11:26 for pitch and roll 50lb are required, for yaw it's 12-15lb. The system auto resets. You work against a spring. The spring basically keeps both sides together. Once you have overcome the spring force both sides can move independently. When the force applied decreases below the force of the spring, the system reconnects again. For the ailerons you can imagine it like a pair of hollow tubes one inside the other with a set of springs holding them together. When the force is high enough one tube can slide in or out of the other. Boeing themselves describe this as a pogo stick like device. For the elevators it's a roller on a cam. The cam has a detent, more like a valley. Springs keep the roller in the valley. With enough force applied you can move the roller "uphill" along the cam against the spring force separating left and right. When the force decreases the roller will go back to the lowest point resynchronizing both sides.
I’m just curious which side, left or right, actually has control when the two are broken free from one another? Or does it basically average out the two opposing inputs, one side pitching up and the other side pitching down so the net is no change?
@@pilotboy2612 I believe it's a split system, just like on an Airbus. The left controls operate the left control surfaces (left ailerons & elevator), and the right, the right control surfaces. Not sure how the rudder (controls the yaw) is affected. I very definitely could be wrong.
@@GRosa250 I just tried to look into this in the manuals. Never actually tried it. I think in normal mode and secondary mode an average is calculated. In direct mode both sides are actually independent from each other. Boeing does it differently to Airbus. There are position transducers and force transducers on the wheels, columns, and pedals. They send their readings to the actuator control electronics. There are four of those. The ACEs convert analog signals to digital signals and send them to the primary flight computers. There are three PFC, each containing three command lanes. Each lane is a separate circuit board with different hardware and the software is programmed in different programming languages. The three PFC condition all incoming signals. Not only control inputs but also air data, auto pilot commands and more. An average of the input signals is calculated and protection functions are applied (bank angle, TAC, Stall and so on). In each PFC one lane is actively doing the work, one is in standby in case the first one fails and the third lane monitors what the first one is doing. When all three PFC have come up with a proposed command output, they talk to each other, compare their values and if they closely match they send a middle value back to the ACEs. The ACEs then convert these digital control commands from the PFC back to analog and send them to the power control units of the control surfaces. It's basically the same in secondary mode, except the protection functions are not applied. Only when we go into direct mode are the signals from the columns and wheels sent directly to the control surfaces (through the ACEs) without the detour through the PFC. Then each pilot would control different control surfaces independently. For example the captain would control the left elevator surface, the first officer would control the right elevator surface. But I have to verify this the next time I'm at the aircraft. As I said I haven't tested this yet.
Following the AF447 accident a lot of people were quick to blame the airbus flight control system saying that it was the disconnection between the two sidesticks that made the pilots unaware of each other's inputs. This incident clearly illustrates that there is nothing wrong with either flight control system philosophy. It is simply a pilot training issue.
I saw an earlier report where the #3 pilot, who was apparently left at the controls for almost the entire descent, was pulling back on the stick. 30,000 feet of altitude and a basically properly functioning aircraft screaming "Stall! Stall!" and he was pulling back. Proper stall recovery is push forward, regain forward air speed, pull out. Been known for over a century.
IDK what those particular armchair (or not) pilots that were commenting "it must be the plane's fault" were thinking, but I've personally made enough mistakes while playing video games and injured myself just doing DIY things around the house enough times to know one thing for certain: Human beings are often the most failure-prone element in any system that contains them. And since human beings design all technological solutions that we know of to date, NOTHING is immune to "human error". From a certain point of view, if you find a fault in a design after an incident, that merely means a human error happened in the mind of the person or people who worked on the design's engineering.
When AF 447 crashed, dual inputs were a factor. I don’t want to get into an Airbus vs Boeing argument but there was a lot of discussion regarding the uncoupled sidesticks. Folks were talking about whether or not that design resulted in a lack of situational awareness and hence the dual inputs during the high stress scenario the crew was in. Fast forwarding to this incident, we have a Boeing 777 with coupled yokes. Despite this, dual inputs still occurred vs a positive handover of the controls between the 2 pilots. The point I want to get at is this. I’m not favoring Airbus’s design over Boeing’s or vica verca. I think that there clearly is a much bigger issue at hand here that’s allowing this practice to continue and it’s not aircraft design: it has to do with something at Air France (training, pilot culture, combination?). I really think that Air France needs to do a deep root cause analysis to understand why this dual input behavior is occurring within some of their crews. Once that occurs, solutions to prevent reoccurrence can then occur.
Thanks for the clear and thoughtful comment. I recall discussion in the media of AF447 focusing on the sidestick vs. control column , but from the released VR there appeared at no point a definite MY AIRCRAFT or equivalent from the 1st officer. Instead they fought each other all the way down.
You’d have thought that AF would train this over and over again. as Juan mentioned, they lost an aircraft to this. You’d think it would be trained till muscle memory in their sims and line checks.
Except AF 447 was an A330. "Sully" has done a vid on why AF447 probably would not have been lost if it was a Boeing operating that flight. The controls on the Airbus are not interlinked.
This probably happens in all airlines at some point but is not reported because nothing bad happens to the the aircraft, in the case of the two AF flight a report had to be filed. The first one crashed, with dual control input being a contributing factor and in this case a report was issued because of a go around. Coincidences happen.
One of the BEA investigators spoke at the Royal Aeronautical Society in London a few years ago. I challenged her to make recommendations to stop pilots making opposing control inputs - but the BEA didn't seem to treat this as seriously as other issues. I'm a big fan of the BEA, but I don't think they've been as forceful on this issue as they need to be.
Yeah. Gliders, Cubs, C150s, instruction, or with friends... only remember one or two instructors who didn't firmly say "MY AIRPLANE" and give the whee/stickl a shake to establish the fact. Under these circumstances I'd almost expect "MY [EXPLETIVE-ing] AIRPLANE [EXPLETIVE-it], but not saying it? "Inconceivable "
It’s me again. Always with the same conclusion: airline pilots lack manual flying skills. Not completely their fault. Company SOP in many airlines simply forbid it. I have a friend that had 6000 hrs as captain in my company. He left for a FO position to Air France. When I met him again last summer (he flies the 777) he told me that out of 50 captains only one or two allow manual flying during descend below 10.000 feet. Now, there is a time and a place for manual flying of course. Is a cloud base of 300 feet with 3 km vis a good idea? Yes, when you are proficient. No, when you only handfly once a month. Get confident in VMC conditions, build it up to IMC. Tanks Juan for another top notch analysis.
It seems to me that the modern emphasis of immediately turning on the autopilot and monitoring systems for hours, then turning off the autopilot on the final few minutes means that there is little time for the pilots to actually get a feel for the conditions. Why not manually fly for some time longer manually, at each end of the flight, that way the pilots have more practice of how it feels. I think that management needs to address that and also really crew CRM.
When flying the 777, with flight directors and autothrottle, you literally follow the FD’s. You don’t really even look outside. You could get a child to do it, in fact they’d be good at it with all the games they play. I don’t think a lack of hand flying is to blame, and I don’t think it’s that much of a big deal. I do, however, think that understanding the automation and the ability to monitor are far more important things in the modern aircraft. “I have control” is something you learn on your first flight with an instructor. How such a basic thing can be lost with these AF pilots suggests that there is something truely amiss within the AF training system.
Stunning. When I first heard the "Stop It, Stop It" I assumed that one of the crew was yelling at the plane. Now it seems like the Captain was yelling at the FO.
I keep wondering if the communication in French instead of English is part of the problem. Are there any other commercial airlines using their own language instead of (highly standardized) English?
Never worked on the 777, but when the elevator torque tube breakout mechanism appeared on the 737-700, I had another mechanic hold one column while I pulled on the other until the breakout mechanism released. The mechanism reengaged smoothly when the forces on the columns were reduced. The breakout mechanism is actually just an extension of the cam-and-roller technology used by Boeing to provide artificial feel and centering to boosted flight control systems for many decades. It is also similar in operation to the aileron force limiter used in early 737 autopilot systems.
Excellent video Juan. As a retired FBO mechanic I wish we'd had something like this to show owners who complained about maintenance costs. On two occasions I was called to the manager's office when owners couldn't understand why their 'annual' was costing so much - both times I took them into the hangar to show how involved the rigging process was on their 310, especially if it had been badly rigged somewhere else. A day to check all the figures and 'pull off' loads etc, then another day if a lot of remedial rigging had to be done. This really opened their eyes as to what a mechanic's job involved..... we are not just 'grease monkeys'. A used high time Cessna 300 or 400 series airplane that is 50 or 60 years old might be cheap to buy for a very good reason - they are very expensive to maintain properly.
It looks like the Captain (pm) jumped on the controls unannounced, starting the tug-o-war, it looks like the FO (pf) figured that out and let go of the controls in time to avoid impact. Fatigue on Final. . .
I think you are right - the graphs show when the controls were completely separate, but not when there was force that each pilot was exerting possibly against one another. The captain probably didn't like how the approach was going, was trying to "help" the FO by nudging the controls without talking to him, and triggered this incident. I recall an instructor many years ago doing this to me and it was very annoying. Hand flying is a hand-eye coordination skill, and requires a lot of practice to do it correctly. The typical airline flight has 2-10 hours of flight on AP/flight director, and about 2 minutes of hand flying - this is not enough to become or remain proficient. Required and expensive simulator time is spent handling emergencies, not "just flying around", getting the feel of the controls and doing a lot of landings. I've read stories from some check airmen in Asia that the Asian airlines have decided that they can't consistently teach their pilots this motor skill, so they "force" them to use the AP until flare. Probably wise unless the poor pilot actually needs to fly some time in their career, like the SFO Asiana crash. ☹
@@rkan2 They were on AP until the last few seconds, that's when the FO started hand flying. The Captain was possibly trying to help the FO by nudging the controls, or perhaps trying to dampen the FO's inputs that were causing PIO. If this is what happened, then the Captain needs more training - he should let the FO fly and give verbal hints, or take full control. This is a perfect example of why you can't have two pilots on the controls at the same time. The other pilot won't know if the aircraft is doing something due to external forces on the aircraft, or if it's the other pilot.
@@rkan2 because at that point they weren’t on auto pilot. Having said that if the captain wasn’t happy then a clearly annunciated I’m taking control should have happened.
It takes 50lbs of force to to break out the force limiters on the 777, for both the aileron and elevator systems. It takes 12-15 lbs at the pedal to cause a breakout for the rudder.
Indeed. There have also been incidents with nobody flying. That is, where both thought the other was in control, so for some period of time (usually just a few seconds), nobody was on the controls.
@@theophrastus3.056 ironically having neither pilot controlling the aircraft is probably safer than both at once. It should at least maintain a generally stable attitude.
I learned this senario some 30 years ago when doing initial training with my primary flight instructor, when CFI says "MY AIRPLANE" & you are confused, he is about to save your life. Used it latter myself twice flying with a CAP friend. Once as instrument safety pilot when PIC was over confident in attempting to fly a practice approach down to 50 feet of touchdown. He wasn't as hot of a pilot as he thought. As we were flying directly at a 75 foot tower, I said "MY AIRPLANE- LOOK UP" (he was using foggles to restrict his vision) as I safely banked 30 degrees right adding power and pulled up to go around he saw the tower pass under our left wing. It helped his humility to become less of a BOLD PILOT. (Remember: There are old pilots & there are bold pilots, but there are NO old-bold pilots!) Later flying with same friend, him PIC, upon landing at night after rain showers on the field we were taxiing straight towards another airplane, I asked "you got the 210?"(cessna), he replied "what?", & I stated "MY AIRPLANE" again & pivoted the nose 45 Degrees Right & stopped. He then was able to see through to glare of raindrops on the windscreen to spot the invisible to him, tried down airplane directly in front of our intended path. Would have made a terrible mess. Thankfully there was never disagreement whenever "MY AIRPLANE" was spoken.
@lolbot, Armchair quarterbacking in aviation is called "hanger flying" and is a great source of teaching. A really great qoute from my primary CFI "Learn from the mistakes of others; you won't live long enough to make them all yourself". There is of course no such thing as a perfect pilot. Teachable moments come through accepting humility. Everyone make mistakes, including pilots, & that's why the rules dictate safety pilots are required during training & bringing extra pilot eyes along to help in bad visual conditions is just a really great idea! My friend did both of these and lived several more decades because he accepted the humiliation life's lessons gave him and learned.
@@blancolirio The wheel cable drums are cast assemblies. The right and left drums are not the same. Both drums have attachment points for the upper force limiter, which is part of the wheel jam breakout mechanism. The left drum has an additional attachment point for the wheel force transducer. The left drum is bearing mounted on a sleeve which is spline mounted on the left shaft assembly. If there is a failure, the sleeve and left drum can connect through a lost motion device. The lost motion device permits connection after a control wheel rotation of 7.8 degrees in either direction. The right drum is bearing mounted on the right shaft assembly. The right drum has a peg on the bottom side which is part of the lost motion device. If there is a failure, the lost motion device lets the right drum connect to the right shaft assembly after a control wheel rotation of 2.9 degrees in either direction. Hope this helps...
Juan, after the Cali accident, we added "speed brake stowed" to the Go-Around sequence. (This was also true for "Terrain", and "Windshear"). If the aircraft was not tracking the localizer one might have to add "heading, select". With the second TOGA push the aircraft would have likely gone into altitude capture fairly quickly so a "speed" input would also be required. They likely stayed at flaps 20 to slow things down to reorient themselves. After the first incident I would not have turned the aircraft back to the F/O as I would have been concerned that there might have been a problem with his flight controls.
Many years ago in UPT, we were briefed about an accident in which a T-38 crashed after the student and instructor both bailed out. They were fighting each other on the controls and thought they had frozen controls. Perfectly good airplane crashed. After that, there was an emphasis on transferring control and holding you hands up in the air when surrendering control and saying “your airplane.”
So hyperactive right seat led to leftward deviation that forced the go around. Left seater never claimed control and authority by stating “my aircraft” but fought his right seater anyway. In the melee both guys flying (or attempting to) no one did the go around immediate actions correctly.
"My aircraft", or in some countries "I have control" should be the call when the captain wants to take control of the aircraft. It must be very clear who is flying the aircraft. How many times do we have to review incidents like this before this message gets home!
At my company, the callout was "I have the aircraft". Same difference. In my freighter days, my boss let me fly a lot, he was a mess and a good guy. He knew how to push my buttons. He would say, "this is getting scary, I might have to take it". Ha, I would be duly insulted!
With just about every airline other than AF that’s normal procedure. I’m at the point that I’d never fly on AF unless I was desperate. AF stuff up again, and again, and again.
I can remember having the phrase "positive transfer of control" pounded into my head at the school house. It does get tedious but this IS the reason why it's necessary. Also I've been out of the 737 for 9 months on LTD (new knees) and I can still spit out the go around litany. I'm pretty sure we demo'd the jammed control mechanism in the sim during initial as I recall it felt like I had to be Arnold Schwarzenegger to overcome the locks.
That’s probably about right Gerry. I think Juan mentioned that the disconnect release is at about 40 pounds. On a yoke that would be a lot of pulling or pushing. Hope your knees get better. I went out LTD for cardio issue (congestive heart failure) after my AME sent me to the cardiologist across the hall. Surprise! 3 X 33mm DES stent in my left anterior descending (LAD) artery. Just when I thought I could get a Class 3 to fly my 1947 Cessna 120 I bought when I was 14…Kidney cancer struck. Still trying to beg and plead for a S.I. From the FAA. So far, so good. Take care and get better soon. Todd, AA Capt., Ret. 727; MD-80; USAF Capt. Ret. T-37; T-38; C-130; OV-10.
Excellent analysis and background info, Juan! Agreed regarding the eery similarities with AF 447. This is getting scary! Companies need to revisit the training regimen a little bit and make sure that pilots actually understand how a plane flies, not just how a computer flies.
Such an excellent point! That way the pilots understand exactly what's happening and why in relation to what the computers are doing on board the airplane! I'd be willing to bet that many pilots still don't completely understand the physics of a plane and how they function!
No , I can guarantee you that they won't be dismissed from the company. Its almost impossible to get dismissed from AF ( pilot or ground personnel) , unless you deliberately run an aircraft in a terminal ....once you are inside the company , its for life.
Listening to this, working on my motorcycle oddly enough. This story reminds me of when my old boss and I were moving it out of his shed, he was moving and didn’t want to bring it with him. It was a 90° day, the tires were flat, it was stuck in gear with no clutch lever. As we started manhandling it out a normal service door I noticed it seemed extra heavy, like he was letting it fall. So I started pulling to pick up the slack and it just got heavier, we were both heaving and thinking it was about to fall. We put it on the kickstand and took a break once we saw sunlight, and promptly discovered we were fighting each other the entire time, thinking the other was dropping it. A simple miscommunication made a relatively straightforward process incredibly strenuous because neither wanted to speak up
Always appreciate your explanation on those air incidents Juan. Easy for someone who doesn't know how to fly a plane understand. Appreciate that about your channel! Thank you.
At the end of a normal T-38 single-ship training sortie at UPT, we were being vectored in the weather for an arrival back to base. The instructor was flying from the back seat (so I thought) and I was the student in the front (tandem seating). Our heading began to drift and roll started to increase. When it hit about 15 degrees, I said something like "your heading is off". At which point the instructor exclaimed: "Oh, crap! My controls! I thought you were flying!" I didn't recall being given the airplane, or acknowledging it, as you're taught from Day 1, and as Juan pointed out. Nor was I lambasted by the instructor, either then or after we landed, so I assumed he had made the error. (BTW: It was pretty normal for the instructors to get a bit of "stick time" by flying the last approach & landing.) All he said after the flight was, with a grin: "Well, let's say we call that an 'unplanned demonstration' [air quotes] of why a positive change of controls is so important." He wasn't wrong! And I had several great flights with him afterwards. [Also: I only tell the stories where somebody else screwed up.]
I am a retired airline pilot. In all my years of flying transport category aircraft (Last flight B-767) I never would have imagined that PIO's almost caused an accident. PIO's were always somewhat of a laugh when a pilot .ot into the maneuver . "What caused that turbulence?. You did!" Just happy it all ended well.
Though not a pilot I worked with lower grade assistants in training we where operating high voltage power equipment and systems and sometimes our personalities clashed with certain individuals while carrying out operational procedures . It was even worse when sometimes I worked with operators on the same grade as there was "no chain of command" between us in some of their minds. For teams to work effectively together they must have respect for each other and someone must be the person in charge especially when carrying out complex or dangerous procedures. As part of our training we where taught many procedures sourced from pilot training principals including nomination of person in charge though some staff had difficultly following that mindset there's nothing worse than having the other person argue or carry out operational changes without the approval of both members of the team but it does happen sometimes. You should never make assumptions but it looks like these two pilots where not suited to work together .
I agree that these pilots didn't seem to be capable of working well together, however (and I know it's never gonna happen because "its too expensive" until maybe we have 10 examples of it happening within the same airline), it could be tested for. Basically, every pair of pilots should be tested to see if they are capable of working well together. This does create its own problems, but at least you won't have pilots fighting each other at the controls nearly to the point of the aircraft crashing. This makes two times it has happened at Air France alone. How many more times must it happen before something is done about it?
Juan. I’ve been sending these videos to my dad. He was the engineer in charge of certification and testing for the 777. He’s got a lot of knowledge of 777 systems. He does enjoy your videos. ✌️
Juan, when you presented this incident a few weeks back my understanding was that the controls on the plane went wonky for a brief period of time. But from this report and your analysis was the upset was pilot induced. I wonder did they have a little pow-wow after they landed the plane. I am going to assume that at least the investigators will be doing that also.
@@DrewNorthup Now that you pointed this out it makes good logical sense. I am not a pilot so I have idea what all the stressors are that they do have to keep up with. Maybe in all of this Air France may want to rethink their number of flying crew corps on a longer flight.
"Communication breakdown, it's always the same. Having a nervous breakdown, drive me insane!!!!!!!!!" Thanks Juan for making what was going on in the cockpit clear. I had a feeling something stupid was happening. I think Led Zeppelin completes the thought nicely.
Funny, I was thinking Roy Orbison's Comm Breakdown ;-D "When it's right, it's so right When it's wrong, it's so wrong When it's gone, it's all gone It's too late Communication breakdown, Communication breakdown I can tell* that it's over now Communication breakdown" * (sung as te-eh-ell)
In our 737 is toga, flaps 15, positive rate gear up, 400ft lnav, 1000ft vnav and flaps retraction on schedule. Missed approach altitude is set upon glide slope capture. Nice video juanas always.
@@paulwilson8367 - the plane will climb perfectly with just TOGA and pitch up to follow the FD’s. Let your brain catch up then complete the go around procedure.
I hope RUclips are not still demonetizing your channel, because they are throwing adverts in every 5 minutes on my TV. Fascinating analysis, thanks so much.
As a French-speaking Belgian (and so, very culturally close to France), and working in a job with safety risks in the belgian's railways, I wonder if there is not a deeper cultural problem at play here. Just as some crashes were caused by the unwillingness from crew members to question an higher ranking pilot actions (think Korean Air Cargo Flight 8509), our French-speaking European culture is VERY adverse toward any mark of hierarchy at any time, and I experienced myself how hard it can be to suddenly have to take control of a situation and tell somebody else to let you do the thing, even in a urgent situation. You really have to fight hard against yourself and your whole education. On one hand, this tendency help to maintain stable democratic and equitable societies, and great team work, but slow down the reaction time in emergency situations when it time to stop suggesting solutions to the group and start to take individual control....
Strangely I had the opposite experience with the French. I'm in South Africa and worked for a French company (largest company in the world in it's industry) for 6 years. The last 4 was as the project manager for the design and construction of a $64 million manufacturing plant. I worked with about 10 engineers @ the French HQ. I was shocked at how reluctant the were to say what they really thought to their superiors although they had a lot to say privately. They really loved do things by committee and not one of them would willingly take responsibility for a decision. Despite being the lowest ranking person in the room I had to drive the decision making. When it came time to make a decision I would ask "does everyone agree that we do it this way?" Silence. Then I would have to go around the room and ask each person if they had any objection. If they all answered no, I would then say OK thats how we will do it. Then they would all nod in agreement.
@@gregculverwell I'm not surprised by this story, and I think it's less the opposite of what I mean than its corollary. This tatse for working in committee and not coming to the forefront in a team work is indeed very common. Because hierachy is seen as intrinsically bad, relations between workers and their managers are often marked by distrust and opposition, with few open talks between them (and climbing the hierarchy scale is a sure way to lose friends and make enemies). Basically, this hate for any mark of hierachy most often doesn't translate into a confrontational or rebel attitude (because you would lose your job), but in a passive, "dragging the feet" about everything one, having to be, at best , (financially) cajoled, or, at worst, coerced to do anything new. It can even become almost comical, with some people being like "I don't care what the boss commands : I'll stay here until I'm specifically paid to escape this fire!". I guess it makes French (and Belgian) workers harder to exploit, but it also embitter the work atmosphere of most busisnesses. French people are known to be "raleurs" (grouchy), and this is probably why...
@@NQR-9000 I found it all very strange. This attitude lead to many bad decisions being made. Being South African I would just say what I thought (somewhat respectfully). My French colleagues would sometimes be shocked, but I didn't see a problem with being honest and open. The funny thing was that the top level management (people with Persident in their title) seemed to actually like me and invite me to dinner when they were out here. Some people were grumpy initially but I didn't take them seriously and would push back or would make a joke of it - then they usually laughed. I ended up with quite a few good friends from that time.
That's excactly what I was assuming. We germans are probably too hierarchy driven (look where it got us and the world in the past) but when I see what goes in France, they swing into the opposite direction. There needs to be a balance between the two mindsets.
Couldn't wait to hear your "take" on the follow-up to this incident. Sounds like these guys almost screwed the pooch on this one. Great analysis as usual sir.
I’m just a passenger, but I can follow what you’re saying. Just got back from Vegas and it was VERY gusty on approach. I did feel that little bit of shaky as we were landing when you said they usual;y disengage the autopilot. But the pilots on my flight just kept it steady and we floated in without problems.
Because some pilots are amazing at what they do, and others suck. But social issues are driving hiring and training. It’s not nice to tell people that they suck, so nobody wants to rock the boat.
Great analysis as always Juan. When I started in the airline world in the late 90's, the simulator instructors would say "get that autopilot off! you need to hand fly this plane during any emergency". Then in the 2000's it went to "get that autopilot on! then you can concentrate on the problem. Now they talk about use the autopilot as needed, which is the best way imo. Another interesting change that has happened in the airline world since the 90's is the stall recovery. In our initial training, we all learned the stall recovery. First, reduce the angle of attack (push), level the wings and add full power. Once the wings are flying again, recover to a slight nose up attitude to regain the altitude that you lost. Well, in the 90's, in the airlines, they told us you can't lose altitude in a stall. So the stall recovery was: Max power, and hold altitude until you fly out of the stall. this is what they were trying to do with AF 447 (even though it appears they didn't even know the plane was stalling). Now they are back to reduce the angle of attack first and accept some altitude loss, especially at high altitude.
“My controls” or “I have control” (response: “your controls”/“you have control”) is the standard phraseology in my 737 flying (and especially handy in my Luscombe 8E when teaching a friend tailwheel flying). It’s a keyword quibble, but fully direct and unmistakable vs. “my aircraft/airplane” in the heat of a stressful moment.
For instances where two pilots are simultaneously giving differing commands to the yoke (or stick in Airbus) I think there should be a voice alert. "Control conflict!" or something like that.
777 the yokes are linked. If one pilot is pushing the other pilot can feel that. Sounds like the pilots had input saturation and didn't notice the pressures on the yoke.
I had been wondering about this flight. Thanks for making this video. I assumed there was more to the story. I'm not surprised the less experience pilot was doing that rocking motion. I see it constantly on RUclips videos of landings. As soon as the AP is disconnected, they start chasing the FD. in IMC, I imagine it is much worse.
To analyze this incident fully we need to know what modes were displayed on the FMA from the time the F/O disconnected the A/P on approach until the aircraft was recovered at MAP altitude. Go around track is the norm for roll guidance and SRS for pitch with PF calling. ie., TOGA/SRS/GATRK. This is a reflection of what the aircraft is programmed to do with PF following F/D commands.
@@EdOeuna so if LOC was the FMA roll mode which I agree why would the A/C have deviated off the LOC course ? Stabilized approach criteria and accurate handling should have kept it on course through to touchdown. If TOGA was pressed then as you say LNAV becomes the roll mode. Examples I gave earlier are applicable to Airbus.
@@ianmacneill8951 - possibly the FO had a micro nap or just spatial disorientation. If you’re looking up into IMC and then down to the flight displays then this might be disorienting as well, especially if the glance outside is more than a quick one.
@@EdOeuna probably should add that when flying a monitored instrument approach the PF should be keeping his/her head down on instruments until the PM or autocall system calls minima at which point if the visual segment is appropriate PM takes control and lands. PM may also call earlier with “runway or approach lights in sight” allowing PF to come heads up and land the A/C.
@@ianmacneill8951 - the problem with not disconnecting before the minima is that the automation begins to decrab due to any cross wind at 500ft as part of the autoland system. Since this isn’t a desired action for a hand flown landing, because we can decrab in the flare, then the AP is usually disengaged above 500ft. This would be pre-briefed.
Amazing!! The plane was doing great until the pilots got involved!! BASIC procedures!! MOST important items. Thanks again for a super detailed, and understandable, analysis of this event. I sure hope those fellers git hollered at!!
A GA Alouette heli destroyed in IE, almost identically. Rotor head direction opposite to many heli's, pilots failed the "my aircraft" command, opposing pedal/tail commands applied during landing flare/collective increase. Both pilots suspected command failure and wrestled the coupled commands until yaw loss caused tail rotor to impact trees. No fatalities but one serious injury!
Was discussing this with a buddy, I told him what I thought and gave him the details that I knew of. He looked at me and asked how do you know so much about this? I told him I have a friend who tells me everything I need to know.
Excellent analysis as always, Juan. Two comments: 1) A single push of TOGA gives a climb rate of 2,000 fpm. 2) You didn't speculate on the reason for the go-around in the first place. It seems to me that the FO was in a PIO condition in roll. I saw this from time to time on both the 747 and the 777. I think that it was a characteristic of the 1960s design of the 747 wing that for unknown reasons was carried over into the fly-by-wire model for the 777 wing.
Juan, FYI, there is a YT channel called "High Pressure Aviation". Its an Air France 777 driver who documents his approaches, landings and T/O's. Its interesting to see how thy work in the cockpit at AF. Worth a look.
Most breakaway systems using springs and cams as shown in picture will auto reset due to the spring at the moment input force is reduced to below breakaway force. So the dude that pulled to hard just had to relax a little to reset his pitch control. Air France now on my airlines to not fly after seeing cockpit management like that. wow first day on the job maybe?
So we know CRM was severely lacking here, as well as communications. Could Fatigue also be a factor, since (as you said) a lot of airlines run this route with three pilots?
@@justinepaula-robilliardSwitch? That didn't work on AF447 either. The concept behind its well explained in the video. Airbus has a takeover bottom to override the other side stick. And that wasn't enough to prevent a the 447 crash. Where the pilot sitting on right held a nose up attitude leading the aircraft to a stall. And other pilot was unable to lower the pitch. That was one of the many the factor. It's 2 very different concepts. Maybe the captain came from airbus or both came from airbus. And they didn't fully understand or adapt to another concept. Air France operates Boeing and Airbus. And having a switch left...both..right it would also have its own flaws. The decision to hand fly a ILS in IMC condition after a 8hrs flight. Most likely they were jetlagged. We don't know if he mention in the approach briefing his intention to disconnect the autopilot while still in the clouds. Nowadays hand flying in IMC condition only in a non normal situation where autopilot becomes inoperative. The captain could be tired. Maybe some operational cultural in the company. They already had a accident related to both pilots trying to fly the airplane at same time.
@@justinepaula-robilliard I am not a airbus pilot. But airbus has a takeover bottom. Because the side sticks are not connected. Boeing kept traditional design. You can see what are the control inputs from the other pilot or AP. Everything else you said. I couldn't understand your thoughts
@@justinepaula-robilliard I am still not following you. I don't know your aviation background. Every system will have its own flaws. Regardless of the manufacturer. (Airbus...Boeing...Embraer or Bombardier and so on) The human factors is the most complex. As humans, we can be very unpredictable. That's why the industry is in a constant evolution. No wonder why aviation has come to a high safety standard. I am sure we'll learn a lot from this incident. The problem with your idea is that goes against the whole concept of a multi crew operation. Might as well put just one control in the cockpit or one pilot only...problem solved. The pilot in the left seat. Which is normally the pilot in command. It doesn't mean he's most qualified. Following the normal career path an airline company. Most of the time he's very senior and experienced. But you can have a very experienced pilot in the right. Or two captains flying together. Instrutor sitting on the right. 737 max crash. It was the 8. Which is the updated version of the 737 800. The max 7...is an update of the 737 700 in "NG" family. And I didn't understand the relation between this incident and the max crash. This concept of splitting the control in the boeing is a way to fly the airplane in case of a jammed control due to a mechanical failure or ice accumulation. It was not designed to prevent what happened. The concept boeing choose is the simplest of the concepts. Which is the same used in a light aircraft trainer. He could just said "I have control" ...this works for both pilot. Either in the left or in right seat.
@@justinepaula-robilliard Your suggestions for the switch is valid. I think we should consider all the ideas. Even though In my opinion, that's my opinion only...it would be very complex to implement a system like that. As Airline pilot...isolating a control is big safety issue. You solve um problem. But it might create several other ones. Such system would require a backup system. Failure analysis...what if this system fails. About the left seat Normally the pilot in command already sits on the left seat. It's been like that since the ww2. We refer to as the pilot in command. Because you might have two captains flying together...or in a 4 men operation for long flights...2 captain and 2 first officers. Or in some companies with direct entry captains. You might have a experienced captain but new in the company and a very senior first officer. In this case the junior guy is the one in charge. We have a chain of commands. It's not a board review or democracy. Every one get envolved. But only one decides. Which is the pilot in command or the designated captain for the flight. Almost everything you said about CRM is what we've been doings for more than a decade. CRM came to create a balance. But still a legal responsible person is require and he has final authority when it comes to a decision and If something goes wrong he's the one how going to be hold accountable. Talking about CRM. Aviation is the leading industry. Other industries learn from aviation. We are talking about a very dynamic environment. Decisions are taken within seconds. It's constantly being updated. In a big company they might've never seen each other before. Company rostered them for that flight. Can you imagine the challenge for industry. You put total strangers in this environment and they have work together. Aviation is the only job you have to go for proficiency check. We go to the simulator twice a year and plus all the recurrent training. This a preliminary report. But I am sure air france management is already working on ways to prevent that to happen again or Supposedly. About the 447 crash I believe you didn't fully understand what happened. Lots of change came after the crash. Especially in training. The industry changed the focus. Procedures were changed. It became a study case for CRM training. We're still learning from it.
@@justinepaula-robilliard And this "I have control" its very important tool. The A320 which landed in the Hudson River. Copilot was flying. He was also a captain before. He was demoted from captain to copilot. Because 2 companies merged together. Both highly experienced. Sully was the captain due to circumstances. But he was the captain. Very first thing he said. "My aircraft"...some airline use...I have control. But let's say. Sally had decided for an attempt to return to LA Guardia. And the Pilot in the right(jeff) had the idea to land in the Hudson. For a well trained crew, the moment someone says "I have control " the other one has to let go the control. They wouldn't have time to be looking for a switch in the overhead panel to decide who's got the control. It's just not feasible. Moreover. There is only one in charge. CRM came to reduce the power distance. Because the senior pilot in the left seat might be wrong or might do something wrong in a critical moment...especially i it's close to ground.
I worked on American 777"s for quite awhile and I can't remember the exact force for "break away" but I think it was something like 75-85 lbs of differential (pushing on one side,pulling on the other 2 mechs required) It's a spring and cam setup. As I remember it there was no reset required just let go and it snaps backs to normal.
With the lower weather conditions it was a poor decision to hand fly the approach. The CA must have forgotten the AP was disconnected and when the FO went around he experienced a somatogravic illusion and was spatially disoriented. The second push of the TOGA buttons exacerbated that illusion and caused the CA to push nose down even harder. Poor communication and crew coordination. Some airline SOP's require AP usage below certain weather minimums. Perhaps AF should adopt the same.
@@Brotha00 A go around isn't a knock on the pilot, crew, or company. If the approach is unstable or gets out of limits then a go around is the appropriate action. As I brief the FO's I fly with, you never will get in trouble for going around, only for not going around. There are many examples of pilots trying to "save" a bad approach only to cause an incident or accident. Good airmanship sometimes requires recognizing you've screwed something up and take the safest course of action. A good decision to go around here but the execution was almost deadly.
Good analogy with the AF447 incident. At least on the AF11/B777 there is a interconnection of columns and both pilots can feel there is a struggle between them, whereas on the AF447/A330 the co-pilot was pitching nose up for an extended period of time while the pilot was totally unaware of this happening.
Juan, the majority of flights between the northeast US and France leave the US late afternoon and land early morning in Paris France. I use to fly from Dulles to Paris every couple of weeks, United 915 to France and 916 return to Dulles. The return flight left Paris just after 1:00PM Paris time and landed at Dulles between 3:30 and 4:00PM Eastern time. EDIT, pulled Flightradar24 data, AF11 scheduled departure 9:00PM Eastern time, landing at Paris 10:20AM, Paris time.
Same as most European flights. About 5am onwards you can see all of the aircraft from the Atlantic coming over my house landing at Heathrow. Nothing out of the ordinary really.
4/30/22...another detail analysis of how a small problem can get human twisted into a (controllable) resumption of normal cockpit operations, proceed with missed approach procedures & land safely. Lots of indepth reporting on this incident Juan. It's another great job informing all viewers of complexity flying these wonderful flying machines! 👍👍👍😊✈
Let me check I got this correctly: Co-pilot appears to have lost his ability to fly to the instruments, increasingly losing it to the left. Captain expresses concern over drifting and banking to left. They commence go-around. They DON'T mention a transfer of command, it's NOT just one pilot making control inputs. They blame the plane. About right? They almost had the full set: they pancaked a perfectly good Airbus, and here they tried to screw up a Boeing with apparently similar root causes of failure in the crew. Unbelievable. Happily I have no likelihood of ever flying Air France.
Me either. 🧐 I’m thinking of the helpless pax and cabin crew in the back, that fortunately were able to walk off still alive after putting their lives in the control of these two. 🥺
I am finding it hard to believe a large, established legacy carrier could have flight crews that are either not trained properly or trained inconsistently with these lapses revealed over many years. What will it take for this company to “get it’s act together”? Thanks, Juan for another EXCELLENT debrief.
The 'going left feeling like going right' phenomenon and compensating by adding more and more left was explored on the Mentour Pilot channel recently. It sounds very much like the kind of disorientation brought on by pilot fatigue. 😴
Holy Crap - talk about lack of communication within the flight deck environment. These guys need some serious "time out" retraining. Autoland was designed for this kind of IMC, yes? The original decision to hand fly seems to be the first "link in the chain of events". Excellent breakdown as always JB, thanks!
What this reminded me of? Dan Gryder.. WAIT! Don't run off! Hear me out. Dan's done several videos on "Panicked Pilots", in like, a Cessna 182, with a new, or maybe nervous pilot, (meaning say, one who felt they needed work on stalls) , and a CFI, where they panic, and, instead of bringing the nose down, they continue to pull hard, so hard, the CFI can't gain control of the plane, and they end up stalling, or even flying the plane, into the ground. Instead of working together, these two were fighting against each other, with the souls of what was it 179+? At stake. Juan said this was a VERY SERIOUS event. Felt very serious, to me. One last thing... thank God they accidently broadcast this almost-disaster. Hopefully, much can be learned from this one.
Had a friend (pilot) killed this way, he took a neighbor up for a flight, shortly after takeoff, they only reached about 500 ft, the passenger panicked grabbed the stick and shoved the nose down and into the ground. They investigators new all this because the pax hit the PTT and you could hear the pilot yelling at her to let go of the stick.
@@wb6anp Sorry you lost your friend. Let's all hope Dan, Juan, & Scott, can bring about the changes needed, to keep this from ever happening again. This is their goal after all, Pilot safety, and NOT just for commercial air.
Indeed, exactly. It was really a very serious incident. And Dan Gryder could learn what even professional pilots are able to do, not only some GA-freaks.
@@NicolaW72, Dan worked a flying career at American, with later years working in their pilot training department. This was at a time of serious research in flight crew interaction and the implementation of newly developed training in the concept of CRM. He specialized in CRM. You may not agreed with his interpretation of various incidents and accidents (and occasionally, I do not) but they are not coming for a person unqualified in the art of flying or uniformed in the principles of CRM.
On Boeing aircraft its the left hand seat aka Captain's seat. On Airbus its the average of both sticks. Which can cause "hero stalls" right into the ground / water.
Exactly the right question-which column wins???? Or does the left elevator follow the left yoke and the right elevator follow the right yoke? (Seems fair to me!)
Good job expanding the situation..the 777 is awesome and I'm glad it was not her fault and she was landed safely along with the souls on board of course
I wish we applied the same rigorous analysis and honest assessment to our stewardship of the environment or even our political decision making. I'm always impressed with the seriousness of aviation investigation. It might be interesting to look at "bad" aviation investigations to see where the process can fail
Just one question that keeps coming to my mind after accidents like this. Juan, is this going to be classified as a “Crew Resources Management “ problem? I don’t really understand why in an industry that strives to “avoid repeating the same mistakes and problems “ , this CRM problem keeps coming up! We still see cases of pilots (mostly 1st officers) choosing to die, rather than talk back to authorities (the captain) or like in this case not communicating because of…. what?
does "Aviate, Navigate, Communicate" apply INSIDE the cockpit as well? It sounds to me like each pilot is too focused on getting the plane in a safe, stable mode too think about talking or discussing the situation. Remember, this is less than a thousand feet from the ground. It doesn't take much at that altitude to cause a crash*, especially when you don't understand what your plane is doing and why.
Juan, is there any data on rudder trim?? I can imagine a situation in which the rudder has too much right rudder input trimmed and when the A/P is disconnected, the FO starts “fighting” the slight roll and heading induced by the mis-trimmed rudder. This is the underlying reason for the many small corrections he keeps making. I can also imagine a situation with too much Left aileron trim prior to A/P disconnect. Then what the data showed as pilot “INPUT” as left roll, would actually be pilot just “relaxing” pressure on the control (which should be the correct “way” to hand fly. Let the aircraft “fly itself” and the pilot just making small, smooth inputs to keep it going where it is supposed to). I’m shocked by the number of pilots that do not know how to properly trim the aircraft, and then have to “fight it” all the way to the ground once the A/P is disconnected.
Hi Juan, when the control columns are unlocked (unsynchronized) in the 777, does it split the elevators? or which control does the aircraft follow? Awesome content as always.
@@blancolirio my web search yielded not much. Would you mind trying it out the next time you’re at work? I’m sure the Captain and the passengers wouldn’t mind…. KIDDING!!! Thanks again for producing one of my all time favorite YT channels.
I think any FBW aircraft (such as the 777) would not allow split-elevator in normal modes or as in an Airbus in normal law. I guess with an Airbus in direct law it is possible.
I wonder if there was any additional clarity that could be obtained on the CVR instead of just the radio transmissions? Something like the Captain telling the FO to get his mitts off the yoke?
@@rickrickard2788 It's certainly more politically correct than to suggest it may be a cultural thing. I wonder what other cultures might foster this same mistake, if it is culturally related. {o.o}
@@Wizardess I would say that TRUTH, no matter where it leads, nor which country it may need to be found in? Is the only thing that matters. Stopping mistakes such as this, should NEVER have "financial", in any aspect of it. Well, IF they truly care about human lives over money, that is.
AF11 & AF447 Juan, Outstanding analysis as usual, and the similarities with AF447 are quite remarkable, though obviously this is a Boeing aircraft whilst AF447 was an Airbus aircraft. Failure to call out "..My Aircraft..." seems common in both instances. Query here with AF11 the Captain, (so PM), putting his inputs to the yoke when he should not have touched it.....? Is there something in AF pilot hierarchy and training amiss somewhere ....? The ages of these pilots, (i.e. experience), may well tell us something..... With AF447 we had relatively young pilots, (less experience and hours), flying the aircraft whilst the Senior Captain was taking a rest break. In addition, your point about three pilots on such routing and schedules would seem valid in every sense of the word..... So might we be back to AF procedures and crewing of flights.....? The BEA should have something to say about this.... James Hennighan Yorkshire, England
Do Air France use V-bar flight directors? I had this same situation, when the copilot started mixing the flight director with the aircraft index. The FD said turn left, and he thought the aircraft was turning left (mixing FD with aircraft index), so he gave the aircraft full right, and nearly turned the aircraft upside down. Again, this was just at 1500 ft on t/o, at night with no ground lights. Luckily the aircraft shouted ‘bank angle’, while I was changing frequency, and I recovered. P
Good job on explaining this in detail Juan. By the sounds of the pilots, I believe it takes a lot of pressure to disengage the torque tube. I believe human factors are involved here. As you mentioned, it was 1:15 local time when they left New York after most likely a 24 hr lay over. It's unfortunate the pilots were fighting each other on the controls. Why I mentioned human factors. If I refer to the torque tube on a Challenger, it will re engage when controls are lined back up. If you look at the graph at the end, both inputs are the same. In the comment you pinned, it was very well explained how the controls work when they are disengaged.
Sounds like Air France needs to really work on their transfer of control training. Having another plane crash due to similar circumstances and now this? ugh.
No, it's the BEA that needs to do their job. This is the cause of the lethal AF447 crash and their hypocritical garbling about this "hopefully" being a one off makes me want to puke.
CRM and situational awareness seem to be severely lacking at AF. That's at least the third time I've seen AF pilots doing something wrong in what should be fairly standard.
Thanks so much for the analysis, Juan!. With the memory of 447 behind us this is a worry that it's happening again. Could it be fatigue, poor quality crew rest, brain fog, poor CRM?. Hope they get to the bottom of this. I am curious how Boeing aircraft behave & which control collumn priority takes precedent in breakaway or differing control collumn inputs
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11:26 for pitch and roll 50lb are required, for yaw it's 12-15lb.
The system auto resets. You work against a spring. The spring basically keeps both sides together. Once you have overcome the spring force both sides can move independently. When the force applied decreases below the force of the spring, the system reconnects again. For the ailerons you can imagine it like a pair of hollow tubes one inside the other with a set of springs holding them together. When the force is high enough one tube can slide in or out of the other. Boeing themselves describe this as a pogo stick like device.
For the elevators it's a roller on a cam. The cam has a detent, more like a valley. Springs keep the roller in the valley. With enough force applied you can move the roller "uphill" along the cam against the spring force separating left and right. When the force decreases the roller will go back to the lowest point resynchronizing both sides.
Thanks for explaining. If the the 2 elevators can move separately can that turn the plane?
I’m just curious which side, left or right, actually has control when the two are broken free from one another? Or does it basically average out the two opposing inputs, one side pitching up and the other side pitching down so the net is no change?
@@GRosa250 Funny thing is they BOTH have control. They would cancel each other out. It most likely results in a turn.
@@pilotboy2612 I believe it's a split system, just like on an Airbus. The left controls operate the left control surfaces (left ailerons & elevator), and the right, the right control surfaces. Not sure how the rudder (controls the yaw) is affected. I very definitely could be wrong.
@@GRosa250 I just tried to look into this in the manuals. Never actually tried it.
I think in normal mode and secondary mode an average is calculated. In direct mode both sides are actually independent from each other.
Boeing does it differently to Airbus. There are position transducers and force transducers on the wheels, columns, and pedals. They send their readings to the actuator control electronics. There are four of those. The ACEs convert analog signals to digital signals and send them to the primary flight computers. There are three PFC, each containing three command lanes. Each lane is a separate circuit board with different hardware and the software is programmed in different programming languages.
The three PFC condition all incoming signals. Not only control inputs but also air data, auto pilot commands and more.
An average of the input signals is calculated and protection functions are applied (bank angle, TAC, Stall and so on). In each PFC one lane is actively doing the work, one is in standby in case the first one fails and the third lane monitors what the first one is doing. When all three PFC have come up with a proposed command output, they talk to each other, compare their values and if they closely match they send a middle value back to the ACEs.
The ACEs then convert these digital control commands from the PFC back to analog and send them to the power control units of the control surfaces.
It's basically the same in secondary mode, except the protection functions are not applied.
Only when we go into direct mode are the signals from the columns and wheels sent directly to the control surfaces (through the ACEs) without the detour through the PFC. Then each pilot would control different control surfaces independently. For example the captain would control the left elevator surface, the first officer would control the right elevator surface.
But I have to verify this the next time I'm at the aircraft. As I said I haven't tested this yet.
Good to see Lt Pete FO assisting the Captain. 👍
Good work Juan.
Following the AF447 accident a lot of people were quick to blame the airbus flight control system saying that it was the disconnection between the two sidesticks that made the pilots unaware of each other's inputs. This incident clearly illustrates that there is nothing wrong with either flight control system philosophy. It is simply a pilot training issue.
I saw an earlier report where the #3 pilot, who was apparently left at the controls for almost the entire descent, was pulling back on the stick. 30,000 feet of altitude and a basically properly functioning aircraft screaming "Stall! Stall!" and he was pulling back. Proper stall recovery is push forward, regain forward air speed, pull out. Been known for over a century.
@@patwilson2546 i am guilty of ignoring the STALL warning during a sim session myself but it sounded just once ;p
The airbus control disagreement warning is makably bad. Way worse than any Boeing system only because there is next to zero physical indication.
@@josh8344 DUAL INPUT!
IDK what those particular armchair (or not) pilots that were commenting "it must be the plane's fault" were thinking, but I've personally made enough mistakes while playing video games and injured myself just doing DIY things around the house enough times to know one thing for certain:
Human beings are often the most failure-prone element in any system that contains them. And since human beings design all technological solutions that we know of to date, NOTHING is immune to "human error". From a certain point of view, if you find a fault in a design after an incident, that merely means a human error happened in the mind of the person or people who worked on the design's engineering.
When AF 447 crashed, dual inputs were a factor. I don’t want to get into an Airbus vs Boeing argument but there was a lot of discussion regarding the uncoupled sidesticks. Folks were talking about whether or not that design resulted in a lack of situational awareness and hence the dual inputs during the high stress scenario the crew was in.
Fast forwarding to this incident, we have a Boeing 777 with coupled yokes. Despite this, dual inputs still occurred vs a positive handover of the controls between the 2 pilots.
The point I want to get at is this. I’m not favoring Airbus’s design over Boeing’s or vica verca. I think that there clearly is a much bigger issue at hand here that’s allowing this practice to continue and it’s not aircraft design: it has to do with something at Air France (training, pilot culture, combination?).
I really think that Air France needs to do a deep root cause analysis to understand why this dual input behavior is occurring within some of their crews. Once that occurs, solutions to prevent reoccurrence can then occur.
The dual inputs may have actually helped here.
Thanks for the clear and thoughtful comment. I recall discussion in the media of AF447 focusing on the sidestick vs. control column , but from the released VR there appeared at no point a definite MY AIRCRAFT or equivalent from the 1st officer. Instead they fought each other all the way down.
You’d have thought that AF would train this over and over again. as Juan mentioned, they lost an aircraft to this. You’d think it would be trained till muscle memory in their sims and line checks.
Yes. And then you´re faced with this incident.
Except AF 447 was an A330. "Sully" has done a vid on why AF447 probably would not have been lost if it was a Boeing operating that flight. The controls on the Airbus are not interlinked.
This probably happens in all airlines at some point but is not reported because nothing bad happens to the the aircraft, in the case of the two AF flight a report had to be filed. The first one crashed, with dual control input being a contributing factor and in this case a report was issued because of a go around. Coincidences happen.
One of the BEA investigators spoke at the Royal Aeronautical Society in London a few years ago. I challenged her to make recommendations to stop pilots making opposing control inputs - but the BEA didn't seem to treat this as seriously as other issues.
I'm a big fan of the BEA, but I don't think they've been as forceful on this issue as they need to be.
Yeah. Gliders, Cubs, C150s, instruction, or with friends... only remember one or two instructors who didn't firmly say "MY AIRPLANE" and give the whee/stickl a shake to establish the fact. Under these circumstances I'd almost expect "MY [EXPLETIVE-ing] AIRPLANE [EXPLETIVE-it], but not saying it? "Inconceivable "
I feel sorry for the plane that was trying to do things correctly and along came these pilots 😟
French theme
lol - the little plane that could
HAL: I'm sorry I can't do that Dave 😳🤣🤣🤣
GIGO.
and people had the audacity calling the plane 'misbehaving' and 'not responding to commands'
It’s me again. Always with the same conclusion: airline pilots lack manual flying skills. Not completely their fault. Company SOP in many airlines simply forbid it. I have a friend that had 6000 hrs as captain in my company. He left for a FO position to Air France. When I met him again last summer (he flies the 777) he told me that out of 50 captains only one or two allow manual flying during descend below 10.000 feet. Now, there is a time and a place for manual flying of course. Is a cloud base of 300 feet with 3 km vis a good idea? Yes, when you are proficient. No, when you only handfly once a month. Get confident in VMC conditions, build it up to IMC. Tanks Juan for another top notch analysis.
It seems to me that the modern emphasis of immediately turning on the autopilot and monitoring systems for hours, then turning off the autopilot on the final few minutes means that there is little time for the pilots to actually get a feel for the conditions.
Why not manually fly for some time longer manually, at each end of the flight, that way the pilots have more practice of how it feels.
I think that management needs to address that and also really crew CRM.
On the other hand…they wouldn’t be in this mess if they’d just left the autopilot in until visual.
Very well said sir. Thank you
When flying the 777, with flight directors and autothrottle, you literally follow the FD’s. You don’t really even look outside. You could get a child to do it, in fact they’d be good at it with all the games they play.
I don’t think a lack of hand flying is to blame, and I don’t think it’s that much of a big deal. I do, however, think that understanding the automation and the ability to monitor are far more important things in the modern aircraft. “I have control” is something you learn on your first flight with an instructor. How such a basic thing can be lost with these AF pilots suggests that there is something truely amiss within the AF training system.
Hand flying below 10,000 feet will load up the pilot monitoring unless it’s a very quiet airport. Not many like that on 777 routes.
Stunning. When I first heard the "Stop It, Stop It" I assumed that one of the crew was yelling at the plane. Now it seems like the Captain was yelling at the FO.
Indeed, exactly. And me the same.
Yep!
I keep wondering if the communication in French instead of English is part of the problem. Are there any other commercial airlines using their own language instead of (highly standardized) English?
The very moment when Captain should have shouted "My Aircraft!".
@@travelbugse2829 Yes.
Never worked on the 777, but when the elevator torque tube breakout mechanism appeared on the 737-700, I had another mechanic hold one column while I pulled on the other until the breakout mechanism released. The mechanism reengaged smoothly when the forces on the columns were reduced. The breakout mechanism is actually just an extension of the cam-and-roller technology used by Boeing to provide artificial feel and centering to boosted flight control systems for many decades. It is also similar in operation to the aileron force limiter used in early 737 autopilot systems.
This. It is actually footnoted in the original BEA report.
What I'd like to know is which pilot has control when the breakout kicks in.
@@Brommear Exactly what I wanted to ask. WTF !!! I would assume Left seat but if there’s a breakaway arm ? Whoever’s stronger ?
Same with the 777, done on Heavy Checks.
787 maintenance manual states it can take 90 lbs of force to fully separate the control columns. It would be the same for the 777
I just LOVE this channel. Nothing comes from Juan’s analyses but solid facts. Very difficult to find anywhere else, even from the NTSB.
"Just the facts Mam. Just the facts."
Sgt. Joe Friday
aka Jack Webb 🙏
@@barrydysert2974 👍😃
JTSB
Juan Dan Gryder, and Scott Perdue are my favorites. I watch Juan the most
Yep, and they (RUclips) beat up on him in the sense of demonetizing of all of these types of awesome reports…
Excellent video Juan. As a retired FBO mechanic I wish we'd had something like this to show owners who complained about maintenance costs. On two occasions I was called to the manager's office when owners couldn't understand why their 'annual' was costing so much - both times I took them into the hangar to show how involved the rigging process was on their 310, especially if it had been badly rigged somewhere else. A day to check all the figures and 'pull off' loads etc, then another day if a lot of remedial rigging had to be done. This really opened their eyes as to what a mechanic's job involved..... we are not just 'grease monkeys'. A used high time Cessna 300 or 400 series airplane that is 50 or 60 years old might be cheap to buy for a very good reason - they are very expensive to maintain properly.
PS - I'm a 62 year old and you remind me of my father who worked in the 1970's as an airline pilot trying to make things safer. Good work man....
It looks like the Captain (pm) jumped on the controls unannounced, starting the tug-o-war, it looks like the FO (pf) figured that out and let go of the controls in time to avoid impact. Fatigue on Final. . .
I think you are right - the graphs show when the controls were completely separate, but not when there was force that each pilot was exerting possibly against one another. The captain probably didn't like how the approach was going, was trying to "help" the FO by nudging the controls without talking to him, and triggered this incident. I recall an instructor many years ago doing this to me and it was very annoying.
Hand flying is a hand-eye coordination skill, and requires a lot of practice to do it correctly. The typical airline flight has 2-10 hours of flight on AP/flight director, and about 2 minutes of hand flying - this is not enough to become or remain proficient. Required and expensive simulator time is spent handling emergencies, not "just flying around", getting the feel of the controls and doing a lot of landings. I've read stories from some check airmen in Asia that the Asian airlines have decided that they can't consistently teach their pilots this motor skill, so they "force" them to use the AP until flare. Probably wise unless the poor pilot actually needs to fly some time in their career, like the SFO Asiana crash. ☹
@@dermick Why would the captain be nudging the controls if they were on AP?
@@rkan2 They were on AP until the last few seconds, that's when the FO started hand flying. The Captain was possibly trying to help the FO by nudging the controls, or perhaps trying to dampen the FO's inputs that were causing PIO. If this is what happened, then the Captain needs more training - he should let the FO fly and give verbal hints, or take full control. This is a perfect example of why you can't have two pilots on the controls at the same time. The other pilot won't know if the aircraft is doing something due to external forces on the aircraft, or if it's the other pilot.
@@rkan2 because at that point they weren’t on auto pilot. Having said that if the captain wasn’t happy then a clearly annunciated I’m taking control should have happened.
It takes 50lbs of force to to break out the force limiters on the 777, for both the aileron and elevator systems. It takes 12-15 lbs at the pedal to cause a breakout for the rudder.
Great analysis as always. Staggering to see they still can’t grasp the “only one pilot is flying at any one time” concept.
Indeed. There have also been incidents with nobody flying. That is, where both thought the other was in control, so for some period of time (usually just a few seconds), nobody was on the controls.
@@theophrastus3.056 ironically having neither pilot controlling the aircraft is probably safer than both at once. It should at least maintain a generally stable attitude.
@@simontist True, especially if it’s on autopilot.
I learned this senario some 30 years ago when doing initial training with my primary flight instructor, when CFI says "MY AIRPLANE" & you are confused, he is about to save your life. Used it latter myself twice flying with a CAP friend. Once as instrument safety pilot when PIC was over confident in attempting to fly a practice approach down to 50 feet of touchdown. He wasn't as hot of a pilot as he thought. As we were flying directly at a 75 foot tower, I said "MY AIRPLANE- LOOK UP" (he was using foggles to restrict his vision) as I safely banked 30 degrees right adding power and pulled up to go around he saw the tower pass under our left wing. It helped his humility to become less of a BOLD PILOT. (Remember: There are old pilots & there are bold pilots, but there are NO old-bold pilots!)
Later flying with same friend, him PIC, upon landing at night after rain showers on the field we were taxiing straight towards another airplane, I asked "you got the 210?"(cessna), he replied "what?", & I stated "MY AIRPLANE" again & pivoted the nose 45 Degrees Right & stopped. He then was able to see through to glare of raindrops on the windscreen to spot the invisible to him, tried down airplane directly in front of our intended path. Would have made a terrible mess.
Thankfully there was never disagreement whenever "MY AIRPLANE" was spoken.
your friend should not be flying 😕
@lolbot, Armchair quarterbacking in aviation is called "hanger flying" and is a great source of teaching. A really great qoute from my primary CFI "Learn from the mistakes of others; you won't live long enough to make them all yourself". There is of course no such thing as a perfect pilot. Teachable moments come through accepting humility. Everyone make mistakes, including pilots, & that's why the rules dictate safety pilots are required during training & bringing extra pilot eyes along to help in bad visual conditions is just a really great idea!
My friend did both of these and lived several more decades because he accepted the humiliation life's lessons gave him and learned.
@@michaelamick8295 My wife’s catch-phrase from when she taught gliding is “Help stamp out old age. Fly low and slow” 😉
@@johnhay1033 Great Line! Will put it into my bag of favorite qoutes.
The force required for the breakout mechanism is 50 lbs (23kg) (I use to be a production test pilot on the Triple)
Thanks! Does it snap back in place if you line 'em back up?
@@blancolirio The wheel cable drums are cast assemblies. The right and left drums are not the same. Both drums have attachment points for the upper force limiter, which is part of the wheel jam breakout mechanism.
The left drum has an additional attachment point for the wheel force transducer. The left drum is bearing mounted on a sleeve which is spline mounted on the left shaft assembly. If there is a failure, the sleeve and left drum can connect through a lost motion device. The lost motion device permits connection after a control wheel rotation of 7.8 degrees in either direction.
The right drum is bearing mounted on the right shaft assembly. The right drum has a peg on the bottom side which is part of the lost motion device. If there is a failure, the lost motion device lets the right drum connect to the right shaft assembly after a control wheel rotation of 2.9 degrees in either direction.
Hope this helps...
Nice job. I haven’t listened to you Iin a while, but now that I am retire, home to listen more. Your boy is getting big!!!
Juan, after the Cali accident, we added "speed brake stowed" to the Go-Around sequence. (This was also true for "Terrain", and "Windshear"). If the aircraft was not tracking the localizer one might have to add "heading, select". With the second TOGA push the aircraft would have likely gone into altitude capture fairly quickly so a "speed" input would also be required. They likely stayed at flaps 20 to slow things down to reorient themselves. After the first incident I would not have turned the aircraft back to the F/O as I would have been concerned that there might have been a problem with his flight controls.
Many years ago in UPT, we were briefed about an accident in which a T-38 crashed after the student and instructor both bailed out. They were fighting each other on the controls and thought they had frozen controls. Perfectly good airplane crashed. After that, there was an emphasis on transferring control and holding you hands up in the air when surrendering control and saying “your airplane.”
So hyperactive right seat led to leftward deviation that forced the go around.
Left seater never claimed control and authority by stating “my aircraft” but fought his right seater anyway.
In the melee both guys flying (or attempting to) no one did the go around immediate actions correctly.
"My aircraft", or in some countries "I have control" should be the call when the captain wants to take control of the aircraft. It must be very clear who is flying the aircraft. How many times do we have to review incidents like this before this message gets home!
At my company, the callout was "I have the aircraft". Same difference. In my freighter days, my boss let me fly a lot, he was a mess and a good guy. He knew how to push my buttons. He would say, "this is getting scary, I might have to take it". Ha, I would be duly insulted!
With just about every airline other than AF that’s normal procedure.
I’m at the point that I’d never fly on AF unless I was desperate. AF stuff up again, and again, and again.
I can remember having the phrase "positive transfer of control" pounded into my head at the school house. It does get tedious but this IS the reason why it's necessary. Also I've been out of the 737 for 9 months on LTD (new knees) and I can still spit out the go around litany.
I'm pretty sure we demo'd the jammed control mechanism in the sim during initial as I recall it felt like I had to be Arnold Schwarzenegger to overcome the locks.
That’s probably about right Gerry. I think Juan mentioned that the disconnect release is at about 40 pounds. On a yoke that would be a lot of pulling or pushing. Hope your knees get better. I went out LTD for cardio issue (congestive heart failure) after my AME sent me to the cardiologist across the hall. Surprise! 3 X 33mm DES stent in my left anterior descending (LAD) artery. Just when I thought I could get a Class 3 to fly my 1947 Cessna 120 I bought when I was 14…Kidney cancer struck. Still trying to beg and plead for a S.I. From the FAA. So far, so good. Take care and get better soon. Todd, AA Capt., Ret. 727; MD-80; USAF Capt. Ret. T-37; T-38; C-130; OV-10.
Can you say your airline Gerry? Just curious if you know any of my pilot peeps now on 737’s.
@@toddcitron7869 American Airlines. Based in BOS.
@@toddcitron7869 I'm a colon cancer survivor. Knees gave out last June. Requal mid May(upcoming)(swell). 3.5 til they kick me out.
Heck, even playing volleyball I was taught to yell "MINE" when going for the ball.
Reminds me of AF 447 one pilot with stick up the other down resulting in an avoidable crash
Yes, but here they managed it with a Boeing Control Yoke, not an Airbus Sidestick. Unbelievable.
Excellent analysis and background info, Juan! Agreed regarding the eery similarities with AF 447. This is getting scary! Companies need to revisit the training regimen a little bit and make sure that pilots actually understand how a plane flies, not just how a computer flies.
Such an excellent point! That way the pilots understand exactly what's happening and why in relation to what the computers are doing on board the airplane! I'd be willing to bet that many pilots still don't completely understand the physics of a plane and how they function!
I agree to all points ...
Air France is getting a reputation with pilot incompetence: Air France Flight 296 Mulhausen, Air France Flight 358 Toronto, Air France 447 Atlantic
@@expansionone since they where folded into Air France only a couple of years later, I think you can include Air Inter 148 in that list!
Was waiting patiently for your update on this his report Balncolirio. Thank you 😊
No , I can guarantee you that they won't be dismissed from the company.
Its almost impossible to get dismissed from AF ( pilot or ground personnel) , unless you deliberately run an aircraft in a terminal ....once you are inside the company , its for life.
Listening to this, working on my motorcycle oddly enough. This story reminds me of when my old boss and I were moving it out of his shed, he was moving and didn’t want to bring it with him. It was a 90° day, the tires were flat, it was stuck in gear with no clutch lever. As we started manhandling it out a normal service door I noticed it seemed extra heavy, like he was letting it fall. So I started pulling to pick up the slack and it just got heavier, we were both heaving and thinking it was about to fall. We put it on the kickstand and took a break once we saw sunlight, and promptly discovered we were fighting each other the entire time, thinking the other was dropping it. A simple miscommunication made a relatively straightforward process incredibly strenuous because neither wanted to speak up
Human factors, and a very good example. We teach that as a recurrent topic in Mtc.
Always appreciate your explanation on those air incidents Juan. Easy for someone who doesn't know how to fly a plane understand. Appreciate that about your channel! Thank you.
At the end of a normal T-38 single-ship training sortie at UPT, we were being vectored in the weather for an arrival back to base. The instructor was flying from the back seat (so I thought) and I was the student in the front (tandem seating). Our heading began to drift and roll started to increase. When it hit about 15 degrees, I said something like "your heading is off". At which point the instructor exclaimed: "Oh, crap! My controls! I thought you were flying!" I didn't recall being given the airplane, or acknowledging it, as you're taught from Day 1, and as Juan pointed out. Nor was I lambasted by the instructor, either then or after we landed, so I assumed he had made the error. (BTW: It was pretty normal for the instructors to get a bit of "stick time" by flying the last approach & landing.) All he said after the flight was, with a grin: "Well, let's say we call that an 'unplanned demonstration' [air quotes] of why a positive change of controls is so important." He wasn't wrong! And I had several great flights with him afterwards. [Also: I only tell the stories where somebody else screwed up.]
I am a retired airline pilot. In all my years of flying transport category aircraft (Last flight B-767) I never would have imagined that PIO's almost caused an accident. PIO's were always somewhat of a laugh when a pilot .ot into the maneuver . "What caused that turbulence?. You did!" Just happy it all ended well.
Though not a pilot I worked with lower grade assistants in training we where operating high voltage power equipment and systems and sometimes our personalities clashed with certain individuals while carrying out operational procedures . It was even worse when sometimes I worked with operators on the same grade as there was "no chain of command" between us in some of their minds. For teams to work effectively together they must have respect for each other and someone must be the person in charge especially when carrying out complex or dangerous procedures. As part of our training we where taught many procedures sourced from pilot training principals including nomination of person in charge though some staff had difficultly following that mindset there's nothing worse than having the other person argue or carry out operational changes without the approval of both members of the team but it does happen sometimes. You should never make assumptions but it looks like these two pilots where not suited to work together .
I agree that these pilots didn't seem to be capable of working well together, however (and I know it's never gonna happen because "its too expensive" until maybe we have 10 examples of it happening within the same airline), it could be tested for.
Basically, every pair of pilots should be tested to see if they are capable of working well together. This does create its own problems, but at least you won't have pilots fighting each other at the controls nearly to the point of the aircraft crashing.
This makes two times it has happened at Air France alone. How many more times must it happen before something is done about it?
Juan. I’ve been sending these videos to my dad. He was the engineer in charge of certification and testing for the 777. He’s got a lot of knowledge of 777 systems. He does enjoy your videos. ✌️
Juan, when you presented this incident a few weeks back my understanding was that the controls on the plane went wonky for a brief period of time. But from this report and your analysis was the upset was pilot induced. I wonder did they have a little pow-wow after they landed the plane. I am going to assume that at least the investigators will be doing that also.
@@DrewNorthup Now that you pointed this out it makes good logical sense. I am not a pilot so I have idea what all the stressors are that they do have to keep up with. Maybe in all of this Air France may want to rethink their number of flying crew corps on a longer flight.
As I often used to teach (as flight instructor and training captain in UK) it's never a question of "Who has control" but "I have control".
"Communication breakdown, it's always the same. Having a nervous breakdown, drive me insane!!!!!!!!!" Thanks Juan for making what was going on in the cockpit clear. I had a feeling something stupid was happening. I think Led Zeppelin completes the thought nicely.
Guess the pilots were dazed and confused.
Funny, I was thinking Roy Orbison's Comm Breakdown ;-D
"When it's right, it's so right
When it's wrong, it's so wrong
When it's gone, it's all gone
It's too late
Communication breakdown, Communication breakdown
I can tell* that it's over now
Communication breakdown"
* (sung as te-eh-ell)
Great analysis Juan. Love that you’ve got Pete there helping.
In our 737 is toga, flaps 15, positive rate gear up, 400ft lnav, 1000ft vnav and flaps retraction on schedule. Missed approach altitude is set upon glide slope capture. Nice video juanas always.
I can still spit out those words instantly after being retired for 4 years. But in the sim, you know it's coming.
@@paulwilson8367 - the plane will climb perfectly with just TOGA and pitch up to follow the FD’s. Let your brain catch up then complete the go around procedure.
Thanks!
I so love the way you converge on important problems. There is no way I can thank you enough. So, thanks.
I hope RUclips are not still demonetizing your channel, because they are throwing adverts in every 5 minutes on my TV.
Fascinating analysis, thanks so much.
As a French-speaking Belgian (and so, very culturally close to France), and working in a job with safety risks in the belgian's railways, I wonder if there is not a deeper cultural problem at play here. Just as some crashes were caused by the unwillingness from crew members to question an higher ranking pilot actions (think Korean Air Cargo Flight 8509), our French-speaking European culture is VERY adverse toward any mark of hierarchy at any time, and I experienced myself how hard it can be to suddenly have to take control of a situation and tell somebody else to let you do the thing, even in a urgent situation. You really have to fight hard against yourself and your whole education.
On one hand, this tendency help to maintain stable democratic and equitable societies, and great team work, but slow down the reaction time in emergency situations when it time to stop suggesting solutions to the group and start to take individual control....
If it's France, it has to be "arrogance" !
Strangely I had the opposite experience with the French.
I'm in South Africa and worked for a French company (largest company in the world in it's industry) for 6 years. The last 4 was as the project manager for the design and construction of a $64 million manufacturing plant. I worked with about 10 engineers @ the French HQ.
I was shocked at how reluctant the were to say what they really thought to their superiors although they had a lot to say privately. They really loved do things by committee and not one of them would willingly take responsibility for a decision.
Despite being the lowest ranking person in the room I had to drive the decision making. When it came time to make a decision I would ask "does everyone agree that we do it this way?" Silence. Then I would have to go around the room and ask each person if they had any objection. If they all answered no, I would then say OK thats how we will do it. Then they would all nod in agreement.
@@gregculverwell I'm not surprised by this story, and I think it's less the opposite of what I mean than its corollary. This tatse for working in committee and not coming to the forefront in a team work is indeed very common. Because hierachy is seen as intrinsically bad, relations between workers and their managers are often marked by distrust and opposition, with few open talks between them (and climbing the hierarchy scale is a sure way to lose friends and make enemies). Basically, this hate for any mark of hierachy most often doesn't translate into a confrontational or rebel attitude (because you would lose your job), but in a passive, "dragging the feet" about everything one, having to be, at best , (financially) cajoled, or, at worst, coerced to do anything new. It can even become almost comical, with some people being like "I don't care what the boss commands : I'll stay here until I'm specifically paid to escape this fire!". I guess it makes French (and Belgian) workers harder to exploit, but it also embitter the work atmosphere of most busisnesses. French people are known to be "raleurs" (grouchy), and this is probably why...
@@NQR-9000
I found it all very strange. This attitude lead to many bad decisions being made.
Being South African I would just say what I thought (somewhat respectfully). My French colleagues would sometimes be shocked, but I didn't see a problem with being honest and open.
The funny thing was that the top level management (people with Persident in their title) seemed to actually like me and invite me to dinner when they were out here.
Some people were grumpy initially but I didn't take them seriously and would push back or would make a joke of it - then they usually laughed.
I ended up with quite a few good friends from that time.
That's excactly what I was assuming. We germans are probably too hierarchy driven (look where it got us and the world in the past) but when I see what goes in France, they swing into the opposite direction. There needs to be a balance between the two mindsets.
Couldn't wait to hear your "take" on the follow-up to this incident. Sounds like these guys almost screwed the pooch on this one. Great analysis as usual sir.
I’m just a passenger, but I can follow what you’re saying. Just got back from Vegas and it was VERY gusty on approach. I did feel that little bit of shaky as we were landing when you said they usual;y disengage the autopilot. But the pilots on my flight just kept it steady and we floated in without problems.
Because some pilots are amazing at what they do, and others suck. But social issues are driving hiring and training. It’s not nice to tell people that they suck, so nobody wants to rock the boat.
@@markg7963 Lol, you got all that from an anecdotal post? Calm down mildred, you're scaring yourself with yet another replacement trope
Great analysis as always Juan. When I started in the airline world in the late 90's, the simulator instructors would say "get that autopilot off! you need to hand fly this plane during any emergency". Then in the 2000's it went to "get that autopilot on! then you can concentrate on the problem. Now they talk about use the autopilot as needed, which is the best way imo.
Another interesting change that has happened in the airline world since the 90's is the stall recovery. In our initial training, we all learned the stall recovery. First, reduce the angle of attack (push), level the wings and add full power. Once the wings are flying again, recover to a slight nose up attitude to regain the altitude that you lost.
Well, in the 90's, in the airlines, they told us you can't lose altitude in a stall. So the stall recovery was: Max power, and hold altitude until you fly out of the stall. this is what they were trying to do with AF 447 (even though it appears they didn't even know the plane was stalling). Now they are back to reduce the angle of attack first and accept some altitude loss, especially at high altitude.
“My controls” or “I have control” (response: “your controls”/“you have control”) is the standard phraseology in my 737 flying (and especially handy in my Luscombe 8E when teaching a friend tailwheel flying). It’s a keyword quibble, but fully direct and unmistakable vs. “my aircraft/airplane” in the heat of a stressful moment.
As per the AMM the wheel jam breakout ( roll ) and column breakout ( pitch ) mechanism need a force of 50 lb ( 23 kgs ) to operate.
For instances where two pilots are simultaneously giving differing commands to the yoke (or stick in Airbus) I think there should be a voice alert. "Control conflict!" or something like that.
There is in Airbus, an audible “dual input” annunciation.
this option should be I. French since only Air France pilots have problems with CRM
777 the yokes are linked. If one pilot is pushing the other pilot can feel that. Sounds like the pilots had input saturation and didn't notice the pressures on the yoke.
It does: Stop it !!! Stop
Captain has to say “my controls!” This is taught in private pilot school
Greatly appreciate the prompt , comprehensive and professional update.
I had been wondering about this flight. Thanks for making this video. I assumed there was more to the story. I'm not surprised the less experience pilot was doing that rocking motion. I see it constantly on RUclips videos of landings. As soon as the AP is disconnected, they start chasing the FD. in IMC, I imagine it is much worse.
Great analysis. Thanks so much for the info. WoW! Don't fight over control of aircraft!!!!
Allo Juan the break out mec. that you call it, is a torque limiter and can be made different ways in this set-up it will reengage by itself
It's always a great learning experience watching these analyses.
To analyze this incident fully we need to know what modes were displayed on the FMA from the time the F/O disconnected the A/P on approach until the aircraft was recovered at MAP altitude. Go around track is the norm for roll guidance and SRS for pitch with PF calling. ie., TOGA/SRS/GATRK. This is a reflection of what the aircraft is programmed to do with PF following F/D commands.
FMA would have been SPD | LOC | GS on approach and then THR | TOGA | TOGA. TOGA will change to LNAV at 50ft, in this instance, with the AP disengaged.
@@EdOeuna so if LOC was the FMA roll mode which I agree why would the A/C have deviated off the LOC course ? Stabilized approach criteria and accurate handling should have kept it on course through to touchdown. If TOGA was pressed then as you say LNAV becomes the roll mode. Examples I gave earlier are applicable to Airbus.
@@ianmacneill8951 - possibly the FO had a micro nap or just spatial disorientation. If you’re looking up into IMC and then down to the flight displays then this might be disorienting as well, especially if the glance outside is more than a quick one.
@@EdOeuna probably should add that when flying a monitored instrument approach the PF should be keeping his/her head down on instruments until the PM or autocall system calls minima at which point if the visual segment is appropriate PM takes control and lands. PM may also call earlier with “runway or approach lights in sight” allowing PF to come heads up and land the A/C.
@@ianmacneill8951 - the problem with not disconnecting before the minima is that the automation begins to decrab due to any cross wind at 500ft as part of the autoland system. Since this isn’t a desired action for a hand flown landing, because we can decrab in the flare, then the AP is usually disengaged above 500ft. This would be pre-briefed.
As a flight instructor for many years, "My Aircraft" was my mantra. Not sure why that was not said. Thank you Juan .
Amazing!! The plane was doing great until the pilots got involved!! BASIC procedures!! MOST important items. Thanks again for a super detailed, and understandable, analysis of this event. I sure hope those fellers git hollered at!!
Not if getting hollered at causes them to clam up and withhold pertinent information.
A GA Alouette heli destroyed in IE, almost identically. Rotor head direction opposite to many heli's, pilots failed the "my aircraft" command, opposing pedal/tail commands applied during landing flare/collective increase. Both pilots suspected command failure and wrestled the coupled commands until yaw loss caused tail rotor to impact trees. No fatalities but one serious injury!
Was discussing this with a buddy, I told him what I thought and gave him the details that I knew of. He looked at me and asked how do you know so much about this? I told him I have a friend who tells me everything I need to know.
Done that many times.....
👍👍👍
Good job petey, good job dad for keepin it light and fun!
That also happened on Atlas Air 3591
Yes that's the one I was referring to but yes thanks for explaining that to me makes a lot of sense good video my friend and God bless👍👍👍🙏🛩
Excellent analysis as always, Juan. Two comments: 1) A single push of TOGA gives a climb rate of 2,000 fpm. 2) You didn't speculate on the reason for the go-around in the first place. It seems to me that the FO was in a PIO condition in roll. I saw this from time to time on both the 747 and the 777. I think that it was a characteristic of the 1960s design of the 747 wing that for unknown reasons was carried over into the fly-by-wire model for the 777 wing.
Juan, FYI, there is a YT channel called "High Pressure Aviation". Its an Air France 777 driver who documents his approaches, landings and T/O's. Its interesting to see how thy work in the cockpit at AF. Worth a look.
Great analysis Juan. A rookie question: when the torque tube device disconnects the two yokes, who has control?
This was covered in a later video. It's the average of the two inputs. If the other one is pushing and the other one is pulling nothing happens.
@@anttiruo Exactly.
Most breakaway systems using springs and cams as shown in picture will auto reset due to the spring at the moment input force is reduced to below breakaway force. So the dude that pulled to hard just had to relax a little to reset his pitch control. Air France now on my airlines to not fly after seeing cockpit management like that. wow first day on the job maybe?
Not "first day on the job" ..... their Last day 😢
AF have a serious pilot competency problem, and what really scares me is no one is talking about it. Especially AF.
@@idanceforpennies281 Yeah, scary AF. Oh wait, did you mean Air France?
So we know CRM was severely lacking here, as well as communications. Could Fatigue also be a factor, since (as you said) a lot of airlines run this route with three pilots?
@@justinepaula-robilliardSwitch?
That didn't work on AF447 either.
The concept behind its well explained in the video. Airbus has a takeover bottom to override the other side stick. And that wasn't enough to prevent a the 447 crash. Where the pilot sitting on right held a nose up attitude leading the aircraft to a stall. And other pilot was unable to lower the pitch. That was one of the many the factor. It's 2 very different concepts. Maybe the captain came from airbus or both came from airbus. And they didn't fully understand or adapt to another concept.
Air France operates Boeing and Airbus.
And having a switch left...both..right it would also have its own flaws.
The decision to hand fly a ILS in IMC condition after a 8hrs flight. Most likely they were jetlagged. We don't know if he mention in the approach briefing his intention to disconnect the autopilot while still in the clouds. Nowadays hand flying in IMC condition only in a non normal situation where autopilot becomes inoperative.
The captain could be tired.
Maybe some operational cultural in the company. They already had a accident related to both pilots trying to fly the airplane at same time.
@@justinepaula-robilliard
I am not a airbus pilot. But airbus has a takeover bottom. Because the side sticks are not connected. Boeing kept traditional design. You can see what are the control inputs from the other pilot or AP.
Everything else you said. I couldn't understand your thoughts
@@justinepaula-robilliard
I am still not following you. I don't know your aviation background.
Every system will have its own flaws. Regardless of the manufacturer. (Airbus...Boeing...Embraer or Bombardier and so on)
The human factors is the most complex. As humans, we can be very unpredictable. That's why the industry is in a constant evolution. No wonder why aviation has come to a high safety standard. I am sure we'll learn a lot from this incident.
The problem with your idea is that goes against the whole concept of a multi crew operation. Might as well put just one control in the cockpit or one pilot only...problem solved.
The pilot in the left seat. Which is normally the pilot in command. It doesn't mean he's most qualified. Following the normal career path an airline company. Most of the time he's very senior and experienced. But you can have a very experienced pilot in the right. Or two captains flying together. Instrutor sitting on the right.
737 max crash. It was the 8. Which is the updated version of the 737 800.
The max 7...is an update of the 737 700 in "NG" family.
And I didn't understand the relation between this incident and the max crash.
This concept of splitting the control in the boeing is a way to fly the airplane in case of a jammed control due to a mechanical failure or ice accumulation. It was not designed to prevent what happened.
The concept boeing choose is the simplest of the concepts. Which is the same used in a light aircraft trainer.
He could just said "I have control" ...this works for both pilot. Either in the left or in right seat.
@@justinepaula-robilliard
Your suggestions for the switch is valid. I think we should consider all the ideas. Even though In my opinion, that's my opinion only...it would be very complex to implement a system like that. As Airline pilot...isolating a control is big safety issue. You solve um problem. But it might create several other ones. Such system would require a backup system. Failure analysis...what if this system fails.
About the left seat
Normally the pilot in command already sits on the left seat. It's been like that since the ww2.
We refer to as the pilot in command. Because you might have two captains flying together...or in a 4 men operation for long flights...2 captain and 2 first officers.
Or in some companies with direct entry captains. You might have a experienced captain but new in the company and a very senior first officer. In this case the junior guy is the one in charge. We have a chain of commands. It's not a board review or democracy. Every one get envolved. But only one decides. Which is the pilot in command or the designated captain for the flight. Almost everything you said about CRM is what we've been doings for more than a decade.
CRM came to create a balance. But still a legal responsible person is require and he has final authority when it comes to a decision and If something goes wrong he's the one how going to be hold accountable.
Talking about CRM. Aviation is the leading industry. Other industries learn from aviation. We are talking about a very dynamic environment. Decisions are taken within seconds. It's constantly being updated.
In a big company they might've never seen each other before. Company rostered them for that flight. Can you imagine the challenge for industry. You put total strangers in this environment and they have work together.
Aviation is the only job you have to go for proficiency check. We go to the simulator twice a year and plus all the recurrent training.
This a preliminary report. But I am sure air france management is already working on ways to prevent that to happen again or Supposedly.
About the 447 crash I believe you didn't fully understand what happened. Lots of change came after the crash. Especially in training. The industry changed the focus. Procedures were changed. It became a study case for CRM training.
We're still learning from it.
@@justinepaula-robilliard
And this "I have control" its very important tool. The A320 which landed in the Hudson River. Copilot was flying. He was also a captain before. He was demoted from captain to copilot. Because 2 companies merged together. Both highly experienced.
Sully was the captain due to circumstances. But he was the captain.
Very first thing he said. "My aircraft"...some airline use...I have control.
But let's say. Sally had decided for an attempt to return to LA Guardia. And the Pilot in the right(jeff) had the idea to land in the Hudson. For a well trained crew, the moment someone says "I have control " the other one has to let go the control.
They wouldn't have time to be looking for a switch in the overhead panel to decide who's got the control. It's just not feasible.
Moreover. There is only one in charge. CRM came to reduce the power distance. Because the senior pilot in the left seat might be wrong or might do something wrong in a critical moment...especially i it's close to ground.
Crazy! First day of training, “I have control” is emphasized. In the end, complacency is what will get you every time.
I worked on American 777"s for quite awhile and I can't remember the exact force for "break away" but I think it was something like 75-85 lbs of differential (pushing on one side,pulling on the other 2 mechs required) It's a spring and cam setup. As I remember it there was no reset required just let go and it snaps backs to normal.
Thanks Denny!
It's 50lb for pitch and bank and 12 to 15lb for yaw control a 777 maintenance technician just commented and Juan pinned the comment on top.
@@AviationNut Thanks.It's been 7 years since I worked on the 777. The last 7 years before I retired I was on the I was on UPS Airbus A300-600F"s
Great analysis Juan. Pilot fatigue a factor. AF needs to take some responsibility !
With the lower weather conditions it was a poor decision to hand fly the approach. The CA must have forgotten the AP was disconnected and when the FO went around he experienced a somatogravic illusion and was spatially disoriented. The second push of the TOGA buttons exacerbated that illusion and caused the CA to push nose down even harder. Poor communication and crew coordination. Some airline SOP's require AP usage below certain weather minimums. Perhaps AF should adopt the same.
Is a go around a knock for the pilots or the company?
@@Brotha00 A go around isn't a knock on the pilot, crew, or company. If the approach is unstable or gets out of limits then a go around is the appropriate action. As I brief the FO's I fly with, you never will get in trouble for going around, only for not going around. There are many examples of pilots trying to "save" a bad approach only to cause an incident or accident. Good airmanship sometimes requires recognizing you've screwed something up and take the safest course of action. A good decision to go around here but the execution was almost deadly.
You can see in videos around here: Air France pilots may disconnect the AP very early in the approach.
@@NWA320DRVR thank you for the information, that makes perfect sense.
@@NWA320DRVR Indeed.
Good analogy with the AF447 incident. At least on the AF11/B777 there is a interconnection of columns and both pilots can feel there is a struggle between them, whereas on the AF447/A330 the co-pilot was pitching nose up for an extended period of time while the pilot was totally unaware of this happening.
Juan, the majority of flights between the northeast US and France leave the US late afternoon and land early morning in Paris France.
I use to fly from Dulles to Paris every couple of weeks, United 915 to France and 916 return to Dulles. The return flight left Paris just after 1:00PM Paris time and landed at Dulles between 3:30 and 4:00PM Eastern time.
EDIT, pulled Flightradar24 data, AF11 scheduled departure 9:00PM Eastern time, landing at Paris 10:20AM, Paris time.
Same as most European flights. About 5am onwards you can see all of the aircraft from the Atlantic coming over my house landing at Heathrow. Nothing out of the ordinary really.
4/30/22...another detail analysis of how a small problem can get human twisted into a (controllable) resumption of normal cockpit operations, proceed with missed approach procedures & land safely.
Lots of indepth reporting on this incident Juan. It's another great job informing all viewers of complexity flying these wonderful flying machines! 👍👍👍😊✈
Let me check I got this correctly:
Co-pilot appears to have lost his ability to fly to the instruments, increasingly losing it to the left.
Captain expresses concern over drifting and banking to left.
They commence go-around.
They DON'T mention a transfer of command, it's NOT just one pilot making control inputs.
They blame the plane.
About right?
They almost had the full set: they pancaked a perfectly good Airbus, and here they tried to screw up a Boeing with apparently similar root causes of failure in the crew.
Unbelievable.
Happily I have no likelihood of ever flying Air France.
Me either. 🧐 I’m thinking of the helpless pax and cabin crew in the back, that fortunately were able to walk off still alive after putting their lives in the control of these two. 🥺
@steeltrap - yup I was thinking the exact same. What the hell was going on? Terrible CRM...
@@fredfred2363 Perhaps it's lost in translation and they think CRM = Crew Resource Mayhem?
;-D
Your last comment was unnecessary
I am finding it hard to believe a large, established legacy carrier could have flight crews that are either not trained properly or trained inconsistently with these lapses revealed over many years. What will it take for this company to “get it’s act together”? Thanks, Juan for another EXCELLENT debrief.
The 'going left feeling like going right' phenomenon and compensating by adding more and more left was explored on the Mentour Pilot channel recently.
It sounds very much like the kind of disorientation brought on by pilot fatigue. 😴
Agreed, notable that they were still in the clouds at that point.
Fatigue doesn’t make you not fly the flight directors. Maybe the FO was literally falling asleep as the controls.
Holy Crap - talk about lack of communication within the flight deck environment. These guys need some serious "time out" retraining. Autoland was designed for this kind of IMC, yes? The original decision to hand fly seems to be the first "link in the chain of events". Excellent breakdown as always JB, thanks!
What this reminded me of? Dan Gryder.. WAIT! Don't run off! Hear me out. Dan's done several videos on "Panicked Pilots", in like, a Cessna 182, with a new, or maybe nervous pilot, (meaning say, one who felt they needed work on stalls) , and a CFI, where they panic, and, instead of bringing the nose down, they continue to pull hard, so hard, the CFI can't gain control of the plane, and they end up stalling, or even flying the plane, into the ground.
Instead of working together, these two were fighting against each other, with the souls of what was it 179+? At stake. Juan said this was a VERY SERIOUS event. Felt very serious, to me.
One last thing... thank God they accidently broadcast this almost-disaster. Hopefully, much can be learned from this one.
Had a friend (pilot) killed this way, he took a neighbor up for a flight, shortly after takeoff, they only reached about 500 ft, the passenger panicked grabbed the stick and shoved the nose down and into the ground. They investigators new all this because the pax hit the PTT and you could hear the pilot yelling at her to let go of the stick.
@@wb6anp Sorry you lost your friend. Let's all hope Dan, Juan, & Scott, can bring about the changes needed, to keep this from ever happening again.
This is their goal after all, Pilot safety, and NOT just for commercial air.
@T.J. Kong The "WAIT!" didn't help, huh? Now I feel bad.
Indeed, exactly. It was really a very serious incident. And Dan Gryder could learn what even professional pilots are able to do, not only some GA-freaks.
@@NicolaW72, Dan worked a flying career at American, with later years working in their pilot training department. This was at a time of serious research in flight crew interaction and the implementation of newly developed training in the concept of CRM. He specialized in CRM. You may not agreed with his interpretation of various incidents and accidents (and occasionally, I do not) but they are not coming for a person unqualified in the art of flying or uniformed in the principles of CRM.
If Pete can't remember, I don't have a prayer! 😆Thanks for the update, Juan. Learned something with the pinned comment, too. 👍👍
Man your good. But both got in control. Sulley said my air craft. Thank you
Thank you sir! Show Pete the NBC-7 San Diego clip about the pelican on the TWY at KSAN..
Juan, when the control column breakout occurs, which column is providing the control input to the aircraft??
I was wondering the same thing.
On Boeing aircraft its the left hand seat aka Captain's seat. On Airbus its the average of both sticks. Which can cause "hero stalls" right into the ground / water.
A fifth column. /snark
Exactly the right question-which column wins???? Or does the left elevator follow the left yoke and the right elevator follow the right yoke? (Seems fair to me!)
Good job expanding the situation..the 777 is awesome and I'm glad it was not her fault and she was landed safely along with the souls on board of course
I wish we applied the same rigorous analysis and honest assessment to our stewardship of the environment or even our political decision making. I'm always impressed with the seriousness of aviation investigation. It might be interesting to look at "bad" aviation investigations to see where the process can fail
Look up Egypt Air 990.
Again an excellent video; fatigue seems to be an important factor in this case of insufficient CRM.
Just one question that keeps coming to my mind after accidents like this. Juan, is this going to be classified as a “Crew Resources Management “ problem?
I don’t really understand why in an industry that strives to “avoid repeating the same mistakes and problems “ , this CRM problem keeps coming up!
We still see cases of pilots (mostly 1st officers) choosing to die, rather than talk back to authorities (the captain) or like in this case not communicating because of…. what?
startle factor?
does "Aviate, Navigate, Communicate" apply INSIDE the cockpit as well? It sounds to me like each pilot is too focused on getting the plane in a safe, stable mode too think about talking or discussing the situation. Remember, this is less than a thousand feet from the ground. It doesn't take much at that altitude to cause a crash*, especially when you don't understand what your plane is doing and why.
@@dstarfire42 Exactly - and: good question.
Juan, is there any data on rudder trim?? I can imagine a situation in which the rudder has too much right rudder input trimmed and when the A/P is disconnected, the FO starts “fighting” the slight roll and heading induced by the mis-trimmed rudder. This is the underlying reason for the many small corrections he keeps making.
I can also imagine a situation with too much Left aileron trim prior to A/P disconnect. Then what the data showed as pilot “INPUT” as left roll, would actually be pilot just “relaxing” pressure on the control (which should be the correct “way” to hand fly. Let the aircraft “fly itself” and the pilot just making small, smooth inputs to keep it going where it is supposed to).
I’m shocked by the number of pilots that do not know how to properly trim the aircraft, and then have to “fight it” all the way to the ground once the A/P is disconnected.
Hi Juan, when the control columns are unlocked (unsynchronized) in the 777, does it split the elevators? or which control does the aircraft follow? Awesome content as always.
Great question!
@@shaggybreeks I don't know how it works, but you'd think captains side would be given priority in control conflict situations.
Not sure...on the 76, the elevators would split, following their respective control column input. Egypt Air crash....
@@blancolirio my web search yielded not much. Would you mind trying it out the next time you’re at work? I’m sure the Captain and the passengers wouldn’t mind…. KIDDING!!! Thanks again for producing one of my all time favorite YT channels.
I think any FBW aircraft (such as the 777) would not allow split-elevator in normal modes or as in an Airbus in normal law. I guess with an Airbus in direct law it is possible.
I wonder if there was any additional clarity that could be obtained on the CVR instead of just the radio transmissions? Something like the Captain telling the FO to get his mitts off the yoke?
Juan, young Pete is a carbon copy of you, you are blessed! Capt GB Slagle. MIA 777 Retired
Hello Juan,
You will find the force value to activate the breakout mechanism, in the notes below the first page of the BEA report : 50 pounds = 23 kg.
I'll bet pilot fatigue will be implicated in the final report.
NTSB loves that one, if ya know what I mean. Unless they see your post. Or Juan/Dan/Scott happens to mention it. Then... meh, maybe not so much.
@@rickrickard2788 It's certainly more politically correct than to suggest it may be a cultural thing. I wonder what other cultures might foster this same mistake, if it is culturally related.
{o.o}
Yup
@@Wizardess I would say that TRUTH, no matter where it leads, nor which country it may need to be found in? Is the only thing that matters. Stopping mistakes such as this, should NEVER have "financial", in any aspect of it.
Well, IF they truly care about human lives over money, that is.
AF11 & AF447
Juan,
Outstanding analysis as usual, and the similarities with AF447 are quite remarkable, though obviously this is a Boeing aircraft whilst AF447 was an Airbus aircraft.
Failure to call out "..My Aircraft..." seems common in both instances.
Query here with AF11 the Captain, (so PM), putting his inputs to the yoke when he should not have touched it.....?
Is there something in AF pilot hierarchy and training amiss somewhere ....?
The ages of these pilots, (i.e. experience), may well tell us something.....
With AF447 we had relatively young pilots, (less experience and hours), flying the aircraft whilst the Senior Captain was taking a rest break.
In addition, your point about three pilots on such routing and schedules would seem valid in every sense of the word.....
So might we be back to AF procedures and crewing of flights.....?
The BEA should have something to say about this....
James Hennighan
Yorkshire, England
Do Air France use V-bar flight directors?
I had this same situation, when the copilot started mixing the flight director with the aircraft index. The FD said turn left, and he thought the aircraft was turning left (mixing FD with aircraft index), so he gave the aircraft full right, and nearly turned the aircraft upside down. Again, this was just at 1500 ft on t/o, at night with no ground lights. Luckily the aircraft shouted ‘bank angle’, while I was changing frequency, and I recovered.
P
Good job on explaining this in detail Juan. By the sounds of the pilots, I believe it takes a lot of pressure to disengage the torque tube.
I believe human factors are involved here. As you mentioned, it was 1:15 local time when they left New York after most likely a 24 hr lay over.
It's unfortunate the pilots were fighting each other on the controls. Why I mentioned human factors.
If I refer to the torque tube on a Challenger, it will re engage when controls are lined back up. If you look at the graph at the end, both inputs are the same.
In the comment you pinned, it was very well explained how the controls work when they are disengaged.
Sounds like Air France needs to really work on their transfer of control training. Having another plane crash due to similar circumstances and now this? ugh.
No, it's the BEA that needs to do their job. This is the cause of the lethal AF447 crash and their hypocritical garbling about this "hopefully" being a one off makes me want to puke.
@@DrewNorthup would an audible warning of "opposite input" have prevented the AF447 crash? Yes.
Juan, heads up, straight on analysis. Thanks.
CRM and situational awareness seem to be severely lacking at AF. That's at least the third time I've seen AF pilots doing something wrong in what should be fairly standard.
“Fairly standard” is too generous. These are utterly basic elements of flight that the pilots are missing.
As usual Juan, EXCELLENT rundown with the straight hard facts. Welcome to the NO BS zone!
Thanks so much for the analysis, Juan!.
With the memory of 447 behind us this is a worry that it's happening again.
Could it be fatigue, poor quality crew rest, brain fog, poor CRM?.
Hope they get to the bottom of this.
I am curious how Boeing aircraft behave & which control collumn priority takes precedent in breakaway or differing control collumn inputs