Medium dive bombers such as the Soviet Pe-2 were reasonably effective, when used by both USSR and Germany (I don't know about other countries to comment on them), but their dive was usually much more shallow the Stuka's.
@@nobody4248 yeah that’s true, although tbh I’d consider something like the Pe-2 more similar to something like the ground attack variants of the BF 110 than to like the Ju 88 tbh
I think you have to also consider the human factor- the major proponent of dive bombing was Ernst Udet- he was giving demonstrations on the technique in the early 30's. Whereas the strategic proponent at the time was Walther Wever- and he was never able to truly show what effect strategic bombing could achieve, being killed in a crash in 1936
Wever’s death did not change the trajectory of the LW in any significant way. The main decisions were in the works before, as was the doctrine. The 1936 and 1940 version are basically the same. Udet might have been a proponent, yet his arguments (and those of others) are in the video. Also, the LW went into Poland with 350 Ju 87 vs 1200 bombers - so the focus is clear.
@@MilitaryAviationHistory What I dont get is why didnt they go for a dive bomber version of the Bf 110? Rather than make the Ju 88 bigger and THEN try to turn it into a dive bomber, that was not a fast bomber not a dive bomber, good aircraft, just a compromised design. Put a couple SC500s on the Bf 110, add some sort of dive break, done... SKG 210 would do something similar, but not quite there yet.
@@trauko1388 Or even an Fw 190 for that matter. If America was able to create a fighter/dive-bomber hybrid (basically a dive-bomber that can also dogfight) with the P-51A (specifically with the A-36A Apache variant), then Germany could have done the same with the Fw 190A/F/G.
@@calvinstraveldreams By 1940 the Bf109 was already dropping bombs on precision targets as part of SKG 210, one would hit Warspite with a 250Kg bomb off Crete in 1941.
@@trauko1388 True, though while a 250kg bomb is enough to take out small, medium warships, it may not be enough for taking out battleships/fleet carriers or for crippling factories with precision strikes. A Bf 109 can carry at most a 250kg bomb (maybe 500kg as a Rüststand /R2 variant with a special jettisonable extended tailwheel), but an Fw 190 can be field modified to carry a full on 1800kg bomb-more than enough to sink a battleship or cripple an industrial center. That and the Fw 190, being more rugged, might be five-brake compatible whereas a Bf 109 likely would not be.
7:14 Whether you are right or wrong Chris, THANK YOU for bringing references into RUclips! I am fine with Synthesis, Antithesis, Thesis. You read what has been written, instead of simply talking off the cuff like most do. This is a valuable channel to fund!
Hey, something I would love to hear about in future is the development and progression of avionics equipment during the war. It gets left out a lot but I think there's a lot of cool history there, and nobody talks about it.
The emphasis on bombers during WW II on both sides is a rather strange concept without the ability to place your bombs where you want or need to. Neither the allies nor Germany had very good bomb sites and the necessary amount of bombs needed to take out a single bridge was kinda crazy in those days, also causing a large amount of ancillary damage and deaths. There's just so many factors in trying to hit a target from a moving plane that having a single bomb from a Stuka that could hit its target was better than dozens of bombs from a large bomber aircraft hitting everything but your target. It really was a smart idea by the Germans to create the Stuka. Albeit a dangerous one for the pilot, it was effective. And scary.
Why not Stuka? It seems fairly obvious in the 1930s that dive bombing was the best way to get a bomb on target, but I suppose that's just me though. Years of watching MAH and MHV probably contribute to that recognition.
Arguably the IJN figured out carrier strike operations to the highest level. Jonathan Parshall, author of Shattered Sword, said it wasn't until 1944 that the USN could match the IJN carrier air group operational speed and efficiency of launch, positioning and recovery.
Dive bombers were definitely not unique to Germany. Germany's focus on the for land warfare is unusual. The Japanese and Americans (as well as the British, who mostly had dive bombing as a secondary function of aircraft) generally focussed on dive bombers as an anti-ship platform not for their use to support land battles.
@@fazole But the IJN never figured out damage control. And it was very telling. That and underway replenishment was pioneered by the US, and has since been a cornerstone of naval operations. But really, the war in the pacific boiled down to the same war in Europe. Production of war materiel. The US could and did just keep pumping out equipment and personnel, and the axis just could not keep up. Japan was never going to win, just like Germany was never going to win. Germany attacking the USSR and Japan attacking the US were both strategic decisions that were probably inevitable, but spelled the end. The USSR (with the help of the west) took care of Germany. And the US (with the help of the allies) pretty much put paid to the Japanese. Even without the atomic bombing of the Japanese homeland, Japan was beaten well before that. But just like the Germans, they just had to fight to the end instead of realizing they were not going to win, and suing for peace early where they could have perhaps done better post war. Human ego has cost more soldiers lives than any other single factor.
A straightforward discussion on the rationale behind the dive bomber as influenced by the technical and material limitations of the time. How it figured into the whole Blitzkrieg concept seems to have been like rolling high stakes dice, as if betting on a band of sprinters to win an endurance race. If the knockout punch is not fully successful early on, you find yourself at a disadvantage quickly, at least in relative terms. Pardon my honest impressions, but I've never understood how either Germany or Japan, with their limited geographical size and resources, ever believed their war efforts would ultimately succeed. I'm glad it's history.
They didn't believe America would mobilise as much as it did. Which in all fairness nobody did. And in the case of Germany they didn't have a good opinion of the soviet union's strengh.
@@matthiuskoenig3378 IMO, the "nobody did" comment is not really accurate, unless you are speaking primarily about people in Europe and Japan who did not or could not understand, or who were prevented from understanding the vast array of opinions in America. There were plenty of people in the U.S. who realized what was coming and what would be needed, even if grudgingly, but the pacifist movement dominated the media coverage, so Germany and Japan bought it, partly because it was what they wanted to believe and partly because they were directed by ignorant and arrogant officials who would literally eliminate anyone in their circle voicing more rational and informed opinions. There were privileged Germans and Japanese like Isoroku Yamamoto who spent time in the U.S. before hostilities began and profoundly assessed what the U.S. was capable of. Those people entered hostilities with trepidation and believed it to be a great risk in the long term. I believe it is more accurate to say that plenty of people within the Axis knew the risks and were simply forced to accept them while their leaders recklessly plodded forward.
Read The Wages of Destruction for Germany and Hirohito's War for Japan. It'll go a long way to helping you answer your questions about how Germany and Japan thought they could win.
This is a good and interesting video - I'd never thought about the prewar German analysis of the cost effectiveness of bombing, nor been aware that the Ju-87 wasn't originally, doctrinally intended for battlefield strike. However, given the title, I was surprised *not* to see anything about the wider... seeming *obsession* with the tactic in other prewar and WWII German aircraft design. Sure, make the Ju-87! It's a great implementation of a great idea! But they stereotypically required that every bomber design, and some non-bombers, bolt on an ersatz "dive bombing" capability - which in practice delivered "practically level gentle glide bombing". The Ju-88 is the star of this show. Adding strength and equipment to the Heinkel 177 to pull out of a 60 degree dive, well, you could make the argument that given how badly they mismatched the strategic situation, anything that kept He-177s from getting built helped Germany overall. Spending months adding useless racks and sights to the ME 262, at the time the purest interceptor in the world? Ultimately, A H be crazy - fortunately he was very bad at a lot of things and making aircraft development decisions is one of them. But the Ju-88, which was conceived as defending itself through speed, but then got hacked up by the dive-bombing requirement into "only" a thoroughly decent bomber... I still recall a particular post : alternatehistory dot communication ju88-divebombing-question.245475 which ends with a pretty convincing argument that a Ju-88 which didn't have to pivot to dive-bombing would have been more capable and survivable, cheaper, started production much sooner, and been available in much greater numbers - a collection of changes that would, at minimum, have delivered an easy German victory in the Battle of Britain. "Why did they try to make everything dive bomb?" might be a worthwhile future companion to this.
I think if you consider that their strategic win condition was basically to have quick and decisive victories and avoid attrition wars, the dive bombers were a very important part of that equation. You cannot really execute the movement war doctrine if you cannot effectively disrupt enemy communications and movement. It's just that once the nature of the war changed, the original concept behind the dive bombers was no longer relevant. The key point is, if they didn't have the dive bombers for the first part, would they ever even reach the point where the lack of heavy bombers becomes a key issue.
@@b1laxsonyes but some bridges will still be better to break than to let the enemy use them until you maybe take them. Of course you wouldn’t destroy all bridges if they are vital to your future advance
I think to build on your points from this video, OKW didn't fully expect the complete collapse of France in 1940, and were left with alot of aircraft that weren't operationally capable of achieving Seelowe (pretty sure this is somewhat proven, although it could always be argued). While maintaining operational success through the end of 1941, the lack of manpower in the east left the Luftwaffe trying to maintain local air superiority/local support to the Heer, and the increase in need for fighter cover in the West more or less left the Luftwaffe somewhat pidgeon-holed into continuing to maintain/develop these requirements, given the limited resources available(?). If any of you haven't subscribed to Christoph's Channel here, please do! He has been a great content producer over the years, and is a great person to follow!
Fun fact the norden bomb site was actually not that good. It was the 2nd string in terms of performance for american sights, what it was one of the most successfully marketing campaigns in history. Using heavy lobbying they were able to get it "top secret" classification even though there was no reason for it, simply so they could then use that to stop competitors releasing how much better their sights were. This combined with a large add campaign in print and radio media basically forced the USAAF to adopt the sight, in spite of its lackluster performance.
They seem to have decent results using it for med-altitude bombing in the clearer skies over the Pacific. Mission to Rabaul documentary shows B-24s bombing ships in Simpson Harbor. However, maybe that was just war propaganda. At any rate, the terrible weather in Europe in WW2 significantly degraded the effectiveness of the precision bombing campaigns and how much of that is also attributable to flak or bombing mistakes?
@@clazy8Everything I have seen basically comes down to the Norden Bombsight having the potential to be incredibly accurate. However the limiting factor for everyone in WWII wasn't the sight, but the input data. The crews simply didn't have reliable enough details on all the factors affecting the point of impact to maximize its value.
Dive bomber make quite a bit of sense if you have local air supremacy. Dive bombers also work for anti shipping roles if equipped with AP bombs. Although other means will have to be used to get dive bombers to the ships.
The earlier Seversky-designed bomb sights manufactured by Sperry were "precise" compared to early devices of the same type, but accuracy was still rather casual. That's why bombers flew in formation and dropped salvos on the target area--high-altitude level accuracy bombing lacked accuracy. To make sure of hitting something important, a squadron or more of bombers flew in a formation intended to saturate the target area with enough bombs to get at least one on target. Bombing from 5000 feet altitude would have made bombing more accurate--but at that altitude enemy anti-aircraft fire was expected to be devastating to the bombers. Bombing from high altitudes was supposed to render anti-aircraft fire ineffective. Every solution causes more problems. Bombing accuracy was just one additional problem. American Marines had a different set of circumstances during their Banana Wars--their bombers were single-engine biplanes that could only carry a small bomb load. Hitting the target was one issue and the second issue was avoiding enemy fire. The few bombs carried by light carrier-based bombers had to be placed precisely and bombing a native fort from high altitude using a single light bomber with the fort in close proximity to Marines required a high-angle dive and a rapid escape beyond the range of enemy gunfire. A thousand-plane raid by bombers carrying ten tons of bombs each just wasn't possible for the Marines. That need to develop combat effectiveness with limited logistics also kept the Marine sniper program from the Great War alive for use during World War Two--unlike the Army, Marines couldn't rely on field artillery and having mass quantities of machine guns and mortars. I liked the characterization of the dive bomber as the "sniper among bombers."
One of the last remaining Stukas is in the Chicago Museum of Science and Technology. I went there with my young German exchange student and said "Wow... that's a Stuka!"... and she didn't know what I was talking about... haha. I guess that is probably a good thing.
4 месяца назад
I am in luck. I have both books :) Very nice Video. For me the why behind developments of tanks/Aircraft/Ships etc. is the most interesting part of learning about them.
As was said above, dive bombing definitely had its merits, but the Luftwaffe high command took this basic rule to ridiculous heights when the four engine (two in tandem mounted engines) He 188 was expected to be used in this role ! The aircraft had enough teething problems without expecting such a large aircraft to complete near suicidal dive bombing on top ! The same story goes on with the Me 262 and many other Luftwaffe models being transformed into dive bombers somewhere along the way from planning to construction. It seems that nobody had the guts to point out to Hitler, Goering, Milch & Co. that the era of versatile bi- planes was over and that very few models could actually take the stress and strain of dive bombing, and attempting to strengthen unlikely aircraft to fit the Führer's mad wishes only prolongued production time in an arms race the Reich had already lost.
I just yesterday started flying ju87 B-2 model in enlisted, and it instantly became my favorite. It's quite balanced and effective in my opinion, even allowing me to have a brawl with enemy fighters if needed. I use it mostly to bomb tanks and enemy clusters, but sometimes also just to create mayhem on some areas just to slow down enemy while giving hints to friendlys where the enemy might be lurking. It's not the fastest or most maneuverable, but it sure can give devastating hits on enemy with it's 250kg bomb, 4 x 50kg bombs and the machine guns can make hefty damage too especially against lightly armored vehicles. Overall it's very effective plane in the game, and if it's any indicator to why it was so beloved by many pilots and feared by so many opponents, I can clearly see why, as it's not unusual for me to get like 1 tank and 10-16 soldiers out with a single run. Excellent plane for rookie pilots still learning the basic tricks of flying.
I would love to hear about how the Spanish Civil War experience influenced this. My understanding is that Stukas were effective there (in the absence of enemy fighters) - did that lead to German over confidence in their effectiveness on the Western front?
It seems the Stuka dive bomber was a very clever precursor to things like FPV drones and cruise missiles, and even GPS guided artillery munitions. So this discussion is interesting, especially in view of the current war in Ukraine, or indeed any modern war. It's pretty obvious that precision is way more important than any kind of carpet bombing. With the possible exception of cluster munitions, which are something in the middle. The Russian way and equavilant of carpet WWII bombings, is very slow and inefficient. Places like Grosny and Bachmut makes this very obvious. And the whole USA bombing campaign in Vietnam has to be considered the ultimate failiure.
Ernst Udet was heavily into aerial acrobatics (and alcohol) and erroneously thought such flying technique would be good for the Luffwaffe ..now I will go watch the video.
So, Germany's mid-1930s' decision to focus on dive-bombers was a decision born of scarcity. Scarcity of military-age manpower (thanks to the catastrophic casualties of WWI), thinness of the industrial base, and lack of critical resources. So, smaller airplanes, with 2-man crews, using precision strikes to accomplish strategic objectives. By contrast, the U.S., with something like 40% of the world's war-making potential, developed heavy bombers with large (10-man) crews. BUT, the UK and France had some of the same problems in manpower and industrial base than Germany had. Instead of dive-bombers, they developed (or purchased abroad) light bombers with small crews instead. For example, the Fairey Battle had a crew of 3, as did the Martin Maryland and the Douglas Db-7. The Breguet 690-series had a crew of 2. Those light bombers shared a problem with Ju 87s --they could not operate effectively in the face of effective fighter opposition. However, these light bombers could fill multiple roles, while the Ju 87 was somewhat of a one-trick pony.
Interesting observation, but I would argue that RANGE was the biggest factor by far why the US went for large bombers like B17 in the '30s, something that was not that restricting for the UK and France. The US always expected war to stay our of the nation, and to be fought abroad in the Pacific and South-Asian holdings. France bomber forces have been on a very tight shoestring budget all the time, and where expected to be multi-purpose, where light and medium bombers would serve as recon planes too.
How does the Ju 87 stack up against the Il-2 or the Fairey Battle? Also the U.S. had the A-36 for a while...was that any good, and why'd we stop using it?
That's a fascinating array of books behind you, maybe we should have an update video on all your aviation books, nicht nur den Englische Buecher aber auch die auf deutsch.
I know from Military History Visualized that the Prussians/Germans frequently talked about strategy while in all essence talking about operations instead [operations being in between the strategic and the tactical realms]. Does your differentiation of "strategic effect" from "just strategic bombing raids" indicate that this was what was going on with Luftwaffe doctrine as well? It certainly seems as though taking out a bridge that is a chokepoint by a railroad marshalling yards or destroying a power station will have effects on an on-going campaign as opposed to completely destroying the enemy's "will to fight" or whatever other stuff the Douhet types wanted.
The main emphasis for Germany at the time (and historically for the region in its multitude of duke and kingdoms) is a fast war, hence the near immediate focus on the operational level. The provision to mount strategic raids as air effect are included in LW thinking, the scope of L.Dv.16 is fantastic in this regard - however there is a recognition that the effect is delayed by an period of +4-8 weeks. Hence for the operations Germany wants to run (and does esp. early war), the focus on battlefield interdiction is in line with the overall war plans.
It's often the way of things that the seemingly obvious reason isn't the real reason for something. Just look at how many people still believe the reason for the 100ft wing span of the RAF bombers was the hangar doors.
But arguably the war goes on to show that the tactical use of air power does absolutely create a strategic effect, often more than bombing „strategic“ targets (although that depends). The German army ends up relying massively on close air support, to the point where it’s decisive in almost all their victories. And we see the Ju 87 able to play a decisive role even relatively late in the war, and were only really neutralized by the increasing inability of the fighters to protect them.
So, to help fulfill its strategic doctrine, Germany meticulously develops and hones an essentially dedicated tactical instrument--the Ju-87... Why am I not surprised that the Stuka quickly defaulted to its tactical role, especially as Germany went on the defensive.
Sehr interessantes Video - v. a. das herausarbeiten des "Missverständnisses" über CAP vs. Interdiction Missions beim Stuka. 👍 Btw.: das schwarze Buch von der Panzerkonferenz gibt es leider kaum in Bibliotheken in DE (bzgl. Verfügbarkeit für die Forschung usw.) - nicht mal in der Nationalbibliothek in Leipzig. Könnt ihr zumindest da vielleicht ein Exemplar als Beleg hin schicken? :-) (Die sammeln ja auch dt. Publikationen aus dem Ausland - weil ja in London erschienen)
I would also note that most other nations are looking at having a large strategic bomber force to level a city per night as deterrent against war, if Germany had started going all in on strat bombers means likely intervention way sooner though I'm unsure if anyone at the time thought that
"Sniper" is a mistranslation - I noticed this in the Stuka book as well. In German, I believe the term "Scharfschütze" is used for both the specialist role called "sniper" and also the wider role called "sharpshooter". If I understand the Stuka doctrine correctly, it's " a sharpshooter among the bombers".
Part of the reason the Allies didn't develop Dive Bombers might be because of their emphasis on Fighter Bombers - Soon kitted out with RP-3 rockets for pretty precise ground attack? Interesting insight into the Luftwaffe's thinking - Cheers Chris
The lead times alone for aircraft development rule that out. Developing aircraft like the Stuka involves making decisions in the early-mid 1930s, whereas aircraft rockets weren't really considered until the middle of the war, and didn't enter service until the last couple of years.
The USAAF did not favor dive bombers because they believed the attack profile left the aircraft too vulnerable to ground fir. They tested and developed them early but decided not to field them in numbers.
Hi mate. Lack of resources meant a mania for pinpoint attacks. Hence the ridiculous stipulation that the Ju 88 should be able to dive bomb (which ruined it’s original specification as a schnell bomber) and made the He 177 a complete fiasco. Precision is great. But it is no substitute for true strategic depth and resources. Plus - the Luftwaffe was wedded to the traditional German strategic policy of Befelgunskrieg . It was a separate airforce (like the RAF) but still an army support arm with an army operational philosophy. Bit weird but.. Well - Nazis so there you go…
I think you can make a very cogent argument that the Allied tactical Airforces, like 2 TAF, had a much greater impact than anyone had expected and when used to target Nazi transport and oil, were at least as effective as the strategic bomber forces. But to use it they had, as you said, to get the strategic conditions right. Thus there wasn't anything wrong conceptually with diving bombing and precision attacks, the execution was lacking. And then Udet went bonkers and tried to make *everything* dive bomb....but that's a whole other thing
While the Germans weren't the only ones to make use of dive bombing, they stood out in having some medium bombers designed with that in mind. I can't recall any Japanese or American medium bombers that had dive bombing capability designed into them.
Ju87 found itself in serious trouble in the face of AA and enemy fighters ( got terribly decimated in the Battle of Britain and were withdrawn) Air superiority was essential as was a highly skilled pilot for precise dive bombing tasks...the verstile FW190 could achieve what the 87 could do and much more.
One of the most hazardous jobs you could have in this war. Loss-rate was terrible. The success of some aces make you oversee the fact that most pilots were young, inexperienced and soon dead. They gave them drugs.
The German planners didn't know how ineffective large bombers would be in the early war. They got lucky choosing tactical bombers that were extremely effective.
Original concept does not matter. Use matters. The F-14 Tomcat was conceived as a stand-off fighter to protect the carrier. It became a fighter-bomber used to deliver PGM and dumb bombs. The P-47 was conceived as an escort fighter. It became a CAS fighter-bomber.
Thank you for another incredible video. I think you nailed it with tonnage over precision or precision over tonnage. In our modern world we need precision because the other option is beyond the budget of most countries. I guess these were the first drones. (I do not in any way detract from the bravery of the pilots). The vast tonnage of bombs that failed in carpet bombing and it's real effect are questionable.
They had a wonderful effect on the jew, who was keen on destroying White Christian European culture. So carpet bombing Montecassino was a military stupidity? Who cares? it was destroying the ur-European Benedictine Abbey there which counted, and destroyed she was. Oh, and spearheading the bomber waves was a B-17 whose call number ended in 666. You really can´t make that up!
Its fair to call the tactical employment reactionary, but isn’t it reasonable to say that the most effective use of the limited resources was to limit breakthroughs and help soften key targets?
What if they had built a few thousand more Stukas instead of 1,100+ bombers? Would that have enabled them to create more of the conditions for strategic effect? Maybe not the by-then obsolete Ju-87, but some new development. After all, we now rely on precision over tonnage and it seems to work reasonably well.
Would be an absolute suicide mission. Not only are you right in the teeth of short ranged AA guns that ring important targets, you're making interception wayyy easier when they don't have to climb to your altitude.
The reason for the Stuka makes sense tactically, but why did the Germans continue to “demand” dive bombing capabilities in planes like the JU88 and more importantly, the HE177?
But didn't all planes have to dive in and fly close to their targets to be able to hit anything anyways? Even the Americans had to dive and fly close to the ground when they tried to take out a North Vietnamese factory or bridge with a bunch of F-105 Thunderchiefs or F4 Phantoms, and they suffered high losses to Anti-aircraft guns as a result. And that led to the creation of laser guided bombs so the americans did not have to fly close to their targets to knock them out, and that took away the risk of losing an expensive aircraft to anti-aircraft guns.
@@nattygsbord an aircraft being capable to provide ground support with bombs is not the same as an aircraft designed from the outset specifically to be able to “dive bomb”. For example the B-25 became a very capable “skip-bomber” against ships, but that capability was never part of its intended design requirements.
I wonder where the hell that "dive-bombing capability" story for the He 177 came from. Nowhere did I find provision in the airframe for dive brakes, for example, and no references for He-177 dive bombing trials seems to be available. Bombs safely locked within the huge internal bomb bay would simply not fall away from the aircraft, unless a special swinging frame like that of the Ju-87 was provided for EACH bomb. But, apart from such contraptions being awfully awkward and impossibly complicated, no pictures of the Greif´s bomb bay exist indicating any intended provision for them. I think what is meant by "dive bombing" with a Greif is putting the bomber in a shallow dive from well far-off the target in order to increase speed and release the bombs in a relatively horizontal attitude, combined with high speed. That was effectively done in the "Steinbock" operations, with notable success. "Dive bombing" is so indelibly associated with the crazy head-on plunges of the Stuka that people are led to believe that the Germans were so stupid as to expect a heavy bomber to do the same.
@@javiergilvidal1558 Nobody said the HE177 was going to deliver its bombs in the same manner as the Stuka!🙄 Aerodynamic forces alone would make that impossible. However, as you say, the HE177 was designed from pretty much the outset to deliver its bombs from a dive rather than from level flight. The Stuka, and its relative bombing accuracy, did provide a lot of impetus for the HE177 diving requirement. Early German bomb sights were pretty much crap until the Lotfe 7 site came along in 41 (based on the Norden). So Udet had pushed for the better accuracy of a diving attack in the HE177 design. Not the near vertical diving of the Stuka, but nonetheless, bomb delivery from an angle dive. At the same time, the design of the DB606 promised to deliver the necessary power requirements of the HE177 design. The smaller frontal section of this engine seemed to be a good fit to Udets diving requirements, even though from the outset that engine looked to be a maintenance nightmare (the cooling issues and fires had yet to become apparent). So if Udet had kept his 2 cents to himself, (something he should have done with many German designs), there is a good chance that the HE177 would not have relied solely on the DB606, and all its significant teething problems. It’s very possible that Heinkel would have gone instead to a traditional 4 engine design and been able to deploy the HE177 as a level bomber, using the Lotfe 7 to good effect.
It has always seemed to me that it didn't really matter what kind of aircraft Germany built, or how good (or otherwise) they were, they couldn't build enough of them. 300-odd Stukas becomes irrelevant in the context of what happens in the skies by 1943.
@@javiergilvidal1558 Not the point. We're talking here as to whether it was a good idea for Germany to have focussed on dive bombing. It doesn't matter. They had a 300 bombers on a raid air force in a 1,000 bomber world.
@@PaulInPorirua No. The 1000 bomber world only began (just began) to come true in May 1942 over Cologne, and the symbolic/propaganda/magical number "1000" was only arrived at by scraping the bottom of the barrel with substandard Whitleys and Hampdens, and just adequate Wellingtons -none of which was any more powerful than the German twin-engined aircraft. Aim was horrible, and the military/economic effects were negligible -although the psychological blow of Cologne is not to be neglected. Seven hundred-plus strong forces of really destructive bombers (Lancasters, Halifaxes, and, to a not so great an extent, Stirlings) were a true reality from 1943 onwards. This has nothing to do with the conflict hypotheses Germany was working on as from 1938. Germany was strategically weak in 1914, and could only afford a knock-out blow. The blow failed, and she was stuck in a hopeless long-term war. Germany was even weaker in 1939, and we all know what followed. The Germans could never have envisaged in 1936-onwards the tidal wave of destruction that would befall their country seven years later
So, what was the US doing during this period concerning dive bombing? All you need to know can be found if you watch the 1941 movie "Dive Bomber" with a star-studded cast and Errol Flynn in the lead role. Yes, I do watch too many war movies.
Literally the first Stuka mission of WW2 is indicative of the sort of effect Germans werer going for. It was to bomb Polish outpost guarding the border bridge at Tczew, to facilitate capturing ther bridge intact. (BTW, Poles managed to blow up the bridge, so that particular mission ended in failure)
Eh? The premise here isn't that Stuka was a failure, I don't think that's the case. It was rather discussing the rationale behind the concept that led to Stuka instead
What is this obsession with a 2-front war? During WW2 the allies fought all over the world, they had many frontlines. Russia had the biggest army in WW1, not wanting to fight them had to do with the numbers of soldiers they had. Not with 1 front being fine and 2 fronts randomly being horrible.
because many countries have more manpower to call upon than a single country, when you are at a manpower OR equipment disadvantage the last thing you want is to have your limited resources strained across a greater area. which is the opposite for the side that knows they have the advantage in those fields. as there is a certain level of effectual degradation of having so much assets in a single area and leaves them vulnerable to things like artillery and airpower.
@@dragonzd97 The focus on 2 fronts suggests that 2 fronts of 10 miles would be worse than 1 front of 100 miles. I think that's completely wrong. The WW1 fronts both in east and west where hundreds of miles long. I don't think the number mattered, or at that point even another 10 miles, but the military strength that each side had.
@@voswouter87 100 miles on one side is easier to defend than 50 miles in two though... if you think about it logistically and from a support standpoint, the defender can shift forces easier to react to things that are close to them which they would be unable to do if say they had to help the other half of the country. this entire concept is why the allies invaded italy in the first place.... to drag divisions away from the atlantic wall so their invasions there would meet less resistance
It does make sense to use dive bombers when your industry is still not fully developed and capable of producing large bombers. Most dive bombers in the 30s and 40s had external bomb payloads (despite causing drag, this meant they could carry larger bombs). With external bombs most dive bombers could carry a single bomb that was often larger than most heavy bombers carried (cuz they would carry more but smaller bombs). Stukas typically had 250/500kg bombs in the early stages of the war and would even go to 1000kg, this meant that you could have this massively powerful bomb be dropped in a extremely accurate fashion while also only using a single aircraft that used 1 engine. Heavily reducing operational costs per bomb, so you could not only have something that was cheaper and quicker to build, it could also strike bigger bombs, be more accurate and also have a lot of less impact if it got damaged or destroyed. Losing 1 b-17 would mean losing 4 engines, losing 1 Corsair would mean 1 engine lost, so for a country that, again, was still catching up in industrial power, it makes sense.
So in other words what you're saying is... The Stuka is ye olde kalibre? Ye olde tomahawk? Seems to me rhat it fulfils mostly the same doctrinal role aa cruise missiles tend to do in today's war. And just like todays war, they seem ill-suited for the role of strategic bombing of population centres as they have been pressed into doing.
The concept of dive bombing has a good bit of merit, but the idea of making your medium and heavy bombers capable of doing it is madness
The He 177 was out of pocket, but the versatility of the Ju 88 definitely contributed to it doubling as a dive bomber.
@@moblinmajorgeneral He 177 - see Lord HardThrasher😁 worth every minute
[sad french noises]
Medium dive bombers such as the Soviet Pe-2 were reasonably effective, when used by both USSR and Germany (I don't know about other countries to comment on them), but their dive was usually much more shallow the Stuka's.
@@nobody4248 yeah that’s true, although tbh I’d consider something like the Pe-2 more similar to something like the ground attack variants of the BF 110 than to like the Ju 88 tbh
I love how it basically boils down to "cost vs effect" like most other weapons. But I guess the propaganda bits later help in that too
I think you have to also consider the human factor- the major proponent of dive bombing was Ernst Udet- he was giving demonstrations on the technique in the early 30's. Whereas the strategic proponent at the time was Walther Wever- and he was never able to truly show what effect strategic bombing could achieve, being killed in a crash in 1936
Wever’s death did not change the trajectory of the LW in any significant way. The main decisions were in the works before, as was the doctrine. The 1936 and 1940 version are basically the same. Udet might have been a proponent, yet his arguments (and those of others) are in the video. Also, the LW went into Poland with 350 Ju 87 vs 1200 bombers - so the focus is clear.
@@MilitaryAviationHistory What I dont get is why didnt they go for a dive bomber version of the Bf 110? Rather than make the Ju 88 bigger and THEN try to turn it into a dive bomber, that was not a fast bomber not a dive bomber, good aircraft, just a compromised design.
Put a couple SC500s on the Bf 110, add some sort of dive break, done... SKG 210 would do something similar, but not quite there yet.
@@trauko1388 Or even an Fw 190 for that matter. If America was able to create a fighter/dive-bomber hybrid (basically a dive-bomber that can also dogfight) with the P-51A (specifically with the A-36A Apache variant), then Germany could have done the same with the Fw 190A/F/G.
@@calvinstraveldreams By 1940 the Bf109 was already dropping bombs on precision targets as part of SKG 210, one would hit Warspite with a 250Kg bomb off Crete in 1941.
@@trauko1388 True, though while a 250kg bomb is enough to take out small, medium warships, it may not be enough for taking out battleships/fleet carriers or for crippling factories with precision strikes. A Bf 109 can carry at most a 250kg bomb (maybe 500kg as a Rüststand /R2 variant with a special jettisonable extended tailwheel), but an Fw 190 can be field modified to carry a full on 1800kg bomb-more than enough to sink a battleship or cripple an industrial center. That and the Fw 190, being more rugged, might be five-brake compatible whereas a Bf 109 likely would not be.
I'll recommend that Stuka book. Lots of interesting aspects of how to attack, from what direction, altitude, and so on.
7:14 Whether you are right or wrong Chris, THANK YOU for bringing references into RUclips! I am fine with Synthesis, Antithesis, Thesis. You read what has been written, instead of simply talking off the cuff like most do. This is a valuable channel to fund!
thank you !
Hey, something I would love to hear about in future is the development and progression of avionics equipment during the war. It gets left out a lot but I think there's a lot of cool history there, and nobody talks about it.
For a future video, perhaps you could do a comparison of the development of dive-bombing by the Americans, Japanese, and British.
The emphasis on bombers during WW II on both sides is a rather strange concept without the ability to place your bombs where you want or need to. Neither the allies nor Germany had very good bomb sites and the necessary amount of bombs needed to take out a single bridge was kinda crazy in those days, also causing a large amount of ancillary damage and deaths. There's just so many factors in trying to hit a target from a moving plane that having a single bomb from a Stuka that could hit its target was better than dozens of bombs from a large bomber aircraft hitting everything but your target. It really was a smart idea by the Germans to create the Stuka. Albeit a dangerous one for the pilot, it was effective. And scary.
Why not Stuka?
It seems fairly obvious in the 1930s that dive bombing was the best way to get a bomb on target, but I suppose that's just me though. Years of watching MAH and MHV probably contribute to that recognition.
The USN and Japanese navy made good use of dive bombers. They played a huge role in the Pacific theater.
Arguably the IJN figured out carrier strike operations to the highest level. Jonathan Parshall, author of Shattered Sword, said it wasn't until 1944 that the USN could match the IJN carrier air group operational speed and efficiency of launch, positioning and recovery.
@@fazole Suspecting a fellow Seth, Bill and regular Jon enjoyer?
Dive bombers were definitely not unique to Germany. Germany's focus on the for land warfare is unusual.
The Japanese and Americans (as well as the British, who mostly had dive bombing as a secondary function of aircraft) generally focussed on dive bombers as an anti-ship platform not for their use to support land battles.
@@88porpoiseSweden also developed dive bombers for anti shipping
@@fazole But the IJN never figured out damage control. And it was very telling. That and underway replenishment was pioneered by the US, and has since been a cornerstone of naval operations.
But really, the war in the pacific boiled down to the same war in Europe. Production of war materiel. The US could and did just keep pumping out equipment and personnel, and the axis just could not keep up.
Japan was never going to win, just like Germany was never going to win. Germany attacking the USSR and Japan attacking the US were both strategic decisions that were probably inevitable, but spelled the end. The USSR (with the help of the west) took care of Germany. And the US (with the help of the allies) pretty much put paid to the Japanese.
Even without the atomic bombing of the Japanese homeland, Japan was beaten well before that. But just like the Germans, they just had to fight to the end instead of realizing they were not going to win, and suing for peace early where they could have perhaps done better post war.
Human ego has cost more soldiers lives than any other single factor.
A straightforward discussion on the rationale behind the dive bomber as influenced by the technical and material limitations of the time. How it figured into the whole Blitzkrieg concept seems to have been like rolling high stakes dice, as if betting on a band of sprinters to win an endurance race. If the knockout punch is not fully successful early on, you find yourself at a disadvantage quickly, at least in relative terms. Pardon my honest impressions, but I've never understood how either Germany or Japan, with their limited geographical size and resources, ever believed their war efforts would ultimately succeed. I'm glad it's history.
They didn't believe America would mobilise as much as it did. Which in all fairness nobody did. And in the case of Germany they didn't have a good opinion of the soviet union's strengh.
@@matthiuskoenig3378 IMO, the "nobody did" comment is not really accurate, unless you are speaking primarily about people in Europe and Japan who did not or could not understand, or who were prevented from understanding the vast array of opinions in America. There were plenty of people in the U.S. who realized what was coming and what would be needed, even if grudgingly, but the pacifist movement dominated the media coverage, so Germany and Japan bought it, partly because it was what they wanted to believe and partly because they were directed by ignorant and arrogant officials who would literally eliminate anyone in their circle voicing more rational and informed opinions. There were privileged Germans and Japanese like Isoroku Yamamoto who spent time in the U.S. before hostilities began and profoundly assessed what the U.S. was capable of. Those people entered hostilities with trepidation and believed it to be a great risk in the long term. I believe it is more accurate to say that plenty of people within the Axis knew the risks and were simply forced to accept them while their leaders recklessly plodded forward.
Read The Wages of Destruction for Germany and Hirohito's War for Japan. It'll go a long way to helping you answer your questions about how Germany and Japan thought they could win.
This is a good and interesting video - I'd never thought about the prewar German analysis of the cost effectiveness of bombing, nor been aware that the Ju-87 wasn't originally, doctrinally intended for battlefield strike.
However, given the title, I was surprised *not* to see anything about the wider... seeming *obsession* with the tactic in other prewar and WWII German aircraft design. Sure, make the Ju-87! It's a great implementation of a great idea! But they stereotypically required that every bomber design, and some non-bombers, bolt on an ersatz "dive bombing" capability - which in practice delivered "practically level gentle glide bombing".
The Ju-88 is the star of this show.
Adding strength and equipment to the Heinkel 177 to pull out of a 60 degree dive, well, you could make the argument that given how badly they mismatched the strategic situation, anything that kept He-177s from getting built helped Germany overall.
Spending months adding useless racks and sights to the ME 262, at the time the purest interceptor in the world? Ultimately, A H be crazy - fortunately he was very bad at a lot of things and making aircraft development decisions is one of them.
But the Ju-88, which was conceived as defending itself through speed, but then got hacked up by the dive-bombing requirement into "only" a thoroughly decent bomber... I still recall a particular post :
alternatehistory dot communication ju88-divebombing-question.245475
which ends with a pretty convincing argument that a Ju-88 which didn't have to pivot to dive-bombing would have been more capable and survivable, cheaper, started production much sooner, and been available in much greater numbers - a collection of changes that would, at minimum, have delivered an easy German victory in the Battle of Britain.
"Why did they try to make everything dive bomb?" might be a worthwhile future companion to this.
A very small correction - 50m x 50m is more like 150feet, not 100
....which is pretty much the same in METRIC feet.
@@jm9371 what the hell is a metric foot?
@@jm9371 bro what are you talking about
@@teenybopper777
50 m = 164 feet.
@@r0ky_M I know
I think if you consider that their strategic win condition was basically to have quick and decisive victories and avoid attrition wars, the dive bombers were a very important part of that equation. You cannot really execute the movement war doctrine if you cannot effectively disrupt enemy communications and movement.
It's just that once the nature of the war changed, the original concept behind the dive bombers was no longer relevant. The key point is, if they didn't have the dive bombers for the first part, would they ever even reach the point where the lack of heavy bombers becomes a key issue.
A broken bridge is broken both ways.
@@b1laxsonyes but some bridges will still be better to break than to let the enemy use them until you maybe take them. Of course you wouldn’t destroy all bridges if they are vital to your future advance
Germany: "This! Behold our dive bomber, the Stuka!"
Japanese: "Oh that's neat! So here's ours, it's called the *Yokosuka MXY-7"*
I think to build on your points from this video, OKW didn't fully expect the complete collapse of France in 1940, and were left with alot of aircraft that weren't operationally capable of achieving Seelowe (pretty sure this is somewhat proven, although it could always be argued). While maintaining operational success through the end of 1941, the lack of manpower in the east left the Luftwaffe trying to maintain local air superiority/local support to the Heer, and the increase in need for fighter cover in the West more or less left the Luftwaffe somewhat pidgeon-holed into continuing to maintain/develop these requirements, given the limited resources available(?). If any of you haven't subscribed to Christoph's Channel here, please do! He has been a great content producer over the years, and is a great person to follow!
Fun fact the norden bomb site was actually not that good. It was the 2nd string in terms of performance for american sights, what it was one of the most successfully marketing campaigns in history. Using heavy lobbying they were able to get it "top secret" classification even though there was no reason for it, simply so they could then use that to stop competitors releasing how much better their sights were. This combined with a large add campaign in print and radio media basically forced the USAAF to adopt the sight, in spite of its lackluster performance.
Another great example of FDR's corruption.
Hmm, that's new to me, but quite believable. Very interesting.
Source?
They seem to have decent results using it for med-altitude bombing in the clearer skies over the Pacific. Mission to Rabaul documentary shows B-24s bombing ships in Simpson Harbor. However, maybe that was just war propaganda. At any rate, the terrible weather in Europe in WW2 significantly degraded the effectiveness of the precision bombing campaigns and how much of that is also attributable to flak or bombing mistakes?
@@clazy8Everything I have seen basically comes down to the Norden Bombsight having the potential to be incredibly accurate.
However the limiting factor for everyone in WWII wasn't the sight, but the input data. The crews simply didn't have reliable enough details on all the factors affecting the point of impact to maximize its value.
Dive bomber make quite a bit of sense if you have local air supremacy. Dive bombers also work for anti shipping roles if equipped with AP bombs. Although other means will have to be used to get dive bombers to the ships.
Any bombing requires at least some air supremacy, as the american 8th air force discovered the hard way.
The earlier Seversky-designed bomb sights manufactured by Sperry were "precise" compared to early devices of the same type, but accuracy was still rather casual. That's why bombers flew in formation and dropped salvos on the target area--high-altitude level accuracy bombing lacked accuracy. To make sure of hitting something important, a squadron or more of bombers flew in a formation intended to saturate the target area with enough bombs to get at least one on target.
Bombing from 5000 feet altitude would have made bombing more accurate--but at that altitude enemy anti-aircraft fire was expected to be devastating to the bombers. Bombing from high altitudes was supposed to render anti-aircraft fire ineffective. Every solution causes more problems. Bombing accuracy was just one additional problem.
American Marines had a different set of circumstances during their Banana Wars--their bombers were single-engine biplanes that could only carry a small bomb load. Hitting the target was one issue and the second issue was avoiding enemy fire. The few bombs carried by light carrier-based bombers had to be placed precisely and bombing a native fort from high altitude using a single light bomber with the fort in close proximity to Marines required a high-angle dive and a rapid escape beyond the range of enemy gunfire. A thousand-plane raid by bombers carrying ten tons of bombs each just wasn't possible for the Marines. That need to develop combat effectiveness with limited logistics also kept the Marine sniper program from the Great War alive for use during World War Two--unlike the Army, Marines couldn't rely on field artillery and having mass quantities of machine guns and mortars.
I liked the characterization of the dive bomber as the "sniper among bombers."
One of the last remaining Stukas is in the Chicago Museum of Science and Technology. I went there with my young German exchange student and said "Wow... that's a Stuka!"... and she didn't know what I was talking about... haha. I guess that is probably a good thing.
I am in luck. I have both books :) Very nice Video. For me the why behind developments of tanks/Aircraft/Ships etc. is the most interesting part of learning about them.
As was said above, dive bombing definitely had its merits, but the Luftwaffe high command took this basic rule to ridiculous heights when the four engine (two in tandem mounted engines) He 188 was expected to be used in this role ! The aircraft had enough teething problems without expecting such a large aircraft to complete near suicidal dive bombing on top !
The same story goes on with the Me 262 and many other Luftwaffe models being transformed into dive bombers somewhere along the way from planning to construction. It seems that nobody had the guts to point out to Hitler, Goering, Milch & Co. that the era of versatile bi- planes was over and that very few models could actually take the stress and strain of dive bombing, and attempting to strengthen unlikely aircraft to fit the Führer's mad wishes only prolongued production time in an arms race the Reich had already lost.
I just yesterday started flying ju87 B-2 model in enlisted, and it instantly became my favorite. It's quite balanced and effective in my opinion, even allowing me to have a brawl with enemy fighters if needed.
I use it mostly to bomb tanks and enemy clusters, but sometimes also just to create mayhem on some areas just to slow down enemy while giving hints to friendlys where the enemy might be lurking.
It's not the fastest or most maneuverable, but it sure can give devastating hits on enemy with it's 250kg bomb, 4 x 50kg bombs and the machine guns can make hefty damage too especially against lightly armored vehicles.
Overall it's very effective plane in the game, and if it's any indicator to why it was so beloved by many pilots and feared by so many opponents, I can clearly see why, as it's not unusual for me to get like 1 tank and 10-16 soldiers out with a single run.
Excellent plane for rookie pilots still learning the basic tricks of flying.
I would love to hear about how the Spanish Civil War experience influenced this. My understanding is that Stukas were effective there (in the absence of enemy fighters) - did that lead to German over confidence in their effectiveness on the Western front?
Suggestion: discuss bomb racks sometime
It seems the Stuka dive bomber was a very clever precursor to things like FPV drones and cruise missiles, and even GPS guided artillery munitions.
So this discussion is interesting, especially in view of the current war in Ukraine, or indeed any modern war. It's pretty obvious that precision is way more important than any kind of carpet bombing. With the possible exception of cluster munitions, which are something in the middle.
The Russian way and equavilant of carpet WWII bombings, is very slow and inefficient. Places like Grosny and Bachmut makes this very obvious. And the whole USA bombing campaign in Vietnam has to be considered the ultimate failiure.
Ernst Udet was heavily into aerial acrobatics (and alcohol)
and erroneously thought such flying technique would be
good for the Luffwaffe ..now I will go watch the video.
Don't forget the drugs as well !!
So, Germany's mid-1930s' decision to focus on dive-bombers was a decision born of scarcity. Scarcity of military-age manpower (thanks to the catastrophic casualties of WWI), thinness of the industrial base, and lack of critical resources. So, smaller airplanes, with 2-man crews, using precision strikes to accomplish strategic objectives. By contrast, the U.S., with something like 40% of the world's war-making potential, developed heavy bombers with large (10-man) crews. BUT, the UK and France had some of the same problems in manpower and industrial base than Germany had. Instead of dive-bombers, they developed (or purchased abroad) light bombers with small crews instead. For example, the Fairey Battle had a crew of 3, as did the Martin Maryland and the Douglas Db-7. The Breguet 690-series had a crew of 2. Those light bombers shared a problem with Ju 87s --they could not operate effectively in the face of effective fighter opposition. However, these light bombers could fill multiple roles, while the Ju 87 was somewhat of a one-trick pony.
Interesting observation, but I would argue that RANGE was the biggest factor by far why the US went for large bombers like B17 in the '30s, something that was not that restricting for the UK and France. The US always expected war to stay our of the nation, and to be fought abroad in the Pacific and South-Asian holdings.
France bomber forces have been on a very tight shoestring budget all the time, and where expected to be multi-purpose, where light and medium bombers would serve as recon planes too.
How does the Ju 87 stack up against the Il-2 or the Fairey Battle? Also the U.S. had the A-36 for a while...was that any good, and why'd we stop using it?
That's a fascinating array of books behind you, maybe we should have an update video on all your aviation books, nicht nur den Englische Buecher aber auch die auf deutsch.
I know from Military History Visualized that the Prussians/Germans frequently talked about strategy while in all essence talking about operations instead [operations being in between the strategic and the tactical realms]. Does your differentiation of "strategic effect" from "just strategic bombing raids" indicate that this was what was going on with Luftwaffe doctrine as well? It certainly seems as though taking out a bridge that is a chokepoint by a railroad marshalling yards or destroying a power station will have effects on an on-going campaign as opposed to completely destroying the enemy's "will to fight" or whatever other stuff the Douhet types wanted.
The main emphasis for Germany at the time (and historically for the region in its multitude of duke and kingdoms) is a fast war, hence the near immediate focus on the operational level. The provision to mount strategic raids as air effect are included in LW thinking, the scope of L.Dv.16 is fantastic in this regard - however there is a recognition that the effect is delayed by an period of +4-8 weeks. Hence for the operations Germany wants to run (and does esp. early war), the focus on battlefield interdiction is in line with the overall war plans.
It's often the way of things that the seemingly obvious reason isn't the real reason for something. Just look at how many people still believe the reason for the 100ft wing span of the RAF bombers was the hangar doors.
But arguably the war goes on to show that the tactical use of air power does absolutely create a strategic effect, often more than bombing „strategic“ targets (although that depends).
The German army ends up relying massively on close air support, to the point where it’s decisive in almost all their victories. And we see the Ju 87 able to play a decisive role even relatively late in the war, and were only really neutralized by the increasing inability of the fighters to protect them.
Another great video as always Bismarck!
So, to help fulfill its strategic doctrine, Germany meticulously develops and hones an essentially dedicated tactical instrument--the Ju-87...
Why am I not surprised that the Stuka quickly defaulted to its tactical role, especially as Germany went on the defensive.
this also fits with the demand of the luftwaffe to include the dive bombing capability into the JU-88s
Sehr interessantes Video - v. a. das herausarbeiten des "Missverständnisses" über CAP vs. Interdiction Missions beim Stuka. 👍
Btw.: das schwarze Buch von der Panzerkonferenz gibt es leider kaum in Bibliotheken in DE (bzgl. Verfügbarkeit für die Forschung usw.) - nicht mal in der Nationalbibliothek in Leipzig. Könnt ihr zumindest da vielleicht ein Exemplar als Beleg hin schicken? :-)
(Die sammeln ja auch dt. Publikationen aus dem Ausland - weil ja in London erschienen)
Insightful analysis. Enjoyed this!
super interesting! i wonder now what the statistics look like for ju87 strike targets. I had always assumed they were only for CAS.
Thanks Chris, as usual, another great explanation !
I had plastic & metal Stukas toys & detailed collectors.They are in my Xbox 360 & PC games.
Interesting video. Just a note: 50 meters is 164 feet so a bit bigger than your conversion. :)
I would also note that most other nations are looking at having a large strategic bomber force to level a city per night as deterrent against war, if Germany had started going all in on strat bombers means likely intervention way sooner though I'm unsure if anyone at the time thought that
Love the footage of the Ju-86s. An interesting aircraft with some interesting operational history (what intercept at 42,000 feet?).
Great video, though 50m x 50m is over 150 feet by 150 feet, but your point is well taken not a small target, but industrial building size.
Compares well with the recent Soviet episode.
"Sniper" is a mistranslation - I noticed this in the Stuka book as well. In German, I believe the term "Scharfschütze" is used for both the specialist role called "sniper" and also the wider role called "sharpshooter". If I understand the Stuka doctrine correctly, it's " a sharpshooter among the bombers".
@MilitaryAviationHistory >>> Great video...👍
Part of the reason the Allies didn't develop Dive Bombers might be because of their emphasis on Fighter Bombers - Soon kitted out with RP-3 rockets for pretty precise ground attack?
Interesting insight into the Luftwaffe's thinking - Cheers Chris
They had dive bombers but for navy, Douglass dauntless. It was well regarded but there's no point once you start developing missiles and guided bombs.
The lead times alone for aircraft development rule that out. Developing aircraft like the Stuka involves making decisions in the early-mid 1930s, whereas aircraft rockets weren't really considered until the middle of the war, and didn't enter service until the last couple of years.
The USAAF did not favor dive bombers because they believed the attack profile left the aircraft too vulnerable to ground fir. They tested and developed them early but decided not to field them in numbers.
@@gort8203 Interesting statement, considering how much the US Navy came to rely on them against dense AA targets.
@@Tuning3434 You must realize that the Navy had a different operational environment that required hitting moving ships with armor piercing bombs.
Hi mate.
Lack of resources meant a mania for pinpoint attacks.
Hence the ridiculous stipulation that the Ju 88 should be able to dive bomb (which ruined it’s original specification as a schnell bomber) and made the He 177 a complete fiasco.
Precision is great.
But it is no substitute for true strategic depth and resources.
Plus - the Luftwaffe was wedded to the traditional German strategic policy of Befelgunskrieg .
It was a separate airforce (like the RAF) but still an army support arm with an army operational philosophy.
Bit weird but..
Well - Nazis so there you go…
Was just about to write somethin simmular. You saved me the efford.
I think you can make a very cogent argument that the Allied tactical Airforces, like 2 TAF, had a much greater impact than anyone had expected and when used to target Nazi transport and oil, were at least as effective as the strategic bomber forces. But to use it they had, as you said, to get the strategic conditions right. Thus there wasn't anything wrong conceptually with diving bombing and precision attacks, the execution was lacking. And then Udet went bonkers and tried to make *everything* dive bomb....but that's a whole other thing
While the Germans weren't the only ones to make use of dive bombing, they stood out in having some medium bombers designed with that in mind. I can't recall any Japanese or American medium bombers that had dive bombing capability designed into them.
Does the Skyraider, A-10 and Tucano in their times, all serve the same tactical purpose as the Ju-87?
Ju87 found itself in serious trouble in the face of AA
and enemy fighters ( got terribly decimated in the Battle of Britain
and were withdrawn) Air superiority was essential as was a highly
skilled pilot for precise dive bombing tasks...the verstile FW190
could achieve what the 87 could do and much more.
Dive bombers make perfect sense if one is planning a war of rapid movement but your artillery is largely horse drawn.
One of the most hazardous jobs you could have in this war.
Loss-rate was terrible.
The success of some aces make you oversee the fact that most pilots were young, inexperienced and soon dead.
They gave them drugs.
Always a pleasure...stay well
The German planners didn't know how ineffective large bombers would be in the early war. They got lucky choosing tactical bombers that were extremely effective.
And then they wasted tons of resources on those heavy bombers anyway,because they too caught the Douhet bug.
Original concept does not matter. Use matters. The F-14 Tomcat was conceived as a stand-off fighter to protect the carrier. It became a fighter-bomber used to deliver PGM and dumb bombs. The P-47 was conceived as an escort fighter. It became a CAS fighter-bomber.
Great video !!!
Thank you for another incredible video. I think you nailed it with tonnage over precision or precision over tonnage. In our modern world we need precision because the other option is beyond the budget of most countries. I guess these were the first drones. (I do not in any way detract from the bravery of the pilots). The vast tonnage of bombs that failed in carpet bombing and it's real effect are questionable.
They had a wonderful effect on the jew, who was keen on destroying White Christian European culture. So carpet bombing Montecassino was a military stupidity? Who cares? it was destroying the ur-European Benedictine Abbey there which counted, and destroyed she was. Oh, and spearheading the bomber waves was a B-17 whose call number ended in 666. You really can´t make that up!
very interesting, thank you
Dive bombers and bilingualism= kinky😮all the best lads and lassies from sunny Troon 😊
Is that the Tintin book The Black Island on the poster behind?
Its fair to call the tactical employment reactionary, but isn’t it reasonable to say that the most effective use of the limited resources was to limit breakthroughs and help soften key targets?
Why dive bombing? As a veteran WW 1 Goering really wanted his pilots to know what it feels like to "tap that".
Great vid!
Thanks!
(The plant over/behind your right shoulder looks like a D’deridex war bird.)
Just sayin.
😆😎👍🖖
The Italian Ba.65 doesn't count?
What if they had built a few thousand more Stukas instead of 1,100+ bombers? Would that have enabled them to create more of the conditions for strategic effect? Maybe not the by-then obsolete Ju-87, but some new development. After all, we now rely on precision over tonnage and it seems to work reasonably well.
Would be an absolute suicide mission. Not only are you right in the teeth of short ranged AA guns that ring important targets, you're making interception wayyy easier when they don't have to climb to your altitude.
i like that MAD logo spoof
The reason for the Stuka makes sense tactically, but why did the Germans continue to “demand” dive bombing capabilities in planes like the JU88 and more importantly, the HE177?
But didn't all planes have to dive in and fly close to their targets to be able to hit anything anyways? Even the Americans had to dive and fly close to the ground when they tried to take out a North Vietnamese factory or bridge with a bunch of F-105 Thunderchiefs or F4 Phantoms, and they suffered high losses to Anti-aircraft guns as a result.
And that led to the creation of laser guided bombs so the americans did not have to fly close to their targets to knock them out, and that took away the risk of losing an expensive aircraft to anti-aircraft guns.
@@nattygsbord an aircraft being capable to provide ground support with bombs is not the same as an aircraft designed from the outset specifically to be able to “dive bomb”. For example the B-25 became a very capable “skip-bomber” against ships, but that capability was never part of its intended design requirements.
I wonder where the hell that "dive-bombing capability" story for the He 177 came from. Nowhere did I find provision in the airframe for dive brakes, for example, and no references for He-177 dive bombing trials seems to be available. Bombs safely locked within the huge internal bomb bay would simply not fall away from the aircraft, unless a special swinging frame like that of the Ju-87 was provided for EACH bomb. But, apart from such contraptions being awfully awkward and impossibly complicated, no pictures of the Greif´s bomb bay exist indicating any intended provision for them. I think what is meant by "dive bombing" with a Greif is putting the bomber in a shallow dive from well far-off the target in order to increase speed and release the bombs in a relatively horizontal attitude, combined with high speed. That was effectively done in the "Steinbock" operations, with notable success. "Dive bombing" is so indelibly associated with the crazy head-on plunges of the Stuka that people are led to believe that the Germans were so stupid as to expect a heavy bomber to do the same.
@@javiergilvidal1558 Nobody said the HE177 was going to deliver its bombs in the same manner as the Stuka!🙄 Aerodynamic forces alone would make that impossible. However, as you say, the HE177 was designed from pretty much the outset to deliver its bombs from a dive rather than from level flight.
The Stuka, and its relative bombing accuracy, did provide a lot of impetus for the HE177 diving requirement. Early German bomb sights were pretty much crap until the Lotfe 7 site came along in 41 (based on the Norden). So Udet had pushed for the better accuracy of a diving attack in the HE177 design. Not the near vertical diving of the Stuka, but nonetheless, bomb delivery from an angle dive. At the same time, the design of the DB606 promised to deliver the necessary power requirements of the HE177 design. The smaller frontal section of this engine seemed to be a good fit to Udets diving requirements, even though from the outset that engine looked to be a maintenance nightmare (the cooling issues and fires had yet to become apparent).
So if Udet had kept his 2 cents to himself, (something he should have done with many German designs), there is a good chance that the HE177 would not have relied solely on the DB606, and all its significant teething problems. It’s very possible that Heinkel would have gone instead to a traditional 4 engine design and been able to deploy the HE177 as a level bomber, using the Lotfe 7 to good effect.
excellent content. Thank you.
Fantastic video.
It has always seemed to me that it didn't really matter what kind of aircraft Germany built, or how good (or otherwise) they were, they couldn't build enough of them. 300-odd Stukas becomes irrelevant in the context of what happens in the skies by 1943.
But a 1943 scenario was not envisioned in 1936
@@javiergilvidal1558 Not the point. We're talking here as to whether it was a good idea for Germany to have focussed on dive bombing. It doesn't matter. They had a 300 bombers on a raid air force in a 1,000 bomber world.
@@PaulInPorirua No. The 1000 bomber world only began (just began) to come true in May 1942 over Cologne, and the symbolic/propaganda/magical number "1000" was only arrived at by scraping the bottom of the barrel with substandard Whitleys and Hampdens, and just adequate Wellingtons -none of which was any more powerful than the German twin-engined aircraft. Aim was horrible, and the military/economic effects were negligible -although the psychological blow of Cologne is not to be neglected. Seven hundred-plus strong forces of really destructive bombers (Lancasters, Halifaxes, and, to a not so great an extent, Stirlings) were a true reality from 1943 onwards. This has nothing to do with the conflict hypotheses Germany was working on as from 1938. Germany was strategically weak in 1914, and could only afford a knock-out blow. The blow failed, and she was stuck in a hopeless long-term war. Germany was even weaker in 1939, and we all know what followed. The Germans could never have envisaged in 1936-onwards the tidal wave of destruction that would befall their country seven years later
So, what was the US doing during this period concerning dive bombing? All you need to know can be found if you watch the 1941 movie "Dive Bomber" with a star-studded cast and Errol Flynn in the lead role. Yes, I do watch too many war movies.
Take out.. bridges? I thought it was the V-2 rocket that was supposed to take out bridges :P
You do love your dive bombers. Germans must like things that go down.
German dive bomber doctrine was designed for operational effectiveness.
In hindsight, it would have been better to put a radial engine on the Stuka as it is much more robust.
Literally the first Stuka mission of WW2 is indicative of the sort of effect Germans werer going for.
It was to bomb Polish outpost guarding the border bridge at Tczew, to facilitate capturing ther bridge intact.
(BTW, Poles managed to blow up the bridge, so that particular mission ended in failure)
Whooooooooooooo! Notting. Love your work btw :))))
@9:12 you say 50x50 meters is 100x100 feet. As far as i know it should be 150x150 feet.
that is correct
could the experience obtained during the spanish civil war have influenced their conclusions?
Stuckas were envisioned as cute tiny bombers, and not the evil CAS.
Because they CAN be accurate so you need fewer bombs.
From the man who wrote the book!
hey Chris what is your favourite stuka?
The Norden bomb sight was terrible quite a lot of evidence as well as videos covering this.
Hmmm let me look into that book you signed for me.....
9:10 50 x 50 meters would be closer to 164 feet for our American friends.
Blame Udet! Everybody else did.
It was Cheap !
Total hypothetical. How would the Stuka have failed if the Japanese had made a naval version for the war in the pacific?
I don't think it outperforms the Japanese aircraft significantly?
@@WALTERBROADDUS Yes especially once you add all the extra weight for carrier ops I don't think it would be an upgrade.
Eh? The premise here isn't that Stuka was a failure, I don't think that's the case. It was rather discussing the rationale behind the concept that led to Stuka instead
What is this obsession with a 2-front war?
During WW2 the allies fought all over the world, they had many frontlines.
Russia had the biggest army in WW1, not wanting to fight them had to do with the numbers of soldiers they had.
Not with 1 front being fine and 2 fronts randomly being horrible.
because many countries have more manpower to call upon than a single country, when you are at a manpower OR equipment disadvantage the last thing you want is to have your limited resources strained across a greater area. which is the opposite for the side that knows they have the advantage in those fields. as there is a certain level of effectual degradation of having so much assets in a single area and leaves them vulnerable to things like artillery and airpower.
@@dragonzd97 The focus on 2 fronts suggests that 2 fronts of 10 miles would be worse than 1 front of 100 miles. I think that's completely wrong. The WW1 fronts both in east and west where hundreds of miles long. I don't think the number mattered, or at that point even another 10 miles, but the military strength that each side had.
@@voswouter87 100 miles on one side is easier to defend than 50 miles in two though... if you think about it logistically and from a support standpoint, the defender can shift forces easier to react to things that are close to them which they would be unable to do if say they had to help the other half of the country. this entire concept is why the allies invaded italy in the first place.... to drag divisions away from the atlantic wall so their invasions there would meet less resistance
Because the Germans knew it looked badass!!!
It does make sense to use dive bombers when your industry is still not fully developed and capable of producing large bombers. Most dive bombers in the 30s and 40s had external bomb payloads (despite causing drag, this meant they could carry larger bombs). With external bombs most dive bombers could carry a single bomb that was often larger than most heavy bombers carried (cuz they would carry more but smaller bombs).
Stukas typically had 250/500kg bombs in the early stages of the war and would even go to 1000kg, this meant that you could have this massively powerful bomb be dropped in a extremely accurate fashion while also only using a single aircraft that used 1 engine. Heavily reducing operational costs per bomb, so you could not only have something that was cheaper and quicker to build, it could also strike bigger bombs, be more accurate and also have a lot of less impact if it got damaged or destroyed. Losing 1 b-17 would mean losing 4 engines, losing 1 Corsair would mean 1 engine lost, so for a country that, again, was still catching up in industrial power, it makes sense.
In fact, we don't need to speak English, German or any language at all.
We only need to read it. 😅
Hi
nice
So in other words what you're saying is... The Stuka is ye olde kalibre? Ye olde tomahawk?
Seems to me rhat it fulfils mostly the same doctrinal role aa cruise missiles tend to do in today's war.
And just like todays war, they seem ill-suited for the role of strategic bombing of population centres as they have been pressed into doing.