Wasn’t a SPAD. Though, very close to it. Also, when 173pts on the Down Midcalder (the route taken by the 385) are set reverse, 172pts (in front of the 334) towards are also reverse (towards the Up Midcalder). So, if the 334 had somehow managed to pass EH511 far enough to cross the points (incredibly unlikely from a standing start because of TPWS), it would have taken the route onto the Up Midcalder towards Carstairs and wouldn’t have crossed the path of the 385. Not ideal from the perspective of the driver or the passengers as it would require a setting back and likely the relief of the driver (there’s probably also at least two trains on the Down South behind it that would be trapped), but there was never even the remotest chance of a collision. Even a non-stopping train would only be doing 50mph into a 40mph turnout which would never derail it. Source: I’m a Signalling Fault Response Team Leader for the Haymarket area. 200 years of signalling interlocking development has meant that we do everything we can to iron out conflicts. If we can create a protecting move by reversing points (known as Flank Protection), we will. So, there was a risk of a serious operational incident, which will endanger the drivers job, but the passengers were never at risk to the extent you describe.
This was quite embarrassing but definitely not life threatening. Where the points are that close to the signal, they are locked in a safe position when a conflicting move is set. In this case the points would’ve been held for position 1 routing until : 1 - the arriving train was in the platform clear of the conflict zone and 2 - the desired route had been set. If the signal was passed by a significant distance, the departing train would’ve be routed left instead of straight ahead into the arriving train.
There also seems to be mixed opinions on whether the TPWS or the driver applied the brakes. If you look very closely at the first wheel set, you can see that they are just about to go over the TPWS grids when the brake application is heard. So it seems that the driver spotted the signal just before passing it.
In that case with a train coming across the junction then the points for the route out of platform would be set towards Carstairs route so that in the event of a train passing the signal a collision would be avoided. But still a very serious event for the driver. I drove this route for many years.
Interesting capture of that SPAD event, although it did look like the driver spotted it late and braked as train stops only just past the platform ramp and well before the TPWS grid. Also looking at other trains passing that same signal it stopped well before the end of the track circuit, so borderline if it was actually a SPAD although it did look like it on the video and certainly would not have been picked up by the signaling as it didn't go far enough. Brakes are impressive on these units though.
The driver didn't actually apply the emergency brake themselves, the train went over the TPWS grid which is placed adjacent to the signal, if the signal is red and a train passes over it will trip causing an emergency brake application
I've said this on their other video of this, but the train did not reach the TPWS grid and the driver manually applied the breaks (whether that be full service or emergency brakes I have no idea). To explain this in more than enough detail: Looking on a bigger screen than a phone, the grid is beyond the end of the ramp. The breaks apply before the cab reaches the end of the ramp / signal to which the TPWS grid on that line just becomes out of view by the cab. You can hear the initial break squal noise apply and the motors cut out. You can still see the TPWS grid in front of the cab and as soon as it becomes out of sight the breaks apply. But the cab is nowhere near the grid - the distance the train travels in that second it doesn't reach the grid. Yes it is opposite the two grids on the adjacent line but they have no affect on this train. The driver applied the breaks and not the grid. Second to this, looking at the wheels, where they make contact with the rail (plus the shadow that the train casts in the 6ft) they do not reach the line of cleared sleeper ends in the 6ft before the breaks apply, with these sleeper ends being clearly visible and protruding back towards the platform compared to the grid - proving the that bogie was nowhere near the grid for the breaks to be activated as suggested, by the grid. The bogie / train is too far back. I hope this helps
@rock_dinosaurnot really. Had the driver of gone past the signal the TPWS would have stopped the train, also even though the train was booked to have gone straight on the points would have been set for the diverging route anyway. It’s a fail safe, I forge the correct technical term for it, but was brought in after an accident many years ago. So even if the driver had gone through the red light there would have been no collision. Although I am surprised the train departed as the driver should have been taken off and Med screen because whether they went through the red signal or not they started against a red, which certainly at my company is a “ for cause” incident. Which makes me think either there was another driver to travelling on the train to take the train forward, or the driver had not reported it. It’s not well shown in the video how long it is between the incident and train moving forwards.
if Signal was red why did they dispatch the unit ?? and why wasn't the driver paying attention to the signal ??if these are guardless trains this just goes and proves why you need a Guard !!
I've said this on their other video of this, but the train did not reach the TPWS grid and the driver manually applied the breaks (whether that be full service or emergency brakes I have no idea). To explain this in more than enough detail: Looking on a bigger screen than a phone, the grid is beyond the end of the ramp. The breaks apply before the cab reaches the end of the ramp / signal to which the TPWS grid on that line just becomes out of view by the cab. You can hear the initial break squal noise apply and the motors cut out. You can still see the TPWS grid in front of the cab and as soon as it becomes out of sight the breaks apply. But the cab is nowhere near the grid - the distance the train travels in that second it doesn't reach the grid. Yes it is opposite the two grids on the adjacent line but they have no affect on this train. The driver applied the breaks and not the grid. Second to this, looking at the wheels, where they make contact with the rail (plus the shadow that the train casts in the 6ft) they do not reach the line of cleared sleeper ends in the 6ft before the breaks apply, with these sleeper ends being clearly visible and protruding back towards the platform compared to the grid - proving the that bogie was nowhere near the grid for the breaks to be activated as suggested, by the grid. The bogie / train is too far back. I hope this helps
@Michael Laing I apologise but only some signals have more than 1 grid (usually for certain high risk areas). There can be an Overspeed Sensor arrangement (TPWS OSS) where there are 2x grids located way before the signal in question and are situated of close proximity to eachother. The first grid is the 'arming' grid and the second grid is the 'trigger' grid with the distance between them calculating the train's speed and thus calculating if it is going fast enough to SPAD the signal ahead, if it were to continue at that speed. Here at Haymarket, as you rightly said the train enters the platform slowly and stops because it in service and booked to stopped and it doesn't trigger the TPWS OSS (if there any in the platform, it's hard to tell on my phone currently), but the driver sets off and applies the brakes before reaching the signal and was way off the TPWS grid that is just beyond the signal (analyising how it sits in relation to the infrastructure around it), which will be engersied due to the red aspect beyond the end of the platform ramp. In this scenario the train breaks were not atomatically applied by the safety equipment and by the driver. It is clear that this is the case if you know and understand the equipment but also by looking at the clip on a bigger screen than a phone screen (tv / computer). I apologise if I am coming accross as rude, I am not trying to be at all - it really is not my intention, but I hope this explanation helps. But honestly looking at this video, a 'TPWS emergency brake application' was not activated, the train was nowhere near the grid for it to have done so
I'm surprised, following a SPAD the driver isn't allowed to continue, unless moving to the next signal helps get them off a junction or to a place where the signaller can deal with them better. Train looks to pull away rather fast and I can't see them wanting to go to the next signal when they're sitting in a station. Not knowing where the track circuits are, the driver might be lucky and have not spadded as far as the signaller is concerned if they haven't crossed the block joint. Perhaps slightly different rules in Scotland though. How long was the driver stationary?
This appears to be the classic “Ding Ding Away” the guard signals away and the driver applies power.. may be they were running a little late? Or the oncoming train was late? Or a multitude of reasons. But the driver saw the signal and stopped.
Firstly. There would not have been a collision, as although the train is booked to go straight on the route would have been set for the diverging route as a fail safe should a train go past the red signal, it was the result of a similar collision many years ago, I forget the correct technical signalling term. Secondly as other viewers have noted it looks like TPWS has stopped the train rather than the actions of the driver, indeed may have even been a Cat A SPAD. I can’t see that the train would have simply just departed after getting the proceed aspect as all parts of this incident are reportable as the dispatcher, guard and Driver have all missed the red signal. What is not clear is how long has elapsed between the incident and the train moving off. Enough time for a change of crew whilst the incident is investigated, as certainly with my company, starting against a real is as serious as a SPAD, with all involved being removed from duty for med-screen and investigation. So although potentially a serious incident, in reality due to improvements in safety and signalling technology very little chance of a collision here I would have thought.
I've said this on their other video of this, but the train did not reach the TPWS grid and the driver manually applied the breaks (whether that be full service or emergency brakes I have no idea). To explain this in more than enough detail: Looking on a bigger screen than a phone, the grid is beyond the end of the ramp. The breaks apply before the cab reaches the end of the ramp / signal to which the TPWS grid on that line just becomes out of view by the cab. You can hear the initial break squal noise apply and the motors cut out. You can still see the TPWS grid in front of the cab and as soon as it becomes out of sight the breaks apply. But the cab is nowhere near the grid - the distance the train travels in that second it doesn't reach the grid. Yes it is opposite the two grids on the adjacent line but they have no affect on this train. The driver applied the breaks and not the grid. Second to this, looking at the wheels, where they make contact with the rail (plus the shadow that the train casts in the 6ft) they do not reach the line of cleared sleeper ends in the 6ft before the breaks apply, with these sleeper ends being clearly visible and protruding back towards the platform compared to the grid - proving the that bogie was nowhere near the grid for the breaks to be activated as suggested, by the grid. The bogie / train is too far back. I hope this helps
The reason for disliking your video, yrs it's lovely to see the variety of units. And of course the Class 60. But that driver of the spad could lose their job or get a warning.
The driver obviously didn’t intend to SPAD, he was probably worrying about getting all the passengers on the train and clearing the platform. Lucky we have TPWS
Definitely not a Spad but close. Nothing would have saved these trains from meeting if the speed of the 334 had continued as it was before braking. My question is what kind of driver accelerates like this towards a red signal on a wet day ?? Not particularly professional or safe surely?!
@@cmtransportvids yeah I know that (not sure they're keeping the country together though, helping the politicians divide us, I'd say), still hardly rocket science though is it?
Wasn’t a SPAD. Though, very close to it. Also, when 173pts on the Down Midcalder (the route taken by the 385) are set reverse, 172pts (in front of the 334) towards are also reverse (towards the Up Midcalder). So, if the 334 had somehow managed to pass EH511 far enough to cross the points (incredibly unlikely from a standing start because of TPWS), it would have taken the route onto the Up Midcalder towards Carstairs and wouldn’t have crossed the path of the 385. Not ideal from the perspective of the driver or the passengers as it would require a setting back and likely the relief of the driver (there’s probably also at least two trains on the Down South behind it that would be trapped), but there was never even the remotest chance of a collision. Even a non-stopping train would only be doing 50mph into a 40mph turnout which would never derail it. Source: I’m a Signalling Fault Response Team Leader for the Haymarket area.
200 years of signalling interlocking development has meant that we do everything we can to iron out conflicts. If we can create a protecting move by reversing points (known as Flank Protection), we will. So, there was a risk of a serious operational incident, which will endanger the drivers job, but the passengers were never at risk to the extent you describe.
I think Scotrail all should repaint a HST into the old scotrail (blue stripe) livery.Would look really smart!!
This was quite embarrassing but definitely not life threatening. Where the points are that close to the signal, they are locked in a safe position when a conflicting move is set. In this case the points would’ve been held for position 1 routing until : 1 - the arriving train was in the platform clear of the conflict zone and 2 - the desired route had been set. If the signal was passed by a significant distance, the departing train would’ve be routed left instead of straight ahead into the arriving train.
There also seems to be mixed opinions on whether the TPWS or the driver applied the brakes. If you look very closely at the first wheel set, you can see that they are just about to go over the TPWS grids when the brake application is heard. So it seems that the driver spotted the signal just before passing it.
In that case with a train coming across the junction then the points for the route out of platform would be set towards Carstairs route so that in the event of a train passing the signal a collision would be avoided. But still a very serious event for the driver. I drove this route for many years.
Interesting capture of that SPAD event, although it did look like the driver spotted it late and braked as train stops only just past the platform ramp and well before the TPWS grid. Also looking at other trains passing that same signal it stopped well before the end of the track circuit, so borderline if it was actually a SPAD although it did look like it on the video and certainly would not have been picked up by the signaling as it didn't go far enough. Brakes are impressive on these units though.
See kids, this is why DRA is important
The driver didn't actually apply the emergency brake themselves, the train went over the TPWS grid which is placed adjacent to the signal, if the signal is red and a train passes over it will trip causing an emergency brake application
I've said this on their other video of this, but the train did not reach the TPWS grid and the driver manually applied the breaks (whether that be full service or emergency brakes I have no idea). To explain this in more than enough detail:
Looking on a bigger screen than a phone, the grid is beyond the end of the ramp. The breaks apply before the cab reaches the end of the ramp / signal to which the TPWS grid on that line just becomes out of view by the cab. You can hear the initial break squal noise apply and the motors cut out. You can still see the TPWS grid in front of the cab and as soon as it becomes out of sight the breaks apply. But the cab is nowhere near the grid - the distance the train travels in that second it doesn't reach the grid. Yes it is opposite the two grids on the adjacent line but they have no affect on this train. The driver applied the breaks and not the grid. Second to this, looking at the wheels, where they make contact with the rail (plus the shadow that the train casts in the 6ft) they do not reach the line of cleared sleeper ends in the 6ft before the breaks apply, with these sleeper ends being clearly visible and protruding back towards the platform compared to the grid - proving the that bogie was nowhere near the grid for the breaks to be activated as suggested, by the grid. The bogie / train is too far back.
I hope this helps
@@PoxyMoxon97ah thanks! That explains a lot
Thankful we have AWS, DRA and TPWS in the UK
@rock_dinosaurnot really. Had the driver of gone past the signal the TPWS would have stopped the train, also even though the train was booked to have gone straight on the points would have been set for the diverging route anyway. It’s a fail safe, I forge the correct technical term for it, but was brought in after an accident many years ago. So even if the driver had gone through the red light there would have been no collision. Although I am surprised the train departed as the driver should have been taken off and Med screen because whether they went through the red signal or not they started against a red, which certainly at my company is a “ for cause” incident. Which makes me think either there was another driver to travelling on the train to take the train forward, or the driver had not reported it. It’s not well shown in the video how long it is between the incident and train moving forwards.
What phone do you use to film trains ?
iPhone 12
@@cmtransportvids nice 😁
Nice video 😁
The near crash was terrifying
if Signal was red why did they dispatch the unit ?? and why wasn't the driver paying attention to the signal ??if these are guardless trains this just goes and proves why you need a Guard !!
Crickey! Looks like TPWS had kicked in rather than driver acknowledgement if anything based on how close it was to the signal
I've said this on their other video of this, but the train did not reach the TPWS grid and the driver manually applied the breaks (whether that be full service or emergency brakes I have no idea). To explain this in more than enough detail:
Looking on a bigger screen than a phone, the grid is beyond the end of the ramp. The breaks apply before the cab reaches the end of the ramp / signal to which the TPWS grid on that line just becomes out of view by the cab. You can hear the initial break squal noise apply and the motors cut out. You can still see the TPWS grid in front of the cab and as soon as it becomes out of sight the breaks apply. But the cab is nowhere near the grid - the distance the train travels in that second it doesn't reach the grid. Yes it is opposite the two grids on the adjacent line but they have no affect on this train. The driver applied the breaks and not the grid. Second to this, looking at the wheels, where they make contact with the rail (plus the shadow that the train casts in the 6ft) they do not reach the line of cleared sleeper ends in the 6ft before the breaks apply, with these sleeper ends being clearly visible and protruding back towards the platform compared to the grid - proving the that bogie was nowhere near the grid for the breaks to be activated as suggested, by the grid. The bogie / train is too far back.
I hope this helps
@Michael Laing I apologise but only some signals have more than 1 grid (usually for certain high risk areas). There can be an Overspeed Sensor arrangement (TPWS OSS) where there are 2x grids located way before the signal in question and are situated of close proximity to eachother. The first grid is the 'arming' grid and the second grid is the 'trigger' grid with the distance between them calculating the train's speed and thus calculating if it is going fast enough to SPAD the signal ahead, if it were to continue at that speed.
Here at Haymarket, as you rightly said the train enters the platform slowly and stops because it in service and booked to stopped and it doesn't trigger the TPWS OSS (if there any in the platform, it's hard to tell on my phone currently), but the driver sets off and applies the brakes before reaching the signal and was way off the TPWS grid that is just beyond the signal (analyising how it sits in relation to the infrastructure around it), which will be engersied due to the red aspect beyond the end of the platform ramp. In this scenario the train breaks were not atomatically applied by the safety equipment and by the driver. It is clear that this is the case if you know and understand the equipment but also by looking at the clip on a bigger screen than a phone screen (tv / computer).
I apologise if I am coming accross as rude, I am not trying to be at all - it really is not my intention, but I hope this explanation helps. But honestly looking at this video, a 'TPWS emergency brake application' was not activated, the train was nowhere near the grid for it to have done so
I'm surprised, following a SPAD the driver isn't allowed to continue, unless moving to the next signal helps get them off a junction or to a place where the signaller can deal with them better. Train looks to pull away rather fast and I can't see them wanting to go to the next signal when they're sitting in a station. Not knowing where the track circuits are, the driver might be lucky and have not spadded as far as the signaller is concerned if they haven't crossed the block joint. Perhaps slightly different rules in Scotland though. How long was the driver stationary?
This appears to be the classic “Ding Ding Away” the guard signals away and the driver applies power.. may be they were running a little late? Or the oncoming train was late? Or a multitude of reasons. But the driver saw the signal and stopped.
No guard on North Clyde services.
Firstly. There would not have been a collision, as although the train is booked to go straight on the route would have been set for the diverging route as a fail safe should a train go past the red signal, it was the result of a similar collision many years ago, I forget the correct technical signalling term.
Secondly as other viewers have noted it looks like TPWS has stopped the train rather than the actions of the driver, indeed may have even been a Cat A SPAD.
I can’t see that the train would have simply just departed after getting the proceed aspect as all parts of this incident are reportable as the dispatcher, guard and Driver have all missed the red signal. What is not clear is how long has elapsed between the incident and the train moving off. Enough time for a change of crew whilst the incident is investigated, as certainly with my company, starting against a real is as serious as a SPAD, with all involved being removed from duty for med-screen and investigation. So although potentially a serious incident, in reality due to improvements in safety and signalling technology very little chance of a collision here I would have thought.
I think the signalling term is flank protection.
Amazing content as always - that incident was close!
Thank you!
The TPE 802 was also unexpected
i hope that driver is reprimanded for that
TPWS probably saved his job right there
I've said this on their other video of this, but the train did not reach the TPWS grid and the driver manually applied the breaks (whether that be full service or emergency brakes I have no idea). To explain this in more than enough detail:
Looking on a bigger screen than a phone, the grid is beyond the end of the ramp. The breaks apply before the cab reaches the end of the ramp / signal to which the TPWS grid on that line just becomes out of view by the cab. You can hear the initial break squal noise apply and the motors cut out. You can still see the TPWS grid in front of the cab and as soon as it becomes out of sight the breaks apply. But the cab is nowhere near the grid - the distance the train travels in that second it doesn't reach the grid. Yes it is opposite the two grids on the adjacent line but they have no affect on this train. The driver applied the breaks and not the grid. Second to this, looking at the wheels, where they make contact with the rail (plus the shadow that the train casts in the 6ft) they do not reach the line of cleared sleeper ends in the 6ft before the breaks apply, with these sleeper ends being clearly visible and protruding back towards the platform compared to the grid - proving the that bogie was nowhere near the grid for the breaks to be activated as suggested, by the grid. The bogie / train is too far back.
I hope this helps
A nice clean well kept station. Bit different to Carlisle
Jesus christ! that would of been on the news if the class 385 was hit!
The reason for disliking your video, yrs it's lovely to see the variety of units. And of course the Class 60. But that driver of the spad could lose their job or get a warning.
It’s not really my fault they put passengers at danger though is it, I was just filming by coincidence
I'm not blaming anyone. Just being realistic as there might be someone at Edinburgh SC that has watched your videos. Keep up the good work👍
did he pass the signal?
Something gone seriously wrong there. Platform dispatcher, guard and driver not acknowledged signal hadn't cleared. Some explanations needed there. Deary me.
Don’t understand why train drivers are still attempting to go through a RED signals!!! Don’t get it.
The driver obviously didn’t intend to SPAD, he was probably worrying about getting all the passengers on the train and clearing the platform. Lucky we have TPWS
Definitely not a Spad but close. Nothing would have saved these trains from meeting if the speed of the 334 had continued as it was before braking. My question is what kind of driver accelerates like this towards a red signal on a wet day ?? Not particularly professional or safe surely?!
Must be hard sitting down all day looking for one of three different coloured lights. I'd be striking for more pay too!
Train driving isn’t all about obeying signals, it’s about getting passengers on time, driving safely, and keeping the country together
@@cmtransportvids yeah I know that (not sure they're keeping the country together though, helping the politicians divide us, I'd say), still hardly rocket science though is it?
I hope this was reported. Someone needs a word with that driver. Beyond careless. Another argument for driverless trains?