Free Will, Determinism, and Compatibilism | Robert Wright & Gideon Rosen [The Wright Show]
HTML-код
- Опубликовано: 12 сен 2024
- 2:24 A brief primer on the free will vs. determinism debate
6:59 Are moral responsibility and determinism compatible?
11:51 Is punishment a tragic necessity or a moral good?
18:00 Gideon tries to convince Bob that compatibilism is coherent
38:49 Gideon’s distinctive take on compatibilism
51:11 A thought experiment about the moral culpability of an ancient slaveholder
62:59 Free will and the mind-body problem
68:41 Buddhist ideas about punishment
Robert Wright (Bloggingheads.tv, The Evolution of God, Nonzero, Why Buddhism Is True) and Gideon Rosen (Princeton University)
Recorded June 10, 2019
Join the conversation on MeaningofLife.tv: meaningoflife.t...
Follow Bob's Mindful Resistance Newsletter mindfulresistan...
Subscribe to the podcast: meaningoflife.t...
Subscribe to the MeaningofLife.tv RUclips channel: goo.gl/J9BHA4
Follow us on Twitter: / meaninglifetv
Like us on Facebook: / meaningoflife.tv
![Does Compatibilism Solve Free Will? | Robert Wright & Eddy Nahmias [The Wright Show]](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/0ERH3NdtFas/mqdefault.jpg)
![Does Compatibilism Solve Free Will? | Robert Wright & Eddy Nahmias [The Wright Show]](/img/tr.png)
![The metaphysics of free will | Robert Wright & Timothy O'Connor [The Wright Show]](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/iQjOxDXuznE/mqdefault.jpg)
![Neuroscience and Free Will | Robert Wright & Gregg Caruso [The Wright Show]](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/bMhbTWutFds/mqdefault.jpg)
I am a physicist and I will provide solid arguments that prove that consciousness cannot be generated by the brain (in my youtube channel you can find a video with more detailed explanations). Many argue that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain, but it is possible to show that such hypothesis is inconsistent with our scientific knowledges. In fact, it is possible to show that all the examples of emergent properties consists of concepts used to describe how an external object appear to our conscious mind, and not how it is in itself, which means how the object is independently from our observation. In other words, emergent properties are ideas conceived to describe or classify, according to arbitrary criteria and from an arbitrary point of view, certain processes or systems. In summary, emergent properties are intrinsically subjective, since they are based on the arbitrary choice to focus on certain aspects of a system and neglet other aspects, such as microscopic structures and processes; emergent properties consist of ideas through which we describe how the external reality appears to our conscious mind: without a conscious mind, these ideas (= emergent properties) would not exist at all.
Here comes my first argument: arbitrariness, subjectivity, classifications and approximate descriptions, imply the existence of a conscious mind, which can arbitrarily choose a specific point of view and focus on certain aspects while neglecting others. It is obvious that consciousness cannot be considered an emergent property of the physical reality, because consciousenss is a preliminary necessary condition for the existence of any emergent property. We have then a logical contradiction. Nothing which presupposes the existence of consciousness can be used to try to explain the existence of consciousness.
Here comes my second argument: our scientific knowledge shows that brain processes consist of sequences of ordinary elementary physical processes; since consciousness is not a property of ordinary elementary physical processes, then a succession of such processes cannot have cosciousness as a property. In fact we can break down the process and analyze it step by step, and in every step consciousness would be absent, so there would never be any consciousness during the entire sequence of elementary processes. It must be also understood that considering a group of elementary processes together as a whole is an arbitrary choice. In fact, according to the laws of physics, any number of elementary processes is totally equivalent. We could consider a group of one hundred elementary processes or ten thousand elementary processes, or any other number; this choice is arbitrary and not reducible to the laws of physics. However, consciousness is a necessary preliminary condition for the existence of arbitrary choices; therefore consciousness cannot be a property of a sequence of elementary processes as a whole, because such sequence as a whole is only an arbitrary and abstract concept that cannot exist independently of a conscious mind.
Here comes my third argument: It should also be considered that brain processes consist of billions of sequences of elementary processes that take place in different points of the brain; if we attributed to these processes the property of consciousness, we would have to associate with the brain billions of different consciousnesses, that is billions of minds and personalities, each with its own self-awareness and will; this contradicts our direct experience, that is, our awareness of being a single person who is able to control the voluntary movements of his own body with his own will. If cerebral processes are analyzed taking into account the laws of physics, these processes do not identify any unity; this missing unit is the necessarily non-physical element (precisely because it is missing in the brain), the element that interprets the brain processes and generates a unitary conscious state, that is the human mind.
Here comes my forth argument: Consciousness is characterized by the fact that self-awareness is an immediate intuition that cannot be broken down or fragmented into simpler elements. This characteristic of consciousness of presenting itself as a unitary and non-decomposable state, not fragmented into billions of personalities, does not correspond to the quantum description of brain processes, which instead consist of billions of sequences of elementary incoherent quantum processes. When someone claims that consciousness is a property of the brain, they are implicitly considering the brain as a whole, an entity with its own specific properties, other than the properties of the components. From the physical point of view, the brain is not a whole, because its quantum state is not a coherent state, as in the case of entangled systems; the very fact of speaking of "brain" rather than many cells that have different quantum states, is an arbitrary choice. This is an important aspect, because, as I have said, consciousness is a necessary preliminary condition for the existence of arbitrariness. So, if a system can be considered decomposable and considering it as a whole is an arbitrary choice, then it is inconsistent to assume that such a system can have or generate consciousness, since consciousness is a necessary precondition for the existence of any arbitrary choice. In other words, to regard consciousness as a property ofthe brain, we must first define what the brain is, and to do so we must rely only on the laws of physics, without introducing arbitrary notions extraneous to them; if this cannot be done, then it means that every property we attribute to the brain is not reducible to the laws of physics, and therefore such property would be nonphysical. Since the interactions between the quantum particles that make up the brain are ordinary interactions, it is not actually possible to define the brain based solely on the laws of physics. The only way to define the brain is to arbitrarily establish that a certain number of particles belong to it and others do not belong to it, but such arbitrariness is not admissible. In fact, the brain is not physically separated from the other organs of the body, with which it interacts, nor is it physically isolated from the external environment, just as it is not isolated from other brains, since we can communicate with other people, and to do so we use physical means, for example acoustic waves or electromagnetic waves (light). This necessary arbitrariness in defining what the brain is, is sufficient to demonstrate that consciousness is not reducible to the laws of physics. Besides, since the brain is an arbitrary concept, and consciousness is the necessary preliminary condition for the existence of arbitrariness, consciousness cannot be a property of the brain. Based on these considerations, we can exclude that consciousness is generated by brain processes or is an emergent property of the brain. Marco Biagini
Great conversation, many thanks. These podcasts are becoming a first port of call when I (enthusiastic layperson, scientific training) want to know more about an area of philosophy that has piqued my interest.
I came in at the start at a pretty similar place to Bob (probably thanks to Sam Harris): for free will to mean anything it's got to be the real libertarian deal, and that's just not allowed by the laws of physics. But I found Gideon's arguments consistently comprehensible and sensible, down to earth, and focusing on worthwhile concerns rather than abstract philosophical purity. Am I now a compatibilist? Maybe the door has come ajar...
Free will microchoice and macro determined processes really brings me back to my readings inAustrian economics, and choice, human action. I experience choice in a universe I cannot at this time comprehend, we cannot intuit what is in advance, but if we had a loving mother and a kind father, we will know what to do.
If you're rich you most definitely can get off on the fine grain causes. Remember the afflunenza kid.
1:02:40, I think it is the Sea Squirt that is referred to here. In the beginning of its life cycle it has a nervous system that allows it to swim to a good place where it can attach itself to so the nutrients wash through it. It then goes for extreme passivity and digests it nervous system rendering itself mobile. - signed, the sea slug interest group.
Compatibilism in a nutshell:
“Free will” is when we decide for ourselves what we will do, free of coercion or other undue influence.
“Determinism” asserts that the behavior of objects and forces in our universe provide perfectly reliable cause and effect, and thus, at least in theory, is perfectly predictable.
Because reliable cause and effect is neither coercive nor undue, it poses no threat to free will. A meaningful constraint would be a man holding a gun to our head, forcing us to do his will. But reliable causation is not such a force. It is simply how we operate as we go about being us, doing what we do, and choosing what we choose.
Because our decisions are reliably caused by our own purpose, our own reasons, and our own interests, our deliberate choosing poses no threat to determinism. Choosing is a deterministic process.
As it turns out, every choice we make for ourselves is both freely chosen and reliably caused. Thus, the concepts of free will and determinism are naturally compatible.
The illusion of conflict is created by a logic error called the “reification fallacy“. This happens when we mistakenly treat the concept of “reliable cause and effect” as if it were an external force controlling our choices, as if it were not actually us, simply being us and doing what we do.
But concepts are not “things” that cause. Only the actual objects themselves, and the forces they naturally exert upon other objects, can cause events to happen.
When empirically observed, we find that we exist in reality as physical objects, living organisms, and an intelligent species. As living organisms, we act purposefully to survive, thrive, and reproduce. As an intelligent species, we act deliberately by imagination, evaluation, and choosing. And, when we act upon our choices, we are forces of nature.
Reliable cause and effect is not an external force. It is us, and the rest of the physical universe, just doing what we do. Those who try to turn it into a boogeyman robbing us of our choices are empirically mistaken.
To understand how philosophy managed to create this little mess called the "determinism versus free will" paradox, see marvinedwards.me/2019/03/08/free-will-whats-wrong-and-how-to-fix-it/
"free of coercion or other undue influence." Can you give an example of when this has ever been the case?
@@usegnu1485 Sure. I'm responding to this comment by my own choice. I noticed the others, but chose this one. There was no coercion. There were no hallucinations or delusions. Just a simple consideration of the options and a choice, a freely chosen "I will respond to this comment rather than the others from the GNU guy. Do you wish to claim that I was coerced or deranged?
@@marvinedwards737 Would you have chosen to reply had I never made a comment?
@@usegnu1485 Of course not. How could I reply to a comment that you didn't make? And your point is ... ?
@rob see Free will is nothing more or less than what it is. Free will is when we decide for ourselves what we WILL do, FREE of coercion and undue influence. That is the the "operational" definition that everyone uses when judging moral and legal responsibility.
The "philosophical" notion of free will being a choice free of causation is nonsense. And no one actually believes in such a thing. Once we stop using nonsensical definitions, free will stops being nonsense. Philosophy needs to clean its house of such nonsense rather than perpetuating it.
The "cascade" of prior causes cannot bypass the current cause, which is me. I am the most meaningful and relevant cause. A meaningful cause efficiently explains why something happened (like this comment). A relevant cause is something we can do something about (like attempting to challenge my statements).
The definition of coercion is straightforward, and you'll find one here: en.wiktionary.org/wiki/coercion
Is it just me or does every explanation (that I have heard) of Determinism include some (what appears to me to be) Compatibilist remarks about the proper course of action to take regarding people who harm others as if we have Free Will to choose some retributive or rehabilitative action?
e.g. "X stole some food, but we ought not hold them responsible since they had no Free Will..." to me invites the following scenario: "Y punished X for stealing food but we cannot hold Y responsible for punishing X since Y has no Free Will."
Why do Determinists insist on suggesting that future events can be changed?
What am I missing?
You say: Why do Determinists insist on suggesting that future events can be changed? What am I missing?
Response: Because they either 1. don't understand determinism 2. deny the logical implications of determinism. If determinism is true there is only one possible outcome, and this outcome has already been decided at the Big Bang. Compatibilism is the determinists attempt to have their cake and eat it too.
I think that it's about changing systems rather than events. Change the event by changing the system behind the event. It's not possible on a universe level to do this, but it is on a human level.
@@projectmalus Surely you realize that "change" is impossible on determinism. Who/what would be able to change anything in a deterministic system..? In other words: What would be able to override the laws of physics..?
@@MidiwaveProductions While it is true that every event is causally necessary from any prior point in eternity, it would be false to suggest that the Big Bang is the meaningful and relevant cause of all subsequent events. To be meaningful, a cause must efficiently explain why the event happened. To be relevant, a cause must be something we can do something about. That's why the cause of the bank robbery is the bank robber, and not the Big Bang. We can do something about the robber, but we can't do anything about the Big Bang.
@@marvinedwards737 On determinism there is nothing that is not determined at the Big Bang. The movie is already in the can. The bank robber is determined to rob banks and we are determined to do something about the robber. Real free will (libertarian) can not exist on materialism --- only on dualism or idealism. Why? Because the Self must be a non-determined causal agent in order to have free will. And on materialism such entity doesn't exist.
If we could agree that a free will is ability for changing behavior in response for expectation of reward or punishment, what usually is a case, and we take utilitarian perspective, much of this discution will be pointless.
See my two comments above.
@@marvinedwards737.Thank you for an answer, very interesting article on this topic
@@marekgalteestaff7087 Thanks!
@@marvinedwards737 Maybe peoples are not only inanimate objects, living organisms or even intelligent species behave deliberately by calculation and reason but biological beings living in the world of ideas (algorithms to say otherwise), and free will is just an idea. As Albert Einstein said, free will and responsibility do not exist but is compelled to act as if freedom of the will existed.
@@marekgalteestaff7087 Einstein's position, while popular, is basically incoherent. He says he must act as if something were true while believing it is false. By using the correct definition of free will to begin with he could have avoided the paradox in the first place.
Is this just a low key Calvinism debate?
hey bob - you should get christian list on the podcast.
Determinism = There is only one possible outcome already decided at the Big Bang.
Compatibilism = There is only one possible outcome already decided at the Big Bang but the determined brain is determined to believe that this outcome is freely chosen by the determined brain.
There will be only one future, because we have only one past to put it in. The practical question is how will this singular inevitability come about. Turns out that, at least within the domain of human influence, it will happen by our imagination, our evaluation, and our choosing. These facts are indisputable.
@@marvinedwards737 I think the contradiction comes about because people think they can change the future. I.e., there are multiple possible futures - the future is not set in stone. But if causal determinism is true, the future is just "an unfolding of the given". You can deliberate all you like, but your deliberation is itself entirely determined. It's not that your deliberation and choices were not part of the causal chain, it's that *because* they were part of a causal chain they were inevitable in the sense that given the initial conditions of the universe, your particular pattern of deliberation was a necessary consequence of the initial conditions plus the laws of physics.
It's like a computer program: it can deliberate for as long as it wants, but it's still just doing what it must do according to its programming. A conscious computer program (if such a thing is possible) would be aware of its deliberation, but it couldn't "do otherwise" in the literal sense. The point of materialism/physicalism/naturalism is that the entire universe is mechanical. Hence the term "meat robots". It's determinism all the way down, physical, chemical, biological, psychological, etc.
@@joshatkins94 People cannot change the future. But they can choose the future from a number of possibilities. And they actually do this. It is not just the choice that is inevitable, but also the encounter with an issue that requires a choice, the consideration of the different options, the evaluation of how the future is likely to unfold if I choose option A versus how it might unfold if I choose option B. And finally, based on that evaluation, the single inevitable future is chosen.
That's how events unfold in empirical reality. The meaningful and relevant control of the operation of choosing is that person's own purposes and reasons, their own thoughts and feelings, their own genetic dispositions and life experiences. The person is that which controls which possibility becomes the actual future.
@@marvinedwards737 You can't actually choose the future from a number of possibilities if there is only one possible future, which is what determinism means. You can make choices, but you can't do otherwise than you in fact do. Moral responsibility means you should have done otherwise, and this just isn't true under determinism. You can redefine could have done otherwise so that the sentence makes sense, but not in a such a way that it was literally possible at the moment of choice, given the laws of physics and the antecedent causes. Choice-making on determinism is a mechanistic process, not a moral process.
@@joshatkins94 There are many possible futures but there will only be one actual future. If we were omniscient, then we would have no notion of possibility, because we wouldn't need it.
But we're not omniscient. In fact, we face uncertainties many times every day. That's why the human mind evolved the notion of possibilities, things that might happen, but then again might never happen.
So, here's the key: When we do not know what will happen, we imagine what can happen, to prepare for what does happen. And, when we do not know what we will choose, we consider what we can choose, and imagine the likely outcome of each option, and then choose the one that seems most likely to produce the best result.
What "can" happen constrains what "will" happen, because if it cannot happen then it will not happen.
But the reverse is not true. What "will" happen never constrains what "can" happen. What "can" happen is only constrained by our imagination and our ability to actually carry out.
There are always multiple possibilities, multiple things that can happen. But there is only one actuality, the inevitable thing that will happen.
It is inaccurate to say, "You can make choices, but you can't do otherwise than you in fact do". In a deterministic world, you still can do otherwise, but you won't.
Looking forward to listening. As someone very well studied in this field, I'm predicting it will be a terrible representation of state of the art "free will research & philosophy".
Was just interviewed today actually.
ruclips.net/video/NAiG_sELUD4/видео.html
Are you referring to Rosen's text book? Or did you write that before you listened to this interview? If it's the latter, what did you think about this dialogue?
A follow up would be nice.
I still don't know what they mean by course grained and fine grained capacities.
It's quite possible that the speakers themselves are confused on this as well. The brain inputs sensory data and makes it usable by conceptualizing it into objects and events. It can then manipulate these objects and events in the imagination and estimate what might happen if the person takes certain actions. Based on that estimate, it chooses what it will do.
It's not very clear, I agree. My understanding from watching the video is that the difference between course and fine is roughly the difference between explanations/descriptions taking place at the level of the 'manifest image' or of the 'scientific image'. Or in other words, explanations/descriptions which are dealing with persons, meanings, utterances, wishes, etc. and explanations/descriptions which are dealing with forces, causes, physical laws, etc.
@@WilliamPearson There is no distinction between the manifest image and the scientific image. Even atoms, electrons, and quarks are macro concepts. If we are reduced to atoms, then atoms are reduced to quantum particles, which are in turn reduced to whatever they are made of (strings?), all the way down to the theoretical "smallest part of the smallest part".
I agree that there is no conflict between ‘manifest’ and ‘scientific’ images, but the distinction is important, no?
@@WilliamPearson The distinction between what atoms are doing versus what cells are doing is useful (physical versus biological causation). The distinction between what neurons are doing and what the mind is doing is also useful (biological versus rational causation). The organism as a whole behaves differently than its parts. The mind as a whole behaves differently than its neurons. The intelligent species is a collaborative collection of reliable causal mechanisms. It can behave as a whole to achieve a rational objective to satisfy its biological needs. For example, I can decide to get an apple now to satisfy my hunger. Having chosen what "I will" do sets my intent which motivates and directs my actions to get up and go get an apple. My individual neurons do not know what my mind has decided to do.
Lucky Number 7
Let's be clear. No one is ever punished for having free will. Blame and punishment are deterministic tools for behavior modification. When a sane adult deliberately commits a crime against someone else, we are justified in taking these steps: (a) repair the harm to the victim if possible, (b) correct the behavior of the offender if he allows it, (c) protect society from further harm by keeping the offender locked up until his behavior changes, and (d) do no harm to the offender or his rights which is not reasonably required to accomplish (a), (b), and (c). That's a just penalty. That is the criminal's "just deserts" for his crime. So, if we are seeking justice, then that is the kind of penalty that can be justified. On the other hand, if we are not seeking justice, but rather seek retribution or vengeance, then we're not likely to find justice.
There is a popular myth, being circulated among hard determinists and free will skeptics, that if we dispose of free will, then we'll all be more understanding and compassionate. But that's only a myth. One can just as easily justify retribution and vengeance using deterministic arguments. Have you heard "don't do the crime if you can't do the time"? That's a deterministic argument. In fact, the "3 strikes and you're out" rule (3 felonies and you get a life sentence) was a utilitarian proposal to get the incorrigible repeat offenders off the streets.
Psychologists and Sociologists study the personal and social causes of criminal behavior. And they've been doing this for years, without making the stupid argument that people have no control over their choices. In fact, rehabilitation is impossible without the assumption that the offender can learn to make better choices of his own free will, with counseling, addiction treatment, education, job skills and employment opportunities, post-release follow-up, and all the other programs that reduce recidivism.
Rehabilitation is impossible if we take the view that the offender had no control over his prior actions. Because the same arguments used to remove his control in the past also remove his control in the future. If he is to change at all, he must have the ability to behave otherwise in the future.
"When a sane adult deliberately commits a crime". This statement implies free will.
Determinism robs you of moral agency. Computers don't have moral agency. Digital thermostats don't have moral agency. They're just machines, after all, and machines aren't moral agents. Conscious machines wouldn't be moral agents; they'd be machines that were aware of what they were doing, following their causal programming.
@@joshatkins94 A compatibilist's determinism does not rob you of anything, because it doesn't actually change anything. What you will inevitably do is exactly identical to you just being you, doing what you choose to do. And that is not a meaningful constraint. It is not something that anyone can or needs to be free of.
Machines are not moral agents because they have no will of their own. We create machines to help us do our will. When a machine starts acting as if it had a will of its own, we call the repairman.