11:27 - the reason why Gavin didn't have a drop zone to the north of the bridge is answered in his interview with Cornelius Ryan: 'The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. For days afterward, the division was completely disorganized.' (Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967. James Maurice Gavin, Box 101 Folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University) Gavin's rationale was to have his three parachute regiments land together in a "power center" to avoid dispersal and help assemble quickly, and have the battalions then fan out towards their objectives. 11:33 - for the bridge at Grave, the highly experienced 504th CO, Colonel Reuben Tucker, insisted on a special drop zone for one company to drop near the south end of the Maas bridge, and Gavin granted it.
12:28 - about 750 Germans in Nijmegen on 17 September is a figure often quoted in the literature for Kampfgruppe Hencke*, mainly consisting of second and third rate troops on the Maas-Waal canal, which was the main line of resistance (MLR) in the area - it linked the River Waal defence line west to the North Sea and the River Maas line south to Maastricht. Most of these troops later withdrew into Nijmegen and were incorporated into the defence of the city centre and the two Waal bridges, but only after they were dispossessed of the canal bridges on 17-18 September by 82nd Airborne as they were taking their objectives on the canal. When the 82nd Airborne first landed between 1300-1400 hrs, two regiments (505th and 508th) had effectively dropped in the German rear behind the Maas-Waal canal MLR and had a clear run into the city - if only they had taken it, and one regiment (504th) landed in front of the line. Between 1300 and about 1830 hrs, the German rear echelon troops in Nijmegen itself evacuated the city, this was mainly the BdO (Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei) - the headquarters of the German Order Police in the Netherlands (prviously in Den Haag until 1943), equivalent to a division HQ and based at the Oud Burgerengasthuis (Old Civil Hospital) on Molenstraat under the command of Generalmajor der Polizei Hellmuth Mascus. Also, the Ortskommandantur 869 (Nymwegen), the local military command under Hauptmann Hagemeister, had evacuated the dominicus monastery on Dennenstraat. The BdO evacuated by 1830 to their training base at Schalkhaar near Deventer, and then more permanent quarters at Zwolle, while Hagemeister was said to be the first to flee and went to Elst - about halfway to Arnhem, but I have no idea if he stayed there long. The BdO sent their small Infanterie-Stabswache (infantry guard section) to Apeldoorn to join a police company that went to Arnhem (joining the SS-Kampfgruppe Krafft), but left behind their Muskikkorps-Zug of 30-40 musicians, who reinforced the bridge guard, according to Gernot Traupel of SS-Kampfgruppe Reinhold (10.SS-Panzer-Division) who noted their presence after he arrived in the city. Traupel also noted there were no combat troops to defend the bridge at all, just some senior staff officers standing around discussing what to do, and there was a heavy Flak position on the polder east of the bridge which was later relocated in the anti-tank role. He was surprised to find Gräbner's almost entire SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 in the city with about 30 armoured vehicles, and these had arrived shortly before as it had got dark, probably around 2000 hrs. Traupel's account of the defence of Nijmegen is in Retake Arnhem Bridge - An Illustrated History of Kampfgruppe Knaust September to October 1944, by Bob Gerritsen and Scott Revell (2010). So, the critical time for the bridge to be grabbed, possibly without having to fire a shot, was between about 1830 and 2000 hrs on the evening of 17 September, and three Scouts from the 1st Battalion S-2 Section 508th apparently did this on their own, which proves the point it was possible, but obviously couldn't stay without reinforcements. *I'm currently studying the 82nd Airborne G-2 (Intel) and G-3 (Operations) documents available from PaperlessArchives for about twelve dollars, and nowhere does Fallschirm Oberst Fritz Hencke get a personal mention, although some PWs were taken from his (alleged) unit Fallschirm-Jäger-Ausbildings-und-Erstaz-Regiment 1 (destroyed in France and about 120-170 survivors were in the Nijmegen area). The defence of this sector was said to be led by Fallschirm Oberst Günther Hartung of the Lehrstabes für Offizierausbildung des Fallschirm-A.O.K. (Officer Training Staff of the Parachute Army Command), which was located in the NEBO monastery near De Ploeg, and evacuated as the 1st Battalion and Regiment HQ of the 508th took over the area. Hencke may be a misidentification, or they are conflated somehow. I have checked both officer's career records and Hartung had seniority in grade by two months (1942), which would settle who's in charge if both were present.
16:00 - my understanding is that Gavin had first suggested putting some of his troops across the Waal in boats at the first command conference after the XXX Corps linkup on 19 September, but Browning rejected the idea in favour of a combined armour infantry assault by Grenadier Guards and Vandervoort's 2nd Battalion 505th on both bridges from the south. Two such attempts were made and were unsuccessful, and it was then that Gavin suggested the river assault again and it was accepted for an attack the next day. It's interesting that there was a default plan for every bridge and every permutation of scenarios, if the bridge was blown and the site in friendly hands, or site in enemy hands, or the bridge was intact but in enemy hands. For the latter scenario on the Waal, the default plans were for one or two brigade crossings by 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division, which had one battalion in each brigade fully mobilised in amphibious DUKWs for river assaults, and the follow-up battalions to use assault boats. It seems that Gavin's offer of his own troops, despite not being trained for river crossings, was accepted as an expedient instead of waiting for 43rd Division to be brought up, but they were put on standby for the default engineer planned operation BASIL to be conducted on the Waal. I believe Gavin's insistent request to use his own 504th troops for the crossing was to make amends for the blunder with the 508th on D-Day. Source: Special Bridging Force - Engineers Under XXX Corps in Operation Market Garden, John Sliz (2021)
6:00 - James, it was a reinforced platoon based on Lt Robert Weaver's 3rd Platoon of C Company (Weaver was selected because he had performed well in Normandy), plus the Battlion S-2 (Intel) Section under Lt Lee Frigo, a couple of squads from the battalion LMG Platoon, and an SCR-300 radio and operator from battalion. It was a pre-planned recon patrol to the Waal highway bridge to report on its condition. I believe this planned patrol pre-dated Gavin's claimed instruction on 15 September (as the divisional plan was shaping up nicely in his words) to send the 1st Battalion directly to the bridge as soon as practical after landing - and this was the instruction Lindquist misinterpeted, because he thought he was to clear the drop Zone (a job being done by D Company of 2nd Battalion) and secure his other objectives (De Ploeg, De Hut and Berg-en-Dal by the three battalions along the Groesbeek ridge) before sending any large force to the bridge. When Gavin found out the 1st Battalion was not moving, he went immediately to the 508th CP to confront Lindquist with the words "I told you to move with speed", and it was then that 1st Battalion with HQ, A and B Companies assembled and moved into the city, but this took time and it was too late to get to the bridge before 10.SS-Panzer-Division moved in. The recon patrol had got split up and lost in the back streets while just a three-man point team from the S-2 Section under PFC Joe Atkins reached the bridge, surprised seven guards at the southern end and took them prisoner without firing a shot. They waited about an hour until it got dark and nobody showed up to reinsforve them, so they decided they could not hold the bridge against any counter-attack and should withdraw. As they were leaving, they could hear "heavy equipment" arriving at the other side. By the time Weaver obtained a guide from the Dutch resistance, it was after dark and they bumped German troops as they tried to approach the bridge and took some casualties, losing three men. At this point they managed to receive a radio message that two companies were on the way to the bridge, so they also decided to withdraw. Lindquist had not performed well in Normandy and Alexander was a replacement XO from the 505th after the 508th's original XO was reported combat ineffective by the regimental medical officer on D-Day and court-martialled by division CO Matthew Ridgeway. He was transferred out of the Airborne and went to a regular infantry regiment, where he was later killed in the Hürtgen Forest. These details can be obtained from a combination of three books: September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus (2012) Put Us Down In Hell - The Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012) The 508th Connection, Zig Boroughs (2013), chapter 6 - Nijmegen Bridge Both McManus and Nordyke have different first hand witnesses in the final divisional briefing where Gavin instructed Lindquist to send a battalion directly to the bridge, confirming his 1945 letter to US Army Historical Officer Captain Westover and his 1967 interview with Cornelius Ryan for his book A Bridge Too Far (1974). It's a shame Ryan did not pursue this line of research and it wasn't until RG's excellent book Lost At Nijmegen (2011) raised the important questions, and then McManus and Nordyke (both 2012) found first hand accounts from junior officers present at the time to flesh out the story.
Conratulations you find the only Dutchman that doesn't blame bernard and run with it. Here's a proper tutorial - a Dutchman with an actual PhD in history. And not a photographer that couldn't identify an M-1. Robert Kershaw is also quoted - who interviewed the Germans in his excellent effort - *It Never Snows in September* Type into the RUclips search bar at the top - *Vain Browning lost 1944 Arnhem battle in Nijmegen: Col. Robert Kershaw & Dr Adriaan Groeneweg* It's only 8 minutes
How about an English author with a PhD and head of defense studies department King's College London. Ya know instead of of a no source slappy Dutch photographer *Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415* After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely, *Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"*
What was it 4-5 tanks showing up then sitting there.Just like sitting on your island and not crossing your own 30 mile wide channel from may1940-june 1944.Revolting as Uncle Joe pointed out and FDR agreed *'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221,SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war *why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further* The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself *Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.'It was a lost chance* 'The Allied infantry were too late supporting their tanks'- *'It Never Snows in September' by Robert J.Kershaw,map reference pages 192-193* The German Defense of Nijmegan 17-20 September 1944.The KampfgruppeHenke initially established a line of defense outposts based on the two traffic circles south of the railway and road bridges on 17 September.The 10SS Kampfgruppe Reinhold arrived and established the triangular defense with Euling on the road bridge,Henke and other units defending the approaches of the railway bridge,and his own Kampfgruppe on the home bank in the village of Lent *A surprise assault river crossing by the U.S. 3/504 combined with a tank assault on the road bridge on 20 September unhinged the defense* The Waal had been secured by 1900. *There was nothing further barring the road to Arnhem 17 kilometers to the North* So why did Carrington chicken out - did he join Monty?The 82nd just lost 51 KIA and 138 wounded to carry the fight forward.And he just stopped
*Monty with the spine of a Gummy bear was no where around to direct his operation that he demanded and got. Not like actual Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student who there and directing textbook counter attacks. Reconstituting new divisions out of shattered ones. Their ability to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome.* XXX Corp didn't get to and cross the Bridge until 7:10 on the 20th over 3 days and 5 1/2 hrs after starting in Belgium then they sat as the 82nd wanted to carry the fight into Arnhem proper. But the Crown calls one "LORD" as in the Carrington - for dick moves like that as Frost's men were fighting on. Unlike dave hack that is the truth.Anything to get his tainted waif bernie off the hook But Monty screwed up even before his bigger screw up *Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river.* In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp, the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed* Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: *"Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine"* *Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure?p. 201-02 General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks, who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors,"Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities."* *Sir Francis De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p. 16* - Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support Operation MARKET-GARDEN, Montgomery's supposed master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was warning, from his intelligence network in Holland, that German armoured units were stationed there.' *Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.170,by R.W. Thompson* *In Early September,Montgomery failed to exploit his opportunity by failing to cross the Albert Canal and advance down the Walcheren Rd to capture the coastal batteries situated along the Scheldt that prevented shipping from reaching the port of Antwerp and delivering critical supplies to the Allied Armies massing along the Siegfried Line. The Germans quickly took advantage of Monty's failure* by sending in heavy reinforcements to the Walcheren area. It would take 21 st Army group more than 2 months to clear the region of enemy troops *Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.171,by R.W.Thompson who was an Intelligence Officer in the British Army during WWII, also lays the blame for the army's failure with the Field Marshall "At the crucial hour leadership was lacking,the decision that only Field Marshall Montgomery could have exercised for which the hour demanded on seizing options and opportunities."*
Poloussen was a photographer and not a historian - the door knob couldn't identify an M-1.He is a novel scribbler.Thesis I left men who were there(Irish Guards,Germans,GIs) unlike this graffiti artist. Gavin's army gave Monty tanks and they give us canvas foogking boats - then for good measure they left the bridging equipment in the rear. Approaching an objective that has 12-13 bridges over rivers and canals.And they couldn't hold the bridge for 3 1/2 days - it was two days tops.This book must out sell the bible in England if it gets Monty off the hook - who as you know was nowhere around. Read Hastings,Beevor,Buckingham,Atkinson all infinitely more knowlegable than this hack who took pictures for a living
Funny you name those historians, all of who have been accused of various inaccuracies and we all know why that is (:-. Strange that Gavin didn't bring any boats with him through his GIRs after having declined coup de mains don't you think? And then why insist on untrained 504th PIR do the river crossing when 43rd Division had trained units ready the same day.
@@OldWolflad listen the only inaccuracies are the fanbois that ignore the USA had to 3500 miles of ocean to supply and fight so your king could go 30 across a channel Why don't you go across and ask the Euros who was it that evacuated from: -Norway,Netherlands, Belgium and France,Dunkirk in 1940 -Greece, Crete,Hong Kong and Libya in 1941 -Tobruk and Singapore in 1942 Ya Empire,sure the world shook in it's boots. But it's my inaccuracies - seriously - set the scotch down
@@bigwoody4704 Yawn (:-. yes we know Britain was ill-equipped to fight in1939, the underfunded army at Dunkirk were given no chance. BTW if the US had entered the war in 1939 it too would have got its ass spanked no doubt. Only difference being you had the luxury of being thousands of miles away. I'm very grateful to all those American lads who came over and fought alongside the British, but you were able to build your forces up over 2 years until you were ready, and by that time the Germans were largely down to their reserves.
Yes british operations were boring and ineffectual w/o the Russiand and GIs pooring in How about a poster from the Balkans whose family lived thru it all THE DIRECTOR Britain was the biggest loser of any participant, only now are you really feeling the effect of that loss. The fact that, in a way - you actually lost World War II. In a pretty big way, one might argue. What was it? A quarter of the globe? You lost a quarter of the globe? Now you're second-fiddle to the Germans again.. they lost less territory than you, in the end. And make no mistake - the Empire was the price of American help. Now you get to be their satellite rather than the Germans'... well, at they speak the same language :-) I can't imagine what Hitler could have done beyond stripping you of (virtually) all of your overseas holdings and influence. And the Americans did that anyway... so... who knows. He does seem to have been a kind of Anglophile.he was pretty consistent about that, maybe he would have left you alone, who the f*** knows. But you hardly could've gotten off worse than you did. Second...Fiddle...to...Germany.
Here are a few book reviews of this carnival barker Polluted or whatever his name is N0.1) OMG!! Where do I start? I wish I could rate it negative five stars. I have read many works about World War Two and Market Garden in particular, WOW. *This guy makes claims that no one has ever heard of then you go to the acknowledgments and it is "combat interview", combat interview? By whom, of who? When? Where? Then he cites the ever wonderful "statistical survey". Done by whom? Of who? At what date and time and place? He also cites an author (Ryan), not his works. So one can only assume he interviewed him, correct? Ryan died in 1974* so not sure how you do that without a shady lady and a crystal ball or something. And he states that in 2011? If you are a serious reader of World War Two historical books then I would not waste your money unless you are interested in what historical works should not look like. I am not sure how a reputable publisher would print it. There are so many provable falsehoods played out as new undiscovered information, I would think someone may be liable. Good luck to my fellow historians but WOW, this one is as bad as I have seen in 35 years of World War Two research N0.2)The author makes absolutely outrageous claims based entirely on uninformed information and mistaken facts, and draws outlandish conclusions that are amateurish and embarrassingly naïve at best. His major contention that had the Waal River bridge been secured when the British arrived at Nijmegen on September 19, the British would have had 48 hours to relieve their compatriots at Arnhem is a laughable observation. I'll ignore for the moment that 76 out of 260 American paratroopers of Company C of the 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion and Company H and Company I of the 504th Parachute Infantry were KILLED, and another 138 wounded crossing the Waal and along the river's far bank in their suicidal effort to get the British across the river, only so that the British could cross the bridge and then STOP for over twenty-four hours on the far bank, adamantly refusing to drive on to Arnhem. Hey, I'll even go the author one further, I'll also ignore the fact that XXX Corps should have been in Nijmegen on September 18. But I'll get back to that one. Meanwhile, I'll address some of his more ridiculous claims. *I'll start with the easiest lie to refute. That would of course be the author's contention that "There is an official statement in which General Gavin admits that he alone was responsible for the shift in priority from capturing the Waal Bridge to defending the Groesbeek Heights." Really? When did General Gavin issue "official statements" after the battle?* If the author ever plans to write another book about Operation Market, I strongly suggest he take a quick glance at British Airborne Corps' Operational Order Number 1. In it, he'll find General Browning's explicit orders to the 82d Airborne Division that the high ground around Groesbeek is the 82d Airborne Division's primary objective, and all the division's other objectives, including the Waal bridge, are to be considered secondary to the high ground. General Gavin did make an off-hand comment that he agreed with General Browning's prioritizing of the high ground, but he never said it was his decision, as it was clearly General Browning's. If I were writing a book about Operation Market, I would have started with British Airborne Corps' Operational Order Number 1. But maybe that's just me. The author's entire assumption of the 508th Parachute Infantry easily taking the bridge if only given the chance, and "Authentic documents however prove that in fact no pre-jump orders were issued, as claimed by General Gavin," is equally libelous. Let's take the latter first, and quickly. Both General Gavin and Colonel Roy Lindquist have attested in writing to the fact that the evening before departing England General Gavin instructed Colonel Lindquist to try for the bridge if circumstances warranted it. *Perhaps there is no official documentation because Gavin's instructions to Lindquist were contrary to Gavin's orders from Browning, which the author has yet to find in British Airborne Corps Operational Order Number 1 through his "well-founded" and "meticulous" research.* And that leads me to the 508th Parachute Infantry. The 508th Parachute Infantry actually landed with explicit orders, and they were the most demanding of any unit, American or British, in the entire operation. The regiment was stretched paper-thin the minute it landed. The First Battalion was to move 5 or 6 miles to the outskirts of south-central Nijmegen, primarily to block the Nijmegen-Groesbeek Road. If the situation then allowed, First Battalion was supposed to send a platoon into Nijmegen to try for the bridge. After sundown First Battalion dispatched a platoon from Company C, which quickly became lost inside the city. Later that night, First Battalion sent Company A and Company B into the city, both of which also became hopelessly lost inside the city, and were thrust into a firefight with elements of both Colonel Henke's defenders, and the arriving 9 SS Panzer Division's armored reconnaissance battalion. By sunrise they had made no progress toward the bridge when General Gavin started receiving reports of a German assault against the landing zones. That would be the assault the author describes as "the German attack was only local and there was no need for the withdrawal of the three companies in Nijmegen who were making good progress in capturing the Waal Bridge." Well, as we have just seen, the two, not three companies were hardly making "good progress in capturing the Wall bridge." They were in fact, stopped cold in their tracks. And "the German attack that was only local," did overrun and nearly annihilate the 508th Parachute Infantry's Company D which had been left behind to hold the landing zones, and did consist of three full non-local kampfgruppe or 250-300 men each with twenty non-local armored vehicles (Pumas) supported by nearly a non-local regiment of artillery. The 508th Parachute Infantry's Company G was in a perfect assault position, amazingly the author got that much correct. But it's hardly that simple when you're conducting a major combat operation. Company G was nearly alone in guarding the 82d Airborne Division's eastern flank, specifically the critical road out of Cleve in Germany. *The very road that the Germans utilized a day later to launch another "non-local" attack which consumed all of the 508th Parachute Infantry, and eventually the British Coldstream Guards for three full days - yet no mention of that.* Strangely, in all the author's "meticulous research" he missed two salient facts. General Gavin initially planned a coup de main against the Waal bridge on September 17 by jumping the 508th Parachute Infantry's Company B, followed by two gliders carrying a pair of 37mm antitank guns. But General Browning and the Air Corps strenuously objected, and joined to have the plan scrapped. The author's "meticulous research" also missed General Gavin's having devised a two-prong attack to capture the bridge on September 18 by moving elements of the 504th Parachute Infantry down from the north, and elements of the 508th Parachute Infantry up from the south. But General Browning quickly vetoed the plan. Sadly, the 504th Parachute Infantry's proposed route would have brought it into contact with a then virtually undefended railroad bridge. If the author is that interested in finding an element of Operation Market "Lost," I strongly suggest he look much further south. He can begin at the tiny village of Elst. Or he can spend his "meticulous research" analyzing the British 1st Airborne Division's operations, and explain how two-thirds of an entire airborne division were initially blocked from reaching the bridge in Arnhem by a para-military police force, and handful of converted German flack gunners, and a German training company. But I'd start with Elst, and explain an entire armored corps being held up for an entire day by a pair of 8mm guns. Much was "lost" in Operation Market. But little of it involved the American operations. While the British airborne division struggled to seize a single bridge at Arnhem, the 82d Airborne Division captured five bridges across an area of twenty-five square miles, and two of those bridges were larger than the bridge in Arnhem. British XXX Corps decided to stop and rest and maintain its tanks for the night south of Eindhoven, throwing their entire drive irrecoverably behind schedule. A second division could have easily leap-frogged the lead division to maintain the momentum of the drive. But they failed to do so of World War Two historical books then I would not waste your money unless you are interested in what historical works should not look like. I am not sure how a reputable publisher would print it. There are so many provable falsehoods played out as new undiscovered information, I would think someone may be liable. Good luck to my fellow historians but WOW, this one is as bad as I have seen in 35 years of World War Two research
![[SFM] Risky Recital](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/RzNkY1_Nk3o/mqdefault.jpg)
11:27 - the reason why Gavin didn't have a drop zone to the north of the bridge is answered in his interview with Cornelius Ryan:
'The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. For days afterward, the division was completely disorganized.'
(Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967. James Maurice Gavin, Box 101 Folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University)
Gavin's rationale was to have his three parachute regiments land together in a "power center" to avoid dispersal and help assemble quickly, and have the battalions then fan out towards their objectives.
11:33 - for the bridge at Grave, the highly experienced 504th CO, Colonel Reuben Tucker, insisted on a special drop zone for one company to drop near the south end of the Maas bridge, and Gavin granted it.
12:28 - about 750 Germans in Nijmegen on 17 September is a figure often quoted in the literature for Kampfgruppe Hencke*, mainly consisting of second and third rate troops on the Maas-Waal canal, which was the main line of resistance (MLR) in the area - it linked the River Waal defence line west to the North Sea and the River Maas line south to Maastricht. Most of these troops later withdrew into Nijmegen and were incorporated into the defence of the city centre and the two Waal bridges, but only after they were dispossessed of the canal bridges on 17-18 September by 82nd Airborne as they were taking their objectives on the canal.
When the 82nd Airborne first landed between 1300-1400 hrs, two regiments (505th and 508th) had effectively dropped in the German rear behind the Maas-Waal canal MLR and had a clear run into the city - if only they had taken it, and one regiment (504th) landed in front of the line. Between 1300 and about 1830 hrs, the German rear echelon troops in Nijmegen itself evacuated the city, this was mainly the BdO (Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei) - the headquarters of the German Order Police in the Netherlands (prviously in Den Haag until 1943), equivalent to a division HQ and based at the Oud Burgerengasthuis (Old Civil Hospital) on Molenstraat under the command of Generalmajor der Polizei Hellmuth Mascus. Also, the Ortskommandantur 869 (Nymwegen), the local military command under Hauptmann Hagemeister, had evacuated the dominicus monastery on Dennenstraat. The BdO evacuated by 1830 to their training base at Schalkhaar near Deventer, and then more permanent quarters at Zwolle, while Hagemeister was said to be the first to flee and went to Elst - about halfway to Arnhem, but I have no idea if he stayed there long.
The BdO sent their small Infanterie-Stabswache (infantry guard section) to Apeldoorn to join a police company that went to Arnhem (joining the SS-Kampfgruppe Krafft), but left behind their Muskikkorps-Zug of 30-40 musicians, who reinforced the bridge guard, according to Gernot Traupel of SS-Kampfgruppe Reinhold (10.SS-Panzer-Division) who noted their presence after he arrived in the city. Traupel also noted there were no combat troops to defend the bridge at all, just some senior staff officers standing around discussing what to do, and there was a heavy Flak position on the polder east of the bridge which was later relocated in the anti-tank role. He was surprised to find Gräbner's almost entire SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 in the city with about 30 armoured vehicles, and these had arrived shortly before as it had got dark, probably around 2000 hrs.
Traupel's account of the defence of Nijmegen is in Retake Arnhem Bridge - An Illustrated History of Kampfgruppe Knaust September to October 1944, by Bob Gerritsen and Scott Revell (2010).
So, the critical time for the bridge to be grabbed, possibly without having to fire a shot, was between about 1830 and 2000 hrs on the evening of 17 September, and three Scouts from the 1st Battalion S-2 Section 508th apparently did this on their own, which proves the point it was possible, but obviously couldn't stay without reinforcements.
*I'm currently studying the 82nd Airborne G-2 (Intel) and G-3 (Operations) documents available from PaperlessArchives for about twelve dollars, and nowhere does Fallschirm Oberst Fritz Hencke get a personal mention, although some PWs were taken from his (alleged) unit Fallschirm-Jäger-Ausbildings-und-Erstaz-Regiment 1 (destroyed in France and about 120-170 survivors were in the Nijmegen area). The defence of this sector was said to be led by Fallschirm Oberst Günther Hartung of the Lehrstabes für Offizierausbildung des Fallschirm-A.O.K. (Officer Training Staff of the Parachute Army Command), which was located in the NEBO monastery near De Ploeg, and evacuated as the 1st Battalion and Regiment HQ of the 508th took over the area. Hencke may be a misidentification, or they are conflated somehow. I have checked both officer's career records and Hartung had seniority in grade by two months (1942), which would settle who's in charge if both were present.
16:00 - my understanding is that Gavin had first suggested putting some of his troops across the Waal in boats at the first command conference after the XXX Corps linkup on 19 September, but Browning rejected the idea in favour of a combined armour infantry assault by Grenadier Guards and Vandervoort's 2nd Battalion 505th on both bridges from the south. Two such attempts were made and were unsuccessful, and it was then that Gavin suggested the river assault again and it was accepted for an attack the next day.
It's interesting that there was a default plan for every bridge and every permutation of scenarios, if the bridge was blown and the site in friendly hands, or site in enemy hands, or the bridge was intact but in enemy hands. For the latter scenario on the Waal, the default plans were for one or two brigade crossings by 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division, which had one battalion in each brigade fully mobilised in amphibious DUKWs for river assaults, and the follow-up battalions to use assault boats. It seems that Gavin's offer of his own troops, despite not being trained for river crossings, was accepted as an expedient instead of waiting for 43rd Division to be brought up, but they were put on standby for the default engineer planned operation BASIL to be conducted on the Waal. I believe Gavin's insistent request to use his own 504th troops for the crossing was to make amends for the blunder with the 508th on D-Day.
Source:
Special Bridging Force - Engineers Under XXX Corps in Operation Market Garden, John Sliz (2021)
like the us in the Saarland, the germans would have reacted violently to a breakout from an Arnhem Bridgehead and stopped a push to encircle the ruhr
6:00 - James, it was a reinforced platoon based on Lt Robert Weaver's 3rd Platoon of C Company (Weaver was selected because he had performed well in Normandy), plus the Battlion S-2 (Intel) Section under Lt Lee Frigo, a couple of squads from the battalion LMG Platoon, and an SCR-300 radio and operator from battalion. It was a pre-planned recon patrol to the Waal highway bridge to report on its condition.
I believe this planned patrol pre-dated Gavin's claimed instruction on 15 September (as the divisional plan was shaping up nicely in his words) to send the 1st Battalion directly to the bridge as soon as practical after landing - and this was the instruction Lindquist misinterpeted, because he thought he was to clear the drop Zone (a job being done by D Company of 2nd Battalion) and secure his other objectives (De Ploeg, De Hut and Berg-en-Dal by the three battalions along the Groesbeek ridge) before sending any large force to the bridge.
When Gavin found out the 1st Battalion was not moving, he went immediately to the 508th CP to confront Lindquist with the words "I told you to move with speed", and it was then that 1st Battalion with HQ, A and B Companies assembled and moved into the city, but this took time and it was too late to get to the bridge before 10.SS-Panzer-Division moved in.
The recon patrol had got split up and lost in the back streets while just a three-man point team from the S-2 Section under PFC Joe Atkins reached the bridge, surprised seven guards at the southern end and took them prisoner without firing a shot. They waited about an hour until it got dark and nobody showed up to reinsforve them, so they decided they could not hold the bridge against any counter-attack and should withdraw. As they were leaving, they could hear "heavy equipment" arriving at the other side. By the time Weaver obtained a guide from the Dutch resistance, it was after dark and they bumped German troops as they tried to approach the bridge and took some casualties, losing three men. At this point they managed to receive a radio message that two companies were on the way to the bridge, so they also decided to withdraw.
Lindquist had not performed well in Normandy and Alexander was a replacement XO from the 505th after the 508th's original XO was reported combat ineffective by the regimental medical officer on D-Day and court-martialled by division CO Matthew Ridgeway. He was transferred out of the Airborne and went to a regular infantry regiment, where he was later killed in the Hürtgen Forest.
These details can be obtained from a combination of three books:
September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus (2012)
Put Us Down In Hell - The Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012)
The 508th Connection, Zig Boroughs (2013), chapter 6 - Nijmegen Bridge
Both McManus and Nordyke have different first hand witnesses in the final divisional briefing where Gavin instructed Lindquist to send a battalion directly to the bridge, confirming his 1945 letter to US Army Historical Officer Captain Westover and his 1967 interview with Cornelius Ryan for his book A Bridge Too Far (1974). It's a shame Ryan did not pursue this line of research and it wasn't until RG's excellent book Lost At Nijmegen (2011) raised the important questions, and then McManus and Nordyke (both 2012) found first hand accounts from junior officers present at the time to flesh out the story.
Conratulations you find the only Dutchman that doesn't blame bernard and run with it. Here's a proper tutorial - a Dutchman with an actual PhD in history. And not a photographer that couldn't identify an M-1. Robert Kershaw is also quoted - who interviewed the Germans in his excellent effort - *It Never Snows in September*
Type into the RUclips search bar at the top - *Vain Browning lost 1944 Arnhem battle in Nijmegen: Col. Robert Kershaw & Dr Adriaan Groeneweg* It's only 8 minutes
How about an English author with a PhD and head of defense studies department King's College London. Ya know instead of of a no source slappy Dutch photographer
*Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415* After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely, *Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"*
What was it 4-5 tanks showing up then sitting there.Just like sitting on your island and not crossing your own 30 mile wide channel from may1940-june 1944.Revolting as Uncle Joe pointed out and FDR agreed
*'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221,SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war *why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further* The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself *Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.'It was a lost chance* 'The Allied infantry were too late supporting their tanks'-
*'It Never Snows in September' by Robert J.Kershaw,map reference pages 192-193* The German Defense of Nijmegan 17-20 September 1944.The KampfgruppeHenke initially established a line of defense outposts based on the two traffic circles south of the railway and road bridges on 17 September.The 10SS Kampfgruppe Reinhold arrived and established the triangular defense with Euling on the road bridge,Henke and other units defending the approaches of the railway bridge,and his own Kampfgruppe on the home bank in the village of Lent *A surprise assault river crossing by the U.S. 3/504 combined with a tank assault on the road bridge on 20 September unhinged the defense* The Waal had been secured by 1900. *There was nothing further barring the road to Arnhem 17 kilometers to the North*
So why did Carrington chicken out - did he join Monty?The 82nd just lost 51 KIA and 138 wounded to carry the fight forward.And he just stopped
*Monty with the spine of a Gummy bear was no where around to direct his operation that he demanded and got. Not like actual Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student who there and directing textbook counter attacks. Reconstituting new divisions out of shattered ones. Their ability to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome.*
XXX Corp didn't get to and cross the Bridge until 7:10 on the 20th over 3 days and 5 1/2 hrs after starting in Belgium then they sat as the 82nd wanted to carry the fight into Arnhem proper. But the Crown calls one "LORD" as in the Carrington - for dick moves like that as Frost's men were fighting on. Unlike dave hack that is the truth.Anything to get his tainted waif bernie off the hook
But Monty screwed up even before his bigger screw up
*Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river.* In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp, the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed* Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: *"Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine"*
*Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure?p. 201-02 General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks, who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors,"Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities."*
*Sir Francis De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p. 16* - Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support Operation MARKET-GARDEN, Montgomery's supposed master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was warning, from his intelligence network in Holland, that German armoured units were stationed there.'
*Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.170,by R.W. Thompson* *In Early September,Montgomery failed to exploit his opportunity by failing to cross the Albert Canal and advance down the Walcheren Rd to capture the coastal batteries situated along the Scheldt that prevented shipping from reaching the port of Antwerp and delivering critical supplies to the Allied Armies massing along the Siegfried Line. The Germans quickly took advantage of Monty's failure* by sending in heavy reinforcements to the Walcheren area. It would take 21 st Army group more than 2 months to clear the region of enemy troops
*Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.171,by R.W.Thompson who was an Intelligence Officer in the British Army during WWII, also lays the blame for the army's failure with the Field Marshall "At the crucial hour leadership was lacking,the decision that only Field Marshall Montgomery could have exercised for which the hour demanded on seizing options and opportunities."*
Poloussen was a photographer and not a historian - the door knob couldn't identify an M-1.He is a novel scribbler.Thesis I left men who were there(Irish Guards,Germans,GIs) unlike this graffiti artist. Gavin's army gave Monty tanks and they give us canvas foogking boats - then for good measure they left the bridging equipment in the rear. Approaching an objective that has 12-13 bridges over rivers and canals.And they couldn't hold the bridge for 3 1/2 days - it was two days tops.This book must out sell the bible in England if it gets Monty off the hook - who as you know was nowhere around. Read Hastings,Beevor,Buckingham,Atkinson all infinitely more knowlegable than this hack who took pictures for a living
Funny you name those historians, all of who have been accused of various inaccuracies and we all know why that is (:-.
Strange that Gavin didn't bring any boats with him through his GIRs after having declined coup de mains don't you think? And then why insist on untrained 504th PIR do the river crossing when 43rd Division had trained units ready the same day.
@@OldWolflad listen the only inaccuracies are the fanbois that ignore the USA had to 3500 miles of ocean to supply and fight so your king could go 30 across a channel
Why don't you go across and ask the Euros who was it that evacuated from:
-Norway,Netherlands, Belgium and France,Dunkirk in 1940
-Greece, Crete,Hong Kong and Libya in 1941
-Tobruk and Singapore in 1942
Ya Empire,sure the world shook in it's boots. But it's my inaccuracies - seriously - set the scotch down
@@bigwoody4704 Yawn (:-.
yes we know Britain was ill-equipped to fight in1939, the underfunded army at Dunkirk were given no chance. BTW if the US had entered the war in 1939 it too would have got its ass spanked no doubt. Only difference being you had the luxury of being thousands of miles away. I'm very grateful to all those American lads who came over and fought alongside the British, but you were able to build your forces up over 2 years until you were ready, and by that time the Germans were largely down to their reserves.
Yes british operations were boring and ineffectual w/o the Russiand and GIs pooring in
How about a poster from the Balkans whose family lived thru it all
THE DIRECTOR
Britain was the biggest loser of any participant, only now are you really feeling the effect of that loss. The fact that, in a way - you actually lost World War II. In a pretty big way, one might argue.
What was it? A quarter of the globe? You lost a quarter of the globe?
Now you're second-fiddle to the Germans again.. they lost less territory than you, in the end.
And make no mistake - the Empire was the price of American help. Now you get to be their satellite rather than the Germans'... well, at they speak the same language :-)
I can't imagine what Hitler could have done beyond stripping you of (virtually) all of your overseas holdings and influence. And the Americans did that anyway... so... who knows. He does seem to have been a kind of Anglophile.he was pretty consistent about that, maybe he would have left you alone, who the f*** knows.
But you hardly could've gotten off worse than you did. Second...Fiddle...to...Germany.
Here are a few book reviews of this carnival barker Polluted or whatever his name is
N0.1) OMG!! Where do I start? I wish I could rate it negative five stars. I have read many works about World War Two and Market Garden in particular, WOW. *This guy makes claims that no one has ever heard of then you go to the acknowledgments and it is "combat interview", combat interview? By whom, of who? When? Where? Then he cites the ever wonderful "statistical survey". Done by whom? Of who? At what date and time and place? He also cites an author (Ryan), not his works. So one can only assume he interviewed him, correct? Ryan died in 1974* so not sure how you do that without a shady lady and a crystal ball or something. And he states that in 2011? If you are a serious reader of World War Two historical books then I would not waste your money unless you are interested in what historical works should not look like. I am not sure how a reputable publisher would print it. There are so many provable falsehoods played out as new undiscovered information, I would think someone may be liable. Good luck to my fellow historians but WOW, this one is as bad as I have seen in 35 years of World War Two research
N0.2)The author makes absolutely outrageous claims based entirely on uninformed information and mistaken facts, and draws outlandish conclusions that are amateurish and embarrassingly naïve at best.
His major contention that had the Waal River bridge been secured when the British arrived at Nijmegen on September 19, the British would have had 48 hours to relieve their compatriots at Arnhem is a laughable observation. I'll ignore for the moment that 76 out of 260 American paratroopers of Company C of the 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion and Company H and Company I of the 504th Parachute Infantry were KILLED, and another 138 wounded crossing the Waal and along the river's far bank in their suicidal effort to get the British across the river, only so that the British could cross the bridge and then STOP for over twenty-four hours on the far bank, adamantly refusing to drive on to Arnhem. Hey, I'll even go the author one further, I'll also ignore the fact that XXX Corps should have been in Nijmegen on September 18. But I'll get back to that one. Meanwhile, I'll address some of his more ridiculous claims.
*I'll start with the easiest lie to refute. That would of course be the author's contention that "There is an official statement in which General Gavin admits that he alone was responsible for the shift in priority from capturing the Waal Bridge to defending the Groesbeek Heights." Really? When did General Gavin issue "official statements" after the battle?* If the author ever plans to write another book about Operation Market, I strongly suggest he take a quick glance at British Airborne Corps' Operational Order Number 1. In it, he'll find General Browning's explicit orders to the 82d Airborne Division that the high ground around Groesbeek is the 82d Airborne Division's primary objective, and all the division's other objectives, including the Waal bridge, are to be considered secondary to the high ground. General Gavin did make an off-hand comment that he agreed with General Browning's prioritizing of the high ground, but he never said it was his decision, as it was clearly General Browning's. If I were writing a book about Operation Market, I would have started with British Airborne Corps' Operational Order Number 1. But maybe that's just me.
The author's entire assumption of the 508th Parachute Infantry easily taking the bridge if only given the chance, and "Authentic documents however prove that in fact no pre-jump orders were issued, as claimed by General Gavin," is equally libelous. Let's take the latter first, and quickly. Both General Gavin and Colonel Roy Lindquist have attested in writing to the fact that the evening before departing England General Gavin instructed Colonel Lindquist to try for the bridge if circumstances warranted it. *Perhaps there is no official documentation because Gavin's instructions to Lindquist were contrary to Gavin's orders from Browning, which the author has yet to find in British Airborne Corps Operational Order Number 1 through his "well-founded" and "meticulous" research.* And that leads me to the 508th Parachute Infantry.
The 508th Parachute Infantry actually landed with explicit orders, and they were the most demanding of any unit, American or British, in the entire operation. The regiment was stretched paper-thin the minute it landed. The First Battalion was to move 5 or 6 miles to the outskirts of south-central Nijmegen, primarily to block the Nijmegen-Groesbeek Road. If the situation then allowed, First Battalion was supposed to send a platoon into Nijmegen to try for the bridge. After sundown First Battalion dispatched a platoon from Company C, which quickly became lost inside the city. Later that night, First Battalion sent Company A and Company B into the city, both of which also became hopelessly lost inside the city, and were thrust into a firefight with elements of both Colonel Henke's defenders, and the arriving 9 SS Panzer Division's armored reconnaissance battalion.
By sunrise they had made no progress toward the bridge when General Gavin started receiving reports of a German assault against the landing zones. That would be the assault the author describes as "the German attack was only local and there was no need for the withdrawal of the three companies in Nijmegen who were making good progress in capturing the Waal Bridge." Well, as we have just seen, the two, not three companies were hardly making "good progress in capturing the Wall bridge." They were in fact, stopped cold in their tracks. And "the German attack that was only local," did overrun and nearly annihilate the 508th Parachute Infantry's Company D which had been left behind to hold the landing zones, and did consist of three full non-local kampfgruppe or 250-300 men each with twenty non-local armored vehicles (Pumas) supported by nearly a non-local regiment of artillery.
The 508th Parachute Infantry's Company G was in a perfect assault position, amazingly the author got that much correct. But it's hardly that simple when you're conducting a major combat operation. Company G was nearly alone in guarding the 82d Airborne Division's eastern flank, specifically the critical road out of Cleve in Germany. *The very road that the Germans utilized a day later to launch another "non-local" attack which consumed all of the 508th Parachute Infantry, and eventually the British Coldstream Guards for three full days - yet no mention of that.*
Strangely, in all the author's "meticulous research" he missed two salient facts. General Gavin initially planned a coup de main against the Waal bridge on September 17 by jumping the 508th Parachute Infantry's Company B, followed by two gliders carrying a pair of 37mm antitank guns. But General Browning and the Air Corps strenuously objected, and joined to have the plan scrapped. The author's "meticulous research" also missed General Gavin's having devised a two-prong attack to capture the bridge on September 18 by moving elements of the 504th Parachute Infantry down from the north, and elements of the 508th Parachute Infantry up from the south. But General Browning quickly vetoed the plan. Sadly, the 504th Parachute Infantry's proposed route would have brought it into contact with a then virtually undefended railroad bridge.
If the author is that interested in finding an element of Operation Market "Lost," I strongly suggest he look much further south. He can begin at the tiny village of Elst. Or he can spend his "meticulous research" analyzing the British 1st Airborne Division's operations, and explain how two-thirds of an entire airborne division were initially blocked from reaching the bridge in Arnhem by a para-military police force, and handful of converted German flack gunners, and a German training company. But I'd start with Elst, and explain an entire armored corps being held up for an entire day by a pair of 8mm guns.
Much was "lost" in Operation Market. But little of it involved the American operations. While the British airborne division struggled to seize a single bridge at Arnhem, the 82d Airborne Division captured five bridges across an area of twenty-five square miles, and two of those bridges were larger than the bridge in Arnhem. British XXX Corps decided to stop and rest and maintain its tanks for the night south of Eindhoven, throwing their entire drive irrecoverably behind schedule. A second division could have easily leap-frogged the lead division to maintain the momentum of the drive. But they failed to do so of World War Two historical books then I would not waste your money unless you are interested in what historical works should not look like. I am not sure how a reputable publisher would print it. There are so many provable falsehoods played out as new undiscovered information, I would think someone may be liable. Good luck to my fellow historians but WOW, this one is as bad as I have seen in 35 years of World War Two research