So glad Dr. Craig is responding to TAC's interview series. Especially looking forward to Dr. Craig's response to Dr. Rubio's critique of the Ontological Argument video!
I have shared the RF video on the Fine-Tuning Argument as foundational to another argument; Objective Beauty. The Argument from objective beauty states that if God does not exist, objective beauty does not exist. Objective beauty exists, therefore God exists. An example of fine-tuning and design that I find fascinating is light. It is pure energy that is fundamental to our existence in so many ways. But beyond that, light also reveals a stunning spectrum of colors! We see this amazing beauty in shells, and flowers in the organic world, and in sunsets, prisms, and crystals in the inorganic. We see it in photographs of nebulae in the macro, and in the micro; a hummingbird's feather under a microscope. How could chance or necessity account for the biological ability of the countless irreducibly complex mechanisms in the cells of our eyes, nervous system and brains to perceive the reflection of this energy, and why, on pure naturalism would we have any emotional response to it? This is far beyond being necessary for mere human survival. Also, how could chance or necessity explain the intricacies of the engineering of our ears to convert acoustic waves into sound that we can hear, and why would we have an emotional response to it as well, and a desire to create beautiful music? This cannot be explained by chance or necessity, but only by the design of a loving creator, our God. The Argument from Beauty is a beautiful argument. I would love to see a video that would bring together both the Fine-Tuning Argument and the Argument from Objective Beauty.
The inference from something's beginning to exist to its contingency is an invalid one, and one Craig elsewhere rejects. Consider, for instance, Craig's modal collapse arguments against the doctrine of divine simplicity. These arguments--variously construed-- tend towards the view that, if God is metaphysically simple in the strong, usually Thomistic sense, then all facts about the world become metaphysically necessary, including tensed facts such as facts concerning things coming into being. There is therefore no logical connection between the two distinct categories of contingency and temporally limited, although there might be a metaphysical connection that is non-analytic in nature. Craig seems to be presuming that if there is no earliest state of the universe or, alternatively, if there is a non-temporal portion of the universe's history (a seeming possibility I've not heard him discuss) then the universe cannot be metaphysically necessary. That is mistaken. His reason for thinking otherwise stems from his equation of necessity--that is to say, something's obtaining in all possible worlds--with a certain understanding of eternity, construed as eternal duration or timelessness. To be charitable, one might think Craig's equation of the two stems from the legitimate inference from the actual to the possible. If it is actually the case that the universe does not exist, then it is of course possible that it does not exist, wherein it follows that it is metaphysically contingent. However, if we interpret Craig as saying this, then we must attribute to him the further assumptions that (i) there must be a moment (logical or temporal) at which the universe does not exist if the universe begins to exist and (ii) if there is such a moment, then its existence is not metaphysically necessary. Neither of these claims ought to be granted. Firstly, it is entirely logically possible to imagine a model of the world in which the first state of the world (metaphysically speaking) is identical with a first, non-timeless physical state of the world, in which case it turns out false that the universe was ever non-actual though it is nevertheless the case that it begins to exist as Craig has defined this elsewhere in his writings. Thus, the inference from the universe's actual non-existence to its possible non-existence would not be violated, given that there is no state of the world in which the universe is non-actual. Moreover, even if this were not the case, and there was a state of the world in which the universe did not exist and subsequently did exist, that would still not logically require us to believe in its contingency. Suppose, for instance, that God exists, and that God creates the world, that this world is temporally finite, and that God's creative intentions for the actual world are essential to him and do not vary across worlds. In this case, it would be the case that the universe is metaphysically necessary--that is to say, existing in all possible worlds--though false that it is eternal in its duration or timeless in its existence. For something can be metaphysically necessary, even if there are points in time or logical moments at which it does not exist. This is because something can exist in all possible worlds without necessarily existing at all temporal or logical moments in such worlds. To suppose otherwise is to make as Craig makes a conceptual conflation of eternal existence and metaphysically necessary existence. Thus, one cannot claim that Oppy's view must be committed to a B-theory of time in order to logically avoid the implication of contingency. That isn't to say it is a good view, though I do think it is much better than Craig gives it credit for. He seems to think it is laughable or absurd to suppose the fine-tuning of the universe is metaphysically necessary, although he does not seem to consider how such a view is an entailment of a view not concocted out of thin air but rather a natural consequence a very popular theory of neo-Aristotelian theory of modality that was developed independently of considerations of fine-tuning.
Are you claiming that something can begin to exist and be necessary? That seems to be what you are claiming here: "The inference from something's beginning to exist to its contingency is an invalid one".
But those aren’t the only two options. P1-either energy is eternal or God is eternal P2-1st law of thermodynamics shows that energy is most likely eternal C-no god needed
So blessed to be living in the time of WLC’s work and ministry.
So glad Dr. Craig is responding to TAC's interview series. Especially looking forward to Dr. Craig's response to Dr. Rubio's critique of the Ontological Argument video!
Nice to see Craig responding to TAC's playlist of scholars critiquing his arguments!
Excellent. I’m a non-Christian theist, but I agree that on this issue, the naturalist simply lives in denial.
I have shared the RF video on the Fine-Tuning Argument as foundational to another argument; Objective Beauty. The Argument from objective beauty states that if God does not exist, objective beauty does not exist. Objective beauty exists, therefore God exists.
An example of fine-tuning and design that I find fascinating is light. It is pure energy that is fundamental to our existence in so many ways. But beyond that, light also reveals a stunning spectrum of colors! We see this amazing beauty in shells, and flowers in the organic world, and in sunsets, prisms, and crystals in the inorganic. We see it in photographs of nebulae in the macro, and in the micro; a hummingbird's feather under a microscope. How could chance or necessity account for the biological ability of the countless irreducibly complex mechanisms in the cells of our eyes, nervous system and brains to perceive the reflection of this energy, and why, on pure naturalism would we have any emotional response to it? This is far beyond being necessary for mere human survival.
Also, how could chance or necessity explain the intricacies of the engineering of our ears to convert acoustic waves into sound that we can hear, and why would we have an emotional response to it as well, and a desire to create beautiful music?
This cannot be explained by chance or necessity, but only by the design of a loving creator, our God.
The Argument from Beauty is a beautiful argument. I would love to see a video that would bring together both the Fine-Tuning Argument and the Argument from Objective Beauty.
I love this!
@@flavioa2252 Thank you!
Beautiful ❤
Please support how object beauty is true
Your fine tuning part comes off as personal incredulity and the rest is god of the gaps
The inference from something's beginning to exist to its contingency is an invalid one, and one Craig elsewhere rejects.
Consider, for instance, Craig's modal collapse arguments against the doctrine of divine simplicity. These arguments--variously construed-- tend towards the view that, if God is metaphysically simple in the strong, usually Thomistic sense, then all facts about the world become metaphysically necessary, including tensed facts such as facts concerning things coming into being.
There is therefore no logical connection between the two distinct categories of contingency and temporally limited, although there might be a metaphysical connection that is non-analytic in nature.
Craig seems to be presuming that if there is no earliest state of the universe or, alternatively, if there is a non-temporal portion of the universe's history (a seeming possibility I've not heard him discuss) then the universe cannot be metaphysically necessary. That is mistaken. His reason for thinking otherwise stems from his equation of necessity--that is to say, something's obtaining in all possible worlds--with a certain understanding of eternity, construed as eternal duration or timelessness.
To be charitable, one might think Craig's equation of the two stems from the legitimate inference from the actual to the possible. If it is actually the case that the universe does not exist, then it is of course possible that it does not exist, wherein it follows that it is metaphysically contingent. However, if we interpret Craig as saying this, then we must attribute to him the further assumptions that (i) there must be a moment (logical or temporal) at which the universe does not exist if the universe begins to exist and (ii) if there is such a moment, then its existence is not metaphysically necessary.
Neither of these claims ought to be granted. Firstly, it is entirely logically possible to imagine a model of the world in which the first state of the world (metaphysically speaking) is identical with a first, non-timeless physical state of the world, in which case it turns out false that the universe was ever non-actual though it is nevertheless the case that it begins to exist as Craig has defined this elsewhere in his writings. Thus, the inference from the universe's actual non-existence to its possible non-existence would not be violated, given that there is no state of the world in which the universe is non-actual.
Moreover, even if this were not the case, and there was a state of the world in which the universe did not exist and subsequently did exist, that would still not logically require us to believe in its contingency. Suppose, for instance, that God exists, and that God creates the world, that this world is temporally finite, and that God's creative intentions for the actual world are essential to him and do not vary across worlds. In this case, it would be the case that the universe is metaphysically necessary--that is to say, existing in all possible worlds--though false that it is eternal in its duration or timeless in its existence. For something can be metaphysically necessary, even if there are points in time or logical moments at which it does not exist. This is because something can exist in all possible worlds without necessarily existing at all temporal or logical moments in such worlds. To suppose otherwise is to make as Craig makes a conceptual conflation of eternal existence and metaphysically necessary existence.
Thus, one cannot claim that Oppy's view must be committed to a B-theory of time in order to logically avoid the implication of contingency.
That isn't to say it is a good view, though I do think it is much better than Craig gives it credit for. He seems to think it is laughable or absurd to suppose the fine-tuning of the universe is metaphysically necessary, although he does not seem to consider how such a view is an entailment of a view not concocted out of thin air but rather a natural consequence a very popular theory of neo-Aristotelian theory of modality that was developed independently of considerations of fine-tuning.
Are you claiming that something can begin to exist and be necessary?
That seems to be what you are claiming here: "The inference from something's beginning to exist to its contingency is an invalid one".
Somewhat along the same lines:
P1): Either the universe is eternal, or God is eternal.
P2): The universe is not eternal.
C): Therefore God is eternal.
But those aren’t the only two options.
P1-either energy is eternal or God is eternal
P2-1st law of thermodynamics shows that energy is most likely eternal
C-no god needed