First. :D MHV asked me to expand on a few things he mentions in the video. Re: Japanese air services equipment The IJAAS had been caught in the middle of a big push for modernization that left them fighting with a lot of out-dated kit at the start of the so-called China Incident. This was particularly true regarding their bomber fleet, which was badly obsolete in mid-1937. The Ki-21 was finishing up development, but the need for modern bombers was so high that the Army purchased Italian Br. 20s as a stopgap. The IJNAS was in better shape technologically, though it hadn't really trained to "attack a continent" as the late historian Mark Peattie entitled his chapter on the subject. That being said, there was a lot of legacy equipment still soldiering on in front line units as new production chugged along, particularly the carrier-based attack aircraft and dive bombers. Re: Japanese tank development Weight restrictions due to shipping concerns was certainly one factor. More importantly, the Japanese were getting all the performance out of the tanks that they wanted. The Type 95 Ha-Go was a perfectly adequate light tank by the standards of the mid-1930s, and the Type 97 Chi-Ha was a reasonable medium by the standards of that same period. The Type 89 I-Go, a design dating back to 1929, was still chugging along as well and performed well in China. Nomonhan shocked the Japanese into some further armour development, leading to the 47mm AT gun and Chi-Ha Kai in 1942. Japanese armour development was slow since scarce resources were diverted to aircraft and ship production. The Japanese were satisfied with the Chi-Ha Kai's performance against Stuarts, which the Japanese assumed would continue to be deployed as the main armoured strength of the US in amphibious operations. The appearance of M4s was a nasty shock. By the time the Japanese started a crash program of tank modernization, it was too late. The programs didn't start to bear fruit until late 1944-45. In short, the Ha-Go and Chi-Ha were not bad tanks for when they were designed. However, they were obsolescent by 1939 and horrifically obsolete by 1945. Re: Setting a false standard for judging the IJA Overall, the IJA was not a match for a European army in the context of Europe: narrow frontages, high force-to-space ratios, and relatively forgiving logistics. The problem, as John Ferris notes in his study of British intelligence assessments of the IJA before WWII, is that many observers judged the Japanese by a set of fallacies he calls the "paper standard" and the "first-class power." In short, the British would mentally transplant the IJA from where they would actually fight it over to the battlefields of Europe: "The circumstances which they envisaged centred on narrow fronts and dense quantities of men and material, where soldiers skilled in deliberate operations would eat alive enemies adopting the tactics of the I.J.A. Elsewhere the diner might become dinner." The environment of Southeast Asia was decidedly not Northeast France. Hence why the IJA held up as well as it did, even in the face of overwhelming firepower it took a lot of effort to dislodge them.
Neither saw combat, they were held back in defence of the Home Islands. The Chi-He would have been a good tank design if it had entered service in 1941, early 1942 at the latest. It didn't enter production until 1943-44. By that point it was already obsolete (47mm gun and maximum 50mm of armour). The Chi-Nu was a reasonable vehicle, but hardly state-of-the-art by 1944, when it entered production. The Chi-Nu II, Chi-To, Chi-Ri, and other very late-war designs were much better but still weren't going to blow anybody's socks off. That being said they would have certainly given M4s problems. At that point you are well into 1945 and the Japanese had bigger problems than how capable their new tanks were.
Shadow Gamera The Chi Nu would have seen service if Operation Downfall had been launched, and while it had potential, it came far too late to be very relevant at all. -Yes, I read that incorrectly at first-
Shadow Gamera they weren’t used at all. They were decent tanks but nothing spectacular. You have to understand that in the environment the Japanese were fighting in, large German style tanks would be more of a hindrance than anything. Imagine trying to drive a tiger tank through Saipan.
Another factor in Japan's tank development was that during their early campaigns they didn't run up against much anti-tank capability so that made the tanks they had more than adequate for their needs. It wasn't until later in the war when they started to fight the Allies (particularly the US) in earnest that they realized that their tanks were no longer adequate.
The Japanese did come up with one innovation in aviation, the counter sunk rivet. It lowered drag considerably and every nation has adopted this practice.
Charles Ward Hall of the Hall-Aluminum Aircraft Corporation submitted a patent for a flush rivet in 1926. Hall’s company in Buffalo, New York produced the XFH Naval Fighter Prototype the first aircraft designed with a flush riveted fuselage. The first aircraft with butt joints and flush rivets to fly was the Hall PH flying boat of 1929. The most famous early aircraft to use flush rivets and butt joints is Howard Hughes' H-1 racer in September of 1935, but it wasn't the first. Incidentally, both the Focke-Wulf 190 and the Mitsubishi Zero-Sen appear to have their design genesis in the H-1 although both Kurt Tank and Jiro Horikoshi denied this. As it turned out, flush rivets only slightly improved aerodynamic efficiency at low altitudes. As airplanes flew and fought at higher altitudes, the effect of flush rivets and other streamlining diminished due to the thinner (rarified) air.
Well English started off as German, a slight variation of German that was altered with Latin and other languages over the time. Ich/I, mein/mine-my, feuer/fire some examples that really haven’t changed. Funny what a couple hundred years of separation will do to a language, he’ll look at modern English in all of the countries it’s spoken in, while still the same the idioms and slang are vastly different and may seem like a separate language. I believe the same is for quite a few other languages.
Ach, Junge. So schwierig ist es nicht. They're sister languages, after all. After a year of high school German, I more or less taught myself...to read the language, anyway. I did have to live and work there for half a year in order to learn to speak it properly, but you don't really need to strive for a native accent, which most Americans can't seem to acquire in any case. Just get some intro-level books and you'll be on your way. Erich Kaestner is perfect for this. Pretty sure that Emil und die Detektiven is still in print...
From everything I've read, the Japanese Imperial Army & Navy did not like one another, did not coordinate or work with one another very well, and therefore developed their own air forces (hence why there were 2 of them). 😄
@@tyree9055 I believe that came over a feud for resources because Japanese iron quality is not good mainly when it came to large thing like boats and tanks.( fun fact most of the steel used in Japan boats was actually purchased from the United States)
It's because Japan did not believe in Combined Arms as far as the command structure went. Hence why you had issues of Japanese Marines ignoring Army commands in the Pacific.
@@tyree9055 The problems was that it was not simply the rivalry between different branches of the armed forces. IJA and IJN were also political rivals in the struggle for power. Neither of them reported to the Prime Minister, but instead reported directly to the Emperor. During the period between 2 world wars, Assassinations of IJA and IJN members, as well as politicians were so common that Admiral Yamamoto felt safer when he was on the sea.
The Chinese Nationalist and Communist armies were also fighting each other as well and some War Lords. A united Chinese military may have proven more difficult.
Yes, and even with their internal fighting and bickering with war lords they still held up half of the Imperial Japanese Army during the entire war and caused close a million dead Japanese. As such their contribution to defeat Japan during WWII has been cruelly overlooked.
Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) hated each other so much that they were on the verge of fighting each other in the late 1930s. In order to avoid internal fightings they needed outside enemies, firstly China and later the British Empire (Aussies, Canadians, Kiwis and loyal Indians inclusive), the USA and the Dutch East Indies.
U should discuss the meeting of German U boots with Japanese Navy in the eastern Indian ocean for resupply and that this was uncomfortable to say the least. There were cultural issues.
I would like to read on this too. I read about the Japanese and German submarines a few times going to both respective countries but only very minor detail.
So far as I have read there were no intercultural interactions and thus no intercultural problems; however, the stationing of U-Boats at Penang was a reaction to the Japanese lackluster performance and indifference to the Indian ocean. So a strategic conflict of resources and interests maybe but not a cultural one.
Ann Onymous Maybe cultural is not the right word. Let me go so far to say that my understand was that Japanese sailors were less than comfortable working were Europreans. Note this after Japan defeats of English and Dutch colonies.
Why would Germany complain about Japan's inaction. After the 1942 raid by Japan, Britain had to leave Ceylon. Throughout 1942 and 1943, Allied shipping in the Indian Ocean was minimal. In fact it was the Allies that resorted to submarine attacks in the Indian ocean. The Allies worried enough that they attacked Madagascar. In 1944, Japan raided the Indian Ocean again when allied presence increased.
I think the best summary of the Japanese Army is that its arms were state-of-the-art for the early 1920s. This means light machineguns, Brandt-type mortars, light tanks, and other weapons everyone else adopted following WW1. What sets the Japanese Army apart is that they never updated their arsenals significantly beyond that. Even when they adopted newer weapons, they tended to be designs that had more in common with the designs of the mid-1920s than the late 1930s. It is ironic considering how Japanese aeronautical and naval engineers proved to be among the best in the world while their army arsenals couldn't progress much beyond the work of Nambu despite his best efforts to instill an innovative culture in the system. Incidentally, Nambu's impact on Japanese arms manufacturing would be a great topic for MHV.
The Japanese Army was state of the art even by 1940, having one of the most effective LMGs, a unique and excellent grenade launcher, and otherwise serviceable rifles (really only the US had semi-automatic rifles, and this made up for the inferiority of the BAR). The Chi-Ha series of tanks were very adaptable, the Shinhoto upgrade in particular is unique in being the only pre 1940 tank that had a 3-man turret, diesel engines, high velocity cannon and sloped armour. Their major failings were the lack of a suitable SMG (Japanese did some minor experimentation but production was stalled). And general inferiority in artillery, which is perhaps understandable given the primitive nature of Japanese industry. However many of these problems were also shared by other world class powers, such as the British who also did not have a serviceable SMG, and the US who lacked modern artillery pieces, although both of them were able to rectify their problems quickly.
The issue is that infantry small arms were not the decisive weapons of war in 1940 anymore than they had been in 1916 or 1924. Artillery, tanks, and aircraft were what allowed infantry to perform in WW2. Japanese tanks had more in common with the Renault FT than the Panzerkampfwagen IV, a truly modern tank in 1940 which also happened to have a three-man turret. Japanese artillery lacked the weight, range, and numbers to contest European powers in any meaningful way. Japan had no practical anti-tank weapons despites having the Soviet Union as a primary threat, and they struggled to even harm the weakest of American tanks, let alone the much more powerful ones that inevitably came. Be it against the Soviet Union in Manchuria, the Americans in the Pacific islands, or the British Empire in Burma and New Guinea, the Japanese were outgunned and the results were bloody for the Japanese.
They had comparable AT weapons to other major powers in 1940. A 37mm gun, a 47mm gun developed after Khalkin Ghol, and various heavy AA guns comparable to the 88 FlaK that can be used for the AT role. The PzkfIV was a very wanting vehicle until the Ausf F in 1941 where it acquired the long 75mm and imporved armour protection. By the standards of 1940, the Chi-Ha Shinhoto stands out as particularily innovative. Comparing Japanese tanks to the renault shows a very poor understanding of Japanese military capabilities. Rather the issue is that in the South Pacific, these heavy pieces were obviously not carried through dense jungle foilage. Likewise it would be foolish to issue limited stocks of weaponry to island garrisons that could not be resupplied. Following 1944, the Japanese brought all that they could to the homeland in order to fight an expect American invasion. Nevetherless the cut-down Kwangtung army fought an effective fighting retreat, namely at Mutanchiang where they held off the Soviets allowing the vast majority of IJA formations to escape.
Oh Puhleeze.... The Japanese Army didn't design around the South Pacific. They didn't even want to BE in the South Pacific. Their AO by an order of magnitude was the asian mainland. Period. Full Stop. Their "innovative design" was completely outclassed by early 42 and was NEVER DEVELOPED. Why?? Because the Chinese Army had neither tanks or large numbers of anti-tank guns that would have forced the Japanese to continue to develop it. Which is why what anti-tank guns the IJA did produce were small in caliber and number. The Japanese Army was deeply conservative, un-educated, and rigid in both outlook and doctrine. It's officer ranks were filled navy rejects and it's senior NCO development consisted of "whose the biggest most vicious thug in the unit",. Innovation wasn't discouraged... it was anathema. Blind loyalty and fanatical obedience coupled with brutal dicipline were it's hallmarks. It disdained manuever so who needs commo, it ignored casualties so ditto on a medical corps It had plenty of superb tube artillery available in easily adapted naval guns , but that would have required inter service cooperation and TRAINED artillery crews, oh, and commo to direct fires. It claimed as virtues all it's myriad vices and all you can come up with is the "Nambu". In the end they either died sealed in their caves or running straight ahead into BELT FED machine guns lashed by medium and heavy artillery. Which while regrettable for their poor infinately abused common soldiers; was completely fitting for their pig ignorant sword waving officers and their sadistic NCOs.
The Chi-Ha was developed with an unchanged chassis into the Chi-He and Chi-Nu. The chassis was enlarged for the prototype Chi-To and Chi-Ri, all of which more or less roughly kept pace with contemporary militaries, although naturally production was not prioritised. Naval artillery is not easily adapted into ground based tube artillery at all. The high pressure and APC shells required of naval artillery is very poorly suited towards ground artillery which requires blast effect. Heavy emphasis was placed on manoeuvre as is evidenced in Japanese offensives in China, Malaysia, Phillipines and the South Pacific. Although the Japanese, lacking shells, frequently opted to use men in it's stead for frontal assaults when manoeuvre was not an option. Frankly the US had much to learn here considering their constant face first hammering into defensive positions. The armies of any nation, past and present, and made up of inane old bastards without a hint of creativity. It's why they were promoted. The Japanese were no less worse then anyone else, and showed capacity to adapt to the situation, as well as having some smart cookies along with the imbeciles. Their great failing was a lack of industry and fuel for their ambitions. The best NCO's typically are of the thuggish sort, certainly among those that subscribe to the Sandhurst school. And although your claim of there being a extraordinary number of naval officer rejects is asinine, as the IJA held it's own officer's schools and focused recruitment in entirely different demographics, it at least correlates with the 90% rejection rate of the notoriously picky IJN. Otherwise you seem to be mistaking massive numerical superiority, overwhelming artillery, abundance of supplies, air and naval dominance as being marks against the Japanese Army, who were obviously stupid in charging against our machineguns or being pummeled into the ground by artillery. Completely ignoring that when the shoe was on the other foot, US and British troops were being completely thrashed despite outnumbering the enemy. I'd much like to see how long the US army holds up on Peleliu or Iwo Jima given the same odds. They'd probably throw in the towel as soon as the enemy hits the beach as they did in Guam.
yeah, the idea is that here I add more "personal" stuff, whereas "personal" has several meanings: 1) more experiences, e.g., memoirs or combat reports, 2) more primary source reports like this one, 3) summaries and/or introduction to topics that have a lesser information-density than my Visualized Episodes, 4) personal Hands On videos, e.g., Museums, etc. and 5) interviews etc. although the later two might also add up on my main channel, like the Interview with Chieftain.
Thank you for your videos. You show greater academic knowledge and effort than many other channels which may be also very good. But yours is unique because it’s very professional.
The Chinese had employed the Germans to help them train there army. I belive one of the German officers died leading the men he had been training, against the Japanese in Shanghai.
Yep, we also were close allies with china and actually had some animosities with the japanese. In the end the war brought us into a marriage of reason, not love with the japanese. China simply wasn't ready for war and we needed someone to eather flank the russians or stop the americans from keeping effectively beaten enemies in the war by resupplying them. with china eventually turning communist, sadly all ties have been untill rather recently severed, eventhough we had been quite close before the war.
The Japanese aircraft were very good, generally, if a bit fragile. The Yamato could sink the Bismark well before the Bismark could get into range. The Japanese tanks were tin cans. Their artillery was good, but limited in numbers. The war in the Pacific was to the death, after the first few months. It was a giant meat grinder. Iwo Jima is smaller than the Dallas Fort Worth Airport. 29,000 men died there in 36 days.
In my words. The Japanese military especially the army adapted to fight certain enemies in certain environments like with all industrialized nations. They were designed to respond to the arms race with their surrounding neighbors. The Japanese army just happened to be designed to fight in very mountainous and heavily forested areas so their equipment was designed for that. The army wasn’t in need for this arms race as their equipment did just fine against their enemies at the time while the navy had to respond to the western powers and at the same time received the lions share of the research and development department. Same with the Germans. They had to respond to the arms race with Russia especially when it came to tanks. You could say that the German tank program was all thanks to the Soviets and their counter program. So if the Japanese army had to respond to fighting say in the steppes with the soviet army, it would force them to change their army strategy and equipment. But it’s really hard especially as an island nation with very little resources and with those little resources that you have, you have branches of the military fighting for what little you have.
The Japanese did frequently fight the Soviets in innumerable border skirmishes, usually winning. The 2 major incidents would be the battle of Lake Khasan and Khalkin Ghol. At Lake Khasan, the Soviets occupied a defensible hill on Japanese claimed territory which they quickly fortified, the Japanese captured the hill utilising nighttime infiltration and proceeded to defend it against a soviet counter-attack including tanks until a diplomatic settlement lead to the region being demilitarised. Khalkin Ghol, after a series of skirmishes the Japanese escalated the situation by sending two reinforced divisions along with tank battalions across the Khalkin Ghol river in a anticipated pincer movement over the built up soviet forces. This was met and counterattacked by soviet forces upon which it degenerated into a stalemate, until Zhukov received sufficient reinforcements for a major offensive which managed to surround the Japanese. The Japanese failed repeated attempts to break out, and ultimately agreed to a ceasefire. Following these battles, the Japanese did correctly deduce that although they held superiority in airpower and had superior troops, their tanks and artillery were inadequate, and that they lacked the industrial capacity to face the soviets in a prolonged war (One artillery officer mentioning the soviets firing more shells in a single day then the Japanese did the entire battle). The IJA did respond curiously with plans to increase motorisation and fairly interesting armour designs, however lack of funding and resources lead the to IJA to double down on "spiritual mobilisation" and forced it to attempt to make up material inferiority with spiritual will.
JustPersonOfTheWorld 20 A bit of a myth. It was a undersized Japanese attack that had no approval from high command. They were granted limited air support and basically ran headlong into a trap where they would be outnumbered 2:1 in material and troop count so ofc they had no chance. However, going off this to predict what would happen in a general war is rather sketchy, and unsurpisingly many Japanese officers did not draw the conclusion that the Soviets were too well defended, rather they felt that the whole engagement was a debacle where a unit clumsly stumbled into a hopelessly bad tactical sitaution. You can correctly argue that the soviets possessed more advanced weapons and a better doctine in some respects, but from the Japanese perspective, a large land war was still a real option. They and the Ha-Go plan, and after Operation Barbarossa, they nearly launched plan Kantokuen; kind of why I think the signifigance of the border skrimishes is severely overstated. The real reason why these plans never materialized was due to shortages in Japanese oil (just months left before reserves depleted) and other vital resources blocked off by American sanctions. Furthermore, the Americans were clearly preparing for a decisive first strike agaisnt the Japanese in Joint board plan 355, which is why they had heavy strategic bombers stationed in the _Pacific_ bases. Of course, the American war plans were washed over by Japans own surprise strike in 1941, in which the Japanese rushed south for resource-rich Dutch territories in the hopes of relieving their doomed war economy. All of this instead of attacking Siberia, which was, at the time, lacking in infrastructure and had no such industry whatsoever in which the Japanese could benefit from. TL:DR - Attacking Soviet siberia was no longer a viable option with ticking time bomb of a eventual resource shortage. And he Japanese didn't really have the resources fight two giants, so the IJN was given priorty, leaving the IJA to be even more frugal.
I believe it also involved for the first time in their military history, the burning of regimental colors to avoid capture... good practise for the next 6 years...
If by crushing defeat, you mean a Japanese division attacked across a river into fortified soviet positions, captured their objective, then were counterattacked and surrounded by soviets who were reinforced by 3 times their number in infantry and artillery, 5 times as many tanks, twice as many aircraft. And still somehow managed to inflict more casualties then they lost. And Khasan was where the Japanese effectively humiliated a Soviet Armoured division with an unsupported infantry regiment.
The Japanese were excellent at the regimental (tactical) level and below. Above that, not so much. They lacked what modern western armies took for granted in divisional and above formations. Starting with heavy artillery and communications and specialist formations on call, but more importantly the "S" staff structure. Personnel S-1, Intel S-2, Ops S-3, and most importantly S-4 Logistics. The roles existed but the over-whelming emphasis and path to promotion was exclusively combat command. As a result professional development was almost non-existent and officers assigned to non-combat admin slots were considered inferior and many were in fact cast-offs, failures and/or political place holders. If anything the Sr. NCO picture was even worse. Basically the successful Japanese Army NCO was one who was unquestioning in obedience and enforced discipline through sheer mindless brutality. Employed against a disorganized and poorly equipped Chinese army indifferently commanded by casualty averse warlords, the hyper-aggressive tactical employment of Japanese Army units could and did run rampant. Yet time and again lack of the ability to logistically sustain strategic offensives would allow shattered Chinese formations to slip away to be re-routed another day. The lack of heavy long range artillery and battlefield mobility made it all the easier for hardy Chinese peasants to "outwalk" their pursuers. There's also no question that the early successes the Japanese enjoyed at the outset of the wider war, post Dec. 1941 was due in large part to facing meager European colonial garrisons ill-supplied and poorly equipped and above all lacking air cover. Singapore and Burma were the result more of poor leadership and collapsing morale than actual Japanese combat efficiency. In the Philippines, against an isolated but determined American garrison, the Japanese floundered and suffered heavy casualties until reinforcements coupled with declining US ability to resist, absent relief, finally turned the tide. It should be noted that in the end, the Japanese insisted Wainwright surrender ALL American forces in the Philippines, not just those on Leyte. The Japanese Army had no desire to fight another protracted campaign/s throughout the islands, particularly against prepared American forces on Mindanao. Once the tide of war turned during the Solomon's campaign the Japanese proved as fanatical in defense as they were hyper-aggressive in attack. Still it took them until 45 and the Okinawa campaign to recognize the need for a more flexible defensive strategy. It's thus unsurprising that the stalemate along the Shuri Line was ended only after the Japanese Deputy Commander insisted on a major counter-attack that exposed and effectively wiped out Japanese combat power defending the line; and caused it's premature collapse ( a smaller scale oriental version of the ultimate results of the Ardennes Offensive ). Proving sometimes old dogs get tired of "new tricks" and prefer a "blaze of glory" over grinding, yet effective attritional strategies. Lastly the Japanese Army Officer Corp was from a national standpoint, the "leftovers", ie. Naval rejects. They were much less educated than their Naval counterparts and were drawn mainly from rural provinces. They were deeply conservative in outlook and tended to rigidity in response to rapidly changing events on the battlefield. To them "The Plan" was "The Plan" was "The Plan"; no exceptions and the go-to solution to any setback was to throw more men at the problem. Defeat was preferable to spontaneous deviation, that might after all, still end in defeat. In conclusion, while their navy in the short term was clearly the match of any western power in terms of equipment, tactics and training; the Japanese Army despite initial success was not. Unyielding fanaticism covered a multitude of sins; but in the end even that facade began to crack. What few Americans know about Okinawa was it saw the first significant Japanese surrenders. By the end of the battle over 5,000 Japanese soldiers had laid down their arms. Perhaps proving attritional warfare cuts both ways and fanatical indoctrination and institutional brutality eventually reach their limits.... and maybe, just maybe, dying for the Emperor isn't strictly necessary or desirable in the end. On reflection in terms of equipment and structure of components... I think the closest WW2 European analog is the Rumanians. The divisional components and capabilities are really close in both infantry and even "armor". Although I don't think the Japanese really ever had an "Armored Division" per se. The divisional and corps asset distribution is darn close to identical. And to be clear I'm talking force structure and command level training, NOT morale or motivation. Also the Red Army gave high marks to the individual courage of both Japanese and Rumanian individual soldiers; but thought their equipment and above all leadership to be deficient. For an excellent account/analysis of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese Army after the Solomon's Campaign I highly recommend "Implacable Foes: The War in the Pacific 1944-45" by Waldo Heinrichs and Marc Gallicchio; available on Amazon KIndle.
Waldo Heinrichs and Marc Gallicchio, hows that for a multi-cultural mouthful. It's a very well balanced account that goes far deeper than just the military aspects of the war. It's examination of American re-deployment issues, both in terms of morale and logistics is eye-opening. It also makes clear that by 1945 the Japanese people were deeply disillusioned with the war and would have welcomed an end to it on practically any terms by the fall of 44. Also while I thought it difficult to think any less of Douglass MacArthur than I already did; his grandstanding, credit stealing, scheming insubordination and outright lying to Allied peers and superiors was far, far worse than anything I ever imagined. You begin to think he was put in charge of Japanese occupation to keep him as far as possible from the rest of the army for as long as possible. He literally destroyed the 6th Army under Krueger by insisting on the liberation of every square inch of the Philippines and then absolutely lied/falsified it's readiness status as relates to Olympic/Coronet/Downfall. He planned to just skim off the cream of all the units and troops being transferred from Europe with no questions asked... Well Marshall wasn't buying it for a heartbeat and was in the process of dispatching a 3 Star IG to get answers when Hiroshima happened. It makes for truly fascinating and incredibly well sourced informative reading. It's one of those books that really spotlights "the things you didn't know, you didn't know. A variation of Rumsfelds "Unknown/Unknowns.....But by far the worst thing he did, MacArthur ( I say this as a combat vet), was when the discharge point system came out.... He friggin ignored it... he said that basically it didn't apply to his troops and did everything in his power to delay and hinder it's application. To me personally, that's just unforgivable. Period. Full stop.
Thank's for the data. Seems pretty interesting book. Concerning Douglass McArthur, I must say I'm surprised by your really bad opinion on him. I assume he was put in command of Southwest Pacific Theatre mainly for propagandistic and morale boosting reasons, after his escape from Bataan was turned into epic story by American media. But, well, morale and psicology are crucial aspects in a war that have to be adressed from the strategic perspective of those at top command level. So that decision taken by Marshall or, perhaps, by Roosevelt himself, must be understood. Apart from McArthur's actual performance during the war, I think we should not underestimate his work after the war rebuilding Japan's infrastructure and industry, unless you think this is another case of credit stealing.
During japanese occupation in my country (Indonesia), the japanese are actively recruit locals for their armies. Those are Heiho and PETA (Pembela Tanah air) for army, Taiho for Navy. Their purpose is to support japanese armies to help defend and secure territory that japan conquer while the main japanese forces go to Guam and Midway. Also Kempetai (japanese ww2 secret police) are involved on training and recruiting.
There is absolutely NO question that MacArthur is/was one of the great captains of modern military history. Yet along with that came deep personal flaws. In his case a tendancy to actually believe in his own infallibility even when events proved otherwise... sometimes decisively. It was his last minute redeployment of American and Philippino forces to attempt a forward defense of the beaches that led to the debacle on Bataan. The original plan had called for a staged withdrawal to allow time for adequate food stocks and military stores to be transferred for a prolonged siege. At the last minute and berefit of aircover he suddenly tried to engage far forward of any of the planned phase lines. With few exceptions the Philippino auxilleries were utterly routed, his flank turned and an orderly planned withdrawal devolved into headlong rout sans supplies. From that point there could be no real hope of holding until the American Fleet arrived; with or without Pearl Harbor. And yet despite all the self-serving grandiosity; he truly did rally Australia. He really did much with very little thru 1943 and early 44. The problem is all the bodies that hit the ground in the course of keeping his image untarnished. To a degree he reminds me of Montgomery; always concerned with image; not so much at times as realities on the ground. He was the prima donna's; "prima donna". Roosevelt once remarked to a depply frustrated Marshall that he, Roosevelt, had created/participated in the MacArthur myth; and now they were, for better or worse, "Stuck with it". And MacArthur, being a very, very smart man and experienced political infighter was well aware of their dilemma, and took advantage of it whenever and where ever he could. Essentially he ran his own war with it's primary objective being to erase the stain on his honor that he felt his defeat in the Philippines had created. History is replete with "difficult" commanders; MacArthur is/was one of them.
it will be a series, I have quite some books myself (a few I showed in the Debriefing #2), which I hadn't time to look at yet, so I let my patreons vote on them.
Fair enough. I can't support you financially, since I'm a _hungry and unemployed_ historian, but I'd love to see, eventually, a similar document about Italy.
Sorry, I didn't really made myself clear. I meant documents written by German commands about Italy. Although an assesment of italians about the japaneses would be interesting, expecially considering the collaboration in arms industry before '39. I'll ask my contemporary-studying colleagues to look around.
One downside to fighting the way the Japanese did in WWII is that will make your enemies that can stand and fight respond to your fanatacicsm and brutality accordingly. In the long run it only hardened the American's resolve and led them to consider deploying more and more extreme methods to deal with Imperial Japan.
This is based on hindsight that the nuke would be developed and deployed. Otherwise the brutality and fanaticism served as a brilliant deterrence and forced the US to consider other means to do battle, despite the massive material superiority. If the nuke was not developed, how many casualties would the US consider acceptable before they are forced to agree to some of the Japanese demands for a negotiated peace such as the retention of the emperor? The Vietnamese would use this very concept to force the US to withdraw it's forces. Contempt of death can be a very strong force.
+Beauchamp Porkington+ Or it could have enraged the Americans so much that they would start simply annihilating their foe using ever more extreme methods (including the use of chemical and biological weapons) until they either surrendered, were wiped out or they starved to death. Let's also not forget that the Soviets would've also tried their hand at an invasion and they would have had absolutely no qualms about waging wholesale genocide to get compliance (especially with the level of fanatacicsm Japan tended to exhibit).
I keep hearing about how the Japanese were severely lacking in heavy artillery, but frankly it's general absence is warranted given the terrain/logistics of the Pacific Theater. The proliferation of low profile, light, easily manhandled pieces giving direct fire support (and sometimes smoke shells) against enemy positions gave the IJA a substantial advantage against everything that wasn't either a properly armored tank, or the massive fortresses at Port Arthur. The reliance on light battalion pieces worked in the Pacific theater, it worked in the Russo-Japanese War, it worked for numerous colonial powers, it worked well for the Prussians in the Franco-Prussian war, and was standard practice for most armies before then. Armies generally started to slow down and dig in when the average artillery piece exceeded the weight of the 1857 Canon obusier de 12 and the average soldier's full marching order exceeding 60lbs. The main weakness of light guns has always been return fire, especially from heavier pieces (provided they can be brought to bear and can observe and adjust for the target) but this weakness was mostly a problem in the European Theater, and not the Pacific or Colonial due to logistics and the proliferation of terrain cover that allowed the Battalion Pieces to get within small arms range on a remarkably common basis, negating any ranged defensive advantage the heavier pieces would have otherwise had.
Could you possibly do more videos on the Italian army, their were some diamonds in the rough like their Bersaglieri, Alpini, and Folgore were crack units and saw most of the only success the Italians had in the war
I have way too much stuff on everything else, additionally I speak German and not Italian. See my debriefing video to just get a glimpse on my primary sources in German or my patreon vote for the next source on #FromTheArchives
Military History for Adults Thanks for replying anyway I completely understand, your videos are incredibly detailed. I’m excited to see whatever you have in store next.
You probably already know this, but quite some time ago he did quite detailed assesment of why the Italians had such a hard time: ruclips.net/video/IqoOk5nZEKw/видео.html
+Military History not Visualized Considering you cant really broach other topics could you recommend someone trustworthy who does? I have found patriotism often makes people who analyze this period of history disregard reality.
How did the Japanese army stack up compared to the British army? I think that’s a much more apt comparison- Naval power vs Naval power. Not land power vs naval power.
Both forces fought for years in some of the most brutal terrain of the region. The British had to learn the hard way how to function at the end of a long supply chain being last in priority compared to the other theatres in Middle East/N Africa, Europe, etc. The Indian army was a vital part of this fight too which is often over looked as was the African troops deployed. By 1944 Slim had trained his army not to attack frontally but flank always. As an army if surrounded or flanked to form brigade boxes and fight as surrender meant death. Supply was by air and it worked wearing down their enemy. After the war the surviving Japanese generals who had fought there said Meiktila was the master stroke that broke them.
+Robs Small unit infiltrations were common at least on the eastern front. They mostly were aimed at capturing or destroying heavy equipment and taking prisoners with the aim of gaining intelligence and demoralizing the enemy. Still it wasnt a primary method of preparing an assault.
I think we saw how they stacked up on the Malay Peninsula... St least early. I would suggest looking up info on the Burma campaigns (the theatre of war my grandfather served in as a surgeon in the US Army)
The Japanese navy and army were a better force in my opinion, despite the numbers on paper favoring Britain. For example the Royal Navy had the most ships in the world before the start of the war, Japan 3rd, but Japan's was the most powerful simply because of their use of Kido Butai, and at one point had 10 carriers in one task force. Most countries only did 3 at most. Also Japan caused the greatest defeats in British military history. Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia.....Britain never really recovered from Japan like US did. Britain got pushed back all the way to India.
i am really into be a military historian someday and I wish you could be my professor haha, but its always very interesting, informative and exciting to watch your videos. sehr gute arbeit! bitte so weiter machen, danke!
Given that there wasn't a conflict that the U.S. was not involved in at the moment, I don't think that you'll get as an in-depth analysis. Sure, you could look at the equipment, but that's not a huge (it is a big one, though) portion.
4:25 Japan had a problem with getting enough planes and that is why they bought around 80 Breda Br20 bombers from Italy (the Ki21 Sally was just finishing prototype testing when the war started in 1937)
I like this new video topic/concept. I think that this can add some worthwhile insight into A) what particular groups thought at a certain point in time (and by extension, what led them to take the actions that they did); B) how well those historical assessments stood the test of time (hindsight).
Really interesting stuff! If you have, I would like to hear more of these assesments made from different countries intelligents offices vs other countries and specifically PRE-war assesments
Great video. Very interesting to hear some more in depth history about relations between allied nations in WW 2. Could you do a video about how the Germans viewed Finland and the Finnish forces before and during the Finnish conflicts? Also it would be interesting to hear German opinions about Italians who they were the closest to, but who could not fight without constant assistance.
Well Japan definitely thought well of Germany! I mean they pretty much modeled their military off of Prussia, and who can blame them Prussia is the best in terms of military dress, marches and discipline. They were both great allies, but Italy kind of dragged them down, and constantly got into trouble.
Italy didnt have the hardness of the ideology that Germany and Japan indoctrinated their people with. Less brainwashed people leads to less fanatic soldiers.
I think an issue with the Japanese military during the Second world war was the rivalry between the navy and land forces, a house divided cannot stand, and so a military divided cannot defeat an equal foe.
The Chinese 3rd, 6th, 9th, 14th, 36th, 87th, 88th, and Training Divisions were fully German-trained. The 88th gets most of the glory, closely followed by the 87th and 36th, but they were not at all the only ones. Other Chinese units were fairly good as well, such as the Tax Police Division (whose name belied their discipline and equipment), and the units fielded by the Ma Clique in Qinghai and Gansu provinces.
It's a super video. I love history channel on RUclips but most of them are about vulgarisation (it's not a bad thing) and I always fell like "Give me some primary sources"
Concerning the problems with the equipment: I read that the Japanese had some problems with the reliability of their combustion engines (armored cars and planes as well), which was later declared responsable for some misfortunes in battles. This had a profound impact on the generation of industrials after the war, where they emphasized quality and endurance as an utmost requirement - which in turn lead to the worldwide success of their car and technological industry in the years to come.
Thank you for your entire reliable information, motivation together with teaching to help support my journey to turning into more consciously aware in addition to spiritually connected.
Is there an English translation of "Oberkommando des Heeres: Erfahrungen und Betrachtungen aus dem japanisch-chinesischen Feldzug 1937/38, Berlin, 15. March 1938"?
Military History for Adults Respekt für deinen Kanal, den Erfolg hast du dir verdient. Denn du besprichst interessante Themen und wichtige Umstände welche ansonsten "nicht im Licht betrachtet werden".
Ok, this report is right after the Sino-Japanese War. Is there one right after Pearl Harbor and the fall of Singapore? Or are there any Germans left in Asia after that to do any report at all?
Can you translate the part which talks about Chinese forces? Also, does anyone have any resources how much intelligence Western powers received from China before 1941? The Japanese tore through the British and other western allies like a buzz saw in 1942 and I've never seen any indication that the British or the Americans took Chinese warnings about Japanese capabilities seriously.
The German military had really influenced and trained the military of many nations: -Japan ( the Imperial Japanese army) -China (National Revolutionary army/KMT army) -Turkey (Ottoman Empire army before & during WW1) -Argentina -US (During the US war of independence, the US continental army was trained by a Prussian German officer) Feel free to comment and provide list of other nations, if I seem to forgot some.
Weiter so immer sehr interesant deine clips. Und endlich mal zumindest ein teil auf deutsch. Hoffe das kommt jetzt öffters mal vor. Wie wäre es denn wenn du noch einen kanal für dein deutschsprachiges puplikum machst würde bestimmt deine deutschsprachigen zuschauer sehr begeistern die geschichtsinteressiert sind.
sehr unwahrscheinlich war ursprünglich zweisprachig geplant, aber die Nachteile für einen deutschsprachigen Kanal sind meiner Meinung zuviele und zu groß.
Military History not Visualized To read tat is a littelbit sad but anyway i hope you go on an make still your good contend ;-) you do a pretty good work
only tangentially related, prior to Barbarossa (but after Khalkhin Gol), a Japanese army and navy delegation traveled across the Soviet Union to visit Germany. Hitler welcomed the delegation in a big party, well publicized. The Japanese delegation were then given tours of important military projects. The one thing Yamashita wanted to learn about was radar, but the German tour guided steered away from this (not sure if this was by direction from Hitler or some level below). One day Yamashita and the army delegation showed up at a radar facility unannounced. The local boss had seen the press reports and assumed this was sanctioned, giving a full show and tell. Later the German host discretely suggested that the Japanese delegation return home. Yamashita took the hint and did so. The navy delegation was having a great time in Germany, did not get the hint. So after June 22, they had to take the long way home by sea (submarine?)
If you haven't done so already can you tell us how many pilots each country had each year and how many would be in the air at once? I can find information on how many planes were built but there is no way that there are many pilots as planes.
It appeared they also didn't take into account the fact that the whole world would have massive increases in tonnage of shipping to support war fighting capacity. The German navy, the US Navy both used submarines as commerce raiders. For some reason the Japanese didn't consider their subs as commerce raiders, why?
Hitler wished his wehrmacht has the tenacity of the japanese armed forces. Fight til last man standing and never surrender. Unfortunately, millions of his forces surrendered to the allies more did than japan.
Great video. This was before the Russians defeated the Japanese in 1939. Did the Germans assess that battle? Did they have advisers there? Will you do a video/s? on those conflicts? Do you know what the talk between Germany and Japan was in the fall of 1941??? You might consider siting at a desk with a LARGE map of the area/ battle you are talking about. A pointer highlighting each area would be omg great.
As always it seems like I am late to the party. My most recent work in German is Bismark's which is an edition from the late 1800's in the old style print font. I also have an English translation of Clausewitz's discussion of the German General Staff. Could you possibly make some recommendations for German versions of worthwhile assessments of the Imperial and Later German Military forces. I will readily admit that I seldom keep track of the sources that you cite in your various videos. From time to time I go back and dig them out, but almost never get around to actually attempting to acquire them. Nor, have I kept my listings of Used Bookstores in Niedersachsen from 35 years ago up-to-date. As always a great video. Thanks.
Most foreign perspectives on Japanese aircraft were based on the well publicized actions in China and Manchuria. There, the planes involved were Ki-27 (and its contemporaries and friends); light, slow, spatted, planes more appropriate to the 1920s and '30s. These were, in the main, equipped with twin rifle caliber Machine Guns, making them as lightly armed as WW1 Pursuit planes. Pretty tough to shoot down a P40 in one of those . . . but it happened.
I found his information regarding,Germany impressions of Japan military capacities . However,, he indicated that Impressions revealed, were that if Japan was actually was location within Europe their successes with military capacity would be inferior. My question is that what then was the rationale for Japan defeating Russia in 1905? which resulting in Japan destruction of Russia military ships? Russia being located within Europe?
As my mastery of German language has badly decayed during the decades since my school years (as well as my hearing), I would have appreciated a display of the conclusion text (in German). I tend to think I still can read German adequately, especially as the text remains on screen if I pause, while the spoken words don’t. A display of the text should not have been too difficult, as there were other text overlays throughout.
10:00 Oh, like "research-based best practices of assessment-driven culturally-relevant student-oriented pedagogy" or "differentiated graphic organizers for scaffolding diverse learners" in my field. ... ^ Translated, this means tests & worksheets.
Yes, it's actually disgraceful to see how a corrupt Government told it's people, that the reason they were poor it's because they had a few poor immigrants among them. Also quite interesting to see how fighting a war and occupying enemy territory works for small countries, with extremely limited or non-existent military resources.
If i remember the name well, it was the japanese navy pilot Saburo Sakagi that pointed to one of the problems in japanese army/navy. From 1000 candidates for navy pilots, only under 20 graduated as one. Insane level of excelence, in the end of the war they still had aircraft but all pilots were gone
That applies to every elite-formation. SAS-veteran and fresh recruit with three weeks of military training are equally vulnerable to bullets and recover from injuries about as fast.
Thats how it is in the current US air force's selection process, if anything it is stricter. Of 1000 candidates, only 70 will be accepted to go onto Officer training school And of those 70 and only 7 would be granted a pilot/rated slot. Only 3 of those 7 would fly a fighter.
i am thinking the british/american were unprepared like what saladin reply to his distractors,how many battles did u won before i came,it is because u were unprepared.
The Germans were aware of what happened in Port Arthur in 1904, which caused Germany, Russia to revisit their tactics because no one expected the Japanese to oust the Russians. Some say the Tsar of Russia was weakened because of it. 8000 dead to capture a hill... en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Port_Arthur#Battle_of_203_Meter_Hill
Japanese Imperial Army was caught by budget limits by the needs of the Navy and the national resources stretch by the Great Depression. It caused programs to rearm the army to be longer to get equipment and upgrade their units
![BLACK BAG - Official Trailer [HD] - Only in Theaters March 14](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/Du0Xp8WX_7I/mqdefault.jpg)
First. :D
MHV asked me to expand on a few things he mentions in the video.
Re: Japanese air services equipment
The IJAAS had been caught in the middle of a big push for modernization that left them fighting with a lot of out-dated kit at the start of the so-called China Incident. This was particularly true regarding their bomber fleet, which was badly obsolete in mid-1937. The Ki-21 was finishing up development, but the need for modern bombers was so high that the Army purchased Italian Br. 20s as a stopgap. The IJNAS was in better shape technologically, though it hadn't really trained to "attack a continent" as the late historian Mark Peattie entitled his chapter on the subject. That being said, there was a lot of legacy equipment still soldiering on in front line units as new production chugged along, particularly the carrier-based attack aircraft and dive bombers.
Re: Japanese tank development
Weight restrictions due to shipping concerns was certainly one factor. More importantly, the Japanese were getting all the performance out of the tanks that they wanted. The Type 95 Ha-Go was a perfectly adequate light tank by the standards of the mid-1930s, and the Type 97 Chi-Ha was a reasonable medium by the standards of that same period. The Type 89 I-Go, a design dating back to 1929, was still chugging along as well and performed well in China. Nomonhan shocked the Japanese into some further armour development, leading to the 47mm AT gun and Chi-Ha Kai in 1942. Japanese armour development was slow since scarce resources were diverted to aircraft and ship production. The Japanese were satisfied with the Chi-Ha Kai's performance against Stuarts, which the Japanese assumed would continue to be deployed as the main armoured strength of the US in amphibious operations. The appearance of M4s was a nasty shock. By the time the Japanese started a crash program of tank modernization, it was too late. The programs didn't start to bear fruit until late 1944-45. In short, the Ha-Go and Chi-Ha were not bad tanks for when they were designed. However, they were obsolescent by 1939 and horrifically obsolete by 1945.
Re: Setting a false standard for judging the IJA
Overall, the IJA was not a match for a European army in the context of Europe: narrow frontages, high force-to-space ratios, and relatively forgiving logistics. The problem, as John Ferris notes in his study of British intelligence assessments of the IJA before WWII, is that many observers judged the Japanese by a set of fallacies he calls the "paper standard" and the "first-class power." In short, the British would mentally transplant the IJA from where they would actually fight it over to the battlefields of Europe:
"The circumstances which they envisaged centred on narrow fronts and dense quantities of men and material, where soldiers skilled in deliberate operations would eat alive enemies adopting the tactics of the I.J.A. Elsewhere the diner might become dinner."
The environment of Southeast Asia was decidedly not Northeast France. Hence why the IJA held up as well as it did, even in the face of overwhelming firepower it took a lot of effort to dislodge them.
Justin Pyke What about Japanese tanks like the Chi-Nu and the Chi-He. They weren't used that much in combat but they seem like really good tanks.
Neither saw combat, they were held back in defence of the Home Islands. The Chi-He would have been a good tank design if it had entered service in 1941, early 1942 at the latest. It didn't enter production until 1943-44. By that point it was already obsolete (47mm gun and maximum 50mm of armour). The Chi-Nu was a reasonable vehicle, but hardly state-of-the-art by 1944, when it entered production. The Chi-Nu II, Chi-To, Chi-Ri, and other very late-war designs were much better but still weren't going to blow anybody's socks off. That being said they would have certainly given M4s problems. At that point you are well into 1945 and the Japanese had bigger problems than how capable their new tanks were.
Shadow Gamera The Chi Nu would have seen service if Operation Downfall had been launched, and while it had potential, it came far too late to be very relevant at all. -Yes, I read that incorrectly at first-
Shadow Gamera they weren’t used at all. They were decent tanks but nothing spectacular. You have to understand that in the environment the Japanese were fighting in, large German style tanks would be more of a hindrance than anything. Imagine trying to drive a tiger tank through Saipan.
Another factor in Japan's tank development was that during their early campaigns they didn't run up against much anti-tank capability so that made the tanks they had more than adequate for their needs. It wasn't until later in the war when they started to fight the Allies (particularly the US) in earnest that they realized that their tanks were no longer adequate.
The Japanese did come up with one innovation in aviation, the counter sunk rivet. It lowered drag considerably and every nation has adopted this practice.
Charles Ward Hall of the Hall-Aluminum Aircraft Corporation submitted a patent for a flush rivet in 1926. Hall’s company in Buffalo, New York produced the XFH Naval Fighter Prototype the first aircraft designed with a flush riveted fuselage. The first aircraft with butt joints and flush rivets to fly was the Hall PH flying boat of 1929.
The most famous early aircraft to use flush rivets and butt joints is Howard Hughes' H-1 racer in September of 1935, but it wasn't the first. Incidentally, both the Focke-Wulf 190 and the Mitsubishi Zero-Sen appear to have their design genesis in the H-1 although both Kurt Tank and Jiro Horikoshi denied this.
As it turned out, flush rivets only slightly improved aerodynamic efficiency at low altitudes. As airplanes flew and fought at higher altitudes, the effect of flush rivets and other streamlining diminished due to the thinner (rarified) air.
Also 6 point harnesses but i guess its not as decisive
I don’t understand a word of German but I listen to everything at the end.
lol,
Well English started off as German, a slight variation of German that was altered with Latin and other languages over the time. Ich/I, mein/mine-my, feuer/fire some examples that really haven’t changed. Funny what a couple hundred years of separation will do to a language, he’ll look at modern English in all of the countries it’s spoken in, while still the same the idioms and slang are vastly different and may seem like a separate language. I believe the same is for quite a few other languages.
Ach, Junge. So schwierig ist es nicht. They're sister languages, after all. After a year of high school German, I more or less taught myself...to read the language, anyway. I did have to live and work there for half a year in order to learn to speak it properly, but you don't really need to strive for a native accent, which most Americans can't seem to acquire in any case. Just get some intro-level books and you'll be on your way. Erich Kaestner is perfect for this. Pretty sure that Emil und die Detektiven is still in print...
Yeah I love my language
@@hattrick8684 english didn't 'start off as german' but they are both descended from a common ancestor language.
"And the Japanese had a Navy and they had an airforce and they also had two air forces."
Made me laugh
From everything I've read, the Japanese Imperial Army & Navy did not like one another, did not coordinate or work with one another very well, and therefore developed their own air forces (hence why there were 2 of them).
😄
@@tyree9055 I believe that came over a feud for resources because Japanese iron quality is not good mainly when it came to large thing like boats and tanks.( fun fact most of the steel used in Japan boats was actually purchased from the United States)
It's because Japan did not believe in Combined Arms as far as the command structure went. Hence why you had issues of Japanese Marines ignoring Army commands in the Pacific.
@@tyree9055 The problems was that it was not simply the rivalry between different branches of the armed forces. IJA and IJN were also political rivals in the struggle for power. Neither of them reported to the Prime Minister, but instead reported directly to the Emperor. During the period between 2 world wars, Assassinations of IJA and IJN members, as well as politicians were so common that Admiral Yamamoto felt safer when he was on the sea.
The Chinese Nationalist and Communist armies were also fighting each other as well and some War Lords. A united Chinese military may have proven more difficult.
Yes, and even with their internal fighting and bickering with war lords they still held up half of the Imperial Japanese Army during the entire war and caused close a million dead Japanese. As such their contribution to defeat Japan during WWII has been cruelly overlooked.
Well, the Chinese army is united today or should I say people's liberation army. Trained educated and well equipped.
binaway 👍
Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) hated each other so much that they were on the verge of fighting each other in the late 1930s. In order to avoid internal fightings they needed outside enemies, firstly China and later the British Empire (Aussies, Canadians, Kiwis and loyal Indians inclusive), the USA and the Dutch East Indies.
@@jasonlay9492 hahaha no.... they are losing to india
U should discuss the meeting of German U boots with Japanese Navy in the eastern Indian ocean for resupply and that this was uncomfortable to say the least. There were cultural issues.
Chili Prepper do you have any more info on this exchange? I’d like to read up on it
I would like to read on this too. I read about the Japanese and German submarines a few times going to both respective countries but only very minor detail.
So far as I have read there were no intercultural interactions and thus no intercultural problems; however, the stationing of U-Boats at Penang was a reaction to the Japanese lackluster performance and indifference to the Indian ocean. So a strategic conflict of resources and interests maybe but not a cultural one.
Ann Onymous
Maybe cultural is not the right word. Let me go so far to say that my understand was that Japanese sailors were less than comfortable working were Europreans. Note this after Japan defeats of English and Dutch colonies.
Why would Germany complain about Japan's inaction. After the 1942 raid by Japan, Britain had to leave Ceylon. Throughout 1942 and 1943, Allied shipping in the Indian Ocean was minimal. In fact it was the Allies that resorted to submarine attacks in the Indian ocean.
The Allies worried enough that they attacked Madagascar. In 1944, Japan raided the Indian Ocean again when allied presence increased.
I think the best summary of the Japanese Army is that its arms were state-of-the-art for the early 1920s. This means light machineguns, Brandt-type mortars, light tanks, and other weapons everyone else adopted following WW1. What sets the Japanese Army apart is that they never updated their arsenals significantly beyond that. Even when they adopted newer weapons, they tended to be designs that had more in common with the designs of the mid-1920s than the late 1930s.
It is ironic considering how Japanese aeronautical and naval engineers proved to be among the best in the world while their army arsenals couldn't progress much beyond the work of Nambu despite his best efforts to instill an innovative culture in the system.
Incidentally, Nambu's impact on Japanese arms manufacturing would be a great topic for MHV.
The Japanese Army was state of the art even by 1940, having one of the most effective LMGs, a unique and excellent grenade launcher, and otherwise serviceable rifles (really only the US had semi-automatic rifles, and this made up for the inferiority of the BAR). The Chi-Ha series of tanks were very adaptable, the Shinhoto upgrade in particular is unique in being the only pre 1940 tank that had a 3-man turret, diesel engines, high velocity cannon and sloped armour.
Their major failings were the lack of a suitable SMG (Japanese did some minor experimentation but production was stalled). And general inferiority in artillery, which is perhaps understandable given the primitive nature of Japanese industry. However many of these problems were also shared by other world class powers, such as the British who also did not have a serviceable SMG, and the US who lacked modern artillery pieces, although both of them were able to rectify their problems quickly.
The issue is that infantry small arms were not the decisive weapons of war in 1940 anymore than they had been in 1916 or 1924. Artillery, tanks, and aircraft were what allowed infantry to perform in WW2. Japanese tanks had more in common with the Renault FT than the Panzerkampfwagen IV, a truly modern tank in 1940 which also happened to have a three-man turret. Japanese artillery lacked the weight, range, and numbers to contest European powers in any meaningful way. Japan had no practical anti-tank weapons despites having the Soviet Union as a primary threat, and they struggled to even harm the weakest of American tanks, let alone the much more powerful ones that inevitably came. Be it against the Soviet Union in Manchuria, the Americans in the Pacific islands, or the British Empire in Burma and New Guinea, the Japanese were outgunned and the results were bloody for the Japanese.
They had comparable AT weapons to other major powers in 1940. A 37mm gun, a 47mm gun developed after Khalkin Ghol, and various heavy AA guns comparable to the 88 FlaK that can be used for the AT role.
The PzkfIV was a very wanting vehicle until the Ausf F in 1941 where it acquired the long 75mm and imporved armour protection. By the standards of 1940, the Chi-Ha Shinhoto stands out as particularily innovative. Comparing Japanese tanks to the renault shows a very poor understanding of Japanese military capabilities.
Rather the issue is that in the South Pacific, these heavy pieces were obviously not carried through dense jungle foilage. Likewise it would be foolish to issue limited stocks of weaponry to island garrisons that could not be resupplied. Following 1944, the Japanese brought all that they could to the homeland in order to fight an expect American invasion. Nevetherless the cut-down Kwangtung army fought an effective fighting retreat, namely at Mutanchiang where they held off the Soviets allowing the vast majority of IJA formations to escape.
Oh Puhleeze.... The Japanese Army didn't design around the South Pacific. They didn't even want to BE in the South Pacific. Their AO by an order of magnitude was the asian mainland. Period. Full Stop. Their "innovative design" was completely outclassed by early 42 and was NEVER DEVELOPED. Why?? Because the Chinese Army had neither tanks or large numbers of anti-tank guns that would have forced the Japanese to continue to develop it. Which is why what anti-tank guns the IJA did produce were small in caliber and number. The Japanese Army was deeply conservative, un-educated, and rigid in both outlook and doctrine. It's officer ranks were filled navy rejects and it's senior NCO development consisted of "whose the biggest most vicious thug in the unit",. Innovation wasn't discouraged... it was anathema. Blind loyalty and fanatical obedience coupled with brutal dicipline were it's hallmarks. It disdained manuever so who needs commo, it ignored casualties so ditto on a medical corps It had plenty of superb tube artillery available in easily adapted naval guns , but that would have required inter service cooperation and TRAINED artillery crews, oh, and commo to direct fires. It claimed as virtues all it's myriad vices and all you can come up with is the "Nambu". In the end they either died sealed in their caves or running straight ahead into BELT FED machine guns lashed by medium and heavy artillery. Which while regrettable for their poor infinately abused common soldiers; was completely fitting for their pig ignorant sword waving officers and their sadistic NCOs.
The Chi-Ha was developed with an unchanged chassis into the Chi-He and Chi-Nu. The chassis was enlarged for the prototype Chi-To and Chi-Ri, all of which more or less roughly kept pace with contemporary militaries, although naturally production was not prioritised.
Naval artillery is not easily adapted into ground based tube artillery at all. The high pressure and APC shells required of naval artillery is very poorly suited towards ground artillery which requires blast effect.
Heavy emphasis was placed on manoeuvre as is evidenced in Japanese offensives in China, Malaysia, Phillipines and the South Pacific. Although the Japanese, lacking shells, frequently opted to use men in it's stead for frontal assaults when manoeuvre was not an option. Frankly the US had much to learn here considering their constant face first hammering into defensive positions.
The armies of any nation, past and present, and made up of inane old bastards without a hint of creativity. It's why they were promoted. The Japanese were no less worse then anyone else, and showed capacity to adapt to the situation, as well as having some smart cookies along with the imbeciles. Their great failing was a lack of industry and fuel for their ambitions.
The best NCO's typically are of the thuggish sort, certainly among those that subscribe to the Sandhurst school. And although your claim of there being a extraordinary number of naval officer rejects is asinine, as the IJA held it's own officer's schools and focused recruitment in entirely different demographics, it at least correlates with the 90% rejection rate of the notoriously picky IJN.
Otherwise you seem to be mistaking massive numerical superiority, overwhelming artillery, abundance of supplies, air and naval dominance as being marks against the Japanese Army, who were obviously stupid in charging against our machineguns or being pummeled into the ground by artillery. Completely ignoring that when the shoe was on the other foot, US and British troops were being completely thrashed despite outnumbering the enemy. I'd much like to see how long the US army holds up on Peleliu or Iwo Jima given the same odds. They'd probably throw in the towel as soon as the enemy hits the beach as they did in Guam.
I enjoy this channel more than your main channel tbh the off script viewpoint really adds to the perspective
yeah, the idea is that here I add more "personal" stuff, whereas "personal" has several meanings: 1) more experiences, e.g., memoirs or combat reports, 2) more primary source reports like this one, 3) summaries and/or introduction to topics that have a lesser information-density than my Visualized Episodes, 4) personal Hands On videos, e.g., Museums, etc. and 5) interviews etc. although the later two might also add up on my main channel, like the Interview with Chieftain.
I definitely prefer this format.
Thank you for your videos. You show greater academic knowledge and effort than many other channels which may be also very good. But yours is unique because it’s very professional.
A suggestion - Do a series on each major country's assessments on its allies and enemies. This one was extremely fascinating! Thank you!
The Chinese had employed the Germans to help them train there army. I belive one of the German officers died leading the men he had been training, against the Japanese in Shanghai.
true, my maternal grandpa was an advicer to Chian Kai-shek during the time of Sino-German cooperation.
The irony
I wish I could, my aunt has the family archive and I have to ask her for pics and data first.
Yep, we also were close allies with china and actually had some animosities with the japanese. In the end the war brought us into a marriage of reason, not love with the japanese. China simply wasn't ready for war and we needed someone to eather flank the russians or stop the americans from keeping effectively beaten enemies in the war by resupplying them. with china eventually turning communist, sadly all ties have been untill rather recently severed, eventhough we had been quite close before the war.
Japan actually urged Germans to stop aiding us Chinese, claiming that they felt as if they were engaging the Wehrmacht.
The Japanese aircraft were very good, generally, if a bit fragile.
The Yamato could sink the Bismark well before the Bismark could get into range.
The Japanese tanks were tin cans. Their artillery was good, but limited in numbers.
The war in the Pacific was to the death, after the first few months. It was a giant meat grinder.
Iwo Jima is smaller than the Dallas Fort Worth Airport. 29,000 men died there in 36 days.
In my words. The Japanese military especially the army adapted to fight certain enemies in certain environments like with all industrialized nations. They were designed to respond to the arms race with their surrounding neighbors. The Japanese army just happened to be designed to fight in very mountainous and heavily forested areas so their equipment was designed for that. The army wasn’t in need for this arms race as their equipment did just fine against their enemies at the time while the navy had to respond to the western powers and at the same time received the lions share of the research and development department. Same with the Germans. They had to respond to the arms race with Russia especially when it came to tanks. You could say that the German tank program was all thanks to the Soviets and their counter program. So if the Japanese army had to respond to fighting say in the steppes with the soviet army, it would force them to change their army strategy and equipment. But it’s really hard especially as an island nation with very little resources and with those little resources that you have, you have branches of the military fighting for what little you have.
The Japanese did frequently fight the Soviets in innumerable border skirmishes, usually winning. The 2 major incidents would be the battle of Lake Khasan and Khalkin Ghol. At Lake Khasan, the Soviets occupied a defensible hill on Japanese claimed territory which they quickly fortified, the Japanese captured the hill utilising nighttime infiltration and proceeded to defend it against a soviet counter-attack including tanks until a diplomatic settlement lead to the region being demilitarised. Khalkin Ghol, after a series of skirmishes the Japanese escalated the situation by sending two reinforced divisions along with tank battalions across the Khalkin Ghol river in a anticipated pincer movement over the built up soviet forces. This was met and counterattacked by soviet forces upon which it degenerated into a stalemate, until Zhukov received sufficient reinforcements for a major offensive which managed to surround the Japanese. The Japanese failed repeated attempts to break out, and ultimately agreed to a ceasefire.
Following these battles, the Japanese did correctly deduce that although they held superiority in airpower and had superior troops, their tanks and artillery were inadequate, and that they lacked the industrial capacity to face the soviets in a prolonged war (One artillery officer mentioning the soviets firing more shells in a single day then the Japanese did the entire battle). The IJA did respond curiously with plans to increase motorisation and fairly interesting armour designs, however lack of funding and resources lead the to IJA to double down on "spiritual mobilisation" and forced it to attempt to make up material inferiority with spiritual will.
Mmm, no, and on Khasan and Khalkhin-Gol the Japanese suffered a crushing defeat and realized that they could not win a war against the USSR
JustPersonOfTheWorld 20 A bit of a myth. It was a undersized Japanese attack that had no approval from high command. They were granted limited air support and basically ran headlong into a trap where they would be outnumbered 2:1 in material and troop count so ofc they had no chance. However, going off this to predict what would happen in a general war is rather sketchy, and unsurpisingly many Japanese officers did not draw the conclusion that the Soviets were too well defended, rather they felt that the whole engagement was a debacle where a unit clumsly stumbled into a hopelessly bad tactical sitaution.
You can correctly argue that the soviets possessed more advanced weapons and a better doctine in some respects, but from the Japanese perspective, a large land war was still a real option. They and the Ha-Go plan, and after Operation Barbarossa, they nearly launched plan Kantokuen; kind of why I think the signifigance of the border skrimishes is severely overstated. The real reason why these plans never materialized was due to shortages in Japanese oil (just months left before reserves depleted) and other vital resources blocked off by American sanctions. Furthermore, the Americans were clearly preparing for a decisive first strike agaisnt the Japanese in Joint board plan 355, which is why they had heavy strategic bombers stationed in the _Pacific_ bases. Of course, the American war plans were washed over by Japans own surprise strike in 1941, in which the Japanese rushed south for resource-rich Dutch territories in the hopes of relieving their doomed war economy. All of this instead of attacking Siberia, which was, at the time, lacking in infrastructure and had no such industry whatsoever in which the Japanese could benefit from.
TL:DR - Attacking Soviet siberia was no longer a viable option with ticking time bomb of a eventual resource shortage. And he Japanese didn't really have the resources fight two giants, so the IJN was given priorty, leaving the IJA to be even more frugal.
I believe it also involved for the first time in their military history, the burning of regimental colors to avoid capture... good practise for the next 6 years...
If by crushing defeat, you mean a Japanese division attacked across a river into fortified soviet positions, captured their objective, then were counterattacked and surrounded by soviets who were reinforced by 3 times their number in infantry and artillery, 5 times as many tanks, twice as many aircraft. And still somehow managed to inflict more casualties then they lost.
And Khasan was where the Japanese effectively humiliated a Soviet Armoured division with an unsupported infantry regiment.
The Japanese were excellent at the regimental (tactical) level and below. Above that, not so much. They lacked what modern western armies took for granted in divisional and above formations. Starting with heavy artillery and communications and specialist formations on call, but more importantly the "S" staff structure. Personnel S-1, Intel S-2, Ops S-3, and most importantly S-4 Logistics. The roles existed but the over-whelming emphasis and path to promotion was exclusively combat command. As a result professional development was almost non-existent and officers assigned to non-combat admin slots were considered inferior and many were in fact cast-offs, failures and/or political place holders. If anything the Sr. NCO picture was even worse. Basically the successful Japanese Army NCO was one who was unquestioning in obedience and enforced discipline through sheer mindless brutality. Employed against a disorganized and poorly equipped Chinese army indifferently commanded by casualty averse warlords, the hyper-aggressive tactical employment of Japanese Army units could and did run rampant. Yet time and again lack of the ability to logistically sustain strategic offensives would allow shattered Chinese formations to slip away to be re-routed another day. The lack of heavy long range artillery and battlefield mobility made it all the easier for hardy Chinese peasants to "outwalk" their pursuers.
There's also no question that the early successes the Japanese enjoyed at the outset of the wider war, post Dec. 1941 was due in large part to facing meager European colonial garrisons ill-supplied and poorly equipped and above all lacking air cover. Singapore and Burma were the result more of poor leadership and collapsing morale than actual Japanese combat efficiency. In the Philippines, against an isolated but determined American garrison, the Japanese floundered and suffered heavy casualties until reinforcements coupled with declining US ability to resist, absent relief, finally turned the tide. It should be noted that in the end, the Japanese insisted Wainwright surrender ALL American forces in the Philippines, not just those on Leyte. The Japanese Army had no desire to fight another protracted campaign/s throughout the islands, particularly against prepared American forces on Mindanao.
Once the tide of war turned during the Solomon's campaign the Japanese proved as fanatical in defense as they were hyper-aggressive in attack. Still it took them until 45 and the Okinawa campaign to recognize the need for a more flexible defensive strategy. It's thus unsurprising that the stalemate along the Shuri Line was ended only after the Japanese Deputy Commander insisted on a major counter-attack that exposed and effectively wiped out Japanese combat power defending the line; and caused it's premature collapse ( a smaller scale oriental version of the ultimate results of the Ardennes Offensive ). Proving sometimes old dogs get tired of "new tricks" and prefer a "blaze of glory" over grinding, yet effective attritional strategies.
Lastly the Japanese Army Officer Corp was from a national standpoint, the "leftovers", ie. Naval rejects. They were much less educated than their Naval counterparts and were drawn mainly from rural provinces. They were deeply conservative in outlook and tended to rigidity in response to rapidly changing events on the battlefield. To them "The Plan" was "The Plan" was "The Plan"; no exceptions and the go-to solution to any setback was to throw more men at the problem. Defeat was preferable to spontaneous deviation, that might after all, still end in defeat.
In conclusion, while their navy in the short term was clearly the match of any western power in terms of equipment, tactics and training; the Japanese Army despite initial success was not. Unyielding fanaticism covered a multitude of sins; but in the end even that facade began to crack. What few Americans know about Okinawa was it saw the first significant Japanese surrenders. By the end of the battle over 5,000 Japanese soldiers had laid down their arms. Perhaps proving attritional warfare cuts both ways and fanatical indoctrination and institutional brutality eventually reach their limits.... and maybe, just maybe, dying for the Emperor isn't strictly necessary or desirable in the end.
On reflection in terms of equipment and structure of components... I think the closest WW2 European analog is the Rumanians. The divisional components and capabilities are really close in both infantry and even "armor". Although I don't think the Japanese really ever had an "Armored Division" per se. The divisional and corps asset distribution is darn close to identical. And to be clear I'm talking force structure and command level training, NOT morale or motivation. Also the Red Army gave high marks to the individual courage of both Japanese and Rumanian individual soldiers; but thought their equipment and above all leadership to be deficient.
For an excellent account/analysis of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese Army after the Solomon's Campaign I highly recommend "Implacable Foes: The War in the Pacific 1944-45" by Waldo Heinrichs and Marc Gallicchio; available on Amazon KIndle.
When you'll mention a book, as "Implacable Foes: The War in the Pacific 1944-45", don't forget to mention the author.
Waldo Heinrichs and Marc Gallicchio, hows that for a multi-cultural mouthful. It's a very well balanced account that goes far deeper than just the military aspects of the war. It's examination of American re-deployment issues, both in terms of morale and logistics is eye-opening. It also makes clear that by 1945 the Japanese people were deeply disillusioned with the war and would have welcomed an end to it on practically any terms by the fall of 44.
Also while I thought it difficult to think any less of Douglass MacArthur than I already did; his grandstanding, credit stealing, scheming insubordination and outright lying to Allied peers and superiors was far, far worse than anything I ever imagined. You begin to think he was put in charge of Japanese occupation to keep him as far as possible from the rest of the army for as long as possible. He literally destroyed the 6th Army under Krueger by insisting on the liberation of every square inch of the Philippines and then absolutely lied/falsified it's readiness status as relates to Olympic/Coronet/Downfall. He planned to just skim off the cream of all the units and troops being transferred from Europe with no questions asked... Well Marshall wasn't buying it for a heartbeat and was in the process of dispatching a 3 Star IG to get answers when Hiroshima happened. It makes for truly fascinating and incredibly well sourced informative reading. It's one of those books that really spotlights "the things you didn't know, you didn't know. A variation of Rumsfelds "Unknown/Unknowns.....But by far the worst thing he did, MacArthur ( I say this as a combat vet), was when the discharge point system came out.... He friggin ignored it... he said that basically it didn't apply to his troops and did everything in his power to delay and hinder it's application. To me personally, that's just unforgivable. Period. Full stop.
Thank's for the data. Seems pretty interesting book. Concerning Douglass McArthur, I must say I'm surprised by your really bad opinion on him. I assume he was put in command of Southwest Pacific Theatre mainly for propagandistic and morale boosting reasons, after his escape from Bataan was turned into epic story by American media. But, well, morale and psicology are crucial aspects in a war that have to be adressed from the strategic perspective of those at top command level. So that decision taken by Marshall or, perhaps, by Roosevelt himself, must be understood. Apart from McArthur's actual performance during the war, I think we should not underestimate his work after the war rebuilding Japan's infrastructure and industry, unless you think this is another case of credit stealing.
During japanese occupation in my country (Indonesia), the japanese are actively recruit locals for their armies.
Those are Heiho and PETA (Pembela Tanah air) for army, Taiho for Navy. Their purpose is to support japanese armies to help defend and secure territory that japan conquer while the main japanese forces go to Guam and Midway. Also Kempetai (japanese ww2 secret police) are involved on training and recruiting.
There is absolutely NO question that MacArthur is/was one of the great captains of modern military history. Yet along with that came deep personal flaws. In his case a tendancy to actually believe in his own infallibility even when events proved otherwise... sometimes decisively. It was his last minute redeployment of American and Philippino forces to attempt a forward defense of the beaches that led to the debacle on Bataan. The original plan had called for a staged withdrawal to allow time for adequate food stocks and military stores to be transferred for a prolonged siege. At the last minute and berefit of aircover he suddenly tried to engage far forward of any of the planned phase lines. With few exceptions the Philippino auxilleries were utterly routed, his flank turned and an orderly planned withdrawal devolved into headlong rout sans supplies. From that point there could be no real hope of holding until the American Fleet arrived; with or without Pearl Harbor.
And yet despite all the self-serving grandiosity; he truly did rally Australia. He really did much with very little thru 1943 and early 44. The problem is all the bodies that hit the ground in the course of keeping his image untarnished. To a degree he reminds me of Montgomery; always concerned with image; not so much at times as realities on the ground. He was the prima donna's; "prima donna". Roosevelt once remarked to a depply frustrated Marshall that he, Roosevelt, had created/participated in the MacArthur myth; and now they were, for better or worse, "Stuck with it". And MacArthur, being a very, very smart man and experienced political infighter was well aware of their dilemma, and took advantage of it whenever and where ever he could. Essentially he ran his own war with it's primary objective being to erase the stain on his honor that he felt his defeat in the Philippines had created. History is replete with "difficult" commanders; MacArthur is/was one of them.
Great video, I love learning from primary sources like this
I like the presentation coz it's got no irritating shite patronising 'music's polluting it
Fantastic. (As an historian myself) I would love to see more of these documents read and commented. Keep it up!
it will be a series, I have quite some books myself (a few I showed in the Debriefing #2), which I hadn't time to look at yet, so I let my patreons vote on them.
Fair enough. I can't support you financially, since I'm a _hungry and unemployed_ historian, but I'd love to see, eventually, a similar document about Italy.
I don't speak Italian, so this will probably never happen, besides I have loads of German documents.
Sorry, I didn't really made myself clear. I meant documents written by German commands about Italy. Although an assesment of italians about the japaneses would be interesting, expecially considering the collaboration in arms industry before '39. I'll ask my contemporary-studying colleagues to look around.
This is a topic I have often wondered about, nice that you brought it up!
Best military History channel on RUclips without a doubt!
>episode came out today
>pinned comment was posted a week ago
Welp
I should have just written "first."
yeah, I have to upload everything earlier to get my videos reviewed without my patreons: www.patreon.com/mhv I probably would have closed by now.
btw. Justin, you can edit your first comment and add PS: First, that would also give it some extra flair.
Ah. I see. That makes sense, wasnt thinking about that.I initially thought there was some bug again.
Military historian strategizing to score flair points on a youtube comment section. This is an interesting development.
One downside to fighting the way the Japanese did in WWII is that will make your enemies that can stand and fight respond to your fanatacicsm and brutality accordingly. In the long run it only hardened the American's resolve and led them to consider deploying more and more extreme methods to deal with Imperial Japan.
Like Nukes.
Nukes on women and children.
This is based on hindsight that the nuke would be developed and deployed. Otherwise the brutality and fanaticism served as a brilliant deterrence and forced the US to consider other means to do battle, despite the massive material superiority.
If the nuke was not developed, how many casualties would the US consider acceptable before they are forced to agree to some of the Japanese demands for a negotiated peace such as the retention of the emperor?
The Vietnamese would use this very concept to force the US to withdraw it's forces. Contempt of death can be a very strong force.
+Beauchamp Porkington+ Or it could have enraged the Americans so much that they would start simply annihilating their foe using ever more extreme methods (including the use of chemical and biological weapons) until they either surrendered, were wiped out or they starved to death. Let's also not forget that the Soviets would've also tried their hand at an invasion and they would have had absolutely no qualms about waging wholesale genocide to get compliance (especially with the level of fanatacicsm Japan tended to exhibit).
Meister Eder and ewhat of the women and children the Japanese pushed towards the front with bayonets?
I keep hearing about how the Japanese were severely lacking in heavy artillery, but frankly it's general absence is warranted given the terrain/logistics of the Pacific Theater. The proliferation of low profile, light, easily manhandled pieces giving direct fire support (and sometimes smoke shells) against enemy positions gave the IJA a substantial advantage against everything that wasn't either a properly armored tank, or the massive fortresses at Port Arthur. The reliance on light battalion pieces worked in the Pacific theater, it worked in the Russo-Japanese War, it worked for numerous colonial powers, it worked well for the Prussians in the Franco-Prussian war, and was standard practice for most armies before then. Armies generally started to slow down and dig in when the average artillery piece exceeded the weight of the 1857 Canon obusier de 12 and the average soldier's full marching order exceeding 60lbs. The main weakness of light guns has always been return fire, especially from heavier pieces (provided they can be brought to bear and can observe and adjust for the target) but this weakness was mostly a problem in the European Theater, and not the Pacific or Colonial due to logistics and the proliferation of terrain cover that allowed the Battalion Pieces to get within small arms range on a remarkably common basis, negating any ranged defensive advantage the heavier pieces would have otherwise had.
in the 1970s in US Army officer training I learned about the success of Japanese "knee mortars". I wondered why we didn't have them.
Could you possibly do more videos on the Italian army, their were some diamonds in the rough like their Bersaglieri, Alpini, and Folgore were crack units and saw most of the only success the Italians had in the war
I have way too much stuff on everything else, additionally I speak German and not Italian. See my debriefing video to just get a glimpse on my primary sources in German or my patreon vote for the next source on #FromTheArchives
Military History for Adults Thanks for replying anyway I completely understand, your videos are incredibly detailed. I’m excited to see whatever you have in store next.
You probably already know this, but quite some time ago he did quite detailed assesment of why the Italians had such a hard time: ruclips.net/video/IqoOk5nZEKw/видео.html
+Military History not Visualized Considering you cant really broach other topics could you recommend someone trustworthy who does?
I have found patriotism often makes people who analyze this period of history disregard reality.
How did the Japanese army stack up compared to the British army?
I think that’s a much more apt comparison- Naval power vs Naval power. Not land power vs naval power.
Both forces fought for years in some of the most brutal terrain of the region. The British had to learn the hard way how to function at the end of a long supply chain being last in priority compared to the other theatres in Middle East/N Africa, Europe, etc.
The Indian army was a vital part of this fight too which is often over looked as was the African troops deployed.
By 1944 Slim had trained his army not to attack frontally but flank always. As an army if surrounded or flanked to form brigade boxes and fight as surrender meant death. Supply was by air and it worked wearing down their enemy.
After the war the surviving Japanese generals who had fought there said Meiktila was the master stroke that broke them.
+Robs Small unit infiltrations were common at least on the eastern front.
They mostly were aimed at capturing or destroying heavy equipment and taking prisoners with the aim of gaining intelligence and demoralizing the enemy. Still it wasnt a primary method of preparing an assault.
I think we saw how they stacked up on the Malay Peninsula... St least early. I would suggest looking up info on the Burma campaigns (the theatre of war my grandfather served in as a surgeon in the US Army)
The Japanese navy and army were a better force in my opinion, despite the numbers on paper favoring Britain. For example the Royal Navy had the most ships in the world before the start of the war, Japan 3rd, but Japan's was the most powerful simply because of their use of Kido Butai, and at one point had 10 carriers in one task force. Most countries only did 3 at most.
Also Japan caused the greatest defeats in British military history. Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia.....Britain never really recovered from Japan like US did. Britain got pushed back all the way to India.
i am dutch from zuid holland. and i can say that your english is good so dont stress about it ;) great video !
Your videos are incredible! I was showing you to my friend who’s going into the us marines and he thought you were awesome!
I always wanted to know this. Thanks for uploading this!
i am really into be a military historian someday and I wish you could be my professor haha, but its always very interesting, informative and exciting to watch your videos. sehr gute arbeit! bitte so weiter machen, danke!
Is there a similar German analysis of the US military?
Given that there wasn't a conflict that the U.S. was not involved in at the moment, I don't think that you'll get as an in-depth analysis. Sure, you could look at the equipment, but that's not a huge (it is a big one, though) portion.
How about a Japanese analysis of the German military?
Jasc Random How about a Brazilian analysis of Luxembourg's soldier???
What about a Honduran analysis of Switzthland's army?
Brandon Michaels Swiss army?? The only Swiss soldiers are in service to the Pope 😂😂
4:25 Japan had a problem with getting enough planes and that is why they bought around 80 Breda Br20 bombers from Italy (the Ki21 Sally was just finishing prototype testing when the war started in 1937)
I like this new video topic/concept. I think that this can add some worthwhile insight into A) what particular groups thought at a certain point in time (and by extension, what led them to take the actions that they did); B) how well those historical assessments stood the test of time (hindsight).
I am Dutch. So I love and understand both languages. Keep up the good work. I don't care in what language. 👍
Hey man i was wondering if you could do a video about the greco-italian war in ww2 or maybe the defense of crete
Really interesting stuff! If you have, I would like to hear more of these assesments made from different countries intelligents offices vs other countries and specifically PRE-war assesments
Very interesting. This is a perspective I did not have access to before.
Great video. Very interesting to hear some more in depth history about relations between allied nations in WW 2.
Could you do a video about how the Germans viewed Finland and the Finnish forces before and during the Finnish conflicts?
Also it would be interesting to hear German opinions about Italians who they were the closest to, but who could not fight without constant assistance.
Interesting stuff.
Impressive beard.
Well Japan definitely thought well of Germany! I mean they pretty much modeled their military off of Prussia, and who can blame them
Prussia is the best in terms of military dress, marches and discipline. They were both great allies, but Italy kind of dragged them down, and constantly got into trouble.
Italy didnt have the hardness of the ideology that Germany and Japan indoctrinated their people with. Less brainwashed people leads to less fanatic soldiers.
Just wanted to say I really enjoy your video's. Keep up the good work!
One of my favourite channels
Thank you another brilliant video
So how would then the Japanese military branches compare with Italian?
I think an issue with the Japanese military during the Second world war was the rivalry between the navy and land forces, a house divided cannot stand, and so a military divided cannot defeat an equal foe.
The Chinese 3rd, 6th, 9th, 14th, 36th, 87th, 88th, and Training Divisions were fully German-trained. The 88th gets most of the glory, closely followed by the 87th and 36th, but they were not at all the only ones. Other Chinese units were fairly good as well, such as the Tax Police Division (whose name belied their discipline and equipment), and the units fielded by the Ma Clique in Qinghai and Gansu provinces.
I enjoy watching these programmes whilst stoned. makes me think deeper about these types of topics.
It's a super video. I love history channel on RUclips but most of them are about vulgarisation (it's not a bad thing) and I always fell like
"Give me some primary sources"
Interesting perspectives presented.
Phenomenal, as always.
Concerning the problems with the equipment: I read that the Japanese had some problems with the reliability of their combustion engines (armored cars and planes as well), which was later declared responsable for some misfortunes in battles. This had a profound impact on the generation of industrials after the war, where they emphasized quality and endurance as an utmost requirement - which in turn lead to the worldwide success of their car and technological industry in the years to come.
Excellent analysis.
Thank you for your entire reliable information, motivation together with teaching to help support my journey to turning into more consciously aware in addition to spiritually connected.
Thanks, interesting document and fun approach - I stuck for the German version, keep it up.
Would be fun to present FHO/W in this manner.
Is there an English translation of "Oberkommando des Heeres: Erfahrungen und Betrachtungen aus dem japanisch-chinesischen Feldzug 1937/38, Berlin, 15. March 1938"?
Not that I know of.
I love your content but secretly I'm always hoping to learn some extra german haha
Good to see you in person. For some reason I imagined that you looked like Jeremy Irons.
The youtube subtitles to these videos are amazing!
Looks like if family guy should make fun of the way a German person talk
Military History for Adults Respekt für deinen Kanal, den Erfolg hast du dir verdient. Denn du besprichst interessante Themen und wichtige Umstände welche ansonsten "nicht im Licht betrachtet werden".
Ok, this report is right after the Sino-Japanese War. Is there one right after Pearl Harbor and the fall of Singapore? Or are there any Germans left in Asia after that to do any report at all?
Are there assessments of French, Soviet, British, Polish, other European armies?
Can you translate the part which talks about Chinese forces?
Also, does anyone have any resources how much intelligence Western powers received from China before 1941? The Japanese tore through the British and other western allies like a buzz saw in 1942 and I've never seen any indication that the British or the Americans took Chinese warnings about Japanese capabilities seriously.
Interesting topic, never heard of this document.
not sure if it was ever "published", there is so much stuff in the archives, which was never touched.
I wonder if the Type 5 might have caused shipping problems 🤔
The German military had really influenced and trained the military of many nations:
-Japan ( the Imperial Japanese army)
-China (National Revolutionary army/KMT army)
-Turkey (Ottoman Empire army before & during WW1)
-Argentina
-US (During the US war of independence, the US continental army was trained by a Prussian German officer)
Feel free to comment and provide list of other nations, if I seem to forgot some.
10:40 ahhh, very intersting assestment there MHV!
Vielen Dank. Thank you . Merci.
I haven't watched your videos for quite a while and by jove, you've grown a magnificent beard
Weiter so immer sehr interesant deine clips.
Und endlich mal zumindest ein teil auf deutsch.
Hoffe das kommt jetzt öffters mal vor.
Wie wäre es denn wenn du noch einen kanal für dein deutschsprachiges puplikum machst würde bestimmt deine deutschsprachigen zuschauer sehr begeistern die geschichtsinteressiert sind.
sehr unwahrscheinlich war ursprünglich zweisprachig geplant, aber die Nachteile für einen deutschsprachigen Kanal sind meiner Meinung zuviele und zu groß.
Military History not Visualized
To read tat is a littelbit sad but anyway i hope you go on an make still your good contend ;-) you do a pretty good work
I just found your channel. Great video!
Most interesting assessment.
only tangentially related, prior to Barbarossa (but after Khalkhin Gol), a Japanese army and navy delegation traveled across the Soviet Union to visit Germany. Hitler welcomed the delegation in a big party, well publicized. The Japanese delegation were then given tours of important military projects. The one thing Yamashita wanted to learn about was radar, but the German tour guided steered away from this (not sure if this was by direction from Hitler or some level below). One day Yamashita and the army delegation showed up at a radar facility unannounced. The local boss had seen the press reports and assumed this was sanctioned, giving a full show and tell.
Later the German host discretely suggested that the Japanese delegation return home. Yamashita took the hint and did so. The navy delegation was having a great time in Germany, did not get the hint. So after June 22, they had to take the long way home by sea (submarine?)
could you give a source please.
sorry, can't remember, drank too much in those days. probably a book about Yamashita
Try Edwin Hoyt, Japan’s War, though I am not sure
If you haven't done so already can you tell us how many pilots each country had each year and how many would be in the air at once?
I can find information on how many planes were built but there is no way that there are many pilots as planes.
Could you do a video on the First Italo Ethopian War
The Chinese KMT govt had a few German-equipped and trained divisions. Mind including those units?
It appeared they also didn't take into account the fact that the whole world would have massive increases in tonnage of shipping to support war fighting capacity. The German navy, the US Navy both used submarines as commerce raiders. For some reason the Japanese didn't consider their subs as commerce raiders, why?
Hitler wished his wehrmacht has the tenacity of the japanese armed forces. Fight til last man standing and never surrender. Unfortunately, millions of his forces surrendered to the allies more did than japan.
Great video. This was before the Russians defeated the Japanese in 1939. Did the Germans assess that battle? Did they have advisers there? Will you do a video/s? on those conflicts? Do you know what the talk between Germany and Japan was in the fall of 1941??? You might consider siting at a desk with a LARGE map of the area/ battle you are talking about. A pointer highlighting each area would be omg great.
As always it seems like I am late to the party. My most recent work in German is Bismark's which is an edition from the late 1800's in the old style print font. I also have an English translation of Clausewitz's discussion of the German General Staff. Could you possibly make some recommendations for German versions of worthwhile assessments of the Imperial and Later German Military forces. I will readily admit that I seldom keep track of the sources that you cite in your various videos. From time to time I go back and dig them out, but almost never get around to actually attempting to acquire them. Nor, have I kept my listings of Used Bookstores in Niedersachsen from 35 years ago up-to-date. As always a great video. Thanks.
Why did the Brits and Commonwealth forces surrender in Singapore to such a small Japanese force if the former’s assumptions were as suggested?
Most foreign perspectives on Japanese aircraft were based on the well publicized actions in China and Manchuria. There, the planes involved were Ki-27 (and its contemporaries and friends); light, slow, spatted, planes more appropriate to the 1920s and '30s. These were, in the main, equipped with twin rifle caliber Machine Guns, making them as lightly armed as WW1 Pursuit planes. Pretty tough to shoot down a P40 in one of those . . . but it happened.
I found his information regarding,Germany impressions of Japan military capacities .
However,, he indicated that Impressions revealed, were that if Japan was actually was location within Europe their successes with military capacity would be inferior.
My question is that what then was the rationale for Japan defeating Russia in 1905?
which resulting in Japan destruction of Russia military ships?
Russia being located within Europe?
You should do a poll on how many of your viewers are fluent in german
My main thought is here you have this assessment in 1937: How much did the battle of Khalkin Gold (1939) v. USSR prove the assessment right, or wrong?
video on flamethrower warfare?
As my mastery of German language has badly decayed during the decades since my school years (as well as my hearing), I would have appreciated a display of the conclusion text (in German). I tend to think I still can read German adequately, especially as the text remains on screen if I pause, while the spoken words don’t. A display of the text should not have been too difficult, as there were other text overlays throughout.
it's linked in the description...
Why are the subtitles in Dutch?🤔
maybe someone provided them
10:00 Oh, like "research-based best practices of assessment-driven culturally-relevant student-oriented pedagogy" or "differentiated graphic organizers for scaffolding diverse learners" in my field.
...
^ Translated, this means tests & worksheets.
Can you please make a video about the Salvadoran-Honduran war?
football war? Oversimplified and Jabzy have videos on that.
Roberto Rubio Stupid fucking war
I prefer Military History for Adults gracias.
Yes, it's actually disgraceful to see how a corrupt Government told it's people, that the reason they were poor it's because they had a few poor immigrants among them. Also quite interesting to see how fighting a war and occupying enemy territory works for small countries, with extremely limited or non-existent military resources.
lol as anyone told you you look like Karl Krasser. :o great video. you seem to got like three channels now i think.
I know one thing for sure the American Japanese in the US army was one of the most decorated combat units in the European theater during WW2.
Who else kept listening even though they couldn't understand it when he switched to rapid-fire German?
first part: serious, objective material and contemporary testimonies
second part: okay okay guys, here's all that again in Blitzish
If i remember the name well, it was the japanese navy pilot Saburo Sakagi that pointed to one of the problems in japanese army/navy.
From 1000 candidates for navy pilots, only under 20 graduated as one.
Insane level of excelence, in the end of the war they still had aircraft but all pilots were gone
That applies to every elite-formation. SAS-veteran and fresh recruit with three weeks of military training are equally vulnerable to bullets and recover from injuries about as fast.
Thats how it is in the current US air force's selection process, if anything it is stricter.
Of 1000 candidates, only 70 will be accepted to go onto Officer training school
And of those 70 and only 7 would be granted a pilot/rated slot. Only 3 of those 7 would fly a fighter.
i am thinking the british/american were unprepared like what saladin reply to his distractors,how
many battles did u won before i came,it is because u were unprepared.
I love this video
Did you mean 1500 versions were distributed to the German army or 1500 copies? 1500 versions seems like they changed their minds a lot.
This beginning of this video made me think he's a German Simon Whistler
Did the Germans have attachés or advisers witness the Nanjing Massacre and if so, how did they report on it?
The Germans were aware of what happened in Port Arthur in 1904, which caused Germany, Russia to revisit their tactics because no one expected the Japanese to oust the Russians. Some say the Tsar of Russia was weakened because of it. 8000 dead to capture a hill... en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Port_Arthur#Battle_of_203_Meter_Hill
does this format replace Military History Visualized?
see my answer to Celin Schwab's comment below, short answer is no.
No, this is a separate channel
I’m a Japanese. My grandfather was Imperial Navy. He said they competed by imperial Army. Imperial Navy was a little better.
How about a German analysis on Bhutanese army?
Japanese Imperial Army was caught by budget limits by the needs of the Navy and the national resources stretch by the Great Depression. It caused programs to rearm the army to be longer to get equipment and upgrade their units