Carneades is still the standard for Philosophy education on RUclips. It's shocking to me how few views your recent videos get. RUclips's algorithm needs to get it together.
8:16 According to the laws of Classical logic, the last two rows of the truth table are inherent contradiction and thus it is improper to use them in furtherance of any propositions. In effect, the implication is only justified if the antecedent is true or the consequent is false and not v.v.: ∃((p=⟙)⊻(q=~⟙))>Js(p>q). If p =~⟙, another implication must be set up: ∃((p=~⟙)⊻(q=~~⟙))>Js(p>q), which says that any false antecedent OR any true consequent are enough to justify an implication, which in turn implies I can find any truth or falsehood to imply any claim; clearly a singularity in our system of thinking, a paradox, a contradiction, a failure, a limit. In effect, by using the last two rows of the truth table in furtherance of a proposition, you are asking for a any falsehood to imply a any truth or any truth implies a any falsehood, which are obvious contradictions: ∃(~⟙>⟙)=⟘= ∃(~~⟙>~⟙) 30:50 This difficulty will go away if we break up our epistemology into conceptual or nomical and, if nomical, into causal or acausal: *Conceptual*: all is all; anything I can think, rationally or irrationally applies. If I think of two apples in one hand and think of two more apples in the other and bring my hands together, the Evil Deceiver can make me open the hand to have four apples OR 5 apples OR a horse OR etc. *Nomical, causal*: You can in fact make "all" claims within your observable universe but not beyond; beyond would be the realm of no data and thus pure conceptual speculation. However I can say that every star in the universe is within a radius of 14B ly or that my left hand can reach my right hand as I have causal access to all that data. *Nomical, acausal*: This is the area beyond where you can reach causally, through the known forces of physics. Thus, while it is _presumed_ that this area is nomical and subject to a physics-like structure, it is more realistically (more skeptically) dealt with as a conceptual space where anything rational or irrational can occur, rather like with a black hole singularity or interactions smaller than the planck scale where we _presume_ physics still applies but we are remain skeptical at the same time. 37:10 More precise spatial-temporal qualifiers (local, non-local; causal, a-causal) make these concerns go away... ...and don't call me Shirley.
29:32 "...it is possible that there exists a jar of pickles." But you ate it, didn't you? On a more serious note, I really appreciate this channel! I'll have to take a look at the logic section because I haven't yet come across possible worlds, modality, etc. in my schooling.
+Cédric Morier-Roy After making the video I totally did. And thanks! I'm glad you appreciate! I have some basic videos on logic, and one good solid video on modal logic (ruclips.net/video/FacUHU_gjPw/видео.html). I'm hoping to do some more on various kinds of modal logics soon, and some about modality (things like modal realism and combinatorialism) at some point.
Do truthbearers only have truthmakers under the correspondence theory of truth? Or are truthmakers real in pragmatism, the coherence theory of truth, the deflationary theory of truth, etc?
A great question. It depends on the specifics of the theory. They are more primary in the correspondence theory of truth. Some deflationary theories have some version of them. Coherentists might claim that beliefs are their truth makers, or they might ignore them completely.
Umm...are we implicitly using entailment when arguing for/against all these truthmakers including entailment itself? It feels strange...is this topic essentially argues about how to argue?
Amazing channel, one question, it might be dumb. Are these concepts of truth and the truth that Godel and Alfred Tarski talk about relatable? Are they exclusive to each other or are they multipliable (for example can you put inside the truth predicate in Godel's coding this kind of definitions of truth)
Thanks! You should check out the part of this series on Tarski's undefinability of truth. It covers how Godel numbers are used in Tarski's proof. ruclips.net/video/7uLYQ8nXJFM/видео.html
Great video, very informative. I want to comment on some of the points made in the video and give my personal take on the subject. At 10:33 "Clearly, a jar of pickles being in the supermarket has nothing to do with Vladimir Putin being the leader of Russia" - Unless there only is one possible world, namely the actual one, something which seem to follow from the truth of determinism and the necessity of ending any temporal regress with some necessary being (which obviously doesn't have to be a god). If so, then every fact and thus every truth would follow from necessary ones. Given that both the jar of pickles being in the supermarket and Vladimir Putin being the leader of Russia follow causally and necessarily from the same set of initial conditions and truths, they would indubitably have something to do with each other. This would also, I think, solve the original problem with the entailment theory. This would not avoid the problems with the necessitation theory since it would effectively be the necessition theory. The projection theory seem to avoid most problems, one would have to accept a holistic truth making process (since it treats existence as a predicate) but I personally don't see the problem with that. My view is that a statement is true (more precisely, expresses truth) if and only if it affirms a fact of reality in the mind of a semantic agent which means that the statement is used to affirm a fact of reality. At 25:33 to 26:36 "this statement has no truth maker." and "this statement is meaningless or has no truth maker." - They are untrue or not true. Since the semantic qualities of statements (which would include having a truth maker) aren't actually a part of reality, the statements fail to express truth since it fails to describe reality. Just as clocks don't actually measure time but rather are used to measure time, statements aren't actually true but rather are used to express truth; this shouldn't stop us from saying that a particular statement is true since it is a convenient way of expressing ourselves. I wouldn't call the statements above false however (this is only my personal preference) since that would to me imply that the statements contradict or deny some fact of reality when in fact they are not saying anything at all about reality. 26:38 to 27:04 "if it were the case that the statement 'NU) Nothing exists* were true then there would have to be something to make it true. But then something would exist and make the statement false" - All this seem to show though, is that the existence of nothing is logically impossible. There would then not be any possible world in which the statement "Nothing exists" would be true since a logically impossible or contradictory world isn't a logically possible world. 29:50 "What makes ~p true?" - The fact that the pantry is full (with air perhaps) and (perhaps only) the fact that there is no pickles to be found in the pantry. Perhaps a modus tollens argument could be helpful here: if there were pickles in the pantry, then it would be possible to find pickles in the pantry (to put it another way, pickles have the property of being perceptible in pantries). It is impossible to find pickles in the pantry; therefore, there aren't any pickles in the pantry. 30:47 "What makes it true that all pickles are green?" - The fact that all pickles are green. Am I missing something here? As for how no pickles are orange is true. Perhaps it is the fact that no pickle is in fact orange. Surely the lack of negative facts doesn't preclude the possibility of negative truths. If a strawberry is fully and purely red, then it cannot be blue due to the nature of colors. It should thus be trivial to truthfully say that the strawberry isn't blue. A triangle is not a square whether or not negative facts exist so I must admit that I don't see how anyone takes that objection seriously. I assume that I must have misunderstood something because otherwise I'm not sure what to think. I'll end this comment by saying that I'm not sure that I agree fully with any of the theories presented here about truth makers and bearers. In my view truth is the relationship that a proposition in the mind of a semantic agent (person or other capable of projecting meaning, that is ascribe meaning to statements etc.) which affirm a fact of reality has to reality or, in other words, the relationship that a statement which is used to affirm a fact of reality has to reality. It would then be this relationship (which is the fact that the proposition is used to correspond with reality) that is the truth bearer. The truth maker would the semantic agent projecting a meaning to a proposition which results in it possessing the previously mentioned relationship.
Greetings, 7 years after. 1. ''"this statement has no truth maker." and "this statement is meaningless or has no truth maker." - They are untrue or not true. Since the semantic qualities of statements (which would include having a truth maker) aren't actually a part of reality, the statements fail to express truth since it fails to describe reality.'' How are they not part of reality: a semantic agent - as you say - exists, his voice exists, both are part of reality, he says 'this statement is meaningless or has no truth maker.', thus the sentence is part of reality. How does it fail to describe reality: it could be taken to describe reality in the way/sense that means reality can, through its agents, produce paradoxes; this could be a fact of/about reality. Or taken to describe reality in the sense that some statements are meaningless - explaining the nature of some statements, or the nature of paradoxes or humans or language or meaning; it says something or some things about reality, it describes reality. 2. '' "What makes it true that all pickles are green?" '' I am more concerned about the usefulness of such general/universal statements. What is the purpose of claiming such general things? Anyways, empirical evidence and search would enable us to confirm whether the above statement is true or not it seems to me.
I am probably misunderstanding something, but you said there's no way for the entailment to be false, if the consequent is true. Could you explain further? For instance, if I say 'if the moon is made of cheese, then I was born'. In this entailment, the consequent is obviously true, but that doesn't make the entailment true, because obviously the notion that the moon is made of cheese doesn't logically entail that I should have been born. Further, I can say "if I was not born, then I was born". The consequent is true, but the entailment is false.
derezzed83 Not when we are talking about logical entailment. Logical entailment, or implication is strictly defined by a truth table where it is only false if the consequent is false and the antecedent is true. According to the laws of logic "if I was not born, then I was born" is in fact equivalent to just the statement "I was born" Here's how (take b as "I was born"): P1) ~b>b P2) ~~bvb (P1 Impl) P3) bvb (P2 DN) C) b (P3 Taut) For more on the logical definition of implication check out this video (ruclips.net/video/do5vRAnntKI/видео.html) Some philosophers don't like this conception of implication and have come up with alternative, non-classical logics that define it differently. I hopefully will be doing a series on nonclassical logic soon so stay tuned!
Carneades.org that really doesn't make sense to me. How could "if I am not born, I am born" be equivalent to "I am born". In P2 what does it mean to say "if I am not not born or born". How is that logically entailed by P1?
derezzed83 It's not just logically entailed by it, it is materially equivalent. In the end it all comes down to truth tables. Here's a solid 90 second explanation ruclips.net/video/pNrzlMaCaF4/видео.html That's just the definition of implication that classical logic works with. If you don't like it, you have to throw out all of classical logic to get away from it.
"According to the laws of logic "if I was not born, then I was born" " According to the laws of Classical logic, that is an inherent contradiction and thus a improper proposition. In effect you are asking for a falsehood to imply a truth which is an obvious contradiction ∃(~⟙>⟙)=⟘,
'There is a jar of pickles in my pantry' is false because 'the jar of pickles in my pantry' does not exist. 'The jar of pickles that is not in my pantry' is not quantified over by the original statement.
I don't see why a state of affairs is such a strange thing to accept as existing. After all, practically everything is nothing more than a state of affairs. Even your jar of pickles is nothing more than the state of pickles being inside a jar, two objects that don't have to exist together. The pickles themselves are just a particular organization of a particular set of molecules, and thus a state of affairs. You can go as far down the rabbit hole as you like. How is that different than saying a jar of pickles inside your pantry is a particular state of affairs that exists?
jeremy hansen In fact one would only need to posit one state of affairs, namely reality. Reality would include all lesser "states of affairs" and therefore, if reality is a state of affairs which include every object and their relations with each other and if we (as we must) assume that reality exists, then it would in fact be necessary for us to accept the existence that at least one state of affairs exist. If we make the further claim that reality can be divided into parts, then we can, it seems to me, speak of the existence of states of affairs which describe parts of reality. Good catch!
jeremy hansen Metaphysicians don't like to add unnecessary things to their ontologies. If they can not posit states of affairs, then they won't. If they have to then they need to give the necessary and sufficient conditions for something being a state of affairs or not, or explaining how it is a primitive concept.
Carneades.org I don't think it's unnecessary. From a physical stand point, everything can be seen a system of corresponding parts. In this manner, states of affairs necessarily arise from the fact that these more fundamental parts interact with each other. In fact, as of now we can only really talk about 'states of affairs' as we have not developed a sufficient model that accurately describes everything that we have observed, and thus any model that we have currently established can most likely be broken down into further parts. In this way, pickles and a cabinet with pickles are practically the same as they are both systems that can be broken down into the same basic parts.
Not quite. P1 is logically necessary. From P1, you can conclude P1.1) ~Jv(Pv~P) (Impl P1) P1.2) (~JvP)v~P (Assoc P1.2) P1.3) (~JvP)v(~Jv~P) (Add, Comm, P1.2) P2) (J>P)v(J>~P) (Impl, P1.3) But you can't conclude your P3 from that. Unless you show ~(J>~P) you can't use Disjunctive Syllogism to conclude J>P.
Carneades is still the standard for Philosophy education on RUclips. It's shocking to me how few views your recent videos get.
RUclips's algorithm needs to get it together.
Very elaborate series im enjoying it throughly
8:16
According to the laws of Classical logic, the last two rows of the truth table are inherent contradiction and thus it is improper to use them in furtherance of any propositions. In effect, the implication is only justified if the antecedent is true or the consequent is false and not v.v.: ∃((p=⟙)⊻(q=~⟙))>Js(p>q).
If p =~⟙, another implication must be set up: ∃((p=~⟙)⊻(q=~~⟙))>Js(p>q), which says that any false antecedent OR any
true consequent are enough to justify an implication, which in turn implies I can find any truth or falsehood to imply any claim; clearly a singularity in our system of thinking, a paradox, a contradiction, a failure, a limit.
In effect, by using the last two rows of the truth table in furtherance of a proposition, you are asking for a any falsehood to imply a any truth or any truth implies a any falsehood, which are obvious contradictions: ∃(~⟙>⟙)=⟘= ∃(~~⟙>~⟙)
30:50
This difficulty will go away if we break up our epistemology into conceptual or nomical and, if nomical, into causal or acausal:
*Conceptual*: all is all; anything I can think, rationally or irrationally applies. If I think of two apples in one hand and think of two more apples in the other and bring my hands together, the Evil Deceiver can make me open the hand to have four apples OR 5 apples OR a horse OR etc.
*Nomical, causal*: You can in fact make "all" claims within your observable universe but not beyond; beyond would be the realm of no data and thus pure conceptual speculation. However I can say that every star in the universe is within a radius of 14B ly or that my left hand can reach my right hand as I have causal access to all that data.
*Nomical, acausal*: This is the area beyond where you can reach causally, through the known forces of physics. Thus, while it is _presumed_ that this area is nomical and subject to a physics-like structure, it is more realistically (more skeptically) dealt with as a conceptual space where anything rational or irrational can occur, rather like with a black hole singularity or interactions smaller than the planck scale where we _presume_ physics still applies but we are remain skeptical at the same time.
37:10
More precise spatial-temporal qualifiers (local, non-local; causal, a-causal) make these concerns go away...
...and don't call me Shirley.
29:32
"...it is possible that there exists a jar of pickles."
But you ate it, didn't you?
On a more serious note, I really appreciate this channel!
I'll have to take a look at the logic section because I haven't yet come across possible worlds, modality, etc. in my schooling.
+Cédric Morier-Roy After making the video I totally did.
And thanks! I'm glad you appreciate! I have some basic videos on logic, and one good solid video on modal logic (ruclips.net/video/FacUHU_gjPw/видео.html). I'm hoping to do some more on various kinds of modal logics soon, and some about modality (things like modal realism and combinatorialism) at some point.
Nice video! Is rejecting the disjunctive thesis common? Thanks
Good stuff.
+Zack Alil Thanks, I'm glad you enjoy.
Many thanks. Good podcast to listen to while jogging.
Please look at entailment truth table, very last line. S/b F F F? 6:39
John V. Karavitis
Do truthbearers only have truthmakers under the correspondence theory of truth? Or are truthmakers real in pragmatism, the coherence theory of truth, the deflationary theory of truth, etc?
A great question. It depends on the specifics of the theory. They are more primary in the correspondence theory of truth. Some deflationary theories have some version of them. Coherentists might claim that beliefs are their truth makers, or they might ignore them completely.
Great video. Thanks.
No problem. Thanks for watching!
Umm...are we implicitly using entailment when arguing for/against all these truthmakers including entailment itself?
It feels strange...is this topic essentially argues about how to argue?
Amazing channel, one question, it might be dumb. Are these concepts of truth and the truth that Godel and Alfred Tarski talk about relatable? Are they exclusive to each other or are they multipliable (for example can you put inside the truth predicate in Godel's coding this kind of definitions of truth)
Thanks! You should check out the part of this series on Tarski's undefinability of truth. It covers how Godel numbers are used in Tarski's proof. ruclips.net/video/7uLYQ8nXJFM/видео.html
Great video, very informative. I want to comment on some of the points made in the video and give my personal take on the subject.
At 10:33 "Clearly, a jar of pickles being in the supermarket has nothing to do with Vladimir Putin being the leader of Russia"
- Unless there only is one possible world, namely the actual one, something which seem to follow from the truth of determinism and the necessity of ending any temporal regress with some necessary being (which obviously doesn't have to be a god). If so, then every fact and thus every truth would follow from necessary ones. Given that both the jar of pickles being in the supermarket and Vladimir Putin being the leader of Russia follow causally and necessarily from the same set of initial conditions and truths, they would indubitably have something to do with each other. This would also, I think, solve the original problem with the entailment theory. This would not avoid the problems with the necessitation theory since it would effectively be the necessition theory. The projection theory seem to avoid most problems, one would have to accept a holistic truth making process (since it treats existence as a predicate) but I personally don't see the problem with that.
My view is that a statement is true (more precisely, expresses truth) if and only if it affirms a fact of reality in the mind of a semantic agent which means that the statement is used to affirm a fact of reality.
At 25:33 to 26:36 "this statement has no truth maker." and "this statement is meaningless or has no truth maker."
- They are untrue or not true. Since the semantic qualities of statements (which would include having a truth maker) aren't actually a part of reality, the statements fail to express truth since it fails to describe reality. Just as clocks don't actually measure time but rather are used to measure time, statements aren't actually true but rather are used to express truth; this shouldn't stop us from saying that a particular statement is true since it is a convenient way of expressing ourselves. I wouldn't call the statements above false however (this is only my personal preference) since that would to me imply that the statements contradict or deny some fact of reality when in fact they are not saying anything at all about reality.
26:38 to 27:04 "if it were the case that the statement 'NU) Nothing exists* were true then there would have to be something to make it true. But then something would exist and make the statement false"
- All this seem to show though, is that the existence of nothing is logically impossible. There would then not be any possible world in which the statement "Nothing exists" would be true since a logically impossible or contradictory world isn't a logically possible world.
29:50 "What makes ~p true?"
- The fact that the pantry is full (with air perhaps) and (perhaps only) the fact that there is no pickles to be found in the pantry. Perhaps a modus tollens argument could be helpful here: if there were pickles in the pantry, then it would be possible to find pickles in the pantry (to put it another way, pickles have the property of being perceptible in pantries). It is impossible to find pickles in the pantry; therefore, there aren't any pickles in the pantry.
30:47 "What makes it true that all pickles are green?"
- The fact that all pickles are green. Am I missing something here? As for how no pickles are orange is true. Perhaps it is the fact that no pickle is in fact orange.
Surely the lack of negative facts doesn't preclude the possibility of negative truths. If a strawberry is fully and purely red, then it cannot be blue due to the nature of colors. It should thus be trivial to truthfully say that the strawberry isn't blue. A triangle is not a square whether or not negative facts exist so I must admit that I don't see how anyone takes that objection seriously. I assume that I must have misunderstood something because otherwise I'm not sure what to think.
I'll end this comment by saying that I'm not sure that I agree fully with any of the theories presented here about truth makers and bearers. In my view truth is the relationship that a proposition in the mind of a semantic agent (person or other capable of projecting meaning, that is ascribe meaning to statements etc.) which affirm a fact of reality has to reality or, in other words, the relationship that a statement which is used to affirm a fact of reality has to reality. It would then be this relationship (which is the fact that the proposition is used to correspond with reality) that is the truth bearer. The truth maker would the semantic agent projecting a meaning to a proposition which results in it possessing the previously mentioned relationship.
Greetings, 7 years after.
1. ''"this statement has no truth maker." and "this statement is meaningless or has no truth maker."
- They are untrue or not true. Since the semantic qualities of statements (which would include having a truth maker) aren't actually a part of reality, the statements fail to express truth since it fails to describe reality.''
How are they not part of reality: a semantic agent - as you say - exists, his voice exists, both are part of reality, he says 'this statement is meaningless or has no truth maker.', thus the sentence is part of reality. How does it fail to describe reality: it could be taken to describe reality in the way/sense that means reality can, through its agents, produce paradoxes; this could be a fact of/about reality. Or taken to describe reality in the sense that some statements are meaningless - explaining the nature of some statements, or the nature of paradoxes or humans or language or meaning; it says something or some things about reality, it describes reality.
2. '' "What makes it true that all pickles are green?" ''
I am more concerned about the usefulness of such general/universal statements. What is the purpose of claiming such general things? Anyways, empirical evidence and search would enable us to confirm whether the above statement is true or not it seems to me.
I am probably misunderstanding something, but you said there's no way for the entailment to be false, if the consequent is true. Could you explain further? For instance, if I say 'if the moon is made of cheese, then I was born'. In this entailment, the consequent is obviously true, but that doesn't make the entailment true, because obviously the notion that the moon is made of cheese doesn't logically entail that I should have been born. Further, I can say "if I was not born, then I was born". The consequent is true, but the entailment is false.
derezzed83 Not when we are talking about logical entailment. Logical entailment, or implication is strictly defined by a truth table where it is only false if the consequent is false and the antecedent is true. According to the laws of logic "if I was not born, then I was born" is in fact equivalent to just the statement "I was born" Here's how (take b as "I was born"):
P1) ~b>b
P2) ~~bvb (P1 Impl)
P3) bvb (P2 DN)
C) b (P3 Taut)
For more on the logical definition of implication check out this video (ruclips.net/video/do5vRAnntKI/видео.html) Some philosophers don't like this conception of implication and have come up with alternative, non-classical logics that define it differently. I hopefully will be doing a series on nonclassical logic soon so stay tuned!
Carneades.org
that really doesn't make sense to me. How could "if I am not born, I am born" be equivalent to "I am born". In P2 what does it mean to say "if I am not not born or born". How is that logically entailed by P1?
derezzed83 It's not just logically entailed by it, it is materially equivalent. In the end it all comes down to truth tables. Here's a solid 90 second explanation ruclips.net/video/pNrzlMaCaF4/видео.html That's just the definition of implication that classical logic works with. If you don't like it, you have to throw out all of classical logic to get away from it.
"According to the laws of logic "if I was not born, then I was born" "
According to the laws of Classical logic, that is an inherent contradiction and thus a improper proposition.
In effect you are asking for a falsehood to imply a truth which is an obvious contradiction
∃(~⟙>⟙)=⟘,
the chad essentialist
It is okay to have steam coming out my ears, right?
TheAtheistPaladin This whole series is a little crazy. I'm trying to make it as understandable as I can. Hope it works. Thanks for watching!
'There is a jar of pickles in my pantry' is false because 'the jar of pickles in my pantry' does not exist. 'The jar of pickles that is not in my pantry' is not quantified over by the original statement.
I don't see why a state of affairs is such a strange thing to accept as existing. After all, practically everything is nothing more than a state of affairs. Even your jar of pickles is nothing more than the state of pickles being inside a jar, two objects that don't have to exist together. The pickles themselves are just a particular organization of a particular set of molecules, and thus a state of affairs. You can go as far down the rabbit hole as you like. How is that different than saying a jar of pickles inside your pantry is a particular state of affairs that exists?
jeremy hansen In fact one would only need to posit one state of affairs, namely reality. Reality would include all lesser "states of affairs" and therefore, if reality is a state of affairs which include every object and their relations with each other and if we (as we must) assume that reality exists, then it would in fact be necessary for us to accept the existence that at least one state of affairs exist. If we make the further claim that reality can be divided into parts, then we can, it seems to me, speak of the existence of states of affairs which describe parts of reality. Good catch!
Paradoxarn Well said.
Paradoxarn That sounds strangely like Bradley's idealism/Identity/coherence theory of truth. Stay tuned for more on that coming soon!
jeremy hansen Metaphysicians don't like to add unnecessary things to their ontologies. If they can not posit states of affairs, then they won't. If they have to then they need to give the necessary and sufficient conditions for something being a state of affairs or not, or explaining how it is a primitive concept.
Carneades.org I don't think it's unnecessary. From a physical stand point, everything can be seen a system of corresponding parts. In this manner, states of affairs necessarily arise from the fact that these more fundamental parts interact with each other. In fact, as of now we can only really talk about 'states of affairs' as we have not developed a sufficient model that accurately describes everything that we have observed, and thus any model that we have currently established can most likely be broken down into further parts. In this way, pickles and a cabinet with pickles are practically the same as they are both systems that can be broken down into the same basic parts.
J=Jar in the super market
P=Putin is the leader of Russia
P1) J>(Pv~P)
P2) (J>P) v (J>~P)
P3) J>P
Am I right??
Not quite. P1 is logically necessary. From P1, you can conclude
P1.1) ~Jv(Pv~P) (Impl P1)
P1.2) (~JvP)v~P (Assoc P1.2)
P1.3) (~JvP)v(~Jv~P) (Add, Comm, P1.2)
P2) (J>P)v(J>~P) (Impl, P1.3)
But you can't conclude your P3 from that. Unless you show ~(J>~P) you can't use Disjunctive Syllogism to conclude J>P.
Dogecoin to the moon!