When I was younger I used to pour over Orders of Battle but I only had Second Manassas onwards. It is amazing how Meade was just a brigade commander here and just over a year later would be commanding the Army of the Potomac.
These newly remastered videos are amazing. The animations, the music, the reenactment footage - truly some of the best military history content on youtube. keep them coming please, I'd like to see some of the older ones updated as well!
I wish Kings and Generals were on the same production level, but using live action in this series is easier than the time periods Kings and Generals teaches.
So glad you all finally did this one!! There is so much content to cover and so many intact historical sites on the Peninsula...especially at Yorktown, Newport News Park, and Williamsburg. Thank you!
These are fantastic. Thank you for doing them. Dates would be excellent and help those that wish to watch in chronological order. And/or a numbering system; though, I realize that might not work unless you know precisely how many you will be making. GREAT JOB! Thank you.
Grew up in Richmond. Two battlefields in the area area that left the greatest impression on me are Cold Harbor and Malvern Hill. The trenches Grant’s charged are still intact. Terrible carnage was wreaked on those Union troops who advanced against those breastworks. After the war Grant lamented ordering those doomed attacks. To look up the sloping rise to Union guns at Malvern Hill makes one question the soundness of that assault. From the 12 lb Napoleons that still line this ridge one sees an unobstructed field of fire. The troops making these two doomed attacks must have been filled with dread. So much history dominates Richmond. The Home for Confederate Women was across the street from my high school. Behind THFCW is the beautiful Lee Chapel, this site is now adjacent to the Valentine Museum. After the war this was the site of Confederate Veterans Camp #1. Next to the Valentine Museum is the headquarters of the United Daughters of the Confederacy. Next to that is the Virginia Historical Society (The Battle Abbey). During my high school days disagreements were settled man-to-man in the mazed boxwood garden, which formed perfect boxing rings. These squared areas left combatants unseen but for those attending. Many an argument led to these words, “meet at the Abbey.” Those gardens are now a parking lot. The statues two blocks away are all gone except Arthur Ashe and Robert. E. Lee.
I really like the videos you guys make! I would love to see you make videos on Second Bull Run, Chancellorsville, Petersburg, Appomattox, Nashville, Chattanooga, Atlanta, Sherman’s March to the Sea, Fort Wagner, Fort Fisher, and Stones River.
Thanks Alec. If you want more content on Petersburg and Fort Fisher, then do we have the perfect series for you: ruclips.net/p/PLZrhqv_T1O1tKyNXoAqU9oEp17sxPK3SA
It can't be understated how fantastic these videos are. Also, McClellan is an incompetent battle field commander. And no one wants to talk about Jackson's screw ups during the Peninsula campaign.
This was awesome and done so well! I want to see more, and I’d like to see some of your other videos, the ones done without this kind of narration and battle map, be redone to be like this video.
The thing about the Peninsula Campaign is that with rivers to both sides of him, McClellan's flanks were secure until he got near Richmond and his supplies could be brought in by ship. Things didn't go quite according to plan but the basic concept of the campaign was sound. People always hear a lot about Lincoln pushing his Generals but they don't hear as much about how much he interfered with what they were doing. I don't know why Lincoln pulled the plug on the Campaign - unless he was afraid that Washington was exposed. The thing with Washington though is that it was very well manned by Union troops and protected by Union Forts. The Confederacy did in fact attack Washington later in the war - but couldn't get past the forts. .
You're quite right Bob. They pulled him back I believe b'cos they wanted to prolong the war. It may have been about money or maybe they didn't want this whig/democrat general winning the war. So they sabotaged/interfered with the AOTP officer corps until they found compliant generals.
One of the main problems was it rained for, what was it, two or three weeks prior to the campaign. And the Chikahomony River was swolen so badly that the bridges the Union had built almost washed away. Add to that Lincoln withheld McDowell's Corps altogether and McClellan was enacting his plans with a large chunk of the troops he planned for, not there.
McClellan said that he'd left ~57,000 troops around Washington. What he didn't say is that he was including Fremont's men in western Virginia, Banks men in the Shenandoah and McDowell's men also SW of the capitol in northern Virginia. Jackson was so slippery and quick that most Union people couldn't believe he was doing all that with just ~30,000 men. Discounting those troops already mentioned, he left less than 27,000 men in the actual environs of Washington, too few, at least in Lincoln and Stanton's eyes. You'll also find that Lincoln interfered with his generals who were actually doing their jobs, like Grant and Sherman. He didn't bother Pope until it was too late, and he was satisfied with Meade until Lee slipped back into Virginia after Gettysburg.
Things didn't "go quite according to plan" because the Lincoln Administration interfered with the operation from the very beginning, all the way up to it's completion. Think of it this way... The plan was to have the climactic battle to end the Civil War, and then immediately Lincoln and Stanton started by withholding 40,000 troops that were in the original plans for the operation? And then refused throughout to give McClellan enough troops to win this "climactic battle to end the Civil War?" As it turned out, they expected McClellan to win the climactic battle of the Civil War with just about a 1 to 1 troop ratio. With Union troops numbering 104,000 and Confederates numbering 94,000. You aren't going to end the war with that ratio. Sounds to me like they didn't want McClellan to have or to win the climactic battle to win the Civil War.
@@frankpotter1982 ....Very interesting comment, especially when you said whig/democrat. It fits my very radical theory. Don't say anything bad about McClellan or you'll get a mouth full from that Joseph Hewes fella. Maybe my comment will shut his mouth. And then you something like people were deliberately sabatoging the war so it could be prolonged, I was stunned, finally I've heard from someone who's finally sees the obvious. Let me explain. When Edwin Stanton went before the Senate for conformation, Senator Charles Sumner, (a well known communist) said, don't worry, he's one of us. And if I remember correctly, there was also a General Sumner in the Union army, brother or son maybe? There were 118 foreign born Generals in the Union army, and most if not all were radical socialist's. And more than a few American born, including besides Stanton himself, McClellan, Sumner, William T Sherman, probably Meade and William Birney, allthough American born, participated in the socialist uprising in Germany in 1848. Charles Dana....He was co-founder of the American Union of Associations, which established nearly 50 communist communes across America. He was one of Stanton's under-secretaries of war. He worked on the editorial staff of Horace Greely,(communist), of the New York Tribune, and was sent by Greely to Europe to pay in gold writers of the Tribune such as Karl Marx and Heinrich Bornstein. This is when he participated in the uprising in Germany. Gustave-Paul Cluseret....Became the friend of Karl Marx and was refered to as the Red General. Participated in the viscious communist uprising in the Paris commune in 1871 that would slaugtered priests simply because they were clergy. Frederich Aunikin....Friend of both Marx and Engles, and a well known Communist Revolutionary in Germany. Joseph Weydemeyer....A founder of the first International National. It is in his home where Karl Marx stayed when fleeing out of Germany. Who then moved the International Communist Headquarters to New York City in 1872, where it remains to this day in the Chase Manhatten headquarters at 1 Karl Marx Square. Carl Schurz....A young communist revolutionary who ended up under the direct command of Carbinari leader Mazzini, and also the head of the Iluminati. He was sent to America by Mazzini, where he was propelled into prominence in the Republican party, which he was clearly not a Republican. ever since the Republican party was created in 1845, many Democrats have portrayed themselves as Republicans in order to infiltrate the party. Probably the most famous was Theodore Roosevelt. As I recall, he first became a Senator in Wisconsin and then served under Lincoln as Ambassador to Spain before becoming a Major General William Birney. Although American born, as you recall participated int the uprising in Germany in 1848. The goal of Stanton and his comrades was not to win the war as quickly as possible, but to deliberately prolong the war with as many deaths on both side as they possibly could. Stanton had way too much power and had the ability to undermine the war effort and Lincoln at every turn. He demanded and got the telegraph office moved to the war department so he could control all information. He was a Southern Democrat and slave owner who sympathized with the south, and he hated Lincoln. I get sick and tired of people who will rush to blame Lincoln for what Stanton was responsible for. With the numeric and logistical advantage the Union had, the war should not have lasted much more than a year. But with these traitors in charge, didn't happen. And Sherman's march through Georgia was completely the work of he and Stanton, in order to create as much death, destruction and division before the was was over. Although people rush to blame Lincoln, although he knew that Sherman was in Georgia, he had no clue what was actually going on. He wanted the war over as soon as possible with a policy of, (with malace towards none). It was not in his DNA to ever condone what was done. That was a communist action. Now, one of the most blatant examples of how Stanton undermined the Union war effort. THE BATTLE OF FREDRICKSBURG In the fall of 1862. The patience of Abraham Lincoln and his cabinet had come to an end. It had been several months since the Battle of Antietam and yet Major General George McClellan and the Army of the Potomac had yet to press their advantage of the retreating army of Northern Virginia under Robert E Lee. On Nov,7,1862, Lincoln removed the popular McClellan and replaced him with Major General Ambrose Burnside.Burnsides promotion came with a strong admonition for decisive action. After crossing the Potomac into Virginia, Confederate Commander Robert E Lee, divided his forces, spreading Lt. General Thomas (Stonewall) Jacksons command across the lower Shanandoah Valley, and placing Lt. General James Longstreet's forces in Culpepper. This division greatly greatly influenced Burnsides next move. He developed a plan for Fredrickburg that would suck in half of Lee's forces and destroy it before the other half could come to their aid. For this he needed the use of the pontoon bridges which he requested from the war department. As soon as I heard that, knowing what I know about Stanton. I knew at that moment, things were not going to go well for the Union. Instead of crossing the river in a surprise attack before the confederates knew what was going on and set up any defensive measures, The Union Army sat their and waited for the pontoons. I have actually driven from Washington DC to Fredricksburg in about a half hour. Downstream it shouldn't have taken them much more than 12 hours. THEY WERE 10 DAYS LATE!!!! By the time the pontoons showed up, the Confederates had called in the other half of their army and somehow knew Burnsides battle plan. And instead of 137;000 Union troop's attacking an unprepared 44,000. It was now 80,000 well dug in troops with the advantage of a great defensive position. General Swartzkoff of Desert Storm once said, an army like that starts out with a 5 to 1 advantage.And instead of a crushing Confederate defeat, it completely flipped into a Union disaster. Many of the troops the south called in were the ones who the traitor McClellan allowed to escape at Antietam. And yes Joseph Hewes, that comment was aimed directly at you!!! The only reason why Lee dared to split his army as he did is because he knew McClellan was a traitor and he had nothing to worry about. I'm ready for you the next time you feel like spouting off.
These videos are so well done! My 3x great grandfather fought throughout the Peninsula Campaign - 101st Regiment, Pennsylvania Infantry - and this is the first video I've seen that really allows me to visualize his service. Thank you and please keep these coming!
Looking back on it 150 years later, I suspect McClellan could have won that campaign if he hadn't lost faith in himself. He won most of the battles, but was always pulling back. Two years later, Grant was just the opposite in his summer campaign of 1864. Grant lost most of the battles, but he kept moving forward to his left. His tenacity eventually lead to the capture of Richmond and the end of the Confederacy.
The fact that, having assumed the offensive, Grant did take more casualties meant very little toward the campaign as a whole. The general movement of the two armies during the roughly two months of the campaign was characterized by the advance of Union forces and the withdrawal of Confederate forces toward Petersburg and Richmond. This continued until the AoNV was besieged.
@@manilajohn0182; where Grant had it over all of his predecessors is that after a tactical setback he didn't withdraw, reorganize, and plan a new campaign. He just kept maneuvering and pressing Lee. Lee had to keep between Grant and Richmond. So as Grant moved left and south, lee had to scramble to keep ahead of Grant and yet keep on Grant's right to keep him from turning southwest toward the Capital. Even Lee admitted that if he couldn't make Grant withdraw north, once both Armies got to Petersburg, the fight would turn into a siege, and then it would only be a matter of time till Petersburg fell, and that would seal the fate of Richmond and the Confederacy.
I would argue that you can cannot say a general is losing his battles if his strategic objective is to keep advancing. He may lose men but unless his enemy makes him abandon his goals, he is not losing.
@@JonathanLundkvist; it's possible to lose a battle and still not lose the campaign, just as it's possible to win a battle, but still lose the campaign. The Peninsula Campaign is an example of that. Remember, Rommel won the Battle of Kasserine pass, but he still lost the Tunisia Campaign.
The video neglected to mention the 40,000 troops withheld from McClellan because Lincoln was afraid Stonewall Jackson was going to attack Washington. Those 40,000 troops were earmarked for the north side of the river and would have altered the landscape of the battle, and in fact, may have altered the entire course of the war.
If McClellan hadn't lied to him about the number of troops left around DC he might have had them. To quote Longstreet on another general, "he's as tender about his flanks as a virgin." So was Lincoln about the capitol.
@@indy_go_blue6048 McClellan didn't lie to him about how many troops he left around DC. It was in McClellan's best interests to make it clear exactly how many troops he left around DC, and especially to make it clear when Irvin McDowell's Corps was taken from him so that he could get those troops back. There was no doubt miscommunication between both Lincoln and Stanton, and McClellan, because they were using different methods to count troops, but to say McClellan lied about is absurd. Most (and I mean 99 percent) historians agree McClellan left ample troops in DC to protect DC. And even in the communication between Lincoln and McClellan, Lincoln conceded that the entire operation Stonewall Jackson was running, was nothing more than a ruse to keep troops from the Richmond operation. But Lincoln still wouldn't release McDowell's Corps to McClellan.
This battle was misunderstood at the time, and is still misunderstood. From a Union perspective, it's the best performance, even in a losing effort, of any Union General in the first year and a half to two years of the war. McClellan held his own, and performed the retreats well enough to preserve his army. If Lincoln hadn't pulled the troops off the peninsula, the entire outcome of the war would have been different. Possibly with the end of the war coming a year earlier. The Confederates could not cope with such a large Army that close to Richmond, and eventually would have succumbed. As for McClellan, he has been the continuous victim of the flawed way in which the battle was misunderstood, and told throughout the intervening years. Even he did not know how well he had performed in a losing effort. It's clear the Confederates won the battle, but did so with such losses that they could not have sustained such losses in the future. In fact, you might even be able to make the case that this was a draw. If Antietam was a draw, then this was a draw too.
Inigo Bantok Lincoln and Stanton sabotaged McClellan at every turn, perhaps even deliberately. They took away 40,000 of his troops to guard Washington defenses, then sent McDowell’s corps on a wild goose chase into the Shenandoah valley to chase Jackson (who wasn’t even there anymore)... this tens of thousands of troops would’ve besieged Richmond from the north, with McClellan’s main force besieging it from the East. Lincoln and Stanton are largely to blame.
It is fascinating to note that Grant used McClellans logistical plan (supply the army by the James and York Rivers) in 1864 and 1865. If only McClellan did not consistantly decieve himself as to the numbers facing him...he may well have been comfortable earning a campaign victory by using Lees aggressiveness against him. Alas, McClellan had flaws. He and Halleck are two fascinating generals to study. Both brilliant at certain aspects of leadership (McClellan being one of the finest logistical generals of the war, certainly the finest the Union had in 1861/1862 in high position)...both with skill flaws that made their performance as pure battlefield commanders suffer.
@@josephhewes3923, you would be incorrect that ALL Union generals vastly over-rated CSA troop strength. Several did, McClellan being one of them. Some did not. Most would base their estimates on some documented information (be that as dumb as Pinkerton reports)...but McClellan's estimates came from his own imagination, NOT even from the Pinkertons. Lincoln gets a lot of rightful blame for his handling of the political / military strategy junction. Though, to be fair, I would place more of the blame on the House of Representatives and their allies in the press. There was a LOT of stupidity in the political arena surrounding the Army of the Potomac and it's goals. McClellan was trying to foster a sense of independence of command and to insulate his army from becoming merely a tool of the political hacks. He failed, and the results of his failure was a growing rift between the Lincoln administration's goals (which prioritized protection of Washington) over McClellan's goals...which then resulted in Lincoln's 'interference' in the campaign. No senior general in a representative democracy can hope to be completely insulated from political concerns when devising military strategy. It was important to the politics that the capital be deemed secure, and that means it had weight in the military calculation...though the relative weighting can be debated (and WAS debated at the time). Chancellorsville is less of a debacle than most think...though that was primarily because of the way the Generals reacted to the political games rather than Lincoln's fault per se. Generals afraid of the influence of the press decided to withdraw rather than force Lee to press an issue he was likely to lose. In much the same way as McClellan refused to force Lee to face the consequences of the high casualties from his aggressive attacks, Butterfield and Couch decided to withdraw across the Rappahanock. Of interest is this decisions affect on Lee at Gettysburg some weeks later. He would again attack the center of the Union line after a flank attack had been close to success. Except at Gettysburg he faced Meade and Hancock, who were much more willing to let Lee bleed for his aggressiveness.
I had family on my mom's side who's unit fought in the Peninsula Campaign. Pfc. Floyd Daniel Young, 44th New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment. How they got his body back to New York is a story in of itself XD
Devil is in the details. Jackson was totally in the wrong spot of the first day of the battle but not due to any fault of his own. Lee based his battle plan on erroneous assumptions and at one point was even using a faulty map of the area. Lee actually never gave a starting hour for the initial assault of the campaign to begin, he (Lee) overall had a pretty “hands off” approach to the whole battle planning. Also, AP Hill initiated the whole campaign on the 26th of June WITHOUT having first connected to Jackson’s units on his (Hill’s) left. This was contrary to Lee’s orders. As Hill lost patience and initiated battle against an elevated and entrenched enemy, Lee was caught off guard and was forced to send additional units in support. It’s amazing how people think that Jackson fault without knowing the details.
@@GSD- Lee never provided a starting point for the initial assault because he left the details of that assault to his subordinates- and Jackson was to initiate the assault. Hill's error in launching an assault without waiting for a sign of Jackson in no way excuses Jackson's error in not being in place on time- and Jackson was given more time than he initially wanted to get into position in the first place. The primary reason that Jackson wasn't on time was due to his religious zealotry. His own wife said that Jackson never mailed a letter on Sundays or sent it so that it encumbered the Confederate mail system on Sundays. At this stage in the war, Jackson preferred to give his troops Sundays off in camp- and when he was unable to do so, he chose another day of the weak to make up for the lost Sunday. This is the same Jackson who said that he never ate pepper with his food because it made his left leg weak- and who, on the last day of the Union repulse at Fredericksburg, suggested that the Confederates strip naked for a dawn assault on the AotP the next morning.
@@manilajohn0182Despite this, I think Jackson was still one of the most dedicated generals of the Civil War and I would still hesitate to place all of the blame on Jackson. Jackson’s forces were some of the fastest moving in either the Confederacy and the Union because of how hard he marched his men. Although he may have maintained religious reverence and preferred not to fight certain days, he still would in many cases and his subordinates claimed that he did little else other than plan, sleep, pray, and contemplate. Jackson’s forces were pushed logistically during the 7 Days. His forces would have already been tired and were forced to make a grueling march through swampy and unfavorable terrain. Lee’s rough timetables for Jackson’s army were infeasible given the circumstances. Granted, Jackson supported Lee’s orders to have him join up on the 26th, however Lee should have seen the reality of the situation and allotted more time. Jackson wasn’t entirely blameless here, but not entirely to blame and you can see why this was overlooked.
@@thewanderingwampa4893 Lee left the planning of the attack up to his subordinates. Jackson originally stated that he could be in place on the 25th. Longstreet suggested that Jackson give himself an additional day to get in place.
Very cool, great overview. I believe that the battle of Glendale is considered by some to be the South's best chance to win the war. The story goes that Longstreet broke the Union lines and Lee could possibly have cut off and captured two Union corps, devastating Northern morale and dealing an immense blow to the Union war effort. But Huger and Jackson moved too slowly and never got into position, leaving Lee without reserves to exploit the breakthrough. The Union army escaped to Malvern Hill and the chance was lost. Afterwards Lee reformed the Army of Northern Virginia and removed the commanders that couldn't hack it. Huger was removed from front line commands and excelled in supply and logistics. Jackson's sluggishness was uncharacteristic, but very real during this brief campaign.
I LOVEEE this videos. I’m a huge civil way fan. Could you please do more and also it would be AMAZING if you could redo your old videos that do not have animated maps that would be AWESOME!!! Thanks
Hi Charles, a lot of our maps are fully animated with narration. Visit or Animated Battle Maps playlist for more: ruclips.net/p/PLZrhqv_T1O1sdxRNm5SNc6cGSWr7xiWZs
I visited all these battle fields. Malvern Hill was a killing field. Steep hill with an unobstructed view of the fields below. Crest was filled with artillery. Worse place to attack other then Gettysburg. What was Lee thinking? Love these maps.
Not to insult Lee (I am after all European) but the more I read about the Civil War, it seems like Lee was a bit of a determinator - meaning that if he had decided on something, he was not a man to change his mind. Gettysburg in particular show this. He was too convinced that he had read General Meade correctly, too convinced that the higher morale of the Confederates would overcome good Union defensive positions. Instead, Lee is too clever once too much and Meade accurately predicts his next move, content to hold the field. If only he had learned from this battle, he might have decided to cut his losses before sending Picket to the meat grinder.
@@JonathanLundkvist Yea, just like Napoleon at Waterloo, thinking the British were retreating, made almost the same charge. Surprise when you get over the crest and the whole British army is sitting there. I think the commanders really don't have any choice in the matter. All things taken in consideration, supply lines, avenue of retreat, and moral of your troops, you have no choice but to attack. Lee though, should have know better, I mean he just saw the Union try this at Fredericksburg, He also was sick from eating too many cherries I heard.
@@Irinrover One of the great details in the movie Gettysburg from 1993 is that some of the Union troops repelling Pickets Charge can be heard shouting "Fredericksburg" as a rallying cry.
@@JonathanLundkvist Yea, they were getting their revenge. I was a re-enactor at that time and participated that year and in 1998. The 1998 was the largest re-enactment of the time. Almost 30,000 participated. It was awesome.
McClellan was not a bad general. He handled his command skillfully and in keeping with military thinking of the time, and really didn't commit any big blunders. The reason for his defeats is the name Lee. Outnumbered, ill-supplied, even barefoot armies do NOT counterattack, much less counterattack after dividing their forces; all contrary to sound military practice. But Lee did - and won repeatedly. I always though that Lee's genius occurred because of necessity. He was a product of the same old army as McClellan, but knowing he could never win forced him to think outside of the box, and do things no General did. It made him brilliant. Being from the same school meant that Lee already knew what McClellan was going to do. But, how could McClellan predict what Lee would do? Winning the war took a drunk who didn't care or know what Lee was doing and used a war of attrition to beat him. Grant knew he had more soldiers than the South had ammunition to kill them with. So, charge! Lost 7,000 men? Well, charge again then... just think of the bullets Lee can't replace. And, it worked. Grant didn't retreat after getting beat; he just forced you to beat him again, and again, making the last month's of the war bloodied than the rest of the war combined. An old Veteran of Lee's army summed it up nicely years later ..."They never whipped us; we wore ourselves out whipping them."
Lee showed the same instincts of command tactics, movement and using the ground you are given during the 1860s as he did in Mexico in the 1840s. His scouting for General Winfield Scott along the trek from Veracruz to Chapultepec led the American forces to find ways around and through the Mexican army that were not the normal way the USArmy of the time would do it. No wonder at all that when asked who should command the Union army the same General Winfield Scott told Lincoln that Lee should be his man. That Grant was a drunkard is myth only and is not supported by evidence, just rumor and innuendo. His performance was never, ever shown to be affected by drink in any way during any of the campaigns of the Western or the Eastern theaters. His Corps commanders in the East were all inherited, the same Burnside, Meade, Howard, et al. The best he had was Hancock who was never the same (physically) after being grievously wounded at Gettysburg. Grant did not have a Jackson or a Longstreet, what he had was a 9 lb. hammer and he used it to pummel the enemy army into powder. McClellan committed a number of very big blunders. The biggest of which (...arguably...) was in not quickly following up his victories at the 3 passes of South Mountain by pursuing, closing with and engaging Lee when the Army of the Potomac could have taken on the Army of Northern Virginia in 3 pieces and most likely defeated them in detail. I would put forth that the next biggest blunder was in not pursuing, closing with and destroying Lee's army the day after Antietam/Sharpsburg when McCllelan had 3 Corps (or was it 4) of fresh troops who were not engaged previously while the Army of Northern Virginia was exhausted and nearly broken across the battlefields north and east of Sharpsburg. McClellan was a first rate general in building, training and supplying his army. Sadly, for whatever reason, he was terrible at commanding and fighting the army he built.
Ah yes, George, "Let's see how long we can drag this war out" McClellan at his tactical best. You outnumber your enemy, have supply superiority, navel support and the initiative. What are you going to do next!? "Why, I believe I shall march as slowly as possible through a swamp piecemeal in order to make it a sporting chance for our enemy! Winning is so last century, my lad!"
He was up against superior generals. Stonewall Jacksons valley campaign was a tactical stroke of genius that is still studied by militaries to this very day
Gen. McClellan was the Union's worst General...up to that point. Then, you had two others that were worse than him... though not by much. They, of course, are Gen. Pope, and Gen. Burnside. The Union sure had their hands full, trying to find a great Commanding General. In a big stroke of luck, President Lincoln finally found Gen. Ulysses Simpson Grant. President Lincoln said, concerning Gen. Grant:"I can't spare this man. He fights"! Gen. Grant got the job done, when no one else could...or wanted to!
@@commissaryarrick9670 Gen. Stonewall Jackson marched his men at least 500 Miles throughout the Stonewall Jackson Valley Campaign of 1862. He fought 5 different engagements, and won 4 of them. He never had any more than 17,000 men at his command at any one time, and yet, he managed to hold more than 60,000 Union Soldiers at Bay for months. These are absolutely stunning facts, that any General would be proud to have show up on his service record!
Approximately equal numbers of men from each side were involved during the campaign and McClellan actually inflicted more casualties on Army of Northern Virginia. Lee 'won' in territories where he had direct support from Richmond when McClellan actually had to ship supplies through the sea. Lee should have won the battles more decisively and learned his lessons at Marvel Hil and etc, but he thought he was overconfident not knowing his successes mostly could be attributed to blunders made by Union generals, not his 'brilliance'.
The union army was lacking the officers with Mexican war experience. Industrialization took hold in the north aftter the Mexican war in 48' and factories hired union officers because they were experienced at organizing large groups of men. I read once that the south had over 200 times experience of battle than northern officers. Also, McClellan built up a huge, well trained war machine. When Grant took charge, the Army of the Potomac was a 71' Boss Mustang just waiting for someone to put their foot into the gas pedal.
Mind you, the great majority of West Point graudates sided with the United States of America. In fact, almost all the high ranking senior generals who had experienced Mexican war, except David Twiggs and Joseph Johnston (who was actually a general in the Regular Army and always bitched about his seniority in ranking over his Confederate peers during the war), remained loyal to the US. Lee was never promoted to (actual) generalship in the Regular Army and he ended his military in the US army as colonel.
I think after Lee sent Hood on a successful frontal assault at Gaines' Mill (against a fortified position) he always thought he could make more breakthroughs that way
Who was it, Shelby Foote maybe, who wrote that the best of the Confederacy were lost in this campaign. Many successes after, but the South would never be this strong again. Even here though they were outnumbered. Enjoying these ABT videos very much although a lot is omitted for time reasons. Jackson's Valley campaign tying up Union troops for example.
According to some of the books I've read on this campaign, Johnston (and Lee) called in reinforcements from all around the area to help reinforce and hold Richmond. By the time of the Seven Days, the ANV numbered 95,000, the AoP ~110,000. Those are total numbers, not the number of troops able to fight on the line. It was the closest (in the East) to parity that these two armies ever came. (Of course the Rebels actually outnumbered the Union, the only time in the ACW (major battle) that this ever happened.
I didn't know that Lincoln visited at the end and it was his idea to completely retreat. That McClellan wanted to stay and continue the fight.?. I did not know that. I thought the retreat back to Washington was all McClellan.?.🤔
bonanza I've always thought lincoln was an idiot ...mac's strategy got the AOP to within 7 miles of richmond and all of lee's efforts (along with enormous casualties) only forced him back a few more miles ...the AOP was still within easy striking distance and much closer than starting out again from washington and marching overland via manassas which is what lincoln wanted. I know most people hate mac ....fine, if YOU or lincoln think he is too timid, passive, lazy, arrogant, stupid, foolish, cowardly, or traitorous (pick the adjective of your own preference) then remove him and have SOMEONE else execute HIS on the peninsula strategy. you sir have stumbled onto the truth and understanding of the war ....congrats and keep learning
After McClellan retre... er, "changed his base" he immediately called for 50,000 reinforcements. As Lincoln once said of Mac, "sending troops to him is like shovelling fleas across a farmyard, half of them never get there." He also said, "if I send McClellan 100,000 he'll still sit and say that the enemy has 200,000. Re visits to McClellan, Lincoln, Stanton and the new Gen'l-in-Chief Halleck all visited Mac in July. It was Halleck who made the final recommendation to retreat, reasoning that as things stood the AoNV (with its 150,000 men) stood directly between Mac and Pope's Army of Virginia and neither could help the other, thus on Aug. 6 Mac was ordered to retreat. I suppose they didn't see the camouflage value of keeping Mac south; if he'd even pretended to attack Lee wouldn't have been able to send Jackson north and Pope's campaign might've turned out differently. Pope wasn't a total idiot though Lee made him look that way.
The Army of the Potomac was removed from the Peninsula for political, not military reasons. Lincoln had decided to remove McClellan from command of his Army, and he intended to do that by removing his Army from the Peninsula and dispersing his troops to other commands. Most notably to the newly formed Army headed by John Pope. We see how that worked out.
A time index between events would be nice, from this one might think McClellan was being far more aggressive than he was. The web side for the campaign does this, Williams Burg is May 5 .. 7 pines May 31.
I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory - as it is the Govt must not & cannot hold me responsible for the result… If I save this Army now I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or any other persons in Washington - you have done your best to sacrifice this Army. Geo. B. McClellan
You cannot deny McClellan was not only undermined in DC while he was on the Peninsula, but also had his operation directly interfered with. His dispatch that night was clearly born out of both exhaustion and exasperation at how much Stanton had sabotaged his efforts. Which evidence shows Stanton absolutely did. But clearly the letter was intemperate in the extreme.
I have respect for McClellan . He at least wanted to TRY winning the war without resorting to attrition and mass casualties. He cared about the lives of men on both sides. It didn't work so history judged him harshly. But I respect the effort. The lives of those men was worth trying to avoid a massive bloody slug fest if possible. If Johnson wasn't wounded and replaced by Lee it may have actually worked. McClellan inched his way to Richmond and Johnson kept reeling backward. If M Mcclelan had gotten a bit closer, with all those heavy guns, he would have pounded Richmond into submission. But nobody expected R E Lee to come out swinging like he did. He certainly unnerved little Mac. He was sickened by the mass twisted dead bodies and lost his nerve.
Ernest von Vegesack, A Swedish Volunteer earned the Medal of Honor at Gaines Mill. He would serve at Second Battle of Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. Vegesack resigned from the Union Army on June 1, 1863 and returned to Sweden. On February 22, 1866, President Andrew Johnson nominated von Vegesack for award of the brevet grade of brigadier general of volunteers, to rank from March 13, 1865 and the United States Senate confirmed the appointment on April 10, 1866. For his service in the Union army, and for repeated acts of courage he was given Sweden's highest medal for bravery, the För tapperhet i fält (For valour in the field) in gold upon his return to Sweden. His citation reads: "While voluntarily serving as aide-de-camp, successfully and advantageously charged the position of troops under fire."
My question is, what would have happened had McClellan been allowed to stay on the Peninsula and re-initiate the campaign after his army had retreated to the safety of the gunboats? McClellan made it closer to Richmond than any Union General would in more than another two years thereafter. But the political mechanisms were so intent on getting rid of McClellan, that the real reason the Army was pulled from the peninsula was to disperse his Army, and remove him from command. This despite the advantages McClellan had put in place by the logistics network he built to support that Army, for the long term, on the peninsula. If McClellan had been allowed to stay to fight another day, there wouldn't have been a Second Battle of Bull Run. Antietam would not have happened. And in all likelihood, the weakened Confederate Army would not have been able to cope with McClellan's army still on the Peninsula and so close to Richmond. Jackson had played out his Valley Campaign to deny all the Union Troops available to McClellan and his campaign around Richmond, and most likely would not be able to repeat that. In short, Robert E. Lee would have never been able to get away from Richmond to display his abilities in the open. If McClellan had been allowed to stay on the Peninsula, as he begged Lincoln and Stanton to allow him to do, the Civil War would most likely have ended in 1863 or 1864 instead of 1865.
Mac would've sat on his thumbs until he had 125,000 men, then would've sobbed that the rebels had 250,000 and would've continued sitting on his thumb. McClellan should've been gotten rid of long before... but as Lincoln lamented when he finally did it... who do I replace him with? Meade did well at Gettysburg, Hooker did well at Chattanooga as a division commander, but it took Grant to finally turn the wheel hard enough to end the war.
@@indy_go_blue6048 I would have sat on my thumbs with 125,000 troops. Any modern General SHOULD sit on their thumbs with ONLY 125,000 troops to go against Lee's 92,000 troops. When attacking an entrenched force, you should never attack with less than THREE TIMES their number. That's why there were so many casualties in the Civil War. Because Arm chair Generals influence forced Generals to attack in untenable situations. Of course you don't mind US Grant sitting on his thumbs during his siege of Petersburg, where he had a better numbers advantage over Lee than McClellan did?
@@indy_go_blue6048, Grant ended up using McClellans logistical plan to supply his assault on Richmond. Indeed, its the only plan capable of moving that much supply to the decisive point.
@@josephhewes3923 He wanted McDowell's corps which was around 20,000 additional men. Perhaps a modern general wouldn't attack with less with 3:1 odds; logistically it was an impossibility in 1862. The chief point is: McClelland was not going to attack; he was going to lay siege and yes that's how Grant ended up beating ANV and winning the war.
The peninsula was a good idea if due to the army of the Potomac being at or around the banks of the york and James River they could constantly give constant supply from the navy. If a more aggressive general like hooker, grant, Sherman I have no doubt the peninsula campaign could have been a victory
Virtually any other commander of the Army of the Potomac (Excluding Pope) would’ve taken Richmond if they’d been in command during the Peninsular Campaign. The Union outnumbered the confederacy, had a better logistical supply base, and had reached the outskirts of Richmond itself with the Confederate armies divided with Jackson in the West and Johnston/Lee in the East. McClellan’s inaction and cautiousness proved disastrous for the Union as they were pushed out of Virginia
@10:50 abraham lincoln ordered a withdraw? he was on the record for criticizing mcclellan for not attacking fast enough or with enough men. and mcclellan finding safety after defeating the confederate army with its +5000 causalities on malvern hill? supplies and re-enforcements could have been delivered on the james river by the US navy and defended by its superior firepower. (new orleans was captured at about this time, on 1 may 1862, with the assistance of the US navy.) @5:00 what happened to the richmond and york river railroad? who controlled it thereafter?
With the losses sustained by the CS, one could argue that the campaign was a small strategic victory for the North, as they could afford the prolonged war and losses whilst the CSA could not.
@@philipthecow Good question. The 7 day battles surely points to massive losses on both sides (Malvern Hill comes to mind) - relatively much less for the US than the CS, though.
It was definitely a strategic vitory for the CS since they succeeded in driving the US army off from their territories and enabled themselves to have a go against the US in Maryland. It seems like a pointless bloodshed to us and a strategic loss for wasting valuable human lives & resources, but that's because we know the outcome of the Maryland campaign.
@@Greenfield-yf1wh Great point. Especially about hindsight being 20/20 of course. I would however argue that the Maryland campaign as well was a strategic blunder as there were no clear goals and/or exit strategy. Gettysburg was an important battle, no doubt of that, but with no logistical support or strategic end goal, the campaign was doomed to fail. Even after a few victories.... It was Vicksburg that ultimately sealed the fate of the CS.
@@Emanon... I think the problem here is that we try to rationalize with the decions made by delusional people. The slave states should have not seceded in the first place when odds were heavily stacked against them. CSA should have never fired at Ft Sumter and started the war regardless what Lincoln did. The Confederate leadership was delusional - they thought the people of Maryland (a slave state) would welcome them with open arms if they 'liberate' the state from the Lincoln administration and the Federal goverment would surrender and offer a neogiated peace if they had harassed the North enough. The CS thought things would worked out in their favor if they had advanced to the North and won just a few of battles in there. Again, they were wrong. You see, you can't reason with crazies and this is why Confederates had no 'grand strategy' to begin with and we will never 'logically' understand their decisions.
Crazy "what if" in history but imagine if McClellan moved to the peninsula and Johnston moved on Washington. For awhile McClellan thought Magruder outnumbered him so it could have spelled disaster.
There were plenty of troops defending Washington. And to top that off, Lincoln held back tens of thousands of additional troops that McClellan could have used, and weren't really needed in Washington, because Stonewall Jackson spooked the entire Washington high command with his small force of 15,000 men in his valley campaign.
You know McClellan had an opportunity to defeat Lee and Jackson. He was a competent general an experrt in training his army and raise its morale. Yet his inner demons prevented him from gaining imimortality.
Oh, he's got immortality if just for the fact that 150 years +/- people still debate him. Additionally, McClellan was Lincoln's opponent in the 1864 presidential election. Imagine what would have happened if he won.
Much of what you read about McClellan was a politically motivated narrative attached to McClellan, which stuck the moment Abraham Lincoln was assassinated, and made into a deity. While I don't fault Lincoln specifically, the Republicans tarred and feathered McClellan beyond any reasonable facsimile to reality. The reality was that he was a very good general, who organized the first modern army in the history of the world, but who was not perfect. His conduct during the seven days battles was better than any Union General in the east to this point. He was unfortunately facing a desperate opponent, who was acting out of character and taking extreme risks. The extreme risks unnerved McClellan enough for the outcome to be what it was. Otherwise, the battles were a draw in that the Union inflicted heavier casualties on the Confederates, while the Confederates were able to remove the Union Army from the immediate vicinity of Richmond.
@@josephhewes3923 McClellan was a coward on the battlefield - he stayed far back from the actual fighting, thus unable to effectively lead with quick decision making.
@@jimmarble1425 This is also false. First of all, he won medals for gallantry in the Mexican war, being recognized for bravery twice during that war. There are also reports that during the Battle of Antietam, he and Fitz John Porter stood on a hill, while the Confederates were hitting the hill with canons. They were observing the battlefield with a bunch of other officers, and when the Confederates targeted the group, McClellan sent the other officers to safety, while he stayed on the hill, continuing the observation. With shells landing around him. I guess you don't mind all the reports of U.S. Grant sitting at his headquarters, whittling away at a piece of wood, waiting for his subordinates to come and update him on the battle? Why do you not mind US Grant leading from headquarters, while you expect George McClellan to run up to the front and lead a regiment on a charge? I guess that's what you expect the commanding General to do? You need to stop reading Stephen Sears book. It's nothing more than a 1864 Republican campaign pamphlet.
Multi-Man Publishing has a Great Campaigns of the Civil War game called "On to Richmond." The Gamers/MMP have 3 brigade level games called "Seven Pines", "Malvern Hill" and "Gaines Mill" if board games are what you're talking about.
Ironically, it’s a good thing the union lost so many early battles to Lee. Otherwise the 13th amendment wouldn’t have been passed and slavery wouldn’t have ended.
Poor Gustavus. Imagine having such a grand mental breakdown upon being given the responsiblity of commanding an army that your brief period of leadership isn't even mentioned in this telling... barely a one or two sentence footnote usually in the history of this campaign. Not that I feel bad for him, but I emphasize with that level of failure.
You could have mentioned how General John Magruder tricked McClellan into thinking the Confederate resistance was massive by marching his small army in circles.
Wrong... Longstreet was not part of the battle of Seven Pines. He was supposed to but failed to show up. Ended up getting in the way of those who were heading to the fight (Huger) and failed requests of assistance from Hill, whose flank he was supposed to shore up, when the fight got dicey.
Of course, on 25th and 26th it WAS McClellan on the offensive. He had seized the dominant Garnett's Hill on the 26th with Smith's Division. Only Jackson's appearance saved Richmond.
the thing is with McClellan he would not attack unless he knows he has a decisive advantage he is to catous and lee took advantage of this character flaw of McCellan. not to mention lee knows the guy personally which did not help much.
@@TheManofthecross Yes, McClellan was very cautious. But Lee was behaving out of his known character of the time. He was understood to be cautious at this time, and it was believed he would not attack unless he had a major advantage in numbers. McClellan viewed Lee's behavior as evidence to support his own misunderstanding about Confederate troop strength, and confirmed in his mind that he was out numbered. As for Lee, from this point forward, he completely performed contrary to those previous assumptions about cautious behavior, and actually took risk, after risk, after risk, even to the point of recklessness. It was his risk taking, bordering on recklessness, that served him well now, but which eventually foiled him at both Antietam and Gettysburg.
@@josephhewes3923 I see but still even then he took advantage of McCellans cautious nature if he had been bolder enough he could had taken richomnd and ended it early or at least put a real hurt on the confederacy and the moral factor. either way those moves and what not would prove to be the bane of most union forces in the east anyway and not grant for his bulldog fighting tenacity.
Reinforcements? He was asking for his own troops back. McDowell's Corp was a part of McClellan's own Army, which were an integral part of his plan, which Lincoln at the last minute removed from McClellan's operation. McClellan is asked to go down to Richmond, end the war with a climactic battle, and then at the last moment Stanton and Lincoln take away 40,000 of the troops that had an integral part of the plan?
@@bigred6486 not so funny to the sweds because when they search for Friedricksburg they will see results for some stupid battle in the American civil war and not the one that ended the Swedish Empire
@@panzerofthelake506 ey bud, sweden doesn't hold a monopoly over peninsulas, friend, so the possibility of other countries having peninsula campaigns isn't crazy. Napoleon had his own peninsula war against the spanish that was actually called the peninsula war, and basically any war on a peninsula can be called a peninsula campaign. Don't blame america for people's inability to see beyond their own country and use proper keywords
Lee sent a draft of the battle plans to his lieutenants to be written by his chief of staff, who did not do a good job, and the bungling of this task led to confusions throughout the battle. It wasn't just a bad attack, it was badly planned as well.
Lee's immediate subordinates were all well informed as to Lee's operational plan, because Lee met with them in person to explain his intentions. Furthermore, there was nothing wrong with Lee's plan. It was risky but workable. It failed for a number of reasons- among them being unfounded assumptions on the part of his subordinates and un-timed orders being delivered late (and thus not received in chronological order). However, the main reason was that Jackson completely failed in the execution of his orders.
@@Raison_d-etre Yes, actually, Lee did meet with them- on 23 June. Lee explained his intentions to his subordinates and then left the room to allow them to work out details.
@@manilajohn0182 Lol, such a copout. You don't give orders for subordinates to be worked out. That's why he ordered the vague written instructions, which led to failure.
If you study these Civil War battles in detail you find that Lee wasn't the genius he was made out to be. Malvern Hill and Pickets Charge are just two examples of Lee's blunders. The thing is ... Union generals made so many more blunders than Lee. McClellan MADE Lee look like a genius.
Also no mention of Jackson's Valley campaign, which was designed to deprive McClellan of as many troops as possible, working like a charm, with Lincoln withholding over 40,000 troops that McClellan's original plan depended on.
This is what they should make movies about... Its really sad the only really good movie about a particular battle is Gettysburg... Gods & Generals sucked probably just cause they didn't want to make the CSA winning battles look good. But they should make movies about how Lee took command & show the battles Gaines Mill & Malvern Hill
Two sad things as I see it: #1 there's little market for ACW movies about the battles and campaigns unless there's some romantic angle thrown into it (see "Horse Soldiers") and #2, tv networks like THC which SHOULD be making shows about this (and used to) are too full of (un)reality shows to bother with history any more.
I've never understood McClellan's way of "realizing hallucinations" as one contemporary said. If Lee had 150 or 200,000 troops, would he be sitting around Richmond waiting for an attack, or would he split his army, hold Mac in place and attack DC with his other 75,000 men? Mac was a superb organizer and give him credit for making the AoP what it was, but he certainly was a horrible field commander.
Grant had a better numbers ratio against Lee and didn't get to Richmond for another two and a half years. The numbers ratio around Richmond during the Peninsula campaign was 105,000 to 92,000, which any modern General will tell you is at best a negligible advantage, and more than likely not an advantage at all. Why aren't you accusing Lincoln of hallucinating when he imagined Stonewall Jackson's 17,000 in his valley campaign was 40,000? Every single Union General and politician was over-estimating Confederate strength because the Confederates had an active disinformation campaign to inflate their numbers. And it worked.
Great Video and Thank you. When the subject is McClellan never acted decisively or moved like a snail, please keep in mind this one fact (from the books - Lincoln's Lieutenants, Lincoln and his Generals - McLellan); The Union Army hired the Pinkerton Detective Agency for all "Spying" on the Confederate forces and they had a very simple three step process; 1. The more we inflate the numbers, the longer McClellan will sit on his ass. 2. The longer McClellan sits on his ass, the longer the war. 3. The longer the war, the longer we get paid.
@@flapjack4845 You're right, that's the main reason. They were also expensive vs the cost of a rifled musket; most cavalrymen bought their own or their general bought them for his men if he had the money.
Ive asked this many times but ive never got a reply... I always wondered why Lee always went more North when invading Union territory like at Antietam & Gettysburg.... Why not make bridges or get enough river transports to move 50k+ rebel troops straight to Washington DC? Even if it failed an actual legit attack on the Capital probably would've done more to the moral on the Union than anything the CSA did!
Washington was a fortress. Even if he could get around the Union army and reach Washington it's unlikely that he'll be able to do any serious damage before the Union army caught up with him. On the other hand, the surrounding areas are vulnerable. Beside a few small garrisons, the only protection they had was the Army of the Potomac itself which would take time to react to the confederate offensive and reach those threatened areas.
@@philliptaylor9129 Yes but occupying places like Antietam or Gettysburg really didn't do anything to Union morale! They weren't really major Union cities... While u look at what the Union was doing under Grant in TN taking major Southern Cities... I agree that Lee needed to destroy the Army of the Potomac... Yet Lee basically went the same route to Gettysburg as he did Antietam & it failed each time while never threatening a major Union city. So again I never said an attack on Washington would've succeeded its just that in my opinion even a weak attack on DC would've done more to Union morale then the CSA going further North like they did at both Antietam & Gettysburg... Lee at that time needed to get his army between Meade & Washington.... Meade got his army between Lee & Washington! Thats why Im against the more Northern approach Lee took each time he tried to invade Union territory.
@@borivojetravica569 i take it the north, one they won, 2 the south started their independence from the heavy taxes and unfair monetary system placed on them
But as jason robbins says, it really doesnt make sence it seems more like the people in charge wanted the war, and profited at the cost of dumb sheep. History is such a lie we dont know anything and its bullshit
When I was younger I used to pour over Orders of Battle but I only had Second Manassas onwards. It is amazing how Meade was just a brigade commander here and just over a year later would be commanding the Army of the Potomac.
Love these videos. My wish list for future one's:
Murfreesboro/Stones River
Atlanta Campaign
Shenandoah 1864.
These newly remastered videos are amazing. The animations, the music, the reenactment footage - truly some of the best military history content on youtube. keep them coming please, I'd like to see some of the older ones updated as well!
Probably the Best Production of the Civil War I have ever seen (especially the graphics; makes it easy to visualize). The whole thing is Fantastic.
I wish Kings and Generals were on the same production level, but using live action in this series is easier than the time periods Kings and Generals teaches.
Very glad to see the Animated Battle Maps return! Fantastic tools to use!
Excellent coverage of the Peninsula Campaign of 1862!
So glad you all finally did this one!! There is so much content to cover and so many intact historical sites on the Peninsula...especially at Yorktown, Newport News Park, and Williamsburg. Thank you!
Nice graphic... I know what you've been doing with your spare time. ;)
Grew up in Williamsburg and Newport News.👻
Very cool. I love these and I think they do a wonderful job of teaching history. Keep them coming, please.
You are welcome
As a Newport News native I love this. Forgetten part of the war in a mainstream sense.
These are fantastic. Thank you for doing them. Dates would be excellent and help those that wish to watch in chronological order. And/or a numbering system; though, I realize that might not work unless you know precisely how many you will be making. GREAT JOB! Thank you.
I love these animated maps I’m so happy that you keep making them thank you
Grew up in Richmond.
Two battlefields in the area area that left the greatest impression on me are Cold Harbor and Malvern Hill. The trenches Grant’s charged are still intact. Terrible carnage was wreaked on those Union troops who advanced against those breastworks. After the war Grant lamented ordering those doomed attacks. To look up the sloping rise to Union guns at Malvern Hill makes one question the soundness of that assault. From the 12 lb Napoleons that still line this ridge one sees an unobstructed field of fire. The troops making these two doomed attacks must have been filled with dread.
So much history dominates Richmond. The Home for Confederate Women was across the street from my high school. Behind THFCW is the beautiful Lee Chapel, this site is now adjacent to the Valentine Museum. After the war this was the site of Confederate Veterans Camp #1.
Next to the Valentine Museum is the headquarters of the United Daughters of the Confederacy. Next to that is the Virginia Historical Society (The Battle Abbey). During my high school days disagreements were settled man-to-man in the mazed boxwood garden, which formed perfect boxing rings. These squared areas left combatants unseen but for those attending. Many an argument led to these words, “meet at the Abbey.” Those gardens are now a parking lot. The statues two blocks away are all gone except Arthur Ashe and Robert. E. Lee.
I really like the videos you guys make! I would love to see you make videos on Second Bull Run, Chancellorsville, Petersburg, Appomattox, Nashville, Chattanooga, Atlanta, Sherman’s March to the Sea, Fort Wagner, Fort Fisher, and Stones River.
Thanks Alec. If you want more content on Petersburg and Fort Fisher, then do we have the perfect series for you: ruclips.net/p/PLZrhqv_T1O1tKyNXoAqU9oEp17sxPK3SA
Amazing work as always. Thank you Battlefield Trust.
This video is a perfect primer for understanding Longstreet's book.
It can't be understated how fantastic these videos are. Also, McClellan is an incompetent battle field commander. And no one wants to talk about Jackson's screw ups during the Peninsula campaign.
This was awesome and done so well! I want to see more, and I’d like to see some of your other videos, the ones done without this kind of narration and battle map, be redone to be like this video.
My prayers have been answered
I hope you guys make more!
The thing about the Peninsula Campaign is that with rivers to both sides of him, McClellan's flanks were secure until he got near Richmond and his supplies could be brought in by ship. Things didn't go quite according to plan but the basic concept of the campaign was sound.
People always hear a lot about Lincoln pushing his Generals but they don't hear as much about how much he interfered with what they were doing. I don't know why Lincoln pulled the plug on the Campaign - unless he was afraid that Washington was exposed. The thing with Washington though is that it was very well manned by Union troops and protected by Union Forts. The Confederacy did in fact attack Washington later in the war - but couldn't get past the forts.
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You're quite right Bob. They pulled him back I believe b'cos they wanted to prolong the war. It may have been about money or maybe they didn't want this whig/democrat general winning the war. So they sabotaged/interfered with the AOTP officer corps until they found compliant generals.
One of the main problems was it rained for, what was it, two or three weeks prior to the campaign. And the Chikahomony River was swolen so badly that the bridges the Union had built almost washed away. Add to that Lincoln withheld McDowell's Corps altogether and McClellan was enacting his plans with a large chunk of the troops he planned for, not there.
McClellan said that he'd left ~57,000 troops around Washington. What he didn't say is that he was including Fremont's men in western Virginia, Banks men in the Shenandoah and McDowell's men also SW of the capitol in northern Virginia. Jackson was so slippery and quick that most Union people couldn't believe he was doing all that with just ~30,000 men. Discounting those troops already mentioned, he left less than 27,000 men in the actual environs of Washington, too few, at least in Lincoln and Stanton's eyes. You'll also find that Lincoln interfered with his generals who were actually doing their jobs, like Grant and Sherman. He didn't bother Pope until it was too late, and he was satisfied with Meade until Lee slipped back into Virginia after Gettysburg.
Things didn't "go quite according to plan" because the Lincoln Administration interfered with the operation from the very beginning, all the way up to it's completion. Think of it this way... The plan was to have the climactic battle to end the Civil War, and then immediately Lincoln and Stanton started by withholding 40,000 troops that were in the original plans for the operation? And then refused throughout to give McClellan enough troops to win this "climactic battle to end the Civil War?"
As it turned out, they expected McClellan to win the climactic battle of the Civil War with just about a 1 to 1 troop ratio. With Union troops numbering 104,000 and Confederates numbering 94,000. You aren't going to end the war with that ratio. Sounds to me like they didn't want McClellan to have or to win the climactic battle to win the Civil War.
@@frankpotter1982 ....Very interesting comment, especially when you said whig/democrat. It fits my very radical theory. Don't say anything bad about McClellan or you'll get a mouth full from that Joseph Hewes fella. Maybe my comment will shut his mouth. And then you something like people were deliberately sabatoging the war so it could be prolonged, I was stunned, finally I've heard from someone who's finally sees the obvious. Let me explain. When Edwin Stanton went before the Senate for conformation, Senator Charles Sumner, (a well known communist) said, don't worry, he's one of us. And if I remember correctly, there was also a General Sumner in the Union army, brother or son maybe? There were 118 foreign born Generals in the Union army, and most if not all were radical socialist's. And more than a few American born, including besides Stanton himself, McClellan, Sumner, William T Sherman, probably Meade and William Birney, allthough American born, participated in the socialist uprising in Germany in 1848.
Charles Dana....He was co-founder of the American Union of Associations, which established nearly 50 communist communes across America. He was one of Stanton's under-secretaries of war. He worked on the editorial staff of Horace Greely,(communist), of the New York Tribune, and was sent by Greely to Europe to pay in gold writers of the Tribune such as Karl Marx and Heinrich Bornstein. This is when he participated in the uprising in Germany.
Gustave-Paul Cluseret....Became the friend of Karl Marx and was refered to as the Red General. Participated in the viscious communist uprising in the Paris commune in 1871 that would slaugtered priests simply because they were clergy.
Frederich Aunikin....Friend of both Marx and Engles, and a well known Communist Revolutionary in Germany.
Joseph Weydemeyer....A founder of the first International National. It is in his home where Karl Marx stayed when fleeing out of Germany. Who then moved the International Communist Headquarters to New York City in 1872, where it remains to this day in the Chase Manhatten headquarters at 1 Karl Marx Square.
Carl Schurz....A young communist revolutionary who ended up under the direct command of Carbinari leader Mazzini, and also the head of the Iluminati. He was sent to America by Mazzini, where he was propelled into prominence in the Republican party, which he was clearly not a Republican.
ever since the Republican party was created in 1845, many Democrats have portrayed themselves as Republicans in order to infiltrate the party. Probably the most famous was Theodore Roosevelt. As I recall, he first became a Senator in Wisconsin and then served under Lincoln as Ambassador to Spain before becoming a Major General William Birney. Although American born, as you recall participated int the uprising in Germany in 1848.
The goal of Stanton and his comrades was not to win the war as quickly as possible, but to deliberately prolong the war with as many deaths on both side as they possibly could. Stanton had way too much power and had the ability to undermine the war effort and Lincoln at every turn. He demanded and got the telegraph office moved to the war department so he could control all information. He was a Southern Democrat and slave owner who sympathized with the south, and he hated Lincoln. I get sick and tired of people who will rush to blame Lincoln for what Stanton was responsible for. With the numeric and logistical advantage the Union had, the war should not have lasted much more than a year. But with these traitors in charge, didn't happen. And Sherman's march through Georgia was completely the work of he and Stanton, in order to create as much death, destruction and division before the was was over. Although people rush to blame Lincoln, although he knew that Sherman was in Georgia, he had no clue what was actually going on. He wanted the war over as soon as possible with a policy of, (with malace towards none). It was not in his DNA to ever condone what was done. That was a communist action.
Now, one of the most blatant examples of how Stanton undermined the Union war effort.
THE BATTLE OF FREDRICKSBURG
In the fall of 1862. The patience of Abraham Lincoln and his cabinet had come to an end. It had been several months since the Battle of Antietam and yet Major General George McClellan and the Army of the Potomac had yet to press their advantage of the retreating army of Northern Virginia under Robert E Lee. On Nov,7,1862, Lincoln removed the popular McClellan and replaced him with Major General Ambrose Burnside.Burnsides promotion came with a strong admonition for decisive action.
After crossing the Potomac into Virginia, Confederate Commander Robert E Lee, divided his forces, spreading Lt. General Thomas (Stonewall) Jacksons command across the lower Shanandoah Valley, and placing Lt. General James Longstreet's forces in Culpepper. This division greatly greatly influenced Burnsides next move. He developed a plan for Fredrickburg that would suck in half of Lee's forces and destroy it before the other half could come to their aid. For this he needed the use of the pontoon bridges which he requested from the war department. As soon as I heard that, knowing what I know about Stanton. I knew at that moment, things were not going to go well for the Union. Instead of crossing the river in a surprise attack before the confederates knew what was going on and set up any defensive measures, The Union Army sat their and waited for the pontoons. I have actually driven from Washington DC to Fredricksburg in about a half hour. Downstream it shouldn't have taken them much more than 12 hours. THEY WERE 10 DAYS LATE!!!! By the time the pontoons showed up, the Confederates had called in the other half of their army and somehow knew Burnsides battle plan. And instead of 137;000 Union troop's attacking an unprepared 44,000. It was now 80,000 well dug in troops with the advantage of a great defensive position. General Swartzkoff of Desert Storm once said, an army like that starts out with a 5 to 1 advantage.And instead of a crushing Confederate defeat, it completely flipped into a Union disaster. Many of the troops the south called in were the ones who the traitor McClellan allowed to escape at Antietam. And yes Joseph Hewes, that comment was aimed directly at you!!! The only reason why Lee dared to split his army as he did is because he knew McClellan was a traitor and he had nothing to worry about. I'm ready for you the next time you feel like spouting off.
My first large scale reenactment was On to Richmond last summer.
Would LOVE to see one of these covering the Alamo/San Jacinto battles.
These videos are so well done! My 3x great grandfather fought throughout the Peninsula Campaign - 101st Regiment, Pennsylvania Infantry - and this is the first video I've seen that really allows me to visualize his service. Thank you and please keep these coming!
you do the best animated battles!
Looking back on it 150 years later, I suspect McClellan could have won that campaign if he hadn't lost faith in himself. He won most of the battles, but was always pulling back. Two years later, Grant was just the opposite in his summer campaign of 1864. Grant lost most of the battles, but he kept moving forward to his left. His tenacity eventually lead to the capture of Richmond and the end of the Confederacy.
I particularly like General Kearny's nickname for Little Mac... "The Virginia creeper"
The fact that, having assumed the offensive, Grant did take more casualties meant very little toward the campaign as a whole. The general movement of the two armies during the roughly two months of the campaign was characterized by the advance of Union forces and the withdrawal of Confederate forces toward Petersburg and Richmond. This continued until the AoNV was besieged.
@@manilajohn0182; where Grant had it over all of his predecessors is that after a tactical setback he didn't withdraw, reorganize, and plan a new campaign. He just kept maneuvering and pressing Lee. Lee had to keep between Grant and Richmond. So as Grant moved left and south, lee had to scramble to keep ahead of Grant and yet keep on Grant's right to keep him from turning southwest toward the Capital. Even Lee admitted that if he couldn't make Grant withdraw north, once both Armies got to Petersburg, the fight would turn into a siege, and then it would only be a matter of time till Petersburg fell, and that would seal the fate of Richmond and the Confederacy.
I would argue that you can cannot say a general is losing his battles if his strategic objective is to keep advancing. He may lose men but unless his enemy makes him abandon his goals, he is not losing.
@@JonathanLundkvist; it's possible to lose a battle and still not lose the campaign, just as it's possible to win a battle, but still lose the campaign. The Peninsula Campaign is an example of that. Remember, Rommel won the Battle of Kasserine pass, but he still lost the Tunisia Campaign.
This whole series by the ABT is simply the best. It has certainly opened my eyes as to the intelligence and courage of the Confederate soldiers.
The video neglected to mention the 40,000 troops withheld from McClellan because Lincoln was afraid Stonewall Jackson was going to attack Washington. Those 40,000 troops were earmarked for the north side of the river and would have altered the landscape of the battle, and in fact, may have altered the entire course of the war.
If McClellan hadn't lied to him about the number of troops left around DC he might have had them. To quote Longstreet on another general, "he's as tender about his flanks as a virgin." So was Lincoln about the capitol.
@@indy_go_blue6048 McClellan didn't lie to him about how many troops he left around DC. It was in McClellan's best interests to make it clear exactly how many troops he left around DC, and especially to make it clear when Irvin McDowell's Corps was taken from him so that he could get those troops back. There was no doubt miscommunication between both Lincoln and Stanton, and McClellan, because they were using different methods to count troops, but to say McClellan lied about is absurd.
Most (and I mean 99 percent) historians agree McClellan left ample troops in DC to protect DC. And even in the communication between Lincoln and McClellan, Lincoln conceded that the entire operation Stonewall Jackson was running, was nothing more than a ruse to keep troops from the Richmond operation. But Lincoln still wouldn't release McDowell's Corps to McClellan.
Great video & awesome edits. Thanks!
This battle was misunderstood at the time, and is still misunderstood. From a Union perspective, it's the best performance, even in a losing effort, of any Union General in the first year and a half to two years of the war. McClellan held his own, and performed the retreats well enough to preserve his army. If Lincoln hadn't pulled the troops off the peninsula, the entire outcome of the war would have been different. Possibly with the end of the war coming a year earlier.
The Confederates could not cope with such a large Army that close to Richmond, and eventually would have succumbed. As for McClellan, he has been the continuous victim of the flawed way in which the battle was misunderstood, and told throughout the intervening years. Even he did not know how well he had performed in a losing effort. It's clear the Confederates won the battle, but did so with such losses that they could not have sustained such losses in the future. In fact, you might even be able to make the case that this was a draw. If Antietam was a draw, then this was a draw too.
Inigo Bantok Lincoln and Stanton sabotaged McClellan at every turn, perhaps even deliberately. They took away 40,000 of his troops to guard Washington defenses, then sent McDowell’s corps on a wild goose chase into the Shenandoah valley to chase Jackson (who wasn’t even there anymore)... this tens of thousands of troops would’ve besieged Richmond from the north, with McClellan’s main force besieging it from the East. Lincoln and Stanton are largely to blame.
It is fascinating to note that Grant used McClellans logistical plan (supply the army by the James and York Rivers) in 1864 and 1865.
If only McClellan did not consistantly decieve himself as to the numbers facing him...he may well have been comfortable earning a campaign victory by using Lees aggressiveness against him.
Alas, McClellan had flaws.
He and Halleck are two fascinating generals to study. Both brilliant at certain aspects of leadership (McClellan being one of the finest logistical generals of the war, certainly the finest the Union had in 1861/1862 in high position)...both with skill flaws that made their performance as pure battlefield commanders suffer.
@@josephhewes3923, you would be incorrect that ALL Union generals vastly over-rated CSA troop strength. Several did, McClellan being one of them. Some did not. Most would base their estimates on some documented information (be that as dumb as Pinkerton reports)...but McClellan's estimates came from his own imagination, NOT even from the Pinkertons.
Lincoln gets a lot of rightful blame for his handling of the political / military strategy junction. Though, to be fair, I would place more of the blame on the House of Representatives and their allies in the press. There was a LOT of stupidity in the political arena surrounding the Army of the Potomac and it's goals. McClellan was trying to foster a sense of independence of command and to insulate his army from becoming merely a tool of the political hacks. He failed, and the results of his failure was a growing rift between the Lincoln administration's goals (which prioritized protection of Washington) over McClellan's goals...which then resulted in Lincoln's 'interference' in the campaign.
No senior general in a representative democracy can hope to be completely insulated from political concerns when devising military strategy. It was important to the politics that the capital be deemed secure, and that means it had weight in the military calculation...though the relative weighting can be debated (and WAS debated at the time).
Chancellorsville is less of a debacle than most think...though that was primarily because of the way the Generals reacted to the political games rather than Lincoln's fault per se. Generals afraid of the influence of the press decided to withdraw rather than force Lee to press an issue he was likely to lose. In much the same way as McClellan refused to force Lee to face the consequences of the high casualties from his aggressive attacks, Butterfield and Couch decided to withdraw across the Rappahanock. Of interest is this decisions affect on Lee at Gettysburg some weeks later. He would again attack the center of the Union line after a flank attack had been close to success. Except at Gettysburg he faced Meade and Hancock, who were much more willing to let Lee bleed for his aggressiveness.
Mack was a coward by the definition of the word
@@yoyyoy6357 looks like we have a rebel in our midst...
I had family on my mom's side who's unit fought in the Peninsula Campaign.
Pfc. Floyd Daniel Young, 44th New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment.
How they got his body back to New York is a story in of itself XD
It's amazing how Jackson completely failed Lee, and yet it's glossed over by his supporters.
Devil is in the details.
Jackson was totally in the wrong spot of the first day of the battle but not due to any fault of his own. Lee based his battle plan on erroneous assumptions and at one point was even using a faulty map of the area. Lee actually never gave a starting hour for the initial assault of the campaign to begin, he (Lee) overall had a pretty “hands off” approach to the whole battle planning. Also, AP Hill initiated the whole campaign on the 26th of June WITHOUT having first connected to Jackson’s units on his (Hill’s) left. This was contrary to Lee’s orders. As Hill lost patience and initiated battle against an elevated and entrenched enemy, Lee was caught off guard and was forced to send additional units in support.
It’s amazing how people think that Jackson fault without knowing the details.
@@GSD- Lee never provided a starting point for the initial assault because he left the details of that assault to his subordinates- and Jackson was to initiate the assault. Hill's error in launching an assault without waiting for a sign of Jackson in no way excuses Jackson's error in not being in place on time- and Jackson was given more time than he initially wanted to get into position in the first place.
The primary reason that Jackson wasn't on time was due to his religious zealotry. His own wife said that Jackson never mailed a letter on Sundays or sent it so that it encumbered the Confederate mail system on Sundays. At this stage in the war, Jackson preferred to give his troops Sundays off in camp- and when he was unable to do so, he chose another day of the weak to make up for the lost Sunday. This is the same Jackson who said that he never ate pepper with his food because it made his left leg weak- and who, on the last day of the Union repulse at Fredericksburg, suggested that the Confederates strip naked for a dawn assault on the AotP the next morning.
@@manilajohn0182Despite this, I think Jackson was still one of the most dedicated generals of the Civil War and I would still hesitate to place all of the blame on Jackson. Jackson’s forces were some of the fastest moving in either the Confederacy and the Union because of how hard he marched his men. Although he may have maintained religious reverence and preferred not to fight certain days, he still would in many cases and his subordinates claimed that he did little else other than plan, sleep, pray, and contemplate.
Jackson’s forces were pushed logistically during the 7 Days. His forces would have already been tired and were forced to make a grueling march through swampy and unfavorable terrain. Lee’s rough timetables for Jackson’s army were infeasible given the circumstances. Granted, Jackson supported Lee’s orders to have him join up on the 26th, however Lee should have seen the reality of the situation and allotted more time. Jackson wasn’t entirely blameless here, but not entirely to blame and you can see why this was overlooked.
@@thewanderingwampa4893 Lee left the planning of the attack up to his subordinates. Jackson originally stated that he could be in place on the 25th. Longstreet suggested that Jackson give himself an additional day to get in place.
Very cool, great overview.
I believe that the battle of Glendale is considered by some to be the South's best chance to win the war. The story goes that Longstreet broke the Union lines and Lee could possibly have cut off and captured two Union corps, devastating Northern morale and dealing an immense blow to the Union war effort. But Huger and Jackson moved too slowly and never got into position, leaving Lee without reserves to exploit the breakthrough. The Union army escaped to Malvern Hill and the chance was lost.
Afterwards Lee reformed the Army of Northern Virginia and removed the commanders that couldn't hack it. Huger was removed from front line commands and excelled in supply and logistics. Jackson's sluggishness was uncharacteristic, but very real during this brief campaign.
I LOVEEE this videos. I’m a huge civil way fan. Could you please do more and also it would be AMAZING if you could redo your old videos that do not have animated maps that would be AWESOME!!! Thanks
This was the first narrated video of yours that I have seen. Much better
Hi Charles, a lot of our maps are fully animated with narration. Visit or Animated Battle Maps playlist for more: ruclips.net/p/PLZrhqv_T1O1sdxRNm5SNc6cGSWr7xiWZs
well done. I really enjoy this series of videos.
Great History from across the pond 👏🇮🇲
I visited all these battle fields. Malvern Hill was a killing field. Steep hill with an unobstructed view of the fields below. Crest was filled with artillery. Worse place to attack other then Gettysburg. What was Lee thinking? Love these maps.
Not to insult Lee (I am after all European) but the more I read about the Civil War, it seems like Lee was a bit of a determinator - meaning that if he had decided on something, he was not a man to change his mind. Gettysburg in particular show this. He was too convinced that he had read General Meade correctly, too convinced that the higher morale of the Confederates would overcome good Union defensive positions. Instead, Lee is too clever once too much and Meade accurately predicts his next move, content to hold the field.
If only he had learned from this battle, he might have decided to cut his losses before sending Picket to the meat grinder.
@@JonathanLundkvist Yea, just like Napoleon at Waterloo, thinking the British were retreating, made almost the same charge. Surprise when you get over the crest and the whole British army is sitting there. I think the commanders really don't have any choice in the matter. All things taken in consideration, supply lines, avenue of retreat, and moral of your troops, you have no choice but to attack. Lee though, should have know better, I mean he just saw the Union try this at Fredericksburg, He also was sick from eating too many cherries I heard.
@@Irinrover One of the great details in the movie Gettysburg from 1993 is that some of the Union troops repelling Pickets Charge can be heard shouting "Fredericksburg" as a rallying cry.
@@JonathanLundkvist Yea, they were getting their revenge. I was a re-enactor at that time and participated that year and in 1998. The 1998 was the largest re-enactment of the time. Almost 30,000 participated. It was awesome.
love these maps
Please do one for the Atlanta Campaign and Nashville.
They did.
This made my day
McClellan was not a bad general. He handled his command skillfully and in keeping with military thinking of the time, and really didn't commit any big blunders. The reason for his defeats is the name Lee. Outnumbered, ill-supplied, even barefoot armies do NOT counterattack, much less counterattack after dividing their forces; all contrary to sound military practice. But Lee did - and won repeatedly. I always though that Lee's genius occurred because of necessity. He was a product of the same old army as McClellan, but knowing he could never win forced him to think outside of the box, and do things no General did. It made him brilliant. Being from the same school meant that Lee already knew what McClellan was going to do. But, how could McClellan predict what Lee would do? Winning the war took a drunk who didn't care or know what Lee was doing and used a war of attrition to beat him. Grant knew he had more soldiers than the South had ammunition to kill them with. So, charge! Lost 7,000 men? Well, charge again then... just think of the bullets Lee can't replace. And, it worked. Grant didn't retreat after getting beat; he just forced you to beat him again, and again, making the last month's of the war bloodied than the rest of the war combined. An old Veteran of Lee's army summed it up nicely years later ..."They never whipped us; we wore ourselves out whipping them."
Lee showed the same instincts of command tactics, movement and using the ground you are given during the 1860s as he did in Mexico in the 1840s. His scouting for General Winfield Scott along the trek from Veracruz to Chapultepec led the American forces to find ways around and through the Mexican army that were not the normal way the USArmy of the time would do it. No wonder at all that when asked who should command the Union army the same General Winfield Scott told Lincoln that Lee should be his man.
That Grant was a drunkard is myth only and is not supported by evidence, just rumor and innuendo. His performance was never, ever shown to be affected by drink in any way during any of the campaigns of the Western or the Eastern theaters. His Corps commanders in the East were all inherited, the same Burnside, Meade, Howard, et al. The best he had was Hancock who was never the same (physically) after being grievously wounded at Gettysburg. Grant did not have a Jackson or a Longstreet, what he had was a 9 lb. hammer and he used it to pummel the enemy army into powder.
McClellan committed a number of very big blunders. The biggest of which (...arguably...) was in not quickly following up his victories at the 3 passes of South Mountain by pursuing, closing with and engaging Lee when the Army of the Potomac could have taken on the Army of Northern Virginia in 3 pieces and most likely defeated them in detail. I would put forth that the next biggest blunder was in not pursuing, closing with and destroying Lee's army the day after Antietam/Sharpsburg when McCllelan had 3 Corps (or was it 4) of fresh troops who were not engaged previously while the Army of Northern Virginia was exhausted and nearly broken across the battlefields north and east of Sharpsburg. McClellan was a first rate general in building, training and supplying his army. Sadly, for whatever reason, he was terrible at commanding and fighting the army he built.
You overrate Lee.
Finally! Thanks!
Please do a video on williamsburg civil war era it's a missing link
Ah yes, George, "Let's see how long we can drag this war out" McClellan at his tactical best. You outnumber your enemy, have supply superiority, navel support and the initiative. What are you going to do next!?
"Why, I believe I shall march as slowly as possible through a swamp piecemeal in order to make it a sporting chance for our enemy! Winning is so last century, my lad!"
He was up against superior generals. Stonewall Jacksons valley campaign was a tactical stroke of genius that is still studied by militaries to this very day
Gen. McClellan was the Union's worst General...up to that point. Then, you had two others that were worse than him... though not by much. They, of course, are Gen. Pope, and Gen. Burnside. The Union sure had their hands full, trying to find a great Commanding General. In a big stroke of luck, President Lincoln finally found Gen. Ulysses Simpson Grant. President Lincoln said, concerning Gen. Grant:"I can't spare this man. He fights"! Gen. Grant got the job done, when no one else could...or wanted to!
@@commissaryarrick9670 Gen. Stonewall Jackson marched his men at least 500 Miles throughout the Stonewall Jackson Valley Campaign of 1862. He fought 5 different engagements, and won 4 of them. He never had any more than 17,000 men at his command at any one time, and yet, he managed to hold more than 60,000 Union Soldiers at Bay for months. These are absolutely stunning facts, that any General would be proud to have show up on his service record!
Certainly one of the worst generals in the civil war but at least the union did far better in the west
Approximately equal numbers of men from each side were involved during the campaign and McClellan actually inflicted more casualties on Army of Northern Virginia. Lee 'won' in territories where he had direct support from Richmond when McClellan actually had to ship supplies through the sea. Lee should have won the battles more decisively and learned his lessons at Marvel Hil and etc, but he thought he was overconfident not knowing his successes mostly could be attributed to blunders made by Union generals, not his 'brilliance'.
It reminds you what those rich men north of Richmond is about
Awesome video
Very good video, well done. Thanks
My great grandfather was shot @ Drewrys Bluff on May 14 1864 . The mini ball cut 14 holes through his bed roll . He lived & made it back home
The union army was lacking the officers with Mexican war experience. Industrialization took hold in the north aftter the Mexican war in 48' and factories hired union officers because they were experienced at organizing large groups of men.
I read once that the south had over 200 times experience of battle than northern officers.
Also, McClellan built up a huge, well trained war machine. When Grant took charge, the Army of the Potomac was a 71' Boss Mustang just waiting for someone to put their foot into the gas pedal.
Mind you, the great majority of West Point graudates sided with the United States of America. In fact, almost all the high ranking senior generals who had experienced Mexican war, except David Twiggs and Joseph Johnston (who was actually a general in the Regular Army and always bitched about his seniority in ranking over his Confederate peers during the war), remained loyal to the US. Lee was never promoted to (actual) generalship in the Regular Army and he ended his military in the US army as colonel.
usefull thanks
You should do on the Atlanta campaign next
They have.
@@Raison_d-etre where
Great information! Do you think Malvern Hill was a pre-curser to Gettysburg days 2-3 in that Lee shouldn't have made that attack?
I think after Lee sent Hood on a successful frontal assault at Gaines' Mill (against a fortified position) he always thought he could make more breakthroughs that way
Sun Tzu: "When strong appear weak"
Civil War General: 🖕
This is great.
Who was it, Shelby Foote maybe, who wrote that the best of the Confederacy were lost in this campaign. Many successes after, but the South would never be this strong again. Even here though they were outnumbered. Enjoying these ABT videos very much although a lot is omitted for time reasons. Jackson's Valley campaign tying up Union troops for example.
According to some of the books I've read on this campaign, Johnston (and Lee) called in reinforcements from all around the area to help reinforce and hold Richmond. By the time of the Seven Days, the ANV numbered 95,000, the AoP ~110,000. Those are total numbers, not the number of troops able to fight on the line. It was the closest (in the East) to parity that these two armies ever came. (Of course the Rebels actually outnumbered the Union, the only time in the ACW (major battle) that this ever happened.
I didn't know that Lincoln visited at the end and it was his idea to completely retreat. That McClellan wanted to stay and continue the fight.?. I did not know that. I thought the retreat back to Washington was all McClellan.?.🤔
@mike jos Very true. And very good point regarding the Pinkertons.
bonanza
I've always thought lincoln was an idiot ...mac's strategy got the AOP to within 7 miles of richmond and all of lee's efforts (along with enormous casualties) only forced him back a few more miles ...the AOP was still within easy striking distance and much closer than starting out again from washington and marching overland via manassas which is what lincoln wanted.
I know most people hate mac ....fine, if YOU or lincoln think he is too timid, passive, lazy, arrogant, stupid, foolish, cowardly, or traitorous (pick the adjective of your own preference) then remove him and have SOMEONE else execute HIS on the peninsula strategy.
you sir have stumbled onto the truth and understanding of the war ....congrats and keep learning
The entire army wanted to stay.
After McClellan retre... er, "changed his base" he immediately called for 50,000 reinforcements. As Lincoln once said of Mac, "sending troops to him is like shovelling fleas across a farmyard, half of them never get there." He also said, "if I send McClellan 100,000 he'll still sit and say that the enemy has 200,000.
Re visits to McClellan, Lincoln, Stanton and the new Gen'l-in-Chief Halleck all visited Mac in July. It was Halleck who made the final recommendation to retreat, reasoning that as things stood the AoNV (with its 150,000 men) stood directly between Mac and Pope's Army of Virginia and neither could help the other, thus on Aug. 6 Mac was ordered to retreat. I suppose they didn't see the camouflage value of keeping Mac south; if he'd even pretended to attack Lee wouldn't have been able to send Jackson north and Pope's campaign might've turned out differently. Pope wasn't a total idiot though Lee made him look that way.
The Army of the Potomac was removed from the Peninsula for political, not military reasons. Lincoln had decided to remove McClellan from command of his Army, and he intended to do that by removing his Army from the Peninsula and dispersing his troops to other commands. Most notably to the newly formed Army headed by John Pope. We see how that worked out.
EXCELLENT!!
A time index between events would be nice, from this one might think McClellan was being far more aggressive than he was. The web side for the campaign does this, Williams Burg is May 5 .. 7 pines May 31.
And the "Seven" Days begins June 26.
I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory - as it is the Govt must not & cannot hold me responsible for the result…
If I save this Army now I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or any other persons in Washington - you have done your best to sacrifice this Army.
Geo. B. McClellan
McClellan is lucky Lincoln nor Stanton saw that message until a few years later.
A guy like McClellan would have been bodily tossed from a war planning conference during the two Great Wars 👩🏭 I mean really, what an attitude.
You cannot deny McClellan was not only undermined in DC while he was on the Peninsula, but also had his operation directly interfered with. His dispatch that night was clearly born out of both exhaustion and exasperation at how much Stanton had sabotaged his efforts. Which evidence shows Stanton absolutely did. But clearly the letter was intemperate in the extreme.
I have respect for McClellan . He at least wanted to TRY winning the war without resorting to attrition and mass casualties. He cared about the lives of men on both sides. It didn't work so history judged him harshly. But I respect the effort. The lives of those men was worth trying to avoid a massive bloody slug fest if possible. If Johnson wasn't wounded and replaced by Lee it may have actually worked. McClellan inched his way to Richmond and Johnson kept reeling backward. If M Mcclelan had gotten a bit closer, with all those heavy guns, he would have pounded Richmond into submission. But nobody expected R E Lee to come out swinging like he did. He certainly unnerved little Mac. He was sickened by the mass twisted dead bodies and lost his nerve.
He shouldve stayed at malvrin hill and let lee destroy his army there and ended the war years early
He was a puss. Worst General Ever.
I love of year of 1862 in the Civil War!
Ernest von Vegesack, A Swedish Volunteer earned the Medal of Honor at Gaines Mill. He would serve at Second Battle of Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. Vegesack resigned from the Union Army on June 1, 1863 and returned to Sweden. On February 22, 1866, President Andrew Johnson nominated von Vegesack for award of the brevet grade of brigadier general of volunteers, to rank from March 13, 1865 and the United States Senate confirmed the appointment on April 10, 1866.
For his service in the Union army, and for repeated acts of courage he was given Sweden's highest medal for bravery, the För tapperhet i fält (For valour in the field) in gold upon his return to Sweden.
His citation reads: "While voluntarily serving as aide-de-camp, successfully and advantageously charged the position of troops under fire."
My question is, what would have happened had McClellan been allowed to stay on the Peninsula and re-initiate the campaign after his army had retreated to the safety of the gunboats? McClellan made it closer to Richmond than any Union General would in more than another two years thereafter. But the political mechanisms were so intent on getting rid of McClellan, that the real reason the Army was pulled from the peninsula was to disperse his Army, and remove him from command. This despite the advantages McClellan had put in place by the logistics network he built to support that Army, for the long term, on the peninsula.
If McClellan had been allowed to stay to fight another day, there wouldn't have been a Second Battle of Bull Run. Antietam would not have happened. And in all likelihood, the weakened Confederate Army would not have been able to cope with McClellan's army still on the Peninsula and so close to Richmond. Jackson had played out his Valley Campaign to deny all the Union Troops available to McClellan and his campaign around Richmond, and most likely would not be able to repeat that. In short, Robert E. Lee would have never been able to get away from Richmond to display his abilities in the open.
If McClellan had been allowed to stay on the Peninsula, as he begged Lincoln and Stanton to allow him to do, the Civil War would most likely have ended in 1863 or 1864 instead of 1865.
Mac would've sat on his thumbs until he had 125,000 men, then would've sobbed that the rebels had 250,000 and would've continued sitting on his thumb. McClellan should've been gotten rid of long before... but as Lincoln lamented when he finally did it... who do I replace him with? Meade did well at Gettysburg, Hooker did well at Chattanooga as a division commander, but it took Grant to finally turn the wheel hard enough to end the war.
@@indy_go_blue6048 I would have sat on my thumbs with 125,000 troops. Any modern General SHOULD sit on their thumbs with ONLY 125,000 troops to go against Lee's 92,000 troops. When attacking an entrenched force, you should never attack with less than THREE TIMES their number. That's why there were so many casualties in the Civil War. Because Arm chair Generals influence forced Generals to attack in untenable situations.
Of course you don't mind US Grant sitting on his thumbs during his siege of Petersburg, where he had a better numbers advantage over Lee than McClellan did?
@@indy_go_blue6048, Grant ended up using McClellans logistical plan to supply his assault on Richmond.
Indeed, its the only plan capable of moving that much supply to the decisive point.
@@indy_go_blue6048 And by the way, McClellan didn't have 125,000 men, he had 105,000 men.
@@josephhewes3923 He wanted McDowell's corps which was around 20,000 additional men. Perhaps a modern general wouldn't attack with less with 3:1 odds; logistically it was an impossibility in 1862. The chief point is: McClelland was not going to attack; he was going to lay siege and yes that's how Grant ended up beating ANV and winning the war.
The peninsula was a good idea if due to the army of the Potomac being at or around the banks of the york and James River they could constantly give constant supply from the navy. If a more aggressive general like hooker, grant, Sherman I have no doubt the peninsula campaign could have been a victory
Virtually any other commander of the Army of the Potomac (Excluding Pope) would’ve taken Richmond if they’d been in command during the Peninsular Campaign. The Union outnumbered the confederacy, had a better logistical supply base, and had reached the outskirts of Richmond itself with the Confederate armies divided with Jackson in the West and Johnston/Lee in the East. McClellan’s inaction and cautiousness proved disastrous for the Union as they were pushed out of Virginia
@10:50 abraham lincoln ordered a withdraw? he was on the record for criticizing mcclellan for not attacking fast enough or with enough men.
and mcclellan finding safety after defeating the confederate army with its +5000 causalities on malvern hill?
supplies and re-enforcements could have been delivered on the james river by the US navy and defended by its superior firepower. (new orleans was captured at about this time, on 1 may 1862, with the assistance of the US navy.)
@5:00 what happened to the richmond and york river railroad? who controlled it thereafter?
I loved finding some markers off the road in some woods just down the road from busch gardens. The wife waited in the car.
I don't like RUclips's new format. Much of their content isn't what I want to see. But ABT is good.
Shared.
With the losses sustained by the CS, one could argue that the campaign was a small strategic victory for the North, as they could afford the prolonged war and losses whilst the CSA could not.
Come to think about it, what was McClellan overall casualty taken vs. inflicted rate?
@@philipthecow Good question.
The 7 day battles surely points to massive losses on both sides (Malvern Hill comes to mind) - relatively much less for the US than the CS, though.
It was definitely a strategic vitory for the CS since they succeeded in driving the US army off from their territories and enabled themselves to have a go against the US in Maryland. It seems like a pointless bloodshed to us and a strategic loss for wasting valuable human lives & resources, but that's because we know the outcome of the Maryland campaign.
@@Greenfield-yf1wh Great point. Especially about hindsight being 20/20 of course. I would however argue that the Maryland campaign as well was a strategic blunder as there were no clear goals and/or exit strategy.
Gettysburg was an important battle, no doubt of that, but with no logistical support or strategic end goal, the campaign was doomed to fail. Even after a few victories....
It was Vicksburg that ultimately sealed the fate of the CS.
@@Emanon... I think the problem here is that we try to rationalize with the decions made by delusional people. The slave states should have not seceded in the first place when odds were heavily stacked against them. CSA should have never fired at Ft Sumter and started the war regardless what Lincoln did. The Confederate leadership was delusional - they thought the people of Maryland (a slave state) would welcome them with open arms if they 'liberate' the state from the Lincoln administration and the Federal goverment would surrender and offer a neogiated peace if they had harassed the North enough. The CS thought things would worked out in their favor if they had advanced to the North and won just a few of battles in there. Again, they were wrong. You see, you can't reason with crazies and this is why Confederates had no 'grand strategy' to begin with and we will never 'logically' understand their decisions.
Crazy "what if" in history but imagine if McClellan moved to the peninsula and Johnston moved on Washington. For awhile McClellan thought Magruder outnumbered him so it could have spelled disaster.
At the time of McClellan's push, Johnston had no way to cross the Potomac. Plus, the first stop for Union flowing in from the North is D.C.
There were plenty of troops defending Washington. And to top that off, Lincoln held back tens of thousands of additional troops that McClellan could have used, and weren't really needed in Washington, because Stonewall Jackson spooked the entire Washington high command with his small force of 15,000 men in his valley campaign.
You should do the battle of Second Manassas, Chancellorsville, Chattanooga, or lead up and retreat from Gettysburg
I live in this area.We talk about it all the time.
You know McClellan had an opportunity to defeat Lee and Jackson. He was a competent general an experrt in training his army and raise its morale. Yet his inner demons prevented him from gaining imimortality.
Oh, he's got immortality if just for the fact that 150 years +/- people still debate him. Additionally, McClellan was Lincoln's opponent in the 1864 presidential election. Imagine what would have happened if he won.
IF those inner demons were actually washington politicians, then we're in agreement.
Much of what you read about McClellan was a politically motivated narrative attached to McClellan, which stuck the moment Abraham Lincoln was assassinated, and made into a deity. While I don't fault Lincoln specifically, the Republicans tarred and feathered McClellan beyond any reasonable facsimile to reality. The reality was that he was a very good general, who organized the first modern army in the history of the world, but who was not perfect. His conduct during the seven days battles was better than any Union General in the east to this point. He was unfortunately facing a desperate opponent, who was acting out of character and taking extreme risks. The extreme risks unnerved McClellan enough for the outcome to be what it was.
Otherwise, the battles were a draw in that the Union inflicted heavier casualties on the Confederates, while the Confederates were able to remove the Union Army from the immediate vicinity of Richmond.
@@josephhewes3923 McClellan was a coward on the battlefield - he stayed far back from the actual fighting, thus unable to effectively lead with quick decision making.
@@jimmarble1425 This is also false. First of all, he won medals for gallantry in the Mexican war, being recognized for bravery twice during that war.
There are also reports that during the Battle of Antietam, he and Fitz John Porter stood on a hill, while the Confederates were hitting the hill with canons. They were observing the battlefield with a bunch of other officers, and when the Confederates targeted the group, McClellan sent the other officers to safety, while he stayed on the hill, continuing the observation. With shells landing around him.
I guess you don't mind all the reports of U.S. Grant sitting at his headquarters, whittling away at a piece of wood, waiting for his subordinates to come and update him on the battle? Why do you not mind US Grant leading from headquarters, while you expect George McClellan to run up to the front and lead a regiment on a charge? I guess that's what you expect the commanding General to do?
You need to stop reading Stephen Sears book. It's nothing more than a 1864 Republican campaign pamphlet.
But wasn't the CSS Virginia destroyed near Portsmouth?
When are we going to see a wargame like the Gettysburg one for this battle?
Multi-Man Publishing has a Great Campaigns of the Civil War game called "On to Richmond." The Gamers/MMP have 3 brigade level games called "Seven Pines", "Malvern Hill" and "Gaines Mill" if board games are what you're talking about.
Ultimate General-Civil war.
"Eggcellent"
Keep on people...
Both sides had hot air balloons for aerial reconnaissance. Why weren't they used more often?
Ironically, it’s a good thing the union lost so many early battles to Lee. Otherwise the 13th amendment wouldn’t have been passed and slavery wouldn’t have ended.
Poor Gustavus. Imagine having such a grand mental breakdown upon being given the responsiblity of commanding an army that your brief period of leadership isn't even mentioned in this telling... barely a one or two sentence footnote usually in the history of this campaign. Not that I feel bad for him, but I emphasize with that level of failure.
You could have mentioned how General John Magruder tricked McClellan into thinking the Confederate resistance was massive by marching his small army in circles.
Wrong... Longstreet was not part of the battle of Seven Pines. He was supposed to but failed to show up. Ended up getting in the way of those who were heading to the fight (Huger) and failed requests of assistance from Hill, whose flank he was supposed to shore up, when the fight got dicey.
see that's hilarious that you said McClellan was ready to attack without getting reinforcements first. Or even attack at all.
Of course, on 25th and 26th it WAS McClellan on the offensive. He had seized the dominant Garnett's Hill on the 26th with Smith's Division. Only Jackson's appearance saved Richmond.
the thing is with McClellan he would not attack unless he knows he has a decisive advantage he is to catous and lee took advantage of this character flaw of McCellan. not to mention lee knows the guy personally which did not help much.
@@TheManofthecross Yes, McClellan was very cautious. But Lee was behaving out of his known character of the time. He was understood to be cautious at this time, and it was believed he would not attack unless he had a major advantage in numbers. McClellan viewed Lee's behavior as evidence to support his own misunderstanding about Confederate troop strength, and confirmed in his mind that he was out numbered. As for Lee, from this point forward, he completely performed contrary to those previous assumptions about cautious behavior, and actually took risk, after risk, after risk, even to the point of recklessness. It was his risk taking, bordering on recklessness, that served him well now, but which eventually foiled him at both Antietam and Gettysburg.
@@josephhewes3923 I see but still even then he took advantage of McCellans cautious nature if he had been bolder enough he could had taken richomnd and ended it early or at least put a real hurt on the confederacy and the moral factor.
either way those moves and what not would prove to be the bane of most union forces in the east anyway and not grant for his bulldog fighting tenacity.
Reinforcements? He was asking for his own troops back. McDowell's Corp was a part of McClellan's own Army, which were an integral part of his plan, which Lincoln at the last minute removed from McClellan's operation. McClellan is asked to go down to Richmond, end the war with a climactic battle, and then at the last moment Stanton and Lincoln take away 40,000 of the troops that had an integral part of the plan?
When I clicked on this video I thought it was about Wellingtons 'Peninsular Campaign'.
The Americans like to rip off stuff from the continent. Like fredricsberg which is a town In norway where Charles XII died in battle.
@@bigred6486 not so funny to the sweds because when they search for Friedricksburg they will see results for some stupid battle in the American civil war and not the one that ended the Swedish Empire
@@panzerofthelake506 ey bud, sweden doesn't hold a monopoly over peninsulas, friend, so the possibility of other countries having peninsula campaigns isn't crazy. Napoleon had his own peninsula war against the spanish that was actually called the peninsula war, and basically any war on a peninsula can be called a peninsula campaign. Don't blame america for people's inability to see beyond their own country and use proper keywords
@@steviechubbs5238 not talking about any Peninsular war here
@@steviechubbs5238 talking about frediksburg
I've never thought much of an army that copies the French, even to the point of wearing blue like the French.
Both sides also had zouave units modeled after French colonial troops too.
Lee sent a draft of the battle plans to his lieutenants to be written by his chief of staff, who did not do a good job, and the bungling of this task led to confusions throughout the battle. It wasn't just a bad attack, it was badly planned as well.
Lee's immediate subordinates were all well informed as to Lee's operational plan, because Lee met with them in person to explain his intentions. Furthermore, there was nothing wrong with Lee's plan. It was risky but workable. It failed for a number of reasons- among them being unfounded assumptions on the part of his subordinates and un-timed orders being delivered late (and thus not received in chronological order). However, the main reason was that Jackson completely failed in the execution of his orders.
@@manilajohn0182 Lee did not meet with them all personally to convey his orders. That's such a copout.
@@Raison_d-etre Yes, actually, Lee did meet with them- on 23 June. Lee explained his intentions to his subordinates and then left the room to allow them to work out details.
@@manilajohn0182 Lol, such a copout. You don't give orders for subordinates to be worked out. That's why he ordered the vague written instructions, which led to failure.
@@Raison_d-etre Well, there's your opinion- and then there's the historical record.
If you study these Civil War battles in detail you find that Lee wasn't the genius he was made out to be. Malvern Hill and Pickets Charge are just two examples of Lee's blunders. The thing is ... Union generals made so many more blunders than Lee. McClellan MADE Lee look like a genius.
No mention of Stuarts ride around McClellen's army?
Also no mention of Jackson's Valley campaign, which was designed to deprive McClellan of as many troops as possible, working like a charm, with Lincoln withholding over 40,000 troops that McClellan's original plan depended on.
79 years later, the Germans make an enormous version of the Confederate railway gun, the Schwerer Gustav.
Would have been better off making two hundred 88s instead.
The Paris Gun? 🙆 Zeppelin's were tough, could take strafing attacks for hours.
To really understand America you need to study this war, Mexican war, Indian war, WW2, and the Vietnam war
America?
America?
*cough *cough Do the overland campaign
ruclips.net/video/MPrD10g20V4/видео.html&list=PLZrhqv_T1O1sdxRNm5SNc6cGSWr7xiWZs&index=10
@@AmericanBattlefieldTrust how could I of been so blind
Damn Seige of Yorktown,alone,was 29 days.
"Union armies INVADED the South". Let that sink in.
Good.
This is what they should make movies about... Its really sad the only really good movie about a particular battle is Gettysburg... Gods & Generals sucked probably just cause they didn't want to make the CSA winning battles look good. But they should make movies about how Lee took command & show the battles Gaines Mill & Malvern Hill
Two sad things as I see it: #1 there's little market for ACW movies about the battles and campaigns unless there's some romantic angle thrown into it (see "Horse Soldiers") and #2, tv networks like THC which SHOULD be making shows about this (and used to) are too full of (un)reality shows to bother with history any more.
Nah, it just takes time and skill. Two things Hollywood doesn't use.
Do Atlanta
I didn't know Meade was wounded
I've never understood McClellan's way of "realizing hallucinations" as one contemporary said. If Lee had 150 or 200,000 troops, would he be sitting around Richmond waiting for an attack, or would he split his army, hold Mac in place and attack DC with his other 75,000 men? Mac was a superb organizer and give him credit for making the AoP what it was, but he certainly was a horrible field commander.
Grant had a better numbers ratio against Lee and didn't get to Richmond for another two and a half years. The numbers ratio around Richmond during the Peninsula campaign was 105,000 to 92,000, which any modern General will tell you is at best a negligible advantage, and more than likely not an advantage at all.
Why aren't you accusing Lincoln of hallucinating when he imagined Stonewall Jackson's 17,000 in his valley campaign was 40,000? Every single Union General and politician was over-estimating Confederate strength because the Confederates had an active disinformation campaign to inflate their numbers. And it worked.
@@josephhewes3923 Grant got to Petersburg in 2 months, then the siege lasted 9 months, so let's say in just under a year.
Great Video and Thank you.
When the subject is McClellan never acted decisively or moved like a snail, please keep in mind this one fact (from the books - Lincoln's Lieutenants, Lincoln and his Generals - McLellan);
The Union Army hired the Pinkerton Detective Agency for all "Spying" on the Confederate forces and they had a very simple three step process;
1. The more we inflate the numbers, the longer McClellan will sit on his ass.
2. The longer McClellan sits on his ass, the longer the war.
3. The longer the war, the longer we get paid.
is that actually real or are you just shitting on mcclellan
but i'm asking if that was their legit reasoning for doin so
I must say, I take full responsibility for the loss of life on our side, I should've stepped up sooner.
does any1 here know why the North did not use their superior industry to get a crazy amount of Henry rifles?
thanks
István Sipos early in the war, many commanders thought that repeating rifles would cause troops to waste ammunition.
They were very new. McClellan ordered the first 250, I think.
@@flapjack4845 You're right, that's the main reason. They were also expensive vs the cost of a rifled musket; most cavalrymen bought their own or their general bought them for his men if he had the money.
Ive asked this many times but ive never got a reply... I always wondered why Lee always went more North when invading Union territory like at Antietam & Gettysburg.... Why not make bridges or get enough river transports to move 50k+ rebel troops straight to Washington DC? Even if it failed an actual legit attack on the Capital probably would've done more to the moral on the Union than anything the CSA did!
Can you tell me truth answer, way did fight in first place? And which side jewish financial lobby are suport?
Washington was a fortress. Even if he could get around the Union army and reach Washington it's unlikely that he'll be able to do any serious damage before the Union army caught up with him. On the other hand, the surrounding areas are vulnerable. Beside a few small garrisons, the only protection they had was the Army of the Potomac itself which would take time to react to the confederate offensive and reach those threatened areas.
@@philliptaylor9129 Yes but occupying places like Antietam or Gettysburg really didn't do anything to Union morale! They weren't really major Union cities... While u look at what the Union was doing under Grant in TN taking major Southern Cities... I agree that Lee needed to destroy the Army of the Potomac... Yet Lee basically went the same route to Gettysburg as he did Antietam & it failed each time while never threatening a major Union city. So again I never said an attack on Washington would've succeeded its just that in my opinion even a weak attack on DC would've done more to Union morale then the CSA going further North like they did at both Antietam & Gettysburg...
Lee at that time needed to get his army between Meade & Washington.... Meade got his army between Lee & Washington! Thats why Im against the more Northern approach Lee took each time he tried to invade Union territory.
@@borivojetravica569 i take it the north, one they won, 2 the south started their independence from the heavy taxes and unfair monetary system placed on them
But as jason robbins says, it really doesnt make sence it seems more like the people in charge wanted the war, and profited at the cost of dumb sheep. History is such a lie we dont know anything and its bullshit