I am an economist. As such I can tell you we don’t have such things as turning points. For example every economic is cased by things that happen long ago, but they are triggered when a critical number of people realized it happen. The stock market, like military willingness to fight works on speculation and deniability. Best way to find the closest thing to an economic turning point would looking at Albert Speer; who knew this was going to be catastrophic either way, but he worked with incomplete information to make an accurate estimate. All of that being said: from eco-political point of view the only turning point was after the fall of France. From the start of the war to the fall of France everything is kind of unstoppable; that is generalizing all reactions. After the fall of France is the only time that Germany ever had real political bargaining power. They could had stopped and called for negotiations. They could had launch a propaganda campaign against the Brits instead of bombing raids. That is the only one point where Germans had the option to change the world direction.
5 лет назад+4
A mathematician, a statistician and an economist walk into a bar to discuss what is "1+1". The mathematician starts "It is obvious, 1 + 1 = 2" and sips his beer. "Not so fast" the statistician cautions "1 + 1 = 2, plus or minus 10%" "Well..." the economist weighs in "1 + 1.... It entirely depends what you want the outcome to be."
You’re not just correct, but also insightful, up to the point where you assert that Germany had tangible bargaining power after the Fall of France. I disagree, I think that on the contrary it’s the fall of France where they effectively forfeit their political bargaining power in favor of military domination. Germany had steadily-growing bargaining power up to that point - otherwise the annexation of Austria, the affair in the Sudetenland, the shenanigans in Spain - those would not have been feasible unless they had a position from which to bargain. They did - they held total war above everyone’s heads only a couple short decades after the last global conflagration and resulting political, social, economic, even biological turmoil. That was their bargaining chip. After the invasion of Poland the ability to leverage the threat of war changes to the ability to leverage a limitation to the hostilities but once France falls, there is nothing else for Germany to hold over Britains head. Total War it is and while it’s tempting to give in to the British propaganda of an empire besieged on all sides, I don’t think Churchill or anyone else in the know really thought the worst would come to pass. Call it denial, or call it something else. There’s the anecdote of Churchill making plans for the occupation of Germany during the Blitz, but regardless of its factuality it is an accurate illustration of Churchill’s machinations in planning the prosecution of the war. Everything is done in consideration of what is to come afterwards, what would give Britain and in a larger context the Western countries the best possible position. For all of its military might, I don’t think the Germans had any more real bargaining power after the fall of France. They’d pushed their adversaries into forlorn acceptance of the eventuality that’d kept them paralyzed for years. I think Churchill and the rest of the British leadership never visualized a war without eventual American participation and in that economic participation the impossibility of defeat. The foreknowledge of the looming Barbarossa must have seemed like Christmas. I think the one - or perhaps two - genuine surprises to the British calculus after that point in the war were the competency and audacity of the Japanese, and that the balance of power would eventually shift to the American side of the partnership. The first is the very well-established and discussed colonial tendency to denigrate - and thus underestimate - a non-European opponent despite the red flags and the second is a similar kind of colonial delusion - that one is the recipient of goods, and thus the dominant entity. I’m sure Churchill at his most optimistic saw the Americans as just another colony - once removed - but here now in the clutch to help the mother country. He probably hoped that the partnership would bring America into the British sphere rather than vice-versa, as he hoped to with Ireland by bullying them into the war and the putting them under British command - it would be a wartime necessity, he would say. With this kind of mindset, I really don’t believe they were giving Germany ANY inroads with which to bargain, after France and Poland, it was war until the bitter end. Perhaps if things turned out differently we’d speak of Great Britain in 41 with the same astonishment we reserve for the Nazi leadership in 1945.
For me,everything in WWII hinges on the Germans not securing the Caucasus oil fields in 1941. This wasn't just an issue of 20/20 hindsight, the Nazi logistics people knew it and informed Hitler accordingly before Barbarossa.
Funnily enough and perhaps fittingly given the role they played in WWI, this was a fuckup on the part of the German General staff. They were convinced that going for Moscow was the right choice and did much to undermine Hitler's desire to go for the oil resources. I'd never want to have to fight tactically against the German General staff but they let Bismarck did all their strategic thinking for them and once he was gone Germany lacked any clear strategy, it was all tactical planning for the worst to an extent that they didn't have a way to avoid the two-front war in WWI because they'd committed themselves so wholly to a plan that involved invading France through Belgium.
I've read somewhere that Hitler got sick for a few weeks, and German army staff decided to change the plans to focus on Moscow, instead of Caucasus. They also refused Hitlers suggestion to mount bigger guns on some of the panzer IV's, which they did next year anyway, creating the best tank in the world at the time. Could have solved the t-34 problem in 41.
I would say it all started going bad for the Germans when they judged Britain wouldn't go to war to defend Poland, once they enter a war against Britain they can't trade effectively with anyone that requires shipping other than through the Baltic. In many ways it's the same as WWI.
"For me" - that's the point. YOU blame Hitler without knowing what you're talking about. Hitler focused on the economics of war but the general staff wanted to capture Moscow as quickly as possible and at all costs, while even sabotaging Hitler's plans. Why do you think did he fire so many competent generals before July 20th 1944? Watch these: ruclips.net/video/kVo5I0xNRhg/видео.html ruclips.net/video/hzr6dD8fvVY/видео.html And then come back. But then you'll probably say "Hitler should've focused on capturing Moscow". What a joke!
I agree, the war probably would always end in disaster for Germany because...America...I mean see Japanese navy for proof, the Royal Navy was globally the largest navy for centuries, the US dethroned them in a few years making a mockery of the statement of “naval strategy is built strategy” But I agree without securing the oil fields in the opening assault, the Germans forfeit their ability to survive the war, whether victory or stalemate
I think the turning point of the Pacific War was when the U.S. put oil embargoes in Japan. That almost ran Japan oit of oil and forced Japan to either halt their war on China or take on the Western Allies.
Both were still pretty much doomed to failure without access to oil for the Japanese military. The latter most likely still doomed to failure regardless.
Aden Litwiller They didn't have choice, FDR approved Joint Board plan 355 with his own signature. It laid out the pre-emptive strike of firebombings to destroy Japanese cities from bases in China. War breaks out in Pacific in 1942 regardless of whether the Japanese do something or nothing at all.
Schwarzbraun they could have stopped raping and pillaging their way through China. The US was pursuing a diplomatic solution to stop the atrocities committed by Japan right up to the point when the Japanese Ambassador notified them of War on December 7. Also, just because FDR signed a plan for a pre-emptive strike does not mean they would execute the plan. And, an intervention in the Second Sino-Japanese war would be justified by every measure: atrocities committed by the Japanese, the Japanese having started the war for no reason, and the threats to American interests in the Pacific, such as Guam and the Philippines.
Imagine this exchange if you will; Guy A: "This is the situation; our economy is in a real crisis now and the war we've been fighting for over a decade requires a steady supply of resources if we hope to continue it." Guy B: "Yes we can't go loosing this war now can we, so what's the situation on our resources currently?" Guy C: "Currently we've got next to nothing coming in and a lot of our reserves going out to maintain the war effort." Guy A: "Why's nothing coming in?" Guy C: "Well because we started this war, some real horrible things have happened during it, and the guys with whom which we were getting the vast majority of our resources from earlier through trade wanted us to end the war and we told them to mind their own damn business and to get fucked. More or less. Well they didn't like that and so they put this embargo on us that's strangling our economy and soon enough will start to strangle the war effort as well." Guy B: "What a bunch of jerks right? Really unfair of them to deny us resources when they've got a nearly limitless supply to draw from and our own is so severely limited to begin with. On top of that they're not at war with anyone currently and meanwhile we've been at war for over ten years. A war we couldn't maintain for very long in the first place if we'd not been receiving resources from them through trade. Oh and their industrial manufacturing capabilities far surpass us in every way!" Guy A: "Oh well then that settles it then. We've got to go to war with them. There's no other choice, 'cause we need those resources they have so that we can keep our war effort going unimpeded." Guy C: "So let me get this straight. Our resources are limited and supply is dwindling rapidly because of the war we're currently in. Then there's also the embargo that the guys with whom we used to get our resources from have currently placed on us because of this war we're in, further straining supply, and our only solution is to go to war with them to get access to those resources again. Right?" Guy B: "Well we've no choice!" Guy C: "War with the guys whose access to resources is nearly limitless and whose manufacturing capabilities far surpass our own?" Guy A: "It's the only viable option to get those resources for the war effort." Guy C: "Umm, are you sure it's the only choice?" Guy A: "Well it's the only choice we've got, so of course it is." Guy C: "Right, sorry. Um.. what was our reason again for starting the war we're still currently in?"
What I wonder is whether there is any utility in looking/finding “turning points”? It seems like an arbitrary point that each author gets to define for him/herself. The only value I can see, perhaps, is to simplify the complex series of events into discrete portions. But that seems like really low bar to set for serious academic work.
But that sounds like exactly what "turning points" are used for. To my very limited understanding the most useful reason for identifying "turning points" is when the actual participants realize either that they are winning or losing and that there is really nothing that can be done to change it. For the nation/alliance that realizes that they are beginning to win it can cause them to push themselves harder to push the enemy over the edge. What "turning point" means to the losing side is that they get to that point where they decide when it is acceptable to quit, if at all? WW1 Germany saw that the war was unsustainable so instead of losing all of their additional expansions and have enemy forces drive into Germany, they decided to quit. To me, that is really the only use for "turning points" other than for writing a book. I think if you want to figure out what triggered the turning point one must look at what caused the combatant to give up or become unable to resist. This would appear to be much simpler if the combatant in question surrendered because with enough research it's possible to fairly accurately guess what made them come to the conclusion. If they fought to the last you almost have to start at the end of a conflict, and ask "why did this happen?", go further back, ask "why" again until there appears to be a correlation of sorts. That seems more like speculation though.
I have seen the Battle of Smolensk as being placed as a turning point for exhausting Army group Centre and halting their advance in Operation Barbarossa. Also you have a better case for Alam el Halfa where Rommel was stopped from advancing into Egypt
I think the Turning Point of WW2 was Stalin's speech to the nation on July 3, 1941. In every country that Hitler had attacked up to that point, the government collapsed (or fled.) In France, the new government surrendered. Hitler expected the same thing to happen in the USSR. He is famously quoted as saying, "All we must do is kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will fall." This was a reasonable expectation based on previous experience. (Only in the UK did the government collapse yet the nation keep fighting. Had Hallifax been P.M. this might not have happened.) But when Stalin was able to pull himself together and give his first speech, he cemented his grip on the nation. The war would not have been over until he decided to give up. In that sense, his elimination of anyone capable of replacing him in the Purges can be seen as a success. The only way for Barbarossa to have been a success would have been for Stalin to be deposed and sucessor government to have given Hitler what he wanted. But the problem for Hitler was that this would have required events to happen over which he had no control. It did not matter how deep in the USSR his panzers drove or how many Soviet soldiers he killed; he could not physically drive far enough or kill enough to make Stalin quit if Stalin didn't want to. And no one other than Stalin was going to change Stalin's mind.
And Stalin wasn’t going to because of either stupidity/paranoia/determination/fear/hatred/whatever Regardless of reason, he wasn’t going to, especially because he wasn’t the peasant rifleman being encircled
The Soviets didn't have a choice. Hitler's intention was extermination, where in France, if you kept your head down and do what you were supposed to, you'd probably be all right.
I prefer the concept of 'tipping point', so this can be the point where the overwhelming economic / military production / size of military of one nation finally stops the momentum of a small, aggressive and highly competent/experienced enemy. Or to get away from obvious WW2 references, the point at which the reliability and cost of guns makes them more effective than longbows. With hindsight, many of these outcomes are inevitable, but the tipping points remain interesting for all the less obvious reasons (psychology etc) that you discuss.
The discovery and colonization of the new world was a huge turning point in human history, where Europe went from being meh, to the dominant. It did take a long time but the results were that
ww2-Europe turning point: 3 July 1940: The British fleet's attack on the French fleet are Oran Algeria. US President Roosevelt had been reluctant to support Britain because of doubts that Britain would actually fight on. This changed his mind and armaments and supplies started flowing to Britain (and later the Soviet Union). Since this channel concentrates on logistics, industrial power … (much appreciated), thought that this might meet the request for an "economic turning point".
Okay, why does that matter? You say what happened but this ignores the fact that Germany would never be able to break the UK in historical terms, only uboats could do it and it didn’t work, the only maybe is the Soviet Union aid since the west fed the soldiers and civilians and gave them the good equipment but simultaneously Roosevelt believed where no one else did in the Soviet ability to fight, and who’s to say he or the US wouldn’t be convinced later without a war crime?
Speaking as an Australian, I consider that the Battle of the Coral Sea (4-8 May 1942) and the Battle of Milne Bay (25 August 1942 - 7 September 1942) when the Japanese were first checked at sea and on land to be important turning points-not least because these (with Kokoda) meant that Australia would not be invaded.
38.27 MHnV - VERY good point. The imperative to attack from the strategic level constantly overrode the reports from the operational and tactical levels (Army Group down to Corps) about troop exhaustion. When the Germans had had time to dig in with adequate numbers, they could and did repel Soviet offensives with very heavy losses and create tactical opportunities to counterattack.
I mean, it still comes down to what does "turning point" mean? Does it mean the strategic initiative has shifted? Or is it how the war is perceived by participants? Or is it the point at which one side has effectively already won? Or if you want to think of it in a mathematical sense, it could be thought of as an inflection point, like on a sinusoidal line. In that case the battles of the Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal fit as an example of this model. The Coral Sea is where the Japanese could be said to still be "winning" (or at least achieving victories), but not as effectively as they were previously. Then Midway was the turning point itself when their fortunes took a definitive downward turn with the loss of 4 key ships. By the time Guadalcanal was fought they were definitely losing but still had some fighting capability left. After those battles though it is a general downward trend from there. They did not have the same fighting capabilities that they had had before. The argument could be made that the turning point was Pearl Harbor, since the USA ultimately could out produce Japan on all economic fronts, but I would say that the trio of battles at the Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal was the point at which the USA definitively overcame any effective Japanese resistance. Pearl Harbor set in motion the events that would lead to Japan's defeat, but Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal was when it was achieved at the practical level. The Eastern Front on the other hand was more dynamic, with the initiative shifting multiple times, so it had multiple turning points. But if going by the model I just described, the key turning point was the Battle of Moscow. That was the high water mark and the point at which the strategic initiative began passing to the USSR. Sure, Germany launched Case Blue in 1942, but it was on a smaller scale and achieved far less, with Kursk following the same pattern of increasingly less effective operations. So before a turning point even occurs under this model, there will be events that show were the trend is going, and the turning point itself is when a sudden and obvious shift occurs.
Enjoyable discussion, agree definition of the turning point is key, so what are the strategic, operational or tactical outcomes from initial impacts resulting in a turning point. So consider for discussion the following examples. Pearl harbour I agree was a/make that, the strategic turning point with America entering WW2, most certainly Winston Churchill thought that in his diary. Operation Barbarossa the invasion of Russia 1942, with the inevitably outcome, similar to Napoleon 1812, the breaking of Lorenz the German strategic command code 1942 consider by Eisenhower to reduce the war by 2 years. Operationally the Battle of the Atlantic 1943 defeating the u-boats, Jutland 1916, and Cambria 1917. Tactically the battles France 1940, Dunkirk 1940, Normandy 1944, Kohima 1944 El Alamein 1942 Stalingrad 1942 and Kursk 1943 which are key changes in momentum.
4 years after it was published, but here we go: Turning point is a fuzzy term, seem it could mean: -Battle/event where if it had gone differently, the war after that point goes hugely differently. -Point where a war switches from one side being generally successful/advancing to the other side being successful/advancing. This one could easily stretch a "turning point" out to a long period of back and forth fighting as one side gains an advantage over time, and where arguments come in about whether stopping an army, or reversing an army, or starting to advance, counts as a turning point. --Also a turning point needs a longer war than the events described as the "point". A single battle finishing a war doesn't really have one (aside from maybe one part of a battle), and a war that's mostly won at the beginning with mopping up, or with a quick finish after a long, even, war aren't really thought of as having turning points. --And, of course, a war that continually goes well for one side doesn't have turning points either, they just win. For WW2, Midway = guadacanal and Moscow-->Stalingrad-->Kursk are examples of the second point, where the allies slowed, stopped, and started pushing back against the axis over a long time, and all of these could be considered a turning point. Non WW2 possible examples: -Plataea, Salamis in Xerxes's invasion could be either kind -Egypt attacking the Sinai passes in the 1973 Israel war could be either one -Pusan defense, Chinese invasion in the Korean war, both kinds. -Iran-Iraq war: In 1981, pick any battle where the Iraqi invasion stalled to when Iran reconquered something. 2nd kind. Non examples: -2nd Punic war, from my understanding. Rome survived awhile, than finished it pretty quickly. -Conquistadors vs. Aztecs: Conquistadors escamped, but didn't continuously fight the Aztecs, instead got more forces and won quickly. -Hastings: Single battle, doesn't seem like any particular event lost it immediately. -U.S. Civil War doesn't have any one big moment, just lots of fighting and building of northern advantages.
Yes, please do another episode on turning points, ok? You might want to include this in your discussion: Thesis: There were actually multiple turning points within each theater. On the eastern front Theatre, there were 3 major turning points: 1) Battle of Moscow & counteroffensive (which "made it impossible for Germany to win the war"), 2) Stalingrad and the Uranus/Saturn counteroffensive (which "made it certain that Germany would lose the war"), and 3) Kursk (which made it certain that the war would end with Germany's near-destruction, unconditional surrender, and occupation). In the North African Theatre, the first turning point may have been Operation Crusader and the relief of Tobruk, which halted, depleted, and turned back Rommel's forces for the first time, the second was the survival and successful resupply of Malta (which prevented Rommel from being fully resupplied), and the third was the combined successes of Auchinlech and Montgomery in halting Rommel's advance in the First Battle of El Alamein and the Battle of Alam el Halfa (July-Sept, 1942). In the South Pacific Theatre, the first turning point might have been the Battle of the Coral Sea, which prevented two Japanese carriers from being part of the Midway operation, the second might have been Midway, and the third would have been the Solomons Campaign of 1942 and conquest of Guadalcanal. There was also a famous letter, written by Mao Tze-Teng, addressing the turning point that was about to happen in the fall of 1942 around Stalingrad.
In order to talk about a turning point (in time), in the context of history, it is necessary to borrow a concept well known in physics and engineering - that is the concept of convolution. Using this concept the moment of the turning point is not the battle or the campaign but the decision which initiated the actions.
The IJN command mostly though that a war with the US would be unwinnable, in fact Yamamoto stated that the only option for Japan was winning a few important battles and then make a peace agreement (the IJA was all for the war, actually).
Solomons campaign was from August 1942 to the end of the war, since Bougainville remained contested throughout the war. But, it was largely over with the landings at Empress Augusta Bay and the completion or the airfields in the perimiter.
Talking of turning points makes sense in older wars when there would often be a large battle, with one side getting annihilated and unable to put up a fight from that point. In more modern wars, battles are overrated and what matters more is just having more stuff and grinding the enemy down.
The Japanese loss at Midway cost them air superiority over blue water and restricted day time operations. Before Midway the Japanese dominated everywhere. The Japanese had to island hop to perform operations after Midway. The Solomons cost them the ability to perform offensive operations. The Japanese didn't realize this until the marianis islands.
according to TIK the horses were not outside the Stalingrad encirclement. They were eaten after the Luftwaffe failed completely to even supply the bare bare minimum to the 6th Army.
I believe the actual situation is the majority of the horses were evacuated outside of the encirclement prior to it happening. However these would be nonessential horses or horses that could be spared. Zero horses would have made it impossible to for example, reposition divisional artillary. Therefore a certain % were always going to be retained, and it was these that were eaten - Reducing the very last traces of mobility left to the sixth army.
i would say that when the shogun abandoned the idea of defending Edo in the Boshin war it changed the situation from "both sides can win" to "the northern alliance is fucked".
Damnit finish the fucking story Justin! You're givin' me a wicked case of history fan blue balls here m'dude. What was it the soviet Sherman tank commander had to say that you were going to say, but then forgot the title of the book and never bothered getting back to? What was the quote?
@@WordBearer86 Probably that the Soviet Sherman tankers were transported, men only, from the west to the east, on the border in the desert. Then they were taken to their new equipment. Down in a desert ravine that had dugouts all along the sides, were brand new Shermans ready to go. The Soviets were able to ditch most stuff that was in the west, and get brand new stuff in the east. The force used lots of trucks, though the book doesn't say how many. But they were all likely brand new, and held in the east after unloading from ships, for this attack specifically. Also, instead of turning the tanks back over to the US as agreed on, they took the turrets off and stored them and the guns, and sent the hulls to various locales for use in agriculture.
Dad was working in the Munich rail yards during the 1st winter of the Eastern front. Every day the returning trains were full of medical cases, mostly due to the weather and not battle injuries. He thought this was not what the news papers were reporting and he could only witness the arrivals in one city.
8:25 I was waiting for this to come up! If one wants to argue that turning points are a useful tool for understanding history, you need to openly define how much time you are willing to abstract into a single, isolated point. Example: “Stalingrad was a turning point” Okay, how much of it? The Axis reached Stalingrad at or about the 23th of August, Uranus was launched on the 19th November, and Paulus surrendered on the 2nd of February. That’s over 5 months or about 10% of the entire war between the two! That, to me, kinda settles the debate whether it was a turning point or not, as the term becomes rather meaningless if your ‘point’ is nearly half a year long
I think Gettysburg could be argued to be a turning point because it helped Abraham Lincoln secure his second term which would mean the war would continue. It also was the last Southern offensive. Before that there had been people speculating that the South might win after that it was clear to most observers the North would win the war. The winning side loosing momentum and the offensive. Teuteburg forrest was a turning point for the Roman expansion into Germania because afterwards the Romans limited themselves to punishing expeditions but not territorial expansion. The end of political expansion coming along with war coming to an end. Iran Air Flight 655, because it showed the Iranians that the west would stop at nothing to keep Iran from wining (at least that was the Iranian perspective) bringing the Iran-Iraq war to an end. Although that was more on the political level it changed the position of Iran to accept peace with Iraq. Before that they had just stubbornly kept on fighting.
You make a very good point about turning points as in there are many factors that influenced the dynamic of this conflict and each one has its curve. One turning point for me is the capitulation of France. IMO this is were the Heer began to believe in its superiority. They held this believe until the end of the war and it is still the believe of the majority in the West today. The real factors for their success were ignored or remained hidden and false ones were embraced. Another turning point can be the decision to turn the Panzer Armies of AGC north and south. For me it marks the end of the "Blitzkrieg" period in the Heer. Up to this point the military operations were free of the economic side of the war (I include here logistics also). From this point things like oil, economic efficiency, standardization, transportation and many other related things start to influence what the Germans can successfully do .
Firstly, how I define turning point: A turning point in war means a single event in history that sets an irreversible outcome that affects the entire chain of events that follow thereafter. When this event happens, the changes that come from this affect the decision making process and psychological mindset of all sides involved. The example that I'll use to support my point is the battle of Gettysburg, from the American Civil War. Contrary to popular belief, Gettysburg was not the bloodiest battle of the war, and there could be an argument that it wasn't really helpful in the strategic sense (though a clear tactical victory for the federal forces, but I digress). Why this battle is so important though, is that the Army of Northern Virginia had become broken, and the south would never again be able to be the level of threat to the Union it was before the battle. The battle's victory was a huge political and psychological victory for the Union. Now, I do think that even if the battle weren't won, the Union would have won the war regardless. By the numbers the outcome of victory favors the Union, if nothing else. But BECAUSE the CSA lost this battle, the end came that much quicker. My point being that a turning point is a highly visual event that goes beyond tactics, strategies, and logistics. It goes to mindset, morale, politics, and psychology which is an important aspect of warfare. It's important to seem like your winning almost as much as it helps to actually be winning. That being said, I do think the term "Turning point" is something to look and search for, and it's a pretty abstract term.
Defining turning points also takes us dangerously close to the realm of historical "What ifs" and we all know how deep that rabbit hole goes. We can talk forever about those, espeically if approached holistically.
I think you should amend you definition to, "...sets a 'perceived' irreversible outcome..." Take May, 1940: France had been crushed. Britain had no major allies left standing. The British army was humiliated and now lacked heavy equipment. The RAF on paper was quite a bit smaller then the Luftwaffe. THe U-boats were attacking British shipping with virtual impunity. The German navy, though smaller, was ship for ship a great threat to the Royal Navy, and the Italians had the numbers to challenge it as well. Parliament was in concerted discussion to negotiate a peace deal with Hitler. Churchill was on thin ice, and there was real talk that he might be sacked. The ONLY thing that prevented Britain from brokering a peace was Churchill's adamant opposition to the idea, and the British people mostly backing him. By right, from the information available at the time, Britain should have made peace, and no one would have blamed them for doing so.
Perhaps some clarification would help, you say "A turning point in war means a single event in history that sets an irreversible outcome" and yet you say " Now, I do think that even if the battle weren't won, the Union would have won the war regardless." So, I don't see how Gettysberg was a "turning point" if from the start the CSA had already lost. Do you mean that the only way the CSA could win is through psychological warfare, and that victory through material means in itself was the only impossibility? I get that impression by this statement: "It's important to seem like your winning almost as much as it helps to actually be winning."
austen bin, the critical date was the start of Dunkirk evacuation, end of May 1940. After that when Churchill sorted the appeasers Britain moved into total war. However you have compressed events a bit. The Royal Navy at that point was the largest in the world, and effectively destroyed or seriously damaged the majority of the German surface fleet after Norway. Admiral Cunningham, sorted the Italian fleet at Taranto late 1940. The u-boats were not an issue until France was fully captured and they moved to the Atlantic coast up to then it was a skirmish to quote the historians. He does an analysis of Sealion ruclips.net/video/YnPo7V03nbY/видео.html you may find it interesting because he blows a load of myths. Basically Britain alone is BS, largest Navy the RAF with the most advance Air Defence in the world, and the commonwealth importantly the trained army had been saved all it need was new equipment. Had the Wehrmacht tried it would have ended at the bottom of the channel, think about the Allies and overlord, took 3 years to plan. Gerd Von Rundstedt and Adolf Galland thought Hitler was never serious about it, it was a bluff to get the British to agree a peace before Barbarossa. ruclips.net/video/A_3R-Rkn_98/видео.html
on the subject of turning points Robert Catino has a good book looking at 1942 he made a grate effort not to use turning point at all in the book but argues that 1942 saw an end the the Manoeuvre warfare and why this was the case
Love this channel. I agree with these guys. What makes a turning point. I consider stalingrad to be the turning point on the eastern front. However the issue is we are missing a term. The soviet winter offensive of 1941 I would call a Balancing point. The Russians checked the Germans on a theater level. You could even call stalingrad a balancing point. In terms of the Germans would attack at Kursk in 43. 41 German offensive is with across the entire front. 42 it is limited in the south. 43 it is limited to a section of the south and the germans no longer go on the offensive in the east again. So Kursk you could call the turning point in the east as well. However I would still call 42 to be the turning point in the east.
As usual great discussion topic. I suppose I’ll take first crack at WWI turning points. So I tend to define turning point as an event that changes and/or solidifies the momentum of the war from that point onwards, regardless of how much longer the war goes on. For WWI I tend to pick First Marne, Tannenburg, and Jutland. Up until the first two battles the war on both fronts was one of maneuver, and was also going how both sides anticipated, with the Germans crushing the French and the Russians running over the Germans. At these battles the momentum was first halted, and at the Marne especially the Central Powers never really regained their initiative. Both sides were thrown into uncertainty about what to do next, and chose plans that determined the stalemate in the West, and the eventual failure of the Brusilov Offensive in the East. In a lot of ways Jutland is more important. Even though the Germans were effective tactically at the battle, the results scared them enough that they spent the rest of the war in port, leaving the British free to push a naval blockade that forced the Central Powers to more and more desperate strategy to survive, culminating in the U-boat campaign that drive America into the war, and convincing the Germans in particular to try for a most likely doomed from the start to defeat the Entente before they could be fully reinforced (as reluctant as I am to give America too much credit for winning the war)
Every book on the history of the American Civil War and on the Second World War characterizes every second or third battle as a "turning point". Apparently both wars had about 20 "turning points". Is it possible for a war to have so many turning points?
I know I am days behind your initial publication, but I'll give a stab at defining a 'Turning point' I'd suggest after not too much thinking (feel free to provide a better one) that a turning point, not necessarily with hindsight, is when the perceived immediate direction/future of the war changes almost completely. This is fairly broad and could cover who has strategic initiative, asset losses, etc. To this extent, Op Barbarossa would be a turning point, because it was imagined by most that the USSR would fall within a few months, but the previously nigh-invincible Wehrmacht suffered its first major defeat. Battle of the Bulge would also qualify, albeit weaker - almost nobody foresaw it, the Yanks weren't really prepared, and there was a significant chance that the Wehrnacht could have reached Antwerp. It was a gamble, which backfired, but was an unforseen change in events. El Alamein, the 1st defensive battle by the Auk against Wüstenfuchs, but not Monty's offensive. Midway, here I count because the IJN was dealt such a severe blow (4 Carriers, experienced pilots etc). The failure of the op I'd say isn't a turning point, but the unreplacable losses are. I'm all ears for better definitions, civil counterarguments etc
Kursk wasn't een offensive. It was intended as a pre-emptive halting counterblow to deprive the Russians of the means to take the initiative for 1943 and buy the Germans time.
For my defination of turning point, im going to cop out a bit becuse its late lol. I think, in a holstic way for me, the turning point is an key event which signficantly narrows the possible futures in which one side could defeat the other. Sort of like (and with an abatrary number) the chance of one side winning goes from victory in 50% of possible futures to 10% of possible futures. You would also have to decide what defeat and victory are but that is that is super contextual. For WW2, given how it ended in our timeline, I will say 'vicotry' for the axis is peace on even or favrible terms. Basically, not getting absolutly crushed and prehapse being able to keep some stuff they conqured, like luxenburg and Belgium, germany can annex luxenburg and Belgium.
I think that a turning point is not only one event, but a chain of event in quick succession. For the Japaneses it was for me, either Pearl Harbor OR the Battle of the Coral Sea. I'll explain myself here : For Pearl Harbor, the japaneses failed to deliver the decleration of war in time before the attack, giving the american governement a big cassus belli to fight to the end. Seconde was the failed first assault on the base, the main damage ships were only Battleships and a couple of detroyers and auxiliary. If a second assault was launch maybe the damage outcome would be better, but the american were able to mount a defence at that point. So, yeah hard to tell. As for the Battle of the Coral Sea, the loss of 1 japaneses Light Carrier (Shōhō). Whit the loss of around 90 japaneses planes and 960 personel killed, as for the americans they loss were far less with 65~ planes destroyed and 650 personel killed, and the japaneses got an "carrier advantage" here. Yes one american carrier was loss, but 1 us carrier is equal to roughly 2 japaneses carrier (technologically). So to summary the failed attempt to silence 2 us carrier here cost them the victory at Midway. So i don't understand why peoples want to summarize 1 event for a turning point were its a ll chain of event.
Good point in saying that defining what "turning point" even means and the context in which it's used is important. Rejecting turning points entirely I think is going a bit far. In terms of the WW2 PTO specifically, if one were to graph the Japanese sphere of influence, there would be an inflection point around Coral Sea and Midway as the losses severely curtailed their ability to expand it and a local maximum somewhere in the Solomons campaign where they were no longer expanding and now in retreat. Now, the graph is going to be a bit noisy and fuzzy rather than being a nice, neat curve but when looking at larger trends, I think one could reasonably define inflection points or local extrema as "turning points", with the acknowledgement that when things are really fuzzy, there might not be a single point but a blob.
One of the key factors in German defeat, as well as a key reason Barbarosa failed in it's primary objectives, was the Soviets disassembling their industry and shipping it to the Urals before the Wermacht could capture or destroy it. After that, Germany could only knock the USSR out by taking the Caucasus, and/or killing millions of soldiers on the front lines.
Turning point definition in my view: The point at which a major paradigm in a conflict that was previously true, has become untrue. (Option A). A point at which one side of a conflict irrevocably loses the ability to "win" the war to a particular degree. i.e. Germany could have probably managed a limited-War victory with reasonable territorial expansion had they only tried to annex the Sudetenland, and the pre-Poland stuff. They might even have held on to Poland and France, if they had NOT engaged against the Soviet Union. Japan's turning points? Pearl Harbor was an act of protracted suicide, though one aspect of World War II that is often forgotten by Logistics and Strategic minded folks, is the moral aspect of the conflicts. Once your enemy commits heinous atrocities in war, peace without absolute victory becomes nearly impossible. The Nazis COULD NOT be left in power after the Holocaust and SS/Ensatzgruppen had done their things. The Japanese could NOT be left without regime change after the Rape of Nanking and countless others. The people responsible could not be let off the hook by the Allies, even if the Allies might not -really- have cared all that much about the welfare of the Chinese state, or international Jewry. It was the atrocity of it that damned the Axis to being erased from the map... and perhaps the greatest tragedy of World War II was that the Nazi/Japanese ideologies were so repugnant, that they prevented the Allies from applying the same lens against Stalinist Russia. Had there been no holocaust, and atrocities, the Nazis might well have gotten a separate peace... or managed to join the Allies AGAINST Stalin. But that was not to be. So in my view, turning points are pretty vague, but they do exist. Their impact however is the RESULT of things leading up to their moment in history, not the moment themselves.
Wars are not ideological. War is always only ever about resources. Ideology is used to whip frenzy to incite or continue war, but war is not ideological. It's simply about taking land & resource from another group & distributing it to your own group.. Alternatively, war is about defending your group's land & resource from plunder.
I think turning points are inherently difficult to notice, especially without the luxury of hindsight. If you jump up, it's easy to notice when you hit the ground but that's the end point. Before that it's not too easy to tell when exactly the fall begins. If an entire army jumps, even telling the end or the beginning is hard. Similarly, I think the big failures or successes of any side were not so much the turning points of the World Wars but rather the fruit of what was cultivated for a long time. And since wars are complex and the data is somewhat fuzzy even at its best, determining any kinds of points is largely a matter of interpretation. That said, many decisive battles and operations certainly had an impact on the capabilities of the participants. Most clear cases are probably the (effective) losses of major warships, since that might happen very quickly in case of a lucky shot (or mine). The Dunkirk example, I think, _could_ have been a turning point had the Brits not escaped. Then it _might_ have made them sign piece with the Germany, which _might_ have helped the Axis beat the Soviets. But as it turned out, I'd consider it more of a missed turning point.
Napoleon's defeat in Russia is an interesting affair. Because it is absolutely true that it destroyed the best parts of the Grand Armee and that after 1812 Napoleon was not dominant. He achieved parity in 1813 after building a new army, and had a number of chances to defeat the Sixth Coalition, but the day of Napoleon easily overpowering the enemy was over. Add to the Russian debacle, Austria switching sides, the accession of Sweden to the 6th Coalition, that is Bernadotte giving the Allies the keys to Napoleon's tactics and strategy. This meant that in 1813 Napoleon was very vulnerable and never had more than a 50/50 shot at victory.
I would say that two things that would be imo turning points were: Pearl Harbor, in only that it got the US to actually fight, though even without any help from the US on the European fronts the Germans could never have conquered the Soviet Union, especially with Lend-Lease going on. The second was that the Polish codebreakers laid a lot of the groundwork for decoding Enigma, and passed it on the the UK before Poland fell. They were not the only things, but they had a massive effect on the outcome I think.
The 1968 Tet Offensive is regarded as a turning point, but perhaps it's impact is overstated. The 1963-1968 phase of escalation and 1969-1973 phase of retraction are divided by the presidencies of Johnson (D) and Nixon (R); maybe the change in government was more important. What perception do North Vietnamese historians have of the 1968 Tet Offensive? It could well be remembered as unsuccessful. Huế was seized, but was held for only a matter of weeks. Wikipedia's article "Tet Offensive" seems to indicate that the PAVN/NLF suffered more casualties than they inflicted.
a Turning Point in the mind of a military commander could be a Lesson.. a lesson learned from another battle that they had not fought but did hear about in real time. for that I can not speak to, but imagine the Thoughts of Baghdad Bob as he would PR out a new Bs story and the forces of the coalition of the willing were driving into Baghdad.. interesting topic... great debate step off point.
I've always thought of turning point as a battle that had such great effect on the war that it nearly guarantees victory. Like D-Day. The day the Allies got a Foothold in Europe the Germans were never going to be able to push them back into the sea.
D-Day are nowhere near as turning point Germans are already lost any chance of winning the war after Kursk in 1943 and as for Foothold Allies already landing in Italy in 1943 Allied strategic bombing and battle of the Atlantic have bigger impact than D-Day
I would argue that the concept of a "turning" point in a "nation-deciding" war only applied to the time prior to about 1800. Up till that point, a single battle (or decision) could end a war. "Nations" of relatively equal power would field "all" their forces in a single climactic battle. The winner took all. Within a single battle, the loss of a leader could be the turning point. Since then, major wars are decided by a series of blows because forces -- and the logistics to support those forces -- are typically dispersed over many separate arenas. A loss "here" can be compensated by a win "there". However, when a nation loses the ability to compensate across arenas, it has lost the war. Hence, a turning point must refer to the "proportional commitment of a nation's total resources" or the "loss of a large proportion of total resources". Note that the comment "prior to 1800" is only intended as a guide. For example, Leuctra was Sparta's turning point -- it lost a large proportion of its military power in one battle. Conversely, the Roman empire could not be said to have single turning point in its demise. In modern times, the destruction of Sadam's Iraq was accomplished in a single (multi-day) battle.
i did also paper Big K as a turning point.. for loss of the armor that could not be replaced and the psychological affect was a real killer post the surrender of stalingrad.. its Over.. // so although it may not have been a Full blown all war ends in 100 days Turning Point.. but again.. define the turn and how that is a Point .. thanks for the upload.. / a turning point for the dead would be the last time they turned NOT a Round faster than their enemy did Upon them.
I think, a turning point does not need to be the decisive thing that changed the whole picture, but it could also the point in time around which the ballences of power, or intitiative switches - like the point in time in which the US Airpower achieved numerical supriority, over the japanese... what of course however does only show up visible, if one watches the actuall statistics, instead of the ongoing events, what brings the whole thing back to the question of how to define a turning point .... well ^^
You pointed out the Wehrmacht's own internal assessments about the capability of its infantry and panzerwaffe component parts for the upcoming summer offensive of Army Group South during the summer of 1942. The differences from its pre-Barbarossa capability factor and the pre-Fall Blau capability factor is stark. During the year which had transpired on the Eastern Front the Wehrmacht had sustained horrific losses especially during Operation Typhoon and over the course of the Soviet counteroffensive generally beginning December 5th 1941. On paper the Axis were able to replace these losses in terms of men and material to include armor and artillery but gone forever were the days where the Wehrmacht could operate in the field with near impunity as its panzer tipped mechanized spearheads ran circles around massive Red Army formations bagging Soviet POWs by the hundreds of thousands. In this respect I've come to see the failure of the Wehrmacht to effect the collapse of the Red Army in 1941 with special emphasis on Typhoon as perhaps the more important turning point of the larger picture albeit a turning point that was much wider in terms of time perspective. I am someone hesitant to list Typhoon persee as the turning point however due to its focus on Moscow of which I mostly reject as the absolute necessary objective key to victory.
Taylor Lang poland and france are very similar in that time period: both fought for and against germany. The main difference is that france was pacifist. Saying that france fought for the axis is total büllshit. I don't know how the heck can someone even believe that they were all for germany. De Gaulle nobody? Oh yeah but it's easier to forgot actual history to frenchbash than study history then try to frenchbash. Here is a fact: 95% of the french were like : "dammit" but did nothing.
Vietnam by this standard the Americans won everything but lost the war. Internal disintegration (lack of will) Although both sides would still be fighting on into the early eighties. (the need for a non corrupt government) British were better at administration (Emperial bonds) sympathetic locals (don't underestimate cultural bonds) tradition & pageantry ("propaganda")
"Okay, then, well maybe is that the start?" - at the 9:50ish mark.... Isn't that what a turning point has to be? A start or an end? If it isn't either, there is no turn. It doesn't mean it is all over, right there and then. It just means, at that point, things changed in a notable way.
Turning point i'd argue would be the one, where adversary need to yield initiative and completely overhaul their plans for further conflict. Couple of them i would call battle of Sedan or Hiroshima/Nagasaki bombs. These events completely changed the battle plans.
Turning points are like frequent flier miles - if you pile up enough of them you can exchange them at the end of the war for airline tickets or the latest nifty consumer products!
sorry for all the comments but they are on different topics. One for Justin about the decisiveness of Pearl Habour, how unlikely would it have been for the US to not have attack Japan without them striking first. You can add any additions to that, Japan only continues the war on China, or only attacks the European empires, or attacks Russia instead. Also without war against Japan would the US have gone to war in Europe. I suppose, what would have needed to happen for Rosovelt to gain enough domestic support for war?
I think the Turning Point on the eastern front was once Russia was able to get the tank and other war material production running full steam. On the western front the turning point was simply once the US entered the war.
Since you mentioned the amount of NCOs and co getting captured in Stalingrad, why didnt they evacuate these troops by plane once the defeat was becoming certain?
To make a clausewitzian point Clausewitz works out how war is in the end measure to attain political goals. So although within the war we have a goal (defeating the enemy) and means for that goal, in the end the war as a totality is just a political means. Furthermore, as war does not happen in one moment but over a long time, political considerations interfere with strategic ones and ultimately overrule them, i.e. one has to think from the political level not from the strategic one (therefore I would disagree with MHV that the Afrika Korps was a wate of capacities). In one sentence: The political sphere is the sphere which interferes all the time in the war because it is the sphere which governs it, as a war is a political act. Having this in mind let's look at 2. WW in Europe again. The first question is what was the 2. WW actually about? I think there is an quite easy answer: Nazi-German expansion politics that came into conflict with the established order at some point and thus let the war exploaded. Seeing in in this way a turning point would happen at that point when Germany either gave up such plans or when on the political scale a major change happens. And there we have two candidates: The declaration of war against the USA, because this made the war global. Yet Nazi-Germany had not yet given up the political goal of expansion politics. When did that change? With the defeat at Stalingrad and the overall failure of Fall Blau. After that the political goal was to defend the gained ground. Later it was to find a peace agreement with the western allies, which equals giving up expansion plans and even being ready to give back some conquered territories, in order to continue fighting the Soviet Union. As a final remark the Holocaust gained momentum after the defeat at Stalingrad. I think because of the paranoic theory of Nazis that Jews are the driving intelligence behind the forces, which try to destroy Germany. Therefore to the extent they lost the capacity to defeat enemy forces they started increasing the murder of Jews.
4:03 This is a lovely topic. Rather than Pearl Harbor, you could actually argue that the oil and steel embargoes imposed by the US against Japan were the "turning point." Once that happened, the rest had to follow necessarily. Personally, I would go back even further and say that Imperial Japan lost the war when they adopted the hard-core indoctrination policies that resulted in valuable, highly trained pilots and officers needlessly sacrificing their lives. 7:40: You can also argue that the turning point was when Japan tried to jump from Rabaul all the way to Guadalcanal when they had until then stuck with shorter, better supported, jumps. I've also argued that the Japanese should have seen the USN torpedo bomber attack at Midway as a turning point. That level of self-sacrifice was supposed to have been the advantage the IJN had. Closing the air gap in the middle of the Atlantic and the use of radio intelligence were certainly turning points in the Battle of the Atlantic. The Battle of the Bulge was a turning point because after that the Germans lacked enough effective divisions to resist along the entire Western front. The Russian Campaign of 1812 was a turning point because the French lost their cavalry mounts and it took several years, really until 1815, to properly replace them. Yes, you're making my point. Of course you could ALSO argue that Trafalgar was the turning point because that eliminated any chance of forcing Britain out of the war. For WW2 in Europe, you could follow TIK and say that the turning point was when the German's failed to reach the Caucasian oil fields. Oh! The Great War. von Schlieffen would say that the turning point was when the Germans (the younger Moltke?) split the German forces rather than settling the war in the West before dealing with the East. So, again, it was doomed from the start. 36:00 This is why you can't settle any of these questions because if you change anything, everything could change. And those three weeks would also have made the logistical situation much better in 1941. In both 1812 and 1941 it is hard to see what a German victory would have looked like. Taking the oil fields in 1942 could have done it, but by then it was probably already too late because they were so over extended.
WWI was a lost cause for the CP. If one wants to postulate the factors necesseary to turn its outcome, I think the key to that would be to somehow increase the fighting effectiveness of the Dual Monarchy. It had the manpower and industrial capacity to rival Germany, yet it had only limited impact on the war due to a variety of factors, including incompetent high command. A more succesful KuK armee would mean an earlier collapse of Tsariat russia, Italy electing to stay neutral, or even possibly honour their alliance, and with these almost 10 million battle hardened troops would be freed up to reinforce either the Western front, or the middle east. Still, the US joining the Entante would decisively swing the scales even in such a scenario.
Trafalgar 1805 was a turningpoint of the Napoleonic War. Before this point the joint french and spanish fleet was a treath to the Royal Navy. After Trafalgar this threath was much lessened.
I have a great hypothetical Pacific War question for people to think about: What if the USS Enterprise and USS Hornet had been made available for the Coral Sea battle instead of being used for the Doolittle Raid. Could the USN have been dominate enough that they would have suffered fewer losses while also defeating the Japanese in a tactical sense? And would that have altered the Japanese MI operation?
What if the two Japanese small carriers had been at Midway instead of the Aleutians? Japan would have had a LARGE numerical advantage in flattops AND planes.
If we argue that WW2 has no turning point or 'turning line' does that mean there was no point at which the axis could have won? (or not lost completely, which I will say is territorial occupation, or reduction) If there is a period in which not losing was possible would the point at which losing become inevitable be a turning point? Such a point does not have to be a battle, it can be polticaal, econmic, or demgraphic.
El-Alemein could be considered a turning point in a psychological extent in that it was their first significant strategic victory on land for the western allies.
I'm a little late to the party, but I'll add my two cents here. I've always thought of turning points as the winnowing down of probable outcomes. Moreover, one must define the outcome in degrees; in other words, who was losing and by how much. To use the Eastern Front example: during Barbarossa/Typhoon, the Nazis could potentially achieve a complete victory of sorts by driving the Red Army east of the Urals where Stalin would be of little threat. During Fall Blau, Hitler could still have forced a favorable peace but was no longer able to outright crush everyone. Kursk/Torch and the loss of the strategic initiative meant that even Status Quo Antebellum was not possible anymore, though a moderate loss like post-Waterloo France could still achieved with some luck and wisdom (Think Guderian telling people "Make peace, you idiots" while they still had something to negotiate with). After Bagration/Normandy....game's over and the only outcome is total defeat.
I have a supposition that I would like you to examine in the pacific during WW2. The Americans went to take back the Philippines but I think that it would have been better if the US would have tried to take Okinawa. My reasoning for this is that one of the reasons for taking the Philippines was to cut theJapanese off from supplies from the supplies from south Asia. I believe that taking Okinawa would have done the same thing and given the Japanese less time to fortify the Islands (reducing the casualties we took) as well as making the flying time to Japan less and we could have made the Island into supply depots for submarines, Bombers, fighters and the Pacific fleet. Also putting the mainland of China in range of the bombers to attack the Japanese army in support of the Chinese Nationalists.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized I have just listened to the video about the Philippines and while it covers some of the possible problems it doesn't directly cover going to Okinawa rather then the Philippines. When dealing with Okinawa its closeness to Japan and the fact that it can be reached from Japan, Formosa and the Philippines needs to be taken in to account. Did we have the naval strength to take on the Japanese fleet and land based aircraft and would it be worth the risks?
@@richardmeyeroff7397 probably not, you know logistics and range limits. Staging areas for invasions etc. also they had to learn a lot about naval invasions.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized Please forgive me for extending this discussion but it is some thing that has interested me for a long time and there is a scarcity of information that I have been able to locate. Is there any place that you could direct me to for more information? Weren't many of these problems for invading Okinawa the same if they tried to invade Formosa. Is there any information as to the reasons why they went for the Philippines rather then Formosa that may bolster the reasons for not considering Okinawa?
I think Stalingrad is one of the turning point (more accurately the failure of case blue) as the Germans failed to secure the Caucasus oil. But also Kursk (or at least when the Germans could have been said to have lost the Ukraine as the bread situation in the Soviet Union was bad. But must’ve improved once enough of land was recaptured to stabilise the situation. Thought?
A turning point can be definded as many different things. But lets sey its a point in wich one side goes from being succeful to failing. Stalingrad is therefor a turning point as the germans are going to be mostly on retret after
I would posit that turning points are much more relevant in non-industrial warfare. The decisive ability to destroy the enemy army and, most critically, the capturing or killing on opponents leadership. Basically, you are more able to win in a day. In the industrial age, I think battles are less decisive simply because states are more able to recover losses and block enemy advances. In an industrial country with millions of people its hard to knock out an army decisively. A fleet, or airforce, that still seems very possible. As you say I think the most decisive battles in modern warfare are those that psychologically break the enemy and brings them to surrender or negotiation. That makes identifying battles in which someone missed an opportunity to deliver that blow really tough to assess with anything more than speculation. its easier in asymmetric war where the population is not fully committed to the fight. Arguably the Tet offensive was a turning point in Vietnam. As far as I understand the US won that battle and it devastated the Vietnamese. However, the phycological blow knocked them out decisively. Arguably the same happened at Dien Bien Phu for France and Mogadishu in 1993. Egypt's failed attack outside the Suez air defence shield during the Yom Kippur war was very decisive in allowing the Israelis to decisively crush the Egyptian army. While Egypt now has Suez anyway a stalemate could have had a huge effect on Ierlai feelings of insecurity and confidence in Arab nationalist armies abilities. I don't think it is very compelling if anyone says the concept of decisive battles (of turning points/lines) that decide who wins or loses a war can be dismissed. I just think that it is a more viable argument in total, industrialised warfare, even then, we have a small sample size. As for WW2- Could victory at Dunkirk have resulted in the UK to peace? What if stubborn Churchill was not there, would someone like Chamberlain have been easier to bring to terms? Could a blitzkrieg of some manner in Barbarossa have led to the psychological knock out of the USSR as you mentioned? If that is reasonably possible, then you could argue that is a turning point. If the Germans could have inflicted a blow in 1941 that would have resulted in Russian collapse or surrender and they failed, that's the turning point.
The problem with defining turning POINTS in a major industrial war is that one spectacular victory (or loss) doesn't always destroy one side's ability to fight. So your points are more blurred out in time. I think I would have to go with "After what point was the loser unable to conduct a successful offensive operation, on anything other than a minor tactical scale?" Kursk is a good example for the reasons you give. In the First World War, it would probably be Villiers-Brettoneux in 1918 and more certainly the battles that began on 8 August of that year. This was the point after which the German Army was always on the retreat and British operations (for example) were more often than not successful.
This is not typical of industrial war only. The entire idea of a decisive victory is flawed from the beginning and Clausewitz was a clueless fool. Cannae is upheld as the prefect example of an ideal victory won against a superior opponent in war academies. And yet, still this battle that ended with a crushing victory didn't result in any glorious ending in the war for Hannibal and Carthage. Hannibal did in fact win 3 times against much superior Roman armies that he utterly destroyed in some of the finest victories ever won in history. And he walked around in Italy for years and plundering the countryside when he didn't have the siege equipment to take Rome. He hoped his crushing victories would destroy the Roman coalition and make the Italian cities abandon Rome and switich over to his own side. But he hugely underestimated the loyalty and love Romes allied felt, and his strategy utterly failed and he got himself into a hopeless strategic situation. And no tactical victories and won battles could turn the tide of war and help Carthage win.
As with Britain and the USSR in WW2, Hannibal (like Hitler) failed to break his enemy's will to fight. Victory is a combination of will and resources, and Hannibal never had superiority in both at the same time. Other kingdoms might have succumbed, but Rome was (and for a long time remained) a very different kettle of fish. Also, look at how those wars ended - the Carthaginians wanted to bring Rome to terms; the Romans wanted to wipe Carthage off the map. The determination was all with the Romans, who could absorb disasters like Cannae and keep on going.
Many pre-war assessments on the Soviet army were very negative and a lot of western allies thought the Soviets were doomed until after Stalingrad. To them, it was a turning point. In hindsight, maybe it wasn't like many of the medieval wars where one side stopped all coordinated resistance after an epic battle, but I think some people go too far the other way in downplaying it. Losing the entire German 6th Army (and the Romanian 3rd) couldn't have been good for the axis cause and if they could snap their fingers in April 1943 and bring them back, the Soviets would have a much more complicated time besting them back.
There cannot be anything as a turning point, as, due to the nature of the definition, in general, that the battle or campaign somewhere meant that the tide of war changed decisively, is flawed. There are many points in history when a war have a massive decisive victory and thereafter, the opposing side pull something and either a truce is signed, or the tide turns again on to the other side. For instance, one can take a look at the many wars between the Byzantines or Eastern Rome against the Sassanid Empire, or the Battles fought by Narsis and Belisarius against the Barbarians who had taken Italy. As we know, the Italian peninsula was again lost later on. If anything, I would argue that rather than a particular event being a point from which a series of events take a critical effect, such as the common notion around Stalingrad, there is something which can be termed as "The loss of initiative". At first you'd tell me that this is the same thing, but this takes into consideration more exceptions. For instance, in medieval unto the 17th century, many wars were decided upon the point in which one side loses an army, with out an army, one loses the possibility of gaining or taking initiative. On the other hand, take the Crusade battles, one would be hard pressed to find the total army of the Christian and Muslim forces fight, but rather many skirmish battles, which eventually led to the initiative becoming firmly in the hands of the more mobile Muslim forces. More recently, the loss of Napoleon I's cavalry forces in the Russian Campaign, meant that Napoleon could not secure the initiative that would be achieved from destroying the Russian army (as without an army, Russia could still fight a guerrilla war, yet not open battles, which Napoleon would use until he took St. Petersburg). There is then the case in which weather such as all the Russian campaigns such as that of 1812, 1941 among others, which stole the initiative from the invading armies. The rains in Russia led to the inability for more heavy German forces to move due to mud problems, the same problem Napoleon faced in Waterloo, as he could not maneuver his artillery. The case in which pitch battles meant the victory or defeat of a country was, for instance, that of wars between smaller states, such as the wars between the many tiny German states in history, or the wars between tribal chieftains or warlords in Mongolia, where at the defeat of one's army, there was nothing that one could do to defend or continue to prosecute the war. Thus, there would not be the issue of an event as a Turning Point, but event'S', a series of events that led to the initiative being taken, retaken, gained, lost and so on, by which wars were eventually won, lost or reached a stalemate. To illustrate this, look at the 1854-56 Crimean war. The British, French and Ottomans won after the percieved turning point of winning the siege. But eventually, gained nothing from what they wanted (the treaty could not be maintained and was repudiated in 1871). No side gained initiative, but as the allies pulled out, they no longer remained a factor, and on balance, by 1871, the Russians gained enough initiative or the allies lost it enough so as to led to the war to become a draw.
That particular variety of multiple choice question is emblematic of the problem with our public (government) school system. They love to ask really big questions and then offer a reductive pitiful list of answers, of which you can only choose one "correct" answer and offer no opportunity to defend your answer. I would call the teacher over and ask if they wanted me to attempt to give them a serious answer(please give me a couple of pages for an essay) or just give them the bs answer that they were asking for!
An interesting 'what if' kinda popped into my mind while watching this. After Barbarossa started, Stalin was concerned that he was going to be over thrown for his conduct that led to the Soviets being sucker punched at the start of the operation. To his great surprise, instead the administrations and communist elites turned to him to see them through the crisis. My question is, say the coup that he feared actually happened. And he was removed from power while the Germans were rampaging through Soviet lands. Without Stalin in charge, would the Soviets be able to rally as they did?
The bigger question is would the Soviets attempt peace with Germany and give up, stuff? They wouldn’t agree to the AA Barbarossa line but say they agree to Minsk border, before the center army made it to Minsk and took the 25,000 or whatever losses then it would’ve eased the pressure that every Km took, and certainly would’ve given Finland whatever they took back, which would give the renewed offensive (that would’ve totally happened) a springboard for Leningrad and the Murmansk railway
Although more accurate to history is coups do bad things to army high commands, the Soviet command would’ve been even more fractured in a coup and I’m not sure the Soviets could hold the Germans back without a command structure
Commenting without having watched (oops) - as an undergraduate history major "turning point" to me has become short hand for: "this is popular history of the most popular kind".
Declaring war after Germany invaded the Czechoslovakia instead of waiting till after they invaded Poland. The Germans would not have had the resources or the men to fight the French and Britain considering all the industrial capacity they gained from Czechoslovakia as well as the men that where to be put into military service.
History is after all just a simplyfication of real events so I think that the turning point can be a useful expression in that sense. Like saying Stalingrad was a turningpoint. And after the defeat, Germany would never get deeper into Russian territory than that and from this time and onwards would the war mainly be oriented as a defensive action. So if I was a teacher I would tell my students that, and not go into too much details. One could perhaps argue that there still was a small chance Germany still could have won somehow. But that is not relevant when you are talking about what happened in the real war, and skip all counter-factional debate nonsense.
Failure to capture Moscow and Stalin in the initial invasion of the Soviet Union.given how hands on Stalin was with every aspect of the war, I feel his removal as leader would at best dramatically weaken the Soviets at worst effectively knock them out of the war.Another turning point; when Hitler started dismissing his officers and taking command. He was not the general he thought he was.
I disagree about Stalin. He made many terrible decisions in the early years of the war. The idea of shooting generals who lose a battle isn’t just immoral it’s stupid. It makes commanders much more cautious, afraid to take the initiative, and vulnerable to encirclement which resulted in huge mostly preventable losses at the begging of the war. Stalin got a bit better toward the end of the war, because he started to listen to his generals more but I think the Soviet Union would have been much better off if some stray bomb managed to take out Stalin.
What HoI series teached me is that the loser is the one who starts to lack equipment in the army first. Because if the war goes on in the same way, that nation just looses more and more until its army is just an empty box with huge numbers as requirements and litttle numbers of real, existing equipment. I mean, its not like the war cannot be won anymore, if IRL germans had nukes in time when Bagration started, they could completely change the situation...
The main turning point was obviously when Hitler met Eva Ono Braun and started dating her. This soured his relationship with the other Axis leaders and killed off the remaining cohesion and creativity. In the end it was only Tojo who tried to keep the gang going, but by then there was a great distance between him and the others.
Hitler had to launch Operation Typhon. He needed to look like a winner to encourage the Japanese to enter the war. We now know that the pact between Hitler and Japan committed Germany to come into any war that Japan started. Hitler wanted the Japanese Navy to check the US Fleet. The German Army paid a price to keep Hitler looking good. Stalin could not surrender to Hitler. When he tried, the response he got was that Hitler would not negotiate with the USSR so long as Stalin was alive. To negotiate a peace would be suicide for Stalin.
As an engineering student, the turning point is when the second derivative of "progress" crosses the x-axis (or I guess t-axis for time).
That's what I always think of
haha beautiful
Is that basically acceleration? Like progress would be displacement, first derivative/ velocity, and second derivative/ acceleration?
But what if the progress function is convex or only locally concave?
I am an economist. As such I can tell you we don’t have such things as turning points. For example every economic is cased by things that happen long ago, but they are triggered when a critical number of people realized it happen. The stock market, like military willingness to fight works on speculation and deniability.
Best way to find the closest thing to an economic turning point would looking at Albert Speer; who knew this was going to be catastrophic either way, but he worked with incomplete information to make an accurate estimate.
All of that being said: from eco-political point of view the only turning point was after the fall of France. From the start of the war to the fall of France everything is kind of unstoppable; that is generalizing all reactions. After the fall of France is the only time that Germany ever had real political bargaining power. They could had stopped and called for negotiations.
They could had launch a propaganda campaign against the Brits instead of bombing raids. That is the only one point where Germans had the option to change the world direction.
A mathematician, a statistician and an economist walk into a bar to discuss what is "1+1".
The mathematician starts "It is obvious, 1 + 1 = 2" and sips his beer.
"Not so fast" the statistician cautions "1 + 1 = 2, plus or minus 10%"
"Well..." the economist weighs in "1 + 1.... It entirely depends what you want the outcome to be."
You’re not just correct, but also insightful, up to the point where you assert that Germany had tangible bargaining power after the Fall of France. I disagree, I think that on the contrary it’s the fall of France where they effectively forfeit their political bargaining power in favor of military domination.
Germany had steadily-growing bargaining power up to that point - otherwise the annexation of Austria, the affair in the Sudetenland, the shenanigans in Spain - those would not have been feasible unless they had a position from which to bargain. They did - they held total war above everyone’s heads only a couple short decades after the last global conflagration and resulting political, social, economic, even biological turmoil. That was their bargaining chip.
After the invasion of Poland the ability to leverage the threat of war changes to the ability to leverage a limitation to the hostilities but once France falls, there is nothing else for Germany to hold over Britains head. Total War it is and while it’s tempting to give in to the British propaganda of an empire besieged on all sides, I don’t think Churchill or anyone else in the know really thought the worst would come to pass. Call it denial, or call it something else.
There’s the anecdote of Churchill making plans for the occupation of Germany during the Blitz, but regardless of its factuality it is an accurate illustration of Churchill’s machinations in planning the prosecution of the war. Everything is done in consideration of what is to come afterwards, what would give Britain and in a larger context the Western countries the best possible position.
For all of its military might, I don’t think the Germans had any more real bargaining power after the fall of France. They’d pushed their adversaries into forlorn acceptance of the eventuality that’d kept them paralyzed for years. I think Churchill and the rest of the British leadership never visualized a war without eventual American participation and in that economic participation the impossibility of defeat. The foreknowledge of the looming Barbarossa must have seemed like Christmas.
I think the one - or perhaps two - genuine surprises to the British calculus after that point in the war were the competency and audacity of the Japanese, and that the balance of power would eventually shift to the American side of the partnership.
The first is the very well-established and discussed colonial tendency to denigrate - and thus underestimate - a non-European opponent despite the red flags and the second is a similar kind of colonial delusion - that one is the recipient of goods, and thus the dominant entity. I’m sure Churchill at his most optimistic saw the Americans as just another colony - once removed - but here now in the clutch to help the mother country. He probably hoped that the partnership would bring America into the British sphere rather than vice-versa, as he hoped to with Ireland by bullying them into the war and the putting them under British command - it would be a wartime necessity, he would say.
With this kind of mindset, I really don’t believe they were giving Germany ANY inroads with which to bargain, after France and Poland, it was war until the bitter end. Perhaps if things turned out differently we’d speak of Great Britain in 41 with the same astonishment we reserve for the Nazi leadership in 1945.
Excellent point.
For me,everything in WWII hinges on the Germans not securing the Caucasus oil fields in 1941. This wasn't just an issue of 20/20 hindsight, the Nazi logistics people knew it and informed Hitler accordingly before Barbarossa.
Funnily enough and perhaps fittingly given the role they played in WWI, this was a fuckup on the part of the German General staff. They were convinced that going for Moscow was the right choice and did much to undermine Hitler's desire to go for the oil resources.
I'd never want to have to fight tactically against the German General staff but they let Bismarck did all their strategic thinking for them and once he was gone Germany lacked any clear strategy, it was all tactical planning for the worst to an extent that they didn't have a way to avoid the two-front war in WWI because they'd committed themselves so wholly to a plan that involved invading France through Belgium.
I've read somewhere that Hitler got sick for a few weeks, and German army staff decided to change the plans to focus on Moscow, instead of Caucasus. They also refused Hitlers suggestion to mount bigger guns on some of the panzer IV's, which they did next year anyway, creating the best tank in the world at the time. Could have solved the t-34 problem in 41.
I would say it all started going bad for the Germans when they judged Britain wouldn't go to war to defend Poland, once they enter a war against Britain they can't trade effectively with anyone that requires shipping other than through the Baltic. In many ways it's the same as WWI.
"For me" - that's the point. YOU blame Hitler without knowing what you're talking about.
Hitler focused on the economics of war but the general staff wanted to capture Moscow as quickly as possible and at all costs, while even sabotaging Hitler's plans. Why do you think did he fire so many competent generals before July 20th 1944?
Watch these:
ruclips.net/video/kVo5I0xNRhg/видео.html
ruclips.net/video/hzr6dD8fvVY/видео.html
And then come back. But then you'll probably say "Hitler should've focused on capturing Moscow". What a joke!
I agree, the war probably would always end in disaster for Germany because...America...I mean see Japanese navy for proof, the Royal Navy was globally the largest navy for centuries, the US dethroned them in a few years making a mockery of the statement of “naval strategy is built strategy”
But I agree without securing the oil fields in the opening assault, the Germans forfeit their ability to survive the war, whether victory or stalemate
I think the turning point of the Pacific War was when the U.S. put oil embargoes in Japan. That almost ran Japan oit of oil and forced Japan to either halt their war on China or take on the Western Allies.
Both were still pretty much doomed to failure without access to oil for the Japanese military. The latter most likely still doomed to failure regardless.
Ulric Kessler exactly. Taking on all the Western Allies at the same time was only ever going to end one way.
Aden Litwiller They didn't have choice, FDR approved Joint Board plan 355 with his own signature. It laid out the pre-emptive strike of firebombings to destroy Japanese cities from bases in China. War breaks out in Pacific in 1942 regardless of whether the Japanese do something or nothing at all.
Schwarzbraun they could have stopped raping and pillaging their way through China. The US was pursuing a diplomatic solution to stop the atrocities committed by Japan right up to the point when the Japanese Ambassador notified them of War on December 7. Also, just because FDR signed a plan for a pre-emptive strike does not mean they would execute the plan. And, an intervention in the Second Sino-Japanese war would be justified by every measure: atrocities committed by the Japanese, the Japanese having started the war for no reason, and the threats to American interests in the Pacific, such as Guam and the Philippines.
Imagine this exchange if you will;
Guy A: "This is the situation; our economy is in a real crisis now and the war we've been fighting for over a decade requires a steady supply of resources if we hope to continue it."
Guy B: "Yes we can't go loosing this war now can we, so what's the situation on our resources currently?"
Guy C: "Currently we've got next to nothing coming in and a lot of our reserves going out to maintain the war effort."
Guy A: "Why's nothing coming in?"
Guy C: "Well because we started this war, some real horrible things have happened during it, and the guys with whom which we were getting the vast majority of our resources from earlier through trade wanted us to end the war and we told them to mind their own damn business and to get fucked. More or less. Well they didn't like that and so they put this embargo on us that's strangling our economy and soon enough will start to strangle the war effort as well."
Guy B: "What a bunch of jerks right? Really unfair of them to deny us resources when they've got a nearly limitless supply to draw from and our own is so severely limited to begin with. On top of that they're not at war with anyone currently and meanwhile we've been at war for over ten years. A war we couldn't maintain for very long in the first place if we'd not been receiving resources from them through trade. Oh and their industrial manufacturing capabilities far surpass us in every way!"
Guy A: "Oh well then that settles it then. We've got to go to war with them. There's no other choice, 'cause we need those resources they have so that we can keep our war effort going unimpeded."
Guy C: "So let me get this straight. Our resources are limited and supply is dwindling rapidly because of the war we're currently in. Then there's also the embargo that the guys with whom we used to get our resources from have currently placed on us because of this war we're in, further straining supply, and our only solution is to go to war with them to get access to those resources again. Right?"
Guy B: "Well we've no choice!"
Guy C: "War with the guys whose access to resources is nearly limitless and whose manufacturing capabilities far surpass our own?"
Guy A: "It's the only viable option to get those resources for the war effort."
Guy C: "Umm, are you sure it's the only choice?"
Guy A: "Well it's the only choice we've got, so of course it is."
Guy C: "Right, sorry. Um.. what was our reason again for starting the war we're still currently in?"
What I wonder is whether there is any utility in looking/finding “turning points”? It seems like an arbitrary point that each author gets to define for him/herself. The only value I can see, perhaps, is to simplify the complex series of events into discrete portions. But that seems like really low bar to set for serious academic work.
But that sounds like exactly what "turning points" are used for. To my very limited understanding the most useful reason for identifying "turning points" is when the actual participants realize either that they are winning or losing and that there is really nothing that can be done to change it. For the nation/alliance that realizes that they are beginning to win it can cause them to push themselves harder to push the enemy over the edge. What "turning point" means to the losing side is that they get to that point where they decide when it is acceptable to quit, if at all? WW1 Germany saw that the war was unsustainable so instead of losing all of their additional expansions and have enemy forces drive into Germany, they decided to quit. To me, that is really the only use for "turning points" other than for writing a book. I think if you want to figure out what triggered the turning point one must look at what caused the combatant to give up or become unable to resist. This would appear to be much simpler if the combatant in question surrendered because with enough research it's possible to fairly accurately guess what made them come to the conclusion. If they fought to the last you almost have to start at the end of a conflict, and ask "why did this happen?", go further back, ask "why" again until there appears to be a correlation of sorts. That seems more like speculation though.
I have seen the Battle of Smolensk as being placed as a turning point for exhausting Army group Centre and halting their advance in Operation Barbarossa. Also you have a better case for Alam el Halfa where Rommel was stopped from advancing into Egypt
The Japanese not having a joint command didn't help them out either.
Not having a joint command is what got them into war in the first place when the army decided to invade Manchuria
I think the Turning Point of WW2 was Stalin's speech to the nation on July 3, 1941.
In every country that Hitler had attacked up to that point, the government collapsed (or fled.) In France, the new government surrendered. Hitler expected the same thing to happen in the USSR. He is famously quoted as saying, "All we must do is kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will fall." This was a reasonable expectation based on previous experience. (Only in the UK did the government collapse yet the nation keep fighting. Had Hallifax been P.M. this might not have happened.)
But when Stalin was able to pull himself together and give his first speech, he cemented his grip on the nation. The war would not have been over until he decided to give up. In that sense, his elimination of anyone capable of replacing him in the Purges can be seen as a success.
The only way for Barbarossa to have been a success would have been for Stalin to be deposed and sucessor government to have given Hitler what he wanted. But the problem for Hitler was that this would have required events to happen over which he had no control. It did not matter how deep in the USSR his panzers drove or how many Soviet soldiers he killed; he could not physically drive far enough or kill enough to make Stalin quit if Stalin didn't want to. And no one other than Stalin was going to change Stalin's mind.
And Stalin wasn’t going to because of either stupidity/paranoia/determination/fear/hatred/whatever
Regardless of reason, he wasn’t going to, especially because he wasn’t the peasant rifleman being encircled
The Soviets didn't have a choice. Hitler's intention was extermination, where in France, if you kept your head down and do what you were supposed to, you'd probably be all right.
@@looinrims Why are you so butt hurt? Do you prefer the Nazis winning?
@@haldir3120 butthurt? Prefer the nazis win?
Based on what?
I prefer the concept of 'tipping point', so this can be the point where the overwhelming economic / military production / size of military of one nation finally stops the momentum of a small, aggressive and highly competent/experienced enemy. Or to get away from obvious WW2 references, the point at which the reliability and cost of guns makes them more effective than longbows. With hindsight, many of these outcomes are inevitable, but the tipping points remain interesting for all the less obvious reasons (psychology etc) that you discuss.
The discovery and colonization of the new world was a huge turning point in human history, where Europe went from being meh, to the dominant. It did take a long time but the results were that
Lol
ww2-Europe turning point: 3 July 1940: The British fleet's attack on the French fleet are Oran Algeria. US President Roosevelt had been reluctant to support Britain because of doubts that Britain would actually fight on. This changed his mind and armaments and supplies started flowing to Britain (and later the Soviet Union).
Since this channel concentrates on logistics, industrial power … (much appreciated), thought that this might meet the request for an "economic turning point".
Okay, why does that matter? You say what happened but this ignores the fact that Germany would never be able to break the UK in historical terms, only uboats could do it and it didn’t work, the only maybe is the Soviet Union aid since the west fed the soldiers and civilians and gave them the good equipment but simultaneously Roosevelt believed where no one else did in the Soviet ability to fight, and who’s to say he or the US wouldn’t be convinced later without a war crime?
Speaking as an Australian, I consider that the Battle of the Coral Sea (4-8 May 1942) and the Battle of Milne Bay (25 August 1942 - 7 September 1942) when the Japanese were first checked at sea and on land to be important turning points-not least because these (with Kokoda) meant that Australia would not be invaded.
I think you can identify momentum shifts in the war as well as battles which helped solidify one side's lead over the other
Seriously good work. Sincere thanks to all of you.
Thanks for coming out again Justin! Thanks for the engaging discussion!
38.27 MHnV - VERY good point. The imperative to attack from the strategic level constantly overrode the reports from the operational and tactical levels (Army Group down to Corps) about troop exhaustion. When the Germans had had time to dig in with adequate numbers, they could and did repel Soviet offensives with very heavy losses and create tactical opportunities to counterattack.
I mean, it still comes down to what does "turning point" mean? Does it mean the strategic initiative has shifted? Or is it how the war is perceived by participants? Or is it the point at which one side has effectively already won?
Or if you want to think of it in a mathematical sense, it could be thought of as an inflection point, like on a sinusoidal line. In that case the battles of the Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal fit as an example of this model. The Coral Sea is where the Japanese could be said to still be "winning" (or at least achieving victories), but not as effectively as they were previously. Then Midway was the turning point itself when their fortunes took a definitive downward turn with the loss of 4 key ships. By the time Guadalcanal was fought they were definitely losing but still had some fighting capability left. After those battles though it is a general downward trend from there. They did not have the same fighting capabilities that they had had before.
The argument could be made that the turning point was Pearl Harbor, since the USA ultimately could out produce Japan on all economic fronts, but I would say that the trio of battles at the Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal was the point at which the USA definitively overcame any effective Japanese resistance. Pearl Harbor set in motion the events that would lead to Japan's defeat, but Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal was when it was achieved at the practical level.
The Eastern Front on the other hand was more dynamic, with the initiative shifting multiple times, so it had multiple turning points. But if going by the model I just described, the key turning point was the Battle of Moscow. That was the high water mark and the point at which the strategic initiative began passing to the USSR. Sure, Germany launched Case Blue in 1942, but it was on a smaller scale and achieved far less, with Kursk following the same pattern of increasingly less effective operations.
So before a turning point even occurs under this model, there will be events that show were the trend is going, and the turning point itself is when a sudden and obvious shift occurs.
Enjoyable discussion, agree definition of the turning point is key, so what are the strategic, operational or tactical outcomes from initial impacts resulting in a turning point. So consider for discussion the following examples. Pearl harbour I agree was a/make that, the strategic turning point with America entering WW2, most certainly Winston Churchill thought that in his diary. Operation Barbarossa the invasion of Russia 1942, with the inevitably outcome, similar to Napoleon 1812, the breaking of Lorenz the German strategic command code 1942 consider by Eisenhower to reduce the war by 2 years. Operationally the Battle of the Atlantic 1943 defeating the u-boats, Jutland 1916, and Cambria 1917. Tactically the battles France 1940, Dunkirk 1940, Normandy 1944, Kohima 1944 El Alamein 1942 Stalingrad 1942 and Kursk 1943 which are key changes in momentum.
4 years after it was published, but here we go:
Turning point is a fuzzy term, seem it could mean:
-Battle/event where if it had gone differently, the war after that point goes hugely differently.
-Point where a war switches from one side being generally successful/advancing to the other side being successful/advancing. This one could easily stretch a "turning point" out to a long period of back and forth fighting as one side gains an advantage over time, and where arguments come in about whether stopping an army, or reversing an army, or starting to advance, counts as a turning point.
--Also a turning point needs a longer war than the events described as the "point". A single battle finishing a war doesn't really have one (aside from maybe one part of a battle), and a war that's mostly won at the beginning with mopping up, or with a quick finish after a long, even, war aren't really thought of as having turning points.
--And, of course, a war that continually goes well for one side doesn't have turning points either, they just win.
For WW2, Midway = guadacanal and Moscow-->Stalingrad-->Kursk are examples of the second point, where the allies slowed, stopped, and started pushing back against the axis over a long time, and all of these could be considered a turning point.
Non WW2 possible examples:
-Plataea, Salamis in Xerxes's invasion could be either kind
-Egypt attacking the Sinai passes in the 1973 Israel war could be either one
-Pusan defense, Chinese invasion in the Korean war, both kinds.
-Iran-Iraq war: In 1981, pick any battle where the Iraqi invasion stalled to when Iran reconquered something. 2nd kind.
Non examples:
-2nd Punic war, from my understanding. Rome survived awhile, than finished it pretty quickly.
-Conquistadors vs. Aztecs: Conquistadors escamped, but didn't continuously fight the Aztecs, instead got more forces and won quickly.
-Hastings: Single battle, doesn't seem like any particular event lost it immediately.
-U.S. Civil War doesn't have any one big moment, just lots of fighting and building of northern advantages.
Yes, please do another episode on turning points, ok? You might want to include this in your discussion:
Thesis: There were actually multiple turning points within each theater. On the eastern front Theatre, there were 3 major turning points: 1) Battle of Moscow & counteroffensive (which "made it impossible for Germany to win the war"), 2) Stalingrad and the Uranus/Saturn counteroffensive (which "made it certain that Germany would lose the war"), and 3) Kursk (which made it certain that the war would end with Germany's near-destruction, unconditional surrender, and occupation).
In the North African Theatre, the first turning point may have been Operation Crusader and the relief of Tobruk, which halted, depleted, and turned back Rommel's forces for the first time, the second was the survival and successful resupply of Malta (which prevented Rommel from being fully resupplied), and the third was the combined successes of Auchinlech and Montgomery in halting Rommel's advance in the First Battle of El Alamein and the Battle of Alam el Halfa (July-Sept, 1942).
In the South Pacific Theatre, the first turning point might have been the Battle of the Coral Sea, which prevented two Japanese carriers from being part of the Midway operation, the second might have been Midway, and the third would have been the Solomons Campaign of 1942 and conquest of Guadalcanal.
There was also a famous letter, written by Mao Tze-Teng, addressing the turning point that was about to happen in the fall of 1942 around Stalingrad.
In order to talk about a turning point (in time), in the context of history, it is necessary to borrow a concept well known in physics and engineering - that is the concept of convolution. Using this concept the moment of the turning point is not the battle or the campaign but the decision which initiated the actions.
The IJN command mostly though that a war with the US would be unwinnable, in fact Yamamoto stated that the only option for Japan was winning a few important battles and then make a peace agreement (the IJA was all for the war, actually).
Solomons campaign was from August 1942 to the end of the war, since Bougainville remained contested throughout the war. But, it was largely over with the landings at Empress Augusta Bay and the completion or the airfields in the perimiter.
Talking of turning points makes sense in older wars when there would often be a large battle, with one side getting annihilated and unable to put up a fight from that point. In more modern wars, battles are overrated and what matters more is just having more stuff and grinding the enemy down.
The Japanese loss at Midway cost them air superiority over blue water and restricted day time operations. Before Midway the Japanese dominated everywhere.
The Japanese had to island hop to perform operations after Midway. The Solomons cost them the ability to perform offensive operations. The Japanese didn't realize this until the marianis islands.
17:12 “not naming any names here”
Yeah, Denmark
according to TIK the horses were not outside the Stalingrad encirclement. They were eaten after the Luftwaffe failed completely to even supply the bare bare minimum to the 6th Army.
I believe the actual situation is the majority of the horses were evacuated outside of the encirclement prior to it happening. However these would be nonessential horses or horses that could be spared. Zero horses would have made it impossible to for example, reposition divisional artillary. Therefore a certain % were always going to be retained, and it was these that were eaten - Reducing the very last traces of mobility left to the sixth army.
i would say that when the shogun abandoned the idea of defending Edo in the Boshin war it changed the situation from "both sides can win" to "the northern alliance is fucked".
Is this Red Army Sherman book referenced by Justin Dmitry Loza's "Commanding the Red Army's Sherman Tanks" (English title)?
Oh yeah, that must be it. Thanks!
Damnit finish the fucking story Justin! You're givin' me a wicked case of history fan blue balls here m'dude. What was it the soviet Sherman tank commander had to say that you were going to say, but then forgot the title of the book and never bothered getting back to? What was the quote?
@@WordBearer86 This hurt me.
@@WordBearer86 Probably that the Soviet Sherman tankers were transported, men only, from the west to the east, on the border in the desert. Then they were taken to their new equipment. Down in a desert ravine that had dugouts all along the sides, were brand new Shermans ready to go. The Soviets were able to ditch most stuff that was in the west, and get brand new stuff in the east. The force used lots of trucks, though the book doesn't say how many. But they were all likely brand new, and held in the east after unloading from ships, for this attack specifically.
Also, instead of turning the tanks back over to the US as agreed on, they took the turrets off and stored them and the guns, and sent the hulls to various locales for use in agriculture.
Erickson's books were," The Road to Stalingrad," and, " The Road to Berlin."
Dad was working in the Munich rail yards during the 1st winter of the Eastern front. Every day the returning trains were full of medical cases, mostly due to the weather and not battle injuries. He thought this was not what the news papers were reporting and he could only witness the arrivals in one city.
8:25 I was waiting for this to come up! If one wants to argue that turning points are a useful tool for understanding history, you need to openly define how much time you are willing to abstract into a single, isolated point. Example: “Stalingrad was a turning point” Okay, how much of it? The Axis reached Stalingrad at or about the 23th of August, Uranus was launched on the 19th November, and Paulus surrendered on the 2nd of February. That’s over 5 months or about 10% of the entire war between the two! That, to me, kinda settles the debate whether it was a turning point or not, as the term becomes rather meaningless if your ‘point’ is nearly half a year long
I think Gettysburg could be argued to be a turning point because it helped Abraham Lincoln secure his second term which would mean the war would continue. It also was the last Southern offensive. Before that there had been people speculating that the South might win after that it was clear to most observers the North would win the war. The winning side loosing momentum and the offensive.
Teuteburg forrest was a turning point for the Roman expansion into Germania because afterwards the Romans limited themselves to punishing expeditions but not territorial expansion. The end of political expansion coming along with war coming to an end.
Iran Air Flight 655, because it showed the Iranians that the west would stop at nothing to keep Iran from wining (at least that was the Iranian perspective) bringing the Iran-Iraq war to an end. Although that was more on the political level it changed the position of Iran to accept peace with Iraq. Before that they had just stubbornly kept on fighting.
You make a very good point about turning points as in there are many factors that influenced the dynamic of this conflict and each one has its curve.
One turning point for me is the capitulation of France. IMO this is were the Heer began to believe in its superiority. They held this believe until the end of the war and it is still the believe of the majority in the West today. The real factors for their success were ignored or remained hidden and false ones were embraced.
Another turning point can be the decision to turn the Panzer Armies of AGC north and south. For me it marks the end of the "Blitzkrieg" period in the Heer. Up to this point the military operations were free of the economic side of the war (I include here logistics also). From this point things like oil, economic efficiency, standardization, transportation and many other related things start to influence what the Germans can successfully do .
Firstly, how I define turning point: A turning point in war means a single event in history that sets an irreversible outcome that affects the entire chain of events that follow thereafter. When this event happens, the changes that come from this affect the decision making process and psychological mindset of all sides involved. The example that I'll use to support my point is the battle of Gettysburg, from the American Civil War. Contrary to popular belief, Gettysburg was not the bloodiest battle of the war, and there could be an argument that it wasn't really helpful in the strategic sense (though a clear tactical victory for the federal forces, but I digress). Why this battle is so important though, is that the Army of Northern Virginia had become broken, and the south would never again be able to be the level of threat to the Union it was before the battle. The battle's victory was a huge political and psychological victory for the Union. Now, I do think that even if the battle weren't won, the Union would have won the war regardless. By the numbers the outcome of victory favors the Union, if nothing else. But BECAUSE the CSA lost this battle, the end came that much quicker.
My point being that a turning point is a highly visual event that goes beyond tactics, strategies, and logistics. It goes to mindset, morale, politics, and psychology which is an important aspect of warfare. It's important to seem like your winning almost as much as it helps to actually be winning. That being said, I do think the term "Turning point" is something to look and search for, and it's a pretty abstract term.
Defining turning points also takes us dangerously close to the realm of historical "What ifs" and we all know how deep that rabbit hole goes. We can talk forever about those, espeically if approached holistically.
Also, to clarify. When I said "By the numbers" I meant the whole war, not just Gettysburg.
I think you should amend you definition to, "...sets a 'perceived' irreversible outcome..." Take May, 1940: France had been crushed. Britain had no major allies left standing. The British army was humiliated and now lacked heavy equipment. The RAF on paper was quite a bit smaller then the Luftwaffe. THe U-boats were attacking British shipping with virtual impunity. The German navy, though smaller, was ship for ship a great threat to the Royal Navy, and the Italians had the numbers to challenge it as well. Parliament was in concerted discussion to negotiate a peace deal with Hitler. Churchill was on thin ice, and there was real talk that he might be sacked. The ONLY thing that prevented Britain from brokering a peace was Churchill's adamant opposition to the idea, and the British people mostly backing him. By right, from the information available at the time, Britain should have made peace, and no one would have blamed them for doing so.
Perhaps some clarification would help, you say
"A turning point in war means a single event in history that sets an irreversible outcome"
and yet you say
" Now, I do think that even if the battle weren't won, the Union would have won the war regardless."
So, I don't see how Gettysberg was a "turning point" if from the start the CSA had already lost. Do you mean that the only way the CSA could win is through psychological warfare, and that victory through material means in itself was the only impossibility? I get that impression by this statement:
"It's important to seem like your winning almost as much as it helps to actually be winning."
austen bin, the critical date was the start of Dunkirk evacuation, end of May 1940. After that when Churchill sorted the appeasers Britain moved into total war. However you have compressed events a bit. The Royal Navy at that point was the largest in the world, and effectively destroyed or seriously damaged the majority of the German surface fleet after Norway. Admiral Cunningham, sorted the Italian fleet at Taranto late 1940. The u-boats were not an issue until France was fully captured and they moved to the Atlantic coast up to then it was a skirmish to quote the historians. He does an analysis of Sealion ruclips.net/video/YnPo7V03nbY/видео.html you may find it interesting because he blows a load of myths. Basically Britain alone is BS, largest Navy the RAF with the most advance Air Defence in the world, and the commonwealth importantly the trained army had been saved all it need was new equipment. Had the Wehrmacht tried it would have ended at the bottom of the channel, think about the Allies and overlord, took 3 years to plan. Gerd Von Rundstedt and Adolf Galland thought Hitler was never serious about it, it was a bluff to get the British to agree a peace before Barbarossa. ruclips.net/video/A_3R-Rkn_98/видео.html
on the subject of turning points Robert Catino has a good book looking at 1942 he made a grate effort not to use turning point at all in the book but argues that 1942 saw an end the the Manoeuvre warfare and why this was the case
Love this channel. I agree with these guys. What makes a turning point. I consider stalingrad to be the turning point on the eastern front. However the issue is we are missing a term. The soviet winter offensive of 1941 I would call a Balancing point. The Russians checked the Germans on a theater level. You could even call stalingrad a balancing point. In terms of the Germans would attack at Kursk in 43. 41 German offensive is with across the entire front. 42 it is limited in the south. 43 it is limited to a section of the south and the germans no longer go on the offensive in the east again. So Kursk you could call the turning point in the east as well. However I would still call 42 to be the turning point in the east.
As usual great discussion topic. I suppose I’ll take first crack at WWI turning points.
So I tend to define turning point as an event that changes and/or solidifies the momentum of the war from that point onwards, regardless of how much longer the war goes on. For WWI I tend to pick First Marne, Tannenburg, and Jutland.
Up until the first two battles the war on both fronts was one of maneuver, and was also going how both sides anticipated, with the Germans crushing the French and the Russians running over the Germans. At these battles the momentum was first halted, and at the Marne especially the Central Powers never really regained their initiative. Both sides were thrown into uncertainty about what to do next, and chose plans that determined the stalemate in the West, and the eventual failure of the Brusilov Offensive in the East.
In a lot of ways Jutland is more important. Even though the Germans were effective tactically at the battle, the results scared them enough that they spent the rest of the war in port, leaving the British free to push a naval blockade that forced the Central Powers to more and more desperate strategy to survive, culminating in the U-boat campaign that drive America into the war, and convincing the Germans in particular to try for a most likely doomed from the start to defeat the Entente before they could be fully reinforced (as reluctant as I am to give America too much credit for winning the war)
Every book on the history of the American Civil War and on the Second World War characterizes every second or third battle as a "turning point". Apparently both wars had about 20 "turning points". Is it possible for a war to have so many turning points?
Turning point implies the sides were not incredibly stilted to begin with.
It is not so much turning points but decisive events you should be considering.
I know I am days behind your initial publication, but I'll give a stab at defining a 'Turning point'
I'd suggest after not too much thinking (feel free to provide a better one) that a turning point, not necessarily with hindsight, is when the perceived immediate direction/future of the war changes almost completely. This is fairly broad and could cover who has strategic initiative, asset losses, etc.
To this extent, Op Barbarossa would be a turning point, because it was imagined by most that the USSR would fall within a few months, but the previously nigh-invincible Wehrmacht suffered its first major defeat.
Battle of the Bulge would also qualify, albeit weaker - almost nobody foresaw it, the Yanks weren't really prepared, and there was a significant chance that the Wehrnacht could have reached Antwerp. It was a gamble, which backfired, but was an unforseen change in events.
El Alamein, the 1st defensive battle by the Auk against Wüstenfuchs, but not Monty's offensive.
Midway, here I count because the IJN was dealt such a severe blow (4 Carriers, experienced pilots etc). The failure of the op I'd say isn't a turning point, but the unreplacable losses are.
I'm all ears for better definitions, civil counterarguments etc
Kursk wasn't een offensive. It was intended as a pre-emptive halting counterblow to deprive the Russians of the means to take the initiative for 1943 and buy the Germans time.
For my defination of turning point, im going to cop out a bit becuse its late lol. I think, in a holstic way for me, the turning point is an key event which signficantly narrows the possible futures in which one side could defeat the other. Sort of like (and with an abatrary number) the chance of one side winning goes from victory in 50% of possible futures to 10% of possible futures.
You would also have to decide what defeat and victory are but that is that is super contextual. For WW2, given how it ended in our timeline, I will say 'vicotry' for the axis is peace on even or favrible terms. Basically, not getting absolutly crushed and prehapse being able to keep some stuff they conqured, like luxenburg and Belgium, germany can annex luxenburg and Belgium.
The battle of Milne Bay was a turning point in the Pacific when Japan lost their first land defeat
Most pivotal Turning points of WW1 western front - first and second battle of the marne
Eastern front - Gorlice Tarnow offensive (1915)
I think that a turning point is not only one event, but a chain of event in quick succession. For the Japaneses it was for me, either Pearl Harbor OR the Battle of the Coral Sea. I'll explain myself here :
For Pearl Harbor, the japaneses failed to deliver the decleration of war in time before the attack, giving the american governement a big cassus belli to fight to the end. Seconde was the failed first assault on the base, the main damage ships were only Battleships and a couple of detroyers and auxiliary. If a second assault was launch maybe the damage outcome would be better, but the american were able to mount a defence at that point. So, yeah hard to tell.
As for the Battle of the Coral Sea, the loss of 1 japaneses Light Carrier (Shōhō). Whit the loss of around 90 japaneses planes and 960 personel killed, as for the americans they loss were far less with 65~ planes destroyed and 650 personel killed, and the japaneses got an "carrier advantage" here. Yes one american carrier was loss, but 1 us carrier is equal to roughly 2 japaneses carrier (technologically).
So to summary the failed attempt to silence 2 us carrier here cost them the victory at Midway. So i don't understand why peoples want to summarize 1 event for a turning point were its a ll chain of event.
Good point in saying that defining what "turning point" even means and the context in which it's used is important. Rejecting turning points entirely I think is going a bit far. In terms of the WW2 PTO specifically, if one were to graph the Japanese sphere of influence, there would be an inflection point around Coral Sea and Midway as the losses severely curtailed their ability to expand it and a local maximum somewhere in the Solomons campaign where they were no longer expanding and now in retreat. Now, the graph is going to be a bit noisy and fuzzy rather than being a nice, neat curve but when looking at larger trends, I think one could reasonably define inflection points or local extrema as "turning points", with the acknowledgement that when things are really fuzzy, there might not be a single point but a blob.
One of the key factors in German defeat, as well as a key reason Barbarosa failed in it's primary objectives, was the Soviets disassembling their industry and shipping it to the Urals before the Wermacht could capture or destroy it. After that, Germany could only knock the USSR out by taking the Caucasus, and/or killing millions of soldiers on the front lines.
Turning point definition in my view: The point at which a major paradigm in a conflict that was previously true, has become untrue. (Option A). A point at which one side of a conflict irrevocably loses the ability to "win" the war to a particular degree. i.e. Germany could have probably managed a limited-War victory with reasonable territorial expansion had they only tried to annex the Sudetenland, and the pre-Poland stuff. They might even have held on to Poland and France, if they had NOT engaged against the Soviet Union. Japan's turning points? Pearl Harbor was an act of protracted suicide, though one aspect of World War II that is often forgotten by Logistics and Strategic minded folks, is the moral aspect of the conflicts. Once your enemy commits heinous atrocities in war, peace without absolute victory becomes nearly impossible. The Nazis COULD NOT be left in power after the Holocaust and SS/Ensatzgruppen had done their things. The Japanese could NOT be left without regime change after the Rape of Nanking and countless others. The people responsible could not be let off the hook by the Allies, even if the Allies might not -really- have cared all that much about the welfare of the Chinese state, or international Jewry. It was the atrocity of it that damned the Axis to being erased from the map... and perhaps the greatest tragedy of World War II was that the Nazi/Japanese ideologies were so repugnant, that they prevented the Allies from applying the same lens against Stalinist Russia. Had there been no holocaust, and atrocities, the Nazis might well have gotten a separate peace... or managed to join the Allies AGAINST Stalin. But that was not to be. So in my view, turning points are pretty vague, but they do exist. Their impact however is the RESULT of things leading up to their moment in history, not the moment themselves.
Wars are not ideological. War is always only ever about resources. Ideology is used to whip frenzy to incite or continue war, but war is not ideological. It's simply about taking land & resource from another group & distributing it to your own group.. Alternatively, war is about defending your group's land & resource from plunder.
I think turning points are inherently difficult to notice, especially without the luxury of hindsight. If you jump up, it's easy to notice when you hit the ground but that's the end point. Before that it's not too easy to tell when exactly the fall begins. If an entire army jumps, even telling the end or the beginning is hard.
Similarly, I think the big failures or successes of any side were not so much the turning points of the World Wars but rather the fruit of what was cultivated for a long time. And since wars are complex and the data is somewhat fuzzy even at its best, determining any kinds of points is largely a matter of interpretation.
That said, many decisive battles and operations certainly had an impact on the capabilities of the participants. Most clear cases are probably the (effective) losses of major warships, since that might happen very quickly in case of a lucky shot (or mine).
The Dunkirk example, I think, _could_ have been a turning point had the Brits not escaped. Then it _might_ have made them sign piece with the Germany, which _might_ have helped the Axis beat the Soviets. But as it turned out, I'd consider it more of a missed turning point.
militarily I'd say a point that a sides tactical victory could not feasibly result in a strategic victory.
Yes. It helps newcomers in history to understand important landmarks.
Napoleon's defeat in Russia is an interesting affair. Because it is absolutely true that it destroyed the best parts of the Grand Armee and that after 1812 Napoleon was not dominant. He achieved parity in 1813 after building a new army, and had a number of chances to defeat the Sixth Coalition, but the day of Napoleon easily overpowering the enemy was over. Add to the Russian debacle, Austria switching sides, the accession of Sweden to the 6th Coalition, that is Bernadotte giving the Allies the keys to Napoleon's tactics and strategy. This meant that in 1813 Napoleon was very vulnerable and never had more than a 50/50 shot at victory.
I would say that two things that would be imo turning points were: Pearl Harbor, in only that it got the US to actually fight, though even without any help from the US on the European fronts the Germans could never have conquered the Soviet Union, especially with Lend-Lease going on. The second was that the Polish codebreakers laid a lot of the groundwork for decoding Enigma, and passed it on the the UK before Poland fell. They were not the only things, but they had a massive effect on the outcome I think.
**not naming any french here** ;)
Lol I almost spit out my coffee when he said that
The 1968 Tet Offensive is regarded as a turning point, but perhaps it's impact is overstated. The 1963-1968 phase of escalation and 1969-1973 phase of retraction are divided by the presidencies of Johnson (D) and Nixon (R); maybe the change in government was more important.
What perception do North Vietnamese historians have of the 1968 Tet Offensive? It could well be remembered as unsuccessful. Huế was seized, but was held for only a matter of weeks. Wikipedia's article "Tet Offensive" seems to indicate that the PAVN/NLF suffered more casualties than they inflicted.
a Turning Point in the mind of a military commander could be a Lesson.. a lesson learned from another battle that they had not fought but did hear about in real time. for that I can not speak to, but imagine the Thoughts of Baghdad Bob as he would PR out a new Bs story and the forces of the coalition of the willing were driving into Baghdad.. interesting topic... great debate step off point.
I've always thought of turning point as a battle that had such great effect on the war that it nearly guarantees victory.
Like D-Day.
The day the Allies got a Foothold in Europe the Germans were never going to be able to push them back into the sea.
D-Day are nowhere near as turning point
Germans are already lost any chance of winning the war after Kursk in 1943
and as for Foothold Allies already landing in Italy in 1943
Allied strategic bombing and battle of the Atlantic have bigger impact than D-Day
I would argue that the concept of a "turning" point in a "nation-deciding" war only applied to the time prior to about 1800. Up till that point, a single battle (or decision) could end a war. "Nations" of relatively equal power would field "all" their forces in a single climactic battle. The winner took all. Within a single battle, the loss of a leader could be the turning point. Since then, major wars are decided by a series of blows because forces -- and the logistics to support those forces -- are typically dispersed over many separate arenas. A loss "here" can be compensated by a win "there". However, when a nation loses the ability to compensate across arenas, it has lost the war. Hence, a turning point must refer to the "proportional commitment of a nation's total resources" or the "loss of a large proportion of total resources". Note that the comment "prior to 1800" is only intended as a guide. For example, Leuctra was Sparta's turning point -- it lost a large proportion of its military power in one battle. Conversely, the Roman empire could not be said to have single turning point in its demise. In modern times, the destruction of Sadam's Iraq was accomplished in a single (multi-day) battle.
Can I watch this even if I am a teen?
If you need to ask, then probably no
no, your eyes automatically see a black screen. happy to help
Wilmer Holmqvist you can just listen
Do you have your parents' permission?
MHV has some forms that you will have to fill out. :D
i did also paper Big K as a turning point.. for loss of the armor that could not be replaced and the psychological affect was a real killer post the surrender of stalingrad.. its Over.. // so although it may not have been a Full blown all war ends in 100 days Turning Point.. but again.. define the turn and how that is a Point .. thanks for the upload.. / a turning point for the dead would be the last time they turned NOT a Round faster than their enemy did Upon them.
Social history often alludes to Turning Points but after this discussion now I'm not so sure
I think, a turning point does not need to be the decisive thing that changed the whole picture, but it could also the point in time around which the ballences of power, or intitiative switches - like the point in time in which the US Airpower achieved numerical supriority, over the japanese... what of course however does only show up visible, if one watches the actuall statistics, instead of the ongoing events, what brings the whole thing back to the question of how to define a turning point .... well ^^
The turning point of WW2 was obviously the Austro-Hungarian empire declaring war in 1914
;)
You pointed out the Wehrmacht's own internal assessments about the capability of its infantry and panzerwaffe component parts for the upcoming summer offensive of Army Group South during the summer of 1942. The differences from its pre-Barbarossa capability factor and the pre-Fall Blau capability factor is stark. During the year which had transpired on the Eastern Front the Wehrmacht had sustained horrific losses especially during Operation Typhoon and over the course of the Soviet counteroffensive generally beginning December 5th 1941. On paper the Axis were able to replace these losses in terms of men and material to include armor and artillery but gone forever were the days where the Wehrmacht could operate in the field with near impunity as its panzer tipped mechanized spearheads ran circles around massive Red Army formations bagging Soviet POWs by the hundreds of thousands. In this respect I've come to see the failure of the Wehrmacht to effect the collapse of the Red Army in 1941 with special emphasis on Typhoon as perhaps the more important turning point of the larger picture albeit a turning point that was much wider in terms of time perspective. I am someone hesitant to list Typhoon persee as the turning point however due to its focus on Moscow of which I mostly reject as the absolute necessary objective key to victory.
"Not naming any France here..."
Jim Fortune But France kept fighting. Unlike Austria.
Taylor Lang why did you stop? Continue the idea. For what did they fight?
Taylor Lang And the Germans living in Austria did... Do you now see why an Austrian making fun of the French is fucked up.
Taylor Lang is that right? So you do not agree with naming France alone here?
Taylor Lang poland and france are very similar in that time period: both fought for and against germany. The main difference is that france was pacifist. Saying that france fought for the axis is total büllshit. I don't know how the heck can someone even believe that they were all for germany. De Gaulle nobody? Oh yeah but it's easier to forgot actual history to frenchbash than study history then try to frenchbash. Here is a fact: 95% of the french were like : "dammit" but did nothing.
Offence / Defence
Basic fight is either (in war at various levels) until it ends.
Vietnam by this standard the Americans won everything but lost the war.
Internal disintegration (lack of will)
Although both sides would still be fighting on into the early eighties. (the need for a non corrupt government)
British were better at administration (Emperial bonds) sympathetic locals (don't underestimate cultural bonds) tradition & pageantry ("propaganda")
"Okay, then, well maybe is that the start?" - at the 9:50ish mark....
Isn't that what a turning point has to be? A start or an end? If it isn't either, there is no turn. It doesn't mean it is all over, right there and then. It just means, at that point, things changed in a notable way.
Operation Ichigo was a notable change for the Chinese, but that was no turning point
Turning point i'd argue would be the one, where adversary need to yield initiative and completely overhaul their plans for further conflict. Couple of them i would call battle of Sedan or Hiroshima/Nagasaki bombs. These events completely changed the battle plans.
Turning points are like frequent flier miles - if you pile up enough of them you can exchange them at the end of the war for airline tickets or the latest nifty consumer products!
sorry for all the comments but they are on different topics. One for Justin about the decisiveness of Pearl Habour, how unlikely would it have been for the US to not have attack Japan without them striking first. You can add any additions to that, Japan only continues the war on China, or only attacks the European empires, or attacks Russia instead. Also without war against Japan would the US have gone to war in Europe.
I suppose, what would have needed to happen for Rosovelt to gain enough domestic support for war?
I think the Turning Point on the eastern front was once Russia was able to get the tank and other war material production running full steam. On the western front the turning point was simply once the US entered the war.
Since you mentioned the amount of NCOs and co getting captured in Stalingrad, why didnt they evacuate these troops by plane once the defeat was becoming certain?
To make a clausewitzian point
Clausewitz works out how war is in the end measure to attain political goals. So although within the war we have a goal (defeating the enemy) and means for that goal, in the end the war as a totality is just a political means. Furthermore, as war does not happen in one moment but over a long time, political considerations interfere with strategic ones and ultimately overrule them, i.e. one has to think from the political level not from the strategic one (therefore I would disagree with MHV that the Afrika Korps was a wate of capacities). In one sentence: The political sphere is the sphere which interferes all the time in the war because it is the sphere which governs it, as a war is a political act.
Having this in mind let's look at 2. WW in Europe again. The first question is what was the 2. WW actually about? I think there is an quite easy answer: Nazi-German expansion politics that came into conflict with the established order at some point and thus let the war exploaded. Seeing in in this way a turning point would happen at that point when Germany either gave up such plans or when on the political scale a major change happens. And there we have two candidates: The declaration of war against the USA, because this made the war global. Yet Nazi-Germany had not yet given up the political goal of expansion politics. When did that change? With the defeat at Stalingrad and the overall failure of Fall Blau. After that the political goal was to defend the gained ground. Later it was to find a peace agreement with the western allies, which equals giving up expansion plans and even being ready to give back some conquered territories, in order to continue fighting the Soviet Union.
As a final remark the Holocaust gained momentum after the defeat at Stalingrad. I think because of the paranoic theory of Nazis that Jews are the driving intelligence behind the forces, which try to destroy Germany. Therefore to the extent they lost the capacity to defeat enemy forces they started increasing the murder of Jews.
4:03 This is a lovely topic. Rather than Pearl Harbor, you could actually argue that the oil and steel embargoes imposed by the US against Japan were the "turning point." Once that happened, the rest had to follow necessarily.
Personally, I would go back even further and say that Imperial Japan lost the war when they adopted the hard-core indoctrination policies that resulted in valuable, highly trained pilots and officers needlessly sacrificing their lives.
7:40: You can also argue that the turning point was when Japan tried to jump from Rabaul all the way to Guadalcanal when they had until then stuck with shorter, better supported, jumps.
I've also argued that the Japanese should have seen the USN torpedo bomber attack at Midway as a turning point. That level of self-sacrifice was supposed to have been the advantage the IJN had.
Closing the air gap in the middle of the Atlantic and the use of radio intelligence were certainly turning points in the Battle of the Atlantic.
The Battle of the Bulge was a turning point because after that the Germans lacked enough effective divisions to resist along the entire Western front.
The Russian Campaign of 1812 was a turning point because the French lost their cavalry mounts and it took several years, really until 1815, to properly replace them. Yes, you're making my point. Of course you could ALSO argue that Trafalgar was the turning point because that eliminated any chance of forcing Britain out of the war.
For WW2 in Europe, you could follow TIK and say that the turning point was when the German's failed to reach the Caucasian oil fields.
Oh! The Great War. von Schlieffen would say that the turning point was when the Germans (the younger Moltke?) split the German forces rather than settling the war in the West before dealing with the East. So, again, it was doomed from the start.
36:00 This is why you can't settle any of these questions because if you change anything, everything could change. And those three weeks would also have made the logistical situation much better in 1941. In both 1812 and 1941 it is hard to see what a German victory would have looked like. Taking the oil fields in 1942 could have done it, but by then it was probably already too late because they were so over extended.
WWI was a lost cause for the CP.
If one wants to postulate the factors necesseary to turn its outcome, I think the key to that would be to somehow increase the fighting effectiveness of the Dual Monarchy.
It had the manpower and industrial capacity to rival Germany, yet it had only limited impact on the war due to a variety of factors, including incompetent high command.
A more succesful KuK armee would mean an earlier collapse of Tsariat russia, Italy electing to stay neutral, or even possibly honour their alliance, and with these almost 10 million battle hardened troops would be freed up to reinforce either the Western front, or the middle east.
Still, the US joining the Entante would decisively swing the scales even in such a scenario.
Trafalgar 1805 was a turningpoint of the Napoleonic War. Before this point the joint french and spanish fleet was a treath to the Royal Navy. After Trafalgar this threath was much lessened.
From what I read Trafalgar just sealed the deal, see my video on Napoleons chances of invading Britain
Was thinking more about a blockade to starve it to unfavorable terms.
I have a great hypothetical Pacific War question for people to think about: What if the USS Enterprise and USS Hornet had been made available for the Coral Sea battle instead of being used for the Doolittle Raid. Could the USN have been dominate enough that they would have suffered fewer losses while also defeating the Japanese in a tactical sense? And would that have altered the Japanese MI operation?
What if the two Japanese small carriers had been at Midway instead of the Aleutians? Japan would have had a LARGE numerical advantage in flattops AND planes.
Oops, also the Doolittle Raid had a massive psychological effect effect on the entire Japanese nation.
If we argue that WW2 has no turning point or 'turning line' does that mean there was no point at which the axis could have won? (or not lost completely, which I will say is territorial occupation, or reduction) If there is a period in which not losing was possible would the point at which losing become inevitable be a turning point?
Such a point does not have to be a battle, it can be polticaal, econmic, or demgraphic.
El-Alemein could be considered a turning point in a psychological extent in that it was their first significant strategic victory on land for the western allies.
Is the Live-Stream for the Sino-Japanese war available anywhere? I can't seem to find it.
ruclips.net/video/pMVc-w1orUM/видео.html
You have to specified the types of video in someone's channel as it is defaulted to video only
khang177 Thanks a lot! Really appreciate it!
When Barbarossa was given the go, it was all over.
I'm a little late to the party, but I'll add my two cents here. I've always thought of turning points as the winnowing down of probable outcomes. Moreover, one must define the outcome in degrees; in other words, who was losing and by how much. To use the Eastern Front example: during Barbarossa/Typhoon, the Nazis could potentially achieve a complete victory of sorts by driving the Red Army east of the Urals where Stalin would be of little threat. During Fall Blau, Hitler could still have forced a favorable peace but was no longer able to outright crush everyone. Kursk/Torch and the loss of the strategic initiative meant that even Status Quo Antebellum was not possible anymore, though a moderate loss like post-Waterloo France could still achieved with some luck and wisdom (Think Guderian telling people "Make peace, you idiots" while they still had something to negotiate with). After Bagration/Normandy....game's over and the only outcome is total defeat.
I have a supposition that I would like you to examine in the pacific during WW2.
The Americans went to take back the Philippines but I think that it would have been better if the US would have tried to take Okinawa. My reasoning for this is that one of the reasons for taking the Philippines was to cut theJapanese off from supplies from the supplies from south Asia. I believe that taking Okinawa would have done the same thing and given the Japanese less time to fortify the Islands (reducing the casualties we took) as well as making the flying time to Japan less and we could have made the Island into supply depots for submarines, Bombers, fighters and the Pacific fleet. Also putting the mainland of China in range of the bombers to attack the Japanese army in support of the Chinese Nationalists.
My Philippines video tackles that question to a certain degree already
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized I have just listened to the video about the Philippines and while it covers some of the possible problems it doesn't directly cover going to Okinawa rather then the Philippines.
When dealing with Okinawa its closeness to Japan and the fact that it can be reached from Japan, Formosa and the Philippines needs to be taken in to account. Did we have the naval strength to take on the Japanese fleet and land based aircraft and would it be worth the risks?
@@richardmeyeroff7397 probably not, you know logistics and range limits. Staging areas for invasions etc. also they had to learn a lot about naval invasions.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized Please forgive me for extending this discussion but it is some thing that has interested me for a long time and there is a scarcity of information that I have been able to locate. Is there any place that you could direct me to for more information?
Weren't many of these problems for invading Okinawa the same if they tried to invade Formosa. Is there any information as to the reasons why they went for the Philippines rather then Formosa that may bolster the reasons for not considering Okinawa?
yeah, the sources in my Philippines video.
I think Stalingrad is one of the turning point (more accurately the failure of case blue) as the Germans failed to secure the Caucasus oil. But also Kursk (or at least when the Germans could have been said to have lost the Ukraine as the bread situation in the Soviet Union was bad. But must’ve improved once enough of land was recaptured to stabilise the situation. Thought?
A turning point can be definded as many different things. But lets sey its a point in wich one side goes from being succeful to failing. Stalingrad is therefor a turning point as the germans are going to be mostly on retret after
I would posit that turning points are much more relevant in non-industrial warfare. The decisive ability to destroy the enemy army and, most critically, the capturing or killing on opponents leadership. Basically, you are more able to win in a day. In the industrial age, I think battles are less decisive simply because states are more able to recover losses and block enemy advances. In an industrial country with millions of people its hard to knock out an army decisively. A fleet, or airforce, that still seems very possible.
As you say I think the most decisive battles in modern warfare are those that psychologically break the enemy and brings them to surrender or negotiation. That makes identifying battles in which someone missed an opportunity to deliver that blow really tough to assess with anything more than speculation. its easier in asymmetric war where the population is not fully committed to the fight.
Arguably the Tet offensive was a turning point in Vietnam. As far as I understand the US won that battle and it devastated the Vietnamese. However, the phycological blow knocked them out decisively. Arguably the same happened at Dien Bien Phu for France and Mogadishu in 1993.
Egypt's failed attack outside the Suez air defence shield during the Yom Kippur war was very decisive in allowing the Israelis to decisively crush the Egyptian army. While Egypt now has Suez anyway a stalemate could have had a huge effect on Ierlai feelings of insecurity and confidence in Arab nationalist armies abilities.
I don't think it is very compelling if anyone says the concept of decisive battles (of turning points/lines) that decide who wins or loses a war can be dismissed. I just think that it is a more viable argument in total, industrialised warfare, even then, we have a small sample size.
As for WW2-
Could victory at Dunkirk have resulted in the UK to peace?
What if stubborn Churchill was not there, would someone like Chamberlain have been easier to bring to terms?
Could a blitzkrieg of some manner in Barbarossa have led to the psychological knock out of the USSR as you mentioned? If that is reasonably possible, then you could argue that is a turning point. If the Germans could have inflicted a blow in 1941 that would have resulted in Russian collapse or surrender and they failed, that's the turning point.
The problem with defining turning POINTS in a major industrial war is that one spectacular victory (or loss) doesn't always destroy one side's ability to fight. So your points are more blurred out in time. I think I would have to go with "After what point was the loser unable to conduct a successful offensive operation, on anything other than a minor tactical scale?" Kursk is a good example for the reasons you give. In the First World War, it would probably be Villiers-Brettoneux in 1918 and more certainly the battles that began on 8 August of that year. This was the point after which the German Army was always on the retreat and British operations (for example) were more often than not successful.
This is not typical of industrial war only. The entire idea of a decisive victory is flawed from the beginning and Clausewitz was a clueless fool.
Cannae is upheld as the prefect example of an ideal victory won against a superior opponent in war academies.
And yet, still this battle that ended with a crushing victory didn't result in any glorious ending in the war for Hannibal and Carthage. Hannibal did in fact win 3 times against much superior Roman armies that he utterly destroyed in some of the finest victories ever won in history. And he walked around in Italy for years and plundering the countryside when he didn't have the siege equipment to take Rome.
He hoped his crushing victories would destroy the Roman coalition and make the Italian cities abandon Rome and switich over to his own side. But he hugely underestimated the loyalty and love Romes allied felt, and his strategy utterly failed and he got himself into a hopeless strategic situation.
And no tactical victories and won battles could turn the tide of war and help Carthage win.
As with Britain and the USSR in WW2, Hannibal (like Hitler) failed to break his enemy's will to fight. Victory is a combination of will and resources, and Hannibal never had superiority in both at the same time. Other kingdoms might have succumbed, but Rome was (and for a long time remained) a very different kettle of fish. Also, look at how those wars ended - the Carthaginians wanted to bring Rome to terms; the Romans wanted to wipe Carthage off the map. The determination was all with the Romans, who could absorb disasters like Cannae and keep on going.
Many pre-war assessments on the Soviet army were very negative and a lot of western allies thought the Soviets were doomed until after Stalingrad. To them, it was a turning point. In hindsight, maybe it wasn't like many of the medieval wars where one side stopped all coordinated resistance after an epic battle, but I think some people go too far the other way in downplaying it. Losing the entire German 6th Army (and the Romanian 3rd) couldn't have been good for the axis cause and if they could snap their fingers in April 1943 and bring them back, the Soviets would have a much more complicated time besting them back.
Does Justin have a channel I can sub to?
nope, not yet.
There cannot be anything as a turning point, as, due to the nature of the definition, in general, that the battle or campaign somewhere meant that the tide of war changed decisively, is flawed. There are many points in history when a war have a massive decisive victory and thereafter, the opposing side pull something and either a truce is signed, or the tide turns again on to the other side. For instance, one can take a look at the many wars between the Byzantines or Eastern Rome against the Sassanid Empire, or the Battles fought by Narsis and Belisarius against the Barbarians who had taken Italy. As we know, the Italian peninsula was again lost later on.
If anything, I would argue that rather than a particular event being a point from which a series of events take a critical effect, such as the common notion around Stalingrad, there is something which can be termed as "The loss of initiative". At first you'd tell me that this is the same thing, but this takes into consideration more exceptions. For instance, in medieval unto the 17th century, many wars were decided upon the point in which one side loses an army, with out an army, one loses the possibility of gaining or taking initiative. On the other hand, take the Crusade battles, one would be hard pressed to find the total army of the Christian and Muslim forces fight, but rather many skirmish battles, which eventually led to the initiative becoming firmly in the hands of the more mobile Muslim forces. More recently, the loss of Napoleon I's cavalry forces in the Russian Campaign, meant that Napoleon could not secure the initiative that would be achieved from destroying the Russian army (as without an army, Russia could still fight a guerrilla war, yet not open battles, which Napoleon would use until he took St. Petersburg).
There is then the case in which weather such as all the Russian campaigns such as that of 1812, 1941 among others, which stole the initiative from the invading armies. The rains in Russia led to the inability for more heavy German forces to move due to mud problems, the same problem Napoleon faced in Waterloo, as he could not maneuver his artillery.
The case in which pitch battles meant the victory or defeat of a country was, for instance, that of wars between smaller states, such as the wars between the many tiny German states in history, or the wars between tribal chieftains or warlords in Mongolia, where at the defeat of one's army, there was nothing that one could do to defend or continue to prosecute the war.
Thus, there would not be the issue of an event as a Turning Point, but event'S', a series of events that led to the initiative being taken, retaken, gained, lost and so on, by which wars were eventually won, lost or reached a stalemate. To illustrate this, look at the 1854-56 Crimean war. The British, French and Ottomans won after the percieved turning point of winning the siege. But eventually, gained nothing from what they wanted (the treaty could not be maintained and was repudiated in 1871). No side gained initiative, but as the allies pulled out, they no longer remained a factor, and on balance, by 1871, the Russians gained enough initiative or the allies lost it enough so as to led to the war to become a draw.
That particular variety of multiple choice question is emblematic of the problem with our public (government) school system. They love to ask really big questions and then offer a reductive pitiful list of answers, of which you can only choose one "correct" answer and offer no opportunity to defend your answer. I would call the teacher over and ask if they wanted me to attempt to give them a serious answer(please give me a couple of pages for an essay) or just give them the bs answer that they were asking for!
An interesting 'what if' kinda popped into my mind while watching this. After Barbarossa started, Stalin was concerned that he was going to be over thrown for his conduct that led to the Soviets being sucker punched at the start of the operation. To his great surprise, instead the administrations and communist elites turned to him to see them through the crisis. My question is, say the coup that he feared actually happened. And he was removed from power while the Germans were rampaging through Soviet lands. Without Stalin in charge, would the Soviets be able to rally as they did?
The bigger question is would the Soviets attempt peace with Germany and give up, stuff?
They wouldn’t agree to the AA Barbarossa line but say they agree to Minsk border, before the center army made it to Minsk and took the 25,000 or whatever losses then it would’ve eased the pressure that every Km took, and certainly would’ve given Finland whatever they took back, which would give the renewed offensive (that would’ve totally happened) a springboard for Leningrad and the Murmansk railway
Although more accurate to history is coups do bad things to army high commands, the Soviet command would’ve been even more fractured in a coup and I’m not sure the Soviets could hold the Germans back without a command structure
Commenting without having watched (oops) - as an undergraduate history major "turning point" to me has become short hand for: "this is popular history of the most popular kind".
Declaring war after Germany invaded the Czechoslovakia instead of waiting till after they invaded Poland. The Germans would not have had the resources or the men to fight the French and Britain considering all the industrial capacity they gained from Czechoslovakia as well as the men that where to be put into military service.
History is after all just a simplyfication of real events so I think that the turning point can be a useful expression in that sense.
Like saying Stalingrad was a turningpoint. And after the defeat, Germany would never get deeper into Russian territory than that and from this time and onwards would the war mainly be oriented as a defensive action.
So if I was a teacher I would tell my students that, and not go into too much details. One could perhaps argue that there still was a small chance Germany still could have won somehow. But that is not relevant when you are talking about what happened in the real war, and skip all counter-factional debate nonsense.
How is this for adults? Because it isn't visualized?
Failure to capture Moscow and Stalin in the initial invasion of the Soviet Union.given how hands on Stalin was with every aspect of the war, I feel his removal as leader would at best dramatically weaken the Soviets at worst effectively knock them out of the war.Another turning point; when Hitler started dismissing his officers and taking command. He was not the general he thought he was.
I disagree about Stalin. He made many terrible decisions in the early years of the war. The idea of shooting generals who lose a battle isn’t just immoral it’s stupid. It makes commanders much more cautious, afraid to take the initiative, and vulnerable to encirclement which resulted in huge mostly preventable losses at the begging of the war. Stalin got a bit better toward the end of the war, because he started to listen to his generals more but I think the Soviet Union would have been much better off if some stray bomb managed to take out Stalin.
What HoI series teached me is that the loser is the one who starts to lack equipment in the army first. Because if the war goes on in the same way, that nation just looses more and more until its army is just an empty box with huge numbers as requirements and litttle numbers of real, existing equipment. I mean, its not like the war cannot be won anymore, if IRL germans had nukes in time when Bagration started, they could completely change the situation...
The main turning point was obviously when Hitler met Eva Ono Braun and started dating her. This soured his relationship with the other Axis leaders and killed off the remaining cohesion and creativity. In the end it was only Tojo who tried to keep the gang going, but by then there was a great distance between him and the others.
Hitler had to launch Operation Typhon. He needed to look like a winner to encourage the Japanese to enter the war. We now know that the pact between Hitler and Japan committed Germany to come into any war that Japan started. Hitler wanted the Japanese Navy to check the US Fleet. The German Army paid a price to keep Hitler looking good.
Stalin could not surrender to Hitler. When he tried, the response he got was that Hitler would not negotiate with the USSR so long as Stalin was alive. To negotiate a peace would be suicide for Stalin.