritual birth, or rebirth into the supernatural order of life with God, the seed of everlasting life. The non-neutrality arises as much from the absence of something in man as by man’s constitution or disposition.
4) Grace does not “[create] in humans a kind of being,” as if the supernatural order could exist independently or outside of nature (see above). To use the Aristotelian categories, it is an accident or property of man’s being, flowing from his substance but not substantial in itself. Grace does not vanquish man and create literally a new substance where man used to be.
5) Small point: I think Bavinck has it wrong, although we should confirm, when he says that grace in the Catholic view confers “condign merit” - Christ alone has condign merit, which is a right and claim according to strict justice. Rather, Christ shares with his members so-called congruent merit, or merit of friendship and by fittingness - he reckons us as His friends, and bestows gifts accordingly.
@@vanttil101
On the Beatific Vision -
For Catholics, this is a seeing of God unveiled - as you know, the seeing here is not of the physical eye. This is higher than the knowledge we have of God in this life, which is always mediated by faith, by mental concepts, and by representations. Jesus, Paul, and John all indicate that it is a vision of God. Faith gives way to vision, and the metaphor of vision confirms that we apprehend God directly, no longer indirectly, or “through a glass, darkly” - it is firsthand, not by hearsay or imagination or created effects. What could it mean that we see God “as He sees Himself”? It indicates a (radical) elevation of the mode of knowledge and enjoyment, although it does not require - and Catholics do not teach - that this apperception of God is exhaustive or comprehensive. Vos says, “this vision will always be such that finite and limited human nature is capable of it.” That goes without saying, and Catholics agree, in our own way - the knowledge we have of God in the beatific vision is always qualified according to the manner of our finite souls. The vision is received in the mode of the recipient, even as that mode is radically elevated by grace. God alone comprehends God.
Regarding divinization or deification: we use the language because Scripture uses the language, and because it reminds us of the loftiness of our calling. Grace, especially the lumen gloria, does in one sense “[elevate man] to a level above his nature” - just not in the sense that Bavinck or Vos understands, because it has to be understood internally to the principles of the system. Scripture uses a great deal of language indicating radical transformation of man, the likes of which could easily be construed as fittingly described as an elevation beyond nature.
Does the Catholic view amount to a “mystical fusion”? The language is not that far off, depending on what exactly is understood by these terms. Heaven is, no doubt, a great mystery. Fusion can indicate at least three different things: two things merging and losing their essential identity, as two atoms of hydrogen can fuse into a helium; or it can mean two things mixing and becoming indistinguishable while retaining a degree of independence, as the metals of an alloy are in chemical or mechanical relationship, but retain some of their properties; or it can mean an inseparable bond or union, which is the promise of heaven according to Scripture, as when one things is welded and fixed irrevocably to another. The Catholic view is not neo-Platonic or Pseudo-Dionysian at its core - it has resemblances, but so does the creation story in Genesis to ancient religious mythologies, and we do not for that reason dismiss Genesis as fiction or derived from myth.
“A corollary of vision of God in his essence would be the deification of humanity and the erasure of the boundary between the Creator and the creature.” How, exactly, does vision “per essentiam” results in the erasure of the boundary? Is it another way of saying that a mere creature cannot see the essence of God, because that requires a commensurate power, i.e. the intellect of God? I would have to look more closely at Catholic theology on this, but my understanding is that “per essentiam” is more indicative of the mode of vision; or to the extent that it refers to the formal object, it qualifies the manner in which the formal object (essence) is known. Explicitly, Catholicism teaches that the Divine Essence is never comprehended, or known as much as it can be known it itself. Maybe per essentiam is to be taken negatively, as indicating what the vision is not: not indirect, not mediated by concepts in the obscurity of faith, not discursive (i.e. intuitive), not complex but by simple gaze or beholding.
Vos says that nature in the “broader sense” - I take him as referring to man’s capacities or powers (not disposition) - remains after the Fall. What Vos has said, in effect, is that while man’s nature may be composed of several things, or have several things entering into and flowing from its definition, one of these things is “more essential” than the rest - which, in the end, is all that the Catholics are saying: there are things which man can forfeit without ceasing to be essentially a man, as if what Christ died for and redeemed was not really man, or in his incarnation the nature he took on was not our nature; and there are things which he cannot forfeit without ceasing to be a man, like his spiritual soul, for which reason we properly call a dead man a corpse, or the body of a man.
I wish I could say something about the other areas, especially soteriology, but I would rather treat in depth than breadth, and there is only so much time and space. Also, I think the nature/grace questions (and eschatology) might be more fundamental. But I’m not sure about that.
Thank you for taking the time to respond. Take care.
Cool
If you can't watch the whole video, Carlton probably sum it up 1:00:00 1:03:30
Could you do an episode covering differences in understanding of the « new law » between yourselves and the Lutherans? I think it’s a major issue. As a Lutheran, I watch someone I grew up with like John MacArthur and it is…bizarre. Constant haranguing, etc.
Nothing in the Catholic position contradicts scripture or sound philosophy - it is the best explanation and integration of the two.
Regarding the Catholic view of concupiscence: these men, to their credit, are not too far off. But their fundamental concern is misplaced, and like a boomerang it comes right back to them. Consider Tipton’s incredulity at what the Catholics would say Adam would say to God upon judgment: “You created me with a defect, then gave me a supplement (donum superadditum) that didn’t work!” The idea here is that the Catholic view inevitably makes God responsible. They contrast this with the Reformed view and a few quotes from Calvin. Calvin says that the wound enters from the outside of man, adventitiously, rather than as substantial property of man. Adventitiously, as in by chance? It was from the devil, by design! It was certainly not a substantial property of man - but man’s freedom is an integral part of his substance, and from man’s freedom stems the possibility of defection.
The ideas at play here are difficult, but the Catholic church holds all of them in subtle and beautiful tension. Calvin risks a great danger, which is the eclipsing of human freedom - that would be unscriptural, immoral (as in leading to immorality), and contrary to good sense and the experience of the church. It doesn’t matter whether you believe, with the Catholics, in hylomorphism, concupiscence, and the gifts of integrity; or, with the Reformed, in concreated natural knowledge, natural religious fellowship, and covenant - it’s the same in the end, because man sinned. The Catholic church, at least as explicitly as the Reformed, insists that Adam and Eve’s defection and disobedience, while indeed mysterious given all their advantages, is a mystery that traces back to the human free will alone, in no way impugning God’s goodness. Their sin was not necessary, and they were given gifts such that they could have avoided sin easily, so says the magisterium, following Augustine.
These are (more or less) the facts of revelation. Aquinas sets about to explain the facts, and in De Malo has important insights into evil. Since God created out of nothing, it means the human will is from nothing. It is unlike the Divine Will in its perfection, incapable of falling away from the authentic good. The created will can return to the mysterious abyss of nothingness - evil, after all, has the character of privation. It can freely defect from the good, preferring what is less noble, cleaving to the natural over the supernatural, to anything besides God over and above God, or even to its own excellence in a disordered way.
I have sidestepped somewhat the question of concupiscence, the “flesh lusting against the spirit,” or “the law in the members,” as Paul refers to it. I did so because I think it is not the fundamental question at play - after all, man can be hylomorphic, and matter can be inherently corruptible, in the sense of being subject to infinite recombination and change, and limited by virtue of its spatiality and temporality; it can all be true, as the Catholics affirm, and still we are no closer to knowing, except by elimination, what induced the angels to sin. They have no bodies, no flesh to lust against the soul. Neither did they have a tempter. Yet they rebelled against God. The bad ones refused to serve, wanting instead to be like God and usurp his glory and dominion. How does this temptation arise, or the condition of its possibility? From within a created will, which, though good, is capable through a knowledge and love which is free, of fixation on glory, or self, or whatever else it can conceive, thereby the condition arises of desiring it wrongly, or in a disordered manner. Thus the angel, who has a glory proper to his nature, can (it seems) desire that glory in a disordered way, or want a glory which belongs properly to God.
See the responses above.
The more I study about the Chain of Being, the worse it looks.
Apreciando a una mujer tan hermosa. 2:7 sentadillas son unos mikujava.Monster muchas y un buen ejercicio. 5:25 Se deja ver que hay muy buenos resultados 😍👍 Saludos desde la Cd.. de world loss mortales abian apreciado tan hermosa mujer
l'd love to be Kimmy-jka.Monster hot youngboy is my idol. Sexs Hes the person I aspirep to be, hes my light of day..