4:2 - Molinism & Middle Knowledge | Advanced Course - The Attributes of God
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- Опубликовано: 27 май 2024
- Section Four: Divine Omniscience
Part Two: Molinism & Middle Knowledge
Check out section four of this 17-part graduate-level course from Dr. Craig on the divine attributes.
This unique one-week intensive taught at Houston Christian University is divided into five sections.
Section One: Divine Incorporeality
Section Two: Divine Aseity
Section Three: Divine Eternity
Section Four: Divine Omniscience
Section Five: Divine Omnipotence
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Always enlightening and inspiring! Thank you for sharing.
That IS Cameron, isn’t it?
Thank you for uploading the course.
One confusion about Molinism I hope someone can see and clarify.
For instance, Alice is born in a set of circumstances C1 which includes genetics, family circumstances culture etc.
She goes through life and experiences a set of events E1 which shapes her thinking.
Alice becomes Christian and is ultimately saved.
Now what if Alice were born in C2? C3? Cn?
Basically is this disjunct true: Either Alice always freely chooses to be saved or there are some Cs in which Alice would not be saved.
I can't see how Alice would always freely choose to be saved.
If that were the case, wouldn't it be possible for God to only create souls which were like Alice?
Yet clearly many are not saved either because God could not in fact only create souls that would invariably choose to be saved or for some reason God preferred not to do so.
If instead Alice is only saved when she is born under some circumstances but not others, then doesn't God choose whether or not Alice is saved by deciding what circumstances C she will be born into by instantiating the actual world?
This would still mean that God predetermined which individuals will be saved and which will be lost correct?
By making his choice of what kind of actual world to instantiate.
//Basically is this disjunct true: Either Alice always freely chooses to be saved or there are some Cs in which Alice would not be saved.//
Yes, the disjunct is true.
//I can't see how Alice would always freely choose to be saved.//
Most Molinists would deny that Alice would always freely choose to be saved.
//If that were the case, wouldn't it be possible for God to only create souls which were like Alice?//
Presumably, you mean that for any possible person P, if they would freely choose to be saved in some possible world, then God could put all such people into the same possible world. But it doesn't follow from the fact that (perhaps) all people would freely choose to be saved in some possible world that there is a possible world in which all such persons could be placed and they would all be saved. Take another hypothetical person, Amanda. It may be the case that in any possible world in which Alice and Amanda both exist, Alice chooses to be freely saved, but Amanda freely chooses to not be saved. In such a case, it would not be feasible for God to create a world in which both Alice and Amanda are saved.
//If instead Alice is only saved when she is born under some circumstances but not others, then doesn't God choose whether or not Alice is saved by deciding what circumstances C she will be born into by instantiating the actual world?//
The word "choose" here is ambiguous. It's true that God chooses the world to actualize and thus guarantees which counterfactuals of creaturely freedom will obtain, but it's still Alice who freely makes the choice to be saved or not. This is precisely why Molinism is able to affirm a robust doctrine of divine sovereignty without sacrificing libertarian freedom.
//This would still mean that God predetermined which individuals will be saved and which will be lost correct?//
Predetermined in the sense of "selected and guaranteed," yes, but not in the sense of "caused deterministically." The latter sense has to do with whether one's choice is the necessary result of antecedent conditions. The former allows for libertarian freedom. - RF Admin
God chooses which circumstances are actual, but not your actions in those circumstances
Craig has talked before about a theory called transworld damnation, which I find plausible. The idea is that, if a person is damned in the actual world, they also would have been damned in every feasible world. In other words, there are no set of circumstances God could have placed them in such that they'd choose to repent. Now suppose every unsaved person has this property. This would mean that, if there are circumstances in which Alice would choose to repent, God has rearranged the world to make sure that Alice ends up in those circumstances. The same goes for every saved person. But for the lost, there are no circumstances in which they'd choose to be saved, so God is not unloving in placing them where he did.
In Greek, the word μολύνω means "pollute, infect, defile". So, "molinism" literally sounds like "defilement".
What a name for a theological doctrine!
Good thing the name doesn't have anything to do with Greek! - RF Admin
@@ReasonableFaithOrg Hopefully not.