Dr. Sadler, do you think you could do a short video on St. Thomas' understanding of prudence, especially the "integral" and "potential" parts of prudence? I think it would be helpful for many others out there too in understanding this key virtue in ethics. Thanks for considering. I think it is ST II-II Q.48 & 51. If you can't, could you briefly answer these questions: Q1.) When Aristotle and St. Thomas speak about the "common law" under "synesis" regarding prudence, what is this "common law" they are referring to? Are they referring to state law, or any just law established by any kind of community, not necessarily the state? Q2.) And would they both agree that most of the time this should be kept, unless "EXTRAordinary" situations come up? Hence, equity. Q3.) In regards to "shrewdness" in both writers, they say that it is "an easy and rapid conjecture in finding the middle term". Can you please expound on this?
Here's my video about video requests - ruclips.net/video/vkXKtxleGA8/видео.html As to the rest, you're asking complex questions about Thomistic moral theory, better worked through in a tutorial session. If you're interested in that, here's my site - reasonio.wordpress.com/tutorials/
Does Aristotle believe that a person really can obtain prudence as you described (in all aspects of life). I’m using your videos as I read the Ethics thank you very much.
Hello Dr. Sadler, Do you have a video explaining the differences between Socrates' idea of the relationship between practical wisdom and the virtues and Aristotle's? I've read and reread Book 6 chapter 13 and I'm still having a difficult time understanding. Thank you
In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines prudence as a state (εξις) of deliberating well. However, in the De Anima he puts prudence side by side with opinion and epistheme. This leads me into believing that prudence is not a virtue, but one of three types of hypolepsis (suppositions). Confusing, to say the least.
Maybe prudence is a final stage of the deliberative part, i.e., everything after opinion. Since opinion is not deliberation yet, prudence excludes opinion and is a virtue of the higher deliberative part where deliberation happens de facto.
You mentioned that these virtues cannot be reduced to a science, but couldn't prudence, in a functional application, be more generallyreduced to practical intelligence as opposed to theoretical intelligence within the psychological context?
No - not if you're talking about what Aristotle (and other virtue ethicists) mean by prudence. Perhaps if there's some reductive view of "practical intelligence" in A (not THE, since there's quite a few of them out there) psychological theory, you can engage in that sort of reduction - but then you're using "prudence" to name something quite different
Dr. Sadler, do you think you could do a short video on St. Thomas' understanding of prudence, especially the "integral" and "potential" parts of prudence? I think it would be helpful for many others out there too in understanding this key virtue in ethics. Thanks for considering. I think it is ST II-II Q.48 & 51.
If you can't, could you briefly answer these questions: Q1.) When Aristotle and St. Thomas speak about the "common law" under "synesis" regarding prudence, what is this "common law" they are referring to? Are they referring to state law, or any just law established by any kind of community, not necessarily the state? Q2.) And would they both agree that most of the time this should be kept, unless "EXTRAordinary" situations come up? Hence, equity. Q3.) In regards to "shrewdness" in both writers, they say that it is "an easy and rapid conjecture in finding the middle term". Can you please expound on this?
Here's my video about video requests - ruclips.net/video/vkXKtxleGA8/видео.html
As to the rest, you're asking complex questions about Thomistic moral theory, better worked through in a tutorial session. If you're interested in that, here's my site - reasonio.wordpress.com/tutorials/
You could say under Aristotle that 'prudence' is the most accomplished of the rational abilities. This is where virtue ethics gets interesting.
I like that - "This is where virtue ethics gets interesting." And I'd say, you're right
Educative comments by viewers as the same manner of the video. A double thanks.
Thank you for the great body of work you're putting out. It's incredibly helpful.
You're welcome - glad you're finding the videos useful!
Thank you again.
Does Aristotle believe that a person really can obtain prudence as you described (in all aspects of life).
I’m using your videos as I read the Ethics thank you very much.
eogh seems so
thank you again.
Hello Dr. Sadler,
Do you have a video explaining the differences between Socrates' idea of the relationship between practical wisdom and the virtues and Aristotle's? I've read and reread Book 6 chapter 13 and I'm still having a difficult time understanding. Thank you
I do not. That's more of a topic for an individual tutorial session
@@GregoryBSadler Is that something you offer? And if so, how should I go about signing up?
@@thomasabbott1757 The link is right there in the video description.
First openings would be next week
I think I have seen this dude in a few Tarantino movies.
When I was a high school kid, people thought I looked like Travolta
In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines prudence as a state (εξις) of deliberating well. However, in the De Anima he puts prudence side by side with opinion and epistheme. This leads me into believing that prudence is not a virtue, but one of three types of hypolepsis (suppositions). Confusing, to say the least.
To make things worse, opinion is said to discriminate (γνωριζει), whereas prudence perceives (κρινειν) without discriminating.
Maybe prudence is a final stage of the deliberative part, i.e., everything after opinion. Since opinion is not deliberation yet, prudence excludes opinion and is a virtue of the higher deliberative part where deliberation happens de facto.
I think you’re more confusing yourself by expecting that everything fit neatly together rather than trying to think these matters through
You mentioned that these virtues cannot be reduced to a science, but couldn't prudence, in a functional application, be more generallyreduced to practical intelligence as opposed to theoretical intelligence within the psychological context?
Great piece once again by the way
No - not if you're talking about what Aristotle (and other virtue ethicists) mean by prudence.
Perhaps if there's some reductive view of "practical intelligence" in A (not THE, since there's quite a few of them out there) psychological theory, you can engage in that sort of reduction - but then you're using "prudence" to name something quite different
Glad you enjoyed it
👍
Thanks