On the slide at 25:39, why do you say that having three equal sides is the reason for a triangle being equilateral? I think a more precise analysis is that being equilateral just is having three equal sides. So I don't think we usually mean that things that share a property have the same reason for having the property, but only that they do share the property. If they have the same reason in a sense that is not analogous to the equilateral example, that's incidental, not implied by them sharing the property. (As if I say, both this fence and this window are white, and they both happen to be white because you painted them yesterday, that's incidental.)
hi, sorry if mentioned in video, but what are the truthmakers in the deflationist theory? Also, what are the methods to check truth, like in Hindenburg exploding how do we check to see if true?
I don't understand how the equivalence schema doesn't implicilty rest on a correspondence theory of truth, namely that for the statement 'the dog is red' to have the property of being true, it must refer to some external state of affairs, so how is deflation not reliant on correspondence or even coherence? I've been trying to understand the distinction between deflation and these other theories of truth for years. PLEASE HELP SOMEONE
This is exactly whats bugging me about this theory! Saying that: " 'p is true' is true if and only if p is true" implies some kind of correspondence. What does the metalanguage refer to?
Exactly. It's like this giant elephant in the room that no one seems to address. Either that, or there is something fundamental that I'm missing. I just wish I understood it *sigh*
Silly question about possible worlds: I can see how "I don't know whether the dog is red, but I know it could be" can be rephrased as a sentence about possible worlds -- my uncertainty is really about which possible world is/was/will-be actual. What about "I don't know whether 'x is red implies x is not blue' is an analytic statement but I know it could be." If I understand possible worlds, they don't nest -- it isn't the case that 'there is a possible world where y is the case' in some possible world but not in another. How does one express uncertainty about possible worlds in terms of possible worlds or is there a different way of expressing that?
I think you covered earlier that modal logics have some kind of *possibility* operator instead of the ∃ operator, so formally possible is not (∃world in possible-worlds). My confusion may have to do with informally conflating "exists" with "possible" but intuitively, the two kinds of uncertainty seem to have a lot in common.
Mike Samuel It boils down to S4 and S5 vs simpler versions of modal logic. S4 says that possible possible or necessary necessary just reduces to possible or necessary respectively. S5 talks about being able to reduce necessarily possible and possibly necessary. What you would do is use different kinds of modality, if you don't know whether something is possible or not, then it is epistemically possible that it is metaphysically possible, and epistemically possible that it is metaphysically necessary. I have a video coming up that will talk about types of modality.
Thanks for explaining. I'll look into S5, but from previous attempts to wrap my head around it, I concluded that it was possibly necessary that S5 hurts my brain which necessarily hurt my brain in the actual world. Looking forward to your video on modality.
Perhaps I'm just philosophically naive, but it seems to me the major problems of these theories is that they try to boil truth down to a single, one size fits all definition of truth. Imo truth is a very relative and contextual concept. People, imo, seem to use truth with many different shades of meaning, from correspondence with individual, group or the consensus of all sense experience of the actual world, to the analytic idea of truth by definition or semantic truth, to even correspondence to works of fiction, and probably plenty of usages I'm not thinking of. Is it possible that there is no singular, "right" definition of truth?
munstrumridcully You will really like the next position. Pluralists think that there is not one truth property, but many. They are appealing to those that think that there is more than just one way that something can be true.
Is there such thing as an asymptotic theory of truth? In other words: the closer one approximates truth the further truth eludes encapsulation? Like water in your hands truth behaves like the property of liquid contained by faulty receptacles for the task at hand?
iiixtheory That sounds like something that an analytic philosopher would be not too happy with (we mostly do analytic philosophy here), but a continental philosopher would eat right up.
I appreciate the distinction. I'm quite big on conceptual blending. Might there be a middle ground that antinomically posits the strengths of both (if not all?) philosophical categories? By following ones proclivity towards truth, could it not be said that subjectivity alone is an unavoidable hurdle in establishing any "absolute theory of truth" that is properly Gettier-ed/JTB-ed into an indisputable axiom of sorts? Perhaps by starting small with the notion of water being universal to all biological life and extrapolate as far as universality permits? Find some common life ground to postulate further upon... You're possibly the only other human I've stumbled upon that even knows what the current state of philosophical inquiry rests at these days. To that I am grateful for even being able to bounce ideas off of each other!
I'm being lazy so forgive me, but in which theories are attributing non-properties of an object considered mu or undefined? Like the proposition "Atheism is red." could be considered false since it's not true but it could be considered mu or undefined too since "red" is a property type that atheism doesn't even have (color) so talking about its color is meaningless so its not false either. What theory of truth caters to this idea?
Sina Shahbazi Probably Kripke's Tri-modal logic, which allows for three kinds of statements, those that are true, those that are false and those that are undefined, but wait aroudn for my video on the subject and see if that's what you are talking about.
Dude, in reading the (very short) introduction of Horwich's "Truth", you already have upwards of 3 misrepresentations the video makes. I recommend you don't let this be your only reference to deflationism.
The Two Truth Theory of Madhyamaka Buddhism is not indigenous to Tibetans, though they did a formidable job of furthering and exploring the debate. Initially, it was from classical India, developed by Nagarjuna.
No matter who you are, thank you for sharing your work.
The 23:56 "Im concerned about it" had me dying
On the slide at 25:39, why do you say that having three equal sides is the reason for a triangle being equilateral? I think a more precise analysis is that being equilateral just is having three equal sides. So I don't think we usually mean that things that share a property have the same reason for having the property, but only that they do share the property. If they have the same reason in a sense that is not analogous to the equilateral example, that's incidental, not implied by them sharing the property. (As if I say, both this fence and this window are white, and they both happen to be white because you painted them yesterday, that's incidental.)
hi, sorry if mentioned in video, but what are the truthmakers in the deflationist theory? Also, what are the methods to check truth, like in Hindenburg exploding how do we check to see if true?
I don't understand how the equivalence schema doesn't implicilty rest on a correspondence theory of truth, namely that for the statement 'the dog is red' to have the property of being true, it must refer to some external state of affairs, so how is deflation not reliant on correspondence or even coherence? I've been trying to understand the distinction between deflation and these other theories of truth for years.
PLEASE HELP SOMEONE
This is exactly whats bugging me about this theory! Saying that: " 'p is true' is true if and only if p is true" implies some kind of correspondence. What does the metalanguage refer to?
Exactly. It's like this giant elephant in the room that no one seems to address. Either that, or there is something fundamental that I'm missing. I just wish I understood it *sigh*
It's John Searle's argument that the equivalence schema, properly understood, amounts to the correspondence theory of truth.
Could you elaborate further on deflationism in relation to the correspondence view?
What do you mean? If you want more information, check out the SEP articles.
You are so awesome :)
Prosthetic Awesome! Thanks!
Silly question about possible worlds: I can see how "I don't know whether the dog is red, but I know it could be" can be rephrased as a sentence about possible worlds -- my uncertainty is really about which possible world is/was/will-be actual. What about "I don't know whether 'x is red implies x is not blue' is an analytic statement but I know it could be." If I understand possible worlds, they don't nest -- it isn't the case that 'there is a possible world where y is the case' in some possible world but not in another. How does one express uncertainty about possible worlds in terms of possible worlds or is there a different way of expressing that?
I think you covered earlier that modal logics have some kind of *possibility* operator instead of the ∃ operator, so formally possible is not (∃world in possible-worlds). My confusion may have to do with informally conflating "exists" with "possible" but intuitively, the two kinds of uncertainty seem to have a lot in common.
Mike Samuel It boils down to S4 and S5 vs simpler versions of modal logic. S4 says that possible possible or necessary necessary just reduces to possible or necessary respectively. S5 talks about being able to reduce necessarily possible and possibly necessary. What you would do is use different kinds of modality, if you don't know whether something is possible or not, then it is epistemically possible that it is metaphysically possible, and epistemically possible that it is metaphysically necessary. I have a video coming up that will talk about types of modality.
Thanks for explaining. I'll look into S5, but from previous attempts to wrap my head around it, I concluded that it was possibly necessary that S5 hurts my brain which necessarily hurt my brain in the actual world. Looking forward to your video on modality.
Perhaps I'm just philosophically naive, but it seems to me the major problems of these theories is that they try to boil truth down to a single, one size fits all definition of truth. Imo truth is a very relative and contextual concept. People, imo, seem to use truth with many different shades of meaning, from correspondence with individual, group or the consensus of all sense experience of the actual world, to the analytic idea of truth by definition or semantic truth, to even correspondence to works of fiction, and probably plenty of usages I'm not thinking of. Is it possible that there is no singular, "right" definition of truth?
munstrumridcully You will really like the next position. Pluralists think that there is not one truth property, but many. They are appealing to those that think that there is more than just one way that something can be true.
Carneades.org cool, sounds like that position is right up my alley😁
Is there such thing as an asymptotic theory of truth? In other words: the closer one approximates truth the further truth eludes encapsulation? Like water in your hands truth behaves like the property of liquid contained by faulty receptacles for the task at hand?
iiixtheory That sounds like something that an analytic philosopher would be not too happy with (we mostly do analytic philosophy here), but a continental philosopher would eat right up.
I appreciate the distinction. I'm quite big on conceptual blending. Might there be a middle ground that antinomically posits the strengths of both (if not all?) philosophical categories? By following ones proclivity towards truth, could it not be said that subjectivity alone is an unavoidable hurdle in establishing any "absolute theory of truth" that is properly Gettier-ed/JTB-ed into an indisputable axiom of sorts?
Perhaps by starting small with the notion of water being universal to all biological life and extrapolate as far as universality permits? Find some common life ground to postulate further upon...
You're possibly the only other human I've stumbled upon that even knows what the current state of philosophical inquiry rests at these days. To that I am grateful for even being able to bounce ideas off of each other!
I'm being lazy so forgive me, but in which theories are attributing non-properties of an object considered mu or undefined? Like the proposition "Atheism is red." could be considered false since it's not true but it could be considered mu or undefined too since "red" is a property type that atheism doesn't even have (color) so talking about its color is meaningless so its not false either.
What theory of truth caters to this idea?
Sina Shahbazi Probably Kripke's Tri-modal logic, which allows for three kinds of statements, those that are true, those that are false and those that are undefined, but wait aroudn for my video on the subject and see if that's what you are talking about.
Dude, in reading the (very short) introduction of Horwich's "Truth", you already have upwards of 3 misrepresentations the video makes. I recommend you don't let this be your only reference to deflationism.
Isn’t this a whole lot of parsing and argument considering what deflationism is supposedly doing?
Is saying the truth is simply that which is and that which has occurred a deflationist perspective
do not ever lose your sense of questioning whatever is told to you that's how you find the truth.
Or perhaps you will just find ataraxia: ruclips.net/video/YNFyQD8zxkM/видео.html
are you a human or robot, your voice so metallic?
The Two Truth Theory of Madhyamaka Buddhism is not indigenous to Tibetans, though they did a formidable job of furthering and exploring the debate. Initially, it was from classical India, developed by Nagarjuna.
good video ლ{◕ ◡ ◕}ლ)
siamiam Thanks! And thanks for watching!
+mahmood667 Thanks! And thanks for watching!
Easy way of explaining what truth is
Truth isn't a property.
Truth is when the answer is no longer questionable
Give me an example. It seems to me that we can question everything. ruclips.net/video/Xn0Ns_8DXAg/видео.html
Speak with less words and to the point. don't make the word truth so complicated it's easy.
Why do you think it is easy? What are the necessary and sufficient conditions (ruclips.net/video/ibjL90iY1d0/видео.html) for something being true?