@@robert9016A child who is an undisputed favorite of his mother among other siblings keeps the feeling of a Conquerer throughout its lifetime. - Segmund Freud
It seems that necessity depends upon the nature of the possible world. I can't imagine that I must exist in all possible worlds. So that is out. Logical necessity is not a convincing proposition. We are left with having to find me in order to prove my existence, and there is very little to pin necessity on.
If "the proposition 'I do not exist' necessitates I exist", then we only conclude "I" exist only in the sense Sherlock Holmes exists since the proposition "Sherlock does not exist" would necessitate Sherlock exists. If Necessitivism asserts Sherlock Holmes exists as an abstract object and not necessarily as a detective that lives at 221B Baker St. Since the necessary "I" only exists as an abstract object, we have not concluded anything about whether I (a person that is writing this youtube comment) necessarily exist.
For 3, doesn't it seem a bit trivial to construct a case where this premise is violated? Like "unicorns can fly" is a proposition that exists, but by a Russellian account this sort of thing is simply false, because there is no object the proposition corresponds to. I mean, like this, if we just predicate over the proposition - say like "P is true" - by the prior standard, if this is true we can infer P's existence; if this is false, we can't infer P's nonexistence, right? So if P exists, P may be true or false, and if P doesn't exist, P is false, i.e. P's nonexistence -> NECESSARILY P is FALSE, therefore NOT (P's nonexistence -> NECESSARILY P is FALSE) = P's existence -> POSSIBLY P is TRUE. I have a hard time seeing how you could make an inference any stronger than "It is possible that I may not exist". EDIT: Okay, I see that the intension of existence is a bit different. I guess then the test for existence would just be whether "P is TRUE" has any truth-value at all then (or whatever predicate you want) no? So like P exists -> P is TRUE OR P is FALSE. Still seems like you can't get further than the above.
The second point of Williamson's argument is falacious. It does not follow that a proposition merely exists by its condition of being true. For instance a false belief could also be said to exist, as long as its subject (i.e. the agent who thinks or formulates the proposition) exists. The condition for the existence of a proposition is, sic et simpliciter, the subject. I also reject the idea that a proposition exists as long as it is just thinkable, since existence corresponds to actuality, not potentiality.
If the sentence, "I do not exist." suddenly existed AND was true in the sense that "I" had to be the one who created it, then I would agree that "I" has to exist. I think that this is the real crux of the argument we are considering.
I think it would have been helpful to note that both Russell and Frege treat existence not as a predicate and that their views of propositions, although compatible with Williamson's argument, are not in similar spirit.
If it's critical to draw the viewer in and then retain them then this philosophy video definite fulfilled the first criterion. But like it! democratic consensus within a marginalised cohort who by definition argue for the love of knowledge: most Philosopher's deny existence is a property of individuals.
I find it suspicious that we are using a property of languages to justify existence. What if Og lived in prehistoric times and that language in any form did not exist. What if the universe ended during that period, necessarily. Then a proposition, "Og does not exist," could never exist in anything but some strange theoretical sense in this case. I suppose that this simply means that Og would have a very difficult time proving his existence to himself. But I'm still suspicious.
The self-referential paradox (the proposition "I do not exist" implying that you exist) does not override the fact that your existence is tied to specific, contingent circumstances. "It is possible that I don't exist" is another paradox that assumes I don't exist in at least one possible world thereby contradicting 'Necessarily, I exist."
A proposition is a logic statement. Analysis reveals it to be true or false. It may be written as sentence, or it may not. Propositions aren't necessarily sentences. I am less clear about the difference between premises and propositions. A premise is a type of proposition where there exist multiple propositions where it is necessary for all the premises to be true for the conclusion to be true.
It would be great if you did a philosophical breakdown of Zappa’s ‘Thing Fish Album’. You could call whatever position you take as the ‘Breifcase Boogie’!
Anime is a great example of where translations are not necessarily propositionally equivalent. In Japanese they may say “pinch” to mean “you just got me out of a pinch”, but this is usually translated as “nice” or “thanks”. The exact propositional content is lost but the vibe and intentions of the character are maintained.
Idk, if you have a contradiction, likely somthing wrong with it, no? I mean, for the proposition "I do not exist" exist, the subject I must exist, or the proposition would not, nothing wrong with that. But in a world where "I" do not exist, that is, a possible world without a conscious being, the proposition simply would not exist, would it? Do we need a better conceptual understanding of I to handle this issue, or maybe of negation? Is that analytical philosophy reaching beyond its grasp? Am I completely wrong? All possibilities, I suppose.
In some sense, unicorns exist. But if we set up a definition of unicorn within the proposition, then I think the video states that it is possible nothing satisfies the definition. So, the proposition, "The unicorn, a magical, one-horned horse-like animal....does not exist," has the object "A magical, one-horned, horse-like animal." So, the definition exists, and the referent does not, I suppose.
Williamson's position seems to be just a variant on the approach to quantified modal logic under which we treat all things as part of a huge domain of possibly existing things shared by all possible worlds. A thing may be actualized in one possible world but not another. But since all things are present in the domain they all exist necessarily, albeit in a rather weak sense. This approach seems to me less plausible than Lewis' counterpart theory, though I suppose it might have the advantage of keeping the modal logic simpler.
In favour by necessity any first-person who says moo says moo as a nod to what elite failure looks like, where the question posed points to the frontal cortex centric view rather than the lived experience that includes the entire nervous system and complex interdependent states within a functional system of selves qua an international system embedded within a world political system.
This argument seems like a bit of a deepity to me. The original conclusion is, "Necessarily, I exist," but then to defend from objections, Williamson says this shouldn't be interpreted as implying that any concrete object that's anything like me exists in all possible worlds - it's just an abstract object that is "me." But in that case, the sense in which "I exist" in those other possible worlds is the same sense in which Batman exists in the actual world - namely, as a merely hypothetical being. I don't think that's what anyone actually means by sentences like, "X exists necessarily." After all, no one would say it's true that Batman exists. It conflates the thing itself with the concept of the thing or the possibility of the thing. I also think the argument itself is a bit silly. Why would anyone accept both Premise 1 and Premise 3? Depending on your view of proper names and direct reference, you're either going to think that the proposition, "I do not exist," doesn't depend on my actual existence in order to exist (if you don't believe propositions like that require direct reference, or if you think they can reference beings in other possible worlds), or you're going to think that my nonexistence doesn't require the proposition, "I do not exist," to be true, since there would simply be no such proposition (the rule that P implies that P is a true proposition assumes that P would still be a proposition even if it were true). Williamson's objection to the true-in/true-of distinction also doesn't make any sense to me. If the objection actually worked, it would destroy all modal sentences, not just "true-of" sentences. After all, if sentences being true of worlds implies that all sentences have hidden free variables corresponding to the world, why wouldn't the same be true when it comes to sentences being true in worlds? In fact, modal logic can be modeled by giving all propositions an implicit world free variable, treating necessity and possibility as universal quantifiers over the world variable, and substituting in the actual world for any unbound variables. So Williamson's objection is just a general objection to modal logic, not one against the true-in/true-of distinction.
What happens if we take propositions to be sets of possible worlds? I know that every account of what a proposition is runs into problems but the argument (as presented) is a bit lazy if it only deals with accounts that are conducive to the main thrust.
What about the null set? You claim that in order to have a truth value, the object of the proposition must exist. But to prove that the null set is a subset of every set, we must prove that every element of the null set (there is only one null set) must be included in any arbitrary set. However, the null set has no members. Suppose we take our proposition to be, "If x is an element of the null set then x is an element of any arbitrarily chosen set," then the object of the proposition does not exist, but the proposition has the truth value, true. I take the proof referred to above to be as self-evident as any one can produce on any topic. Therefore, we have a counterexample. Hence the claim that the object of propositions (propositions must have a truth value by definition, don't they?) must exist if the proposition exists must be false.
8:46 Am I wierd cuz 1 and 2 seems to me unintuitive? 3 seems fine. 1. Seems off cuz not everything is possible to conceptualize, so proposition "X do not exist" doesn't have to exist (?) 2. Again, it seems counterintuitive that proposition have to be made before "X" doesn't exists. I would think that there are limits (like 'computing power') to what can be proposed. And that our non-ability to conceptualise nonexistence doesn't limit it. 3. Seems natural and perfectly logical. So, conceptualisation isn't required to proposition to exist or am I missing something basic? Im dumbest, I know
Can anyone help me in understanding philosphy and below questions i am beginner and someone say start reading hegel first but i know from one of chomsky interview he dissmiss hegel as nonsense can any one tell me chomsky is right or wrong? Can hegel philosphy of embracing contridictions rather than overcoming is correct or wrong? Also is hegel correct in dissmissing kant noumenal realm is knowable as contridicitions rather than some unkowable substance as describe by kant ? Please answer if someone have answer of above questions i will help me .
Well, if you treat existence as timeless and relations, which you have existing simpliciter, as requiring it fot its relata then you unsurprisingly find out that objects are "necessary", in a logical sense. But is this even establishing anything remotely interesting?
At least a sentient observer is necessary for the universe to exist. Maybe all the sentient observers can be traced back (split and continued from) to an ultimate ancestral sentient observer
Necessitism: ruclips.net/video/SBls-V5IQ9c/видео.html
Are there nonexistent objects?: ruclips.net/video/nd3gBPwx7VE/видео.html
my mum says 'yes' :)
@ahukMy mom’s agenda is that I’m a sweet boy that can do no wrong.
*SHE LIED*
My mum sayz I was never sufficient 😒😮💨
@@robert9016A child who is an undisputed favorite of his mother among other siblings keeps the feeling of a Conquerer throughout its lifetime.
- Segmund Freud
my mum says 'no' :(
Darth Vader is your father
my mum says 'yes and no' at the same time (she's a trivialist) :|
This is a necessary comment.
l'm a necessary thing only to myself. Ego and its own.
It seems that necessity depends upon the nature of the possible world. I can't imagine that I must exist in all possible worlds. So that is out. Logical necessity is not a convincing proposition. We are left with having to find me in order to prove my existence, and there is very little to pin necessity on.
If "the proposition 'I do not exist' necessitates I exist", then we only conclude "I" exist only in the sense Sherlock Holmes exists since the proposition "Sherlock does not exist" would necessitate Sherlock exists. If Necessitivism asserts Sherlock Holmes exists as an abstract object and not necessarily as a detective that lives at 221B Baker St. Since the necessary "I" only exists as an abstract object, we have not concluded anything about whether I (a person that is writing this youtube comment) necessarily exist.
For 3, doesn't it seem a bit trivial to construct a case where this premise is violated? Like "unicorns can fly" is a proposition that exists, but by a Russellian account this sort of thing is simply false, because there is no object the proposition corresponds to. I mean, like this, if we just predicate over the proposition - say like "P is true" - by the prior standard, if this is true we can infer P's existence; if this is false, we can't infer P's nonexistence, right? So if P exists, P may be true or false, and if P doesn't exist, P is false, i.e. P's nonexistence -> NECESSARILY P is FALSE, therefore NOT (P's nonexistence -> NECESSARILY P is FALSE) = P's existence -> POSSIBLY P is TRUE. I have a hard time seeing how you could make an inference any stronger than "It is possible that I may not exist".
EDIT: Okay, I see that the intension of existence is a bit different. I guess then the test for existence would just be whether "P is TRUE" has any truth-value at all then (or whatever predicate you want) no? So like P exists -> P is TRUE OR P is FALSE. Still seems like you can't get further than the above.
The second point of Williamson's argument is falacious. It does not follow that a proposition merely exists by its condition of being true. For instance a false belief could also be said to exist, as long as its subject (i.e. the agent who thinks or formulates the proposition) exists. The condition for the existence of a proposition is, sic et simpliciter, the subject. I also reject the idea that a proposition exists as long as it is just thinkable, since existence corresponds to actuality, not potentiality.
If the sentence, "I do not exist." suddenly existed AND was true in the sense that "I" had to be the one who created it, then I would agree that "I" has to exist. I think that this is the real crux of the argument we are considering.
I think it would have been helpful to note that both Russell and Frege treat existence not as a predicate and that their views of propositions, although compatible with Williamson's argument, are not in similar spirit.
If it's critical to draw the viewer in and then retain them then this philosophy video definite fulfilled the first criterion. But like it! democratic consensus within a marginalised cohort who by definition argue for the love of knowledge: most Philosopher's deny existence is a property of individuals.
This video was necessary.
I find it suspicious that we are using a property of languages to justify existence. What if Og lived in prehistoric times and that language in any form did not exist. What if the universe ended during that period, necessarily. Then a proposition, "Og does not exist," could never exist in anything but some strange theoretical sense in this case. I suppose that this simply means that Og would have a very difficult time proving his existence to himself. But I'm still suspicious.
The self-referential paradox (the proposition "I do not exist" implying that you exist) does not override the fact that your existence is tied to specific, contingent circumstances. "It is possible that I don't exist" is another paradox that assumes I don't exist in at least one possible world thereby contradicting 'Necessarily, I exist."
Kane Uploads Philosophy. It's a good day.
I necessarily comment on KaneB's videos
Doesn't "I do not exist" denote a sentence rather than a proposition? I never understood the notation for referring to propositions.
A proposition is a logic statement. Analysis reveals it to be true or false. It may be written as sentence, or it may not. Propositions aren't necessarily sentences.
I am less clear about the difference between premises and propositions. A premise is a type of proposition where there exist multiple propositions where it is necessary for all the premises to be true for the conclusion to be true.
@@he1ar1 sentences are syntactic entities (strings of symbols) whereas propositions are semantic entities (the meaning 'behind' the symbols)
Yes, there is no definite referent
I wish i could say “No”, but the world truly makes it apparent that i ain’t leaving anytime soon.
It would be great if you did a philosophical breakdown of Zappa’s ‘Thing Fish Album’. You could call whatever position you take as the ‘Breifcase Boogie’!
Anime is a great example of where translations are not necessarily propositionally equivalent. In Japanese they may say “pinch” to mean “you just got me out of a pinch”, but this is usually translated as “nice” or “thanks”. The exact propositional content is lost but the vibe and intentions of the character are maintained.
Idk, if you have a contradiction, likely somthing wrong with it, no? I mean, for the proposition "I do not exist" exist, the subject I must exist, or the proposition would not, nothing wrong with that. But in a world where "I" do not exist, that is, a possible world without a conscious being, the proposition simply would not exist, would it? Do we need a better conceptual understanding of I to handle this issue, or maybe of negation? Is that analytical philosophy reaching beyond its grasp? Am I completely wrong? All possibilities, I suppose.
if every being is necessary then freedom and contigency are !
wait a minute it doesn't work
In some sense, unicorns exist. But if we set up a definition of unicorn within the proposition, then I think the video states that it is possible nothing satisfies the definition. So, the proposition, "The unicorn, a magical, one-horned horse-like animal....does not exist," has the object "A magical, one-horned, horse-like animal." So, the definition exists, and the referent does not, I suppose.
Williamson's position seems to be just a variant on the approach to quantified modal logic under which we treat all things as part of a huge domain of possibly existing things shared by all possible worlds. A thing may be actualized in one possible world but not another. But since all things are present in the domain they all exist necessarily, albeit in a rather weak sense. This approach seems to me less plausible than Lewis' counterpart theory, though I suppose it might have the advantage of keeping the modal logic simpler.
Everything that can be referenced exists.
Like that night we had in Paris?
I can’t really imagine myself not existing so in that naive sense, yes.
In favour by necessity any first-person who says moo says moo as a nod to what elite failure looks like, where the question posed points to the frontal cortex centric view rather than the lived experience that includes the entire nervous system and complex interdependent states within a functional system of selves qua an international system embedded within a world political system.
Hmm.. no i dont think so. gonna scrap it
This argument seems like a bit of a deepity to me. The original conclusion is, "Necessarily, I exist," but then to defend from objections, Williamson says this shouldn't be interpreted as implying that any concrete object that's anything like me exists in all possible worlds - it's just an abstract object that is "me." But in that case, the sense in which "I exist" in those other possible worlds is the same sense in which Batman exists in the actual world - namely, as a merely hypothetical being. I don't think that's what anyone actually means by sentences like, "X exists necessarily." After all, no one would say it's true that Batman exists. It conflates the thing itself with the concept of the thing or the possibility of the thing.
I also think the argument itself is a bit silly. Why would anyone accept both Premise 1 and Premise 3? Depending on your view of proper names and direct reference, you're either going to think that the proposition, "I do not exist," doesn't depend on my actual existence in order to exist (if you don't believe propositions like that require direct reference, or if you think they can reference beings in other possible worlds), or you're going to think that my nonexistence doesn't require the proposition, "I do not exist," to be true, since there would simply be no such proposition (the rule that P implies that P is a true proposition assumes that P would still be a proposition even if it were true).
Williamson's objection to the true-in/true-of distinction also doesn't make any sense to me. If the objection actually worked, it would destroy all modal sentences, not just "true-of" sentences. After all, if sentences being true of worlds implies that all sentences have hidden free variables corresponding to the world, why wouldn't the same be true when it comes to sentences being true in worlds? In fact, modal logic can be modeled by giving all propositions an implicit world free variable, treating necessity and possibility as universal quantifiers over the world variable, and substituting in the actual world for any unbound variables. So Williamson's objection is just a general objection to modal logic, not one against the true-in/true-of distinction.
Obviously, my existence is utterly superfluous and most definitely unnecessary.
And I am perfectly fine with that.
What do you think about Medical Nihilism by Jacob Stegenga? Will you make a video?
What happens if we take propositions to be sets of possible worlds? I know that every account of what a proposition is runs into problems but the argument (as presented) is a bit lazy if it only deals with accounts that are conducive to the main thrust.
Seems...
Things that exist are entailed by preexisting things.
Am: I necessary being
Be: in what
At: why me
What about the null set? You claim that in order to have a truth value, the object of the proposition must exist. But to prove that the null set is a subset of every set, we must prove that every element of the null set (there is only one null set) must be included in any arbitrary set. However, the null set has no members. Suppose we take our proposition to be, "If x is an element of the null set then x is an element of any arbitrarily chosen set," then the object of the proposition does not exist, but the proposition has the truth value, true.
I take the proof referred to above to be as self-evident as any one can produce on any topic. Therefore, we have a counterexample. Hence the claim that the object of propositions (propositions must have a truth value by definition, don't they?) must exist if the proposition exists must be false.
8:46 Am I wierd cuz 1 and 2 seems to me unintuitive? 3 seems fine.
1. Seems off cuz not everything is possible to conceptualize, so proposition "X do not exist" doesn't have to exist (?)
2. Again, it seems counterintuitive that proposition have to be made before "X" doesn't exists. I would think that there are limits (like 'computing power') to what can be proposed. And that our non-ability to conceptualise nonexistence doesn't limit it.
3. Seems natural and perfectly logical.
So, conceptualisation isn't required to proposition to exist or am I missing something basic? Im dumbest, I know
My mum says ‘Reply hazy. Try again later.”
Can anyone help me in understanding philosphy and below questions i am beginner and someone say start reading hegel first but i know from one of chomsky interview he dissmiss hegel as nonsense can any one tell me chomsky is right or wrong? Can hegel philosphy of embracing contridictions rather than overcoming is correct or wrong? Also is hegel correct in dissmissing kant noumenal realm is knowable as contridicitions rather than some unkowable substance as describe by kant ? Please answer if someone have answer of above questions i will help me .
my mom tried to answer and ended up making an infinite regress:(
The follow up question: am I sufficient?
(that's just a quip about how the phrase "necessary and sufficient conditions" comes up a lot in both philosophy and math).
No. I'm contingent.
Simple as.
I said so
i just asked mom and she said i nescessary to help her lol
What are your thoughts on Tony Blair?
As to his necessity?
@@samuelmelton8353no
@@samuelmelton8353 he's unnecessary 🤣🤣
@@masscreationbroadcasts He's necessarily contingent on Bush.
No lol😂😂😂
But i do it anyway
Especially during anti Sudoku month
Maybe you're not, but I'm different.
Well, if you treat existence as timeless and relations, which you have existing simpliciter, as requiring it fot its relata then you unsurprisingly find out that objects are "necessary", in a logical sense. But is this even establishing anything remotely interesting?
Cool
Is youtube necessary tho, also is it necessary i press that subscribe button?
It is required, yes
My no says ‘mum’ :|
No
Didnt watch the video.
At least a sentient observer is necessary for the universe to exist. Maybe all the sentient observers can be traced back (split and continued from) to an ultimate ancestral sentient observer