Market Structure and Extortion: Evidence from 50,000 Extortion Payments in El Salvador

How do gangs compete for extortion? Using detailed data on individual extortion payments to gangs and sales from a leading wholesale distributor of consumer goods and pharmaceuticals in El Salvador, Professor Sviatschi and her co-authors document evidence on the determinants of extortion payments and the effects of extortion on firms and consumers.
María Micaela Sviatschi is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Princeton University. She is an affiliate at CESifo Research Network, NBER development and political economy group, the African School of Economics and the International Crisis Group.
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