OK, I’ve not yet finished viewing, and two thoughts occur to me (that will perhaps be answered over the course of the video). 1) regardless of training and equipment to increase capability, you’re still losing some capability that only comes from having lots of soldiers with rifles, aka infantry, aka boots on the ground. That seems pretty clear cut, no? Or am I wrong? 2) this might actually be a good thing, if it’s made 100% clear to civilian leadership that the force has limited capabilities for certain types of missions. Civilian leadership (hopefully) won’t be tempted to engage the armed forces in those types of missions in the first place. “Sorry, a full invasion and occupation of country X isn’t on the table, you’ll have to figure out a different solution to reach your political goals.” Number 2 is essentially replacing the hammer with a Swiss Army knife. Maybe the new challenge is training the civilian leadership to not see everything as a nail.
It’s not a bad thing, but this talk is covering a LOT of distinct issues. You might consider breaking this kind of video into chapters within the video (with chapter links in the description). I’m approaching this video with my own intellectual interests and frame (as might be clear from my other comment). The salient issue I’ve been thinking about is how the mission environment has changed-we’re operating a networked environment. Civilians are networked, the adversary is networked, and like it or not we are networked. More plainly, anyone with a cell phone is networked. The cases where it is desirable to knock out the network entirely are going to be the exception. The point is, armed forces need to leverage these networks or be at the mercy of them. How to do it is going to require rethinking how information is shared, and that requires rethinking hierarchical command structure.
Thanks for the very constructive comment. This was a rather whistle-stop tour of a huge topic. There is a huge number of rabbit holes and pertinent issues to discuss - some of which you've hit upon. For me, I find the interplay between physical, moral and conceptual components in relation to an opponent fundamental to understanding friction in war. How protagonists prepare, conduct and reconstitute/evolve in war/Warfare is the core to our understanding. That's a huge topic, that is itself ever evolving. Which means lots more conversations from many more military-cultural traditions.
Dumb comment. SF has limited slots for recruits. Lessons learned from recent conflicts demonstrate advantages to a flat structure-SFs already were using flat structure to a certain extent, but COIN missions in the current environment demand it. Some of the discussion here suggests that the regular army is flattening the command structure-or at least putting into place the prerequisites for flat structuring. If you’re not sure what the hell I am talking about, watch some videos by Retired General McCrystal who commanded JSOC in Iraq.
![CHILE vs. BRASIL [1-2] | RESUMEN | ELIMINATORIAS SUDAMERICANAS | FECHA 9](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/5ObJt_71AYc/mqdefault.jpg)
OK, I’ve not yet finished viewing, and two thoughts occur to me (that will perhaps be answered over the course of the video).
1) regardless of training and equipment to increase capability, you’re still losing some capability that only comes from having lots of soldiers with rifles, aka infantry, aka boots on the ground. That seems pretty clear cut, no? Or am I wrong?
2) this might actually be a good thing, if it’s made 100% clear to civilian leadership that the force has limited capabilities for certain types of missions. Civilian leadership (hopefully) won’t be tempted to engage the armed forces in those types of missions in the first place. “Sorry, a full invasion and occupation of country X isn’t on the table, you’ll have to figure out a different solution to reach your political goals.”
Number 2 is essentially replacing the hammer with a Swiss Army knife. Maybe the new challenge is training the civilian leadership to not see everything as a nail.
It’s not a bad thing, but this talk is covering a LOT of distinct issues. You might consider breaking this kind of video into chapters within the video (with chapter links in the description).
I’m approaching this video with my own intellectual interests and frame (as might be clear from my other comment). The salient issue I’ve been thinking about is how the mission environment has changed-we’re operating a networked environment. Civilians are networked, the adversary is networked, and like it or not we are networked. More plainly, anyone with a cell phone is networked. The cases where it is desirable to knock out the network entirely are going to be the exception. The point is, armed forces need to leverage these networks or be at the mercy of them. How to do it is going to require rethinking how information is shared, and that requires rethinking hierarchical command structure.
Thanks for the very constructive comment.
This was a rather whistle-stop tour of a huge topic. There is a huge number of rabbit holes and pertinent issues to discuss - some of which you've hit upon.
For me, I find the interplay between physical, moral and conceptual components in relation to an opponent fundamental to understanding friction in war. How protagonists prepare, conduct and reconstitute/evolve in war/Warfare is the core to our understanding. That's a huge topic, that is itself ever evolving. Which means lots more conversations from many more military-cultural traditions.
Why no comments Andy? Thinking soldiers join UKSF.
?
Dumb comment. SF has limited slots for recruits.
Lessons learned from recent conflicts demonstrate advantages to a flat structure-SFs already were using flat structure to a certain extent, but COIN missions in the current environment demand it. Some of the discussion here suggests that the regular army is flattening the command structure-or at least putting into place the prerequisites for flat structuring.
If you’re not sure what the hell I am talking about, watch some videos by Retired General McCrystal who commanded JSOC in Iraq.
@@MarcosElMalo2 🥱
@@MarcosElMalo2 What's your rank and position please?
@@Katmando376 Don't tell him, Pike!