The worst US General in World War 2?
HTML-код
- Опубликовано: 18 дек 2024
- In this video we talk about a major theater commander that was until recently portrayed in a very positive light that was almost "saint like". Yet, the recent historiography with access to newly available archives is not so positive about him, quite on the contrary. This video is about Joe Stilwell, who as in charge of the Chinese Expeditionary Force (Burma) and coordinated (kinda) with Chiang Kai-shek the leader of the Nationalist Chinese Forces.
»» SUPPORT MHV ««
» paypal donation - paypal.me/mhvis
» patreon - / mhv
» subscribe star - www.subscribes...
» Book Wishlist www.amazon.de/...
»» MERCHANDISE ««
» teespring - teespring.com/...
» SOURCES «
Ven, Hans van de: China at War: Triumph and Tragedy in the Emergence of the New China. Harvard University Press: 2018
Mitter, Rana: Forgotten Ally: China's World War II, 1937-1945
Yu, Maochun: The Dragon's War: Allied Operations and the Fate of China
Peattie, Mark (Ed.); Drea, Edward (Ed.); Ven, Hans van de (Ed.): The Battle of China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945. Stanford University Press: 2010.
Drea, Edward J.: Japan’s Imperial Army. Its Rise and Fall, 1853-1945. Kansas University Press, USA: 2009.
Ness, Leland; Shih, Bin: Kangzhan - Guide to Chinese Ground Forces 1937-45
Images from Wikipedia
commons.wikime...
en.wikipedia.o...
en.wikipedia.o...
en.wikipedia.o...
en.wikipedia.o...
#WorstGeneral #WW2 #Stilwell
My grandfather served under Mark Clark.He despised that man.
Mark Clark was directly responsible for the German 10th Army escaping north out of Rome because he was so obsessed with marching into Rome ahead of the brits that he disobeyed orders to form a pincer with British 8th Army to trap the German 10th! Fucking asshole!
That's why my grandfather despised him.What an egotistical douchebag
This is all new to me, thank you. When I was in the army, 1971-74 , as a lowly specialist, I had to transcribe a recording of Clark's speeches to a narrated tape for the General's private pleasure. Had to take the tape to 3d Army in D.C. for professional narration. I hope Clark enjoyed the final product.
The Brazilian army was part of the V Army under Mark Clark in Italy, 1944-45.
@@PauloPereira-jj4jv,
The Brazilians were also fully racially integrated, while the Americans were racially segregated.
Does anyone remember Lloyd Fredenhall, the commanding general at Kasserine Pass?
I would have thought the same. Kasserine was a disaster. All the reports back to Eisenhower on Fredendall were negative. Thus was he replaced by Patton as II Corps commander.
Fredenhall is a very good choice for worst. His memos, his giant underground bunker HQ, his treatment of British allies. Completely exiled to training detail by Ike, who had liked him greatly before he was combat-tested and found wanting.
Positively the worst. Fredendall ignored all warnings about the German movements from Pinky Ward and tried to pin the Kasserine disaster on Ward in the subsequent reports. Fredendall was a horse general who couldn't adapt to armored warfare in a desert scenario who conducted the battle from a tunnel many miles behind the crumbling front.
You are correct sir. He was relieved and sent home after Kasserine Pass. Actually the US had quite a few crummy Generals compared to the Germans. The Russians executed some of their best Generals but Georgy Zhukov was a real fighting General.
I thought Fredenhall at first too, but Clark was in a whole different league.
13:80 "this isnt to denegrate him
Title: The worst US general in WW2
*Noice*
I didn't pick the title, and it is the content that matters. Very few people are 100% bad. He was promoted beyond his abilities, and suffered for it. You will find similar types of issues behind a multitude of people that failed in their commands.
My personal interest in the "best or worst general" debate is near zero. However, I could see a case being made for people that want to make it. He was a disastrously bad theatre commander. One that went well beyond simple "oh they made these tactical mistakes." The guy almost single-handedly turned a bad situation in Burma into a complete collapse, made a mess of inter-Allied cooperation, and undermined US-Chinese relations for decades.
That is the most beautiful picture of gun Jesus I have ever seen. Thank you.
Yeah, whenever anyone lays down a "I don't wanna be offensive" I go outta my way to say "then don't"......I know I'm a doink for doing it I'm just tired of this very lame rhetorical conceit.
@@leary4 I wasn't. The only thing I said in the video is I don't want to just bash him, because he had redeeming qualities that I detail. If carefully laying out why he was bad based on dozens of sources offends you, then oh well. Go home, stick your copy of Tuchman in the microwave, and then sob into it.
It is silly to say that China was in Stillwell's command when he didn't even have command of the troops. If he didn't have command of the troops, then they weren't part of his command.
I Vote Clark. Disobeyed orders to cut off the German retreat in order to capture an undefended Rome for personal glory.
I AGREE! i have heard to this VERY DAY that at the US Army Academy West Point the "moves" Clark made in the Italian campaign are referred to in lectures to the cadets as "Murder"...of his own troops! Why he was never sacked is beyond me!!
Yes thats a fact at Anzio he didnt move from the beach head rule one is get off the beach
Salerno he had to get the navy to bombard to save him being pushed into the sea
Eh, Clark didn't jeopardize an entire theater. He screwed up Italy, but the rest of ETO could carry on with their operations.
@@balancedactguy he arsehold his way with Isenhower
@@tonyclough9844 That or he had rich family connections ...or both.
Stillwell was called the "3 star company commander" because he loved to command troops up front in combat. Which is bad for a theatre commander. The reason why he is like this is he was commandant of the Infantry School at Ft. Benning before the war. He was the best guy for training troops. He was one of a few generals to be awarded the Combat Infantryman's Badge as a general. Usually the CIB is awarded from Private to Colonel. Good ole Vinegar Joe was up where combat was. Vinegar Joe would have been a good division commander. He was promoted beyond his level of competence.
@@cvr527 I agree with you big time. From his time as a trainer at Ft. Benning GA. before WWII he was excellent. The reason he was picked because he used to be a military attache to China during the 1920s and 30s and knows the Chinese language and culture. He knew how the Chinese military operated too.
Exactly. He had no stomach for diplomacy and no head for grand strategy. He wanted a fight but couldn't pick the right one.
@Noah Boddy Indeed Sir..
He was so bad at the Job he was given he effectively gave China to the Communists by his actions.... And we will all suffer the consequences for years to come...
@@reddevilparatrooperUnfortunately Stillwell had told the US what would happen once Chiang K C fought Mao. Telling people the truth, big mistake! He had briefed Truman before he died. Still the end happened so fast it stunned everyone. The sheer incompetence of the Nationalist leader was amazing even though they had known. Read about it . 'A Force So Swift: Mao, Truman, and the Birth of Modern China'. As General Marshall, said if the US wanted to intervene we would need 500 divisions and that would just be the start. Sorry, back to your mewling about Stillwell. Cheers.
Any discussion of crap American generals need to cite the "egregious" Mark Clark as a probable contender for "worst".
My favorite entry will always be MacArthur.
True but I would place some of the Anzio folly on Gen. Lucas as well.
@@frankl9583 Churchill usually gets the ultimate blame for Anzio even though almost all accounts seem to suggest that if Lucas had got his arse off the beach and into the higher ground right at the start it would have been considered a stroke of genius.
Having listened to this podcast again though , I have to say that Stillwell probably has the edge over Clark - at least the latter only managed to waste a single army.
There does seem to be a telling common thread of contempt for British (or indeed any foreigner) senior officers by US officers. I can't see Clark getting away with ignoring a US superior the way he ignored Alexander.
Yeah, Clark's management of the whole Montecassino campaign, by itself, qualifies him as a solid contender for the infamous title of "Worst US General in WW2". He really blew it completely
@@antred11 mine to MacArthur!!
Mark "Don't stick your neck out" Clark has gotta be up there. That guy was a walking disaster.
This was the first name that came to my mind.
@@jmad627 Yeah, it would seem Stillwell was a competent if not enthusiastic Division Commander, just not up to the politics and strategy of a Theatre Command.
Clark was just a sad sack numnuts who couldn't tie his fucking shoes without breaking a lace.
Mark Clark was the first one I thought of as well.
Mark Clark was worse. He could have beaten the Germans in Italy early and opened up another front against Germany itself, but he had to dash to Rome to claim the glory. As if anyone would remember.
One day of glory ffs. D-Day was the next day😂.
My thoughts too. He took Rome for fame instead of cutting off the retreating Germans.
@Albert Fels vinegar joe should have been fired.
@Albert Fels China was as corrupt then as it is now. Most of the war aid given to them was stolen. I not sure anything Stillwell did would have mattered to China.
absolutely. Stilwell wasn't incompetent. He's just secret buddies with Mao. He's deliberately weakening the Nationalist military to help his buddy Mao in the upcoming Chinese Civil War as a favor for Uncle Joe.
Mark Clark -allowing the divisions on the western part of the Gustav Line to escape immediately after Anzio by taking Rome. A 'film star General'
How To Catch and Convict a Pedophile - A Guide BY GENERAL wesley clark (who IS PEDOFIL}...
Clark missed an opportunity for destroying Kesselring forces in Italy in favour of going to Rome as a Glory hound. This allowed to Kesselring to get away and fight another day. He's the worst
@Ethan Hunter it was after the Anzio landing
@Ethan Hunter we were talking about Clark though and you brought up anzio
@ Moron, Italy had already capitulated after the fall of Sicily. They'd already arrested Mussolini the first time by the time the Salerno landings started.
There were too many roads to block. 7th Corps wasn't large enough of strong enough to cover them all.
The whole Italian campaign was a dog's breakfast. It's what happens when you listen to Churchill's ravings and rantings.
The worst US General in World War 2?
[Sweats in Hearts of Iron]
US? You mean Confederate States of America Right?
@@augustoseiti885 you surely mean The American Empire right?
You ment the mexican junta who took its old territories and puppeted the usa right
you. of course, mean the bolivaran empire right?
**original comment here**
Mark Clark gets my vote, instead of wanting the glory of entering Rome he should have pushed on and as Patton always advocated push on and don’t give the enemy a chance to regroup, he was fortunate that Normandy occurred and took the allied media’s attention away from him,
the orders were to cut straight across Itlay and trap all German troops below that line, but no he turned northward and went to Rome as the liberator, and whilst he did that the bulk of the German army lower down italy went up the eat coast and escaped.
Patton did try to push, but the enemy always did regroup then stop him. A 1985 US Army paper on the Lorraine campaign castigated Patton from outrunning his logistics and that he never understood logistics.
Patton must have been FURIOUS when he learned of Clark's glory trip to Rome. I can only imagine the words he would have flung at the narcissist piece of crap.
@@thunderbird1921
Yep, Patton was jealous that someone got newsreel headlines over him.
Gotta' go with Mark Clark here. Instead of driving across Italy and cutting off many German forces in the south of Italy, he chose to make a hard left turn and relieve Rome. The German forces escaped up the east side of Italy where they reformed, and more or less, fought the allies to a standstill for the remainder of the war! How long was the war prolonged, how many men died unnecessarily, so he could have his moment of glory? He should have been relieved of command and sent home in disgrace! Not only would I not want to follow him into combat, I wouldn't want him to lead me to the latrine!
Monte Cassino. I used to think Gen. Clark was a decent leader, till I studied the Italian campaign more. It's like Clark thought he was in charge of the most important theater and he was *the most important general officer* , instead of just taking Italy out of the war. The Allies wasted too much on Italy, mostly because Churchill thought it was important, only Sicily was important.
@@williestyle35
Without Clark, the allies in Italy would have been in Austria at the end of the war. If the troops of Operation Dragoon had been used to in Italy and Clark removed, the Allies would have been in southern Germany.
He treated General Merrill and his Marauders as cannon fodder. He should never be forgiven for that alone.
The Chindits too. >:|
I read and thought that this business with the "Marauders" were recruited for a single mission and ended up campaigning until almost no one was left to stand.
Anyone down to fight in a war knows they’re essentially canon fodder. It comes with the turf
@@davidtangitau3771 you are right that soldiers in any conflict have a high probability of getting killed, however when General Merrill and his men were told about their mission (singular) to be difficult and arduous they knew what they were up against. What they didn’t expect was that it would go on and on until they were all perished. To Stilwell everyone was wrong except him, and his methods and results were terrible.
I actually met a former Marauder in base camp at the Replacement Depot at Camp Radcliff in Vietnam, this was in May of 66. I had the impression that the man was still thinking about WW2 to the exclusion of everything else which is pretty understandable considering what they went through. I had to hump the Central Highlands for my entire tour and although I manage to think about other stuff Nam owns me and most of the friends I served with.
Stilwell being the worst U.S. general, my close second wasn't even a general but an Admiral. His name was Ernest J King. I know I'm going to get much hate, but hear me out. I hold Admiral King Personally responsible for the Thousands of Americans that died often within sight of the American coast, from NAZI U-Boats, because of his prejudiced hatred for the British Navy, not only did he completely dis-regard any advice from the British about shipping convoy's but did nothing else to protect our cargo ships in our waters. A good commander should have the mandated ability to look aside any emotional prejudices in the interest of security and safety, which King could not do until finally ordered to do so. This is 100% the truth, ask anyone who knows, to those NON-knowing blow-hards, you should really check on stuff before you go and insult someone.
The value of convoys was proven in WW1 yet King refused to use them. His name is mud in the US Merchant Marine. And I'm being nice.
"Ornate orator" what a fitting nickname, what an eloquent statement. 🤔
Absolutely! I couldn’t agree more.
@@Solinimo for a brain fart oxygen thief it is an 8
Thank you! I was desperately trying to remember his name. I'm still a bit suprised Churchill didn't crack it and have Baker St arrange an accident...
A lot of China Theater content, and I am definately not complaining.
Edit: Will we get content on CBI on the main channel?
I'm going to Devil's Advocate a bit, here. Quoting some of the course material from CGSC, it seems he was more expected to have a holding action. It wasn't so much to win the campaign, as much as maintain it: "In addition to supplying nationalist Chinese forces, Roosevelt sent Stilwell off to India with two
new priorities. The first was to convince Chaing Kai-Shek to place his armies under operational control of the United States to help ensure their loyalty as an ally in the fight against Japan. President Roosevelt expressed earlier to Stilwell his concern that his “Europe first” policy would dishearten Chaing Kai-Shek to a point where he would sign a separate peace treaty with the Japanese. Stillwell had to ensure this did not occur. The second priority was to help mend relations between the Chinese and British, who had been
at odds for generations. "
If you look at these as the man's three most important instructions, he was fine for two of three. The third, was a significant problem for him, but the arrival of Slim provided the opportunity for him to achieve the third. So, here's the question: Was there anyone else in the US Army which could have achieved all three of these? Further, Acerbicidity to one nation, in his case to the UK's leadership, was not unique to Stilwell: General Wavell, for example, did not want Chinese troops involved in the Burma campaign. The combination of Stilwell's affinity for the Chinese and Slim's ability to work with Stilwell seems to have provided a reasonable team. It is certainly true that he burned his bridges with CKS, but that was a bit later on. Further, it was felt that Stilwell was hard-assed enough that despite the higher rank of the British officers, he would act in whatever manner he felt suited US (and Chinese) interests, not what the British considered their interest.
I don't know if I'd be too harsh of Stilwell's lack of command experience: Not many US officers of the time had command experience in wartime at that level, and Stilwell was both 2IC of 2nd ID and then CO of 7ID before the fighting got going. It's a bit of a disservice to say his high point was sitting behind a desk. I'd call being a Division CO a pretty good high point. Similarly, Stilwell would hardly be the first General to decide to ignore the advice of others' assessments of the situation as being inferior and having a crack at it. Montgomery is generally considered to be a fairly good general (I certainly think he was), but he was guilty of quite a balls-up at Arnhem despite plenty of competent folks saying "The opposition might be a bit tougher than you think".
There were also some good points to his command time there, even at the operational level. I would agree with Mr Reger's comments that it is a bit of a disservice to disregard his broader achievements in CBI simply because it doesn't mesh with the narrow focus of this video. Stilwell may well have been no Bill Slim, but almost nobody was a Bill Slim.
Hey Chieftain,
Thanks for the post! I always love some intelligent devil's advocate! Ideas only hold up when they are tested.
I wish I could go into more operational depth regarding Burma in the video, but I didn't have the notes for this video (which was unplanned). The historian Richard Frank has a lecture on RUclips called "China's World War II: A New History" that breaks that down a little bit more. Between that and Taylor's, Mitter's, and Van de Ven's vivid details related to Burma in 1942, it doesn't paint a very great picture. Stilwell dismissing Chiang's warnings that 1. he was badly underestimating Japanese strength in Burma, based on a "hunch" if his diary is accurate (Chiang was right) and 2. he was attempting to improperly utilize the Chinese forces under his command (Chiang, unsurprisingly, was right) is quite damning. His plan to hold far further south than the British or Chinese wanted is less "visionary" and more "out-of-touch." Essentially, he arrived on the scene in the middle of things and immediately assumed he knew best, ignored the advice of Chiang (a highly experienced, though certainly imperfect general and national leader), who had been fighting the Japanese for four and a half years up to that point, and didn't understand his own forces or those of the enemy. We know Chiang had grave doubts about Stilwell after this debacle in 1942 (see: Taylor, Mitter, Van de Ven, Paine might have something too, Frank as well), and it never recovered from there. Frank's lecture:
ruclips.net/video/bZREvulH55Y/видео.html
The current consensus among historians in the field, which is essentially what I'm just summarizing in this video, is that Stilwell failed in his duties as Chief of Staff to the NRA and advisor to Chiang. His poor diplomacy and use of LL as a weapon (see: Maochun Yu) was not good. His demands to draw off the best Chinese forces into Burma in 1944 in the midst of Ichigo belay a fundamental lack of strategic vision on the part of someone that was supposed to be paying attention to his overall command. Of course Chiang was livid to have his best forces sucked off into a theatre that, as SCM Paine notes, meant nothing to China. There were 500,000 men ripping the NRA to pieces in central and southern China in the largest operation ever conducted by the IJA, but Stilwell demanded Y force to help retake Burma against a fraction of the forces for reasons that Chiang couldn't understand. Burma was understandably viewed as a sideshow to the main theatre (China) from the Chinese perspective. In summation of the current consensus among historians in the field: Stilwell forgot that the NRA was more than just a couple divisions in India and a few more in Yunnan, and that CBI involved more than the "B."
This is all laid against a back-drop of something SCM Paine beautifully lays out as "nested wars." Hopefully I can do it justice, but I can't recommend her book enough. She used archival sources across four languages! From the US perspective, they had a global war to fight and really couldn't be bothered to dedicate massive resources to a minor Allied power in an at-best secondary theatre. Certainly nowhere near as much as what Chiang was asking for. That is totally justifiable in my view. On the other hand, Chiang was the leader of a nation in the midst of a war of national survival, which had been going on for at least 4 and a half years by 1942 (with near-constant conflict against Japan going on longer than that), and was desperately seeking as much aid from his allies as he could get. He was focused on what Paine refers to as the "regional" and "civil" wars. He didn't care about the ETO. He was focused on China. That fundamental difference in focus is what led to the sour relations. Both the US and Chinese perspectives were completely justified, but neither understood the other. Chiang only had one card to play against the US, and he used it liberally. He knew the only thing the US cared about was that China stayed in the war to tie down the Japanese forces present. So what did he do? He constantly threatened to make a separate peace with Japan (and actually attempted in 1943, but the Japanese terms were so harsh he declined them). From Marshall's perspective he was a two-bit beggar demanding way more than was deemed necessary (or indeed available) by the US in their global strategy. From Chiang's perspective, he was desperately trying to extract as much from his allies as he could to continue resisting Japan using the only thing he knew they cared about as leverage. Again, both views were reasonable. This mismatch between the focus on different aspects of the "nested wars" led to a lack of understanding. The US grew bitter about China's demands and "lack of willingness to fight" when they didn't immediately offer up forces for Burma (which is absurd for anyone familiar with the operational history of the War of Resistance), and China grew increasingly exasperated and frustrated that their allies kept forcing them to do things that were against their national interest.
Now, I should comment on the title of the video as MHV picked a rather provocative one. My personal stake in the whole "best or worst general" debate is zero. Do I think Stilwell was great? Given his performance, not particularly. Do I think he was terrible? Not really. Do I think he was the "worst?" Heck no. Do I think somebody else could have done better? Well, Falkenhausen had his job before (obviously without US Army stuff attached, but it was the exact same role), and Wedemeyer had it after. They both dealt with the same KMT, the same corruption, the same factionalism, and I would argue in the case of Falkenhausen under harder conditions. The historians in the field have concluded they did it better. That can certainly be contested though! History is a wonderful thing that way, hahaha.
Oh, and I'm a huge fan by the way! I need to make it to a tank fest one of these years....
I'm not sure about the holding action angle. From what I've read he seemed more like a hot-head more focused on retaking Burma from the Japanese rather than actually holding things down. I think a illustrative example is how hard he pushed the US Merrill's Marauders regiment during the Burma Campaign.
Under Stilwell they where pushed to the point of exhaustion and then beyond that. Of the 2,750 troops that entered in Burma in Feb 1944 they got whittled down to 130 combat effective soldiers by Aug 1944, majority due to illness.
PART 1: To build on to Justin Pyke's excellent reply.
If those were Stilwell’s three objectives, he failed miserably at all of them. But don't take my word for it, let's quote the War College's own book. If your job is to fight a "holding action," well, let's look at two passages from "Stilwell's Mission to China" (published 1987 by the US Army (history.army.mil/html/books/009/9-1/CMH_Pub_9-1.pdf page 97-98 )
OBJECTIVE 1: FIGHT A HOLDING ACTION.
Look at the three strategies discussed on March 9th and March 5th after the fall of Rangoon.
Strategy 1; "My idea ultimately is to hold a line east and west through Thazi if the Chinese troops are to defend Mandalay. In that case, should the British troops at Prome retreat, then we hold a slanting line with Mandalay as the pivot point in order to protect Myitkyina and Lashio, our railway and highways in order to keep communications between China and India uninterrupted." A day later he remarked, "As long as the British hold Prome, we hold Toungoo." (P. 97)
Strategy 2: "General Plan: (1) Complete communications with India, and operate against the Japanese at Rangoon. Whether or not we use the port, it must be denied to the Japanese for use as a base. Reinforce the 5th and 6th Chun [armies], first with the 71st. Move other units into the Kunming area, where they can train, as a preliminary to moving them into Burma. After making Rangoon safe, concentrate at Kunming-Kweiyang for an offensive to Hanoi (1), or to clear the Hankow area." (P. 98)
Strategy 3: The orders were to hold upper Burma as long as possible to cover the oil fields at Yenangyaung, to keep contact between the British and the Chinese, and to protect the road being hastily built from Assam to Burma (P. 84)
Have an answer?
If you said strategy 1 or 3, as spoken by Chiang Kai Shek and General Wavell respectively, were more consistent with a "holding action," you'd be right. Stillwell, of course chose strategy 2.
He disagreed with Chiang Kai Shek on this basic part of the strategy. From page 97, "Caution and the defensive were enjoined over and over again though Stilwell suggested an offensive to retake Rangoon."
Furthermore, you are a student of WW2. You know there wasn't an Allied force in 1942, British, American or otherwise, that was capable of launching an offensive and defeating the IJA on equal terms. On page 99, it shows Chiang Kai Shek making a similar point. "The Generalissimo observed that three Chinese divisions were needed to match one Japanese division and odds of five to one for an attack." The same book, however, ignores this when describing the Chinese reticence to launch offensives without those conditions, instead it cites it as a character flaw.
See example, "The 22nd Division was in place and ready to attack south to relieve the 200th Division, an attack which would have caught the 143rd Regiment between two fires and confronted two Japanese regiments with two divisions plus two regiments of the Generalissimo's best troops." P. 108 Further on the same page, "While Stilwell was arguing and pleading with Tu Yu-ming to attack one Japanese regiment with five Chinese regiments." The US army writes about this like it was a clear case of Chinese cowardice. The history never entertains the notion that maybe the Chinese know their own capabilities and judged this unwise.
To see the ridiculousness, let’s quote the book from page 103 about what a Chinese division was vs. the size of a Japanese division/regiment. “The 200th Division began with about 8,500 men. It was fully motorized and had a small armored component. The other two divisions of the 5th Army, the 96th and 22d, had about 6,000 men each. The 6th Army divisions averaged 5,700 in strength. These were not all combat troops by any means; each division included coolie labor units for transport and replacements.” The 200th had three regiments so that’s about 2,500 people. A Japanese regiment was 3,800. So this is the case of the Chinese outnumbering by about 3 times as much as the Japanese, not 5 to 1 as it reads. The Chinese knew this wasn't a good situation for them to be attacking into because they had done it… and lost.
For the Chinese, the American attitude of “We want you to expend scarce resources to make death runs on Japanese forces” must have felt like Germany telling the Italian fleet to just sail all the battleships to attack the Mediterranean fleet in 1942. Yes, the Italians could do damage, but they knew their ships would be destroyed and they had far more limited capacity to replace them than the British did.
OBJECTIVE 2: HELP MEND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHINESE AND BRITISH, WHO HAD BEEN AT ODDS FOR GENERATIONS.
The Chinese are the ones who offered to help in Burma in the first place and were initially rebuffed. Furthermore, you know what is not good for building allied comity? Asking them to perform a complex coordinated elastic defense and counterattack when there is no history of cooperation. And there are troops from 6 countries. And they don’t speak the same language.
It is insane to try to do anything complicated or that relies on manoeuvre in this situation. Chieftain, your channel has done great work showcasing the problems of coordination between the French and the British even after 8 months working together and an even longer institutional history.
Stilwell keeps on putting together complicated plans that are reliant on Chinese and Imperial forces working together consistently and reliably and then being surprised when the plans fail.
You can see this later in when the book describes the “trap” at Pyinmana. P 121 "General Stilwell's plan to defeat the Japanese at Pyinmana called for the 96th Division to concentrate in defensive positions there. (Maps 2 and 4) The 200th Division was to be poised and ready north and northeast of Pyinmana. The 22d Division was to fall back slowly on Pyinmana. On reaching its vicinity, the 22d was to fall back rapidly to the northwest, allowing the Japanese to come into contact with the 96th Division.....To the Chinese right, it would be essential for the British to hold in the Irrawaddy valley. They doubted their ability to do this." The whole thing messes up because the British can't hold on the right and the Chinese can't reinforce them in a coordinated way.
That never should have been expected of them. A multinational force with no experience of working together should not have mounted a forward defense. But Stilwell insisted.
DESIRE TO KNOW MORE INTENSIFIES.
Thank you both for getting me interested in a theatre of the war that I do not know much about.
I'm definitely with you on that.
"Stilwell was best at training troops"......I can remember one other such general; did Stillwell have an ancestor named George McClellan?
Only McClellan's ego was even greater, rivalling MacArthur.
George McClellan was a quarter master general extraordinary which is important to any army but did not fit in as a combat commander.
Remember ,LEE, said the best union general he faced WAS, MCLELLAN.
@@edwardmurphy7792 When did he say that?
Attack
No
Attack them
No
ATTACK THEM
NO
You know what buddy old pal? You're fired
*insert fallout shelter failure noise*
Good video. It really shows why we still need to research topics that so many people seem to think that "we already know everything about".
Always appreciate your videos with Justin Pyke, he always provides some great information and insight. Keep it up!
I recommend deeper look into Stilwell's treatment of the Chindits. You say he loved his troops, but this was perhaps true for the Chinese troops. After Stilwell was done with the Chindits they utterly despised him.
It wasn't only the Chindits who despised him. Merrill's Marauders hated him. They wanted to shoot him. The book by John Masters, a Chindit officer, "The Road Past Mandalay" cites one Marauder as saying "I had the bastard in my sights". Which is indicative of the odium in which he was held by Americans fighting in Burma.
Stillwell granted the accolades for the taking of Myktikina (Spelling?) to the Chinese Army. Mike Calvert sent a signal to him - "The Chinese having taken Myktikina the Chindits have taken umbrage". On meeting Calvert for the first time Stillwell commented, "You send some prettly strongly worded messagage". Calvert replied, "You should see the ones my Brigade Major would not let me send". Calvert was an ultra aggressive killing machine who led from the front and fought alongside his men (Many of his officers were concerned that Calvert liked fighting a little too much and got off on killing Japanese - It was what he war there for but maybe he enjoyed the violence a little too much) Stillwell apparently ordered Calvert to take his men to yet another fight, Calvert informed him that his men were at the end of what was physically endurable and he would not order his men to do any more. He instead paraded his men and informed them he was going to fight and said his men were free to join him if they should wish to and started off marching in that direction. They all fell behind him and hobbled off to do battle. This apparently had quite an effect on Stilwell. Without a doubt Calvert was a very flawed man but he was also without a doubt one of the best and arguably the best fighting Brigadier the allies had. Could not win the battle against his own demons, the bottle or the British establishment and they combined to finish a man who had been put forward more than once for a VC.
Stilwell wasn't "done with the Chindits", his long standing conflict with Chiang Kai Shek had him pulled from Burma in a 24 hour period. He didn't have time to say goodbye to anyone. Sure the Chindits felt abandoned, not unlike the Vietnamese or Afghan loyalists left after the US withdrawal. Once Stilwell left the US focus on N. Burma shifted to the Pacific War, as the tide had turned and the Japanese could no longer sustain their Chinese advances. N. Burma went on the back burner and whatever promises or hope that Stilwell had instilled left on the plane with him.
@@williamhedrick5950 After the shit he did to them, the Chindits didn't "feel abandoned" when he left. They were glad to be rid of him.
Given his contempt for everyone given authority over him, his tactical, strategic, and diplomatic ineptitude, and his genuine ability to train raw recruits into competent fighting men, General Joseph Stillwell seems to have been a reincarnation of General George B. McClellan.
He didn't lose, he just failed to win!
The big difference being, that Stillwell rushed his unprepared Chinese troops against a superior enemy and got them slaughtered, while McClellan was very catious about fighting.
I vote Stillwell, Germans in Italy was temporary
the KMT being screwed over is still a problem we are dealing with today.
This should have been about mark clark. How that guy stayed in command when US sacked other generals for less is beyond me.
This guy is basically responsible for Mao taking power, it’s pretty hard to get a higher body count
I'd argue it was chiangs incompetence and the rampant corruption in kuomintang that enabled mao to take power. You can hardly blame stilwell for that.
Saastapukki ́ KMT had been sabotaged by friendly so many times it’s actually sad. The thing to remember is that KMT is in no way in control of the whole China. A lot of his subordinates are originally warlords that surrendered with the condition that they get to keep their army and structures. This amount to half of the Chinese army that is only superficially under KMT control and often straight up run away in the face of Japanese troops, and some like CCP would actively backstab the whole effort. When they almost eradicated CCP Chiang got betrayed by one of the warlords that insisted on him dealing with the Japanese and let the CCP go. Stillwel’s complete incompetence not only hampered the Chinese war efforts, but also painted Chiang in a very bad image (he is bad, don’t get me wrong, but his candidate is Mao). When the war ended Chiang immediately start squashing CCP troops and are actually quite successful, forcing the CCP into Manchuria. Then the US of A comes in and tried to negotiate an armistice by splitting China the way they did Korea. Which is outrageous when you consider this is basically demanding KMT to give up vast territories in a fight they were winning. Tell me someone that will accept this. When Chiang refused to sign(and Mao refused too), the US cut off support for KMT while the Soviets are arming CCP. And it all went downhill from there.
So yes, despite their to be many corruption/inept in the KMT leadership, they’re actually winning the civil war despite that before the Soviets and US intervened. Stillwel is responsible for the sour relationship between China and USA. I’d say on the subject of Mao taking power he is probably the most influential single person
The KMT was the main fighting force against the Japanese, it's hard to do much after fighting a literal World War. One that lasted longer for you than anyone else other than the Japanese who you were fighting.
@Dnomse ReldasReldas maybe that's how crap should be remembered with crap.
For an insiders view by a Chindit Brigade commander, read the passage on Stillwell in The Road Past Mandalay by John Masters. Stillwell was roundly hated by his own American troops in Merrill's brigade. Stillwell quite intentionally ground them into the dirt to the point where very few were still fit for action. He also routinely lied to a compliant press about the achievents of his Chinese command e.g. he gave a press release that his Chinese division had captured Mogaung when it was overrun by a Chindit brigade at a cost of 700 casualties. Stillwell's men turned up on the last day and took half an acre for 3 casualties. He was petty and vindictive. Masters uses temperate language but his comment that Stillwell's obsessive chip on the shoulder against the British revealed an inferiority complex of frightening proportions. His wilful and callous neglect and sacrifice of Merrill's men demonstrates his unfitness for senior commanders.
Tuchman's account in "Stilwell and the American Experience in China" tells a very different tale. Having read quite a bit of both authors, I'll lean toward Tuchman in terms of academic credibility.
@@williamhedrick5950 Tuchman literally took what Stilwell told her at face value and ignored other sources entirely.
@@magni5648 You're not the sharpest crayon in the box, are you?
@@williamhedrick5950Evidently sharper than you, though. Again, Tuchman *literally* took Stilwell by his word and didn't even bother with other sources. Her book may as well have been Stilwell's own memoirs. It sure stands out that her account is *THE ONLY ONE* that puts him in a good light, while literally everyone else blasts him for being a walking disaster at interpersonal relations who ran every unit he was given direct command of into the ground.
@@williamhedrick5950 Tuchman's book is a great narrative and incredibly interesting to read, but the reason it's so biased is she didn't consult Chinese sources at all
My father fought in the Pacific and I was born in Japan after WW2. We lived on Taiwan when Chiang Kai-shek ran the island. I remember my dad talking about General Stilwell and his bad reputation a long time ago. It turns out he was even worse than I had originally thought.
Having spent much of my life over on the China coast it has had a great impact on me. Thank you for this information and the effect it had on geopolitical history even after his death.
When I lived in Houston there was a chain of Chinese fast food restaurants called General Joes. They had a cartoon character as their Logo that combined Chaing Kia-Shek and Joe Stilwell. The character had a yellow face with slity eyes wearing an American military uniform complete with jodhpurs and a swagger stick. I know that the two men hated each other and I imagine that if they could see that restaurant logo they would roll over in their graves.
You were brainwashed by Chiang Kai-shek. It is Chiang Kai-shek who made Stilwell's job impossible.
@@sjsupa Ha ha, that's funny, brainwashed by Chiang Kai-shek.
No, the reality is that Vinegar Joe was hated within the US Army.
How To Catch and Convict a Pedophile - A Guide BY GENERAL wesley clark (who IS PEDOFIL}...
@@sjsupa Uh huh. Cool story, bro. Tell it to Merill's Marauders, will you? I mean, what was left of them after Stilwell was done running them into the ground the same as he had any chinese unit that had the misfortune to be commanded by him.
I think General Mark Clark must be a pretender. His refusal to obey orders allowed the Germany army to escape encirclement and withdraw north to form another defensive line across Italy.
This is why history should be learned from multiple sources.
The first book I read about MacArthur was written in the 50's. I believe he may have had some say in the editing. If it were to be believed, he was the Golden Standard for which all officers should aspire.
More modern sources see less gold, more lead filled tin with gold foil.
Just think... He thought about running for President after being dismissed from Korea. He would have been a Jimmy Carter with an insane love of War. Good thing Ike trumped his ambition.
I think Mark Clark is running equal to Stilwell .
Mark Clark is saved by the fact he didn't destroy millions of troops and handed the most populous country of the world to the communists.
@@HistoryGameV yeah he just killed thousands of Allied troops with a massive ego and poor strategic planning.
Clark also fought in the Korean War, chinese don't really have high opinion about him. His predecessor Ridgway was much more effective
This is a great video. I remember reading Barbara Tuchman’s book years ago and thinking hmmm how come Stilwell never seemed to win any of the campaigns he worked on. Now I know why, so thank you
Admiral King - best friend of all german submariners for avoiding convoy system for a year ... Cost a lot of sailors life in front or sight of the coast, burning tankers ...
Good nomination. It was almost like he was deliberately avoiding using the convoy system purely because it had been recommended by the British. Petty reasons to allow a lot of men to die.
@@chrisstone5743 Well King had some redeeming qualities... like the time where he made the Bureau of Ordnance finally move on their "the mark 14 is competently functional with no flaws" stance.
@@Nonsense010688 A small 'redeeming quality'.
@@chrisstone5743 I wouldn't downplay the mark 14 problem too much but of course you can argue that one can kick bureaus butt and do convoys and not being petty like "because the british said it, I won't do it".
@@Nonsense010688 Yes, it would have possible for King to sort out the torpedoes and to do the convoys. A pity that he didn't.
This was really interesting guys. The dynamic between you two in this video was really awesome, you should do more videos together!
its gotta be Mark Clark, Audie Murphy says so and I'm going to go with his opinion. People in Texas despise that man. His soldiers called him "General Marcus Aurelius Clarkus "
I am a history buff. You are feeding my addiction, especially about Chiang. I had Hans Von de Vans bookk, but left it on an airplane. I really need to buy another one. It was a great book. I often had to reread some events several times just to understand the situation.
There is another book by Jay Taylor, Generalissimo, CKS. Taylor was a American Foreign Service Officer served in American Embassy in Taiwan. He initially disliked liked him, and accepted the conventional wisdom at the time that Chiang was just a dictator. Taylor of course would later totally changed his mind, and wrote his biography with help of Taiwanese archives and Chiangs diary.
Thank you.
You're welcome! Yeah, Taylor's biography of Chiang is a must-read. I feel he is too pro-Chiang in some parts, particularly the post-war chapters, but that comes down to a matter of interpretation and argument. It is excellent overall and his wartime chapters are superb.
@@justinpyke1756 Hey Justin I have a lot of respect for your work. I started to be interested in this part of history around 10 years ago. Just one day felt curious by some online argument, then started reading "wedemeyer report", eventually read Taylor's book. I have been very convinced by Taylor's description of CKS, mostly because of Chiang's core value of traditional Chinese culture. I am still reading on this topic, more and more I feel I can understand Chiang's emotions at different turns of history. Shred many tears for him and our nation.
I was gonna say "Percival," but it said U.S. and he was the Brit who lost Singapore.
It's amazing that US historians have ignored Indian and British sources where Stilwell is widely despised.
When the competition for worst includes MacArthur and Mark Clark it takes some doing to win this easily.
gives u wonder did they the US only win because of superior logistics and equipment because three of its 6 major commanders were turds and some were mediocre to the point of near turds
on the turd list
Stilwell
MacArthur
Halsey
and a little fart Chenault
if not for Nimitz, Gieger, Spruance, Lemay and the crypto guys, the Jarheads the grunts and squids that did the fighting and dying this shit may have gone bad if left completely to the idiots on my top list.
That's mostly because there is a perception that the British didn't like most American commanders, even the competent ones. Names that otherwise command respect within American circles such as Marshal, Eisenhower, Patton, and many other famous generals are panned in the post war writings by people like Alan Brooke, Bernard Montgomery and even Harold Alexander. It should also be pointed out that Alan Brooke for his part had nothing but praise for MacArthur. So US historians don't really give much credence to British sources regarding the effectiveness of American commanders.
@@Avalanche041 The American Generals that have garnered the most respect at home often mystify others. Patton, for example, gained a postwar reputation far higher than his abilities and achievements yet Bradley did more and better, as was recognised by the speed of his promotions, yet remains in old blood and guts' shadow.
To be fair British and others' perceptions of Eisenhower have always been very positive with the notable exception of Montgomery who never could keep his mouth shut.
No country likes to listen to criticism of its military leaders from abroad however it appears that the US is more insular than most in this regard.
That's because you are basing this off of British Sources. Which, like American sources, can be very bias. Likewise, if you researched British General Bernard Montgomery using only American sources, you would come off believing he never did anything right. However British sources, especially media, would have you believing he never did anything wrong. The truth is always somewhere in the middle.
@@Front-Toward-Enemy I make the effort to read widely, I use European American, and Asian sources, the latter when I can find them in English. Popular history is almost always wrong wherever it's found.
If you want a pretty accurate assessment of Montgomery then there's no need to look further than Eisenhower's description of him.
I would say Mark Clark was worse than Stilwell.
Justin, thank you for clarifying some of the suspensions that I had before from reading the old books about CBI. I remember reading Stilwell told correspondent Belden that the Chinese 55th division vanished into thin air. You mentioned in the video that Stilwell did not fully comprehended the situation and aware that some units are still fighting Japanese when he decided to retreat to India.
My favorite bad Admiral is Carleton Wright whos racism disparaged the IJNs Torpedoes, never could be as good as American, lost 1 Cruiser sunk and three Cruisers catastrophically damaged to torpedoes while salvoing off ineffectively 24 Torpedoes against 8x IJN Destroyers only 2 fully armed. Admiral C. Wright commanded 5 Cruisers and 6 Destroyers. After successfully sinking 1 Destroyer, Wright claimed an outrageously large IJN defeat which continued to mask the utter failure of US Navy torpedoes to explode or track at proper depth. He went on to command the 'Port Chicago' Calif. ordnance loading port where incentivized speedy loading and manual handling resulted in a disaster that cost 320 dead 390 injured. His high-handed prosecution of safety concerned stevedores sentenced 50 of his men to Dishonorable discharge and 15 years each at hard labor for the 'Port Chicago Mutiny' see Wikipedia. The stevedores were Black Americans.
I like Stilwell probably not because of what he did but where he was. He went to the high school as me and helped China when my grandparents were just kids
He should read up on Chenault, a real friend of China, brilliant airmen, and a pioneer of US military aviation. He was literally the only person in the US military who saw first hand Japanese air combat doctrine and capabilities before Pearl Harbor as he literally flew biplanes in the air to observe what few planes the KMT had sent up to fight the Japanese. He wrote about the capabilities of Japanese airpower to the USAAF before Pearl Harbor but was ignored.
lire :
" thunder out of china " theodore white
" china shakes the world ", " retreat with stilwell " jack belden
" china correspondant " agnes smedley
" dragon by the tail " john paton davies ...
2nd up worst general might be Mark Clark at Anzio?
And yet another Well Done video sir. It was wonderful meeting you at the D-Day Ohio event. I hope your travels back home were easy. The only thing I can add to this is most Americans who are not history Buffs probably only know about the Flying Tigers and general chennault in the China theater I found out much more about what was going on there while play testing a game about the Japanese invasion of China.
Hey Mike, thank you and thank you for saying hello! You were the one who walked with us from the "lower parking lot" to the Wargaming booth, if I remember correctly.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized yes sir that was me.
I have posted the photo of you and the chieftain with links to your you tube channels. Because more people should have access to well done historical information.
Talk about the Japanese invasion of French Indochina in 1945!
1940
No, the US was not defeated in Viet Nam. We weren't even there militarily. It was up to the South Vietnamese to defend their country after 1973 and they failed. How can we be defeated when we're not there?
@@Mondo762 we retreated in 73. The final push came in 74.
@@davidtuttle7556 There was a huge draw down of combat troops in 1973-4 effectively taking the US out of the fight against North Vietnam. President Nixon called it "Vietnamization" a phased withdrawal of American ground troops and additional material and advisory support to make the ARVN self-sufficient. After the 1974 election the Democrats in Congress took away material support to South Vietnam and the whole effort collapsed in the face of the invading NVA.
@@Mondo762 Again. We withdrew. There was little public support for continuing the fight. Add in that Nixon had run on a platform of ending the stalemate.
Mark Clark should be a serious competitor to get the award for worst general of the war. He got many soldiers killed due to his failure to take advantage of opportunities, failure to listen to his staff, ignored intelligence, was indecisive, incompetent, vain, and then tried to place blame on others.
one of the main reasons he was chosen was because he could speak Chinese and had been to China in the 1930s...i guess for the US military back then that sort of knowledge/experience is quite rare...plus I feel the situation in China in 1942, was already sort of unsalvagable
The Chinese, both Nationalist and Communist forced the Japanese to commit large numbers of troops that might have been used against us in the Pacific.
@@JRobbySh Agreed, of all 230+ Japanese divisions mobilized during the war,, well over two-thirds were stuck in China against the NRA's resistance
@@JRobbySh I disagree with this argument every time I see it. Japanese long term goal always was China, nothing was ever going to change that. I agree that the Warlords working together managed to slow Japan down and thus tie the Japanese Army up tremendously but you also have to remember that when Japan decided to island hop, they left behind intentionally weaker divisions because they knew the what the encounter would be. The mainland Chinese forced needed the best equipment. The only way those troops could be used against the Allies elsewhere is if the Army managed to already have China contained and controlled and even then I can make a case that would be moot as we saw how the Japanese navy did against the Allies after 41 and that might of been more of a nightmare if the Army had to be redeployed.
@@dergberg3923 That wasn't necessarily the case in terms of tying down Japanese military personnel. For most of the Pacific war the China Expeditionary Army was around 1,000,000 to 1,200,000 or so men. Japan had an army of around 6,000,000 by 1945. The estimate of troops held down by the Nationalists that could have been redeployed elsewhere seems to come in around 500,000 to 600,000, but had seen estimates has high as 800,000 (maybe earlier in the war - in 1942?).
And troops were getting withdrawn from the China Expeditionary Army by the end of 1943, on into 1944.
Good points UT Stillwell moniker Vinegar says all we need know as man and person
To the commentators: You should read the British Ghurka Commander's book on the campaign. Very critical and accurate.
1. when I read about Stillwell 40 years ago, there was no mention of the Chinese armies.
2. you should give the credit for any successes to Orde Wingate.
3. yes, he did abandon his command. He thought that it was destroyed.
4. if and when you ever research the overall experience of the American troops, a high percentage of them died during the campaign and within the the year following its conclusion.
General Clark and General Stillwell tie tie for last place.
Stillwell claimed British and Indian Army victories as his own.
Chiang never told Stillwell anything of the kind about the three Chinese divisions (not Armies!!). The fact is that Chiang was constantly overstating the capabilities of his formations because he was collecting the money to pay the troops from the US.....and not paying them.
“He was promoted well beyond capabilities.” The on-going Achilles Heel of military history
Brigadier General Bonner Frank Fellers (February 7, 1896 - October 7, 1973) He is notable as the military attaché in Egypt whose extensive transmissions of detailed British tactical information were unknowingly intercepted by Axis agents and passed to Nazi German Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel for over six months, which contributed to disastrous British defeats at Gazala and Tobruk in June 1942.
Not a word about this from our American friends.
I think my personal pick for worst would be one General Almond. I only know about him from the research I did for a paper almost 10 years ago, but if I remember correctly he:
1.) Was a General involved in the Italian campaign, of rather mediocre capabilities.
2.) Was placed in command of one of the few army units made up of African Americans.
The reason I say he’s my personal pick for worst would be this: when said unit suffered fairly heavy losses and several reversals due to his own failures as a commanding officer, rather than owning up to it, *he blamed the failures of his own unit on the unit itself, specifically the fact that it was made up of blacks*. He even went so far as to recommend to the higher-ups that blacks should never again be used by the army.
You description of Stilwell sounds suspiciously like US civil war general McClellan. History has not been kind to McClellan as well.
Sharp observation. Mac was actually immensely competent. Stilwell was thought to be among the best at the time. Why he was sent there in fact.
Yes he gets the title as worst CW General aka Young Napoleon. Little hefty on him the critics are about him.
@@jamesjacocks6221 mac was competent at training and organizing but he couldnt bear the thought of sending his men to die fighting so he let several opportunities get away.
@@mauriciosanchez5616 and to add insult to injury lee knew his personality to well and took advantage of it. mac's over cautious nature was his down fall.
@@TheManofthecross yes the war might have been over without much bloodshed, a shame
This is highly offsided. did you forget he also had no budget, and those in Washington had no clue as to the hardships that the troops were actually facing. He lost more troops to Malaria than he did to actual combat.
Very good point. Stillwell was given pretty much nothing but leftovers (whether that was entirely avoidable is arguable, but it's still the truth). Never was his command given priority over any other area. Had Vinegar Joe been, instead, Honey Joe, I suspect the analysis would have been different.
But the thing was, he wasn't there to please Washington. He was there to help China fight Japan in a way that would help the global war effort.
Also, he lost tons of Chinese troops to actual combat.
Nobody also seems to be mentioning that Shek wanted to hoard lend lease supplies for a Chinese civil war and didn't want Stillwell using it all up + the insane method of supplying his troops via the hump
No budget, huh?
Becuase surely that's the problem that led to him getting three chinese divisions murdered in '42, and then running the Chindits and Merill's Marauders into the ground, too. And LMAO@Washington having no clue. STILWELL had no fucking clue as to the hardships that the troops under his command were forced to endure on his orders. This is a man who ordered battalions to continue attacking after they told him that ~90% of their men were combat-ineffective due to disease and wounds. Stilwell treated the men under his command - be they Chinese, Indian, British or American - with a level of callous disregard matching one Luigi Cadorna in intensity, if not scale. (Merill's Marauders went into Burma ~300 men strong. After Stilwell was done with them, they were down to *130* combat-effectives. This is ENTIRELY on Stilwell.)
Stilwell's name comes to mind, but only because of results. I would think MacArthur should be listed before. Served under his son in Korea in mid 70s. Much different personality apparently.
What you consider makes a bad general is subjective, but top of my list would be killing your own men completely unnecessarily and without any regret simply to fan your own ego, further your own career, get headlines in newspapers and fame, which makes for me the two equally worst US generals Mark E Clark and Patton..... How many mothers got letters, "your son died unnecessarily, we could have done the job without him dying but the general would have got less personal glory if we had done so?"
MacArthur too
So what was it that Patton did that was unnecessary and simply for his ego? Just curious.
Didn't Clarks own men bring a post war class action against him for murderous incompetance
This guys has got a lot of cool information thank you Bernard!
Could make a case for Douglas Macartur. The people in charge at Pearl Harbor were removed because on December attack. The next day afer a suprise attack in Philippines wiped out all planes on ground and then with country being overrun what happenes? Macartur gets a promotion. Nice to know right people and having a lot of pull
McArthur had been Army Chief of Staff, and very prominent in the affairs of the Philippines. Too big a prize to be captured by the Japanese. Besides, under his command the USA did very well retaking the Philippines, whose recovery was essential to a colonial power like the USA.
I have a glimmering of the political difficulties that Stilwell faced. This was not a favourable posting for an aging general during wartime (where employment is typically good for soldiers). The language and cultural difficulties working with the Chinese would almost be insurmountable. One also wonders at the level of corruption involved in the armed forces of the Nationalist Chinese at that time, which would require Chiang Kai-Shek to get a foreign field general, although I also wonder at the lack of importance the Chinese Nationalists placed on their South-West front? I would not want Stilwell's job with caviar and champagne supplied daily. No wonder Stilwell was irascible at times.
Stilwell didn't suffer fools in the best of situations, and he had little patience with CKS because CKS was an idiot. Had FDR listened to Stilwell and Davies and cut CKS off from lend/lease in favor of the communists (no big deal because we were giving lend/lease equipment to our Soviet communist allies so they could attack in Manchuria) the next half century of warfare and Cold War politics might have ended up very differently. We were convinced (as we were with Diem in Vietnam) that CKS was the great hope for the birth of the new Christian Democracy in China. Stilwell, Davies and even Marshall saw what would happen, but nobody listened.
My uncle had a small library of WW II books that I started reading about 60 years ago. Its amazing that I'm still as interested and learning as much as I did way back then.
Joe Stilwell's characterization of the farcical Louis Mountbatten was well-chosen. The man was nothing more than a public relation newsreel show. Putting such a figure in charge of anything with relevance is a sick yoke.
@John Cornell Yes all true, but Eisenhower did have the diplomatic skill to keep all the prima donna commanders more or less under control. That turned out to be is primary task, and he did that quite well.
As a field commander nobody of his colleagues took him seriously. "Ike is a football coach, running up and down along the sidelines, waving his hands and shouting to is team to go forward" one of his commanders (I don't remember which one) once commented.
I thought it was going to be Mark Clark.
I am reading a book “Seven Stars” by Sarantakes, a book of a collection of diaries of Buckner and Stilwell. In a shock I find that Stilwell’s personal diary is full of his confessions of back-stabbing and constant lobbying for better assignment (after Burma, he’ll take, if not beg, any assignment, even as low as a division cmdr, said himself to MacArthur) not by merit but by opportunistic prospecting through his personal relations in the chain of command. Hard to believe, so I turn to the internet for more info, and I find this RUclips discussion. He’s supposed to be a person who can rightfully claim his accolades; a marching band, flying banners or some next-gen high-tech, do-it-all tank’s namesake, as if he is the Captain America, WWII Rambo or Jungle John Wayne. But his personal diary seems to be telling a very different story.
Please tell me the credentials of the gentlemen making this presentation. I felt sure their life achievements will pale in comparison to Stilwell's. I have studied much of what is available in the English language regarding this great American, and their sarcasm and criticism are mean spirited, doing a disservice to the memory of a great American.
Please read Theodore White, and recent account of George Marshall's 13 months in China after the end of the War, trying to form a coalition between the Nationalists and Communists. There is no question that Chiang's government was hopelessly corrupt, effectively driving popular support into the ranks of the Communists. That was NOT Stilwell's fault.
The presenters of this video should be ashamed of themselves.
@@markhelbraun5425 Papers is more expensive than diary. I paid 29.95 for Stilwell’s diary in Seven Stars; now a new hardcopy of the Stilwell Papers (ISBN-10 : 1299031870), authored by Stilwell himself and edited and arranged by T. H. White, is asking for 248.79. That is a mind-boggling price to pay.
4
Finally, a long overdue revision of Sixties revisionism.
My late uncle was in the Chindits and they hated Stillwell to a man. Plenty of evidence from American sources as well about how badly a lot of US troops felt about him too.
i lvoeo thhe chinditis stillwelll was the worst asshole and fucktard in history.
This is a great presentation. I'd been taught in late 80's military history the simplified version that the Chinese troops weren't reliable, but his (Stilwell's) actions never did make any sense to me at the time. Looking back, my bet now is that this whole situation was allowed to continue for 2 reasons. First, because this was considered the least important theater by the US government and the military. The army's focus was in Europe and with Germany, and the Pacific theater was primarily a Naval concern. What influence the Army had in the Pacific was generally centered around MacArthur, and his primary concern was his own publicity. So Marshal's primary concern in the Pacific was dealing with MacArthur and Nimitz. Second, of all the theaters the US faced in WW2, this one had the worst communications. By that, I mean the ability for senior people to travel back and forth to visit for in person meetings. Senior army and navy commanders met all the time in Europe and in the Pacific. But CBI? I'm certain is was a serious undertaking. So the third priority theater, not really seen as a major problem in the US at the time, was tucked away and left to fail. My bet is that they picked this guy not because he was great, but because he was independent, and more of a micro-manager than strategist. So he micromanaged, and wrecked the campaign, but he didn't divert resources from the other areas that were more important to the US. Maybe his failure was anticipated? If we could only go back in time, though... Had Bradley been there instead, China might be a democracy today.
He wasn't supposed to be a general in China at all. Chiang had gotten along well with his previous foreign advisors (Alexander von falkenhausen from Germany) but these guys had actually listened to what the Chinese said about their own capabilities. Stillwell believed that when the Chinese described their own limitations, they were just covering up their own cowardice.
@@porksterbob That makes perfect sense, thanks for the comment to my comment. Listening is tough for many people, probably tougher for a general listening to someone that he probably felt was inferior (which was clearly inaccurate). Not an excuse, though, Stillwell was lousy. Good leaders in any time in history listen, and have respect for both ally and foe.
@@tomsmith3045 Stilwell was also a huge press / glory hound like MacArthur.
He also lacked the diplomatic skills that someone like Eisenhower had to keep the coalition politics running.
I'm sure that whoever the US sent to the Soviet Union knew about the gulags and the NKVD, but also had the presence of mind not to insult Stalin to his face or speak ill of him in public.
@@porksterbob 蒋介石和德国顾问、苏联顾问，甚至日本顾问和其他美国顾问都相处的很好。
Clark extended the war by six months
This is the most seriously interesting conversation I have ever listened to.
That comment about Stillwell about him being the best three star company commander, reminds me of Rommel during Crusader when he left his army command to lead a unit in an assault.
@Ken Shearson The thing is, Rommel won tactical battles, often due to him being in direct command, but lost the stratigical fight for North Africa. For example he called for more supplies, but at no point tried to get Italian and German naval and air forces to cooperate to either build a proper convoy system or assault Malta. Had he lobbied for this, it would have happened. This is to a certain degree comparable with Stilwell, with a certain difference: Stilwells theatre of war was MASSIVELY bigger, with worse lines of communication. Rommal had what, 2-4 German and 10 Italian divisions at peak strength? Stilwell was effectively the supreme commander of the whole KMT army numbering millions. Put Rommel into this role and you might get the same result. Though he at least showed learning potential, his preparations in France pre-D-Day were pretty good given what little resources he got.
@@HistoryGameV Rommel was not a naval commander and could not have squeezed blood from the limited German supply and Italian shipping forces. Further, the British had thorougly broken the German/Italian shipping codes and were routinely intercepting the majority of supplies enroute to N. Africa.
@@KB4QAA Exactly. And instead of supporting an invasion of Malta or at least a heavy blockade by air and naval forces as it was in effect when he arrived in North Africa, he demanded all Luftwaffe forces he had should remain under his control and not support any action against Malta. Also he lobbied against any diversion of forces to such an operation. Which, as he was immensly popular with Hitler at the time, had quite some impact. The seriously lackluster cooperation between Italian and German command structures did the rest. So just as I said, while he was an excellent tactical and operational commander, his abilities on the strategical level were, at least at that time, seriously limited. Just as with Stilwell.
Though I am not saying he did not improve. His preparations for D-Day were, when you think of the limited resources he had and what kind of command positions he had been in up to that point, very impressive. I am pretty sure that D-Day would have been significantly bloodier for the Allies had Rommel had full control of his forces, especially the WSS divisions.
@@HistoryGameV The ENTIRE tale of Hitler's interfering in D-Day is FALSE. Decades after the war, a surviving D-Day German commander was chowing down with his British opposites -- and then it flashed to him: Hitler/ OKW had given standing orders -- posted to EVERY commanding bunker/HQ that if ANY of the following was noted that ALL reserves are to be promptly released:
1) Parachute landings -- real or just dummies -- either way it's ON.
2) Partisan sabotage of phone lines -- it's ON.
3) Battleship/ Cruiser beach bombardment -- it's ON.
4) Heavy enemy bomber strikes upon the coastline -- it's ON.
I forgot the rest. This list was printed en masse and distributed ALL OVER.
In the event, everyone was so stressed -- it -- the list -- went completely out of their memories -- all of them!
That's how freaked out the Germans were !
It is also FALSE that Hitler did not permit the panzers to move. He ONLY retained his personal restriction to ONE formation: the 1st SS Panzer Corps -- of two divisions. (1st & 12th) Yup.
Why? He feared that his Heer generals just might FLIP and join the Anglo-Allies -- that's why! The 1st SS Corps was being held back within short striking distance of German Army high command HQs. Cute! They were Adolf's ENFORCERS.
Guderian countered this with the 116th Panzer Division. He gave it TWO Panther battalions AND a Mark IV battalion AND stuffed it with anti-Nazi Germans. Guderian got to decide which divisions got new panzers.
He presented the 116th Panzer Division to Adolf on his BIRTHDAY as a gift. What a Jolly Joker.
You'll note that the 116th is strangely missing from the Normandy campaign -- until Guderian can't keep it in reserve any longer. That's why it ends up in the Mortain counter-offensive. Eventually, the SD came after all of the 116ths leading officers. The whole outfit was infested with anti-Nazis. NOT an accident.
NOW do you understand why Hitler held back the 1st SS Corp?
All the other tales are pure BS. They are EXCUSES issued by the losers.
I can't believe you put Stilwell on this list.
I assume Mark Clark comes in second.
4 year old thread but my vote goes to Gen. Lloyd Fredendall. He was drunk, headquartered too far behind the line and oversaw perhaps the worst route of the US Army in WW2. Just an abject failure as a combat leader in every possible respect.
Might be, but it seems the most hated is Clark: ruclips.net/video/h64J4vsHUuk/видео.html
Exactly, who said along with General Clark.
Ooo!! You or Drach could also do a “Worst Admiral in the US during WW2” also! I nominate Adm. Adolphus Andrews, the man largely responsible for allowing the SS Normandie to burn.
I mean I already know who drach is picking cough king cough
I like him, but it is Admiral Halsey. Sailed into two typhoons *and* went with the wrong move at Leyte Gulf.
@@jameson1239 Drach would pick Admiral Gensoul from Mers El Kebir.
I'll bet when Chaing kai Shek regretted not moving to get rid of this guy when found out that Stillwell and OSS Chief Donovan went behind his back to throw the support of our investment there to Mao Zedong. Did he and Donovan actually get along?
I thought Admiral King's first six months of the war in the Atlantic pretty revealing of some pettiness both resulting in a disastrous loss of control of our oil reserves but also pretty much at odds with his temperament through any part of the war when he wasn't having to deal with the fact that the British Admiralty wasn't our enemy.
There seems an abundance of ship commanders in the US Navy that I probably wouldn't find competent at much other somehow avoiding being the focus of any board of inquiry,,that followed some disaster they were in total charge of.
Those kinds of inquiries usually seemed to find someone of less rank and less connected and more accessible for their focus to fix some blame somewhere that wouldn't . . . you know . . . rock anybody's boat that mattered...
The ones that would scare me the most if I found myself under their command are the kind that lose a battle through nothing but incompetence but brazenly lie about how many more cruisers they sunk than they lost which buries any reason for there to be any inquiry whatsoever. That's the kind of stuff of Joseph Heller or Louis Ferdinand Celine novels right there..
Ooh! You mentioned McCarthyism and targeting people who had served in the China-Burma-India theater - that made me remember something. I was researching for a project on Milton Wolff who was the last commander of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in Spain and it turned out that after the Spanish Civil War he had served - in some capacity - in Burma and had given the impression that it was basically to take him and all the other unwanted political types and shove them over to a corner of the war where no one would care about them. Eventually he met the guy in charge of the OSS at the time (was it Donovan?) and was recruited to supposedly airdrop into Northern Italy and help coordinate Partigiani. I wonder if that were one reason McCarthy sunk his claws into veterans of that theater - if what Wilt Wolff said about being 'exiled' there was true.
the war for china was incredibly cursed
wise words from Applejoge
Pretty much.
Must have never heard of Lloyd Fredendall.
My dad was a naughty general...
And Lucas at Anzio.
Stillwell and the Army Air Commander were quite a pair
I've never heard Stilwell referred to in terms that could remotely be considered saintly but rather the opposite.
This is a phenomenon specific to American histories prior to the early 2000s. British histories, from my understanding, have a far more nuanced view.
Mao's 1948 Communist Revolution was won by Stilwell in Burma from 1942-44.
In terms of 1948 and the Chinese Civil war, think more the case of the Imperial Japanese Army crippling the Nationalists, including one last massive mauling through 1944 with the Ichi-Go offensive, while the Soviets gave the CCP a massive boost with the gift that was Manchuria (with sanctuaries and supplies from places like North Korea) after October 1945.
@@michaeldunne338 agreed, but vinegar Joe was responsible for the destruction of the best trained and equipped nationalist troops in fruitless frontal attacks. Chaing Kai shek was furious, but fdr assured him that the u.s. would support him over the communists. Chaing made one mistake...he trusted a Democrat president to keep his word.
@@richardm3023 How many well trained and equipped Nationalist troops under real control of Chiang Kaishek were there? Seems there was never enough lend lease for the 30 or 39 division plan that Stilwell had.
Not sure what FDR promised with respect to the communists since FDR died in April 1945, four months before the abrupt end of the Asia Pacific war. Note, the Army observation group only got to Yen'an in July 1944; and Patrick Hurley, a Republican and former member of the Hoover administration, only arrived in Yen'an November 1944. So, information on the communists and conditions in the north were in some pretty formative stages. And the likes of General Wedemeyer were not so keen on the communists
Given the support in the fall of 1945 to the Kuomingtang by way of repatriating Japanese troops and civilians (a huge unsung achievement of the US and allies), troop movements, helping Nationalist troops reoccupied Taiwan and cities of the eastern seaboard, not sure fingers can be pointed at FDR? Would have to check, but have to wonder what lend lease was allowed to continue to flow through the pipeline after September of 1945, and how much equipment from the Americans were left behind for the Chinese to use? Then there were still training programs after the formal Japanese surrender on September 2.
@@michaeldunne338 they ground up the nationalist troops faster than they could build new units. I think the Japanese may have focused on the southern regions so as to not antagonize the soviets. We know that Mao husbanded his forces, and did not make any major effort to engage the Japanese from 1942 on.
@@richardm3023 Some of the grinding up could be conceivably blamed on Stilwell's use of Chinese troops in Burma. I am not ready to go there- something had to be done to secure a supply route for Nationalist China, and the Japanese moved quickly into a Burma with a weak British Empire force, and with at least some portion of the Burmese population welcoming them.
All sides husbanded resources, and by all, mean Mao with the Yan'an communists; Chiang Kai Shek and the Nationalists he directly control; the regional strongmen/warlords of the Nationalists; maybe others too (like Wang Jingwei of the Nationalists in Nanking?).
Interesting point about not antagonizing the Soviets, at least after 1943. Also, the US airbases were more in the south, and the Japanese were interested in establishing lines of communications/supply to Indochina. Otherwise, the Japanese moved against targets in central China that were the recruiting grounds of the KMT as well as a breadbasket, like Luoyang, and securing the railroad between Kaifeng and Hankow.
The thing is, the Chinese Nationalists needed a training program. The Soviets helped out in the 1920s, the Germans provide one in the 1930s, but those units got lost in the battle of Shanghai and the fight for the lower Yangtse. Interestingly enough, Stilwell's idea of 30 to 39 compact, well trained, mobile, well equipped divisions was something supposedly suggested along the same lines by Von Seekt in the 1930s (thought I read that from a biography on Madam Chang)...
In some counterfactual, if that period of relative quiet between the Summer of 1942 to March 1944 could have been used for such a build up, then I think Stilwell would have looked more of hero. But that is a counterfactual and we can't change history.
Mark Clark and Lloyd Fredendall were horrendous!
Why is the guests name not revealed?
I remember Rana Mitter writing that Stilwell planned Burma '42 campaign as 'an offensive by three corps supplied by only a single muddy dirt road'. And even Chiang Kai-shek, who is not known for his military skills, recognized that the plan was logistically unfeasible, but was forced to approve the plan because the Americans made their wartime aid dependent on it.
Also you forgot to mention that Chennault was basically a mercenary hired by Chiang (with US military approval) and only later given a command after the US joined. So he had very little political influence within the US military establishment.
Chenault had this faults but he deeply loved China and cared for it. The USAAF in China has been largely ignored by historians but their contributions were great. The Japanese literally launched Ichigo to push back against Chennault's forward airfields that were only a few hundred kilometers from China's coasts. They were using them to skip bomb the few large transports Japan had left and from their Southwest and Southern Chinese airfields attacking Burma, Vietnam, and Hong Kong. Japan was reeling from US sub warfare and relied on shallow coastal waters and small navy escorts and aircraft to provide protection for their shipping.
Chiang kai shek knew that Chinese forces shouldn't go on the offensive against Japanese ones unless the situation is extremely favorable. The few Chinese victories were won when Japan fully extended and China was able to attack Japanese troops at the end of their logistics chain after they had burned through supplies to move forward.
Chiangs and Britain's preferred plan was to retreat North 150 km near to mandalay and try to hold North Burma until May when the monsoon rains would prevent the Japan or anyone else from moving. Japan hadn't planned to take all of Burma.
They were only able to because stilwell bullied the British and Chinese into deploying 150 km farther South than their planned defensive line to prepare a counter offensive. When the Japanese realised that they had been able to defeat the allied armies in a forward position, they went on to take all of Burma. Had the original plan been followed, the allies would still have lost South Burma, but it's very possible that they would have held on to the northern half.
That would make the hump airlift much safer and more efficient and make launching a counter offensive to kick Japan out of all of Burma much cheaper and easier.
Chiang was relatively capable militarily. Keep in mind that isn't me saying he was "brilliant" (I know this is the internet, so some guy will see this and read that). He was literally a general that had commanded large formations in the field against opponents that outnumbered him across multiple fronts and won. The Central Plains War of 1930 involved over 1 million men and hundreds of thousands of casualties on three fronts. Again, Chiang made mistakes during the War of Resistance (a tendency to micro-manage being a recurring theme), but when he talked about military issues he was no spring chicken. He spoke from experience. Ironically, more experience than Stilwell had.
@@zeitgeistx5239 Chennault actually worked well with the Chinese generals providing his ground support -- so much that he became sworn brothers with his War Zone commander. That's the difference.
@@justinpyke1756 considering the caliber of Chiang's opponents during the Central Plains War, he doesn't have to be exceptional to win it. But I agree that he actually has experience organizing whole armies, unlike Stilwell.
My Dad served under General Stilwell in the China Theatre. He actually led him around at night because the
General was night blind according to my Dad. My Dad spent 3 years in China, attached as support with other Americans, to a Chinese Battalion. His recounting was that this unit spent more time retreating "running" from the Japanese forces. He said they had many nighttime "retreats" because the "Japanese were coming". Dad was very frustrated the whole time and to add insult to injury his unit was left behind, "forgotten" after the war ended. It took three months for them to finally be able to have the transportation to go home.
Marshall dismissed about a third of the Colenels and Generals shortly before the US got involved WWII. There is precious little analysis of who got dismissed and why. To me, this is very important to understand how to build a modern, flexible military. Is there a good book that covers the subject?
Marshall was a putz...he lost mainland China and it is never discussed. All the flak goes to MacArthur but everyone forgets about Inchon....why is that? Or how he hit the Japanese where they weren't in New Guinea ion 1942. MacArthur was a prima donna no question about that, but he was, save for his moving to Corregidor in 1941, a great general. Marshall never fought anywhere and never gets hit with anything because George is a demoncrat and when has a demoncrat ever been hit?
The pre war war games in Louisiana and the Carolinas showed Marshall and his senior staff that the National Guard Units were unfit for combat. The week after Pearl Harbor, all National Guard Divisions were federalized. Immediately, Marshall retired all but one National Guard Generals. The Guard units had been used by state politicians as dumping grounds for minor political figures who were owed a favor, so the Governors would issue a commission to them in their National Guard. In some instances the entire command structure of Guard units were replaced three times. This is the reason regular army Lt Colonels and Colonels were promoted one or two grades to take command.
Thanks, that helps explain why so many were dismissed yet so much dead wood remained. By the end of the war a third of those in the National Guard at the start were 2nd Lieutenant or higher. (I assume the rest were casualties or senior Sergeants). Who thinks a third of their Highschool class was officer material?
Must have sucked being in one of armies not as well trained or officered as the US was!
After the Carolina and Louisiana Maneuvers during 1941, Marshall knew the army was in trouble. When the US entered the war, there were 18 National Guard divisions. Each was commanded by a politically appointed general, some with little experience. Marshall retired 17 of the 18 generals. Only the Ohio National Guard commander was spared. After the war Marshall offered this man a regular army commission as a MG. State National Guard divisions were used by governors as dumping grounds for politically connected politicians who were due a favor, so they were given commissions. Training in most divisions was limited to close order drills and then back to the card games. Below the generals were colonels and lower ranks. Many were overage, overweight and again, no military training. The average age of a 1st Lt. in the guards was 41, majors 48. One division had its top command replaced 3 times before the army got competent commanders in there.
Any overage over weight regular army flag officers dismissed? MacArthur was safely out in the Philippines and would avoid the overage axe.
Amazing a third of everyone in the National Guard at the start of the war was 2nd Lieutenant or higher by the end of the war. I guess close order drill and cards are worth something.
Out for two years, but a good clip. Seems Stilwell was right about the Nationalists needing 30 to 39 good, well trained, well equipped divisions. And, I suspect he was the man to do it, in India, in Central and Southern China.
Just doesn't seem like he was the man to hold the position he held, which involved dealing with sensitive diplomatic matters, complex arrangements with Allies, and a precarious situation of a giant, continental sized and impoverished country almost completely cut off from supplies while facing large numbers of Japanese formations. His actual record of Burma when it comes to commanding troops/operations doesn't stand out well, while arguably he held much responsibility for poisoning US-China relations in his work with Chiang Kai Shek.
People mention corruption of the Kuomintang and Stilwell having to confront that, but not sure how much lend lease actually got to China in 1942 and 1943 given the precipitous loss of Burma and time needed to ramp up the air bridge over the rump? And, seems China ended up receiving a relatively modest proportion of lend lease - less than the Free French and France over the duration of the war. Meanwhile, a substantial amount of that was diverted by Stilwell, maybe correctly, to support training of his X-Force in India, and maybe Y-Force too...
Then there was the aid and resources sent in to support Operation Matterhorn, the air campaign from China and India, to attack Japan and Japanese forces in East Asia, which kicked off in October 1943, and ran on into 1944 until the Japanese Ichi-Go offensive rendered it useless. Now seems Stilwell was against that effort (and likely correctly again), but doesn't look like he faced much in the way of corruption issues in terms of use of resources with that effort (flying stuff from allied bases in India, to bases being built in China, entrusted in the hands of American support units?).
Hi Justin. You seem to conclude that Joe Stilwell was promoted beyond his abilities. The question is did the US have anyone else they could have promoted in the role at the time?
Given how poorly he performed, literally just pick almost anybody else. Of course this is hindsight, so Stilwell was likely going to be sent. Wedemeyer wasn't high enough in the food chain by '42 IIRC, but when he took over in '44 he did a significantly better job, even if it largely consisted of cleaning up after Stilwell. The US Army had plenty of officers available. That being said, even if the US Army had nobody else for some bizarre bureaucratic reason, that isn't exactly a point in Stilwell's favour. It certainly didn't give him a blank check to be terrible. They really needed to find somebody with some diplomatic tact, actual strategic ability, and an actual idea of what CBI was going to be within the context of the global war (not an operational theatre command, more advisory role to a foreign army). Picking a grumpy soldier's-general that couldn't stand any of his main duties and could barely think above the tactical level was a bad idea. As a divisional or lower commander, or somebody tasked solely with training? Sure, I think Stilwell would have been an excellent choice. Having to actually deal with multiple Allies with varying objectives and views in a low-priority, non-operational (from the US perspective) theatre wasn't Stilwell's strength. His one-liners and dickish attitude would have been cute if it had come from a tactical commander, but it was a poison chalice coming from somebody that was supposed to try and help coordinate Allied efforts.
@@justinpyke1756 I like how Stilwell's sole reason for being picked was that he was a general and he spoke Chinese. Especially in the light of Falkenhausen, who was effectively in Stilwell's position in the 30s (for Nazi Germany mind, China is weird) and got along fairly well with Chiang despite not speaking Chinese and Chiang not speaking German, so they both communicated in Japanese. Temperament, not linguistic skill means a lot in these situations.
I would have thought you would pick Mark Clark, who let the Germans withdraw from Monte Cassino to take Rome and set up an equally formidable defensive line further up the Italian peninsula.
Commonwealth troops who fought under Stillwell's command don't give him a stellar endorsement, from what little I have read on the war in the CBI theatre.
Thanks for the video .
...
I wasn't sure if they were discussing Stillwell or MacArthur.
Both Stilwell and MacArthur got passes from the US press for horrible losses because they were the only American generals fighting in 1942. No one in the US War Department wanted to give the impression that our generals didn't know what they were doing.
@@porksterbob MacArthur fair better than Stilwell because the US didn't give the appropriate funds to the formation of the Philippines Commonwealth Army he built an Army in a shoestring and the equipment from WW1 even the Filipinos generals like Paulino Santos and Vicente Lim knew their equipment and training is not up to standards to the US and MacArthur redeem himself as he command on of the island hopping operations to take back Philippines
@@aker1993 That's on the Americans but again, this is a problem Stilwell had as well, which is you fight and plan based on the capabilities of the army you have... not the one you wish you had. Like, for example, the PVA in Korea knew that they weren't up to US standards. They knew that they lacked planes and artillery compared to the US. They made up for it by doing night marches, prepositioning lots of people, and generally avoiding fighting the US on even terms if they could help it.
Dugout Dug was a coward and, as such, a pathetic excuse for a human being, but he was at least a moderately competent general, not great by any means, but moderately competent. Defending the PI was a monumental task, it would have taken a genius in asymmetrical warfare on the level of Lettow-Vorbeck to pull it off; though, arguably, Col. Wendell Fertig might have been up to the task had he been in overall command, not that anyone would have had any reason to suspect his greatness before the war. And even today he isn't given the recognition he deserves outside of Mindanao, largely because Dugout Dug's propaganda machine and personal vendetta against Col. Fertig. I do hate MacArthur with a burning passion, he was the scum of the earth, but still, he wasn't as incompetent as Stillwell who was amongst the most incompetent generals in history.
not Lloyd Fredendahl?
Whether he is a good or bad general, he is very much irrelevant. In my old Taiwanese history textbook, which was strictly supervised by KMT, I don't remember reading anything about Stilwell, there was the Burma road, the Hump, Chennault and his flying tigers, and Marshall Intervene; it's like someone really did not want to hear about him.The first time I ever read about Stilwell was in "History of the Second World War" by Liddell Hart, and the main thing I take from that book about him is that he has some serious personal issue with Chiang, which was not uncommon since Chiang wasn't really anyone's first choice to befriend with. However even in the last couple of decades when more historical document has been uncovered, I have watched some documentary about Stilwell and his involvement in China, it seems like people still want to portrait him as he had a serious disliking for Chiang and his KMT party but insignificant to China's war effort.
Chiang got along with Soviet military adviser，German military adviser and the military adviser after Stilwell.
The didn't call him "Vinegar Joe" for nothing.
Stilwell was more a diplomat than a general. He was supposed to get Chiang on board with US war aims. But Chiang had zero interest in US war aims. Chiang was much more interested in his own postwar aims. Stilwell did not have a diplomat’s personality, and perhaps wasn’t the best man for the job. But no one was going to succeed with Chiang.
I m sorry Chiang was not onboard with US War so. S because he was preventing the collapse of China
Chiang knew the US war aims overall - it was Europe First - and he then had to figure out how to survive within the context of that priority. And, Chiang maybe didn't expect to see South East Asia overrun as quickly as it did, like Burma, which placed his government in a real precarious situation with a dangerous lack of supply lines.
Not much sounded diplomatic about Stilwell.
Per both of my grandfathers who served in WWII (and actually met one another and agreed on it), they thought it was either Mark Clark or Lloyd Fredendall, with John C.H. Lee getting a mention due to his numerous eccentricities blocking a lot of the ideas he had (including some pretty good ones, like integrating the military and vouching for the transfer of Polish II Corps to US Command). My paternal grandfather was in the C-B-I and thought that Stilwell wasn't so much a problem as a human being as he was someone who had been overranked.
Lloyd Freedendahl by far
Mark Clark every operation he was in command he didnt have enough men for
"The worst General of WW2"? On the allied side, definitely Clarke McArthur & Patton.Their many weaknesses were easy to cover up given the massive amounts of men & materials they had at their disposal & the use of relentless propaganda. Special mention must also go to Admiral King, who's incompetence & disregard for the loss of life amongst the US Atlantic Coast merchant fleet goes unmentioned. His inexcusable hostility to the British meant he ignored valuable intelligence reports on U-Boat activity & disregarded tactical advice. As a result lives were lost, ships were sunk & the war effort badly affected. Since it all happened out at sea & not on some land based battlefield it hardly registered, but if this had been armies & tanks on land he'd be in the same league as Russian generals who simply threw men into meat grinders.
MacArthur was not anywhere close to being the worst. He had fewer casualties in his push from New Guinea to the Philippines than American force in the Battle of the Bulge. On the other hand, Omar Bradley, known as the soldiers' general, was asleep at the wheel when his divisions lost huge numbers of men and material in the Ardennes. . Patton bailed his butt out there. If you include British generals, Montgomery was a disaster at Cannes. Market Garden was even worse.
@@tomvernon2123
What disaster at Caen do you refer?
Montgomery never planned or was involved in the execution of Market Garden. Americans planned it, with another screwing up not seizing a prime bridge at Nijemgen - General Gavin. Monty had reservation of if it should go ahead when he saw the forces allocated. Another American, Eisenhower, insisted it go ahead.
Do not believe US propaganda.
@@johnburns4017 The attack on Cannes was a disaster because it took so long for it to be captured. In the end, it had to be flattened by Allied bombers before it fell, and Monty was in charge of that section. Hence the responsibility rests with him. In regard to Market Garden, thousands of British paratroopers were captured and they were certainly under the command of Mongomery. In the series Band of,Brothers it was stated that operational control was Monty's. I don't think Richard Winters would have let that mistake slide.
The worst US General in WWII was Lloyd Fredendall, followed closely by Mark Clark and Chesty Puller. Marines may hate me for Chesty, however, he was a man promoted far beyond his abilities. However, like Stillwell Puller was not lacking in personal courage.
Both Fredendall and Clark suffered from inflated opinions of themselves and a mindset of "not losing the battle" instead of "winning the battle". Fredendall further destroyed himself by being a micro-manager, ignoring competent commanders under his command, probably because he was afraid following their advice would promote them in to the spotlight that he had reserved for himself. He cost a lot of lives before being sent to the US in training command where he resisted the necessary changes that were a result of experience. Much of that experience was a result of his ineptness...
now calling Chesty out in that crowd just flat out ain't right...