Social contradictions: ruclips.net/video/mivZ5augY68/видео.html The incoherence of morality: ruclips.net/video/w4tRgsHcXQU/видео.html The queerness argument: ruclips.net/video/MCM-xhiHg1E/видео.html Moorean shift: ruclips.net/video/i7zt-tEYpoU/видео.html
I did not know about Tiantai Buddhism as an older example of nondual trivialism, but this kind of thing is interesting to consider when looking at the perspectives of current monks, who might have a bias against this kind of thinking, in that it turns nonduality into a permission structure for doing anything, no matter how horrible. Why choose an empty life with a minimal sense of responsibility, versus the life of Sade's libertines? It is all the same.
From the examples you gave it's seems clear to me that the best logic to model "comon sense morality" would be a fuzzy logic. That is logic that asings a truth value between 0.0 and 1.0. It accounts for people merging different moral criteria into one final choice that might be morally grey. Another counterpoint I would give to the moral trivilist is the folowing: At the end of day you still have to take desitions of what to do everyday (even if that desisition is to be inactive) and some of this actions will be moral. Saing that all actions are moral doesn't liberate yourself from the act of picking one of that moral actions (for example killing yourself to send a message). So, because morality can be though as "what sould do" and you always have to do something you always have an implicit moral stance.
@slumlordelly I am a non native speaker writing on the phone with no spell checker. I could use chat gpt, but these days I sometimes prefer to leave it that way to signal that I'm not a bot... Ok, is laziness XD
Okay, as a "lakatosian dialetiist" I would say that contradiction is an act, not a thing. Morality isn't something that is "out there in the world" as a mind independent thing. Morality is derived from simple axioms, such as "people each have a unique set of desires". During the process of serving morality, contradictions are going to be discovered and then overcome. Hence, Morality both has contradictions and does not have contradictions. The truth and untruth of all things as it were. (I really really really loved your 'O' diagram in this video). Let's look at the example of agreeing to clean Verity's house while also agreeing to stay away from Sydney. It would be easy to derive the morality of fulfilling agreements, but when I arrive at Verity's house, Sydney is sitting on the couch!! This creates a moral contradiction, but from this we can now derive further rules about morality. One way could be that when I must do something, but cannot do that thing, cannot wins. Another way would be to do some cost benefit analysis to see which agreement would be worse to break, and then break the other. Picking just one solution would lead to further contradiction, so we would then derive the circumstances in which to apply which rule. And so on. Thus, by using the Lakatos method of proofs and refutations, we can progress the research programme of ethics.
Isn't a utilitarian calculus already a form of resolving these contradictions? Let's say you have a duty to help your sick daughter, and the only way to afford care is to steal. Let's also accept that stealing is bad. If "stealing is bad" is then taken to mean "For any two choices where one entails stealing and the other does not, the latter is the better one", and "duty" gets an analogous definition, then there indeed is a contradiction: The two options are: 1. steal and help your daughter 2. neglect your daughter but stay lawful. By the definition of "stealing is bad", 2. is better than 1., and by the definition of "you have a duty to help your daughter", 1. is better than 2. But under a utilitarian calculus, "stealing is bad" would not entail the above definition. Instead, you would assign to any result a numerical value, for example "stealing" gets a value of -3, and "helping your daughter" gets a value of +6. Then you can compare the two options rather easily: 1. gets the value 6-3 = 3, and 2. gets the value 0 (because you neither stole nor helped your daughter). With this, 1. has the highest value amongst all the options, and you have judged that helping your daughter is better than obeying the law, and all without any logical contradictions - even though there were two moral imperatives that were in conflict with each other. Of course, I don't believe that everyone ought to assign numbers to things to make consistent moral judgements, as the numbers are rather arbitrary, but as a model of how we think of moral questions, this seems a lot better than the discrete models that you described running into actual contradictions in this video.
Perhaps in doing that calculation you must bring that deontological statement into the domain of consequentialism; the deontological proponent may take it that such a statement only exists as a universal law, no numerical value can be attached to it.
The problem then arises with the assigning of numbers. Why would helping your daughter get a duty value of +6, stealing a -3, etc.? Your values would have to be based on something external to the calculus, a theory of duty that you are implicitly drawing on.
There is of course nothing new about the idea that the logic of obligation is non-classical. People have been trying to develop deontic logics for many years and there is still no consensus.
Morality is easy. If something seems wrong then I don't do it. But if I have time to think it over, my feeling about it might change. Conclusion: Don't decide anything sooner than necessary.
Entailing trivialism strikes me as the philosophical equivalent of the clichéd fictive conclusion "...and it was all a dream!". It's just... such a frustrating let-down, yuh know?
Regarding the whole "morality must be action-guiding" thing: I think I've heard some natural-rights theorists motivate their reasoning in a way that relies on the assumption that, as you say, "the world will be kind to us" when it comes to moral facts. The reasoning goes like this (I think it's fallacious, but to them it seems very natural): 1. If (moral principle A) were not true, there would be no non-arbitrary objectively right answer to (moral dilemma X). 2. But morality is supposed to be action-guiding, so that would be a contradiction to the very concept of morality. 3. Therefore (moral principle A) is true. Importantly, that allows the person to get away with _not having any other_ independent reason to believe in moral principle A. They can just say "any other option is contradictory", and that's it.
Deontological theories ascriptive of the state might adopt a pro-natalist stance to boost population, where a non governmental organisation might advocate for rules as reflecting a commitment to international standards of reproductive rights and family planning. Alternatively, they might champion policies that prioritise environmental sustainability and resource management, even if diverge from the state's immediate economic goals that require an increase in population. NGO's are the kind of entities to find instances of moral contradictions given their advocacy and cultural ambassadors both align and not align them to the state.
Social contradictions: ruclips.net/video/mivZ5augY68/видео.html
The incoherence of morality: ruclips.net/video/w4tRgsHcXQU/видео.html
The queerness argument: ruclips.net/video/MCM-xhiHg1E/видео.html
Moorean shift: ruclips.net/video/i7zt-tEYpoU/видео.html
I did not know about Tiantai Buddhism as an older example of nondual trivialism, but this kind of thing is interesting to consider when looking at the perspectives of current monks, who might have a bias against this kind of thinking, in that it turns nonduality into a permission structure for doing anything, no matter how horrible. Why choose an empty life with a minimal sense of responsibility, versus the life of Sade's libertines? It is all the same.
From the examples you gave it's seems clear to me that the best logic to model "comon sense morality" would be a fuzzy logic. That is logic that asings a truth value between 0.0 and 1.0. It accounts for people merging different moral criteria into one final choice that might be morally grey.
Another counterpoint I would give to the moral trivilist is the folowing:
At the end of day you still have to take desitions of what to do everyday (even if that desisition is to be inactive) and some of this actions will be moral. Saing that all actions are moral doesn't liberate yourself from the act of picking one of that moral actions (for example killing yourself to send a message). So, because morality can be though as "what sould do" and you always have to do something you always have an implicit moral stance.
You make an interesting point.but i’m honestly more impressed that you made a good point with those egregious spelling error’s.well done sir
@slumlordelly I am a non native speaker writing on the phone with no spell checker. I could use chat gpt, but these days I sometimes prefer to leave it that way to signal that I'm not a bot...
Ok, is laziness XD
Okay, as a "lakatosian dialetiist" I would say that contradiction is an act, not a thing. Morality isn't something that is "out there in the world" as a mind independent thing. Morality is derived from simple axioms, such as "people each have a unique set of desires". During the process of serving morality, contradictions are going to be discovered and then overcome. Hence, Morality both has contradictions and does not have contradictions. The truth and untruth of all things as it were. (I really really really loved your 'O' diagram in this video).
Let's look at the example of agreeing to clean Verity's house while also agreeing to stay away from Sydney. It would be easy to derive the morality of fulfilling agreements, but when I arrive at Verity's house, Sydney is sitting on the couch!! This creates a moral contradiction, but from this we can now derive further rules about morality. One way could be that when I must do something, but cannot do that thing, cannot wins. Another way would be to do some cost benefit analysis to see which agreement would be worse to break, and then break the other. Picking just one solution would lead to further contradiction, so we would then derive the circumstances in which to apply which rule. And so on.
Thus, by using the Lakatos method of proofs and refutations, we can progress the research programme of ethics.
Isn't a utilitarian calculus already a form of resolving these contradictions?
Let's say you have a duty to help your sick daughter, and the only way to afford care is to steal. Let's also accept that stealing is bad.
If "stealing is bad" is then taken to mean "For any two choices where one entails stealing and the other does not, the latter is the better one", and "duty" gets an analogous definition, then there indeed is a contradiction:
The two options are:
1. steal and help your daughter
2. neglect your daughter but stay lawful.
By the definition of "stealing is bad", 2. is better than 1., and by the definition of "you have a duty to help your daughter", 1. is better than 2.
But under a utilitarian calculus, "stealing is bad" would not entail the above definition. Instead, you would assign to any result a numerical value, for example "stealing" gets a value of -3, and "helping your daughter" gets a value of +6.
Then you can compare the two options rather easily: 1. gets the value 6-3 = 3, and 2. gets the value 0 (because you neither stole nor helped your daughter). With this, 1. has the highest value amongst all the options, and you have judged that helping your daughter is better than obeying the law, and all without any logical contradictions - even though there were two moral imperatives that were in conflict with each other.
Of course, I don't believe that everyone ought to assign numbers to things to make consistent moral judgements, as the numbers are rather arbitrary, but as a model of how we think of moral questions, this seems a lot better than the discrete models that you described running into actual contradictions in this video.
Perhaps in doing that calculation you must bring that deontological statement into the domain of consequentialism; the deontological proponent may take it that such a statement only exists as a universal law, no numerical value can be attached to it.
The problem then arises with the assigning of numbers. Why would helping your daughter get a duty value of +6, stealing a -3, etc.? Your values would have to be based on something external to the calculus, a theory of duty that you are implicitly drawing on.
There is of course nothing new about the idea that the logic of obligation is non-classical. People have been trying to develop deontic logics for many years and there is still no consensus.
Morality is easy. If something seems wrong then I don't do it. But if I have time to think it over, my feeling about it might change. Conclusion: Don't decide anything sooner than necessary.
Entailing trivialism strikes me as the philosophical equivalent of the clichéd fictive conclusion "...and it was all a dream!". It's just... such a frustrating let-down, yuh know?
Regarding the whole "morality must be action-guiding" thing:
I think I've heard some natural-rights theorists motivate their reasoning in a way that relies on the assumption that, as you say, "the world will be kind to us" when it comes to moral facts.
The reasoning goes like this (I think it's fallacious, but to them it seems very natural):
1. If (moral principle A) were not true, there would be no non-arbitrary objectively right answer to (moral dilemma X).
2. But morality is supposed to be action-guiding, so that would be a contradiction to the very concept of morality.
3. Therefore (moral principle A) is true.
Importantly, that allows the person to get away with _not having any other_ independent reason to believe in moral principle A. They can just say "any other option is contradictory", and that's it.
It's 8:08 AM in your place now and you are already awake?
Philosophers wake up early.
Don't believe the other guy. Philosophers don't sleep.
No, philosophers set an upload time.
who told you 8 o'clock was an early time to get up? that's basically standard.
@@chluff He once said in one of his AMA videos that his sleep time is from 6/7 AM to 2/3 PM if I remember correctly.
Deontological theories ascriptive of the state might adopt a pro-natalist stance to boost population, where a non governmental organisation might advocate for rules as reflecting a commitment to international standards of reproductive rights and family planning. Alternatively, they might champion policies that prioritise environmental sustainability and resource management, even if diverge from the state's immediate economic goals that require an increase in population. NGO's are the kind of entities to find instances of moral contradictions given their advocacy and cultural ambassadors both align and not align them to the state.