I hope you are. As a child I lived with one of those survivors. And it was not easy for no reason he would flip out screaming and trashing around. Oxford 1993 he died. His last moments on earth fighting against his Oxygen mask. Screaming weakly - terror on his face - he was right back there. For us his family and the medical staff it was unbearable. I have a silk handkerchief from the Dutch Government - it's downstairs in a cupboard. I am glad he doesn't see the World today. He lived the rest of his life a dedicated Quaker.
@@thevillaaston7811 No it wasn't. How is an airborne General responsible for the fact that the entire 9th SS Hohenstaufen was being refitted in Arnhem at that time. The paras were doomed from that alone. It's also well known since WWII that you don't use paratroops in offensive operations like that. Both Crete and Arnhem prove that. After Crete, which was a win, the losses were so high that Student's boys were used as ground troops for the rest of the war. Find a better excuse for Monty being crap in offensive operations.
@@Oscuros Its a definite no. The entire 9th SS Hohenstaufen was not being refitted in Arnhem. Only minority of that formation was still in the Arnhem area at the onset of MARKET GARDEN, with the bulk of that formation having been sent to Germany, hence the delay in the bulk of that formation in joining the battle while troops and equipment was brought back from Germany. 'It's also well known since WWII that you don't use paratroops in offensive operations like that.' But at that time, the FAAA (First Allied Airborne Army - to save you looking it up), was created, mainly at the insistence of senior figures in the US military and government. The final say on the use of the FAAA rested with its commander, US General Lewis Brereton. ‘Monty being crap in offensive operations.’ Montgomery won with his offensives in North Africa, Normandy, the Scheldt, and the Rhine. Bradley won where?
@@Oscuros - nonsense. Browning's Operation COMET was cancelled by Montgomery after he was informed the II.SS-Panzerkorps with 9, and presumably the 10.SS-Panzer-Divisions under command, had moved to the area to refit. Both divisions were known to be reduced to regimental battlegroups with few if any tanks. Montgomery then proposed instead an enlarged operation with three airborne divisions instead of just the British one by adding the Americans, and the airborne planning was turned over to Brereton's 1st Allied Airborne Army for detailed planning of Operation MARKET. Brereton deleted COMET's D-Day double airlift and the dawn glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Grave bridges. General Gavin, who was given responsibility for the Nijmegen/Grave sector with 82nd Airborne, also dismissed a British request to drop a battalion on the north end of the Nijmegen bridge and instead instructed the poorly led 508th PIR to seize it immediately after landing and securing the Groesbeek ridge initial objective, which they subsequently failed to do, allowing SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 to reinforce the bridge first with 30 armoured vehicles. For a few vital hours between the German evacuation of Nijmegen of rear echelon units, mostly the BdO (headquarters of all German Order Police in the Netherlands and equivalent to a division HQ), and the arrival of Gräbner's SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9, the Nijmegen road and rail bridges were apparently guarded by the BdO's Musikkorps-Zug, or police band - about 30-40 musicians! When the 508th arrived on their intitial objective on the Groesbeek heights, they were met by Dutch resistance leader Geert van Hees, who told the regiment commander the Germans had deserted Nijmegen and left a non-commissioned officer and seventeen men guarding the highway bridge. The 508th sent a recon patrol based on a single platoon instead of the 1st Battalion as Gavin instructed, and most of the patrol got lost in the backstreets of Nijmegen. No surprise this wasn't in the Hollywood film. I don't think it's Montgomery that's crap in offensive operations and you need to read more books.
lil' villa try looking in actual records at your National archives in London,THICKO *Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon.* The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over *Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured.* *LT John Gorman?* *Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, "we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair"* *How about Lt.Col.Mackenzie?* *ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p 408* on arrival at the Hotle Hartenstein at 23:45 Lt.-Col Mackenzie opted to keep his disquiet over Brownings poor grasp of the gravity of the situation and the marked lack of urgency by XXX Corps and the 43rd Wessex to himself *Heinz Harmel? Tasked with operations from Arnhem south to Nijmegen* *Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 As Heinz Harmel later put it "the English stopped for tea* the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us"* A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
The plan was for the 82nd Airborne to have seized the bridge at Nijmegen before 30 Corps got there. It's a shame that the reasons why they failed to achieve that are not discussed here.
It was actually the 508th Regiment's commander, but Gavin shouldn't have trusted him to carry out the Nijmegen mission and admitted as much in his interview with Cornelius Ryan. Ryan didn't expand on this in his research for the book A Bridge Too Far (1974), preferring an anti-British narrative, and of course none of it is in the Hollywood film version, but the interview is available to read online: Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967 (James Maurice Gavin, Box 101 Folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University) As Walter says, respect for your grandpa's service - the 508th troopers were all brave men, but they were poorly led at the regimental level.
@@davemac1197 Absolutely Dave, I have just posted this in repsonse to another comment made on another "Market Garden" thread in relation to the 82nd Airborne. The failure to immediately capture the Nijmegen bridges was one of the MAJOR problems of the ground operation .... instead of crossing the Waal over an easily taken bridge on day 2, solely because of Gavin's slack leadership and going "off plan", when the battalion from Linquists's 508th Regt eventually turned up at the Nijmegen Bridge having sat around for the previous 3 hours doing absolutely nothing due to poor leadership, rather than facing just TWELVE sentries that had originally been posted on the Nijmegen bridges, they were instead confronted with a heavily armed and dug in reconnaisance company of the 9th SS. Gavin also unilaterally decided to prioritise the capture of the bridges at Grave and the Waal-Maas canal Bridges ALL of which spanned waterways that were narrow enough to be bridged by engineer units if necessary, and then placed the MOST important bridge at Nijmegen (which was too wide to be temporarily bridged) as the LOWEST priority.... that of course was on top his failing to quickly reconnoitre the 1.5 mile distant Groesbeek heights, and instead of IMMEDIATELY capturing the vital Nijmegen bridge as he had been ordered to do so, chose to sit watching for a German "stomach battalion" coming "over the hill" at Groesbeek while the German defenders, leisurely laughing behind his back, bolstered the defence of the MAJOR bottleneck in Gavin's rear, with the result that it was day FOUR before XXX Corps could advance past 82nd Airborne's primary target... two whole days behind schedule. ALL of that mismanagement and poor judgement by Gavin massively compounded the difficulties elsewhere and he KNEW it, as was demonstrated by his constant postwar squirming and repeated changing of his own narrative.
@@walterkronkitesleftshoe6684 - forgive me for not relying sooner - I'm sure I did not get a notification of your reply at the time, RUclips is a bit sketchy in this respect! Much of what you say I think is correct and I agree with your analysis, but I would clarify a few points: It was Lindquist's fault for not following Gavin's instruction to send his 1st Battalion directly to the bridge - he believed he had to clear the drop zone (being done by D Company of 2nd Battalion) and secure his other objectives on the Groesbeek ridge first. Lindquist had not performed well in Normandy and this is told in the early chapters of Phil Nordyke's Put Us Down In Hell - The Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2 (2012). Gavin told Cornelius Ryan in his 1967 interview for A Bridge Too Far (1974) that neither he nor Ridgway (82nd CO in Normandy) trusted Lindquist in a fight. He also confirmed his instruction to Lindquist on sending the battalion to the bridge and also talked about objectives, and this is where Gavin is certainly responsible and can be criticised. Gavin also said he received a British request to drop a battalion at the north end of the Nijmegen bridge and toyed with the idea, until eventually dismissing it because of his experience in Sicily, where his troops were scattered in the drop and the division was disorganised for days. Gavin's first priority was to secure his supply line to XXX Corps, so assigned his best regiment, the 504th, to the Maas road bridge at Grave, and to the western ends of the Maas-Waal canal bridges - which was the German main defence line in the area. His next priority seems to be his concern over a German reaction coming from the Reichswald. He was given a 'sanitised' (unit identifications stripped out) steer that there might be "a regiment of SS" (10.SS-Panzer-Division 'Frundsberg' reduced to a regimental battlegroup and exact location unknown) in Nijmegen's excellent Dutch army barracks facilities, and that they may be drawing new tanks from a depot thought to be in the Kleve area behind the Reichswald. The depot was actually near Münster (Wehrkreis VI - military district 6 - HQ) and the Fundsberg was in and around Ruurlo in the Achterhoek region east of Arnhem. So Gavin assigned his more aggressive and experienced 505th to the Reichswald sector, and also responsible for securing the Maas rail bridge at Mook as an alternative Maas crossing to Grave, and the eastern ends of the Maas-Waal canal bridges at Heumen, Malden, and Hatert. The 2nd Battalion of the 505th under Ben Vandervoort (played by John Wayne in the 1962 film of The Longest Day) was probably the best battalion in the division, and it was held as division reserve after clearing the northern half of Groesbeek town and taking Hill 81.8 behind the town. This left the problematic 508th, with only Normandy as its previous experience, and in the final divisional briefing on 15 September, Gavin instructed Lindquist to send his 1st Battalion directly to the bridge via the open farmland to the east and avoid the city centre, even showing him on a map the exact route he wanted the battalion to take. Lindquist, for his part, stuck to his original 13 September Field Order No.1 in which all three battalions (less D Company on the DZ collecting supply canisters and establishing the regimental supply dump at Voxhill farm with his S-4) would secure the Groesbeek ridge at De Ploeg (1st Bn), De Hut (2nd Bn), and Berg-en-Dal (3rd Bn). They established roadblocks and dug-in along the ridge line. He did immediately send a recon patrol, pre-planned, based on Lt. Bob Weaver's 3rd Platoon of C Company (Weaver was selected after distinguishing himself in Normandy), with Lt. Lee Frigo's S-2 (Intel) Section, two LMG squads and an SCR-300 radio and operator from battalion. They were to recon the Nijmegen highway bridge and report on its condition, but Lindquist had already met Dutch resistance leader Geert van Hees at De Ploeg, who reported the Germans had deserted Nijmegen and left a non-commissioned officer and seventeen men to guard the bridge. The patrol got split up in the streets of Nijmegen by the crowds of celebrating Dutch civilians after taking a wrong turn, losing contact with the three-man point team under PFC Joe Atkins from the S-2 Section. Atkins reached the bridge and surprised the seven guards at the southern end, taking them prisoner without firing a shot (chapter 6 - Nijmegen Bridge, The 508th Connection, Zig Boroughs 2013). Weaver got completely lost in the back streets and eventually asked a civilian resident to contact the resistance and ask for a guide. When the 508th's liasion officer to Division HQ, Captain Chester 'Chet' Graham, went to the 508th CP to ask Lindquist when he was sending the battalion to the bridge, Lindquist said "As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that." Graham returned to the Division CP through "Indian country" and relayed the message, saying he had never seen Gavin so mad. He told Graham to get into a Jeep and said "come with me - let's get him moving". At the 508th CP, Gavin told Lindquist "I told you to move with speed." (Nordyke, 2012). Lt.Col. Shields Warren of 1st Battalion was then ordered at 8 PM by Lindquist to move into Nijmegen and secure the highway bridge, but this surprised Warren as it was the first time he was told his battalion was to secure this bridge. It took an hour for A Company to come out from its line along the ridge and assemble. They moved to the IP (Initial Point) at the Krayenhoff barracks and waited for B Company to catch up. At 10 PM Warren decided they could not wait any longer and proceeded into the city. B Company was even deeper along the ridge line where it contacted the 3rd Battalion line, and took longer to get out and assemble on the main Groesbeek-Nijmegen road at De Ploeg. Meanwhile, PFC Atkins waited at the bridge for about an hour until it got dark (full dark is 8 PM) and decided they had to withdraw, releasing their prisoners. As they left, they could hear "heavy equipment" arriving at the other end (Boroughs, 2013). This was most certainly Gräbner's SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 with about 40 armoured vehicles (10 detached at Arnhem), attached to 10.SS-Panzer-Division and ordered to recon Arnhem and Nijmegen to investigate reports of airborne landings. Arriving a little later were Reinhold (Kdr II./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 from Vorden) and his adjutant Gernot Traupel, who's diary of events at Nijmegen is in Retake Arnhem Bridge - An Illustrated History of Kampfgruppe Knaust September to October 1944, by Bob Gerritsen and Scott Revell (2010). They started organising the defence of the Nijmegen bridges, while Gräbner was ordered back to Elst (midway between Nijmegen and Arnhem) at 9 PM, but he agreed to leave behind a platoon of SPWs with 7.5cm close support Kanon (SdKfz 251/9). At some point after getting a guide and failing to get to the now roadblocked bridge, Weaver received a radio report from battalion (now within range) that two companies were on the way to the bridge, so he decided to also withdraw to rejoin C Company at De Ploeg. Sometime between 10 PM and midnight the 1st Battalion 508th with A and B Companies bumped the German outer perimeter at the Keizer Karelplein traffic circle near the railway station, and after a firefight the battalion withdrew with casualties. At midnight, the SPW platoon commander notified Traupel they were also ordered withdrawn to Elst. German troops on the canal line and Groesbeek area were primarily Landesschützen-Ausbildungs-Bataillon I/6 (home guard training battalion 1 from Werkreis VI), originally based at Grave before mobilisation by the 'Valkyrie' alert in the first week of September and assigned the northern most sector of the Westwall until 15 September, when they detached three companies to the new canal line. Stomach and ear battalions arrived later. Other units in the immediate area were 1./Transport-Sicherungs-Battalion 567 (transferred from Paris) with only 110 men, 65 guarding bridges and the railway station at Nijmegen and the others forming a security screen on the southern outskirts. 1./Pionier-Bau-Bataillon 434 were digging defences along the canal line, and one or two companies from the Fallschirm-Panzer-Ersatz-und-Ausbildungs-Regiment 'Hermann Göring', included their 21.Unter-Lehr-Kommando (NCO training company) at Honinghutje on the canal and a forward platoon at Nederasselt (Grave bridge). These units were supported by anti-tank guns from 2./SS-Panzerjäger-Ersatz-Abteilung 2 from Hilversum. Source of units identified from PW interrogations is the 82nd Airborne G-2 (Intel) Section documents downloaded from PaperlessArchives, so I think they're legit.
dave hak here you go *Irish Guards there, HOw about Lt.Col. Vandeluer? Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360* The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. *Lt Brian Wilson?* Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured. *LT John Gorman?* *Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360* LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, "we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair" *How about Lt.Col.Mackenzie?* *ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p 408* on arrival at the Hotle Hartenstein at 23:45 Lt.-Col Mackenzie opted to keep his disquiet over Brownings poor grasp of the gravity of the situation and the marked lack of urgency by XXX Corps and the 43rd Wessex to himself *Heinz Harmel? Tasked with operations from Arnhem south to Nijmegen* *Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 As Heinz Harmel later put it "the English stopped for tea* the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us"* A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
I am born and live in Valkenswaard. We are all very grateful to the soldiers that liberated us.
I hope you are. As a child I lived with one of those survivors. And it was not easy for no reason he would flip out screaming and trashing around.
Oxford 1993 he died. His last moments on earth fighting against his Oxygen mask. Screaming weakly - terror on his face - he was right back there. For us his family and the medical staff it was unbearable.
I have a silk handkerchief from the Dutch Government - it's downstairs in a cupboard. I am glad he doesn't see the World today. He lived the rest of his life a dedicated Quaker.
This was Monty's brainchild and, sadly, it ended terribly.
But was messed up by US General's First Allied Airborne Army.
@@thevillaaston7811 No it wasn't. How is an airborne General responsible for the fact that the entire 9th SS Hohenstaufen was being refitted in Arnhem at that time. The paras were doomed from that alone.
It's also well known since WWII that you don't use paratroops in offensive operations like that. Both Crete and Arnhem prove that. After Crete, which was a win, the losses were so high that Student's boys were used as ground troops for the rest of the war.
Find a better excuse for Monty being crap in offensive operations.
@@Oscuros
Its a definite no.
The entire 9th SS Hohenstaufen was not being refitted in Arnhem.
Only minority of that formation was still in the Arnhem area at the onset of MARKET GARDEN, with the bulk of that formation having been sent to Germany, hence the delay in the bulk of that formation in joining the battle while troops and equipment was brought back from Germany.
'It's also well known since WWII that you don't use paratroops in offensive operations like that.'
But at that time, the FAAA (First Allied Airborne Army - to save you looking it up), was created, mainly at the insistence of senior figures in the US military and government. The final say on the use of the FAAA rested with its commander, US General Lewis Brereton.
‘Monty being crap in offensive operations.’
Montgomery won with his offensives in North Africa, Normandy, the Scheldt, and the Rhine. Bradley won where?
@@Oscuros - nonsense. Browning's Operation COMET was cancelled by Montgomery after he was informed the II.SS-Panzerkorps with 9, and presumably the 10.SS-Panzer-Divisions under command, had moved to the area to refit. Both divisions were known to be reduced to regimental battlegroups with few if any tanks.
Montgomery then proposed instead an enlarged operation with three airborne divisions instead of just the British one by adding the Americans, and the airborne planning was turned over to Brereton's 1st Allied Airborne Army for detailed planning of Operation MARKET. Brereton deleted COMET's D-Day double airlift and the dawn glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Grave bridges. General Gavin, who was given responsibility for the Nijmegen/Grave sector with 82nd Airborne, also dismissed a British request to drop a battalion on the north end of the Nijmegen bridge and instead instructed the poorly led 508th PIR to seize it immediately after landing and securing the Groesbeek ridge initial objective, which they subsequently failed to do, allowing SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 to reinforce the bridge first with 30 armoured vehicles.
For a few vital hours between the German evacuation of Nijmegen of rear echelon units, mostly the BdO (headquarters of all German Order Police in the Netherlands and equivalent to a division HQ), and the arrival of Gräbner's SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9, the Nijmegen road and rail bridges were apparently guarded by the BdO's Musikkorps-Zug, or police band - about 30-40 musicians! When the 508th arrived on their intitial objective on the Groesbeek heights, they were met by Dutch resistance leader Geert van Hees, who told the regiment commander the Germans had deserted Nijmegen and left a non-commissioned officer and seventeen men guarding the highway bridge.
The 508th sent a recon patrol based on a single platoon instead of the 1st Battalion as Gavin instructed, and most of the patrol got lost in the backstreets of Nijmegen. No surprise this wasn't in the Hollywood film.
I don't think it's Montgomery that's crap in offensive operations and you need to read more books.
lil' villa try looking in actual records at your National archives in London,THICKO
*Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon.* The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over
*Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured.*
*LT John Gorman?*
*Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, "we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair"*
*How about Lt.Col.Mackenzie?*
*ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p 408* on arrival at the Hotle Hartenstein at 23:45 Lt.-Col Mackenzie opted to keep his disquiet over Brownings poor grasp of the gravity of the situation and the marked lack of urgency by XXX Corps and the 43rd Wessex to himself
*Heinz Harmel? Tasked with operations from Arnhem south to Nijmegen*
*Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 As Heinz Harmel later put it "the English stopped for tea* the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us"* A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
The plan was for the 82nd Airborne to have seized the bridge at Nijmegen before 30 Corps got there. It's a shame that the reasons why they failed to achieve that are not discussed here.
My grandpa was in the USAs 508PIR 82nd A/B Div. He said "Operation Market Garden " was almost a total failure
Hey!!! it was your Grandpa's divisional commander who fucked up the WHOLE operation !!!
Sincerest respects to your grandpa's service though.
It was actually the 508th Regiment's commander, but Gavin shouldn't have trusted him to carry out the Nijmegen mission and admitted as much in his interview with Cornelius Ryan.
Ryan didn't expand on this in his research for the book A Bridge Too Far (1974), preferring an anti-British narrative, and of course none of it is in the Hollywood film version, but the interview is available to read online:
Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967 (James Maurice Gavin, Box 101 Folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University)
As Walter says, respect for your grandpa's service - the 508th troopers were all brave men, but they were poorly led at the regimental level.
@@davemac1197 Absolutely Dave, I have just posted this in repsonse to another comment made on another "Market Garden" thread in relation to the 82nd Airborne.
The failure to immediately capture the Nijmegen bridges was one of the MAJOR problems of the ground operation .... instead of crossing the Waal over an easily taken bridge on day 2, solely because of Gavin's slack leadership and going "off plan", when the battalion from Linquists's 508th Regt eventually turned up at the Nijmegen Bridge having sat around for the previous 3 hours doing absolutely nothing due to poor leadership, rather than facing just TWELVE sentries that had originally been posted on the Nijmegen bridges, they were instead confronted with a heavily armed and dug in reconnaisance company of the 9th SS.
Gavin also unilaterally decided to prioritise the capture of the bridges at Grave and the Waal-Maas canal Bridges ALL of which spanned waterways that were narrow enough to be bridged by engineer units if necessary, and then placed the MOST important bridge at Nijmegen (which was too wide to be temporarily bridged) as the LOWEST priority.... that of course was on top his failing to quickly reconnoitre the 1.5 mile distant Groesbeek heights, and instead of IMMEDIATELY capturing the vital Nijmegen bridge as he had been ordered to do so, chose to sit watching for a German "stomach battalion" coming "over the hill" at Groesbeek while the German defenders, leisurely laughing behind his back, bolstered the defence of the MAJOR bottleneck in Gavin's rear, with the result that it was day FOUR before XXX Corps could advance past 82nd Airborne's primary target... two whole days behind schedule.
ALL of that mismanagement and poor judgement by Gavin massively compounded the difficulties elsewhere and he KNEW it, as was demonstrated by his constant postwar squirming and repeated changing of his own narrative.
@@walterkronkitesleftshoe6684 - forgive me for not relying sooner - I'm sure I did not get a notification of your reply at the time, RUclips is a bit sketchy in this respect!
Much of what you say I think is correct and I agree with your analysis, but I would clarify a few points:
It was Lindquist's fault for not following Gavin's instruction to send his 1st Battalion directly to the bridge - he believed he had to clear the drop zone (being done by D Company of 2nd Battalion) and secure his other objectives on the Groesbeek ridge first. Lindquist had not performed well in Normandy and this is told in the early chapters of Phil Nordyke's Put Us Down In Hell - The Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2 (2012). Gavin told Cornelius Ryan in his 1967 interview for A Bridge Too Far (1974) that neither he nor Ridgway (82nd CO in Normandy) trusted Lindquist in a fight. He also confirmed his instruction to Lindquist on sending the battalion to the bridge and also talked about objectives, and this is where Gavin is certainly responsible and can be criticised. Gavin also said he received a British request to drop a battalion at the north end of the Nijmegen bridge and toyed with the idea, until eventually dismissing it because of his experience in Sicily, where his troops were scattered in the drop and the division was disorganised for days.
Gavin's first priority was to secure his supply line to XXX Corps, so assigned his best regiment, the 504th, to the Maas road bridge at Grave, and to the western ends of the Maas-Waal canal bridges - which was the German main defence line in the area. His next priority seems to be his concern over a German reaction coming from the Reichswald. He was given a 'sanitised' (unit identifications stripped out) steer that there might be "a regiment of SS" (10.SS-Panzer-Division 'Frundsberg' reduced to a regimental battlegroup and exact location unknown) in Nijmegen's excellent Dutch army barracks facilities, and that they may be drawing new tanks from a depot thought to be in the Kleve area behind the Reichswald. The depot was actually near Münster (Wehrkreis VI - military district 6 - HQ) and the Fundsberg was in and around Ruurlo in the Achterhoek region east of Arnhem. So Gavin assigned his more aggressive and experienced 505th to the Reichswald sector, and also responsible for securing the Maas rail bridge at Mook as an alternative Maas crossing to Grave, and the eastern ends of the Maas-Waal canal bridges at Heumen, Malden, and Hatert. The 2nd Battalion of the 505th under Ben Vandervoort (played by John Wayne in the 1962 film of The Longest Day) was probably the best battalion in the division, and it was held as division reserve after clearing the northern half of Groesbeek town and taking Hill 81.8 behind the town.
This left the problematic 508th, with only Normandy as its previous experience, and in the final divisional briefing on 15 September, Gavin instructed Lindquist to send his 1st Battalion directly to the bridge via the open farmland to the east and avoid the city centre, even showing him on a map the exact route he wanted the battalion to take. Lindquist, for his part, stuck to his original 13 September Field Order No.1 in which all three battalions (less D Company on the DZ collecting supply canisters and establishing the regimental supply dump at Voxhill farm with his S-4) would secure the Groesbeek ridge at De Ploeg (1st Bn), De Hut (2nd Bn), and Berg-en-Dal (3rd Bn). They established roadblocks and dug-in along the ridge line. He did immediately send a recon patrol, pre-planned, based on Lt. Bob Weaver's 3rd Platoon of C Company (Weaver was selected after distinguishing himself in Normandy), with Lt. Lee Frigo's S-2 (Intel) Section, two LMG squads and an SCR-300 radio and operator from battalion. They were to recon the Nijmegen highway bridge and report on its condition, but Lindquist had already met Dutch resistance leader Geert van Hees at De Ploeg, who reported the Germans had deserted Nijmegen and left a non-commissioned officer and seventeen men to guard the bridge.
The patrol got split up in the streets of Nijmegen by the crowds of celebrating Dutch civilians after taking a wrong turn, losing contact with the three-man point team under PFC Joe Atkins from the S-2 Section. Atkins reached the bridge and surprised the seven guards at the southern end, taking them prisoner without firing a shot (chapter 6 - Nijmegen Bridge, The 508th Connection, Zig Boroughs 2013). Weaver got completely lost in the back streets and eventually asked a civilian resident to contact the resistance and ask for a guide.
When the 508th's liasion officer to Division HQ, Captain Chester 'Chet' Graham, went to the 508th CP to ask Lindquist when he was sending the battalion to the bridge, Lindquist said "As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that." Graham returned to the Division CP through "Indian country" and relayed the message, saying he had never seen Gavin so mad. He told Graham to get into a Jeep and said "come with me - let's get him moving". At the 508th CP, Gavin told Lindquist "I told you to move with speed." (Nordyke, 2012).
Lt.Col. Shields Warren of 1st Battalion was then ordered at 8 PM by Lindquist to move into Nijmegen and secure the highway bridge, but this surprised Warren as it was the first time he was told his battalion was to secure this bridge. It took an hour for A Company to come out from its line along the ridge and assemble. They moved to the IP (Initial Point) at the Krayenhoff barracks and waited for B Company to catch up. At 10 PM Warren decided they could not wait any longer and proceeded into the city. B Company was even deeper along the ridge line where it contacted the 3rd Battalion line, and took longer to get out and assemble on the main Groesbeek-Nijmegen road at De Ploeg.
Meanwhile, PFC Atkins waited at the bridge for about an hour until it got dark (full dark is 8 PM) and decided they had to withdraw, releasing their prisoners. As they left, they could hear "heavy equipment" arriving at the other end (Boroughs, 2013). This was most certainly Gräbner's SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 with about 40 armoured vehicles (10 detached at Arnhem), attached to 10.SS-Panzer-Division and ordered to recon Arnhem and Nijmegen to investigate reports of airborne landings. Arriving a little later were Reinhold (Kdr II./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 from Vorden) and his adjutant Gernot Traupel, who's diary of events at Nijmegen is in Retake Arnhem Bridge - An Illustrated History of Kampfgruppe Knaust September to October 1944, by Bob Gerritsen and Scott Revell (2010). They started organising the defence of the Nijmegen bridges, while Gräbner was ordered back to Elst (midway between Nijmegen and Arnhem) at 9 PM, but he agreed to leave behind a platoon of SPWs with 7.5cm close support Kanon (SdKfz 251/9). At some point after getting a guide and failing to get to the now roadblocked bridge, Weaver received a radio report from battalion (now within range) that two companies were on the way to the bridge, so he decided to also withdraw to rejoin C Company at De Ploeg.
Sometime between 10 PM and midnight the 1st Battalion 508th with A and B Companies bumped the German outer perimeter at the Keizer Karelplein traffic circle near the railway station, and after a firefight the battalion withdrew with casualties. At midnight, the SPW platoon commander notified Traupel they were also ordered withdrawn to Elst.
German troops on the canal line and Groesbeek area were primarily Landesschützen-Ausbildungs-Bataillon I/6 (home guard training battalion 1 from Werkreis VI), originally based at Grave before mobilisation by the 'Valkyrie' alert in the first week of September and assigned the northern most sector of the Westwall until 15 September, when they detached three companies to the new canal line. Stomach and ear battalions arrived later. Other units in the immediate area were 1./Transport-Sicherungs-Battalion 567 (transferred from Paris) with only 110 men, 65 guarding bridges and the railway station at Nijmegen and the others forming a security screen on the southern outskirts. 1./Pionier-Bau-Bataillon 434 were digging defences along the canal line, and one or two companies from the Fallschirm-Panzer-Ersatz-und-Ausbildungs-Regiment 'Hermann Göring', included their 21.Unter-Lehr-Kommando (NCO training company) at Honinghutje on the canal and a forward platoon at Nederasselt (Grave bridge). These units were supported by anti-tank guns from 2./SS-Panzerjäger-Ersatz-Abteilung 2 from Hilversum. Source of units identified from PW interrogations is the 82nd Airborne G-2 (Intel) Section documents downloaded from PaperlessArchives, so I think they're legit.
dave hak here you go
*Irish Guards there, HOw about Lt.Col. Vandeluer? Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360* The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over.
*Lt Brian Wilson?* Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured.
*LT John Gorman?*
*Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360* LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, "we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair"
*How about Lt.Col.Mackenzie?*
*ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p 408* on arrival at the Hotle Hartenstein at 23:45 Lt.-Col Mackenzie opted to keep his disquiet over Brownings poor grasp of the gravity of the situation and the marked lack of urgency by XXX Corps and the 43rd Wessex to himself
*Heinz Harmel? Tasked with operations from Arnhem south to Nijmegen*
*Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 As Heinz Harmel later put it "the English stopped for tea* the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us"* A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
Well done here Sir
Montgomery has a lot to answer for !! The operation was doomed from the off and for him not to be involved in the meeting of generals says it all
What would be gained from him having another argument with the Americans?
The meeting took place on the 22nd September 1944, in the middle of the MARKET GARDEN operation.
"Only the men of third battalion succeeded in breaking through.." Erm - don't you mean second battalion?
Audio up please .
Can't hear anything . Well ,y grandpa was in.USAs 508 PIR 82nf A/B Div. He said it was horrible
Halve the stills were not shot in the Netherlands.
Operation Major Cockup. A case of too many cooks.
And " A Bridge too Far" !
Unfortunately it was a ClusterFluck
I am duchs i love thos man in my ys the are ol héros i live by landing zone Y i saluut al ww2 vets gratiings from ede
This is true of ww2 battles bunch of glory generals and others saying oh dont you worry about that it will be okay.
Thumb down.same reason as part one. For the hard work put in to making this video to screwup with sound is way beyond me.