Complacent, careless, and in a hurry, this is the result of that fiasco. The crew should have exited the runway, stopped the aircraft on the taxiway, and reloaded the FMSs with the correct departing runway, correct departure procedure, and a new takeoff and departure briefing.
Yup - too used to routine takeoffs so when one unusual thing came up they didn't stop to take stock of the change. Too much automation in this case. If the flight computer could've automatically re-calculated and displayed the V speeds they would've been OK but apparently it didn't do that. I know these airplanes are too complex for the old whiz wheels, but it seems that may have helped slow them down to re-evaluate their situation. I wonder what happened to the career of these pilots?
I've never flown anything heavier than a Cessna 402 on third level airline ops, but when the captain moved the thrust levers back, then forward again to the flex detent, I asked myself "why didn't he just push them all the way forward?" It would have kept flying even if the computer didn't necessarily have the correct input!
I'm retired AB Capt and had flown that plane before. I was told the nose gear stur came through the cockpit floor board upon impact. Very odd in my opinion to abandon the take off after you are airborne.
Crew should have rejected takeoff, but much earlier. It was poor judgment to continue a takeoff roll when it was clear before V1 that something was wrong w the v-speed programming.
Easy: Captain ballsed up in spades. This take-off should have been rejected as soon as they realised they did not have the V speeds available. Having made the wrong decision to continue the Captain then made the second wrong decision by rejecting after he was actually flying. He then got himself into a PIO with some inept control inputs. The FO obviously initiated the whole sequence with her FMS mis-steps, but it was the Captain who doubled down. Very poor show, defended by the pilot union of course.
Agreed. The unions are a cancer on aviation. They have come to the defense of drunk pilots that have showed up to work. They also defended a pilot who came to work high on cocaine.
You said it exactly..... sheesh, I could have bloody well flown it better than that myself and my single solitary time in a jet cockpit was being invited in by the pilots as we came in to land at Gatwick from Rio de Janeiro in 1997, in the days when certain favoured passengers still had the opportunity to get such privileges when you knew either one or both the pilots or, as in my case, one of the cabin crew! Honestly, how that could have been so disastrously handled is unimaginable....
It STILL ALL routes back to the Captain... 1. In his interviews, he admitted to "knowing the V-speeds for the other runway, which were the SAME V-speeds as the one he was on."... 2. He STILL insisted on "protocol" that the FO input the new runway numbers as if that mattered ANYWHERE except his precious little mind... AND it's very likely that there was already documentation about changing anything about the Take-off inputs to the computer negating the rest of the data so that it had to be re-introduced. Basic Computer Science here... In a system as dedicated as a Flight Management Computer, it's FAR safer in the "big picture" to throw out the data when something EVEN as inane as runway number is changed. There ARE airports where one side is discretely shorter than the other... or uphill slightly... or any of a dozen ways the V-speeds and target thrust ABSOLUTELY MUST be recalculated. It "invents work" when you arbitrarily start playing with the numbers... and it's too easy to miss the subtlety of a slight uphill runway over a "dead flat" or downhill run... SO it's just better to make it standard practice to re-do ALL the inputs every time. That's just how computer and software engineers think... At the end of the day, the Captain KNEW before he even said anything that it didn't matter a hill of sh*t which numbers in Philadelphia were in the computer. It's not exactly "correct", but if the V-speeds aren't going to change, and you're already taxiing out on the runway, drop the BS and just FLY THE G** D*** PLANE... That's ALWAYS the #1 priority. SO it comes right down to point... The Captain completely engineered this entire clusterf*ck, himself. Sorry if that sounds harsh. He f*cked up royal, from get-go to finish. ;o)
@@caseyedward2890 Really? I don’t think it was a firering offense in the case of the first officer; she made a simple mistake. I do think, however, that the captain showed quite a lot of bad decision making, while apparently blaming it on his co-pilot (“what did you do!?”) so in his case it should either be re-training or getting fired.
Today I finally got to watch this release. I'm here in my PJs, drinking home made latte, knitting and watching air crash videos. Best Sunday ever. Thankyou for contributing to it!
The only reason that plane stop at the end of the runway was because he smashed the nose gear into the ground and was dragging g no.1 along the runway.156 knots was way too fast to have stopped safely if the plane was rolling normaly
I am not a pilot. I respect the work and responsibilities these people take on. I have no opinion on the matter, but i trust that pilots are given adequate training, and as nobody was hurt in the incident, i am grateful. I imagine that computer automation is a double edged sword.
Everyone survived, so this is a good outcome. With that said. Rejecting above V1 with no indication of catastrophic damage is a bad move, and which likely lead to the hull loss of this aircraft. Any kind of derated takeoff, in this case “flex temp” in airbus nomenclature almost always works. However! Power is also your friend, and must be able to be used when needed. In this case, TOGO thrust, with 10 degree climb would likely have lead to boring flight, and maybe a reprimand.
The Pilots are there to make these last minute calls. Hindsight makes it easier to see everything that was happening. Using hindsight it doesn’t appear to make sense why the Captain didn’t continue the takeoff as he has done hundreds of times. But then again, if there was an issue and the captain continued it would be a different story! A strange one! Thank you for this.
I'm not a pilot but it amazes me that these kind of incidents don't happen more often. On vids and cockpit recordings it seems that pre flight checklists get read through quickly and without consideration. All the settings like the one that caused the confusion in this incident are made hastily. Communication with the tower is mumbled and at a speed which is nearly incomprehensible.
It may look like barely controlle chaos to those who are outside of the aviation field, but those of us who live in this environment day in and day out understand how things flow.
Unless you have engine failure or other major issue like landing gear, captain should have continued with take off. My favorite saying is that hesitation kills. He said about working it out while airborne and that would be right choice imo.
The one thing that sticks out to me is what changed the captain's mind. He already had the v1 and rotate speeds from the previous configuration which he seemed comfortable with seconds earlier. The alert continued during the entire take off. So what changed from hos perspective to make him reject?
I think I read somewhere that the aircraft wasn't performing as usual after rotation, since the thrust levers were in a detent that relied on settings that were not properly input into the computer, it was producing less thrust than expected. the aircraft seemed sluggish or like it wasn't climbing as expected? So instead of putting it in tho toga detent which would have provided sufficient thrust he just aborted. Definitely mishandled but no one died. I'm not a pilot so I can't judge. At the time he probably thought he was doing what had to be done. Idk if this is accurate info, I could be getting my accidents mixed up. So take what I say with a grain of salt.
Maybe it just unnerved him too much for the computer to be calling him a retard over and over when he was trying to take the plane off. (I do know this isn't what this warning means but, even still, there's something unnerving about any warning blaring at you when you're trying to do something that requires a lot of concentration.)
Even if he had set to TOGA after take off the engines wouldn't spool up for at least 8 seconds. A higher speed/altitude crash would've had a far worse outcome.
@@blackhawkorg I feel like 8 seconds is from idle tho... Obviously they were making sufficient thrust to get to v rotate. But point taken tho there'd be a delay.
@@blackhawkorg Wrong. That old 8-second rule died LONG ago. AB engines are considered "spooled" at idle. If he had them in the first detent, they were already producing a whole lot of power. Simply pushing them to the next detent would have given him all of it. Stupid reject at that speed. I flew the bus for 5 yrs.
Question: whether the V speeds were set or not, the plane had accelerated to 167 knots which is 5-5 knots over the rotate speed…shouldn’t they have continued? The speed they were doing would guarantee lift according to the engineering of the plane
Your right but most pilots are dumb career pilots not true aviators. True aviators are mostly doing aerobatics, or even gliding, or are lifelong GA instructors or enthusiasts. These days new pilots are in it for the money and career. They only do what they're taught and know NOTHING else. It's all about passing tests to get certificates so they're taught how to pass tests, they're not natural born pilots nor even good pilots. They're garbage, just like these two klutz "pilots". Anything that's out of standard which they weren't taught they panic and make the situation worse. Career pilots are like machines only there to operate what they're programmed to do. When something out of the ordinary happens the machines don't have a brain to think with to make the correct choices. And female pilots don't even get me started if your name is not Martha king youre probably a trash career pilot in it for money and "oh em gee free travel omg yayy". They're not in it because theyre true aviators. Wish I could get rid of the lot of them, or devise randomized tests that I know would instantly fail the fakers and career pilots on the spot because believe me they cannot think on thr spot or fly if something goes wrong, they just crash
And that's why the recall of the takeoff briefing contains something like: "Under 80kts I reject the takeoff for any ECAM message. Above 80kts till v1 only for red ECAM messages or unsafe to fly". So you don't have to make a decsion. Just use the caned ones.
We're talking about mere seconds to make a decision. There have been countless accidents where pilots have chosen to fly an aircraft that wasn't air-worthy, simply b/c they were past V1. While I don't agree w/the crew continuing the takeoff after the 1st warning, believing the aircraft was unsafe to fly & thus rejecting the takeoff after V1, despite being incorrect, I can see the reasoning for doing so.
Of course he made the wrong decision. The engines were both making thrust and takeoff flap was set so all he had to do was pitch the aircraft to 15 degrees nose up and it would have flown.
From what the captain was saying, he didn't feel like it rotated in a normal manner. No doubt due to the already highly abnormal roll, something didn't feel right to him so he decided to put it back down. I'd rather deal with a crash at 170 knots on the ground than be 2000ft in the air with an uncontrollable aircraft. The decision making up to Vr was bad, but the decision to just keep it down was sound
Incompetent first officer. Good call by pilot, no injuries. "It didn't feel right" is sometimes the only chance you get to survive if you listen. With that first officer I don't blame the pilot one bit for fearing there was a major misconfiguration.
incompetent pilot. There was a major misconfiguration prior to starting the take off roll. But the pilot just said F it, and took off? She had one minor input error, the pilot had many more with his decisions to continue, and much more serious ones. SMH. Both pilots apparently are even trained on what Flex means, and that while the pilot remembered the V1/V2 numbers, the plane's thrust doesn't know that. How can pilots not know something so basic?
Performance takeoff problems occur regularly. If you keep your eye on the relevant safety websites, you'll see a good number of them every year (with the exception of the pandemic years). It's amazing that a major disaster hasn't happened yet, but there is still no movement yet towards active monitoring technology for takeoff performance. In the case of the Airbus A320, flight envelope protection is a major safety feature. I would argue that 'flight' begins as soon as takeoff power is set. This means that envelope protection is in fact not functioning during what are the most critical seconds within the most critical overall phase of flight. Let's face it, the aircraft is under active aerodynamic control, and may have already run out of available runway abort length even before reaching V1 (numerous pilots have stated in the context of performance takeoffs with no problems or mistakes that there was no way they could have rejected safely at V1).
As a retired 320 Capt I can't help notice the age/ experience disparity of the nice lady in the RHS. We're l flying l would be prone to keeping a close watch. That said this kind of co*ckup is sadly common. So what to do? 1st ECAM warning, close the power levers vacate and review. Should you elect to go on memorised V speeds, say due landing traffic, select full chat and go. Babbling from the RHS suggests lack of sterile cockpit discipline during the takeoff phase. The SID in the box would of course be incorrect but that is negated this time by a radar heading presumably at 1500ft or similar. As for aborting anything after say V1 ( minus 5kts for reaction time ) you'd better have a good story for the Jury. It's a NONO unless you have hit something big. We would be naieve to think Crew pairing is perfect every time. This pairing displays how sometimes neither party is really on the ball. The human factor wrecking a perfectly good aeroplane. I hope both crew enjoy their new careers gardening or similar.
Both pilots were over the age of 60. CA was 61 and the FO was 62. I plan to retire before 60. I won't and don't believe anyone should be flying commercially beyond that age. Our reactions and decision making just aren't as sharp as we age.
So basically to try to save a few dollars on fuel everything got messed up. Why risk things. When taking off just pedal to the metal then you for sure have enough speed to left off and don't have all these other self induced problems
Captain made a bad choice, should’ve continued the takeoff, he had the speed and the plane was flyable. They should’ve troubleshoot it while in the air. Setting the nose down after V1 at 156kts was dangerous. He got lucky that all he did was destroy the airplane and not kill anyone.
I think the captain made a bad decision. The airplane had all parameters to get in the air and there was no structural failures or indications of any failure. Therefore take off should have been continued and the solved problem air
The captain didn't know that. It's easy to judge from after the fact, but we weren't the ones taking off in a plane we weren't 100% confident in. They made some terrible decisions that led them to a rejected take off, but the rejection itself was the right thing
@@mattd6085 it is always easy to play Monday morning quarterback but this is where going back to the basic of stick and rudder skills come in and he did not revert back to the old days of Cessna flying. He started getting the warnings approximately 80kts. RTO would have been an appropriate decision to take all the way to V1. He was second guessing himself and all the way to V2. When you are going that fast and have hundreds of lives on board, decisions have to be more assertive and prompt. And if you can't be prompt, go back to your training. I'm sorry but I stick to my previous decision that the captain made the wrong choice
Based on the information given in the video, I have a strong suspicion that the captain realised he made a mistake and came up with the fib of the plane not being safe to fly. It sounds like a valid reason and at the same time a very general one which does not tell us anything. However, if the people investigating this incident were as curious and tenacious as myself, they would have kept probing the captain as to WHY he was convinced the plane wasn't safe to fly, and comparing the answers with the data from the wreck. If this would have been inconclusive, the captain most likely fibbed, if he came up with a valid reason which was corroborated by the technical state of the plane and possibly other relevant factors, then I would be satisfied.
It wasn't a "fib", as much as a bold faced lie in an attempt to justify a monumental F-up. You have a bus in the air with 2 good engines, the correct flap setting, and still decide to abort???? C'mon man.
A good decision for the passengers, as they all got off safely and the captain is right that a plane on the ground is far safer than a plane in the sky. A bad decision for the crew, as their deviation from procedure nearly caused a fatal outcome. On balance, it was a neutral decision
My experience is driving buses, not flying planes. If I took a bus out and discovered a problem, I have to determine whether it is safe enough for me to continue driving. One could argue that the pilot waited too long to reject the takeoff. But with all of the information disappearing from the computer screen, I think rejecting the takeoff was the right call. We don't know what other information that the pilot needed from that screen that was wiped out. Takeoff isn't the time to try and refeed info into the computer. The surprise to me is that the F/O didn't catch the fact that she loaded Runway 27R in the system when the Tower directed them to 27L. Had she spoken up immediately she would have had time to properly reload the information. Since Philadelphia is their base, maybe the captain should have left the configuration alone since they should have known that the two runways are equal lengths. But having the F/O make that correction just before takeoff roll certainly didn't give her any time to attempt to put anything else in the computer. Or maybe had he had her redo it while he waited, this could have been avoided. It's easy to say that now, but in the moment not so much.
I think this is a good example of overreliance on computer systems. I'm quite sure that the captain knew the airport and realised that there's no difference in taking off from L and R, and I believe that he more or less remembered the V1 (especially if it was quite odd, otherwise he knew the average value). Aborting takeoff past V1 is by definition not a good idea and this case confirms it perfectly.
If the pilot thought the plane was not safe to take off then he did the right thing. People are worth more then an aircraft. I would fly with that Capt. anytime
it probably didn't occured to the captain the full seriousness of lacking v1, rotation speed etc. he was probably startled and didn't make the right decision to reject take-off right there and then. with hindsight it's easy to see, but at the time, i think a person who was expecting v1 and rotation speed to be there just as thousands of time he took off before, he must have been caught off guard. maybe he needs a good 5 seconds to take that in, in which that's the time the plane went 'too fast' to stop.
On the responsibility of the pilot from the civil aeronautic perspective I cannot comment because I am not a pilot. But what did puzzle me is how an experienced pilot can land his plane with its nose instead of the main landing gears first.
he had already rotated with his nose off for 4 seconds going into 156 kts. with the amount of runway left I highly doubt he was going to be able to set the nose wheel back down and reverse thrust before he ran out of runway.
Both pilots are supposed to check each other's inputs. So he failed just as much. Then he crashed a perfectly good airplane. You're comment is quite ignorant.
Fundamental requirement to delay take off if a significant anomaly is noticed ie wrong runway inputted. The implication is that there may be other anomalies not yet noticed which could endanger the flight, as it was in this case.
Never too late to make the right call. Taking off without speed is super dangerous. The captain must have wrestled with his continuation bias but managed to overcome it in time.
I am not a pilot but by just looking at the high speed 170 kn+ and the fact that the flaps are correctly configurd for takeoff, I can't just let the aircraft absorb all that high speed energy by braking and ultimately breaking my neck too...I just go manual mode, full trust or TOGA and gently rotate, then figure out the rest up in the air
Lack of coordination and re brief after rwy change on the FMC. Take off should have been cancelled and start allover again after rwy change on the computer.
mcdu tells you to check speed once you change runway, us sim pilots even know that. i can't relate how 2 veteran pilots forgot this, don't drink and drive, them buses are build like tanks
In simpler times, with a paper checklist and a serviceable flying aircraft, the pilot would simply have given it full wellie and flown the beast. Too many computers and too many alerts converted a flyable aircraft into a pile of scrap.
First of all, by any chance are you the Andrew Emery of The Regulatory Group, Inc in Washington DC? Secondly, I agree with your comment. Rather than reject at that late stage he should have pushed the levers forward and flown. But if he wasn't inclined to that sort of action I also believe he should have rejected when they got the thrust warnings and blank V speeds at the initiation of takeoff roll. First mistake was not aborting right away. Second and worse mistake was putting it back down after liftoff. We have seen how too much automation leads to pilots not always fully understanding what the machine is up to. If this happens often enough with uneventful consequences pilots can become habituated into assuming this one is another glitch they will eventually sort out. This one was something this crew had never encountered, and I bet habituation led them into trying to determine if it was just another nuisance warning before taking definitive action. But this was time they didn’t have to spend, and that indecision almost lead to disaster. (Some guys will do anything to keep from going back into the taxi queue at PHL)
Agreed. Why not just give it all it's got and get the doggone thing in the air. Scrimping on thrust just to save a few dollars seems very shortsighted when this is a possible outcome of not putting the hammer down. Why run the risk?
I would have dumped the power on it and taken off once I got too fast to safely reject. He should have rejected when the first issue occurred but, since he didn't, the next best option is to use the power you have right at your fingertips power those engines way up. Of course, I usually default to going faster to get out of trouble in the car too so maybe that makes me more likely to decide to put the TOGA on and fly it. At least no one got hurt.
You are so right, too many f-----g geek boxes ,pilots are pilots not geeks with glasses and zits, they are paid to fly the damn plane. Taxi onto the active runway set brakes, slowly ramp the bollocks out of the engines, until both are screaming fit to burst, then release brakes, feel that kick in the small of your back ,yes cat&kittens you are going to lift off.
The correct decision was to taxi off the runway and get the flight management computers programed for the correct runway with the V speeds into system. There was no reason to continue until everything is properly set. Anything other than that is poor decision making. The FO did the Captain no favors by first incorrectly programing the wrong runway into the system and secondly by not pressing the captain to taxi off the runway and correct the error. This is an important tenant of Crew Resource Management.
The captain should have rejected the take off already when they got the ECAM-message. At that point the plane had almost zero speed and a reject would not even have caused high brake temp, thus completely uncontroversial. At
Sounds a bit like Familiarity (assumptions) was the downfall here. A rare accident case where the instruments were correct and the crew got it very wrong. He was getting a spurious RETARD alarm from approx 80 knots. He seems to have thought he knew better. Spurious alarm = WTF... Abort, Stop! Hindsight is a wonderful thing but it only deals with history.
Looks like a huge brain fart by the captain….. The Fo, eeeh, whatever, it’s normal for everyone to fuck something up once in awhile…however PIC is still responsible for everything his FO does or does not do…
Clearly there was a configuration disagreement which calls for an RTO, also from a CRM/safety perspective both pilots did not share the same mental model which also is indicative for an RTO. The automation annunciation of “Retard” is not berating the F/O for her error but advising an RTO be conducted. There were poor decisions made on the PIC's part, it is likely he knew he ought to be conducting an RTO but the window of opportunity closed before he could rationalise it for what ever reason. His better judgement and instincts took over compelling him to finally reject the takeoff despite being well past the decision speed. While erroneous in his previous judgement I agree with his decision. Without more time and information in conjunction with Airbus’s peculiar automation flight laws, he had no confidence the aircraft could remain safely airborne. I sincerely wish the crew of the fated Air France Concorde made the same decision to conduct a post V1 RTO, it was increasingly apparent to them the aircraft was exceptionally unstable, even if it resulted in the airframe being written off, likely all occupants would have evacuated and survived with an extraordinary tale to tell at future dinner parties. There is always much wisdom in hindsight with the luxury of a non threat environment and absence of a time-critical evaluation window rapidly closing.
Being an armchair pilot, these are my thoughts: The plane was flyable as we now know, but in the heat of the moment, the captain believed it was not. So I understand his decision to reject the takeoff, even past V1. Not flyable meant (in his mind) that it surely would have crashed once it was airborn, rejecting past V1 meant it probably would have crashed into something and burst into flames at the end of the runway. And it didn't. But as soon as they noticed there were no V speeds indicated, he should have aborted the takeoff, not several seconds and knots later. 'What did you do?' is not the right question in this situation, 'I'm sorry' isn't the right answer either. Like she's apologizing for spilling some coffee. The trust reversers are not mentioned in the video. Were they deployed? Do pilots have the airport layout in mind, regarding what's past the end of a runway? I mean buildings, hangars, storage tank, fences, trees, ditches, sea etc. Maybe this also influenced his decision to abort or not. I know it doesn't matter what's behind the runway, you shouldn't be rolling there but when you got yourself in that situation and you see either buildings or an open space, I believe it can make a difference, if not cognitive then instinctively anyway. The flex temp I believe is also used for noise abatement if an airport is close to densely populated areas.
When they got the ECAM message that the thrust levers were not set even though they were, the pilot flying should have aborted takeoff immediately. It could have been easily deduced that something wasn't configured correctly in the FMC given the last minute change from 26R to 26L and the error occurring when the thrust levers were places in the Flex detent. That was his cue to abort takeoff. Everything else that happened after that was just going further down the holes in the Swiss cheese. Those people are lucky to be alive given the decision to abort the takeoff AFTER taking off. Also, the FO really screwed the pooch for not entering in all the correct data for the new runway, and the captain screwed up for not doubling checking the FMC after the last minute update. Really, this is a failure of CRM all around.
58s “on board the aircraft there were 2 pilots 3 flight attendants and 149 passengers on board.” I know I’m splitting hairs, just in case you hadn’t noticed.
Attitude is more important than the tons of flying experience. It is useless to suggest options which were available to the experienced cockpit crew at that moment in time, if you cannot exercise a simple decision of fire walling your thrust levers. It was a same situation like a “Pull-up” or “Wind-share” audio warning by your EGPWS and you are trained that without wasting a single second to go Max Power pitching up to a safe attitude to get out safely from adverse situation. Even though there was a audio message to retard.
He should have rejected the takeoff when he got the thrust not set ECAM message and saw that there was no V1 speed on the PFD. Once he committed to the takeoff by starting the rotation he should not have changed his mind and pushed the nose back down. After lift off there would not have been a V2 speed to pitch for but after a few seconds the VLS and other airspeeds would have appeared anyways and would have given the pilots a good estimate for maneuver margin even without V2. Beyond the acceleration height the flight would have been completely normal again and they could have continued to their destination, file a report perhaps and go on with their duty. But I'm not an airline pilot and they may not have had the big picture view like we have after the fact.
Wow, did they go from 86 knots to 143 knots just in the amount of time it took the captain to say "What did you do?" etc etc. I live in Philly and remember this flight seemed to kick off an odd string of incidents at the airport over the course of just a few years. After this there was the crash of the business jet carrying the former owner of the Philadelphia Inquirer newspaper, then a Southwest flight had a rejected take-off and emergency evacuation IIRC, then the other Southwest flight that had the uncontained engine failure and loss of cabin pressure that diverted here.
"Wow, did they go from 86 knots to 143 knots just in the amount of time it took the captain to say "What did you do?" That was my first thought, too. Say "abort" at any time before reaching V1 - as soon as you see smth odd, plus you anyway know your V1, V2 & VR.... Very weird incident
Captain did right by cancelling take off. there was too much happening/wrong to be ignored. the pilot & co pilot made errors. ( Wrong run way, attempting take off while alarms sounding, not certain of proper rotate speed).
Always nice to pretty much crash with the aircraft calling you a retard the whole time 🤣 I know retard is just a normal word but still gives me chuckles I'm a simple guy.
Wrong decision. Technically wasn't unsafe to fly and capt didn't give any valid reasons to abort. Any reason to abort was present before capt decided to plow ahead anyway.
I am not a pilot, but, i think the pilot followed his instincts and made a decision based on his experience and gut feeling to save his passengers, which he did. However, he got lucky with front wheels braking and Nose down slowing the plane to a halt prematurely!!!!
The captain should have rejected the takeoff as soon as he noticed the problem. He did not have enough thinking time to diagnose it, so should have played safe.
Really unfortunate way to end a long career. But yeah, taxi off the runway and set up and brief the new data for the new runway, may take 5 mins, but so what
I love this alarm. It is the only alarm that sounds like it is calling the pilots a retard. I knowcwhat it is saying and what it is for, but it is still funny.
The captain’s decision to abort after rotation is pure stupidity. He should be fired for endangering everyone onboard, had he simply applied TOGA power, this would not happen. If I was in his position, I probably would’ve aborted takeoff as a result of the continuous “Retard” warnings
Im a flt simmer i think the capt made the right decision although a bit late. The a320 is a flying computer and u never know what that dumb beast can do when airborne given the warning messages, I would have aborted the flight. Yes destroy the machine nose gear etc and save many lives.
The Captain is in this cast the ultimate decision maker, regardless of any other agency or authority. Why - because the person who ist the on board leader and ultimate official is the Captain. Who has all the lives onboard on his shoulders. He make a judgement call based on vast knowledge and experiences. It is the right decision at the time for the circumstances in his/her judgement. Any thing else is only opinion.
Everything is always crystal clear with the benefit of hindsight. We know what happened and fortunately, there were no injuries. Had the captain taken off, subsequently crashed, and killed several people, the subsequent investigation would most likely have cited "pilot error" as the reason for the crash. It is the captain's job to make these decisions and I believe he made the correct call. But this is simply my take on the incident. He made the decision to abort, everyone walked away from it. It was a good outcome.
If they had taken the time to reprogram the data into the flght computer though, they may have delayed takeoff by several minutes and who knows, maybe this incident would not be under discussion, having been a normal take-off.
Evacuations are conducted unnecessarily and seemingly often in some regions of the world, particularly North America. There are a number of risks often resulting in injuries when conducting an evacuation, dramatically more so with wide bodied aircraft that sit a great deal higher off the ground and their specific slide design. In thie event featured an evacuation with its inherent risks is completely unwarranted, there was no fire or other risk to life. The occupants were far safer inside the aircraft, especially with the exceptionally steep incline of the slides at the rear doors due to its nose-low tail-high attitude. Stairs could have been brought to the aircraft or a single slide could have been deployed at the nose-low forward left door(1L or L1), the same door they would have likely boarded through, once appropriate transport arrived. The occupants could have safely walked across the shallow incline of the slide, and not being an evacuation they could have taken all of their belongings with them onto the waiting buses. An evacuation is only necessary when the risk to life is greater inside the cabin than out, when the benefits clearly outweigh the risks which is mostly due to fire, or in the event of a ditching the risk of the aircraft submerging and drowning the cabin occupants. If there is no fire or the aircraft is not in pieces it is far safer for all to remain seated and wait for transport and if possible, stairs - wide bodies especially. If the situation changes and a genuine threat exists, then yes, EVACUATE!
By not conducting an evacuation when it is not necessary it has the benefit not only of preventing unnecessary injuries to occupants but also mitigates the likely damage that occurs to the fuselage when opening 'Armed' doors and deploying slides, along with the outrageous expenses surrounding subsequent repairs and the replacement or repackaging of slides (when appropriate). None of the issues surrounding cost mattered in this case as the airframe was written off, but the unnecessary risk to individual's safety must still be factored. The expenses or potential fuselage damage must not and is never a consideration ever worth making whether to Evacuate, or conduct a less risky but still moderately urgent 'Precautionary Disembarkation' (a non-normal disembarking of occupants using either stairs, an aerobridge if still available or a slide using the slower safer 'sit and slide' vs the rapid 'jump and slide' technique). When neither are indicated but the aircraft is unable to reach the terminal for what ever the reason may be, then as described in the former comment, stairs and appropriate transport will brought to the aircraft. In that instance only may passengers and crew ever retrieve and take their belongings with them.
Wasn’t there either. Neither am I a pilot nor do I know all the facts or have the scope to evaluate. Captain’s judgment call based on his experience. Im just some guy with a keyboard watching a video.
Complacent, careless, and in a hurry, this is the result of that fiasco. The crew should have exited the runway, stopped the aircraft on the taxiway, and reloaded the FMSs with the correct departing runway, correct departure procedure, and a new takeoff and departure briefing.
100% correct!
Yup - too used to routine takeoffs so when one unusual thing came up they didn't stop to take stock of the change.
Too much automation in this case. If the flight computer could've automatically re-calculated and displayed the V speeds they would've been OK but apparently it didn't do that. I know these airplanes are too complex for the old whiz wheels, but it seems that may have helped slow them down to re-evaluate their situation.
I wonder what happened to the career of these pilots?
@@chipsawdust5816Agreed! Now, what happened to these two pilots, career wise? They are probably with American or retired.
I've never flown anything heavier than a Cessna 402 on third level airline ops, but when the captain moved the thrust levers back, then forward again to the flex detent, I asked myself "why didn't he just push them all the way forward?" It would have kept flying even if the computer didn't necessarily have the correct input!
I'm retired AB Capt and had flown that plane before. I was told the nose gear stur came through the cockpit floor board upon impact. Very odd in my opinion to abandon the take off after you are airborne.
I was an eye witness to this. Watching it from a US Airways B767 on my way to Amsterdam. Got a 30 minute departure delay out of it.
A 30 minute departure isn’t too bad considering! Amazing.
Crew should have rejected takeoff, but much earlier. It was poor judgment to continue a takeoff roll when it was clear before V1 that something was wrong w the v-speed programming.
Easy: Captain ballsed up in spades. This take-off should have been rejected as soon as they realised they did not have the V speeds available. Having made the wrong decision to continue the Captain then made the second wrong decision by rejecting after he was actually flying. He then got himself into a PIO with some inept control inputs. The FO obviously initiated the whole sequence with her FMS mis-steps, but it was the Captain who doubled down. Very poor show, defended by the pilot union of course.
Agreed. The unions are a cancer on aviation. They have come to the defense of drunk pilots that have showed up to work. They also defended a pilot who came to work high on cocaine.
You said it exactly..... sheesh, I could have bloody well flown it better than that myself and my single solitary time in a jet cockpit was being invited in by the pilots as we came in to land at Gatwick from Rio de Janeiro in 1997, in the days when certain favoured passengers still had the opportunity to get such privileges when you knew either one or both the pilots or, as in my case, one of the cabin crew!
Honestly, how that could have been so disastrously handled is unimaginable....
It STILL ALL routes back to the Captain...
1. In his interviews, he admitted to "knowing the V-speeds for the other runway, which were the SAME V-speeds as the one he was on."...
2. He STILL insisted on "protocol" that the FO input the new runway numbers as if that mattered ANYWHERE except his precious little mind... AND it's very likely that there was already documentation about changing anything about the Take-off inputs to the computer negating the rest of the data so that it had to be re-introduced.
Basic Computer Science here... In a system as dedicated as a Flight Management Computer, it's FAR safer in the "big picture" to throw out the data when something EVEN as inane as runway number is changed. There ARE airports where one side is discretely shorter than the other... or uphill slightly... or any of a dozen ways the V-speeds and target thrust ABSOLUTELY MUST be recalculated. It "invents work" when you arbitrarily start playing with the numbers... and it's too easy to miss the subtlety of a slight uphill runway over a "dead flat" or downhill run... SO it's just better to make it standard practice to re-do ALL the inputs every time. That's just how computer and software engineers think...
At the end of the day, the Captain KNEW before he even said anything that it didn't matter a hill of sh*t which numbers in Philadelphia were in the computer. It's not exactly "correct", but if the V-speeds aren't going to change, and you're already taxiing out on the runway, drop the BS and just FLY THE G** D*** PLANE... That's ALWAYS the #1 priority.
SO it comes right down to point... The Captain completely engineered this entire clusterf*ck, himself. Sorry if that sounds harsh. He f*cked up royal, from get-go to finish. ;o)
Him
And her were fired.
@@caseyedward2890 Really? I don’t think it was a firering offense in the case of the first officer; she made a simple mistake. I do think, however, that the captain showed quite a lot of bad decision making, while apparently blaming it on his co-pilot (“what did you do!?”) so in his case it should either be re-training or getting fired.
Today I finally got to watch this release. I'm here in my PJs, drinking home made latte, knitting and watching air crash videos. Best Sunday ever. Thankyou for contributing to it!
Awesome, they are the best days!
The only reason that plane stop at the end of the runway was because he smashed the nose gear into the ground and was dragging g no.1 along the runway.156 knots was way too fast to have stopped safely if the plane was rolling normaly
I am not a pilot. I respect the work and responsibilities these people take on. I have no opinion on the matter, but i trust that pilots are given adequate training, and as nobody was hurt in the incident, i am grateful. I imagine that computer automation is a double edged sword.
Everyone survived, so this is a good outcome.
With that said. Rejecting above V1 with no indication of catastrophic damage is a bad move, and which likely lead to the hull loss of this aircraft.
Any kind of derated takeoff, in this case “flex temp” in airbus nomenclature almost always works. However! Power is also your friend, and must be able to be used when needed.
In this case, TOGO thrust, with 10 degree climb would likely have lead to boring flight, and maybe a reprimand.
The Pilots are there to make these last minute calls. Hindsight makes it easier to see everything that was happening. Using hindsight it doesn’t appear to make sense why the Captain didn’t continue the takeoff as he has done hundreds of times. But then again, if there was an issue and the captain continued it would be a different story! A strange one! Thank you for this.
Agreed, it is a strange one. It’s hard to make a critical call on the Pilots decision at the time. I’m just glad no one was hurt or killed.
Hindsight is great, if only someone thought of it sooner
As a newly rated a320 pilot I have so much I want to add!
I'm not a pilot but it amazes me that these kind of incidents don't happen more often. On vids and cockpit recordings it seems that pre flight checklists get read through quickly and without consideration. All the settings like the one that caused the confusion in this incident are made hastily. Communication with the tower is mumbled and at a speed which is nearly incomprehensible.
It may look like barely controlle chaos to those who are outside of the aviation field, but those of us who live in this environment day in and day out understand how things flow.
Great video. Having now watched your back catalogue, I look forward to your future releases!
Thank you!
Unless you have engine failure or other major issue like landing gear, captain should have continued with take off. My favorite saying is that hesitation kills. He said about working it out while airborne and that would be right choice imo.
Even engine failure at those speeds is not reason for rejected take-off, unless all engines fail.
The one thing that sticks out to me is what changed the captain's mind. He already had the v1 and rotate speeds from the previous configuration which he seemed comfortable with seconds earlier. The alert continued during the entire take off. So what changed from hos perspective to make him reject?
I think I read somewhere that the aircraft wasn't performing as usual after rotation, since the thrust levers were in a detent that relied on settings that were not properly input into the computer, it was producing less thrust than expected. the aircraft seemed sluggish or like it wasn't climbing as expected? So instead of putting it in tho toga detent which would have provided sufficient thrust he just aborted. Definitely mishandled but no one died. I'm not a pilot so I can't judge. At the time he probably thought he was doing what had to be done.
Idk if this is accurate info, I could be getting my accidents mixed up. So take what I say with a grain of salt.
Maybe it just unnerved him too much for the computer to be calling him a retard over and over when he was trying to take the plane off. (I do know this isn't what this warning means but, even still, there's something unnerving about any warning blaring at you when you're trying to do something that requires a lot of concentration.)
Even if he had set to TOGA after take off the engines wouldn't spool up for at least 8 seconds. A higher speed/altitude crash would've had a far worse outcome.
@@blackhawkorg I feel like 8 seconds is from idle tho... Obviously they were making sufficient thrust to get to v rotate. But point taken tho there'd be a delay.
@@blackhawkorg Wrong. That old 8-second rule died LONG ago. AB engines are considered "spooled" at idle. If he had them in the first detent, they were already producing a whole lot of power. Simply pushing them to the next detent would have given him all of it. Stupid reject at that speed. I flew the bus for 5 yrs.
Question: whether the V speeds were set or not, the plane had accelerated to 167 knots which is 5-5 knots over the rotate speed…shouldn’t they have continued? The speed they were doing would guarantee lift according to the engineering of the plane
Your right but most pilots are dumb career pilots not true aviators. True aviators are mostly doing aerobatics, or even gliding, or are lifelong GA instructors or enthusiasts. These days new pilots are in it for the money and career. They only do what they're taught and know NOTHING else. It's all about passing tests to get certificates so they're taught how to pass tests, they're not natural born pilots nor even good pilots. They're garbage, just like these two klutz "pilots". Anything that's out of standard which they weren't taught they panic and make the situation worse. Career pilots are like machines only there to operate what they're programmed to do. When something out of the ordinary happens the machines don't have a brain to think with to make the correct choices. And female pilots don't even get me started if your name is not Martha king youre probably a trash career pilot in it for money and "oh em gee free travel omg yayy". They're not in it because theyre true aviators. Wish I could get rid of the lot of them, or devise randomized tests that I know would instantly fail the fakers and career pilots on the spot because believe me they cannot think on thr spot or fly if something goes wrong, they just crash
And that's why the recall of the takeoff briefing contains something like: "Under 80kts I reject the takeoff for any ECAM message. Above 80kts till v1 only for red ECAM messages or unsafe to fly". So you don't have to make a decsion. Just use the caned ones.
We're talking about mere seconds to make a decision. There have been countless accidents where pilots have chosen to fly an aircraft that wasn't air-worthy, simply b/c they were past V1. While I don't agree w/the crew continuing the takeoff after the 1st warning, believing the aircraft was unsafe to fly & thus rejecting the takeoff after V1, despite being incorrect, I can see the reasoning for doing so.
Well, the NTSB doesn't agree with you.
@@CLR2TKF thx for the reply 👍 😉
Of course he made the wrong decision. The engines were both making thrust and takeoff flap was set so all he had to do was pitch the aircraft to 15 degrees nose up and it would have flown.
In the moment, I would've considered "what else isn't set correctly? Is there a systemic problem we haven't noticed yet?".
Yeah I suspect that there just seemed to be too many errors and that's why the pilot decided to reject.
So lucky they didn’t catch ablaze with all that fuel!!
When the aircraft lifted off in a normal manner, it would seem that at that time V1, V2 and rotate became a moot point. It was flying.
From what the captain was saying, he didn't feel like it rotated in a normal manner. No doubt due to the already highly abnormal roll, something didn't feel right to him so he decided to put it back down. I'd rather deal with a crash at 170 knots on the ground than be 2000ft in the air with an uncontrollable aircraft. The decision making up to Vr was bad, but the decision to just keep it down was sound
This was really good just found your channel. Thanks.
Incompetent first officer. Good call by pilot, no injuries. "It didn't feel right" is sometimes the only chance you get to survive if you listen.
With that first officer I don't blame the pilot one bit for fearing there was a major misconfiguration.
incompetent pilot. There was a major misconfiguration prior to starting the take off roll. But the pilot just said F it, and took off? She had one minor input error, the pilot had many more with his decisions to continue, and much more serious ones. SMH. Both pilots apparently are even trained on what Flex means, and that while the pilot remembered the V1/V2 numbers, the plane's thrust doesn't know that. How can pilots not know something so basic?
Performance takeoff problems occur regularly. If you keep your eye on the relevant safety websites, you'll see a good number of them every year (with the exception of the pandemic years). It's amazing that a major disaster hasn't happened yet, but there is still no movement yet towards active monitoring technology for takeoff performance. In the case of the Airbus A320, flight envelope protection is a major safety feature. I would argue that 'flight' begins as soon as takeoff power is set. This means that envelope protection is in fact not functioning during what are the most critical seconds within the most critical overall phase of flight. Let's face it, the aircraft is under active aerodynamic control, and may have already run out of available runway abort length even before reaching V1 (numerous pilots have stated in the context of performance takeoffs with no problems or mistakes that there was no way they could have rejected safely at V1).
As a retired 320 Capt I can't help notice the age/ experience disparity of the nice lady in the RHS. We're l flying l would be prone to keeping a close watch. That said this kind of co*ckup is sadly common. So what to do?
1st ECAM warning, close the power levers vacate and review.
Should you elect to go on memorised V speeds, say due landing traffic, select full chat and go. Babbling from the RHS suggests lack of sterile cockpit discipline during the takeoff phase. The SID in the box would of course be incorrect but that is negated this time by a radar heading presumably at 1500ft or similar.
As for aborting anything after say V1 ( minus 5kts for reaction time ) you'd better have a good story for the Jury. It's a NONO unless you have hit something big.
We would be naieve to think Crew pairing is perfect every time. This pairing displays how sometimes neither party is really on the ball.
The human factor wrecking a perfectly good aeroplane.
I hope both crew enjoy their new careers gardening or similar.
Both pilots were over the age of 60. CA was 61 and the FO was 62. I plan to retire before 60. I won't and don't believe anyone should be flying commercially beyond that age. Our reactions and decision making just aren't as sharp as we age.
Really great video, thank you.
Thank you 😊
Now, and FOREVER in the future, remember when human lives ARE NOT LOST, then the correct decision choice was made! Period.
So basically to try to save a few dollars on fuel everything got messed up. Why risk things. When taking off just pedal to the metal then you for sure have enough speed to left off and don't have all these other self induced problems
Captain made a bad choice, should’ve continued the takeoff, he had the speed and the plane was flyable. They should’ve troubleshoot it while in the air. Setting the nose down after V1 at 156kts was dangerous. He got lucky that all he did was destroy the airplane and not kill anyone.
Airplanes are made for flying, not for stopping. Anywhere close to V1 is a go for me.
I think the captain made a bad decision. The airplane had all parameters to get in the air and there was no structural failures or indications of any failure. Therefore take off should have been continued and the solved problem air
The captain didn't know that. It's easy to judge from after the fact, but we weren't the ones taking off in a plane we weren't 100% confident in. They made some terrible decisions that led them to a rejected take off, but the rejection itself was the right thing
@@mattd6085 it is always easy to play Monday morning quarterback but this is where going back to the basic of stick and rudder skills come in and he did not revert back to the old days of Cessna flying. He started getting the warnings approximately 80kts. RTO would have been an appropriate decision to take all the way to V1. He was second guessing himself and all the way to V2. When you are going that fast and have hundreds of lives on board, decisions have to be more assertive and prompt. And if you can't be prompt, go back to your training. I'm sorry but I stick to my previous decision that the captain made the wrong choice
Based on the information given in the video, I have a strong suspicion that the captain realised he made a mistake and came up with the fib of the plane not being safe to fly. It sounds like a valid reason and at the same time a very general one which does not tell us anything.
However, if the people investigating this incident were as curious and tenacious as myself, they would have kept probing the captain as to WHY he was convinced the plane wasn't safe to fly, and comparing the answers with the data from the wreck.
If this would have been inconclusive, the captain most likely fibbed, if he came up with a valid reason which was corroborated by the technical state of the plane and possibly other relevant factors, then I would be satisfied.
It wasn't a "fib", as much as a bold faced lie in an attempt to justify a monumental F-up. You have a bus in the air with 2 good engines, the correct flap setting, and still decide to abort???? C'mon man.
@@bayouflier6641 Exactly!
Whether it was the captain’s or the first officer’s fault, the ultimate cause of this event was greedy airlines and stupid computer systems
No V-speeds displayed-no go.
Some planes don’t take rejection very well. They just go to pieces. 😶
A good decision for the passengers, as they all got off safely and the captain is right that a plane on the ground is far safer than a plane in the sky.
A bad decision for the crew, as their deviation from procedure nearly caused a fatal outcome.
On balance, it was a neutral decision
My experience is driving buses, not flying planes. If I took a bus out and discovered a problem, I have to determine whether it is safe enough for me to continue driving.
One could argue that the pilot waited too long to reject the takeoff. But with all of the information disappearing from the computer screen, I think rejecting the takeoff was the right call. We don't know what other information that the pilot needed from that screen that was wiped out. Takeoff isn't the time to try and refeed info into the computer. The surprise to me is that the F/O didn't catch the fact that she loaded Runway 27R in the system when the Tower directed them to 27L. Had she spoken up immediately she would have had time to properly reload the information. Since Philadelphia is their base, maybe the captain should have left the configuration alone since they should have known that the two runways are equal lengths. But having the F/O make that correction just before takeoff roll certainly didn't give her any time to attempt to put anything else in the computer. Or maybe had he had her redo it while he waited, this could have been avoided.
It's easy to say that now, but in the moment not so much.
I think this is a good example of overreliance on computer systems. I'm quite sure that the captain knew the airport and realised that there's no difference in taking off from L and R, and I believe that he more or less remembered the V1 (especially if it was quite odd, otherwise he knew the average value). Aborting takeoff past V1 is by definition not a good idea and this case confirms it perfectly.
If the pilot thought the plane was not safe to take off then he did the right thing. People are worth more then an aircraft. I would fly with that Capt. anytime
it probably didn't occured to the captain the full seriousness of lacking v1, rotation speed etc.
he was probably startled and didn't make the right decision to reject take-off right there and then.
with hindsight it's easy to see, but at the time, i think a person who was expecting v1 and rotation speed to be there just as thousands of time he took off before, he must have been caught off guard. maybe he needs a good 5 seconds to take that in, in which that's the time the plane went 'too fast' to stop.
On the responsibility of the pilot from the civil aeronautic perspective I cannot comment because I am not a pilot. But what did puzzle me is how an experienced pilot can land his plane with its nose instead of the main landing gears first.
he had already rotated with his nose off for 4 seconds going into 156 kts. with the amount of runway left I highly doubt he was going to be able to set the nose wheel back down and reverse thrust before he ran out of runway.
He didn’t trust anything the First Officer had done. That’s why he rejected take off.
Both pilots are supposed to check each other's inputs. So he failed just as much. Then he crashed a perfectly good airplane. You're comment is quite ignorant.
How did the first officer arrive at the decision to input runway 24right , did controllers tell first officer runway right then change to left ?
Female pilot. Say no more.
Alarm bells all 'round
Fundamental requirement to delay take off if a significant anomaly is noticed ie wrong runway inputted. The implication is that there may be other anomalies not yet noticed which could endanger the flight, as it was in this case.
This is a difficult one for a non-pilot to comment on especially in hindsight.
Good video though, cheers.
Perhaps he realised he was flying with a moron and thought better of it.
😂
Never too late to make the right call. Taking off without speed is super dangerous. The captain must have wrestled with his continuation bias but managed to overcome it in time.
If I don’t have my V speeds showing in MSFS I freak out! Can’t imagine how it wouldn’t immediately make you reject takeoff in real life…
I am not a pilot but by just looking at the high speed 170 kn+ and the fact that the flaps are correctly configurd for takeoff, I can't just let the aircraft absorb all that high speed energy by braking and ultimately breaking my neck too...I just go manual mode, full trust or TOGA and gently rotate, then figure out the rest up in the air
Lack of coordination and re brief after rwy change on the FMC. Take off should have been cancelled and start allover again after rwy change on the computer.
mcdu tells you to check speed once you change runway, us sim pilots even know that. i can't relate how 2 veteran pilots forgot this, don't drink and drive, them buses are build like tanks
In simpler times, with a paper checklist and a serviceable flying aircraft, the pilot would simply have given it full wellie and flown the beast. Too many computers and too many alerts converted a flyable aircraft into a pile of scrap.
First of all, by any chance are you the Andrew Emery of The Regulatory Group, Inc in Washington DC?
Secondly, I agree with your comment. Rather than reject at that late stage he should have pushed the levers forward and flown. But if he wasn't inclined to that sort of action I also believe he should have rejected when they got the thrust warnings and blank V speeds at the initiation of takeoff roll. First mistake was not aborting right away. Second and worse mistake was putting it back down after liftoff.
We have seen how too much automation leads to pilots not always fully understanding what the machine is up to. If this happens often enough with uneventful consequences pilots can become habituated into assuming this one is another glitch they will eventually sort out. This one was something this crew had never encountered, and I bet habituation led them into trying to determine if it was just another nuisance warning before taking definitive action. But this was time they didn’t have to spend, and that indecision almost lead to disaster. (Some guys will do anything to keep from going back into the taxi queue at PHL)
Agreed. Why not just give it all it's got and get the doggone thing in the air. Scrimping on thrust just to save a few dollars seems very shortsighted when this is a possible outcome of not putting the hammer down. Why run the risk?
I would have dumped the power on it and taken off once I got too fast to safely reject. He should have rejected when the first issue occurred but, since he didn't, the next best option is to use the power you have right at your fingertips power those engines way up. Of course, I usually default to going faster to get out of trouble in the car too so maybe that makes me more likely to decide to put the TOGA on and fly it. At least no one got hurt.
You are so right, too many f-----g geek boxes ,pilots are pilots not geeks with glasses and zits, they are paid to fly the damn plane. Taxi onto the active runway set brakes, slowly ramp the bollocks out of the engines, until both are screaming fit to burst, then release brakes, feel that kick in the small of your back ,yes cat&kittens you are going to lift off.
The standard procedure was changed - to press TO/GA and fly visually?
Press toga?
The correct decision was to taxi off the runway and get the flight management computers programed for the correct runway with the V speeds into system. There was no reason to continue until everything is properly set. Anything other than that is poor decision making. The FO did the Captain no favors by first incorrectly programing the wrong runway into the system and secondly by not pressing the captain to taxi off the runway and correct the error. This is an important tenant of Crew Resource Management.
The captain should have rejected the take off already when they got the ECAM-message. At that point the plane had almost zero speed and a reject would not even have caused high brake temp, thus completely uncontroversial. At
Sounds a bit like Familiarity (assumptions) was the downfall here. A rare accident case where the instruments were correct and the crew got it very wrong. He was getting a spurious RETARD alarm from approx 80 knots. He seems to have thought he knew better. Spurious alarm = WTF... Abort, Stop!
Hindsight is a wonderful thing but it only deals with history.
Looks like a huge brain fart by the captain….. The Fo, eeeh, whatever, it’s normal for everyone to fuck something up once in awhile…however PIC is still responsible for everything his FO does or does not do…
Clearly there was a configuration disagreement which calls for an RTO, also from a CRM/safety perspective both pilots did not share the same mental model which also is indicative for an RTO.
The automation annunciation of “Retard” is not berating the F/O for her error but advising an RTO be conducted.
There were poor decisions made on the PIC's part, it is likely he knew he ought to be conducting an RTO but the window of opportunity closed before he could rationalise it for what ever reason. His better judgement and instincts took over compelling him to finally reject the takeoff despite being well past the decision speed.
While erroneous in his previous judgement I agree with his decision.
Without more time and information in conjunction with Airbus’s peculiar automation flight laws, he had no confidence the aircraft could remain safely airborne.
I sincerely wish the crew of the fated Air France Concorde made the same decision to conduct a post V1 RTO, it was increasingly apparent to them the aircraft was exceptionally unstable, even if it resulted in the airframe being written off, likely all occupants would have evacuated and survived with an extraordinary tale to tell at future dinner parties.
There is always much wisdom in hindsight with the luxury of a non threat environment and absence of a time-critical evaluation window rapidly closing.
Being an armchair pilot, these are my thoughts: The plane was flyable as we now know, but in the heat of the moment, the captain believed it was not. So I understand his decision to reject the takeoff, even past V1. Not flyable meant (in his mind) that it surely would have crashed once it was airborn, rejecting past V1 meant it probably would have crashed into something and burst into flames at the end of the runway. And it didn't. But as soon as they noticed there were no V speeds indicated, he should have aborted the takeoff, not several seconds and knots later. 'What did you do?' is not the right question in this situation, 'I'm sorry' isn't the right answer either. Like she's apologizing for spilling some coffee. The trust reversers are not mentioned in the video. Were they deployed? Do pilots have the airport layout in mind, regarding what's past the end of a runway? I mean buildings, hangars, storage tank, fences, trees, ditches, sea etc. Maybe this also influenced his decision to abort or not. I know it doesn't matter what's behind the runway, you shouldn't be rolling there but when you got yourself in that situation and you see either buildings or an open space, I believe it can make a difference, if not cognitive then instinctively anyway. The flex temp I believe is also used for noise abatement if an airport is close to densely populated areas.
When they got the ECAM message that the thrust levers were not set even though they were, the pilot flying should have aborted takeoff immediately. It could have been easily deduced that something wasn't configured correctly in the FMC given the last minute change from 26R to 26L and the error occurring when the thrust levers were places in the Flex detent. That was his cue to abort takeoff. Everything else that happened after that was just going further down the holes in the Swiss cheese. Those people are lucky to be alive given the decision to abort the takeoff AFTER taking off.
Also, the FO really screwed the pooch for not entering in all the correct data for the new runway, and the captain screwed up for not doubling checking the FMC after the last minute update. Really, this is a failure of CRM all around.
58s “on board the aircraft there were 2 pilots 3 flight attendants and 149 passengers on board.” I know I’m splitting hairs, just in case you hadn’t noticed.
Attitude is more important than the tons of flying experience. It is useless to suggest options which were available to the experienced cockpit crew at that moment in time, if you cannot exercise a simple decision of fire walling your thrust levers. It was a same situation like a “Pull-up” or “Wind-share” audio warning by your EGPWS and you are trained that without wasting a single second to go Max Power pitching up to a safe attitude to get out safely from adverse situation. Even though there was a audio message to retard.
He should have rejected the takeoff when he got the thrust not set ECAM message and saw that there was no V1 speed on the PFD. Once he committed to the takeoff by starting the rotation he should not have changed his mind and pushed the nose back down. After lift off there would not have been a V2 speed to pitch for but after a few seconds the VLS and other airspeeds would have appeared anyways and would have given the pilots a good estimate for maneuver margin even without V2. Beyond the acceleration height the flight would have been completely normal again and they could have continued to their destination, file a report perhaps and go on with their duty.
But I'm not an airline pilot and they may not have had the big picture view like we have after the fact.
Wow, did they go from 86 knots to 143 knots just in the amount of time it took the captain to say "What did you do?" etc etc. I live in Philly and remember this flight seemed to kick off an odd string of incidents at the airport over the course of just a few years. After this there was the crash of the business jet carrying the former owner of the Philadelphia Inquirer newspaper, then a Southwest flight had a rejected take-off and emergency evacuation IIRC, then the other Southwest flight that had the uncontained engine failure and loss of cabin pressure that diverted here.
"Wow, did they go from 86 knots to 143 knots just in the amount of time it took the captain to say "What did you do?"
That was my first thought, too. Say "abort" at any time before reaching V1 - as soon as you see smth odd, plus you anyway know your V1, V2 & VR.... Very weird incident
Captain did right by cancelling take off. there was too much happening/wrong to be ignored. the pilot & co pilot made errors. ( Wrong run way, attempting take off while alarms sounding, not certain of proper rotate speed).
Always nice to pretty much crash with the aircraft calling you a retard the whole time 🤣 I know retard is just a normal word but still gives me chuckles I'm a simple guy.
Bro us airways has some explaining to do First 1549 and now 1702💀
Wrong decision. Technically wasn't unsafe to fly and capt didn't give any valid reasons to abort. Any reason to abort was present before capt decided to plow ahead anyway.
I am not a pilot, but, i think the pilot followed his instincts and made a decision based on his experience and gut feeling to save his passengers, which he did. However, he got lucky with front wheels braking and Nose down slowing the plane to a halt prematurely!!!!
I think there is simply way too much fiddling with computers nowdays…just fly the airplane, will you?
61 & 62 year old? I thought you have to retire from commercial flying at 60? I guess I am wrong.
I wonder if anyone has run this scenario on the simulator (Is there an episode of this accident in the Air Crash Investigation series?).
The captain should have rejected the takeoff as soon as he noticed the problem. He did not have enough thinking time to diagnose it, so should have played safe.
Retard means just that. Pull the thrust levers back. A 100-hour pilot knows this.
I defer to the captain's decision. He was there.
The take off should have been aborted much earlier when they realized V speeds were missing and ecas warning came up.
What a mess …. But after coming to a halt, why did the Captain call for an emergency evacuation? Was there fire etc?
Shouldn’t have started take off roll without briefing runway change.
I think that the captain made the right decision even though in hindsight it was wrong...safety of the passengers was his priority I think
Computers are our best friends but too often our worst enemies.
Really unfortunate way to end a long career. But yeah, taxi off the runway and set up and brief the new data for the new runway, may take 5 mins, but so what
I love this alarm. It is the only alarm that sounds like it is calling the pilots a retard. I knowcwhat it is saying and what it is for, but it is still funny.
The captain’s decision to abort after rotation is pure stupidity. He should be fired for endangering everyone onboard, had he simply applied TOGA power, this would not happen. If I was in his position, I probably would’ve aborted takeoff as a result of the continuous “Retard” warnings
The pilot was lucky he didn't put it in the Delaware River.
Well, we now know that V1 and Vr speeds are the real deal....Some test pilot did not make them up
I am not a pilot but after reading the comments I wouldn’t want either of these two pilots flying my plane.
Im a flt simmer i think the capt made the right decision although a bit late.
The a320 is a flying computer and u never know what that dumb beast can do when airborne given the warning messages,
I would have aborted the flight. Yes destroy the machine nose gear etc and save many lives.
The Captain is in this cast the ultimate decision maker, regardless of any other agency or authority. Why - because the person who ist the on board leader and ultimate official is the Captain. Who has all the lives onboard on his shoulders. He make a judgement call based on vast knowledge and experiences. It is the right decision at the time for the circumstances in his/her judgement. Any thing else is only opinion.
Agreed. But human error is a factor in many aviation accidents, and may have been here as well.
I think it would be very difficult for the captain to justify his decision, especially considering the outcome.
WE DON'T KNOW WHAT HAPPENED, THAT'S UP TO YOU TO FIND OUT BEFORE FILMING.
Both crew members over 60? I am no expert but I find this odd.
This iscproblem of depending too much on electronics artificial intelligence
good work
To much reliance on computers , what has happened to the old skills?
Everything is always crystal clear with the benefit of hindsight. We know what happened and fortunately, there were no injuries. Had the captain taken off, subsequently crashed, and killed several people, the subsequent investigation would most likely have cited "pilot error" as the reason for the crash.
It is the captain's job to make these decisions and I believe he made the correct call.
But this is simply my take on the incident.
He made the decision to abort, everyone walked away from it. It was a good outcome.
If they had taken the time to reprogram the data into the flght computer though, they may have delayed takeoff by several minutes and who knows, maybe this incident would not be under discussion, having been a normal take-off.
Your speech is not clear, omitting letters and syllabi .
Evacuations are conducted unnecessarily and seemingly often in some regions of the world, particularly North America.
There are a number of risks often resulting in injuries when conducting an evacuation, dramatically more so with wide bodied aircraft that sit a great deal higher off the ground and their specific slide design.
In thie event featured an evacuation with its inherent risks is completely unwarranted, there was no fire or other risk to life. The occupants were far safer inside the aircraft, especially with the exceptionally steep incline of the slides at the rear doors due to its nose-low tail-high attitude. Stairs could have been brought to the aircraft or a single slide could have been deployed at the nose-low forward left door(1L or L1), the same door they would have likely boarded through, once appropriate transport arrived. The occupants could have safely walked across the shallow incline of the slide, and not being an evacuation they could have taken all of their belongings with them onto the waiting buses.
An evacuation is only necessary when the risk to life is greater inside the cabin than out, when the benefits clearly outweigh the risks which is mostly due to fire, or in the event of a ditching the risk of the aircraft submerging and drowning the cabin occupants.
If there is no fire or the aircraft is not in pieces it is far safer for all to remain seated and wait for transport and if possible, stairs - wide bodies especially.
If the situation changes and a genuine threat exists, then yes, EVACUATE!
By not conducting an evacuation when it is not necessary it has the benefit not only of preventing unnecessary injuries to occupants but also mitigates the likely damage that occurs to the fuselage when opening 'Armed' doors and deploying slides, along with the outrageous expenses surrounding subsequent repairs and the replacement or repackaging of slides (when appropriate).
None of the issues surrounding cost mattered in this case as the airframe was written off, but the unnecessary risk to individual's safety must still be factored.
The expenses or potential fuselage damage must not and is never a consideration ever worth making whether to Evacuate, or conduct a less risky but still moderately urgent 'Precautionary Disembarkation' (a non-normal disembarking of occupants using either stairs, an aerobridge if still available or a slide using the slower safer 'sit and slide' vs the rapid 'jump and slide' technique).
When neither are indicated but the aircraft is unable to reach the terminal for what ever the reason may be, then as described in the former comment, stairs and appropriate transport will brought to the aircraft. In that instance only may passengers and crew ever retrieve and take their belongings with them.
Wasn’t there either. Neither am I a pilot nor do I know all the facts or have the scope to evaluate. Captain’s judgment call based on his experience. Im just some guy with a keyboard watching a video.
Aborting is always applauded in my humble opinion