I served as a Boiler Technician in the USN from 1970-74 on a Fletcher Class DD, and a Knox Class DE/FF. Yes the fireroom was the hot spot of the ship thermally, and radiologically. As commented earlier the USN went away from pressurized firerooms for the reasons state. Combustion air was provided by forced draft blowers connected to an air casing that enclosed the boiler. Space ventilation was provided by exhaust and supply fans. Under a nuclear attack the ships saltwater washdown would be activated drenching the in a continuous deluge of water to wash away the fallout. The space ventilation would be secured and protective masks would be donned. The Knox Class had a control booth with AC, but on the Fletcher Class this would have been hell with the crew likely dying from the heat before the radiation. The washdown may have scrubbed some of the contamination from the air, but not enough to matter. We all knew that the boilers would be the hosts to significant contamination. I don't recall doing much drilling on this. I think we felt it was not likely to happen and if it did there wasn't much we could do about it.
Listening to you answer these random questions always leaves me in awe of your expertise. The amount of research/knowledge you put into each answer is always a mini history lesson that usually goes above and beyond what the listener asked.
I think Drach enjoys doing them as much as we like hearing them,, good thing the channel focus is on WW ll naval technica or else Drach would get picked up by MI6 and spend a few years in Belmarsh ...
The ringland of the muzzle is called the crown. It’s a precision engineered pressure relieve to keep the semi-supported shell from axial-tilting while leaving the barrel. This cone cut into the barrel-end increases accuracy. It also reduces barrel wear to a degree by providing a soft radius where the shell leaves the barrel. It’s also where shell speed, shell temperature is greatest
WMD and NBC protection in boiler rooms. On the RN steam turbine ships I served aboard in the 80s, such as the Tribal, Leander and Rothesay Class Frigates and the County Class Destroyers, the boiler room was not part of the NBC Citadel. There was a sealed control room with viewing windows that allowed observation of the boiler room but allowed the crew to be inside the Citadel, it was also air conditioned and a lot cooler than the boiler room itself. Normal operations even in peacetime were carried out from the control room and every 15 minutes or so one of the watch keepers would do a tour round the boiler and check everything was OK.
The question this begs is what NBC protection was allowed for the watchstanders making these rounds every 15 minutes? Entering and leaving the protected space this often would be very laborious and time consuming. From my own experience in the engine room the decontamination could take longer to accomplish than the actual inspection and then it's repeated a minute or so later? This would require 2 or 3 sets of crewmembers making these rounds.
@@lilidutour3617 If you were in a situation where there was contamination you would be in serious action. There wouldn't be a round every 15 minutes. For one thing they are just a double check routine and if the boiler room was contaminated your life expectancy was going to be short anyway.
@@Andy_Ross1962 Interesting conundrum isn't it? A few points. While, yes, the rounds are routine and expect nothing out of the ordinary. I've made plenty of E/R rounds and found something broken or amiss when I didn't expect it. Also, what if there are changes to the steaming rate? Are we cutting in and out burners? Are we changing burner tips for different steaming rates or because the tips are getting fouled? All things that require manual effort and can't be remote controlled. Your comment about contaminated boiler room merits serious consideration but I'd throw out there it could happen by passing through the location of a previous nuclear detonation and not necessarily one pointed at you. My own experience with USN Nuclear Power Program is this is a "doable" situation and not a "death sentence". You just have to know how to manage it. As I said in the beginning and interesting question for discussion.
@@lilidutour3617 When completely closed down in an NBC state all access to the Citadel is through air locks with scrub down stations to decontaminate before being allowed through the inner air lock. Access to the boiler room is allowed if needed but anyone going out would need to be decontaminated before re entering the Citadel.
Thanks for answering my question! I agree with the G3s; Yamato/Iowa-grade capital ships built well over a decade earlier, meaning that not only do they massively outclass every contemporary design and even most future battleship designs, they are actually strategically relevant instead of being obsolete upon launch because naval aviation has about a decade to go to get to the point of effectively outranging big guns.
Wow you actually found a way to crowbar an “iowas were irrelevant” comment even though it had absolutely nothing to do with your original question. Well done
@@bkjeong4302 I wonder if a lack of treaties would have slowed down the shift to carriers as the major capital ship type, in that with only budget restraints the available money would have gone to BB's, leaving little left over for carriers. Thus the treaties allowed for experimenting and developing carriers and carrier doctrine protected from budget cuts.
@@jbepsilon That, plus things like Akagi and Lexingtons not existing as carriers and thus setting back carrier doctrine significantly without large, fast carrier platforms to tinker with.
At 32:02, my mind went to water versus rum versus dry stores. You got me Drach. Maybe I was thinking of my great-great grandfather who was a cooper in the Civil War.
9:30. As Jack Aubrey said: "The pleasant thing about fighting with the Spaniards, Mr Ellis, is not that they are shy, for they are not, but that they are never, never ready"
Regarding your answer to "USS Minneapolis and USS Pittsburgh lost their bows, for different reasons, during World War 2. Is their survival as extraordinary as it seems?" I'd like to add that the first and last bulkheads are actually called "collisions bulkheads" and properly reinforced. Actually any decent warship would stay afloat without their forward and/or aft peaks and make it home safely. I remember seeing a photo of a Prinz Eugen class cruiser without the aft peak, blown away by a British torpedo, with no damage whatsoever to propulsion or steering systems.
The big problem with losing the bow is it makes the ship vulnerable in a bad storm. The ship needs to maintain enough speed to keep from being turned broadside to the waves, which can lead to capsize (as it did for several destroyers with undamaged bows in Halsey's Typhoon, the remarkable thing in that story is that anybody survived from those ships). But the powerful waves of the storm are going to be hammering the leading bulkheads. The combination of required minimum speed and wave action can break the bulkheads. The ship can try to travel in the direction that minimizes the pounding of the waves. Things get more complicated if there is land or a obstruction such as a reef close in the direction that is safest for the ship to travel, relative to the storm ... Even traveling with the storm, the ship will likely get water coming into the bow section with a lot of force as the bow leaves one wave and drives into another - not as bad as it would be if traveling in the opposite direction, but still bad enough. There is also the problem of 'slamming', a term that describes the bow hitting into waves with considerable force, which can weaken structures. See Nelson to Vanguard, DK Brown. Good seamanship can minimize these problems but not eliminate them - and damage over time can accumulate as rivets break and structures/components get stressed past their elastic limits.
Didn't one of the destroyers searching for survivors after that typhoon "not receive" Halsey's order to break off the search,, basically telling Halsey "f off" until they'd completed their pass and recovered a few more sailors?
@@micnorton9487 DE Tabberer. This is the ship whose crew first realized there was a major problem when a sailor working on the damaged radio antenna saw a person in the water. Tabberer would end up rescuing 55 men. Halsey forgave them and commended the crew and captain for _courageous leadership and excellent seamanship_ . Other ships would rescue another 36 men. The book "Halsey's Typhoon" by Bob Drury and Tom Clavin is worth reading. Running into typhoon's was not unheard of and not unique to Halsey or to the USN. In his book Carrier Pilot, British pilot Norman Hanson on HMS Illustrious had the following to say about a different typhoon: _Soon after we left Cape Town en route for Ceylon, the weather worsened and our met officer began to look thoughtful. It seemed that a typhoon lay ahead of us, astride the Equator. Its position was foxing, for he couldn't decide whether it would turn out to be a 'north' or a 'south'. They have different patterns according to which side of the Equator they occur. We spent two days and nights trying to dodge it, but it won in the end and on October 26 it hit us with all the force of Nature gone stark, staring mad. It continued to hammer us for three days and I have no desire to experience another. Everything about it was terrifying._ Anything that terrifies a Corsair pilot has my respect ...
How impressive is a ship surviving being blown in half. The IJN Amatsukaze was a Kagero class destroyer that famously sank the destroy Barton and helping to sink the light cruiser Juneau at the battle of Guadalcanal. In January of 1944, she was blown in half to a torpedo fired from the submarine Redfin. The forward half sank, but the back half miraculously stayed afloat and was towed to Singapore.
See also USS Murphy DD-603. Cut in half by collision by the tanker SS Bulkoil in October 1943. Towed to Brooklyn Navy Yard. Back in service to fight on D-Day.
Please consider doing one of your awesome alternate history videos on Operation Sea Lion. The Royal Navy battle fleet closing to melee range of a bunch of river barges and such, would be a fight worth paying to watch. I know she was flagship of the Mediterranean fleet, but include Warspite. You can't have an alternate history, surface gun fight, without Warspite.
The sealion plan is so bad that i think it was written as a sarcastic essay that naval officers would understand. Unfortunately army officers and current landlubbers don't comprehend just how bad it is. The one practice of loading the barges, taking them a mile offshore and back, in ideal daylight conditions, had a 4% loss. Upto 72 hours cross channel in convoy, in radio silence, with only one extra saiilor per vessel. Onto beaches with napoleonic anti infantry defences, against Mark 1 humans. With no means to resupply No. It just fails. The only survivors would be from the boats that sank in harbour. But thats now enough th really change the war.
@@neilcampbell2222 The fact that every 24 hours there is a thing called night...and the RN is one of only 2 Navies on earth who could actually fight at night (RN and IJN, with the USN only starting to join c1943) makes See Lowe completely impractical. The Harwich flotilla of Destroyers, the ships at Portsmouth and the ships at Plymouth (including a Revenge Class battleship, could leave port just before dusk and be in amongst the invasion fleet, annihilate it, and be back in port just after daybreak... It's a real pity they didn't try it...because it would have been one of the most disastrous days for the Nazi's...
@@dogsnads5634 Yes, but with little effect. The original army request was for 250k in the first wave, reduced to 150k by the navy and would probably be revised down further. But the loss of all of them would have little effect on Germany's 8 million strong army. The navy would lose most of its 6 destroyers and 100 E-boats and armed smaller craft The Luftwaffe would lose some planes flying combat air patrol at the extreme of their range. But the biggest loss would likely be 1k Rhine barges which account for a huge proportion of bulk transport. The German economy was already suffering after only a few months of them being requisitioned and sitting in Belgium
re NBC protection. Interwar and immediate post-war ships often (all RN but no USN) drew combustion air by into the boiler rooms then the fires drew from the boiler room. Under forced draft boiler room pressure was higher than the air outside (fans so there were air-locks for personnel). If, by enemy action or misadventure, honking great hole were punched in the room, the extra air would leave. That would make the pressure in the fire higher than that in the boiler room so there would be blowback, very unpleasant for anyone nearby and slowing the ship. The USN in the 1930's (late 20's?, I'm writing from memory) eliminated this by taking outside air direct to the boilers, leaving the boiler rooms at outside pressure. Drawing combustion air to the boiler rooms meant that contaminants outside the ship had free access to them. Correcting this was so expensive that I'm not aware of it's being done to any ship post-war. The first ships in the RCN to have NBC compatible boiler rooms were the Sr. Laurent class DE's. As they shared drive-trains with contemporary RN ships, I assume the RN made the switch around the same time,
Flared barrels are an aesthetic choice and give sailors something to polish and clean between engagements. ;) Maybe ask Jingles he served in the Royal Navy in the 1970's? I'm sure he'd give some more insights on WMD prep.
Pittsburgh represent! CA 72 USS PITTSBURGH - longest ship in the world-1500nm from her bow to her stern! If you ever decide to visit USS Requin, let me know. I’ll take you on a fine tour of our fair city.
The term "withering fire" is found in the context of land battles as well as at sea, and (in my mind at least) describes a high volume and/or rate of fire.
Regarding the rank of acting-lieutenant being promoted straight to lieutenant without passing the exam, there's actually a good example of this in (fictional) naval literature. For those aware of the Hornblower series, the titular character actually never finished his lieutenant's exams (owing to a burning ship). Instead, one book later, during his time in a Spanish prison he was promoted straight from acting lieutenant to lieutenant due his exemplary conduct without even completing/passing the lieutenant's exam.
RE: The final question. S M Stirling has the "Safehold" series that describes this situation exactly. Where the nation of Charis starts as a predominent naval power where gun armed oared galleys are the norm. They switch ( on advise from an immortal android, I know, Deus ex machina etc) they go to sail powered broadside armed galleons. Several "Lepanto's" ensue.. 9 books great reads...
the illustration used for the WoW depiction of the Duncan, shows (virtual) her in the Pool of London, offshore of the Tower of London, headed downstream. with something just south of 10 metres of draught, would it have even been possible for a ship of that depth of keel, to get itself into that location, and be turned around, going in that direction?
Thinking of the Luftwaffe trying to support Sealion made me realize that I don’t recall any British capital ships being sunk by them. What was the largest HMS sunk by German aircraft?
Look up "List of Royal Navy losses in World War II". It looks like 8 RN light cruisers were sunk by German aircraft, 6 in the Med, 2 in the far North. No heaver warships were sunk by the Luftwaffe.
42:45 would the fact that the USA has no experience with ships of the line or line of battle mean that they would be at quite a substantial disadvantage. In a way like the spanish crews as discussed earlier but even worse as they wouldn't have the experienced officiers either.
I suppose Drach has covered this before, but how does the world's Navy's handicap themselves compared to their rivals or allies? And was it accurate? Also, what was the prevalence of naval spies to uncover rivals technology? Hull design technology had to have been a pinnacle of concern.
00:32:02 Flare was also a thing due to the material used rather than mode of manufacture, bronze, steel/bronze and cast iron barrels had a flair for much the same reason, but even early steel guns had a tendency to loose the muzzle - for example one of the 1877 de Bang guns exported to the Orange Free State, lost a number of calibres during one of the Sieges of Kimberley -possibly due to British counter battery fire but more likely due to "over firing" (too many shells fired in a given time) the damaged muzzle was cut down and tidied up[ at Pretoria and the piece put back into service.
Technical considerations aside, that HAS to be the best name for an armaments company ever. Unless monsieur de Bange had a rival named monsieur kaboom.
@@notshapedforsportivetricks2912 Not withstanding the technical consideration the De Bange breech is the accepted basis for the interrupted screw breech, so M. Charles Ragon de Bange should be as well known as Hiram Maxim. The likes of the (155mm) M1877 & (120mm ) M1878, were some of the most accurate pieces fielded, although the rigid mount meant it was slow firing, having to be re-sighted during every reload. but the de Banges and the later US 5 inch M1898 (the US are always late🤣) were called Sniper cannons for good reason. Incidentally the Swedes had a designer called Mr Bang who was the designer for the Swedish short stroke semi-auto system on their first automatic rifle. And one of my contemporaries in Durham constabulary was an Inspector Bashem, so there is a definite corollary with names
00:53:41 Drac how would you know how useless a German Panzer would be at the base of the White Cliffs of Dover, remember back in the 1960s people thought that going up stairs was protection against Daleks
Good point, especially since the cliffs are essentially just one step. I'll admit it's a fairly big step, but climbing one step must be easier than an entire flight, right? Although I don't recall hearing about Deleks scaling the Cliffs of Dover, so maybe that would be a step too far, or tall, for them.
Is a Frigate better than the larger ships of the line, or does it depend on how it's deployed? If you do hit and run tactics Frigates do great, but sail in too close the ships of the line will pound you to the waterline?
I have been reading "The Mighty Moo" about the USS Cowpens (CVL 25). The book notes that the airgroup had night landing qualifications in 1943. While the US Navy had no night carrier attack capability at this stage in the war they had the capability to fly at night. Could the US carriers launch an attack on the fly if they had to? There were radar equipped Avengers at this point. Escort carriers in the Atlantic started night ops in early 1944. What prevented fleet carriers operating in the Pacific from rapidly acquitted night attack capability?
If you look at how flying licenses are set up today in the US, you'll notice that the instrument certification is different from the basic certification. The basic certification gives people a foundation that might keep them alive if they run into bad weather, but they're really not supposed to be flying in that weather. The instrument certification goes into a lot more depth and involves a lot more practice. All commercial pilots get the instrument certification, but a fair number of private pilots do not. Relying on instruments is a whole new world for pilots. There is a lot that can go wrong. People's intuition often leads them astray. In practice that usually means a crashed plane and a dead pilot/aircrew. It was even harder back in the 1940s, since they didn't have anywhere near the same level of electronic navigation capabilities we have today. That didn't mean they couldn't do it, just that it was harder. Japanese seaplanes were flying at night during the battle of Savo Island in 1942, dropping flares to highlight US warships, which doubtless helped contribute to the Japanese tactical victory. Basically it come down to increased risk of losing pilots and aircrew and planes, plus greater risk to the ships in the event of a bad landing. WW2 carrier operations were always dangerous - with people being crippled or killed outside of combat in accidents - so they tended to avoid making things worse if they could possibly avoid it. Also, everybody involved in day operations tended to get exhausted, especially when operating in the tropics, and especially when involved in combat ops. Giving people the night to recover - with relatively little happening on the ship to wake up people - was wise since it reduced mistakes in day operations. Even then, fatigue tended to accumulate over time, from one day to the next, eventually leading to serious mistakes. Much easier and better to leave the night flying to specialists. The USS Enterprise would eventually convert over to being a night operation specialist, as a way to continue providing value despite being somewhat obsolete relative to the newer carriers.
@@bluelemming5296 Escort carriers in the Atlantic were flying night ops long before the Enterprise started doing it. U-Boats surfaced at night which was the best time to find kill them. The decks were smaller and the weather typically worse so the skill set was there.
@@johnshepherd9676 Yes, but the escort carrier on ASW duty had to do night flying to be effective - and they were probably operating solo so they couldn't specialize within a group of multiple escort carriers. In that situation, you can have a small numbers of experts on the single CVE doing the night flying - not necessarily every pilot needs to fly every night and some might never fly at night. You might be able to switch the active team(s) from night to night to maximize rest between operations. The ship's total flight operations were probably not as intense (in terms of sorties per 24 hour period) as a fleet carrier so less overall noise to interfere with sleep. Also, carriers on ASW duty probably didn't have to worry much about enemy attack, compared to the fleet carriers, which also reduces stress and hence fatigue. Also, most of the CVEs on ASW duty were probably operating in a cooler/drier climate than the fleet carriers usually operated in, which also help to reduce fatigue. Between all these considerations fatigue would be less of an issue for CVE operations at night when on ASW duty, hence it could be managed more easily than if you tried to do the same thing on a fleet carrier in a different climate, with a more varied set of responsibilities, and a much higher sortie rate. The fleet carriers didn't have to do night operations to be effective, there was plenty of daytime work to do, so night operations were more of a luxury, and also they didn't operate solo so they could have one or two carriers in a big group specialize in night work so it wouldn't impact the rest of the team. In his book 'Carrier Pilot' Norman Hanson talks about how exhausted the pilots (and crew) were getting on his ship as the war went on - and how even extremely experienced pilots could and did have fatal accidents. It's a British Carrier (HMS Illustrious), but I expect the problem was found in US carriers as well.
@bluelemming5296 I think you inadvertently stumble on the answer. It wasn't that the US could develop the capabilty. They had no need to. There were night fighter detachments on more carriers than CV-6. Enterprise had night strike capabilty. That is what made Enterprise different.
I’ll try again then In regards to the M-class Submarines, what, if anything, would have been feasible retrofits to mitigate the primary issue of the 12” gun?
To expand on the Sealion question, assuming the Luftwaffe achieves air superiority in 1940, do the Germans have the capabilities to Force Z the intervention of the Royal Navy absent air cover?
Almost certainly not. The Germans didn't have even halfway decent aerial torpedoes at the time, nor aircrew trained for them, and I don't believe they had the heavy bombs they would use later against Illustrious in the Mediterranean yet.
Drach might I ask you the source of the Picture, for several reasons, one of which, is a favourite Sailing channel of mine RAN Sailing( you may have have heard of them)they're currently building their new yacht in a barn in Sweden, and have just got to the stage, that almost matches your opening pic, And also to enquire if that is the RN's new stealth warship
The real oddity of the decision to rearm Gneisenau is that, at completion, she would not have been suited to sail with her sister, when the key to their success was to have both together. Nor would she be a close match to sail with Tirpitz, and-also she would have been deemed too “valuable” to be sent off on merchant raiding missions (even assuming, by time she were recommissioned, any KM ship could get out into the Atlantic). KM would have then had three capital ships, each of a different design, only one of which was well suited to merchant raiding, and one of which was not well suited either to merchant raiding _or_ directly squaring off against RN capital ships.
00:36:00 pretty difficult to determine who was a deserter in war of 1812 and earlier, in a time that finger printing and photography were still fantasy how would you know? Even the Police National Computer struggles with I.D. based on Race, D of B, Name, Height and Birth marks /Scars and Tattoos, even the language wasn't a thing, there is still some residual "English regional accent" in places like Appalachian hinter lands so back in 1812 it would be hard to discern some-one from Upper New York and some-one from Lancashire UK.
Aing on Aing on Drach you almost got away, with that picture of a G3 Battleship, I know Hollywood are heavily into alternative realities, but does that mean in this pic, Either (a) Tower Bridge was built up near Putney, (b)the ship looks bigger than it really is, So can easily fit under Tower Bridge, Or are you trying to suggest Sherlock Holms couldn't have fallen from it, as it was never built, 😂😂😂😂😂
Also, Spain's merchant navy was not as large as the English, so the pool of manpower with experience would be much smaller. Also, being a continental power, they had to compete with the Army for human resources.
HMS Eskimo: "Wow, if I had a nickel for every time my bow was blown off, I'd have two nickels. Which isn't a lot, but it's weird that it happened twice, right?"
00:23:52 The 1864 Royal Sovereign had four turrets in the cut down hull of a former 121 gun ship of the line but it rose without trace, as it was out of service by 1873, so would have been around as a reference multi-turret ship during designing and building of the likes of Devastation.
@notshapedforsportivetricks2912 Cook changed the course of history when he surveyed the St Lawrence gulf and river in Quebec and charted the river in detail to enable a large armada of ships to land General Wolfe's army and defeat Montcalme's army on the Plains of Abraham. Cooks maps were so accurate they were still being used in the 1990's.
i would think sailors would tend toward a multi-lingual bunch, given hitting the tavernas, houses of ill repute, and traders visited in foreign ports... am i mistaken?
You are not mistaken. In my experience, most sailors who spend time overseas seem to pick up at least bits and pieces of multiple languages, some go all the way to fluency. It's not just sailors. Many people who are stationed overseas on shared military bases - whether or not those are naval bases - tend to pick up some of the native language, though how much they retain after going home is uncertain. There are often local language courses available on base. It's interesting to watch a bunch of GIs learning to sing kindergarten songs such as some local version of the alphabet song. You have to start somewhere, so why not? A lot depends on the individual, and their exact situation. One guy I heard of was working at a base in Germany and volunteered to be an apprentice for a baker during his time there. He would show up at the bakery very early in the morning, help with everything for four hours, then go to his regular job. He came back not only with a far better grasp of the language and culture, but with the skills of a master baker. Learning languages would be a lot easier if our education system taught people to memorize things efficiently from an early age (along the lines of Harry Lorayne and Jerry Lucas, The Memory Book - which actually builds on traditions going back to ancient Greece). Sadly, that's just one of many areas neglected by formal education.
Re: the Royal Navy's plan to stop an invasion. Well, we'll start by sending in Warspite.... (Yes, I'm aware Warspite might have been elsewhere. Don't ruin my fun. 😊)
Good question. I'm just an American, but at least to me, it would be subject to situation and context. I have heard both of them used and am curious about it myself. Mainly, this comment is to see if you get an answer better, more knowledgeable response 😆
@@bull614 Bar the shouting. But citizen and subject are the same. Living in a constitutional monarchy entails no greater subjection than citizenship in a republic. Both affirm individual freedom within the rule of law. From specific religious or political perspectives etc.
@Yandarval thank you for that. I always bug my friends in Europe with questions, lol. History and culture from around the world always intrigues me. I'm too broke to travel, so I just bug my friends online, lol
Out at sea? Don't you mean "on the Lake"?? Being a Midwesterner who has spent most of his life within 20 miles of The Big Mich I tend to notice these things.
I find you need more study in some actions of men like your own Cochran who won against several ships of the line with just a Sloop or Frigate, over 50 ships captured in all. Your bias against fast and nimble frigates vs. big sluggish heavy gunned line ships assumes broadside to broad side engagements too often. Frigates did in fact win against ships of the line though often requiring cunning and guile. The American Frigates were found by England to be so dangerous orders were put out never to engage American frigates without a 2 to 1 advantage in both numbers of ships and guns. If HMS Victory faced Constitution 1V1 her orders were to avoid combat. She fully out gunned the American ships but could not out maneuver them. This meant she was likely to take a broadside to bow or stern and limited to her chase or stern guns. Likewise even smaller French Corvettes acting in pairs or trios often would take on British Frigates or ships of the line and win. The ships of the line were the armored tanks of the sea but like tanks if alone that could and can be beat by one man with an explosive as they can't maneuver enough.
The US/UK thing from the War of 1812 is incorrect I'm afraid, the actual orders were for RN 18lb frigates to abstain from 1v1 action with American 24lb frigates, IE Constitution, President and United States. Everything else was fair game, a lone British third or first rate would happily engage a US frigate of any size. While some frigates did manage to beat ships of the line, it pretty much always required an exceptional frigate captain, a not so brilliant ship of the line captain, and some environmental conditions for good measure. Indefatigable and Amazon vs Droits de l'Homme being a good example. Far more common in frigate vs SoL matches were frigates being taken or destroyed in short order, or else running for the hills.
I'd really like to see your source for the statement "If HMS Victory faced Constitution 1V1 her orders were to avoid combat". I very much doubt you have one. USS Constitution is a big tough frigate, but she's exactly that, a frigate. HMS Victory is a big tough 1st rate ship of the line, USS Constitution is going to lose, and lose badly.
@@Drachinifel As I said it depends a lot on the crew too and you really should check out your own Cockran who with a even smaller sloop won against a few ships of the line and did even better with a frigate with over 50 ships captured. It is often said in wooden era too it didn't matter how many guns you had if the opponent could rake you bow to stern even once avoiding your own broadside. i am not saying that Frigates should have made a habit of going toe to toe with ships of the line but only that it often did work with the right crews an was far from as impossible as you try to make it sound. The biggest factor in wooden era engagements were often who got off the first aimed shot and whoever crossed the T. One of the Brits biggest advantages over other powers was their standardization of guns and powder leading to an avg. 3 to 1 shots per gun (the US kept that factor started by Henry VIII) The American break through design on our Frigates added the firepower very close to a 3rd rate of the day and was faster than any other frigates of the time plus every ship of the line. Also the thicker hull once exclaimed to be made of iron (just thick oak) as British and Barbary warships fire bounced off more often than breaking through the hull. Also adding to their speed and longer life in active service with one still afloat and in use to this day, is the copper bottom that without lead to British ships being badly fouled making them very sluggish often 6 months out of port and rotting in a few years. An issue your own Cockran fought with both shipbuilders and the Admiralty over that left half the fleet acting as though they had a small sheet anchor deployed. Most the stuff you provide is well researched but the blanket statements need some adjustment is the point I am making. Also Cochran helped found 4 countries and served in the leadership of 3 other navies before returning home to lead the transition to steam. I think you should read his autobiography and some other books as his life played a major part in sail after Nelson through the early steamers.
If the Germans and Japanese had won WW2 would the allies and subsequently NATO would have been able to defeat the combined fleets of the Soviet Union and Germany?
If the Germans and Japanese would have won World War II there would have been no Soviet Union... NATO would have been unnecessary because Russia would have already been reduced, Russian resources would have flowed into the Third Reich's corporate system and Washington would have made peace because all THEY were concerned with was getting their loans paid back... as for Japan there was no way they could have beat the Americans,, the Axis partnership was more notional than practical and the Third Reich would have much preferred going into the future with an American partnership rather than with the Japanese.......
As much trouble as the RN had in the Med with the Italians and 10th Flieger Korp, I thought the response to the Sealion question was a little cavalier. If the Germans treat Air superiority over the Channel (suppression / destruction of 11 Group) as the minimum requirement, then the RN may succeed in getting to the Channel and running amok for a while. This would most likely be at such high cost that if the first time isn't decisive, they may not have any more tries left in them even if they can muster the ships. Each attempt wouldn't need to be wiped out to be defeated. All the Germans would have to do is enough damage to convince them to turn back. Also the minefields would have been defended so it may not have been as easy as described to clear them nor as fast. The big difference would have been if the Germans made a go of it in July to September 1940 or made serious attempts to prepare for the crossing and tried in May to July 1941. A lot would have to go right for a German invasion to succeed in either period but the Royal Navy would have paid a high price in 1940 to stop it and probably a crippling one in 1941 to make enough go wrong. The British Army was a mess in 1940 and even in 1941 could not respond to German Armored Warfare tactics very effectively. The RAF had no close air support doctrine and could not effectively coordinate with either the Army or the Navy yet. The Luftwaffe was not that great at anti shipping tactics in 1940 and the Germans were still using defective torpedoes. Both those issues were much improved in 1941 but the Luftwaffe was still not any better at coordinating with their Navy than the RAF was in either period. Enjoyed the show but it would be way more interesting if you took the losing side in these hypotheticals to see what you think they could have realistically done to improve their outcomes. Even if the other side is distasteful to you. (Like say the French in the Napoleonic Wars.)🙂
I believe in the Med (battle of Crete) the big issue was running out of anti-aircraft ammunition. So long as the ships had sufficient ammunition, they had a good track record of holding off the aircraft with relatively few hits being scored. Once they ran low on ammo, that's when they started taking heavy losses. Presumably this wouldn't have been an issue in the English Channel, where the ships could simply rotate back to port in groups to re-ammunition - assuming they had sufficient AA ammo supplies (I don't know, one would hope so ...), some ships re-arming while other ships continued to fight. Basically, the Germans were not very good at anti-shipping operations, thanks to some foolish decisions on the part of their naval and air leaders. They would get better, but it would take a long time. As far as I know, the Luftwaffe was not spending much time training for anti-shipping operations during the build-up for Sea Lion - and if they were, I doubt they were spending enough time training (victory disease plus lack of ability to visualize just what was going to be happening as a result of lack of appropriate experience). This point is further supported by logs of ships operating off Norway (see British Cruiser Warfare: The Lessons of the Early War, 1939-1941 by Alan Raven). There were lots of attacks by German aircraft, often with the advantage of being able to attack with surprise (such as coming over the mountains to attack a ship in a fjord that couldn't see past the mountains and thus couldn't see the aircraft until the last possible moment) that resulted in no damage to warships. US Army Air forces would be equally bad at conducting anti-shipping strikes when they first started operating in North Africa [1943?], as related by ABC in his book *A Sailor's Odyssey*. He offered them advisors but they initially turned him down. Fortunately, after a while they realized they needed the help, and had the self-honesty and integrity to change their minds and accept naval aviation advisors - at which point they quickly became a lot more dangerous. The Luftwaffe didn't have anybody that could provide them with useful advice, since their navy didn't have veteran naval aviators - which means they had to learn everything the hard way. A Japanese or US air attack by naval aviators - or land based forces that had trained for naval strikes - would have been much more dangerous to the Royal Navy, as both powers were sea powers and far better at anti-shipping operations than the Germans. This is ultimately the reason POW and Repulse were sunk. Even then, consider how many torpedoes Repulse dodged before being hit - and also consider that POW was operating at an enormous disadvantage due to the poor ventilation systems that were not designed to support tropical operations. Human beings don't think or act well when overheated and short on oxygen. There may well have been water-tight doors left open or not sufficiently secured in the engineering spaces as a result, and some of the damage control decisions might have suffered as well. These problems would not have occurred in the much cooler climate of the English Channel. Destroyers in the channel would have been very hard targets to hit. There are lots of accounts of destroyers dodging bombs. It was different at Dunkirk where they had to be in specific places in shallow water with nearby obstructions and at low speeds to pick up troops: the conditions made them vulnerable. In the open sea they would be much more maneuverable and free to act in their own defense. The combination of a) having lots of AA ammo and b) being fast and maneuverable and c) having some fighter cover some of the time, taken together, would have created a big problem for the Luftwaffe. The British had their own share of idiots - every nation does - but as we know from the Battle of Britain, the idiots were not in the key positions (though they would spend much of the Battle of Britain engaged in political maneuvers against the people who were actually getting the job done). I think Sea Lion would have been an unmitigated disaster for the Germans.
@@bluelemming5296 Luckily, there are wargames to game it out like "Their Finest Hour" (GDW) and "Britain Stands Alone" (GMT). There is also an interesting book by Robert Forczyk, "We March on England" amongst many others. They don't entirely disagree with your position but there is more nuance and possibility than you currently allow for different outcomes. The "England Rules the Waves" mafia belittle the achievements of the Royal Navy by not allowing for the abilities of their opponents that made them dangerous rather than just another chump to knock down. This also makes the discussion boring. "Right, England Rules the Waves and will sink all who oppose it. That about covers it, next topic." Britain suffered many setbacks at sea during WWII. What made them so impressive is that they learned from their mistakes and were creative in applying lessons learned. I wouldn't be surprised if most of their setbacks were not partially due to them believing their own propaganda. The Germans, Italians and Japanese also learned from their mistakes which created more challenges for the Royal Navy. Thanks for coming back with such a well thought out response Blue... even if I don't entirely agree.
@@AdamMisnik I agree the issue is more complex than most people think. But I also think that Forczyk makes some serious errors, for example by considering the few successes of the Luftwaffe in Norway versus the enormous number of failed attacks (to be fair, he doesn't seem to even be aware of how many failed attacks there were, that's not part of the 'standard history' and is largely unknown to most people). He also doesn't seem to be aware of how well the ships repelled air attacks in the Med - during daylight! - so long as they had sufficient ammunition (also unknown to most people). He makes assumptions about mine-laying during an operation that are pretty dubious - if it was that easy to lay mines to interdict sea lanes, how come it wasn't done at Crete? It would have saved a lot of German lives when the RN did interdict the operation. Further, the British had tried to construct mine barriers in the English channel during WW1 but found in practice they weren't very successful at preventing passage of subs - the effectiveness of mines placed by surprise near a port doesn't necessarily tell us much about the effectiveness of a large barrier emplaced (hastily!) in the open ocean. Also, the British had enough non-naval craft to basically swamp any practical mine-laying effort. Similarly, he looks at very clever ideas to put land-based guns on light craft, but doesn't seem to realize that was tried at Normandy (and on many other occasions, as both the Germans and the Japanese resorted to coastal convoys with similar weapons) and didn't work out very well. His ideas on S-Boats assume ambush conditions (again, he doesn't seem to realize that), but how likely is that during a major naval battle? Attacking a slow moving and poorly escorted convoy in bad weather is very different from attacking a major warship deployment, during a battle which can't take place in bad weather (because the invasion force isn't sufficiently seaworthy). In the Med, RN forces often spotted S-Boats before they could attack, even when not equipped with radar (US PT Boats had radar early, British MTBs did not). When regular military units were present and alert, the S-Boats were driven away far more often then they were successful. The use of subs in major battles was also something that didn't have much success, again, these were ambush hunters that could rarely hit warships expecting trouble and maneuvering accordingly (at least not until acoustic torpedoes). The Germans tried in WW1 to use subs to directly influence surface battles, as did the Japanese in WW2. Neither was successful using them in this role. Ambush hunting, yes, major battles, no. In short, he's cherry picking examples that favor his thesis. Also there are an awful lot of assumptions being made, and that doesn't usually work out well in military operations. He's basically approaching this from the perspective of an amateur, not a professional - the professional will have much more respect for all the things that can go wrong. The Normandy Invasion [1944] certainly demonstrated how many things could go wrong with even the most thoroughly planned military operation in human history - despite the planning being done by people who had far more experience with recent amphibious operations than the Germans did (Dieppe, North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, various commando operations, plus the Pacific Operations - which the planning team in Britain were briefed on). Finally, there were many occasions on which individual German units or small groups were able to achieve surprise in the early war - but how likely is it that a major effort would have done the same? I don't think Forczyk is entirely wrong - he makes some good points. I also think your idea that they could have been more successful in 1941 (with a lot more time to plan, to built appropriate vessels, to rehearse, maybe even to try a few amphibious assaults on other targets and to learn from their mistakes) is a good one.
@@bluelemming5296 The Luftwaffe became much more effective at sinking British ships in 1941 than they were off of Norway in 1940 and the RAF was frankly terrible at coordinating with either of their sister services until 1942 for the Army and at least 1943 for the Navy. They were too preoccupied with trying to win the war solo with their strategic bombing campaign. Minesweepers would have been very vulnerable to S-Boats. The RN Destroyers protecting them could have dealt with the S-Boats easily but not while trying to avoid air attack or haplessly sailing into the Minefields while engaged in evasive maneuvers. Submarines had trouble getting firing solutions on capital ships in both World Wars but that was partly because they were spread thin covering multiple approach routes. In case of Sealion being launched, the British approach routes would have been limited and pretty much a gauntlet of submarine and air launched torpedoes. Even Warspite with its plot armor could have a bad day in that environment.
@@AdamMisnik There was no need to involve Bomber command, though they might actually have been able to destroy minefields with enough air dropped bombs. From the Battle of Britain we know that the most competent people in the RAF were in 10 and 11 group - and those are the people that mattered when it came to control of the air (though in a serious invasion the RAF probably would have staged aircraft from all over England into the battle, giving them much larger numbers than Forczyk assumes). We know from modern studies that the Germans were never even close to beating them. The old idea that the 'Germans almost won but then they switched strategies' has been shown to be a myth. The Luftwaffe would not have had control of the air in any conceivable circumstance. They could dispute it - but controlling it is another matter. Realistically, in the event of invasion, it's likely the senior officers in Bomber Command would have been sacked and they would have found somebody who could play well with others to take over. Churchill sacked a lot of senior officers during the war, for far less reason and under far less critical circumstances. There were not enough S-Boats to make a significant dent in the 300+ minor vessels the British had deployed in the channel (that's not counting the destroyers and larger craft, nor the huge numbers of additional civilian vessels that might be added if needed - think about Dunkirk). Getting hits with torpedoes is hard even when not under fire. Ambush predators don't fare well in major battles, especially lightly built vessels carrying lots of explosive/flammable munitions. The greatest asset of the S-Boats was the difficulty of finding them. But defending a known crossing point would negate that. Few if any submarines would have made it to firing position. Using them in this fashion was attempted numerous times and it never worked out particularly well. If you want to assume Bomber Command would not be able to play well with others based on historical data, it's only appropriate to assume the same for the U-Boats. Again, ambush predators don't fare well in major battles. Despite the large number of submarines routed to attack the Torch landings, very little of substance was accomplished. German aircraft used as torpedo bombers were hideously vulnerable to aircraft and anti-aircraft fire. The Germans lost so many pilots and planes attempting torpedo attacks that they quickly gave up on using aircraft in this fashion for major attacks. Ambush roles, yes, major attacks, no. It might be different if they had custom built aircraft designed for that purpose from the ground up, and real control of the air. Establishing a serious minefield takes a lot of time. It's pretty unlikely there would have been anything like a completed minefield or even anything large enough to be useful unless the Germans put a lot of time and effort into developing a rapid deployment capability - something they never did. A few aircraft could drop mines, but that's not enough. Anything the Germans could deploy would likely be swamped by huge number of civilian vessels manned by volunteers, mostly on-shore naval personnel from all over the country, but also civilians. So what we're left with is a hideously vulnerable seventeen mile column of poorly defended transports, one that has to spend many hours getting organized after they put to sea, then even more hours trying to cross the channel - without control of either the air or the sea. I don't think a single soldier would survive the attempt except as a POW unless the Germans spent a lot of time figuring out better solutions to the problems than they did. Forczyk assumes the Kriegsmarine opposed Sea Lion out of petty reasons, and never takes a moment to consider that the professional naval officers might have had a far more realistic appreciation for the problems and challenges than the amateur does. Yes, the Germans could likely have solved those problems, especially if they took the time to do it right, make other amphibious assaults in other places, and learn from their mistakes. If the alternate history involves somehow making people like Hitler and Goering disappear, and some competent leaders taking their place, the German chances go up considerably.
Is it wrong of me to have the widest possible grin on my face upon hearing my question having made it into an episode of The Drydock?
It is fully justified as I did the same when one of my questions was answered.
Dogs bollocks mate 👍....
Not at all! 👍
I served as a Boiler Technician in the USN from 1970-74 on a Fletcher Class DD, and a Knox Class DE/FF.
Yes the fireroom was the hot spot of the ship thermally, and radiologically. As commented earlier the USN went away from pressurized firerooms for the reasons state. Combustion air was provided by forced draft blowers connected to an air casing that enclosed the boiler. Space ventilation was provided by exhaust and supply fans. Under a nuclear attack the ships saltwater washdown would be activated drenching the in a continuous deluge of water to wash away the fallout. The space ventilation would be secured and protective masks would be donned. The Knox Class had a control booth with AC, but on the Fletcher Class this would have been hell with the crew likely dying from the heat before the radiation. The washdown may have scrubbed some of the contamination from the air, but not enough to matter. We all knew that the boilers would be the hosts to significant contamination. I don't recall doing much drilling on this. I think we felt it was not likely to happen and if it did there wasn't much we could do about it.
Listening to you answer these random questions always leaves me in awe of your expertise. The amount of research/knowledge you put into each answer is always a mini history lesson that usually goes above and beyond what the listener asked.
Huzzah, I am finally current on all of the Drydock episodes, and the other videos as well.
It's taken two years plus to catch up with the drydocks.
I think Drach enjoys doing them as much as we like hearing them,, good thing the channel focus is on WW ll naval technica or else Drach would get picked up by MI6 and spend a few years in Belmarsh ...
The ringland of the muzzle is called the crown. It’s a precision engineered pressure relieve to keep the semi-supported shell from axial-tilting while leaving the barrel. This cone cut into the barrel-end increases accuracy. It also reduces barrel wear to a degree by providing a soft radius where the shell leaves the barrel. It’s also where shell speed, shell temperature is greatest
WMD and NBC protection in boiler rooms.
On the RN steam turbine ships I served aboard in the 80s, such as the Tribal, Leander and Rothesay Class Frigates and the County Class Destroyers, the boiler room was not part of the NBC Citadel.
There was a sealed control room with viewing windows that allowed observation of the boiler room but allowed the crew to be inside the Citadel, it was also air conditioned and a lot cooler than the boiler room itself.
Normal operations even in peacetime were carried out from the control room and every 15 minutes or so one of the watch keepers would do a tour round the boiler and check everything was OK.
The question this begs is what NBC protection was allowed for the watchstanders making these rounds every 15 minutes?
Entering and leaving the protected space this often would be very laborious and time consuming. From my own experience in the engine room the decontamination could take longer to accomplish than the actual inspection and then it's repeated a minute or so later? This would require 2 or 3 sets of crewmembers making these rounds.
@@lilidutour3617 If you were in a situation where there was contamination you would be in serious action. There wouldn't be a round every 15 minutes.
For one thing they are just a double check routine and if the boiler room was contaminated your life expectancy was going to be short anyway.
Makes sense, the boiler room requires both outside air and outside water. Thanks for the insight, never really thought about that
@@Andy_Ross1962 Interesting conundrum isn't it? A few points.
While, yes, the rounds are routine and expect nothing out of the ordinary. I've made plenty of E/R rounds and found something broken or amiss when I didn't expect it.
Also, what if there are changes to the steaming rate? Are we cutting in and out burners? Are we changing burner tips for different steaming rates or because the tips are getting fouled? All things that require manual effort and can't be remote controlled.
Your comment about contaminated boiler room merits serious consideration but I'd throw out there it could happen by passing through the location of a previous nuclear detonation and not necessarily one pointed at you. My own experience with USN Nuclear Power Program is this is a "doable" situation and not a "death sentence". You just have to know how to manage it.
As I said in the beginning and interesting question for discussion.
@@lilidutour3617 When completely closed down in an NBC state all access to the Citadel is through air locks with scrub down stations to decontaminate before being allowed through the inner air lock. Access to the boiler room is allowed if needed but anyone going out would need to be decontaminated before re entering the Citadel.
1:02:16
“Jenkins!!”
“Sir?”
“Where’s the bow of the ship?”
“Sir! Fell off, sir!”
“What, again?”
“Sir, yes sir!”
“That’s twice, Jenkins.”
“Sir, yes sir, sorry sir!”
“Well, don’t let it happen again!”
“Sir, yes sir!”
Thanks for answering my question!
I agree with the G3s; Yamato/Iowa-grade capital ships built well over a decade earlier, meaning that not only do they massively outclass every contemporary design and even most future battleship designs, they are actually strategically relevant instead of being obsolete upon launch because naval aviation has about a decade to go to get to the point of effectively outranging big guns.
Do you reckon the treaty system kept ships that would not have been that useful in WW2 from being built?
@@CSSVirginia
Yes, but those ships would have been viable during most of the interwar era.
Wow you actually found a way to crowbar an “iowas were irrelevant” comment even though it had absolutely nothing to do with your original question. Well done
@@bkjeong4302 I wonder if a lack of treaties would have slowed down the shift to carriers as the major capital ship type, in that with only budget restraints the available money would have gone to BB's, leaving little left over for carriers. Thus the treaties allowed for experimenting and developing carriers and carrier doctrine protected from budget cuts.
@@jbepsilon
That, plus things like Akagi and Lexingtons not existing as carriers and thus setting back carrier doctrine significantly without large, fast carrier platforms to tinker with.
At 32:02, my mind went to water versus rum versus dry stores. You got me Drach. Maybe I was thinking of my great-great grandfather who was a cooper in the Civil War.
9:30. As Jack Aubrey said: "The pleasant thing about fighting with the Spaniards, Mr Ellis, is not that they are shy, for they are not, but that they are never, never ready"
LUCKY JACK,, I know he despised the French but I figured he'd give the Spaniards more respect...
"HMS Eskimo managed to lose her bows twice, which seems a little bit careless to me..." LOL!
You can have some of our sunshine. We're supposed to be hitting triple digits in Utah this week.
Regarding your answer to "USS Minneapolis and USS Pittsburgh lost their bows, for different reasons, during World War 2. Is their survival as extraordinary as it seems?" I'd like to add that the first and last bulkheads are actually called "collisions bulkheads" and properly reinforced. Actually any decent warship would stay afloat without their forward and/or aft peaks and make it home safely. I remember seeing a photo of a Prinz Eugen class cruiser without the aft peak, blown away by a British torpedo, with no damage whatsoever to propulsion or steering systems.
Excellent account, well told, thank you.
The big problem with losing the bow is it makes the ship vulnerable in a bad storm. The ship needs to maintain enough speed to keep from being turned broadside to the waves, which can lead to capsize (as it did for several destroyers with undamaged bows in Halsey's Typhoon, the remarkable thing in that story is that anybody survived from those ships). But the powerful waves of the storm are going to be hammering the leading bulkheads. The combination of required minimum speed and wave action can break the bulkheads.
The ship can try to travel in the direction that minimizes the pounding of the waves. Things get more complicated if there is land or a obstruction such as a reef close in the direction that is safest for the ship to travel, relative to the storm ...
Even traveling with the storm, the ship will likely get water coming into the bow section with a lot of force as the bow leaves one wave and drives into another - not as bad as it would be if traveling in the opposite direction, but still bad enough. There is also the problem of 'slamming', a term that describes the bow hitting into waves with considerable force, which can weaken structures. See Nelson to Vanguard, DK Brown. Good seamanship can minimize these problems but not eliminate them - and damage over time can accumulate as rivets break and structures/components get stressed past their elastic limits.
In this situations, ships often try to star stern-to the waves.
Didn't one of the destroyers searching for survivors after that typhoon "not receive" Halsey's order to break off the search,, basically telling Halsey "f off" until they'd completed their pass and recovered a few more sailors?
@@micnorton9487 DE Tabberer. This is the ship whose crew first realized there was a major problem when a sailor working on the damaged radio antenna saw a person in the water. Tabberer would end up rescuing 55 men. Halsey forgave them and commended the crew and captain for _courageous leadership and excellent seamanship_ . Other ships would rescue another 36 men. The book "Halsey's Typhoon" by Bob Drury and Tom Clavin is worth reading.
Running into typhoon's was not unheard of and not unique to Halsey or to the USN. In his book Carrier Pilot, British pilot Norman Hanson on HMS Illustrious had the following to say about a different typhoon:
_Soon after we left Cape Town en route for Ceylon, the weather worsened and our met officer began to look thoughtful. It seemed that a typhoon lay ahead of us, astride the Equator. Its position was foxing, for he couldn't decide whether it would turn out to be a 'north' or a 'south'. They have different patterns according to which side of the Equator they occur. We spent two days and nights trying to dodge it, but it won in the end and on October 26 it hit us with all the force of Nature gone stark, staring mad. It continued to hammer us for three days and I have no desire to experience another. Everything about it was terrifying._
Anything that terrifies a Corsair pilot has my respect ...
Lots of Sail, splendid. 😄👍👏
I HATE the age of sail,, I'm allergic to hemp lol...
This gentleman has gotten me through many a day!
How impressive is a ship surviving being blown in half. The IJN Amatsukaze was a Kagero class destroyer that famously sank the destroy Barton and helping to sink the light cruiser Juneau at the battle of Guadalcanal. In January of 1944, she was blown in half to a torpedo fired from the submarine Redfin. The forward half sank, but the back half miraculously stayed afloat and was towed to Singapore.
See also USS Murphy DD-603. Cut in half by collision by the tanker SS Bulkoil in October 1943. Towed to Brooklyn Navy Yard. Back in service to fight on D-Day.
1:02:20 Great description of Eskimo
Please consider doing one of your awesome alternate history videos on Operation Sea Lion. The Royal Navy battle fleet closing to melee range of a bunch of river barges and such, would be a fight worth paying to watch. I know she was flagship of the Mediterranean fleet, but include Warspite. You can't have an alternate history, surface gun fight, without Warspite.
The sealion plan is so bad that i think it was written as a sarcastic essay that naval officers would understand. Unfortunately army officers and current landlubbers don't comprehend just how bad it is.
The one practice of loading the barges, taking them a mile offshore and back, in ideal daylight conditions, had a 4% loss.
Upto 72 hours cross channel in convoy, in radio silence, with only one extra saiilor per vessel. Onto beaches with napoleonic anti infantry defences, against Mark 1 humans.
With no means to resupply
No. It just fails. The only survivors would be from the boats that sank in harbour.
But thats now enough th really change the war.
@@neilcampbell2222 The fact that every 24 hours there is a thing called night...and the RN is one of only 2 Navies on earth who could actually fight at night (RN and IJN, with the USN only starting to join c1943) makes See Lowe completely impractical. The Harwich flotilla of Destroyers, the ships at Portsmouth and the ships at Plymouth (including a Revenge Class battleship, could leave port just before dusk and be in amongst the invasion fleet, annihilate it, and be back in port just after daybreak...
It's a real pity they didn't try it...because it would have been one of the most disastrous days for the Nazi's...
@@dogsnads5634 Yes, but with little effect. The original army request was for 250k in the first wave, reduced to 150k by the navy and would probably be revised down further. But the loss of all of them would have little effect on Germany's 8 million strong army.
The navy would lose most of its 6 destroyers and 100 E-boats and armed smaller craft
The Luftwaffe would lose some planes flying combat air patrol at the extreme of their range.
But the biggest loss would likely be 1k Rhine barges which account for a huge proportion of bulk transport. The German economy was already suffering after only a few months of them being requisitioned and sitting in Belgium
Saturday night and the world's alright!
re NBC protection. Interwar and immediate post-war ships often (all RN but no USN) drew combustion air by into the boiler rooms then the fires drew from the boiler room. Under forced draft boiler room pressure was higher than the air outside (fans so there were air-locks for personnel). If, by enemy action or misadventure, honking great hole were punched in the room, the extra air would leave. That would make the pressure in the fire higher than that in the boiler room so there would be blowback, very unpleasant for anyone nearby and slowing the ship. The USN in the 1930's (late 20's?, I'm writing from memory) eliminated this by taking outside air direct to the boilers, leaving the boiler rooms at outside pressure.
Drawing combustion air to the boiler rooms meant that contaminants outside the ship had free access to them. Correcting this was so expensive that I'm not aware of it's being done to any ship post-war. The first ships in the RCN to have NBC compatible boiler rooms were the Sr. Laurent class DE's. As they shared drive-trains with contemporary RN ships, I assume the RN made the switch around the same time,
Flared barrels are an aesthetic choice and give sailors something to polish and clean between engagements. ;) Maybe ask Jingles he served in the Royal Navy in the 1970's? I'm sure he'd give some more insights on WMD prep.
Pittsburgh represent! CA 72 USS PITTSBURGH - longest ship in the world-1500nm from her bow to her stern! If you ever decide to visit USS Requin, let me know. I’ll take you on a fine tour of our fair city.
A day without is like a day without sunshine 😊
The term "withering fire" is found in the context of land battles as well as at sea, and (in my mind at least) describes a high volume and/or rate of fire.
Regarding the rank of acting-lieutenant being promoted straight to lieutenant without passing the exam, there's actually a good example of this in (fictional) naval literature. For those aware of the Hornblower series, the titular character actually never finished his lieutenant's exams (owing to a burning ship). Instead, one book later, during his time in a Spanish prison he was promoted straight from acting lieutenant to lieutenant due his exemplary conduct without even completing/passing the lieutenant's exam.
Thanks Drach.
Can you tell us about the history of diving bells - their invention, features and use during the period the channel covers?
RE: The final question. S M Stirling has the "Safehold" series that describes this situation exactly. Where the nation of Charis starts as a predominent naval power where gun armed oared galleys are the norm. They switch ( on advise from an immortal android, I know, Deus ex machina etc) they go to sail powered broadside armed galleons. Several "Lepanto's" ensue.. 9 books great reads...
The Safehold series is by David Weber. The entire series is 5 feet away from me ATT...
@@dorlonelliott9368 You're right of course.. It's David Weber
the illustration used for the WoW depiction of the Duncan,
shows (virtual) her in the Pool of London, offshore of the Tower of London, headed downstream.
with something just south of 10 metres of draught,
would it have even been possible for a ship of that depth of keel, to get itself into that location,
and be turned around, going in that direction?
Thinking of the Luftwaffe trying to support Sealion made me realize that I don’t recall any British capital ships being sunk by them. What was the largest HMS sunk by German aircraft?
Look up "List of Royal Navy losses in World War II". It looks like 8 RN light cruisers were sunk by German aircraft, 6 in the Med, 2 in the far North. No heaver warships were sunk by the Luftwaffe.
42:45 would the fact that the USA has no experience with ships of the line or line of battle mean that they would be at quite a substantial disadvantage. In a way like the spanish crews as discussed earlier but even worse as they wouldn't have the experienced officiers either.
Enjoyed your content. I'm becoming an expert. Haha
Japanese destroyer Amatsukaze also lost her bow, and ended up with a rather dorky-looking short replacement for the rest of her service.
I suppose Drach has covered this before, but how does the world's Navy's handicap themselves compared to their rivals or allies? And was it accurate? Also, what was the prevalence of naval spies to uncover rivals technology? Hull design technology had to have been a pinnacle of concern.
00:32:02 Flare was also a thing due to the material used rather than mode of manufacture, bronze, steel/bronze and cast iron barrels had a flair for much the same reason, but even early steel guns had a tendency to loose the muzzle - for example one of the 1877 de Bang guns exported to the Orange Free State, lost a number of calibres during one of the Sieges of Kimberley -possibly due to British counter battery fire but more likely due to "over firing" (too many shells fired in a given time) the damaged muzzle was cut down and tidied up[ at Pretoria and the piece put back into service.
Technical considerations aside, that HAS to be the best name for an armaments company ever.
Unless monsieur de Bange had a rival named monsieur kaboom.
@@notshapedforsportivetricks2912 Not withstanding the technical consideration the De Bange breech is the accepted basis for the interrupted screw breech, so M. Charles Ragon de Bange should be as well known as Hiram Maxim.
The likes of the (155mm) M1877 & (120mm ) M1878, were some of the most accurate pieces fielded, although the rigid mount meant it was slow firing, having to be re-sighted during every reload. but the de Banges and the later US 5 inch M1898 (the US are always late🤣) were called Sniper cannons for good reason.
Incidentally the Swedes had a designer called Mr Bang who was the designer for the Swedish short stroke semi-auto system on their first automatic rifle.
And one of my contemporaries in Durham constabulary was an Inspector Bashem, so there is a definite corollary with names
@@SCjunk He he! Nominative determinism at its best.
Thanks for the additional info.
What about the Cuban Mahogony Ships?
Yay!
00:53:41 Drac how would you know how useless a German Panzer would be at the base of the White Cliffs of Dover, remember back in the 1960s people thought that going up stairs was protection against Daleks
Good point, especially since the cliffs are essentially just one step. I'll admit it's a fairly big step, but climbing one step must be easier than an entire flight, right? Although I don't recall hearing about Deleks scaling the Cliffs of Dover, so maybe that would be a step too far, or tall, for them.
@@apparition13 😂😂😂
@@SCjunk Always happy to 'yes, and' a good lead in. :)
Is a Frigate better than the larger ships of the line, or does it depend on how it's deployed? If you do hit and run tactics Frigates do great, but sail in too close the ships of the line will pound you to the waterline?
I have been reading "The Mighty Moo" about the USS Cowpens (CVL 25). The book notes that the airgroup had night landing qualifications in 1943. While the US Navy had no night carrier attack capability at this stage in the war they had the capability to fly at night. Could the US carriers launch an attack on the fly if they had to? There were radar equipped Avengers at this point. Escort carriers in the Atlantic started night ops in early 1944. What prevented fleet carriers operating in the Pacific from rapidly acquitted night attack capability?
If you look at how flying licenses are set up today in the US, you'll notice that the instrument certification is different from the basic certification. The basic certification gives people a foundation that might keep them alive if they run into bad weather, but they're really not supposed to be flying in that weather. The instrument certification goes into a lot more depth and involves a lot more practice.
All commercial pilots get the instrument certification, but a fair number of private pilots do not.
Relying on instruments is a whole new world for pilots. There is a lot that can go wrong. People's intuition often leads them astray. In practice that usually means a crashed plane and a dead pilot/aircrew.
It was even harder back in the 1940s, since they didn't have anywhere near the same level of electronic navigation capabilities we have today. That didn't mean they couldn't do it, just that it was harder. Japanese seaplanes were flying at night during the battle of Savo Island in 1942, dropping flares to highlight US warships, which doubtless helped contribute to the Japanese tactical victory.
Basically it come down to increased risk of losing pilots and aircrew and planes, plus greater risk to the ships in the event of a bad landing. WW2 carrier operations were always dangerous - with people being crippled or killed outside of combat in accidents - so they tended to avoid making things worse if they could possibly avoid it. Also, everybody involved in day operations tended to get exhausted, especially when operating in the tropics, and especially when involved in combat ops. Giving people the night to recover - with relatively little happening on the ship to wake up people - was wise since it reduced mistakes in day operations. Even then, fatigue tended to accumulate over time, from one day to the next, eventually leading to serious mistakes.
Much easier and better to leave the night flying to specialists.
The USS Enterprise would eventually convert over to being a night operation specialist, as a way to continue providing value despite being somewhat obsolete relative to the newer carriers.
@@bluelemming5296 Escort carriers in the Atlantic were flying night ops long before the Enterprise started doing it. U-Boats surfaced at night which was the best time to find kill them. The decks were smaller and the weather typically worse so the skill set was there.
@@johnshepherd9676 Yes, but the escort carrier on ASW duty had to do night flying to be effective - and they were probably operating solo so they couldn't specialize within a group of multiple escort carriers.
In that situation, you can have a small numbers of experts on the single CVE doing the night flying - not necessarily every pilot needs to fly every night and some might never fly at night. You might be able to switch the active team(s) from night to night to maximize rest between operations. The ship's total flight operations were probably not as intense (in terms of sorties per 24 hour period) as a fleet carrier so less overall noise to interfere with sleep. Also, carriers on ASW duty probably didn't have to worry much about enemy attack, compared to the fleet carriers, which also reduces stress and hence fatigue.
Also, most of the CVEs on ASW duty were probably operating in a cooler/drier climate than the fleet carriers usually operated in, which also help to reduce fatigue.
Between all these considerations fatigue would be less of an issue for CVE operations at night when on ASW duty, hence it could be managed more easily than if you tried to do the same thing on a fleet carrier in a different climate, with a more varied set of responsibilities, and a much higher sortie rate.
The fleet carriers didn't have to do night operations to be effective, there was plenty of daytime work to do, so night operations were more of a luxury, and also they didn't operate solo so they could have one or two carriers in a big group specialize in night work so it wouldn't impact the rest of the team.
In his book 'Carrier Pilot' Norman Hanson talks about how exhausted the pilots (and crew) were getting on his ship as the war went on - and how even extremely experienced pilots could and did have fatal accidents. It's a British Carrier (HMS Illustrious), but I expect the problem was found in US carriers as well.
@bluelemming5296 I think you inadvertently stumble on the answer. It wasn't that the US could develop the capabilty. They had no need to. There were night fighter detachments on more carriers than CV-6. Enterprise had night strike capabilty. That is what made Enterprise different.
I’ll try again then
In regards to the M-class Submarines, what, if anything, would have been feasible retrofits to mitigate the primary issue of the 12” gun?
To expand on the Sealion question, assuming the Luftwaffe achieves air superiority in 1940, do the Germans have the capabilities to Force Z the intervention of the Royal Navy absent air cover?
Almost certainly not. The Germans didn't have even halfway decent aerial torpedoes at the time, nor aircrew trained for them, and I don't believe they had the heavy bombs they would use later against Illustrious in the Mediterranean yet.
@@kemarisite That was pretty much the question, Stukas could do it but they'd probably be busy, with an invasion going on and stuff.
Did the US Navy design the tanker from that Clark and Dawes sketch?
The ship lost it's bow - in other words, "the front fell off.."
One of the best satirical comedy sketches ever. ruclips.net/video/3m5qxZm_JqM/видео.html
Drach might I ask you the source of the Picture, for several reasons, one of which, is a favourite Sailing channel of mine RAN Sailing( you may have have heard of them)they're currently building their new yacht in a barn in Sweden, and have just got to the stage, that almost matches your opening pic, And also to enquire if that is the RN's new stealth warship
drach sir, I read / heard somewhere that the ships brining masts from the baltic were a specialised design? any info, designs you know of?
In the plan to upgrade Scharnhorts guns, how many and what size of guns they were supposed to have?
Each triple 11" turret were to be replaced with a twin 15" turret, similar if not identical to the Bismarck/Tirpitz turrets.
@@jbepsilon So they would have 6 guns?
Yes, three twin turrets makes for a total of 6 guns.
@@rodrigogoncalves6165 Equal to the Renown and Repulse.
The real oddity of the decision to rearm Gneisenau is that, at completion, she would not have been suited to sail with her sister, when the key to their success was to have both together.
Nor would she be a close match to sail with Tirpitz, and-also she would have been deemed too “valuable” to be sent off on merchant raiding missions (even assuming, by time she were recommissioned, any KM ship could get out into the Atlantic).
KM would have then had three capital ships, each of a different design, only one of which was well suited to merchant raiding, and one of which was not well suited either to merchant raiding _or_ directly squaring off against RN capital ships.
00:36:00 pretty difficult to determine who was a deserter in war of 1812 and earlier, in a time that finger printing and photography were still fantasy how would you know? Even the Police National Computer struggles with I.D. based on Race, D of B, Name, Height and Birth marks /Scars and Tattoos, even the language wasn't a thing, there is still some residual "English regional accent" in places like Appalachian hinter lands so back in 1812 it would be hard to discern some-one from Upper New York and some-one from Lancashire UK.
⚓
Aing on Aing on Drach you almost got away, with that picture of a G3 Battleship, I know Hollywood are heavily into alternative realities, but does that mean in this pic, Either (a) Tower Bridge was built up near Putney, (b)the ship looks bigger than it really is, So can easily fit under Tower Bridge, Or are you trying to suggest Sherlock Holms couldn't have fallen from it, as it was never built, 😂😂😂😂😂
Also, Spain's merchant navy was not as large as the English, so the pool of manpower with experience would be much smaller. Also, being a continental power, they had to compete with the Army for human resources.
is here.
HMS Eskimo: "Wow, if I had a nickel for every time my bow was blown off, I'd have two nickels. Which isn't a lot, but it's weird that it happened twice, right?"
00:23:52 The 1864 Royal Sovereign had four turrets in the cut down hull of a former 121 gun ship of the line but it rose without trace, as it was out of service by 1873, so would have been around as a reference multi-turret ship during designing and building of the likes of Devastation.
I don't believe the extraordinary James Cook sat a lieutenant's exam. Must have been because he was extraordinary.
Cook was originally from the merchant marine, being a master I believe. Maybe that was why the Admiralty thought thre exam unecessary.
@notshapedforsportivetricks2912 Cook changed the course of history when he surveyed the St Lawrence gulf and river in Quebec and charted the river in detail to enable a large armada of ships to land General Wolfe's army and defeat Montcalme's army on the Plains of Abraham. Cooks maps were so accurate they were still being used in the 1990's.
i would think sailors would tend toward a multi-lingual bunch, given hitting the tavernas, houses of ill repute, and traders visited in foreign ports... am i mistaken?
You are not mistaken. In my experience, most sailors who spend time overseas seem to pick up at least bits and pieces of multiple languages, some go all the way to fluency.
It's not just sailors. Many people who are stationed overseas on shared military bases - whether or not those are naval bases - tend to pick up some of the native language, though how much they retain after going home is uncertain.
There are often local language courses available on base. It's interesting to watch a bunch of GIs learning to sing kindergarten songs such as some local version of the alphabet song. You have to start somewhere, so why not?
A lot depends on the individual, and their exact situation.
One guy I heard of was working at a base in Germany and volunteered to be an apprentice for a baker during his time there. He would show up at the bakery very early in the morning, help with everything for four hours, then go to his regular job. He came back not only with a far better grasp of the language and culture, but with the skills of a master baker.
Learning languages would be a lot easier if our education system taught people to memorize things efficiently from an early age (along the lines of Harry Lorayne and Jerry Lucas, The Memory Book - which actually builds on traditions going back to ancient Greece). Sadly, that's just one of many areas neglected by formal education.
Re: the Royal Navy's plan to stop an invasion.
Well, we'll start by sending in Warspite....
(Yes, I'm aware Warspite might have been elsewhere. Don't ruin my fun. 😊)
Exceptions that "proof" (test) the rule.
So why are not tank guns, firing projectiles at a ,mile per second, not built this way?
What is the ship being built in the photo over the first question, please?
It looks like a museum reproduction of a small frigate?
Probably russian Poltava. It is 4th rate actually
what about Mahogany by the Spanish colonies in the Americas?
Wouldn't Royal navy deserters be British subjects, rather than citizens?
Good question. I'm just an American, but at least to me, it would be subject to situation and context. I have heard both of them used and am curious about it myself. Mainly, this comment is to see if you get an answer better, more knowledgeable response 😆
@@bull614 Bar the shouting. But citizen and subject are the same. Living in a constitutional monarchy entails no greater subjection than citizenship in a republic. Both affirm individual freedom within the rule of law. From specific religious or political perspectives etc.
@Yandarval thank you for that. I always bug my friends in Europe with questions, lol. History and culture from around the world always intrigues me. I'm too broke to travel, so I just bug my friends online, lol
@@bull614 Welcome.
video suggestions what if the the Bismarck made it do France or what if the Bismarck broke into the Atlantic
The RAF says "hello" with 4 engine bombers every night if Bismarck made it back to France.
He answered this before in old drydocks
Bismarck is just sunk later
Why would its fate be different from Tirpitz?
34th, 21 July 2024
"What if the Great Lakes had seen all 5 ships of the line completed?"
War Gamers would have gone insane?
Out at sea? Don't you mean "on the Lake"?? Being a Midwesterner who has spent most of his life within 20 miles of The Big Mich I tend to notice these things.
Algorithm Engagement Comment.
I have to write such things so that the algorithm will share this content with other people!
was joining NATO a good or bad thing for the Royal Navy?
I find you need more study in some actions of men like your own Cochran who won against several ships of the line with just a Sloop or Frigate, over 50 ships captured in all. Your bias against fast and nimble frigates vs. big sluggish heavy gunned line ships assumes broadside to broad side engagements too often. Frigates did in fact win against ships of the line though often requiring cunning and guile. The American Frigates were found by England to be so dangerous orders were put out never to engage American frigates without a 2 to 1 advantage in both numbers of ships and guns. If HMS Victory faced Constitution 1V1 her orders were to avoid combat. She fully out gunned the American ships but could not out maneuver them. This meant she was likely to take a broadside to bow or stern and limited to her chase or stern guns. Likewise even smaller French Corvettes acting in pairs or trios often would take on British Frigates or ships of the line and win. The ships of the line were the armored tanks of the sea but like tanks if alone that could and can be beat by one man with an explosive as they can't maneuver enough.
The US/UK thing from the War of 1812 is incorrect I'm afraid, the actual orders were for RN 18lb frigates to abstain from 1v1 action with American 24lb frigates, IE Constitution, President and United States. Everything else was fair game, a lone British third or first rate would happily engage a US frigate of any size.
While some frigates did manage to beat ships of the line, it pretty much always required an exceptional frigate captain, a not so brilliant ship of the line captain, and some environmental conditions for good measure. Indefatigable and Amazon vs Droits de l'Homme being a good example.
Far more common in frigate vs SoL matches were frigates being taken or destroyed in short order, or else running for the hills.
I'd really like to see your source for the statement "If HMS Victory faced Constitution 1V1 her orders were to avoid combat". I very much doubt you have one. USS Constitution is a big tough frigate, but she's exactly that, a frigate. HMS Victory is a big tough 1st rate ship of the line, USS Constitution is going to lose, and lose badly.
@@Drachinifel As I said it depends a lot on the crew too and you really should check out your own Cockran who with a even smaller sloop won against a few ships of the line and did even better with a frigate with over 50 ships captured. It is often said in wooden era too it didn't matter how many guns you had if the opponent could rake you bow to stern even once avoiding your own broadside. i am not saying that Frigates should have made a habit of going toe to toe with ships of the line but only that it often did work with the right crews an was far from as impossible as you try to make it sound. The biggest factor in wooden era engagements were often who got off the first aimed shot and whoever crossed the T. One of the Brits biggest advantages over other powers was their standardization of guns and powder leading to an avg. 3 to 1 shots per gun (the US kept that factor started by Henry VIII) The American break through design on our Frigates added the firepower very close to a 3rd rate of the day and was faster than any other frigates of the time plus every ship of the line. Also the thicker hull once exclaimed to be made of iron (just thick oak) as British and Barbary warships fire bounced off more often than breaking through the hull. Also adding to their speed and longer life in active service with one still afloat and in use to this day, is the copper bottom that without lead to British ships being badly fouled making them very sluggish often 6 months out of port and rotting in a few years. An issue your own Cockran fought with both shipbuilders and the Admiralty over that left half the fleet acting as though they had a small sheet anchor deployed. Most the stuff you provide is well researched but the blanket statements need some adjustment is the point I am making. Also Cochran helped found 4 countries and served in the leadership of 3 other navies before returning home to lead the transition to steam. I think you should read his autobiography and some other books as his life played a major part in sail after Nelson through the early steamers.
If the Germans and Japanese had won WW2 would the allies and subsequently NATO would have been able to defeat the combined fleets of the Soviet Union and Germany?
If the Germans and Japanese would have won World War II there would have been no Soviet Union... NATO would have been unnecessary because Russia would have already been reduced, Russian resources would have flowed into the Third Reich's corporate system and Washington would have made peace because all THEY were concerned with was getting their loans paid back... as for Japan there was no way they could have beat the Americans,, the Axis partnership was more notional than practical and the Third Reich would have much preferred going into the future with an American partnership rather than with the Japanese.......
As much trouble as the RN had in the Med with the Italians and 10th Flieger Korp, I thought the response to the Sealion question was a little cavalier. If the Germans treat Air superiority over the Channel (suppression / destruction of 11 Group) as the minimum requirement, then the RN may succeed in getting to the Channel and running amok for a while. This would most likely be at such high cost that if the first time isn't decisive, they may not have any more tries left in them even if they can muster the ships. Each attempt wouldn't need to be wiped out to be defeated. All the Germans would have to do is enough damage to convince them to turn back. Also the minefields would have been defended so it may not have been as easy as described to clear them nor as fast.
The big difference would have been if the Germans made a go of it in July to September 1940 or made serious attempts to prepare for the crossing and tried in May to July 1941. A lot would have to go right for a German invasion to succeed in either period but the Royal Navy would have paid a high price in 1940 to stop it and probably a crippling one in 1941 to make enough go wrong. The British Army was a mess in 1940 and even in 1941 could not respond to German Armored Warfare tactics very effectively. The RAF had no close air support doctrine and could not effectively coordinate with either the Army or the Navy yet. The Luftwaffe was not that great at anti shipping tactics in 1940 and the Germans were still using defective torpedoes. Both those issues were much improved in 1941 but the Luftwaffe was still not any better at coordinating with their Navy than the RAF was in either period.
Enjoyed the show but it would be way more interesting if you took the losing side in these hypotheticals to see what you think they could have realistically done to improve their outcomes. Even if the other side is distasteful to you. (Like say the French in the Napoleonic Wars.)🙂
I believe in the Med (battle of Crete) the big issue was running out of anti-aircraft ammunition. So long as the ships had sufficient ammunition, they had a good track record of holding off the aircraft with relatively few hits being scored. Once they ran low on ammo, that's when they started taking heavy losses.
Presumably this wouldn't have been an issue in the English Channel, where the ships could simply rotate back to port in groups to re-ammunition - assuming they had sufficient AA ammo supplies (I don't know, one would hope so ...), some ships re-arming while other ships continued to fight.
Basically, the Germans were not very good at anti-shipping operations, thanks to some foolish decisions on the part of their naval and air leaders. They would get better, but it would take a long time. As far as I know, the Luftwaffe was not spending much time training for anti-shipping operations during the build-up for Sea Lion - and if they were, I doubt they were spending enough time training (victory disease plus lack of ability to visualize just what was going to be happening as a result of lack of appropriate experience).
This point is further supported by logs of ships operating off Norway (see British Cruiser Warfare: The Lessons of the Early War, 1939-1941
by Alan Raven). There were lots of attacks by German aircraft, often with the advantage of being able to attack with surprise (such as coming over the mountains to attack a ship in a fjord that couldn't see past the mountains and thus couldn't see the aircraft until the last possible moment) that resulted in no damage to warships.
US Army Air forces would be equally bad at conducting anti-shipping strikes when they first started operating in North Africa [1943?], as related by ABC in his book *A Sailor's Odyssey*. He offered them advisors but they initially turned him down. Fortunately, after a while they realized they needed the help, and had the self-honesty and integrity to change their minds and accept naval aviation advisors - at which point they quickly became a lot more dangerous. The Luftwaffe didn't have anybody that could provide them with useful advice, since their navy didn't have veteran naval aviators - which means they had to learn everything the hard way.
A Japanese or US air attack by naval aviators - or land based forces that had trained for naval strikes - would have been much more dangerous to the Royal Navy, as both powers were sea powers and far better at anti-shipping operations than the Germans. This is ultimately the reason POW and Repulse were sunk. Even then, consider how many torpedoes Repulse dodged before being hit - and also consider that POW was operating at an enormous disadvantage due to the poor ventilation systems that were not designed to support tropical operations. Human beings don't think or act well when overheated and short on oxygen. There may well have been water-tight doors left open or not sufficiently secured in the engineering spaces as a result, and some of the damage control decisions might have suffered as well. These problems would not have occurred in the much cooler climate of the English Channel.
Destroyers in the channel would have been very hard targets to hit. There are lots of accounts of destroyers dodging bombs. It was different at Dunkirk where they had to be in specific places in shallow water with nearby obstructions and at low speeds to pick up troops: the conditions made them vulnerable. In the open sea they would be much more maneuverable and free to act in their own defense. The combination of a) having lots of AA ammo and b) being fast and maneuverable and c) having some fighter cover some of the time, taken together, would have created a big problem for the Luftwaffe.
The British had their own share of idiots - every nation does - but as we know from the Battle of Britain, the idiots were not in the key positions (though they would spend much of the Battle of Britain engaged in political maneuvers against the people who were actually getting the job done).
I think Sea Lion would have been an unmitigated disaster for the Germans.
@@bluelemming5296 Luckily, there are wargames to game it out like "Their Finest Hour" (GDW) and "Britain Stands Alone" (GMT). There is also an interesting book by Robert Forczyk, "We March on England" amongst many others. They don't entirely disagree with your position but there is more nuance and possibility than you currently allow for different outcomes.
The "England Rules the Waves" mafia belittle the achievements of the Royal Navy by not allowing for the abilities of their opponents that made them dangerous rather than just another chump to knock down. This also makes the discussion boring. "Right, England Rules the Waves and will sink all who oppose it. That about covers it, next topic." Britain suffered many setbacks at sea during WWII. What made them so impressive is that they learned from their mistakes and were creative in applying lessons learned. I wouldn't be surprised if most of their setbacks were not partially due to them believing their own propaganda. The Germans, Italians and Japanese also learned from their mistakes which created more challenges for the Royal Navy. Thanks for coming back with such a well thought out response Blue... even if I don't entirely agree.
@@AdamMisnik I agree the issue is more complex than most people think.
But I also think that Forczyk makes some serious errors, for example by considering the few successes of the Luftwaffe in Norway versus the enormous number of failed attacks (to be fair, he doesn't seem to even be aware of how many failed attacks there were, that's not part of the 'standard history' and is largely unknown to most people). He also doesn't seem to be aware of how well the ships repelled air attacks in the Med - during daylight! - so long as they had sufficient ammunition (also unknown to most people).
He makes assumptions about mine-laying during an operation that are pretty dubious - if it was that easy to lay mines to interdict sea lanes, how come it wasn't done at Crete? It would have saved a lot of German lives when the RN did interdict the operation. Further, the British had tried to construct mine barriers in the English channel during WW1 but found in practice they weren't very successful at preventing passage of subs - the effectiveness of mines placed by surprise near a port doesn't necessarily tell us much about the effectiveness of a large barrier emplaced (hastily!) in the open ocean. Also, the British had enough non-naval craft to basically swamp any practical mine-laying effort.
Similarly, he looks at very clever ideas to put land-based guns on light craft, but doesn't seem to realize that was tried at Normandy (and on many other occasions, as both the Germans and the Japanese resorted to coastal convoys with similar weapons) and didn't work out very well.
His ideas on S-Boats assume ambush conditions (again, he doesn't seem to realize that), but how likely is that during a major naval battle? Attacking a slow moving and poorly escorted convoy in bad weather is very different from attacking a major warship deployment, during a battle which can't take place in bad weather (because the invasion force isn't sufficiently seaworthy). In the Med, RN forces often spotted S-Boats before they could attack, even when not equipped with radar (US PT Boats had radar early, British MTBs did not). When regular military units were present and alert, the S-Boats were driven away far more often then they were successful.
The use of subs in major battles was also something that didn't have much success, again, these were ambush hunters that could rarely hit warships expecting trouble and maneuvering accordingly (at least not until acoustic torpedoes). The Germans tried in WW1 to use subs to directly influence surface battles, as did the Japanese in WW2. Neither was successful using them in this role. Ambush hunting, yes, major battles, no.
In short, he's cherry picking examples that favor his thesis. Also there are an awful lot of assumptions being made, and that doesn't usually work out well in military operations. He's basically approaching this from the perspective of an amateur, not a professional - the professional will have much more respect for all the things that can go wrong. The Normandy Invasion [1944] certainly demonstrated how many things could go wrong with even the most thoroughly planned military operation in human history - despite the planning being done by people who had far more experience with recent amphibious operations than the Germans did (Dieppe, North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, various commando operations, plus the Pacific Operations - which the planning team in Britain were briefed on).
Finally, there were many occasions on which individual German units or small groups were able to achieve surprise in the early war - but how likely is it that a major effort would have done the same?
I don't think Forczyk is entirely wrong - he makes some good points. I also think your idea that they could have been more successful in 1941 (with a lot more time to plan, to built appropriate vessels, to rehearse, maybe even to try a few amphibious assaults on other targets and to learn from their mistakes) is a good one.
@@bluelemming5296 The Luftwaffe became much more effective at sinking British ships in 1941 than they were off of Norway in 1940 and the RAF was frankly terrible at coordinating with either of their sister services until 1942 for the Army and at least 1943 for the Navy. They were too preoccupied with trying to win the war solo with their strategic bombing campaign. Minesweepers would have been very vulnerable to S-Boats. The RN Destroyers protecting them could have dealt with the S-Boats easily but not while trying to avoid air attack or haplessly sailing into the Minefields while engaged in evasive maneuvers. Submarines had trouble getting firing solutions on capital ships in both World Wars but that was partly because they were spread thin covering multiple approach routes. In case of Sealion being launched, the British approach routes would have been limited and pretty much a gauntlet of submarine and air launched torpedoes. Even Warspite with its plot armor could have a bad day in that environment.
@@AdamMisnik There was no need to involve Bomber command, though they might actually have been able to destroy minefields with enough air dropped bombs. From the Battle of Britain we know that the most competent people in the RAF were in 10 and 11 group - and those are the people that mattered when it came to control of the air (though in a serious invasion the RAF probably would have staged aircraft from all over England into the battle, giving them much larger numbers than Forczyk assumes). We know from modern studies that the Germans were never even close to beating them. The old idea that the 'Germans almost won but then they switched strategies' has been shown to be a myth. The Luftwaffe would not have had control of the air in any conceivable circumstance. They could dispute it - but controlling it is another matter.
Realistically, in the event of invasion, it's likely the senior officers in Bomber Command would have been sacked and they would have found somebody who could play well with others to take over. Churchill sacked a lot of senior officers during the war, for far less reason and under far less critical circumstances.
There were not enough S-Boats to make a significant dent in the 300+ minor vessels the British had deployed in the channel (that's not counting the destroyers and larger craft, nor the huge numbers of additional civilian vessels that might be added if needed - think about Dunkirk). Getting hits with torpedoes is hard even when not under fire. Ambush predators don't fare well in major battles, especially lightly built vessels carrying lots of explosive/flammable munitions. The greatest asset of the S-Boats was the difficulty of finding them. But defending a known crossing point would negate that.
Few if any submarines would have made it to firing position. Using them in this fashion was attempted numerous times and it never worked out particularly well. If you want to assume Bomber Command would not be able to play well with others based on historical data, it's only appropriate to assume the same for the U-Boats. Again, ambush predators don't fare well in major battles. Despite the large number of submarines routed to attack the Torch landings, very little of substance was accomplished.
German aircraft used as torpedo bombers were hideously vulnerable to aircraft and anti-aircraft fire. The Germans lost so many pilots and planes attempting torpedo attacks that they quickly gave up on using aircraft in this fashion for major attacks. Ambush roles, yes, major attacks, no. It might be different if they had custom built aircraft designed for that purpose from the ground up, and real control of the air.
Establishing a serious minefield takes a lot of time. It's pretty unlikely there would have been anything like a completed minefield or even anything large enough to be useful unless the Germans put a lot of time and effort into developing a rapid deployment capability - something they never did. A few aircraft could drop mines, but that's not enough. Anything the Germans could deploy would likely be swamped by huge number of civilian vessels manned by volunteers, mostly on-shore naval personnel from all over the country, but also civilians.
So what we're left with is a hideously vulnerable seventeen mile column of poorly defended transports, one that has to spend many hours getting organized after they put to sea, then even more hours trying to cross the channel - without control of either the air or the sea. I don't think a single soldier would survive the attempt except as a POW unless the Germans spent a lot of time figuring out better solutions to the problems than they did.
Forczyk assumes the Kriegsmarine opposed Sea Lion out of petty reasons, and never takes a moment to consider that the professional naval officers might have had a far more realistic appreciation for the problems and challenges than the amateur does. Yes, the Germans could likely have solved those problems, especially if they took the time to do it right, make other amphibious assaults in other places, and learn from their mistakes. If the alternate history involves somehow making people like Hitler and Goering disappear, and some competent leaders taking their place, the German chances go up considerably.