Are Possible Worlds Real? Modal Realism Part 1 - Philosophy Tube
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- Опубликовано: 26 авг 2024
- What are possible worlds? What does it mean to say something might have been true? Watch Part 1 of our discussion on David Lewis’ modal realism to find out!
Part 2! tinyurl.com/pdx...
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David Lewis, On The Plurality of Worlds
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We are always happy to sponsor the show! RUclips needs a lot more Philosophy Channels!
Why do you bother sponsoring this crap?
RoyalGiraffe Why do you think this is crap?
I'm guessing you guys might mean more Analytic school-esque philosophy?. I ask about that "specialty" b/c I have a feeling that almost any social science or humanities expert can talk about Continental philosophy but ppl who veer closer to logicians imo,like Olly who's popularized are a less numerous bunch
Xavier Diaz Sanchez 'is it obvious, or something?'
Mhohhohhahhaa n longstockings ashes to ashes. Arch enemes go phar back
Hi Olly! Just wanted to thank you for doing this video. Great explanation, really helped me out!
"Oh my god I mentioned Quantum Mechanics in a philosophy video. I have become the thing I hate them most."
Ahaha!
Correct me if I'm wrong but... It seemed you where implying that in the multiverse theory that other universes can causality effect each other. This isn't the case. In fact people believe it for almost exactly the same reason you were suggesting for modal realism: because believing otherwise leads to more questions. I'll clarify what I mean, but I better just say that the Many Worlds interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is something completely different. Multiverse theory was put forward to explain why our universe seems so perfect for life. The argument is that if it wasn't, then we'd never survive to ask the question. But then to make this really work, we need other universes that aren't habitable to also exist (so we can make the modal statement, in another universe where some particular physical parameter was different, life wouldn't have evolved). So yeah, Multiverse theory- not actually a scientific theory at all because there is no falsifiablity and actually it sounds a lot link the theory you were talking about in this video. The biggest difference I can see is that Multiverse believers don't usually say that all possible universes exist. Just that a lot do...
Yeah so I think the idea is the multiverse is everything including all the possible universes so it's fair to say it gives rise to all worlds including our own. But each universe is causally separately from each other.
Looking Glass Universe Hi. How about some (spatially, dimensionally, whatever) separate universes that can interact with our own and others that cannot. I feel that would eliminate the contradiction that all possible universes exist... except for ones that can interact with our own.
Joe Horvath I would day that what we mean in this context by universe, are things that are not causally connected, so if there were two “universes” that were they would technically be part of the same universe in this context.
Hi Olly! Your reactions at 2:47 ~ 2:51 pretty much sums up my own reactions about this topic. It is hard for me to draw any kind of plausible considerations, since I don't quite grasp the concepts involved, but it was a very interesting video to watch. I have a question for you (and for anyone who might want to answer) about possible worlds being or not concrete. If possible worlds are real/concrete, and considering they cannot influence our world and we cannot influence theirs, then they would be some kind of dream? Thanks in advance, and congratulations on getting sponsors for your channel, you deserve it! :)
I am writing an essay about conterfactual history, and with my limited formation in Philosophy and Logic I had enormous trouble trying to understand Lewis, Kripke, etc; let alone discover how to use it in my work. You saved my essay!!! thanks
Great video. Here's an objection to Modal Realism - Lewis accidentally creates a new category of Modal Statements which cannot be addressed using his framework. For example, consider the statement: "Lewis might have been completely wrong about Modal Realism". That means that somewhere, there is a concrete world, as real as this one, in which Lewis was incorrect and which Modal Realism doesn't hold. But that makes no sense, because you can't both presuppose the existence of all these different worlds but stipulate that in one of them, Modal Realism is false.
The only real way out of this is to declare the statement meaningless or contradictory or a separate category of Modal Statement, but then out comes the razor (because you no longer have the luxury of declaring that Modal Realism allows us to unify statements about the real world with modals/counterfactuals).
I thought this one up myself after about 30 minutes and have no formal training in philosophy, so it's probably not a great objection, but I really can't think of a way around it. Ollie? Any ideas?
Let me amend the statement, because it's ambiguous (one interpretation is that MR is still true, but Lewis got it wrong). Let's use the counterfactual: "If modal realism were untrue, Lewis would not have written his book."
We actually talked about this in the comment reply section of "Another Earth" and the Humphrey Objection, Modal Realism Part 2 - Philosophy Tube, you weren't the only person to come up with it.
Philosophy Tube Thanks man, I'll have a look. Having further considered it, I suspect Lewis would have claimed Modal Realism is necessarily true and I can't figure out whether that makes sense or not.
If MR is true, then there is no possible world in which Lewis (believing it to be true) was completely wrong. That modal statement is simply false, because at every world, MR is true, so whenever Lewis believes in it, he's right.
In your counterfactual, "if modal realism were untrue, Lewis would not have written his book", the antecedent is simply false, if MR actually is true (in every possible world, as it necessarily must be if it's true in any possible world). So you're saying that in all of the zero possible worlds where MR is false, Lewis does not write his book, or in other words, that there is no world were MR is false and Lewis thus doesn't write about it, which is a true statement, if MR is necessarily true.
One way to resolve this I think is to say that modal statements are never, in actuality, true. If the universe is deterministic then it is not true that things could be any different than the way they are. Modal statements would then be only conventionally useful as thought experiments, but not actually true statements.
I don't see why the alternative world needs to exist.
When I say 'This would not have happened if X event happened instead of the Y event that did' I am not talking about real worlds I am talking about real models. I am saying the mechanisms that got this result could get other distinct results with different inputs. e.g. 'If you had pressed pushed the break earlier you would not have hit the deer'. My statement might not even be correct, it is just me expressing my confidence in the model I have of the world to the point that I can make predictions about its actions.
So I am actually talking about my understanding of this world not the actual world, by describing how it could be different, not an alternate one.
help me understand.
hcheyne
Agreed. "I could have XYZ" is just a statement about conceivability or logical possibility. Nothing mysterious about it.
To me it seems like the argument puts an equal sign between "truth" and "real". Just because something is true doesn't mean it has to be real. Logically, we can make mental exercises to imagine what could have happened if "x" had happened. And thus we can build logically consistent statements - truths - about this imaginary world based on information we have from the real one. So, we can ask what would have happened if Hitler had won WW2 and come to, given Hitler's politics and behavior, truths about that world. One of these truths for example: if Hitler had won WW2, a lot of non-Aryans would have been killed. But just because this is true doesn't mean it has to be real.
Logical consistency =/= Truth.
Truth does have to be real, otherwise, well, it isn't the truth.
Ryan Hutton yes, you're right. :)
***** sorry, this made little sense. mind elaborating with full, properly structured and logically coherent sentences? thanks :)
So what about he statement "Every creature in every possible world (except ours) rolls over the floor, laughing out loud at your theory"? True or not?
Juan Torres, yes, I wanted to write the same thing. It's a silly play on words. Like the ontological argument (Anselm/Descartes), they want to deduce an ontology from semantics, based on a pre-pragmatist conception of language. And for that, the pretentious theory deserves ridicule. Though it may be fun, it does not help earn respect for the discipline of philosophy. Which is hard enough as it is.
@@Naturalist1979 What about it? It says that any world not identical to our own cannot possibly not have rolling-on-the-floor-laughing creatures, and that a world absent creatures is logically impossible. There can be no possible world at which that statement could be true. The pretense is your own.
I miss this Olly and these relatively rigorous and explanatory philosophy videos.
Hey this is my first time getting a comment recognized on a RUclips thing show! I'm honored.
I guess you're right to call me out, because to be honest, in my head I was thinking of a number as something somewhat special, and not just another abstract object like Hamlet. I need to figure out a way to define abstract objects without just using a different abstract object, even if numbers are a little unique. I'll keep thinking about it.
Quick Edit: Although, this does seem to suggest that if we can define numbers, we kinda get all the other abstract objects for free.
As a St.Andrian: feelin' a lil' bit of pride right here, despite the varied reputation our uni has and deserves in some senses.
David Lewis - modal worlds
Another awesome video that is making my brain juices flow. Keep up the good work☺.
-From a Singaorean fan.
There is no possible world which we could ever be aware of which could *not* effect our actual world. Anytime we are aware of a possible world, that realization effects our thinking and perception in this world. In some ways it reflects back upon the Thomas Theorem, in that anything we believe to be real is as good as being actually real. Thoughts affect our behavior and actual world, and vice versa.
Was waiting for this upload for quite a while. Good video!
This really ties well into the discussion about the existence of the abstract, as well as maybe the distinction between logically impossible vs physically impossible.
I have to start with more "if" than I would like but....If abstract objects exist the possible worlds could exist as abstract (possibly defined as not physical but describable). With such a definition of exist and abstract the only things that would not exist would seem to be logical impossibilities: perhaps simplified best descriptions that are self contradicting. So if abstract objects exist, and if possible worlds are abstract, then possible worlds exist. Of course this brings back the question of defining "exists".
Alternative, aside from the need to say possible worlds exist we could use the fictional quantifier for evaluating the truthfulness of a statement. It already seems to be phased similarly to "in the story of batman, batman is Bruce Wayne". "In another possible world I have 6 fingers". Alone the statement "I have 6 fingers" is false but with the fictional quantifier "in another possible world" it becomes true.
Or does it? I feel the need to bring of the question of defining "I". "In another possible world I am President". This fits the general concept but I could never imagine myself as President, wouldn't be a choice I could see me making. What makes this other me, me? That we share physical characteristics? It may be more accurate to say that "in another possible world Kyle Davis is President" because while we have many of the same traits I would never consider him to be me, only similar to me.
If it is categorically impossible to prove or interact with any other possible worlds then for all practical purposes they are only an intellectual exercise. However, assuming for a moment that they are real, allow us to form theories and conclusions about the actual world. What is held to be true in the actual world is only true perhaps by dint of the fact that causality in this instance developed in a certain way, change the given circumstances just a fraction and you have a totally different set of equally true statements held to be equally true in world in which they happen. If that makes sense.
you're an amazing teacher, Olly
How about this solution: modal and counterfactual statements could have been/ can be true, but that's it. It's all about possibilities. There are numerous options to choose from, but in the end a final choice is made or an event occurs. For example, if I was given the choice of drinking coffee or tea, and if I chose to drink coffee, I could still think about how the tea would taste like, but since I drank the coffee, this possible world exists only in my mind. Thus, possible worlds could just be an implication of some logical process.
Is your counterpart in a possible world really "you", though?
No
@@camb5282 well, ok, but why? I always thought the possible counterparts would be the same in all physical respects. Wouldn't that make it possible to be the same person?
CptDrbzIRK the self is an illusion to begin with. On a bottom up level - no physical aspect of “us” is preserved from year to year or really even moment to moment.
@@dirkblabla wouldn't the consciousness different?
Not on Lewis’ version of modal realism. But there are versions that allow for overlap
You know, before this video I thought I believed in the multiverse theory, not realizing that it required the idea that the alternate universes overlapped. I think I like the idea of possible worlds better.
Two objections to modal realism
First, it is not necessary to posit the existence of possible worlds in order to explain the truth of modal truths. The mere possibility of a possible world existing is enough to explain the truth of a modal truth. For the possibility/impossibility of a world determined the truth of a modal proposition.
Second, under modal realism, we'd be much less likely to observe regularities (since there are many more logically possible ways the world could violate laws then strictly follow them) than in modal anti-realism. Since we observe regularities, modal realism is likely false.
Someone once asked me if there's a parallel universe where there is no such thing as parallel universes. I said probably not, because its existence would be a self-contradiction. But then again, if every reality is completely isolated, then every reality is the only reality that exists, relative to itself. It's like pointing to another location called "here." Every place can only be "here" relative to itself.
Every event relies on the existence of all the other events in the past of that particular event. The modal statement "I might have been born ginger" is really saying that if the preceding events of your birth had been different in such a way as to change your genes in a very specific manner, you would be ginger. Of course not every changing of the preceding events would have made you ginger, but it's at least possible (hence the "might" in the modal statement)
+Nikolai riber skånstrøm But then you've explained modality in terms of some modal statements about antecedent conditions, which is circular!
I think that what makes a modal statement true is the fact that accepting it doesn't cause a contradiction. In that sense, I think that the proposition "I could have been ginger" which is true can be transformed to
It wouldn't be a contradiction to affirm that Abigail is ginger
In this actual world that's of course true and that's why modal statements are true, but that doesn't mean necessarily that there's an actual world in which Abigail is ginger.
But can you answer these??:
1. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the realist position with regard to universals. Discuss critically.
2. Can there be more than one entity having no qualities at all? Discuss critically and motivate your view on the validity of the Principle of the Identity of Indisernibles.
Laurence Yu Are you just trying to get me to help with your homework :P
The answer is fractal(s). In nothingness(void) all infinite possibilities(platonic realm) are possible. All fractal patterns "exist" even if they have yet to be "rendered"/"discovered".
Modal realism and multiverse theory seem very related, if not the same to me. The universe seems only so fine-tuned because all other possibilities exist too "somewhere" , of course if stable enough.
they have superficial similarities but are very different. everettian many worlds are by definitely causally (and probably spacially) connected, they split as a result of measurements etc etc. Lewis possible worlds are causally and spacially separate, they never interact, and just exist. it could be the case that everett worlds exist and Lewis ones don't, or vice versa, or that both exist. in which case, all the everettian worlds branching from this world would still be contained in just one Lewis possible world
Thank you. You had info in this video I didn't know yet. Thank you.
Sound levels improved, I can't pick a flaw! If they exist someone will point them out, but my ears are happy.
My brain cannot grasp how a possibility can be 'existing'. Surely...that's contradictory? That something concretely _exists_ but is not actual, is _true_ but not...real.
Also, would the ginger Olly in the Concrete possible world most similar to ours be _you_? Empirically there is only one 'self' - Rusty over there would be a person similar but not actually...you. I think?
Now to me, the idea of possible worlds is based largely on presumption: To say I was born with ginger hair on a possible world presumes that the other 'you' is in-fact in some way of your own existence or at least represents it, where in reality someone like me on a possible world - no matter how much there are alike me - is not actually 'me'. rather similarly to the last episode, as long as abstracta are undefined possible worlds are impossible to argue for in my opinion.
my old phil prof used to say that if you wanted to become a well-known, hot-shot philosopher you have to just write a bunch of wacky and insane crap so that every other philosopher has to do the work of proving you wrong. when that happens, you will be cited by hundreds of papers and create the illusion that you're influential. he cited lewis as the key example of this.
thanks! it helped me a lot !
Thanks for the mention.
The problem seems to be that I am not speaking clearly. Still, new at this stuff very long comment mostly trying to parse "Dielectrics: A Class manual in Formal Logic"
The abstract idea "Hamlet", is simply a term. It defines a universal idea used to categorize all those other versions you mentioned. It is the essence of "hamlet" defined in a way that lets us determine if something is "hamlet"
(ex. "A work attributed to William Shakespeare in 1601 about a fictional prince of Denmark")
If I changed as you suggested the abstract idea of hamlet to "A work about a prince of mars" then I have instantly made every conversation about the bard VERY silly. This is because by redefining that abstract idea of "Hamlet" I have made it impossible for any ideas to follow between each idea as long as they claim to describe the same subject.
QED trying to change the essence of an idea can only result in a new idea being defined. By citing concrete examples as being a mutation of the abstract is absurd for this reason.
To use a classic example If I tell you to imagine a "golden mountain" you have one picture in your head. You understand the essence of those words. You have learned to identify the "golden" quality after comparing several golden objects. In other words though abstraction you come to an understanding of what "gold" means. If I change that abstract idea, I change how everything defined by that idea is understood. When I define gold as "a bodily object excreted by equines", we begin talking about very different things. :P
Getting back to the Hamlet example.
Whenever you alter the play, read the original or discuss any version you're discussing a concrete object. An object which must be able to use the word "Hamlet" in their definition. Every time you talk about a specific representation of the bard you must be talking about a thing containing a non-mutable quality of "hamlet"ness. Otherwise it will be logically impossible to understand what you are talking about.
You are talking about "A language containing object representing A work attributed by William Shakespeare in 1601 about a fictional prince of Denmark"
What would be the competing hypothesis? I have to admit, I like the possible worlds idea. It seems elegant and powerful, which generally means a good hypothesis. I guess I don't really understand what the alternative is. This particular PhilosophyTube felt more like a lecture and less like a debate. (I enjoy both, by the way. I just want to know a bit more about what I'm talking about before I support/oppose the topic at hand).
I would say just because we can imagine something, it does not neccessarily have to be true in an alternate reality. I would even go as far as to say that is quite a big leap of faith.
I would say that statements about how the world could or might have been have to do with human ability to imagine certain scenarios and communicate these to others. People have the ability to use their knowledge about the world to make predictive statements about the world from a certain starting point. We have the ability to make simulations in our mind, and to use our knowledge about how the world actually is to evaluate these scenarios as possible or not possible.
Tl dr: The ability to imagine alternative worlds seems very thin as evidence for the existence of alternative worlds.
Isn't the greatest strength of modal realism that it explains why this world is the way it is? Without modal realism, we could say that the fundamental properties of our world are just brute facts, beyond explanation. But according to modal realism, possibility implies existence, so we need a much weaker brute fact (namely, that our world is possible) in order to explain all of its properties. Isn't this far more significant than explaining modal statements?
A related question: is "possibility" the same as "logical possibility"? Is "possible" defined simply as "exists in some world" or does Lewis give any deeper characterisation of possibility?
Here's a question: is the world entirely deterministic? If that is the case, then saying "if x hadn't happened then y" is basically futile, because x had to happen due to its causes. If the world is entirely deterministic, then to say, "x might have happened" is to pose a so far unanswerable question: how did the beginning of the universe come about and was it deterministic as well? If the world is entirely deterministic (including its beginning), possible worlds do not exist in that they are, well, impossible, and ifs referencing the past are silly. Obviously it is still useful to pose "if" questions concerning the future, because we cannot know everything that has an effect on the future, and in any case ideas about consequences of actions themselves help cause the actions of humans.
Isn't deciding to believe in possible world's as concretely 'real' because they offer working answers to some of life's questions the same reasoning as believing by faith in God to explain other metaphysical questions? I am not a theist, but I find the reasoning behind believing in possible worlds presented in this video to be strangely theistic. Am I missing something?
Hello World!
Have we really defined truth here on PT? My argument hinges on truth being necessarily in accordance with reality, so if it does not have to be, my argument may fall through. But here goes...
Modality seems to be able to be logically consistent, and real possible worlds would explain things quite neatly, but we've run into an untestable hypothesis here. How does one prove that something is real without evidence of it's existence (or a logical framework a la math)? If it can't be proven that it is real, how can it possibly be true? I don't know, it seems like we're kinda begging the question here, but like I said this may fall apart if my definitions are off.
Great video, as always. Left with lots to think about. This video and the last have me especially thinking again of Aristotle's work on form as it relates to matter, coming out of a Platonic position of form as universal. The idea of the chair being the same, matter here is what differentiates/distinguishes one chair from another, creating imperfect copies of the originary universal notion. But, as he gets into, if you take away the particular form from this or that chair, all you are left with is formless universal matter. So, in this reading it is form and not matter which is the individualizing principle.
Not entirely related, but not entirely unrelated either. Get it? Hah!
Hey Ollie, thanks for the videoscould you make a video to explain infinity and maybe mention aristotle and his distinction between potential and actual infinites and maybe link it with infinite series, zeno's paradox and perhaps with current physics and mathematics?
I think a P.W. is a logically consistent math concept like a triangle but with the properties of a world. Also all P.W. are a math set of all logical concepts that are worlds. The set of P.W. is like a set of all logically consistent geometrical shapes, but instead of shapes u use worlds. *The properties of a world could be defined many ways, as long there is no equivocation it is OK to define them differently (and as long as the definition of a world include the actual world otherwise it would be a useless set most of the time)
Is a possible world created when a statement is made that fits the criteria for a possible world?
Does modal realism not deny the existence of Counterfactual Statements or at least Truth, and is this not a theoretical problem for it (why believe a theory on the basis that it correctly explains something it simultaneously denies existing as e.g. Truth is surely abstract)? Great video! I would like to see philosophers apply possible worlds theories to the metaphysical concept of a life e.g. as a possible (finite) set of experiences: a subjective possible world. Despite the importance of "How should I live my life?", no one seems to have seriously asked the question "What is a life?"
Or the modal realist says they don't believe in Counterfactual Statements and Truth (as abstract entities) but just counterfactual statements and truths... but then they seem to be saying that positing a plurality of concrete worlds is justified largely on the basis that it explains certain types of utterances and written sentences produced by Homo sapiens (and I think this analysis of modal realism is what lies behind the 'incredulous stare')
Can it be made true is the only way to determine if something is fantasy or a possible reality.
This was a great video, I love learning which philosophers came up with these sorts of ideas and hearing your take on them is very interesting. What is your opinion on possible worlds and destiny/fate? My belief is that there are no other possible worlds besides this actual world and so the conditional statements such as "If I hadn't spoken this particular sentence to that particular person then xyz.." are negligible. If there is only one actual world and there are no possible worlds then conditionals don't have any grounding and the things that happened were always going to happen due to the experiences that everyone and everything involved in the situation have been through. With this train of thought, there is a particular form of "destiny" or "fate" because choice is sort of an illusion since "xyz" was always going to happen due to a lack of possible worlds. What do you think? I know I spat out a lot at once and combined thoughts on free will, possible worlds and destiny all in one, but I'd love to hear your opinion on some of these things. It would also be equally cool of you to do a video on fate/destiny.
I do not see the use of a modal world... if it is completely separate from our world, unreachable and unprovable, how can it possibly matter? What is it's purpose? How is it any different fiction, fantasy or make-believe? I am not trying to be snipy, I am honestly interested in what is the use of this concept?
love the videos you put out, why did you get angry that you brought up quantum mechanics in this video? just curious
+unicycleguy1 Just because it's a cliche in philosophy to bring up quantum mechanics to explain something without really explaining it.
Does this mean that determinism and free will is still in question?
If there is no difference in the effect, isn't this more a matter of how we define "real"?
Isn't the tidiest option to say that modal statements refer to fictional reconstructions of reality we conjure up through language? Seems to me easier than believing in some unfathomable, undetectable realities.
Although, modal statements could be true due to another hypothesis. Suppose they're one universe and we've eclipsed to the point that to evolve further, our brains need to generate a stronger awareness. That is to say, we need to compute the best course of action and support Will.
Doesn't the very fact that one world exists affect another world in that one world cannot be the other? The fact that they are comparable seems to imply that they affect each other. Doesn't the fact that you are not ginger in the actual world make it possible for you to be ginger in another? Or is there something I am not fully grasping here?
So if there is a reality where even impossibilities can exist... than impossibilities are possible? :S Just wonderin'.
I find it strange to create something such as a concrete possible world solely for the sake of making a statement true. It seems to me that there seems to be no purpose to concrete possible worlds existing as they have no causal relationship to our world. I think that if we need a foundation to allow for the truthfulness of a statement, perhaps concrete possible worlds and modal realism is not the best choice.
Also, do concrete possible worlds become concrete when a statement is made, or are there infinitely many possible worlds that already exist?
There's one thing that I didn't understand. Why separate the multiverse theory from the idea of possible worlds?
I don't want to speak for him here, but it seemed to me like he was just trying to "declutter" the idea if you will. Multiverse theory dives deeply into scientifically-explained phenomena and observable data, while Lewis' Modal Realism is separate in that it utilizes neither of these. Which is not to say that they are mutually exclusive theories, but if scientists were ever to discover a separate universe consistent with the multiverse theory, that would not have any bearing on Modal Realism
But if I recognize that our world is only one of many possible, what is it that makes the logic that happen to occur in our world and that gives rise to modal propositions and ultimately modal realism, true?
Why do you hate quantum mechanics? Or science?
If there is another world where it is true and you can say "I was born with ginger hair in that world", would it be proper to refer to that other you by using "I"?
whats so wrong with quantum machanics?
I can understand that people could use words like "Quantum" around the place to make themselves smart (although iv never heard people do that but thats probabally because no one i know would even know what the word quantum is and why i dont use it)
but why do you think its such a, well a kind of a bad word to say?
Is there a possible world where possible worlds can interact?
But surely if object is a sum of its properties (or possible properties - Descartes' Candle, I'm looking at you), then in an other world a 'you' with red hair wouldn't really be 'you'. Even if it was the difference in what you had for breakfast, that summates, somewhat, to your being and thus may be considered a different being. What really then may be the question is the identity of an object and only once an object is identified can it be considered in conditional worlds. If we conclude that object identity is present and fleeting then nothing could exist outside of identical situations.
Josh Dixon Someone's been watching my video on Leibniz's Law!
If you take the possible worlds to be true does how would that help further an argument? Because you are defining what is "real" in that possible world then there must be both a possible world where without the dallas buyers club leo won best actor and a world where he didn't. There would also be a world where he won best actor despite dallas buyers club. If these possible worlds do not depend on, and therefore relate too, this world what constructive use can they have? To go one step further can a possible world exist where "two plus two equals four" and "two plus two never equals four"?
can orange be if orange is orange red or non orange is orange blue?
just Joshing
You looked and sounds like Christ Board from Aboard in Japan
In this case, in terms of fiction in literature, we can then say that they are factual and truth in their own realms/worlds according to Lewis' theory... correct?
Would there be possible world where the laws of physics don't exist? Or perhaps where a possible world where a possible world in itself doesn't exist? To what extent can possible worlds explain the abstract?
There could definitely be a PW in which there are different, or no laws of physics as we would recognise them. There couldn't be one in which possible worlds don't exist though: that would be a contradiction.
As for the abstract, I'm not sure, it might depend on which abstracta you meant.
Ours, of all possible worlds can engage in the activity of "existing", because it has this mysterious property "concreteness"? Luck us!
How is "concreteness" any more a property and any less merely indexical than "existence"?
I don't think Quine was accurate when he said we should believe in our best theories.
More accurate is to say, _if you are going to choose a theory_ choose the one with the most evidence. This is because the theory might be our best but may not have adequate evidence to support it and there could be something important at stake. It's better to not believe in these cases. It sounds like Quine was talking about scientific theories only, but what I said still holds true in science.
Couldn't there be a combination of possible, non-interacting worlds inside of our own. When the more successful ones generate awareness, this data is supporting our universe. Our universe can then have absolute knowledge of itself, a type of balance really. This could extend into ethics as well. We could be compartments with a larger universe, and our success is the assurance of knowledge of another. We should allow anything and base our codes of ethics on such. This(I know this is sounding a bit weird) should defend Kant, essentially. Independent rationality should generate awareness, supporting universalized maxims, needed by the process of evolution, with the source being Schopenhauer's will to live. Ultimately, we're a test. What works gets passed on to the assembly line, along with the higher formulation of possible worlds. This creates an ideal world. This is wanted and formed by what, you may ask? Well, I'll tell you. The Will. The will is the will to continue, to advance to unity, supported by said processes. Now, the Will is an ultimatum of itself. Its unity is equal to balance. Once it's balanced, it perfectly syncs and is pure. Think of dynamic equilibrium. Equilibrium is reached, but ultimately, its balance is a state of movement. The goal is to build up what you'e done all along, to perfect yourself. Once you've built up all the money in the world, you spend. You spend and save still, at the point. You've built it up to the grad experience. You become dynamic. You embody the goal, but haven't felt it. I'm rambling, but the below is a selection that I think is appropriate.
I agree with Freud on some levels. The will to live us all very good, yet I feel some more continuity is required. I'd say the will to change, which can interfere with the conscious will to believe, yet that cognitive dissonance is dealt with soundly as the will to change( inherent necessity) is filtered or at least altered by the will to believe( external stimulus conflicting with self). Now I'm of also continuing Hume's work on this "unalterable ego." It's true in a sense. I always believe in a preordained ego. It goes back to the universal consciousness( which can explain the nuance of "soulmates"((.)). At any rate, the law of attraction comes in. Now, in response to unknown factors, a portion of the universal is attracted to a certain position on Earth. This is then followed by false ignorance, which is really intellectual honesty and one of the purest stages of the self. Then, as aforementioned, thus ego possesses new necessity and power in a limited universe, filtered by the demand if external stimulus. As society demands, a close bond with it is formed, which causes a lot of trouble when society's ideals is conflicted by those of the ego's early parent care e.g. the ideals of morality, survival, and the like. The result is then concluded by the greater influence along with new stimulus along the way. A phenomenon of this process and shows the true ego, is how the conflict can escalate. Now some may attribute this to early experiences, which is true, to an extent. One must realize the inner necessity comes from somewhere. As Sartre says" condemned to be free," we have responsibility for the self, which could've formulated in two ways, which can be extended and altered. This is either by the force of a higher power or pure, perhaps forgotten decision and will. This cannot be determined physically as how Schopenhauer puts it( my favorite psychodynamic quote, by the way)," A man can do as he wants, but he cannot want as he wants,"supplementing the wants for wills in his World as Will and Representation. This shows that humanity has no earthen self to speak if , as it was left behind, perhaps we are simply a projection of that, however. Interesting question to decipher. This would imply that humans are, were omniscient and had access to an ultimate understanding of everything and being able to create everything. This could imply that everyone's will together is omniscient and omnipotent, which would back up Spinoza as the universe as God . That unity is inherently the key to everything.(Huge assumption)
It seems as though saying that all possible words exist in the same way that the actual world exists is to say that there are no possible worlds, only the actual world. Unless you're defining the actual world as only things that are causally linked to us, but that seems absurd. There are things causally linked with us that are also causally linked to things that are not causally linked to us.
8:30 But Olly, you didn't think about Quantum quantum, quantum quantum quantum. Also the quantum of the Quantum is quite quantumly Quantum.
But in all honesty, Veritasium has an interesting point about this.
Empty Space is NOT Empty
Maybe I have missed the point a bit on this. But, why do we need possible worlds to make the statement "It is possible that I could have with ginger hair true"?
Isn't it a statement of a past possibility?
So, if I was to deciding if I should go on holiday to France or Spain, and chose Spain. It is still true that there was a possibility of me going on holiday to France.
If I flip a coin and it lands on heads, that doesn't change the fact that, before the coin was flipped, there was a 50% chance of it landing on tails.
This seems a far simpler way of thinking of this.
I also think there is a problem with the statement 'Leonardo DeCaprio would have won the Oscar if Dallas Buyers Club was never made'. Because this is not a statement of fact. Maybe Christian Bale would. There is a difference between 'could' and 'would'. Because if there are possible worlds where Dallas Buyers Club was never made, one where Leo won the oscar and one where Chris won it. Either of them could have won it, but they would not have both won it. Equally I could have won it. Or any number of ridiculous things.
And if saying "It is possible that x" means that there is an actually world where x occurred, is there no way to make two statements that contradict each other? I have tried to think of a few but I am not sure they are all workable. Can you think of any?
The multiple worlds theory makes sense, but it could only occur at that particular moment in time which all other variables are the same except the specific variable we would want changed. Due to the idea of the butterfly effect in both future and past all variables would be different. They would branch out in a sort of parabolic way. Where on a graph x would be time, and y would be change in variables. Y would range from 0 being our specific variable point in time, to an infinite amount of variables being changed. Thus leading to infinite different worlds.
Philosophy Tube Modal statements (might, could [I'm assuming], possible, etc.) are indefinite (and thus indefinitely true?), which, I want to say, lends credence to the mere appearance of truth because they can neither be proven nor disproved. They reside in a foggy, grey area. Perhaps modal statements are is the only truth or the only true statements, ultimately. I think modal realism as a possibility cannot be ruled out, seriously (lol:) To be honest, I find that I resonate very much with Parminedes' stance. I mean, how can anything arise from nothing? Our wildest ideas, however absurd they might be, have to be grounded in one way or another. But I'm left wondering if there is really any utility to these ideas?
How can one be justified in believing that possible worlds actually exist? The statement: "It is possible that it is raining right now" is made possible because there is a POSSIBLE world in which it is raining. If that particular possible world, in which it is raining, actually exist then the statement (from my point of view) looses the quality of being possible. It becomes a statement that is simply true in one world and false in another. The truth of the statement in one world (that exist) can not refer to possibility in our world because it now IS another world, not just POSSIBLE versions of the actual world, but other actual worlds, nonidentical with our world. Redefinition of my question: How can we uphold possibility if we actualize possible worlds?
I hold to a slightly different theory of possible worlds, wherein, first of all, physicalism is necessarily true, so all possible worlds are physical worlds, and secondly, possible worlds do not contain time, because other times and other possible worlds are exactly the same kind of thing ontologically: the present is the actual world, and other ways that the physical universe could be arranged constitute other possible worlds, some of which bear a relationship that we call "causal" with the present, actual world, a relationship that does not necessarily create a unique ordering of possible worlds, which is to say that there may be multiple possibilities that are future to the actual world, and even multiple possibilities that are past, although because the causal relationship is entropic in nature, there are necessarily fewer pasts than futures, and over any measurable stretch of time, different possible pasts rapidly converge, while different possible futures diverge freely.
This also results in a picture that is entirely equatable with the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, despite your claims to the contrary.
Does this mean that a possible world could have an actual multiverse?
You need to do a theories of truth episode. Being an American, I'm partial to Pierce's pragmatic theory
cows can't fly in the external or tangible world, but the it can be real in our in ternal world or say the world within our minds.
"You could be a ginger" is true in the sense that given lack of knowledge about the laws and state of the universe, we could imagine it to be true.
Lack of knowledge is very important. Say we roll a non-fair die which rolls only the number 1, hence it rolls a 1. If we don't know this fact it is non-fair, the statement "the die might roll a 6" is true. But, if we knοw it is rolls only 1, this statement is false.
I take issue with the idea that lack of knowledge can make a statement true. In the example you gave, no matter how much knowledge we have, the die cannot roll a 6. Thus the statement, "the die might roll a 6", is false, since it cannot do so. My knowledge has nothing to do with the nature of the die. If I didn't understand how gravity worked, and I said that I could fly, that doesn't make it true.
A paradox: if all possible worlds exist, then there exists a world in which all possibilities are realized in the same stretch of space. So for example, a ginger version of you lives on a version of earth in the Andromeda galaxy. The problem is this: this possible meta-world would have to contain itself to actually include all worlds, which doesn't seem to be possible without an infinite regress of worlds within worlds. I guess you could fix this issue by demonstrating that a world which contains all possible worlds just isn't possible, and that we can only say that there exists a possible world which contains all OTHER worlds. However, the modal statement we started with still seems to be true, and thus seems to show that modal realism doesn't really do its job of accounting for these statements.
As a determinist, I reject that the world "could have been" different. The problem seems to fall away, am I wrong?
Drake Christmas Ahah, be careful not to confuse causal necessity with metaphysical necessity! Perhaps, given certain causes, certain effects must follow, but the causes themselves could still be contingent.
At the quantum level.
What if your counterpart is a necessitarian?
There is no basis to believe modal statements are true since these possible worlds are independent and isolated. If our statements referred to another (possible world), then our world has, somehow, some connection to this other world.
Lets IMAGINE our earth to be exactly as it is, only without other possible worlds existing; what would our counterfactual etc. statements mean?
Nice, I have one of the same problems as you. As much as I would like to philosophize about things quantum mechanics is always nagging at me...
If our world can exist, why can't others?
Isn't discussion about possible worlds (being definitionally barred from having causal interaction with our reality) make them a paradox, as our discussion of them could be a causal interaction?
no. Lewis's idea is that we infer their existence from the usefulness they have in making our modal discourse true. we don't have any causal connection to them by definition, so discussion of them isn't caused by them, but by our models of them. imagine unicorns: these don't exist so have no causal connection to us, but talking about them can have effects. this obviously isn't an effect of unicorns
I'm trying to educate myself on this quantum thing right now, but right now I haven't got past Churchland/Grush... I think this quantum consciousness idea is bogus. despite all the "replies" from Penrose or the "new" evidence...
3:00 spiffing brit?
Are you saying Flash Gordon was not a documentary?!
But if we have a world where dallas buyers club has never ben made and Leo won best actor we also can very well imagine another world where dallas buyers club has never ben made and Leo didnt win best actor. So what is the point in having a statement that is true and false in the same time? Also, we dont have any causality in this statement wich makes it even less usefull. Maybe in our first possible world dallas buyers club has never ben made but Loe won the best actor because he just did better or was ginger and the jury happend to like that.
I dont see any use in a model wich makes ever statement about possible worlds true and false at the same time.
We're the Twilight Zone episodes about possible worlds?
Does determinism not explain everything more easily than possible worlds?
+klop422 Interesting; how do you figure?
But in some possible world the starting conditions could have been different, so you can keep both determinism and PWs.
No, we would have reduced it to another modal statement about starting conditions. PWs aren't the only way to try to explain modality, they're a popular one though.
Ok here's a problem with possible worlds being real: direct contradictions would obtain. When I say all possible worlds for a simple statement I can exhaustively create a truth table with little effort. When I create one for a contradiction, I get the following:
(p=>q) ^ ~ (p=>q) / p / therefore, q
1 F T T (valid)
2 F F T (valid)
3 T T F (invalid)
4 F F F (valid)
There's no problem with worlds 1, 2, and 4. Yes, they seem strange, but remember that the "falses" under the first set of contradictory principles means that in these world the contradiction is not obtaining. In world three however, a direct contradiction obtains. This world is "possible." However, this would cannot ever be sound. It would be a world in which when it rains the streets get wet and not wet at the same time in the same exact place. It creates a logically impossible scenario. If you accept that possible worlds are concretely real, you're commited to saying that logically impossible things aren't actually logically impossible: there are married bachelors, square circles, and non-member members.
You may be able to salvage the concept by claiming that all possible worlds which do not contain fatal contradictions obtain, but this would require some evidence other than a bias against worlds merely because they are logically impossible.
Also, and this may be knitpicking, but if possible worlds cannot interact with our world, then how would be aware of them in the first place? That is not to say, how would we detect them, but how would we even conceive of them in the first place? After all, they are not able to interact with us at all. I assume this would include planting the concept of themselves into our psyches.
To me, it seems like possible worlds are best understood (at least in practical terms) as series of exhaustive hypothetical statements, whose truth-values help us to evaluate the strength of beliefs and whether those beliefs are consistent (obtainable). If you're constructing an argument and create a formal fallacy, you know your argument won't succeed because it is flawed in a rigid and defined way. It is best employed as a check against fallacious reasoning, or to identify it. It still serves this purpose regardless of whether any other possible worlds actually obtain.
Hi Olly, nice video, this is my first comment at your channel. First of all I am not a philosopher, I haven't read any book of this specific (but I will ;-) ).
1.) There can be parallel worlds that influence ours. >>> stick with me :-) If I am a quasi-schizophrenic man who believes that in a parallel world Megan Fox had cheated on me, then I might get so angry in this world and shoot the beauty in this world. - What do you think ?
2.) Another theory of mine is that there can not be other world than this, only if there is an infinite numbers of worlds, which does not make any scenes. >>> stick with me ! :-D So, if planet Jupiter won't exist (in other universe), our solar system will look extremely different (because of the gravity and everything interacting), so the hole world would look different. It can not be things different than our world. Do you remember that quote that says "if we knew every atom in the universe (and there are LIMITED nr. of atoms (and there won't be any many or any less, they are only transforming) we would know the whole future ?" It is true, so there can not be other world where I am taller, etc.. because from the beginning of me it was known how many ... chickens i'd be eating. Am I making myself clear? I guess not.. ;) Anyway, seeee yaaa; byyy ! :)
Possible worlds could be true, also, because there was infinite wills and they had to split apart due to the fact that they needed a separate universe to satisfy their needs. "The universe's desire is the basis of existence."
-Combination of Kant and Schopenhauer.