17:29 The parenthesis would adhere to the correspondence of truth, not to the coherence theory of justification - is seeing a spider on the web a belief or one of the rest beliefs that we have?
Do Idealists actually exist in philosophy departments, or are they a useful ontological device to help understand the relationship truth has to a metaphysically distinct notion of reality?
It is quite possible to have a coherent set of propositions, which includes both "Oscar Wilde died in a bed" and "Oscar Wilde was executed by a firing squad". The following suggested proposition should make it clear: "Some times firing squads do not follow standard procedure." Great video as usual.
Ole Hansen Haha, touche. Fair enough. Perhaps I might amend the statement to Oscar Wilde died lying in bed, vs Oscar Wilde died not lying in bed, to avoid clever firing squads.
Thank you for the video. Would you consider theoretical systems such as mathematics to be examples of a coherence theory of truth? Can you give any real-world examples of a coherent theory of truth to help me understand the concept? Thanks.
1. I have an inquiry/objection to the objection at 30:00 on infinite regress. (To be honest I'm not sure if this is specifically about this case of KK regress or just a general issue I have with the KK regress.) Why is it that the pure coherentist's commitment to believing to the nth power that their system of beliefs is believed is assumed to be held all at once, such that it poses a problem? The way I imagine it, it relates more to implicit beliefs and the potential to hold them so to speak. You explained your indirect skepticism and countered the allegation of infinite regress (of not knowing) by saying the skeptic can simply choose to not believe in an infinite number of propositions. In a way sort of similar to that, a coherentist doesn't need to hold infinite KK beliefs. They are available to him though. (Perhaps one of their beliefs in their system is that they must be ready to accept/believe the belief to any nth power that their system of beliefs is believed). So if anyone ever bothered to ask, "hey do you believe to the power 999,999 that you believe your set of beliefs?" The coherentist just says "yup", and that's that. 2. Regarding the transcendence objection, or at least your example on it, I don't find it convincing. (I assume it, and the other objections before it, relate to the coherence theory of truth. I'd like to note I'm not particularly fond of the coherence theory of truth, but I think my question stands regardless of the theory of truth chosen). If a person holds that it is a justified and true position (based on their theory of truth and evidence) that "there existed some number of human beings on Earth 5,000 years ago", then since that number must be a positive whole number (there is no 1.37 persons), and since they hold the necessary truth regrading positive whole numbers being either even or odd, then it can be deduced that the number at that exact point in time 5,000 years ago must have been either positive or negative. Why do they have to "bite the bullet and simply insist that there is no fact of the matter about" it?
1. To the first point, to me I don't know how to hold the proposition "do you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, (continues for 999,974 times) your belief system is true?" To lack a belief in this, you don't have to have some kind of conscious assent to it (I don't need to think about a giant pink elephant with a proof of Fermat's Last theorem on it to lack a belief about it, but I do need to think about to have some belief about it.). Now you might say that this in an implicit belief (ruclips.net/video/uGW-pW4i0aY/видео.html), but I would go on to doubt that such things are really beliefs, and whether or not you can really assent to a proposition that you cannot hold in your mind. 2. The problem is that we are not trying to show that there is a fact of the matter regarding the truth of the statement: A) The number of humans 5,000 years ago was either even or odd. But rather we are trying to prove the truth of the statements B) The number of humans 5,000 years ago was odd. C) The number of humans 5,000 years ago was even. No one has any beliefs which can show that B is true or false, so it cannot be either. A necessary condition for something being true is that someone has a belief about it. If no one has a belief about it, then it is not true. So even though A is true, neither B nor C can be (since no one has beliefs about them). But this creates quite a problem since we should be able to infer from A that either B or C is true, and we should be able to infer from both B and C not being true, that A is not true either.
Hmm. Hegel is dense, and I am not sure I would put him clearly in any of these camps. There is some that I have read that would put him more in line with correspondence (www.cambridge.org/core/journals/hegel-bulletin/article/abs/hegels-correspondence-theory-of-truth/BEE04D95D87F4E7144ABBE6C2BA9B82D), and others that categorize him as a coherence theorist (philpapers.org/rec/WALTCT). Others still might argue that correspondence and coherence are merely the thesis and antithesis to some other synthesis (whether that is deflationary truth, pragmatic truth, or something else, will depend on who you ask).
Such a missed opportunity you didn't touch on the neutral monist's approach to either identity or coherence truths. They are arguably WAY more defensible than the idealist examples you gave on both videos.
If the largest set of beliefs held by people is the one beliefs need to cohere with in order to be true, then something funny follows: most people accept the correspondence theory of truth. This means that, according to that branch of the coherence threory of truth, the correspondence theory of truth is probably true.
Very good objection. If a certain version of the coherence theory of truth implied that the correspondence theory of truth was true, and they both could not be true, then that coherence theory of truth is false. Take "the coherence theory of truth is true" as H, "the correspondence theory of truth is true" as R. If P1) H>R, and P2) ~(H&R) then we can conclude: P3) ~HvR (P1, Impl.) P4) ~Hv~R (P2, DM) P5) (~HvR)&(~Hv~R) (P3, P4 Conj.) P6) ~Hv(R&~R) (P5, Dist.) P7) ~(R&~R) (Law of Non-Contradiction) C) ~H
Thanks for this. I gave it a like. It seems to me that this is just a version of correspondence theory that is inflated by a bunch of variables that are self-consistent which is itself a type of correspondence, but just different than a subjective-objective correspondence.
34:02 if you grant that their is an infinite number of facts( according to the correspondence theorist) why can’t you grant an infinite number of beliefs about those facts? If we were infinite beings, we would have infinite beliefs of those infinite facts that exist.
It doesn't look like that ideal set of future beliefs or propositions will include anything about local matters. Consider the following: I go into another room and I hear a crash. I come running and the vase has fallen off the table. I could jump to one of two conclusions: 1. The cat knocked over the vase. 2. The wind blew over the vase. Both beliefs cohere with that ideal set. Furthermore, neither conclusion is determined by my current beliefs. Hence the ideal set of propositions believed in the future fails to deal with a lot of important local truths.
I was under the impression that Peirce's theory was an ideal limit theory. So that a true opinion is unimprovable, and it is produced by a community of inquiry. He's not treating truth as agreement, but as stable agreement given an ideal process of norm governed investigation. At least that's how I understood it. I may be wrong. I'm by no means an expert on Pierce. I'll do some more research in the morning and I'll get back to you. The reading of James was fine. I had big problems with "The Will to Believe" when I read it for my phil religion class.
This video seems like a confusion. And I have no idea what “skepticism” is trying to say. If you say that there’s no fact of the matter as to whether “there were an even number of humans at some time Tn” you don’t have to deny the LEM, that’s just a confusion. You can be a holistic verificationist about meaning.
His explanation is like a person explaining the rules of dungeons and dragons to a person that does not play d&d . When in reality it is not important to know the rules of d&d. Go outside and touch a tree. Every human in the world will describe that they touched a physical object and the texture will be similar to all.
I'm not sure if d&d is a metaphor, or an actual example of the point you're trying to make? Are you saying that he's missing the forest for the trees, or that this area of philosophy is taken far to seriously, or prioritized, without merit?
The problem is that people don't just go outside and touch a tree. They still try to understand complex ideas with a very poor capacity of reasoning, and so they misunderstand them, and spread them, then someone applies them wrong... and problems occur. So, the point is... keeping things simple would be nice if you just could prohibit people from touching anything complex, but you can't. Actually, like the discourse from the movie "a few good men" (YOU CAN'T HANDLE THE TRUTH!), the point is people live under a blanket of simplicity, when they really depend on complex machines, ideas, and such. They may not realize the complexities supporting their comfortable simplistic view of the world, but it's there underneath... and some people have to dwell in it to keep things "in order". The point is not when they go outside and touch a tree, but what they had been doing while inside.
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17:29 The parenthesis would adhere to the correspondence of truth, not to the coherence theory of justification - is seeing a spider on the web a belief or one of the rest beliefs that we have?
Do Idealists actually exist in philosophy departments, or are they a useful ontological device to help understand the relationship truth has to a metaphysically distinct notion of reality?
Hahhh
It is quite possible to have a coherent set of propositions, which includes both "Oscar Wilde died in a bed" and "Oscar Wilde was executed by a firing squad". The following suggested proposition should make it clear: "Some times firing squads do not follow standard procedure."
Great video as usual.
Ole Hansen Haha, touche. Fair enough. Perhaps I might amend the statement to Oscar Wilde died lying in bed, vs Oscar Wilde died not lying in bed, to avoid clever firing squads.
Thank you for this video! The Stanford article I've been trying to read was a bit dense. You broke it down nicely.
+Jesse Baumberger Also, spider god was amusing.
+Jesse Baumberger I'm glad to help. Thanks for watching!
Thank you for the video. Would you consider theoretical systems such as mathematics to be examples of a coherence theory of truth? Can you give any real-world examples of a coherent theory of truth to help me understand the concept? Thanks.
What about Susan Haack's Foundherentism?
1. I have an inquiry/objection to the objection at 30:00 on infinite regress. (To be honest I'm not sure if this is specifically about this case of KK regress or just a general issue I have with the KK regress.) Why is it that the pure coherentist's commitment to believing to the nth power that their system of beliefs is believed is assumed to be held all at once, such that it poses a problem?
The way I imagine it, it relates more to implicit beliefs and the potential to hold them so to speak. You explained your indirect skepticism and countered the allegation of infinite regress (of not knowing) by saying the skeptic can simply choose to not believe in an infinite number of propositions. In a way sort of similar to that, a coherentist doesn't need to hold infinite KK beliefs. They are available to him though. (Perhaps one of their beliefs in their system is that they must be ready to accept/believe the belief to any nth power that their system of beliefs is believed). So if anyone ever bothered to ask, "hey do you believe to the power 999,999 that you believe your set of beliefs?" The coherentist just says "yup", and that's that.
2. Regarding the transcendence objection, or at least your example on it, I don't find it convincing. (I assume it, and the other objections before it, relate to the coherence theory of truth. I'd like to note I'm not particularly fond of the coherence theory of truth, but I think my question stands regardless of the theory of truth chosen).
If a person holds that it is a justified and true position (based on their theory of truth and evidence) that "there existed some number of human beings on Earth 5,000 years ago", then since that number must be a positive whole number (there is no 1.37 persons), and since they hold the necessary truth regrading positive whole numbers being either even or odd, then it can be deduced that the number at that exact point in time 5,000 years ago must have been either positive or negative. Why do they have to "bite the bullet and simply insist that there is no fact of the matter about" it?
1. To the first point, to me I don't know how to hold the proposition
"do you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, you believe that, (continues for 999,974 times) your belief system is true?"
To lack a belief in this, you don't have to have some kind of conscious assent to it (I don't need to think about a giant pink elephant with a proof of Fermat's Last theorem on it to lack a belief about it, but I do need to think about to have some belief about it.). Now you might say that this in an implicit belief (ruclips.net/video/uGW-pW4i0aY/видео.html), but I would go on to doubt that such things are really beliefs, and whether or not you can really assent to a proposition that you cannot hold in your mind.
2. The problem is that we are not trying to show that there is a fact of the matter regarding the truth of the statement:
A) The number of humans 5,000 years ago was either even or odd.
But rather we are trying to prove the truth of the statements
B) The number of humans 5,000 years ago was odd.
C) The number of humans 5,000 years ago was even.
No one has any beliefs which can show that B is true or false, so it cannot be either. A necessary condition for something being true is that someone has a belief about it. If no one has a belief about it, then it is not true. So even though A is true, neither B nor C can be (since no one has beliefs about them). But this creates quite a problem since we should be able to infer from A that either B or C is true, and we should be able to infer from both B and C not being true, that A is not true either.
voice familiar. cleveland show?
Am I right that coherence theory is Hegelian or at least a theory of truth that fits the assumption of the hegelian dialectic ?
Hmm. Hegel is dense, and I am not sure I would put him clearly in any of these camps. There is some that I have read that would put him more in line with correspondence (www.cambridge.org/core/journals/hegel-bulletin/article/abs/hegels-correspondence-theory-of-truth/BEE04D95D87F4E7144ABBE6C2BA9B82D), and others that categorize him as a coherence theorist (philpapers.org/rec/WALTCT). Others still might argue that correspondence and coherence are merely the thesis and antithesis to some other synthesis (whether that is deflationary truth, pragmatic truth, or something else, will depend on who you ask).
@@CarneadesOfCyrene helpful answer, thanks
Do you have a link for the 100 days of logic video on entailment? I can't find it (unless it's under another heading)
+Emma Slaughter Try this one: ruclips.net/video/do5vRAnntKI/видео.html
Such a missed opportunity you didn't touch on the neutral monist's approach to either identity or coherence truths. They are arguably WAY more defensible than the idealist examples you gave on both videos.
If the largest set of beliefs held by people is the one beliefs need to cohere with in order to be true, then something funny follows: most people accept the correspondence theory of truth. This means that, according to that branch of the coherence threory of truth, the correspondence theory of truth is probably true.
Very good objection. If a certain version of the coherence theory of truth implied that the correspondence theory of truth was true, and they both could not be true, then that coherence theory of truth is false. Take "the coherence theory of truth is true" as H, "the correspondence theory of truth is true" as R. If P1) H>R, and P2) ~(H&R) then we can conclude:
P3) ~HvR (P1, Impl.)
P4) ~Hv~R (P2, DM)
P5) (~HvR)&(~Hv~R) (P3, P4 Conj.)
P6) ~Hv(R&~R) (P5, Dist.)
P7) ~(R&~R) (Law of Non-Contradiction)
C) ~H
Thanks for this. I gave it a like. It seems to me that this is just a version of correspondence theory that is inflated by a bunch of variables that are self-consistent which is itself a type of correspondence, but just different than a subjective-objective correspondence.
34:02 if you grant that their is an infinite number of facts( according to the correspondence theorist) why can’t you grant an infinite number of beliefs about those facts? If we were infinite beings, we would have infinite beliefs of those infinite facts that exist.
It doesn't look like that ideal set of future beliefs or propositions will include anything about local matters. Consider the following: I go into another room and I hear a crash. I come running and the vase has fallen off the table. I could jump to one of two conclusions:
1. The cat knocked over the vase.
2. The wind blew over the vase.
Both beliefs cohere with that ideal set. Furthermore, neither conclusion is determined by my current beliefs. Hence the ideal set of propositions believed in the future fails to deal with a lot of important local truths.
Good objection, it is in line with my objection about odd or even number of humans, but actually has more relevance.
I was under the impression that Peirce's theory was an ideal limit theory. So that a true opinion is unimprovable, and it is produced by a community of inquiry. He's not treating truth as agreement, but as stable agreement given an ideal process of norm governed investigation. At least that's how I understood it. I may be wrong. I'm by no means an expert on Pierce. I'll do some more research in the morning and I'll get back to you.
The reading of James was fine. I had big problems with "The Will to Believe" when I read it for my phil religion class.
Sorry, responded on the wrong thread. I'll cut and past this comment to the other thread.
This video seems like a confusion. And I have no idea what “skepticism” is trying to say.
If you say that there’s no fact of the matter as to whether “there were an even number of humans at some time Tn” you don’t have to deny the LEM, that’s just a confusion. You can be a holistic verificationist about meaning.
His explanation is like a person explaining the rules of dungeons and dragons to a person that does not play d&d . When in reality it is not important to know the rules of d&d. Go outside and touch a tree. Every human in the world will describe that they touched a physical object and the texture will be similar to all.
I'm not sure if d&d is a metaphor, or an actual example of the point you're trying to make? Are you saying that he's missing the forest for the trees, or that this area of philosophy is taken far to seriously, or prioritized, without merit?
The problem is that people don't just go outside and touch a tree. They still try to understand complex ideas with a very poor capacity of reasoning, and so they misunderstand them, and spread them, then someone applies them wrong... and problems occur. So, the point is... keeping things simple would be nice if you just could prohibit people from touching anything complex, but you can't. Actually, like the discourse from the movie "a few good men" (YOU CAN'T HANDLE THE TRUTH!), the point is people live under a blanket of simplicity, when they really depend on complex machines, ideas, and such. They may not realize the complexities supporting their comfortable simplistic view of the world, but it's there underneath... and some people have to dwell in it to keep things "in order". The point is not when they go outside and touch a tree, but what they had been doing while inside.
Maybe, but I'm a philosophy major, I get what he's saying, and it helped me write a 2,000 page paper in a few hours lol
subbed.
joe bob Awesome! Thanks for watching!